Order Code IB93113
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Saudi Arabia: Current
Issues and U.S. Relations
Updated July 8, 2002
Alfred B. Prados
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Current Issues
Security in the Gulf Region
Containment Policies toward Iraq
U.S. Troop Presence
Bombings of U.S. Military Facilities
Response to September 11 Terrorist Attacks
Arab-Israeli Conflict
Crown Prince Abdullah’s Peace Initiative
Arms Transfers to Saudi Arabia
U.S. Arms Sales
Trade Relationships
Problems in Commercial Transactions
Oil Production
Foreign Investment
Human Rights, Democracy, and Other Issues
Background to U.S.-Saudi Relations
Political Development
Saudi Leadership
Royal Succession
Economy and Aid
Economic Conditions
Aid Relationships
Defense and Security
Congressional Interest in Saudi Arabia
Arms Sales
Arab Boycott
Trade Practices
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Saudi Arabia:
Current Issues and U.S. Relations
SUMMARY
Saudi Arabia, a monarchy ruled by the
rity commitment to Saudi Arabia. Saudi Ara-
Saudi dynasty, enjoys special importance in
bia was a key member of the allied coalition
the international community because of its
that expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait in
unique association with the Islamic religion
1991, and approximately 5,000 U.S. troops
and its oil wealth. Since the establishment of
remain in the country. Saudi Arabia continues
the modern Saudi kingdom in 1932, it has
to host U.S. aircraft enforcing the no-fly zone
benefitted from a stable political system based
over southern Iraq; however, Saudi Arabia has
on a smooth process of succession to the
not offered the use of its territory for major air
throne and an increasingly prosperous econ-
strikes against Iraq in response to Iraqi ob-
omy dominated by the oil sector. Decrees by
struction of U.N. weapons inspections in
King Fahd in March 1992 establishing an
recent years. Bombing attacks against a U.S.
appointive consultative council and provincial
operated training facility and a U.S. military
councils and promulgating a basic law provid-
apartment in 1995 and 1996, respectively,
ing for certain citizens’ rights could signal a
have raised some concerns about security of
gradual trend toward a more open political
U.S. personnel and further security measures
system.
have been implemented. Saudi Arabia con-
victed and executed four Saudi nationals for
Since late 1995, King Fahd has suffered
carrying out the 1995 bombing. After ex-
increasingly from ill health, and Crown Prince
tended investigations, on June 21, 2001, a
Abdullah has assumed many routine govern-
U.S. federal grand jury indicted 14 members
mental functions. The upsurge in oil prices
of Middle East terrorist organizations for the
that began in 1999 has relieved pressure on
1996 bombing. None is believed to be in U.S.
Saudi budgets but created concern in the U.S.
custody. U.S. officials have cited Saudi sup-
Administration and Congress. In March 2000,
port in the aftermath of the September 11,
Members of Congress introduced legislation
2001 attacks, including intelligence sharing,
to reduce or end U.S. assistance or arms sales
law enforcement activities, and tracking of
to countries engaged in oil price fixing.
terrorist financing.
The United States and Saudi Arabia have
Principal issues of bilateral interest in-
long-standing economic and defense ties.
clude the Saudi position on the Arab-Israeli
Between World War II and 1975, the United
conflict, security in the post-war Gulf region,
States provided a total of $328.4 million in
arms transfers to Saudi Arabia, Saudi external
economic and military aid to Saudi Arabia,
aid programs, bilateral trade relationships, and
reducing and ultimately terminating these
Saudi policies involving human rights and
programs as Saudi oil derived income bur-
democracy. In early 2002, Crown Prince
geoned in the 1960s and 1970s. A series of
Abdullah proposed a peace initiative based on
informal agreements, statements by successive
Israeli withdrawal from occupied territories in
U.S. administrations, and military deploy-
return for normal relations between Arab
ments have demonstrated a strong U.S. secu-
states and Israel.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On April 25, 2002, Crown Prince Abdullah visited President Bush at the President’s
ranch in Texas, where the two leaders discussed Prince Abdullah’s proposal to resolve the
Arab-Israeli conflict, U.S.-Saudi relationships, the U.S.-led campaign against terrorism, and
the general situation in the Middle East. According to White House spokesman Ari
Fleischer, there are areas of disagreement between U.S. and Saudi plans for peace in the
Middle East but significant areas of overlap as well. In related discussions, President Bush
expressed support for Saudi accession to the World Trade Organization (WTO), and Saudi
officials said their government did not plan to use oil production as a political weapon
Saudi officials found “positive factors” in President Bush’s speech of June 24 2002,
in which the President outlined proposals to resolve Palestinian-Israeli issues, but they
expressed concern over the President’s statements conditioning a Palestinian state on the
installation of a new Palestinian leadership. A statement by the Saudi cabinet on July 1
alluded to “the positive elements of the Bush initiative,” but on the same day Crown Prince
Abdullah was quoted as telling the visiting Spanish Defense Minister that the Palestinian
people “alone have the right to choose their leadership.”
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Current Issues
Security in the Gulf Region
Saudi Arabia and the United States maintain a close defense relationship, although they
do not have a formal defense pact. Saudi Arabia was a key member of the U.S.-led allied
coalition that expelled Iraqi forces from Kuwait in 1991, and over 5,000 U.S. military
personnel are still in Saudi Arabia. Most of these are from U.S. Air Force units involved in
enforcing a no-fly zone over southern Iraq and from U.S. Army units involved in air and
missile defense. In addition, a number of U.S. contractor personnel work with the Saudi
Armed Forces and National Guard, and many U.S. civilians work in the commercial sector.
Press reports variously put the number of U.S. personnel in Saudi Arabia between 35,000 and
40,000, but according to some other estimates this number has declined to approximately
27,000.
Containment Policies toward Iraq. Saudi Arabia remains committed to the
containment of Iraq and has called on Iraq to implement resolutions of the U.N. Security
Council. Although permitting U.S. and other allied overflights to enforce the no-fly zone
over southern Iraq (Operation Southern Watch), Saudi authorities are opposed to large-scale
military action against Iraqi targets. On several occasions, Saudi Minister of Defense Prince
Sultan has said his country would not permit allied aircraft to launch preemptive or major
retaliatory campaigns against Iraq from bases in Saudi Arabia. Saudi officials have not
usually opposed smaller scale U.S. responses to Iraqi aircraft or air defense units when they
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challenge U.S. or British aircraft conducting overflights under Operation Southern Watch.
