Order Code RS21252
July 3, 2002
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Cruise Missile Proliferation
Christopher Bolkcom and Sharon Squassoni
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Over 80 countries currently possess cruise missiles. U.S. and allied forces currently
face a threat from short-range, conventionally armed, anti-ship cruise missiles in the
hands of a few nations. As relevant technology becomes increasingly available
commercially, efforts to control the sophistication of these missiles and their spread may
become more difficult.
Introduction
More than 80 countries today have cruise missiles of some kind.1 Eighteen of these
countries manufacture cruise missiles domestically. The remaining 62 countries import
these weapons.2 Today, the most advanced cruise missiles, those with the longest ranges,
heaviest payloads, highest accuracy, and stealthy features, tend to be in the hands of U.S.
allies or friendly countries. Potential U.S. adversaries, such as Iran, Iraq, and Libya, tend
to deploy anti-ship cruise missiles. However, these countries are developing and fielding
land attack cruise missiles (LACMs) that typically can attack known, fixed targets, such
as ports, airfields and cities, within 10s to 100s of miles.
Presently, cruise missiles can pose a threat to allied countries and U.S. forces
deployed overseas, but the U.S. intelligence community estimates that, by the end of the
decade, a cruise missile attack on the continental United States may be possible.3 Perhaps
more important, the U.S. intelligence community judges that it may not be able to provide
much, if any warning, of a forward-based LACM threat to the United States. Although
1 There is no universally accepted definition of cruise missiles, but they can be categorized as
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that are a) continually powered by an air-breathing or rocket
engine; b) generally guided for their entire flight; c) weaponized; and d) generally optimized for
one-way missions. This contrasts with weaponized UAVs such as the Predator, that can perform
multiple missions, but they are treated similarly under the Missile Technology Control Regime.
2 International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance, Oxford University Press,
London, various years.
3 Testimony of Director of Central Intelligence, George J. Tenet, before the Senate Armed
Services Committee, March 19, 2002, “Worldwide Threat – Converging Dangers in a Post 9/11
World,” p. 13. The threat, as worded by Director Tenet, is non-specific.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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terrorist groups will probably continue to favor proven delivery vehicles such as trucks,
suicide bombers, and airplanes, cruise missiles have many attributes that could make them
attractive to terrorists, who may use them in ways that we currently can’t foresee.
Figure 1: Illustrative Cruise Missiles
Apache (France)
SS-N-25 (Russia)
HY-4 (China)
Background
A 1994 Defense Science Board (DSB) study concluded that the United States faces
a threat from cruise missiles that is expected to evolve rapidly, and that will be difficult
to predict in a timely way.4 In contrast to ballistic missile proliferation, cruise missiles
present a particular challenge for monitoring and control because they exploit technology
that is well understood and well established in the civil aviation industry. Missile
airframes, navigation systems, jet engines, satellite maps, and mission planning computers
and software all can be purchased on the commercial market. Cruise missile technology
“hides in plain sight” – making it difficult to identify a military program. At the same
time, commercial availability generally means relatively low-cost weapons for many
nations and, potentially, non-state actors.
In addition, some experts believe that it is fairly easy for a country to produce simple
cruise missiles, upgrade purchased cruise missiles, or convert manned and unmanned
aircraft into unmanned weapons. Manufacturers can exploit existing platforms; several
nations have modified anti-ship cruise missiles to attack land targets. In addition to
today’s 18 cruise missile manufacturers, 22 other countries appear to have the industrial
and technological infrastructures required to make cruise missiles.5 The status of these
“threshold cruise missile manufacturers” could have a significant impact on global cruise
missile supply, demand, inventory, and capabilities. Nonetheless, it is difficult to predict
what motivations might underlie a decision by these potential manufacturers to develop
indigenous capabilities and possibly export missiles.
4 Report of the Defense Science Board Summer Study on Cruise Missile Defense. Office of the
Undersecretary of Defense (A&T). January 1995, Washington, D.C. p. 14.
5 Bolkcom, Christopher, Statement before the Senate Committee on Government Affairs,
Subcommittee on International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, June 11, 2002.

