Order Code IB94049
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq-U.S. Confrontation
Updated June 21, 2002
Alfred B. Prados and Kenneth Katzman
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Events of the Crisis
Forerunner Episodes
December 1998 Air Strikes
Further Actions
The February 2001 Strikes
Additional Strikes and Provocations
Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks
Force Deployments and Costs
The 1998 Build-Up
After Desert Fox
Costs
U.S. and International Reactions
Administration Position on Use of Force
Congressional Reactions
International Reactions
Plans and Alternatives
FOR ADDITIONAL READING


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Iraq-U.S. Confrontation
SUMMARY
Efforts by Iraq to impede U.N. weapons
tions amounted to approximately $1.6 billion
inspections since late 1997 and to challenge
in FY1998, 1.3 billion in FY1999, $1.1 billion
the allied-imposed no-fly zones over northern
in FY2000, and $1.1 billion estimated in
and southern Iraq have resulted in further
FY2001. These figures do not include costs
confrontations with the United States and its
resulting from operations in Afghanistan.
allies. A decision by Iraq to ban almost all
U.N. inspections on October 31, 1998, led the
Erosion of the former allied coalition and
United States and Britain to conduct a 4-day
U.S. force constraints limit some military
air operation against Iraq on December 16-20,
options. Although some Arab states, notably
1998 (Operation Desert Fox). The two allies
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, host U.S. aircraft
launched approximately 415 missiles and
enforcing no-fly zones, no Arab states with
dropped more than 600 bombs targeted at
the exception of Kuwait have publicly suppor-
Iraqi military and logistical facilities.
ted allied air strikes against Iraq. At an Arab
summit conference on March 27-28, 2002, the
Since the December 1998 operation, the
attendees welcomed Iraqi assurances that it
United States and Britain have carried out air
would respect the independence of Kuwait,
strikes against Iraqi air defense units and
called for respecting the integrity of Iraq, and
installations on a frequent basis, in response to
announced its “categorical rejection” of
Iraqi attempts to target allied aircraft enforcing
attacking Iraq.
no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq.
On October 7, 2001, following the September
Some officials and analysts have called
11 terrorist attacks on the United States, the
for expansion of no-fly zones over Iraq.
U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations warn-
Others support covert operations to inflict
ed Iraq not to move against Iraqi opposition
damage on key Iraqi facilities and build a
groups or attack its neighbors while the Unit-
viable opposition to the regime. According to
ed States was involved in its campaign against
press articles, some U.S. officials favor more
terrorism.
strikes against Iraq even in the absence of
evidence linking it to the September attacks,
According to the U.S. Defense Depart-
in view of its efforts to acquire mass destruc-
ment as of late November 1998, expanded
tion weapons, refusal to readmit U.N. weap-
military operations and crisis build-ups in the
ons inspectors, and long-standing support for
Gulf since the 1991 war had cost a total of
terrorism.
$6.9 billion. Incremental costs of these opera-
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
During a speech on June 1, 2002, to graduating West Point cadets, President Bush
promised to “confront regimes that sponsor terror” and said we must “confront the worst
threats before they emerge,” while not mentioning Iraq directly. On June 6, Vice President
Cheney described Iraqi President Saddam Hussein as a dictator who is pursuing “deadly
capabilities” and said such a regime “must never be permitted to threaten America with
weapons of mass destruction.”

According to a Washington Post report of June 16, President Bush signed an order
earlier in the year directing the CIA to undertake a comprehensive, covert program aimed
at overthrowing Saddam Hussein, including the use of lethal force to capture him. State
Department and CIA spokesmen declined to comment on these reports. On June 17, State
Department spokesman Richard Boucher told reporters that “[w]e have made very clear
that we think the world would be better off with a different regime in Iraq. Regime change
has always been part of our policy.”

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
This issue brief covers the most recent U.S.-Iraqi confrontations, which began in the fall
of 1998. It summarizes events that led to the crisis, the allied military build-up, military
strikes against Iraq, international reactions, costs, and options for U.S. policy makers. It does
not cover developments in the war in Afghanistan, except insofar as they may relate to the
U.S.-Iraqi confrontation. For further information on previous U.S.-Iraqi confrontations, see
CRS Report 98-386, Iraq: Post-War Challenges and U.S. Responses, 1991-1998.
Since the cease-fire of March 3, 1991, that ended the Persian Gulf war (Operation
Desert Storm), the United States has resorted on several occasions to the use or threat of
force against Iraq. Some of these incidents resulted from Iraqi challenges to U.N. cease-fire
terms that followed the war. Others resulted from bilateral issues between Iraq and the
United States and its allies.