In the aftermath of the September 2001 terrorist attacks, Saudi authorities have expressed
concern over any expansion of the U.S. campaign against terrorism [see below] to Iraq or
Iran. In an interview published on February 25, 2002, Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah told
reporters that “I do not believe that the war on terrorism applies to Iran and Iraq.”
At an Arab League summit conference on March 27-28, 2002, attendees including Saudi
Arabia rejected “threats of aggression” against Arab states, particularly Iraq, and welcomed
assurances by Iraq that it would respect the independence of Kuwait. On March 30, Crown
Prince Abdullah expressed confidence that Iraq would honor a promise it made at the summit
conference to respect Kuwait’s sovereignty. Previously, however, in a March 18 interview
with USA Today, the Saudi Foreign Minister appeared to leave the door ajar to a change of
regime in Iraq, stating that such a change “will only happen if the Iraqi people do it.”
U.S. Troop Presence.
With regard to the U.S. military
Saudi Arabia in Brief
presence, Saudi Defense Minister
Prince Sultan stated on April 10,
Population (July 2001): 22,757,092*
(includes 5,360,526 foreign residents)
2000, that U.S. troops in Saudi
Growth rate: 3.27%
Arabia “are within the frame of
Area: 1,945,000 sq. km. (750,965 sq.mi.)
United Nations assignments and
(almost 3 times that of Texas)
directions to continue the
Ethnic Groups: (native Saudis only)
surveillance of southern Iraq, and
Arab 90% Afro-Asian 10%
also the border of Kuwait and Saudi
Religion: (native Saudis only)
Arabia, as well as the other GCC
Muslim 100% (Sunni 85-95%; Shi’ite 5-15%)
[Gulf Cooperation Council]
Literacy (1995):
countries.” Some commentators
63% (male 72%, female 50%)
suggest that the U.S. troop presence,
GDP: $168.8 billion (2000);
which is unpopular among some
$170.5 billion (2001)
External Public Debt: $28.9 billion (2000)
Islamic fundamentalists both in the
Inflation: -1.2%, 1999; -1.0%, 2000; 0%, 2001
kingdom and elsewhere in the
region, could undermine the stability
*Some estimates are 15-30% lower
of the Saudi regime. Others believe
the U.S. presence is crucial to U.S.
Sources: IMF; U.S. Dept. of Commerce; CIA World Fact
efforts to maintain security in the
Book
Gulf region. Both for reasons of
security and host country
sensitivities, U.S. military personnel are housed in remote compounds away from major
population centers or Islamic holy places.
A Washington Post article on January 18, 2002, described Saudi leaders as increasingly
uncomfortable with the U.S. military presence in their country and indicated that senior
Saudis would like to devise “other forms of less conspicuous military cooperation” once the
Afghan campaign is over. Earlier, on January 15, a Member of the U.S. Senate had
reportedly expressed “unease about our presence in Saudi Arabia.” Officials of the Bush
Administration and Saudi officials have denied that there has been any change in long-
standing U.S.-Saudi defense relationships. In an interview carried by media on February 26,
when asked if “the U.S. military has worn out its welcome in Saudi Arabia”, Prince Abdullah
replied that “[w]e don’t think about raising this issue at all. If and when the time comes, it
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will be discussed by both governments.” According to a senior Administration official, the
subject of bases did not arise during the visit of Crown Prince Abdullah to President Bush
on April 25, 2002.
A subsequent Washington Post article, on April 6, 2002, reported that the U.S. Defense
Department has prepared plans to move a sophisticated military command center known as
the “Coalition Air Operations Center” (CAOC) from Saudi Arabia to the neighboring state
of Qatar, in an effort to reduce U.S. dependence on Saudi Arabia in supporting military
operations in the region. Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld did not confirm this report,
telling reporters that “we’re constantly moving people from one place to another place.”
Earlier, on March 26, the unified theater commander General Tommy Franks told reporters
that “I have no plans to move the CAOC from its current location.” But he added that this
would not preclude plans “to replicate it some place.”
Bombings of U.S. Military Facilities. Two attacks on U.S. military facilities in
Saudi Arabia in the mid-1990s created concern in the United States over the security of U.S.
military personnel stationed in Saudi Arabia and other U.S. service members stationed
elsewhere in the Gulf. The first, which occurred on November 13, 1995, at the headquarters
of a U.S. training program for the Saudi National Guard in the capital of Riyadh, killed seven
persons (including five U.S. citizens). Several months later, Saudi authorities charged four
Saudis with the crime. The four, who confessed to being influenced by Islamic
fundamentalist exiles, were convicted and executed.
The second and more lethal explosion, which occurred at Khobar Towers (a housing
facility for U.S. Air Force personnel near Dhahran Air Base) in June 1996, killed 19 U.S. Air
Force personnel, wounded many others, and prompted the relocation of most U.S. military
personnel to more remote sites in Saudi Arabia to improve security. Press reports allegedly
based on Saudi investigations and reported statements by other suspects have suggested
involvement by Iran, but Saudi officials have called these reports inaccurate. Earlier reports
had suggested involvement by exiled Saudi terrorist Osama bin Ladin, who has praised the
bombings in Saudi Arabia but has not claimed responsibility for them. On May 22, 1998,
Saudi Minister of Interior Prince Nayif told reporters from Kuwait that the Riyadh and
Khobar bombings “were carried out by Saudis with the support of others” (whom he did not
identify). The Minister further stated in November that bin Ladin was not responsible for
either the Riyadh or the Khobar bombings but acknowledged that individuals influenced by
bin Ladin might have conducted the attacks.
In September 1999, media cited purported U.S. intelligence information that three Saudi
men linked to the bombing had taken refuge in Iran. On October 2, 1999, Iran’s foreign
minister rebuffed an alleged request from President Clinton to Iranian President Khatemi for
Iranian assistance in resolving the case. Asked on March 12, 2000, if any suspects in the
Khobar case were currently in Iran, Prince Nayif told reporters that “we cannot hold anyone
responsible until the facts become clear to us.” Later, on October 30, 2000, he commented
that “[t]he main suspects are not in Saudi Arabia” and added that “[w]e are making efforts
for their return to the kingdom.” There have been numerous reports, denied by both the U.S.
and Saudi governments, that both governments fear that a finding of Iranian involvement
could complicate relations with Iran or force U.S. retaliation against Iran.