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Proliferation Concerns
The export of cruise missiles, their production technology, and components are
currently regulated globally under two export control agreements – the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) and the Wassenaar Arrangement. The MTCR
focuses on the upper end of the capability spectrum – missiles (ballistic and cruise)and
unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) that are capable of carrying nuclear, biological or
chemical weapons.6 Exports of complete systems that can carry a 500-kg warhead 300km
or more are presumed to be denied by member states to any country; exports of complete
systems that are less capable are considered on a case-by-case basis, as are components
and subsystems. Export of production facilities is not authorized. In 1993, MTCR
member states added a “catch-all” clause, which presumes denial of exports of any items
in the Annex if there is persuasive information that they are intended to be used for the
delivery of weapons of mass destruction (WMD). This catch-all clause was meant to
address the loophole for biological and chemical warheads.7
The Wassenaar Arrangement picks up the lower range of the capability spectrum.
Wassenaar, which supercedes Cold-War COCOM (Coordinating Committee) export
controls, specifically regulates UAVs and UAV technology designed for military
purposes. Thus, exports of cruise missiles with ranges shorter than 300 km that can carry
warheads weighing less than 500 kg that are not destined for countries with WMD
programs are subject to restrictions under Wassenaar. However, Wassenaar includes
exceptions, as does the MTCR, for technologies and components intended for manned
aircraft.8
Several observers have noted weaknesses in this supply-side approach, especially
where cruise missiles are concerned. To be successful, supply-side regimes require most
of the technology holders to be members and that these members concur on the export
restrictions. Half of the current manufacturers of cruise missiles (Brazil, China, India,
Iran, Iraq, Israel, North Korea, South Africa and Taiwan) are not members of the
Wassenaar Arrangement and of these, only South Africa has joined the MTCR (although
Israel and China have informal arrangements to adhere to the guidelines.) Although the
MTCR is generally regarded as successful in curbing missile exports, member states have
disagreed from time to time. One particularly relevant case is the proposed transfer of
Black Shahine cruise missiles to the United Arab Emirates from a British-French
company, which has been debated for the last four years. The flexibility of cruise missiles
to trade off payload and range configurations makes agreement on how to calculate
capabilities difficult. Moreover, overlapping military and civilian technology increases
pressure to allow technology exports. Ballistic missiles do have a civilian counterpart
technology – space launch vehicles – but the technologies are not nearly as ubiquitous as
they are for UAV technologies in the aircraft industry. Moreover, space launch programs
6 The MTCR, begun in 1987, created a common set of export control guidelines that each
member country (now encompassing 33 states) administers independently. The 300-km, 500-kg
warhead threshold was devised to preclude the ability to carry a nuclear warhead. CRS Report
97-343 F, Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status.
7 CRS Report RL 40427, Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of Foreign Countries.
8 CRS Report RS 20517, Military Technology and Conventional Weapons Export Controls:
The Wassenaar Arrangement.

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do not provide convenient cover for military programs because they are quite expensive
and difficult to hide. Space launch services have also emerged in the last decade as an
alternative to indigenous development. In the case of cruise missiles, the civilian
counterpart is aircraft technology, which most states already have. The specific exception
for exports of technologies applicable to manned aircraft opens what some call the
“manned aviation loophole.” Nonetheless, the significant military/civilian overlap
demonstrates that a monopoly on technology (which arguably doesn’t exist even for
ballistic missiles) does not exist for cruise missiles, except at the most capable end of the
spectrum.
The Wassenaar Arrangement, by admission of even its most ardent supporters, is a
shadow of the former COCOM arrangement. In part, this is probably because it is
difficult to limit trade in military technologies and systems that would otherwise be freely
conducted. The accuracy of many cruise missiles makes them appealing acquisitions even
if only conventionally armed. The U.S. government is pursuing efforts to strengthen the
Wassenaar Arrangement, including more frequent reporting and a no-undercut provision
(once an export is denied by one member state, all member states agree not to export that
item to the denied state) which exists, de facto, under the MTCR. Some analysts have
suggested, however, that the United States’ prominent use of cruise missiles and UAVs
in recent conflicts increases their attractiveness to other nations. On the other hand, the
intelligence community has judged that many states may continue ballistic missile
development programs rather than acquire cruise missiles because the latter do not confer
the same prestige as ballistic missiles.
Military Concerns
Cruise missiles present significant challenges for air and missile defenses. Detecting
a cruise missile attack is difficult because they are small and can be launched from the air,
sea or ground. Locating the source or direction of the attack is complicated by the
missiles’ inherent maneuverability. Stealthy and terrain-hugging missiles may complicate
current air defense radars’s ability to track them. And because cruise missiles fly like
manned aircraft, it can be difficult to separate friend from foe, or to differentiate between
civilian aircraft and enemy missiles.
Some analysts have observed that it is preferable to destroy cruise missiles before
they are launched. The United States has improved its ability to attack mobile targets as
evidenced in Operation Enduring Freedom compared to its “Scud hunting” track record
during the Persian Gulf War. However, destroying mobile, ground launched cruise
missiles and other “time-critical-targets” remains a major challenge for DOD.9 Improving
counter-force targeting capabilities is another challenge in dealing with cruise missiles
and cruise missile proliferation.
9 “We’ve got to do a much better job with time-critical targeting,” said Vice Adm. John B.
Nathman, commander of Naval Air Forces. Aviation Week & Space Technology. April 29, 2002,
p.55. And Ron Laurenzo. “RAND: Time-Critical Targets Still Challenge Air Force.” Defense
Week. June 10, 2002. p.16.