A principal factor in the most recent confrontation was Iraq’s failure to cooperate fully
with U.N. weapons inspectors. The inspection regime, established by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 687 adopted on April 3, 1991, is designed to identify and dismantle Iraq’s
programs to develop weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, biological, and
nuclear warfare systems as well as missiles capable of delivering them. Two agencies are
charged with conducting these inspections: the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq
(UNSCOM), which deals with chemical, biological, and missile systems; and the
International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA), which deals with Iraqi nuclear weapons
programs. Since the inception of the inspection regime, Iraq has obstructed its work in
various ways:
! False, misleading, or incomplete responses to questions posed by inspectors;
! Interference by Iraqi escorts with the conduct of inspections;
! Denial of access to “sensitive” sites on grounds of national security;
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! Removal of or tampering with material evidence of weapons programs; and
! Attempts to exclude U.S. personnel from inspection teams.
On seven occasions between 1991 and 1993, the U.N. Security Council found Iraq in
“material breach of cease-fire terms”; however, the Council has not issued a finding of
“material breach” since June 17, 1993, despite subsequent Iraqi provocations. According to
news reports, some Council members are reluctant to agree to another such finding, which
they think might provide the basis for an attack on Iraq.
Another factor contributing to the recent confrontation was Iraqi violation of the no-fly
zones imposed by the United States and its allies over portions of northern and southern Iraq.
U.S. and British aircraft (and formerly French aircraft) have conducted overflights of
northern and southern Iraq since 1991 and 1992, respectively, to enforce the bans on Iraqi
aircraft in these zones. The allied overflights are known as Operation Northern Watch and
Operation Southern Watch and are designed to exclude Iraqi aircraft from flying north of the
36th parallel and south of the 33rd parallel, respectively. The southern zone, covering 227,277
square kilometers (87,729 square miles) is larger than the northern zone, which covers
43,707 square kilometers (16,871 square miles), but Iraqi air defenses reportedly are thicker
in the northern zone. Together, these zones cover 270,985 square kilometers (104,600 square
miles), or 62% of Iraqi territory.
U.S. officials base the no-fly zones primarily on U.N. Security Council Resolution 688
of April 5, 1991, which demands that Iraq end repression of its population (notably Kurds
in the north and Shi’ite Muslims in the south), and on the military cease-fire agreements after
the Gulf war (the Safwan Accords), which forbid Iraq to interfere with allied air operations
over Iraq. Some countries question this interpretation, arguing that Resolution 688 was not
passed under Chapter VII provisions (peace and security) and does not by itself permit
military action to enforce its terms. Iraq maintains that the no-fly zones constitute an illegal
infringement on its sovereignty and has occasionally fired on allied planes conducting
overflights to enforce these zones.
Events of the Crisis
Forerunner Episodes
Between mid-1993 and 1996, UNSCOM personnel were able to carry out their
inspections of Iraqi weapons programs with relatively little interference by the government
of Iraq. Increasing attempts by Iraq in 1997 to impede U.N. weapons inspections and to
exclude U.S. personnel from UNSCOM teams prompted demands by the U.N. Security
Council that Iraq cease its interference or face further sanctions. A Russian undertaking in
November 1997 to seek “balanced representation” in UNSCOM membership temporarily
averted a crisis; however, tensions mounted again in January 1998, as Iraq once more barred
U.S.-led teams from conducting inspections and declared several “sensitive sites” off limits
to U.N. inspectors. After a month of intensive diplomacy and a continuing build-up of U.S.
forces in the Persian Gulf region, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister and the U.N. Secretary
General signed an agreement with the following provisions:
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! Reconfirmation by Iraq that it accepts relevant U.N. resolutions
! Commitment of U.N. member states to “respect the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Iraq”
! “Immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access” by UNSCOM and
IAEA within Iraq, with respect for Iraqi concerns relating to “national
security, sovereignty, and dignity”
! Special procedures to apply to inspections at eight “presidential sites”
defined in an annex to the agreement
! Efforts to accelerate the inspection process, and an undertaking by the
Secretary General to bring to U.N. Security Council members the concerns
of Iraq over economic sanctions.
On March 3, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1154, co-
sponsored by Britain and Japan, which commended the initiative of the Secretary General
in security these commitments from Iraq, stressed that Iraq must comply with its obligations,
and warned that any violation of these terms or other Security Council resolutions “would
have the severest consequences for Iraq.” Although inspections during the spring of 1998
proceeded relatively smoothly, many questions concerning Iraq’s weapons programs
remained unresolved. Also, Iraqi spokesmen continued periodically to warn of a new crisis
if economic sanctions were not quickly removed.