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On June 21, 2001, U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft announced that a federal grand
jury had indicted 14 individuals in connection with the Khobar Towers bombing. According
to the Justice Department, 13 of those indicted belong to the pro-Iranian Saudi Hizballah
organization and the 14th is linked to the Lebanese Hizballah organization. (Saudi Hizballah
appears to be a chapter of the parent Hizballah organization in Lebanon.) According to the
press, none of the persons indicted is in U.S. custody at this time; 11 of them are in Saudi
jails. Although no Iranian is named or charged in the indictment, Ashcroft said “[t]he
indictment explains that elements of the Iranian government inspired, supported and
supervised members of Saudi Hizbollah [variant spelling]. In particular, the indictment
alleges that the charged defendants reported their surveillance activities to Iranian officials
and were supported and directed in those activities by Iranian officials.” Ashcroft said the
investigation is continuing and additional charges will be brought, as appropriate.
During the investigation, U.S. law enforcement officials criticized Saudi counterparts
for not providing U.S. investigators with access to suspects in the Khobar bombing.
According to a May 14, 2001 article in The New Yorker and other media reports, starting in
late 1998, Saudi officials began allowing FBI agents to watch behind a one-way mirror as
Saudi interrogators posed questions provided by the FBI to suspects and witnesses. In a
phone call on June 21, 2001–the day the indictments were announced–President Bush
thanked Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah for Saudi cooperation in the investigation. The FBI
Director also expressed his appreciation, along with his hopes that the suspects would be
brought to justice in the United States. In an interview published on June 23, however, Saudi
Interior Minister Prince Nayif appeared to rule out extradition of the suspects to the United
States, stating that “[t]he trials must take place before Saudi judicial authorities....” He added
that “[n]o other entity has the right to try or investigate any crimes occurring on Saudi lands.”
On June 1, 2002, Saudi Deputy Minister of the Interior Prince Ahmad said an
unspecified number of people previously arrested by Saudi Arabia in connection with the
Khobar bombing had been sentenced by an Islamic court. In a follow-up announcement on
June 13, the Prince said those convicted “do not include any non-Saudi nationals” and added
that the verdicts would be reviewed by higher courts and announced “at the appropriate
time.”
Response to September 11 Terrorist Attacks. Top Saudi leaders expressed
condolences to the United States after the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, and
offered assistance in tracking down the perpetrators. Crown Prince Abdullah, who is
effectively running the country (see below), told President Bush that “[w]e in the kingdom
of Saudi Arabia are fully prepared to cooperate with you in every way that may help identify
and pursue the perpetrators of this criminal incident.” On September 25, Saudi Arabia
severed relations with the Taliban leadership in Afghanistan. Earlier, in 1994, the Saudi
government had revoked the citizenship of prime suspect Osama bin Laden. On November
27, presidential spokesman Ari Fleischer mentioned several examples of Saudi support to
the campaign against terrorism, including Saudi help in extending economic assistance to
Pakistan, humanitarian relief to the people of Afghanistan, and intelligence sharing with the
United States. At a donors’ conference in Tokyo on January 21, 2002, Saudi Arabia pledged
$220 million over a 3-year period to help rebuild Afghanistan after 23 years of war. On June
18, 2002, Saudi officials announced that Saudi Arabia had arrested 13 suspected Al-Qaeda
members on charges of plotting attacks against “vital sites” in the kingdom. An unnamed
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“security source” said the 13 belonged to two Al-Qaeda cells that were ordered by Al-Qaeda
officials to hit targets in Saudi Arabia including U.S. military facilities.
Saudi officials were non-committal about their willingness to allow allied use of bases
in Saudi Arabia to launch strikes against targets in Afghanistan. At a press conference on
September 26, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince Faysal told reporters that “Saudi Arabia will
do what is within its capability” to support the coalition against terrorism but did not provide
specifics. On October 3, Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told reporters that “[w]e are
not going to be making requests of the Saudi Arabian government. We have a long-standing
relationship with them.” Some speculate that Saudi leaders bases may have allowed the use
of bases for logistical support of allied operations targeting Afghanistan but not as points of
departure for combat missions.
President Bush’s Executive Order 13224, which has blocked assets of 189 individuals
or organizations with ties to exiled terrorist leader Osama bin Laden or other terrorist groups,
reportedly includes a Saudi businessman and a Saudi-based charitable organization. On
October 21, Saudi Minister of Interior Prince Nayif said Saudi authorities have not found any
bank accounts linked to bin Laden or other terrorist organizations, but according to press
reports, U.S. officials are not sure how thorough the Saudi investigation was. On December
11, the Saudi embassy in Washington released a progress report enumerating steps taken by
Saudi Arabia to combat money laundering and terrorist financing. Among these steps is a
requirement for all Saudi banks to have anti-money laundering units to work with the Saudi
Arabian Monetary Agency (SAMA) and with law enforcement agencies. On February 5,
2002, a Saudi official was quoted as saying that every charity in Saudi Arabia (reportedly
230) will be monitored. On the following day, news agencies reported that SAMA is
monitoring 150 bank accounts associated with prominent Saudi businessmen to prevent the
possible diversion of funds in these accounts to terrorist organizations.
During a visit to Saudi Arabia, U.S. Secretary of the Treasury Paul O’Neill told
reporters on March 6 that “the government of Saudi Arabia has been very good in its
cooperation with us” in seeking to uncover money laundering activities. On March 12,
Secretary O’Neill announced a joint operation with Saudi authorities to cut off funding to
several overseas subsidiaries of a large Muslim foundation known as al-Haramain. The
subsidiaries, though not the parent organization itself, have allegedly been involved in
terrorist activities in Bosnia, Somalia, and other locations. The parent organization
reportedly has ties to senior levels of the Saudi government.