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Congressional Considerations
Congress’ constitutional authority to regulate trade gives it a key role in formulating
export controls. In addition, Congress can affect how the Department of Defense funds
and implements its programs to defend against cruise missile threats. Recently, Congress
held hearings on export control regimes and the cruise missile threat. Some relevant
questions emerged from this review, in particular: (1) can we reduce the supply of or
access to cruise missiles and their technology; (2) can we reduce the demand for cruise
missiles; and (3) can we improve U.S. military capabilities to defend against cruise
missile attack or destroy enemy cruise missiles before they can be launched (counter force
targeting)? These matters are explored below in greater detail.
Reducing Supply. In reducing access to cruise missile technology, several
avenues have been suggested. First is the elimination of the manned aviation loophole.
Six different items under the MTCR (guidance sets, turbojet engines, navigation
equipment, flight control systems, avionics, and analog and digital computers) are not
controlled if they are destined for manned aircraft. Closing this loophole would probably
encounter significant resistance, according to many industry analysts. A second approach
is to implement further restrictions on stealth technology. Some of these technologies
have fewer commercial applications and are made by fewer countries than less
sophisticated aviation technologies. A third approach is to tailor some of the technical
parameters in the MTCR technology annex specifically to cruise missiles and UAVs. For
example, the MTCR controls the export of global positioning system (GPS) receivers that
operate in conditions (faster than 1,000 nm/hour, higher than 60,000 ft) relevant to
ballistic missiles, but not to cruise missiles.
General modifications to the Wassenaar Arrangement might also be possible,
including increased frequency of reporting, increased scrutiny of exports to certain
countries with cruise missile programs, and negotiation of a “no-undercut” provision
similar to that which is exercised under the MTCR. If a no-undercut provision is not
possible for all Wassenaar list items, it has been argued that it might be possible to
implement it for cruise missiles and associated technologies. In addition, it might be
useful to create an annex for cruise missiles similar to the addendum on “Elements for
Export Controls on Man-Portable Air Defense Systems (MANPADS).”10
It may also be possible to tighten controls through bilateral agreements, particularly
with nations such as Russia and France, which are two of very few countries capable of
making stealthy cruise missiles. Negotiating an agreement prohibiting the export of
stealthy cruise missiles with these and other appropriate countries is sometimes seen as
potentially useful step.
Reducing Demand. A key component of a strategy to limit technology diffusion
is to focus on reducing demand. A recent comment on the case of Indian and Pakistani
nuclear technology noted that:
10 This addendum was developed because members recognized the threat posed by the
unauthorized proliferation of these systems and to affirm that they would apply strict national
controls on the export of MANPADS

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The limitations of Western nonproliferation policy are now painfully obvious. It has
relied primarily on supply-side export controls to prevent access to nuclear
technologies.... Any effective strategy for nonproliferation must also involve demand-
side measures...11
Creating incentives or disincentives (or perhaps both) for countries to refrain from
importing or manufacturing cruise missiles might help reduce demand for these weapons.
Economic aid or sanctions, military training exercises or confidence-building measures
are some tools. Confidence-building measures might include agreements to avoid
intrusion of neighboring airspace or advance notification of air force exercises. In
general, measures that help improve a country’s confidence in its ability to defend itself
or to deter attack with its current offensive and defensive capabilities would need to be
identified on a case-by-case basis.
Improving Military Capabilities. The Department of Defense has taken several
steps to improve its ability to defend against cruise missile attacks. These include
programs to improve detection of threats through better sensors (E-3 AWACS, the E-2C
Hawkeye airborne surveillance aircraft, and the Army's Joint Land Attack Cruise Missile
Elevated Netted Sensors (JLENS)), better integration of air and missile defense systems
and improving existing air defense radars and battle management computers and
communications links. Integrating air and missile defense systems may have the greatest
payoff in designing and fielding an effective cruise missile defense. The Joint Tactical
Information Distribution System (JTIDS), the Navy's Cooperative Engagement Capability
(CEC), and development of a Single Integrated Air Picture (SIAP) appear to be important
stepping stones. Also, because combat identification is a critical yet often challenging
part of destroying cruise missiles, efforts like the All Service Combat ID Evaluation Team
(ASCIET) will be important.
A key challenge in cruise missile defense is cost. Although cruise missiles are
cheap, many cruise missile defense systems, including missile interceptors, are expensive.
DoD's Low Cost Cruise Missile Defense (LCCMD) program seeks to mitigate this
problem by reducing the cost of interceptor missile technology. In addition, DOD's cruise
missile defense efforts have been focused on protecting forward-deployed U.S. forces.
Presently, the North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), controls a
number of ground-based radar, over 100 fighter aircraft, and several airborne surveillance
aircraft – a scaled down version of the Cold War continental air defense system. If
NORAD also has to consider possible aircraft and missile attacks originating within the
United States, homeland defense would be greatly complicated. Coordinating military
and civilian airspace monitoring and control entities (NORAD and FAA respectively) will
likely be key to any successful continental cruise missile defense system. One relatively
low cost effort might be to improve and expand the Customs Service radar-bearing
balloons (aerostats), currently used to detect small aircraft attempting to smuggle drugs
into the United States. Other technologies that are contributing to this effort include high
bandwidth communications and “network-centric” targeting to improve counter-force
targeting capabilities. The Network Centric Cooperative Targeting ACTD (Advanced
Concept Technology Demonstration) is one example of this approach. In addition, DOD
is experimenting with use of unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs) in counterforce targeting.
11
Ramana, M.V. and Nayyar, A.H, “India, Pakistan, and the Bomb,” Scientific American,
December 16, 2001. URL [http://www.sciam.com].

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