December 1998 Air Strikes
After a lull of several months, tensions mounted in August 1998, as Iraq began to
challenge U.N. operations once more. On August 5, Iraq announced that it would no longer
allow UNSCOM to inspect new facilities, and followed with a ban on all remaining
UNSCOM activities on October 31. U.S. officials described Iraq’s actions as unacceptable,
as did some other members of the Security Council. Resolution 1205 of November 5, which
demanded that Iraq rescind its bans on U.N. weapons inspection activities and resume full
cooperation with UNSCOM, did not specifically mentioned use of force; however, U.S.
officials emphasized again that all options are open including military force to compel Iraqi
compliance. On November 11, the United Nations evacuated more than 230 staff personnel
from Baghdad, including all weapons inspectors, as the United States warned of possible
retaliatory strikes against Iraq.
As U.S. forces were on the verge of conducting air and missile strikes against Iraq on
November 14, the Clinton Administration delayed them for 24 hours upon learning that Iraq
had agreed to resume cooperation with UNSCOM. After further negotiations, Iraq agreed
in a letter to the Security Council on November 15 to provide unconditional cooperation to
UNSCOM and rescind its ban on UNSCOM activities. The Administration then canceled
the planned strikes; however, the President warned that Iraq must fulfill its obligations.
Specifically, in a news conference on November 15, he listed five conditions Iraq must fulfill
to meet the criteria of unconditional cooperation:
! Resolution of all outstanding issues raised by UNSCOM and the IAEA.
! Unfettered access for inspectors with no restrictions, consistent with the
February 23 memorandum signed by Iraq.
! Turnover by Iraq of all relevant documents.
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! Acceptance by Iraq of all U.N. resolutions related to mass destructions
weapons.
! No interference with the independence or professional expertise of weapons
inspectors.
Despite its pledges on November 14-15, Iraq began to impede the work of U.N.
weapons inspectors once more, according to statements by UNSCOM Chief Butler on
December 8. On December 15, Butler submitted a report in which he concluded that “Iraq
did not provide the full cooperation it promised on 14 November 1998" and “initiated new
forms of restrictions upon the Commission’s work.” On December 15, Butler withdrew
remaining UNSCOM inspectors from Iraq, saying that they could no longer perform their
mission. On the following day, then President Clinton directed U.S. forces to strike military
and security targets in Iraq. He described the mission as “to attack Iraq’s nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons programs and its military capacity to threaten its neighbors.”
Attacks began on December 16, 1998, at 5:06 p.m. EST (December 17 at 1:06 a.m.
Baghdad time) in an operation known as Desert Fox, as U.S. forces launched over 200 cruise
missiles (officials declined to give an exact number) at over 50 targets in Iraq, from the
aircraft carrier U.S.S. Enterprise, other Navy ships in the region, and some 70 Navy and
Marine Corps aircraft. According to some media reports, B-52 bombers based in the Indian
Ocean island of Diego Garcia took part as well. British forces also joined in the attacks. A
second wave of attacks took place on the evening of December 17-18, involving
approximately 100 cruise missiles (but with larger warheads than those used in the first wave
of attacks) and B-52 bombers, again with British participation. B-1 bombers joined the
attack during the third wave (evening of December 18-19), marking the first combat
operations for this aircraft. After the fourth wave of attacks (evening of December 19-20),
President Clinton halted the 72-hour operation (code named Operation Desert Fox) on
December 20. Senior U.S. officials warned that the United States would repeat its attacks
as often as necessary to prevent Iraq from continuing programs to develop mass destruction
weapons.
During Operation Desert Fox, U.S. and British forces launched approximately 415
cruise missiles (325 Tomahawks fired by Navy ships and 90 air launched cruise missiles
mainly by B-52s) and dropped more than 600 bombs. According to reports by the U.S.
Department of Defense, the 97 targets of allied attacks included lethal weapons production
or storage facilities (11), security facilities for weapons (18), Iraqi Republican Guards and
other military facilities (9), government command, control, and communications facilities
(20), air defense systems (32), airfields (6), and one oil refinery. According to preliminary
Defense Department assessments on December 20, 10 targets were destroyed, 18 severely
damaged, 18 moderately damaged, 18 lightly damaged, and 23 not yet assessed. A second
assessment on December 21 cited a total of 98 targets, of which 43 were severely damaged
or destroyed, 30 moderately damaged, 12 lightly damaged, and 13 not damaged. The U.S.
theater commander described the estimates as conservative, pointing out that even lightly
damaged facilities can be rendered unusable. There were no U.S. or British casualties.
According to the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, the allied action killed 62 Iraqi military
personnel (including 38 Republican Guards) and wounded 180; there have been no estimates
of Iraqi civilian casualties. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Harry Shelton told
the Senate on January 5, 1999, however, that allied strikes killed or wounded an estimated
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1,400 members of Iraq’s elite military and security forces (600 from the Special Republican
Guard and 800 from the Republican Guard).