Arab-Israeli Conflict
Saudi Arabia supports Palestinian aspirations and strongly endorses Muslim claims in
the old city of Jerusalem. It has supported Israeli-Palestinian peace agreements, and joined
with neighboring Gulf states in 1994 in terminating enforcement of the so-called secondary
and tertiary (indirect) boycotts of Israel while retaining the primary (direct) boycott. Saudi
leaders have been increasingly critical of Israel since the Palestinian uprising began in
September 2000. According to a New York Times article of May 17, 2001, Crown Prince
Abdullah declined an invitation to visit the United States in June 2001, to indicate
displeasure over what Saudis regard as insufficient U.S. efforts to restrain Israeli military
actions against Palestinians. However, the Crown Prince did accept a subsequent invitation
to visit President Bush in Texas in April 2002 (see below).
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Saudi Arabia, like other Arab states, recognizes the Palestine Liberation Organization
(PLO) as the legitimate representative of the Palestinian people and provides some financial
support to Palestinian institutions. At an Arab League meeting on October 22, 2000, Crown
Prince Abdullah took the lead in creating a $1 billion fund: $800 million to help preserve
the “Arab and Islamic identity of Jerusalem” and $200 million to help families of
Palestinians killed in the current unrest. Saudi Arabia reportedly pledged a total of $250
million to these two funds, and provided an additional $30 million to the Palestinian
Authority (PA) on November 5 as a separate donation. At an informal international donors’
conference at Stockholm on April 11, 2001, Saudi Arabia pledged $225 million in direct
monetary support to the PA over a 6-month period to cover emergency expenses. PLO/PA
Chairman Yasir Arafat received a $45 million grant during a visit to Saudi Arabia on July
23, 2001, but it is not clear whether this represented part of the $225 million grant pledged
by Saudi Arabia in April.
There have been unsubstantiated reports of Saudi assistance to the PLO’s rival
organization, the fundamentalist Hamas, particularly after the Saudi-PLO rift that occurred
after the PLO supported Iraq in 1990. In its report entitled Patters of Global Terrorism, 2000,
the State Department noted that Hamas receives funding from “private benefactors in Saudi
Arabia” and some other countries but does not estimate amounts involved. Saudi Arabia has
provided aid (variously estimated at $33 million and $59 million) to families of Palestinians
killed or injured in the 17-month-old Palestinian uprising; in addition, Saudis raised
additional funds (over $100 million according to one report) for this purpose at a telethon
sponsored by King Fahd on April 11, 2002. Saudi officials told U.S. counterparts in late
April that proceeds of the telethon are funneled through non-governmental organizations to
provide some humanitarian support to needy Palestinian families; the Saudis drew a
distinction between their fund raising activities and those of Iraq, which pays families who
will sacrifice their children as suicide bombers. In early May, Israel officials, citing captured
Palestinian documents, said the Saudi Government has given money to 13 charities, seven
of which provide support to Hamas. The Saudi Ambassador denied this report.
Crown Prince Abdullah’s Peace Initiative. On February 17, 2002, New York
Times columnist Thomas Friedman reported an off-the-record conversation with Crown
Prince Abdullah. According to Friedman, the Crown Prince said he had prepared a draft
speech calling for full Israeli withdrawal from Israeli occupied territories in return for full
normalization of relations between Arab states and Israel. The Crown Prince added that he
had planned to give the speech before an Arab summit conference at the end of March but
had delayed doing so after what he regarded as Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon’s
resorting to increased oppression in the Palestinian territories. However, Prince Abdullah’s
office did authorize Friedman to put the prince’s comments on the record. Abdullah did not
provide details of his proposal, and some commentators believe the prince’s comments
represent nothing new over and above long-standing Arab land-for-peace proposals. Other
commentators believe that such comments from an Arab leader of Abdullah’s stature carry
special weight and could portend a breakthrough in Arab-Israeli peace negotiations.
Crown Prince Abdullah’s proposal was the centerpiece of the Arab League summit
conference held on March 27-28, 2002, and an expanded version of his proposal was
included in a resolution adopted at the conference. The proposal, as agreed upon by the
attendees, called among other things for Israeli withdrawal from territories it had occupied
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since 1967, a “just solution to the problem of Palestinian refugees,” and establishment of
normal relations between Arab states and Israel.
The Saudi-initiated peace proposal was a major topic of discussion during Crown Prince
Abdullah’s visit to President Bush at the latter’s ranch in Texas on April 25. A senior
Administration official told reporters that “[t]he President congratulated him [Abdullah}
again on his statesmanship in putting the [initiative] forward.” In addition, according to
press reports, Prince Abdullah brought an eight-point plan to resolve the then on-going
Israeli-Palestinian fighting on the West Bank. (The month-long fighting subsided at the end
of April.) According to White House spokesman Ari Fleischer, there are areas of
disagreement between U.S. and Saudi peace plans but significant areas of overlap as well.
Saudi officials found “positive factors” in President Bush’s speech of June 24 but
expressed concern over his statements conditioning a Palestinian state on the installation of
a new Palestinian leadership. A statement by the Saudi cabinet on July 1 alluded to “the
positive elements of the Bush initiative,” but on the same day Crown Prince Abdullah was
quoted as telling the visiting Spanish Defense Minister that the Palestinian people “alone
have the right to choose their leadership.”
Arms Transfers to Saudi Arabia
U.S. Arms Sales. The United States is currently Saudi Arabia’s leading arms
supplier. Total value of arms agreements with Saudi Arabia from 1950 through March 31,
1997, was $93.8 billion, while arms agreements with Saudi Arabia from 1991 through 1998
amounted to $22.8 billion. The upsurge in Saudi arms purchases from the United States after
1990 was due in large measure to the Persian Gulf crisis and its aftermath. The largest recent
sale was a $9 billion contract for 72 F-15S advanced fighter aircraft, signed in May 1993.
As Table 1 shows, approximately 21% of the value of U.S.-Saudi arms contracts from 1950
to 1997 were for lethal equipment (i.e., weapons, ammunition, and combat vehicles, aircraft,
and ships); the largest portion (32%) went for support services (repair, rehabilitation, supply
operations, and training). Another major component of the Saudi program has been
construction of military bases and facilities, accounting for 19%, although most military
infrastructure projects were completed by 1990.
A downward trend has marked Saudi arms procurement since the mid-1990s as Saudi
Arabia completed many of its post-Gulf War purchases and the country faced straitened
finances. Since the late 1990s there have been occasional reports of Saudi interest in
renovating further their model combat aircraft fleet, but no significant deals have emerged.
On May 7, 2001, the Saudi Assistant Minister of Defense described his country’s priority as
sustaining existing weapon systems rather than large-scale procurement of new weaponry,
despite mounting oil revenues. He ruled out additional F-15 fighters aircraft to replace aging
F-5s this year as well as tank modernization. Reports in April 2001, however, indicated
continued Saudi interest in more and newer F-15s or possibly F-16 or F-22 fighter aircraft
(both made by Lockheed Martin Corporation in Bethesda, Maryland.)
On September 8, 2000, the U.S. Defense Department announced that Saudi Arabia has
asked to buy three arms packages from the United States: (1) $416 million in light armored
vehicles, anti-tank missiles, and advanced communications equipment for the paramilitary
Saudi National Guard; (2) $690 million in contractor training and maintenance support for
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Saudi Arabia’s fleet of F-15 fighter aircraft; and (3) $1.6 billion in flight simulators, repair
parts, and other technical services for the F-15 aircraft. The prime contractors for the first
package would be the Diesel Division of General Motors of London, Ontario, and Raytheon
Corporation of Tuscon, Arizona. The prime contractor for the second package would be al-
Salam Aircraft Company of Saudi Arabia, which is 50% owned by Boeing Co. The prime
contractor for the third package has not yet been determined.
Table 1. U.S. Arms Transfers to Saudi Arabia, 1950-1997
Orders
Deliveries
Category
$ in
% of Total
% of Total
$ in Billions
Billions
Orders
Deliveries
Weapons & Ammunition
19.893
21.2
9.092
15.6
Support Equipment
16.614
17.7
9.815
16.8
Spare Parts & Modifications
9.778
10.4
5.259
9.0
Supply, Repair, Training
29.615
31.6
17.804
30.6
Construction
17.924
19.1
16.197
27.8
TOTALS
93.824
–
58.167
–
Note: All figures are current through March 31, 1997.
Successive U.S. Administrations have entered into military sales agreements with Saudi
Arabia because of its prestige in the Arab world, its importance as a major source of oil, and
its vulnerability to threats from neighboring states supported in the past by the Soviet Union.
Heightened threats from Iran in the late 1980s and subsequently from Iraq provided rationale
for an expansion of the arms supply relationship, and some observers believe further sales
are needed to redress a continuing gap between Saudi weapons inventories and those of
potential adversaries. Also, the Saudi arms market has helped maintain the U.S. industrial
base and create jobs.
Some critics doubt that Saudi forces can absorb large quantities of advanced military
hardware and voice concerns that such equipment could fall into the wrong hands in the
event of external invasion or a radical change in the Saudi regime. Many are concerned that
arms being sold to Saudi Arabia might be used one day against Israel. Others doubt that
Israel is seriously threatened by Saudi Arabia, but oppose sales to Arab countries technically
at war with Israel and fear that enhancement of Saudi air and missile capabilities could
increase the costs to Israel of a future conflict. Another concern is that continuing arms sales
to Saudi Arabia undermine efforts to restrain the flow of advanced weaponry to an already
heavily armed Middle East.
Trade Relationships
Saudi Arabia was the largest U.S. trading partner in the Middle East in 2000. For that
year, Saudi exports to the United States were estimated at $14.3 billion and imports from the
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United States at $5.9 billion. Comparable figures for Israel, the second largest U.S. trading
partner in the Middle East, were $12.9 billion in exports and $6.2 billion in imports. To a
considerable extent, this high volume of trade is a result of U.S. oil imports from Saudi
Arabia and U.S. arms exports to that country. The Saudis buy significant amounts of U.S.
commercial equipment as well. Also, a Washington Post article of February 11, 2002,
estimates that Saudi nationals have invested between $500 and $700 billion in the U.S.
economy.
Saudi Arabia has applied to join the 128-member World Trade Organization (WTO) as
a developing country, an arrangement that would give it a special transition period to bring
its commercial procedures in line with WTO rules. The U.S. State Department notes that
accession will require the Saudi government to initiate substantial reforms, including tariff
reduction, opening up financial services (insurance and banking), allowing competition in
telecommunications and other services, and better protection of intellectual property rights.
In recognition of its progress in protection of intellectual property rights, Saudi Arabia was
removed from the U.S. Trade Representative’s Priority Watch List in 1996, but remains on
the basic Watch List pending further progress. The U.S. Trade Representative reportedly has
also cited Saudi observance of the secondary boycott against Israel as an obstacle to
admission to the WTO. In March 2001, WTO officials reportedly expressed disappointment
over a recent list issued by the Saudi government of activities off limits to foreign investment
(see below) and predicted that these restrictions could delay Saudi accession to the WTO.
During Crown Prince Abdullah’s April 2002 visit, however, President Bush expressed
support for Saudi accession and said the United States is making technical assistance
available to Saudi Arabia to support the Saudi application.
Problems in Commercial Transactions. Complaints have arisen within the U.S.
business community over commercial disputes that have resulted in hardships for U.S.
companies doing business in Saudi Arabia and for their employees. These disputes center
on allegations by U.S. firms that Saudi clients have not paid for services rendered or have
sought to expand terms of a contract without further reimbursement, and in some cases have
taken reprisals against U.S. employees of the firms involved. (For further information, see
CRS Report 95-666, Saudi Arabia: Commercial Disputes With U.S. Firms.).
Oil Production. With the world’s largest proven oil reserves (estimated at 263.5
billion barrels in January 2000), Saudi Arabia produced an average of 7.83 million barrels
per day (bpd) of crude oil during 1999. Approximately 14.1% of U.S. oil imports and 8.0%
of total U.S. oil consumption came from Saudi Arabia during 2000. Formerly the largest
foreign supplier of oil to the United States, Saudi Arabia has been exceeded in this role by
Venezuela and/or Canada during recent years (see Table 2). In recent years, Saudi Arabia
has alternately supported cuts and increases in production as oil prices on the international
market have fluctuated. Under a “gentlemen’s agreement” reached in June 2000, members
of the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) established a mechanism to
adjust the supply of oil by 500,000 bpd if the 20-day average price of oil moved outside a
$22 to $28 price band. Members disagree, however, as to whether this mechanism is
automatic or requires separate action by OPEC to implement, and Saudi Arabia has spoken
of a target price of $25 rather than a price band. Congress has enacted legislation to
discourage price fixing by oil producing countries (see below). With regard to Iraq’s call in
April 2002 for a halt in oil production to protest Israeli actions toward Palestinians, a senior
Administration official told reporters after the visit of Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah that
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Saudi officials assured their U.S. hosts that oil would not be used as a weapon. In May, the
Saudi Oil Minister added that “Saudi Arabia is keen to maintain stability in the international
oil market ...”
Table 2. Oil Consumption and Imports
(in millions of barrels per day)
Category
1997
1998
1999
2000
Total U.S. Consumption
18.620
18.917
19.519
19.476
Total U.S. Imports
10.162
10.708
10.852
11.093
Imports from Saudi Arabia
1.407
1.491
1.478
1.566
Imports from Venezuela
1.773
1.719
1.493
1.519
Imports from Canada
1.563
1.598
1.539
1.686
Source: DOE.
Foreign Investment. Saudi leaders have shown increasing interest in attracting
foreign investment in their energy sector, although projects in upstream oil apparently remain
off limits. On April 10, 2000, King Fahd approved a new foreign investment law which
allows international investors to have full ownership of projects and related property in Saudi
Arabia, reduces taxes from 45% to 30% on corporate profits, and restructures (but apparently
does not abolish) requirements for foreign businessmen to have a Saudi sponsor. On
February 11, 2001, the Saudi Supreme Economic Council issued a so-called “negative list”
of those investment activities that remain off limits to foreign investment. In general, the list
covers oil exploration and production, some manufacturing activities, radio and
telecommunications, transport, electricity transmission and distribution, and a range of
services including tourism, publishing, real estate brokerage, and insurance. According to
news reports in March 2001, international trade officials expressed disappointment over the
length and scope of the list. The list will be reviewed annually, however, and some observers
have speculated that it will be shortened as the country adjusts to an expansion in foreign
investment. In a later development, according to a news report in April 2002, Saudi officials
are considering a draft law that would tax the earnings of expatriate employees in Saudi
Arabia for the first time since the 1970s, in addition to the annual corporate taxes already
levied on foreign firms operating in Saudi Arabia.
On June 3, 2001, Saudi Arabia signed preliminary agreements worth approximately $25
billion with eight international oil companies to develop three natural gas fields, together
with related power plants, transmission pipelines, and water desalinization projects. Five of
these companies are U.S.-based, including Exxon Mobil Corporation, Conoco, Phillips
Petroleum Company, Occidental Petroleum Corporation, and Marathon. Exxon Mobil is the
lead manager for two of the three gas field projects. Conclusion of final agreements,
originally set for mid-December, has been delayed, as Saudi and company negotiators
continue trying to resolve several issues including taxes, rate of return on investments, and
size of the gas reserves being offered. On May 17, 2002, according to a press report, “a
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source close to the talks” predicted that the Saudis would re-open the projects for new bids
if final agreements are not reached with the above-mentioned companies “within the next
couple of months or so.” The source emphasized, however, that the Saudi Government
wants the current negotiations to succeed and denied that political considerations (such as
Israeli-Palestinian fighting) play any role in Saudi decisions on this matter.
Human Rights, Democracy, and Other Issues
Of particular concern to Westerners are pervasive restrictions on women’s activities and
an injunction against the practice of other religions throughout the Kingdom. This injunction
has been applied not only against non-Islamic faiths but also at times against the Shi’ite
Muslim community in Saudi Arabia, estimated at 500,000 or more persons mainly in the
Eastern Province. Since 1990, the Saudi government has moved quietly to ease some
restrictions on Shi’ites. Also, according to the State Department, high-level Saudi officials
have said that Saudi policy allows for private non-Muslim worship, for example, in private
homes or secluded compounds. On April 6, 2000, responding to criticisms by the London-
based Amnesty International, a Saudi Under Secretary in the Foreign Ministry maintained
that “non-Muslims enjoy full freedom to engage in their religious observances in private.”
Earlier, in April 1999, Crown Prince Abdullah told a local audience: “Taking into account
the teachings of Islam, we will do our best to enable Saudi women to continue to contribute.”
Political reforms promulgated by King Fahd appear to represent a limited move toward
democracy and protection of individual freedoms. The “main law” announced by the King
on March 1, 1992, bans arbitrary arrest, harassment, or entry of individual homes without
legal authority and specifies privacy in telephone calls and mail. On August 20, 1993, the
King appointed a 60-member consultative council (increased to 90 in 1997 and to 120 in
2001), with limited powers to question cabinet members and propose laws. On the other
hand, King Fahd has said that free elections are not suitable for his country; he stated on
March 30, 1992 that elections “do not fall within the sphere of the Muslim religion, which
believes in the al-shura (consultative) system and openness between ruler and his subjects
and which makes whoever is in charge fully answerable to his people.”
Background to U.S.-Saudi Relations
Oil and national security concerns have combined to produce a close and cooperative
relationship between the United States and Saudi Arabia. Since the award of the first Saudi
oil concession to a U.S. company in 1933, both states have had an increasing interest,
respectively, in the marketing and acquisition of Saudi petroleum supplies. As regional
threats multiplied in the latter half of the century, mutual concerns over the stability of Saudi
Arabia and other moderate regimes in the Arabian Peninsula engendered a significant degree
of defense cooperation.
Political Development
Saudi Leadership. As the birthplace of the Islamic religion in 622 A.D. and as the
home of Islam’s two holiest shrines, the Arabian Peninsula has always occupied a position
of special prestige within the Middle East. With the establishment of Arab empires based
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in Damascus and Baghdad, the peninsula gradually lost its political importance and sank into
disunity. In the 16th century, much of the Arabian Peninsula came under the nominal rule
of the Ottoman Empire; however, tribal leaders effectively controlled most of the region.
During this period, an alliance developed between an influential eastern tribe, the House of
Saud, and the leaders of a puritanical and reformist Islamic group known as the Wahhabi
movement. During the first quarter of the 20th century, a chieftain of the Saud family, Abd
al-Aziz ibn Abd al-Rahman (later known as Ibn Saud) overcame numerous rivals with the
support of his Wahhabi allies and succeeded in unifying most of the Arabian Peninsula under
his rule, with the exception of Yemen in the southwest and the small, then British-protected
principalities along the eastern coast. On September 23, 1932, Abd al-Aziz proclaimed the
establishment of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, which he ruled until his death in 1953. Four
of his sons have succeeded him: Saud (1953-1964), Faysal (1964-1975), Khalid
(1975-1982), and the present King Fahd, who acceded to the throne in 1982.
Royal Succession. King Fahd, a dynamic leader for many years, is almost 80 years
old and suffers from medical problems including diabetes and arthritis. In early 1996, King
Fahd temporarily turned over affairs of state to his half-brother, Crown Prince Abdullah, for
a six-week period while the King recuperated from a stroke. More recently, amid conflicting
reports about the King’s condition, Crown Prince Abdullah has increasingly carried out many
governmental functions since 1996, together with other senior princes of the royal family.
Another key figure is Defense Minister Prince Sultan, a full brother of King Fahd, who is
generally considered next in line of succession after Prince Abdullah. (King Fahd, Prince
Abdullah, and Prince Sultan also hold the positions of Prime Minister, First Deputy Prime
Minister, and Second Deputy Prime Minister, respectively.)
Most commentators believe the royal family would back Crown Prince Abdullah in a
smooth transfer of power if King Fahd should pass from the scene. Various sources describe
Prince Abdullah as more traditional and less western in outlook than King Fahd and more
oriented toward the Arab world. On balance, the Crown Prince seems likely to maintain
Saudi Arabia’s long-standing strategic and economic ties with the United States. U.S.
officials commented that President Bush and Crown Prince Abdullah established a very good
personal rapport during the latter’s visit in April 2002. Some speculate, however, that
succession could become more intricate after Abdullah (who is only two years younger than
Fahd but believed to be in better health) and fear that future intra-family rivalries could
weaken the Saud dynasty over the long term. Possible future candidates include some 25
brothers and half-brothers of King Fahd and a number of sons and nephews. In June 2000,
Saudi Arabia formed a council consisting of 18 senior princes representing leading branches
of the royal family, chaired by Crown Prince Abdullah with Prince Sultan as deputy
chairman. An observer speculated that its role seems to be to organize family matters,
provide a family forum, and deal with other family issues.
Economy and Aid
Economic Conditions. Oil is the dominant factor in the Saudi economy, accounting
for 35-40% of GDP, 75% of budget receipts, and 90-95% of export earnings as of April
2000; even more of the GDP is derived indirectly from the oil industry. Despite immense
oil revenue, a combination of fluctuating oil prices, domestic welfare spending, and military
spending have caused periodic budget deficits (see Table 3). For example, the 1990-1991
Gulf war cost Saudi Arabia approximately $55 billion (including $16.9 billion contributed
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to the United States to help defray expenses). Although the government was able to retire
its external debt in May 1995, it had to borrow $4.3 billion again from external sources in
December 1997 to finance purchase of aircraft.
In 1994, the Saudi government instituted austerity measures to deal with shrinking
revenues, and during the following year, the government announced additional measures
including raising the costs of utilities (electricity, water, and communications facilities) and
reducing various subsidies in an effort to increase revenues and cut spending. The budget
for 2000, announced on December 21, 1999, entailed a $7.5 billion deficit, but original Saudi
revenue projections were overtaken by the surge in oil prices since early 1999. Increased
revenue led to an estimated surplus of $12 billion in 2000, the first budgetary surplus in over
a decade. For 2001, the government has projected a balanced budget. The 2001 budget,
announced on December 18, 2000, is based on a relatively conservative oil price forecast of
$22 per barrel and continued fiscal restraint.
Table 3. Saudi Budget Figures
(In billions of U.S. dollars, at exchange rate of $1.00=S.R. 3.75)
1999
2000
2001
2002
Category
Budget
Actual
Budget
Actual
Budget Est.
Budget
Expenditure
44.0
48.3
49.3
54.1
57.3
68.0
53.9
Revenue
32.3
39.2
41.9
66.1
57.3
61.3
41.9
Balance
-11.7
-9.1
-7.5
12.0
0
-6.7
-12.0
Source: Saudi Ministry of Finance; Saudi government announcements; press estimates.
Aid Relationships. As Saudi oil income expanded, U.S. economic aid ended in
1959. Small amounts of aid continued through 1975, limited to a small international military
education and training (IMET) program after 1968. Total U.S. aid to Saudi Arabia from
1946 through its termination in 1975 amounted to $328.4 million, of which $295.8 million
was military and $32.6 million was economic assistance. Approximately 20% of total aid
was in the form of grants and 80% in loans, all of which have been repaid. A small IMET
program of $25,000 per year to help defray some expenses of sending Saudi officers to U.S.
military service schools was resumed in FY2002, and the same amount was requested by the
Administration for Saudi Arabia in FY2003. Saudi officials also cite their country’s role as
a donor of aid to less affluent countries; according to a Saudi diplomat, the Saudi government
extended $820.3 million worth of aid to developing countries in 2001.
Defense and Security
The United States and Saudi Arabia are not linked by a formal defense treaty; however,
a series of informal agreements, statements by successive U.S. Administrations (see box),
and military deployments have demonstrated a strong U.S. security commitment to Saudi
Arabia. Although Saudi forces acquired experience during the Gulf war and are undergoing
further upgrading through a large-scale program of arms procurement (see below), both
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Saudi Arabia and its five smaller Gulf neighbors remain vulnerable to future external
aggression. On one hand, both the Iranian and Iraqi armed forces suffered major personnel
and equipment losses during the 1980-1988 Iran-Iraq war and Operation Desert Storm,
respectively, and neither is in a position to offer an immediate threat to the Gulf Cooperation
Council (GCC). On the other hand, as shown in Table 4, the combined forces of Saudi
Arabia and its GCC allies are outnumbered in important categories by those of Iraq and Iran,
even after the losses sustained by both countries in recent wars.
Congressional Interest in Saudi Arabia
The terrorist attack on Khobar
Key U.S. Statements
prompted resolutions in the 104th
Congress (H.Con.Res. 200 and S.Res.
“An attempt by any outside force to gain control of the
273) honoring slain U.S. and other
Persian Gulf Region will be regarded as an assault on
victims and (in S.Res. 273) expressing
the vital interests of the United States of America and
support for Saudi efforts to apprehend
such an assault will be repelled by any means
necessary, including military force.”
the perpetrators. In the 105th Congress,
–President Jimmy Carter, Jan. 23, 1980
Section 1052 of the Defense
(The Carter Doctrine)
Authorization Act for FY1998-1999
(P.L. 105-85) required the Secretary of
“There’s no way that we could stand by [and see Saudi
Defense to report on the roles of
Arabia] taken over by anyone that would shut off that
various Defense officials in providing
oil.”
counter terrorism guidance to U.S.
–President Ronald Reagan, Oct. 1, 1981
(The Reagan Corollary)
military personnel before and after the
1995 and 1996 attacks on U.S. facilities
“The sovereign independence of Saudi Arabia is of
in Saudi Arabia. An amendment
vital interest to the United States.”
(S.Amdt. 605) incorporated as Section
–President George Bush, Aug. 8, 1990
8161 of S. 1122, the Department of
(following Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait)
Defense Appropriations bill for
“President Clinton’s commitment to the security of
FY2000, expresses the sense of the
friends in the Gulf, like that of every President since
Senate that the FBI together with the
Franklin Roosevelt, is firm and constant.”
State Department should report to
–Secretary of State Warren Christopher,
Congress by December 31, 1999, on the
Feb. 21, 1993)
status of the Khobar investigation and
that the U.S. government should take
steps to punish the parties responsible,
once they are identified. The Senate passed S. 1122 on June 8, 1999 by 93 to 4, Record Vote
No. 158; however, the provision regarding the Khobar bombing did not appear in the
companion House bill H.R. 2561 or in the conference report. In early 2000, the precipitate
rise in international oil prices prompted several legislative initiatives designed to restrain oil
price increases, as mentioned above. On March 22, 2000, by a vote of 382 to 38 (with one
present and 30 abstentions, Roll Call 65), the House passed H.R. 3822, which requires the
President, inter alia, to determine which oil producing nations are engaged in oil price fixing
to the detriment of the U.S. economy, submit reports to Congress, and “take the necessary
steps to begin negotiations to achieve multilateral action to reduce, suspend, or terminate
bilateral assistance and arms exports to major net oil exporters engaged in oil price fixing as
part of a concerted diplomatic campaign with other major net oil importers...” In the 107th
Congress, H.R. 334, the Persian Gulf Security Cost Sharing Act, introduced on January 31,
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2001, would direct the President to seek further contributions from Saudi Arabia and other
Persian Gulf states to defray the costs of U.S. military deployments in the region.
Arms Sales
Congress has been particularly sensitive to the argument that enhancing Saudi arms
inventories could result in an incremental increase in overall threats to Israel, although some
Members have supported such sales on the grounds that they help buttress Saudi defense
capabilities in the Gulf and enhance the U.S. job market. Since the mid-1970s, several major
arms sales to Saudi Arabia have been challenged in Congress: F-15 fighter aircraft in 1978;
Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS) aircraft, advanced tanker aircraft, and
advanced Sidewinder air-to-air missiles in 1981; and a large package of air-to-air,
surface-to-air, and air-to-sea missiles in 1986. All of these sales ultimately were allowed to
proceed, and several larger sales followed before and during the Persian Gulf crisis, without
significant congressional opposition. The Bush Administration’s proposal in September
1992 to sell 72 improved F-15XP fighters to Saudi Arabia met some opposition, but
resolutions to block or postpone the sale never came to a vote.
Arab Boycott
Members of Congress frequently have decried Saudi participation in the Arab boycott
because of its impact on Israel and on U.S. businesses. Some have called for linkage
between U.S. arms sales to Saudi Arabia and Saudi renunciation of the boycott. Part C of
the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1994-1995 (P.L. 103-236, April 30, 1994),
known as the Anti-Economic Discrimination Act, under a provision that took effect on April
30, 1995, bars the sale or lease of U.S. defense articles or services to any country that sends
letters to U.S. firms requesting compliance with, or soliciting information regarding
compliance with, the Arab League primary or secondary boycott of Israel. This provision
permits a presidential waiver on national security grounds; then President Clinton exercised
waiver authority for Saudi Arabia and several other Arab states in Presidential Determination
(PD) 95-20, May 1, 1995, and again in PD 96-23, April 30, 1996. On April 24, 1997, the
President delegated waiver authority under this act to the Secretary of State.
Trade Practices
In the 105th Congress, Section 2801 in Division G of the Consolidated and Emergency
Supplemental Appropriations Act, 1999 (P.L. 105-277, October 21, 1998, 112 Stat. 2681-
845) required reports every 120 days by the Secretary of State, in coordination with the
Secretaries of Defense and Commerce, on actions taken by the three departments to resolve
commercial disputes between U.S. firms and Saudi Arabia as listed in a June 1993 letter
from the Secretaries of Defense and Commerce. In the 106th Congress, this requirement was
retained in Section 209 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2000-2001 (H.R.
3427, passed by reference in H.R. 3194, the Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY2000,
P.L. 106-113, November 29, 1999. Currently, this provision appears in Section 201 of H.R.
1646, the Foreign Relations Authorization bill for FY2002-2003, which was passed by the
House on May 16, 2001, by 352 to 73, Roll no. 121.
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Table 4. Selected Middle East Armed Forces
Chem
Main Battle
Combat
Surf. Surf.
Nucl.
Country
Force Size
Warf.
Tanks
Aircraft
Mslsa
Cap.b
Cap
Iran
513,000
1,565
283
S
X
D
Iraqc
424,000
2,200
316
S
X
D
Saudi Arabiad
201,500
910
348
I
–
–
Yemene
54,000
860
71
S
–
–
U. A. E.
65,000
411
101
–
–
–
Oman
43,400
117
40
–
–
–
Kuwait
15,500
293
82
–
–
–
Bahrain
11,000
106
34
–
–
–
Qatar
12,330
35
18
–
–
–
a S = short-range (70-1,000 km); M = medium-range (1,001-3,000 km); I = intermediate-range (3,001-5,000
km).
b D = reportedly under development (now or in the past).
c Figures represent estimates of Iraqi forces and equipment after Operation Desert Storm. Some older tanks are
believed unserviceable. The aircraft total does not include combat aircraft impounded in Iran.
d Force total includes active members of the Saudi Arabian National Guard (estimated at 57,000). Tank total
does not include an estimated 145 French-manufactured AMX-30 tanks in storage.
e Force total includes conscripts (estimated at 25,000). Tank total does not include 50 obsolescent Soviet-
manufactured T-34 tanks. Aircraft total does not include 40 in storage.
Source: The International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, 2001-2002.
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