Further Actions
A series of follow-on military actions have occurred since December 28, 1998, as Iraqi
air defenses have tried to target U.S. and British aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones and Iraqi
aircraft have made brief intrusions into the zones. U.S. Air Force and Navy aircraft, as well
as British aircraft, have responded to Iraqi challenges with anti-radiation missile strikes
directed against Iraq air defense and command and control installations and have fired at
intruding Iraqi aircraft. Before Operation Desert Fox, U.S. responses to Iraqi violations of
the no-fly zones were usually confined to the immediate source of the violation, i.e., an air
defense battery or an intruding Iraqi aircraft. On January 27, 1999, authorities expanded
rules of engagement to allow U.S. aircraft to target a wider range of Iraqi air defense systems
and related installations in response to Iraqi violations of the no-fly zones. In congressional
testimony on March 23, 2000, a Defense Department official said operational commanders
have been given additional flexibility in responding to Iraqi provocations; under the current
rules of engagement, pilots may respond not only by defending themselves but also by acting
to reduce the overall Iraqi air defense threat to coalition aircraft.
Official Iraqi media reported on January 3, 1999 that President Saddam Hussein
condemned the no-fly zones as illegal and said his people would resist them with “bravery
and courage.” The Iraqi President followed up by offering a $14,000 bounty to any unit that
succeeded in shooting down an allied plane and an additional $2,800 reward for capturing
an allied pilot. In an NBC interview carried on June 17, 2001, the Iraqi Ambassador to the
United Nations said Iraq would do “anything possible to down American planes” and
confirmed that the government had offered a reward to Iraqi military personnel who
succeeded in doing so.
In a May 8, 2000 interview, the U.S. commander of Operation Northern Watch said
Iraqi air defense weapons, which can reach altitudes of 40,000 feet, have the capability to hit
U.S. aircraft. According to a July 24 press report, however, the newly designated
commander responsible for the Southern Watch operation told the Senate Armed Services
Committee that Iraqi air defense missiles are largely ineffective because they do not use their
radar systems (which allied pilots can target) and because they must move frequently
(approximately every 12 hours). On June 15, the commander of Iraqi air defense forces
asserted that Iraq had succeeded in shooting down or intercepting 100 U.S. high-speed anti-
radar missiles (HARM) used by allies to target Iraqi radar; however, allied sources dismissed
the Iraqi claim. Similarly, allied officials state that no U.S. or British planes have been lost,
despite Iraqi claims to the contrary. (On September 13, 2000, an Iraqi air defense spokesman
asserted that Iraqi air defense units had shot down 10 allied aircraft since December 17,
1998.)
Iraq has claimed that allied air strikes have killed a number of Iraqi civilians. In a note
to the U.N. Human Rights Commission released by U.N. officials on March 26, 2001, the
Iraqi government protested that allied air strikes had killed 315 and wounded 965 Iraqis, all
civilians; the note described the allied overflights as a violation of international law.
Subsequently, the Iraqi government claimed that a U.S.-British air strike on June 20, 2001
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killed 23 Iraqis and injured 11 others participating in a soccer game near the city of Mosul
in northern Iraqi.
U.S. and British officials have denied some Iraqi reports of civilian casualties and have
attributed others to the Iraqi practice of placing air defense weapons in close proximity to
populated areas, thus using nearby residents as human shields. For example, on August 18,
1999, U.S. Defense Department officials said reconnaissance photographs showed two Iraqi
missile launchers located 115 feet from homes in the northern city of Mosul. On at least one
occasion, in May 1999, U.S. authorities reportedly acknowledged the likelihood that allied
units had erroneously identified a civilian target as an air defense installation. Allied
officials have dismissed some Iraqi complaints as distortions or fabrications; with regard to
the alleged soccer casualties, for example, allied spokesmen said their aircraft had not carried
out any air strikes on June 20 and suggested that any casualties or injuries that occurred may
have been caused by misdirected Iraqi ground fire.
The year 2001 has seen what appears to be a more aggressive effort by Iraq to bring
down an allied aircraft by upgrading its air defense capabilities and mounting more
challenges against allied overflights. Iraq reportedly has succeeded in extending the range
of some of its older model air defense missiles and has made its communications less
vulnerable by installing fiber optic cable, reportedly with Chinese assistance. On July 31,
2001, U.S. Defense Department spokesman Rear Admiral Quigley told reporters that Iraq
has shown “a considerably more aggressive stance in trying to bring down a coalition
aircraft.” He noted continuing provocations by Iraq against allied aircraft over the two no-fly
zones, especially in the southern zone, and allied retaliations (number of days on which allied
aircraft have struck Iraqi targets in response):
! Southern Watch: 221 provocations in 2000 (18.4 per month); 370 in the first
seven months of 2001 (30.8 per month).
! Northern Watch: 145 provocations in 2000 (12.1 per month); 62 in the first
seven months of 2001 (8.9 per month).
In response, allied forces conducted strikes on Iraqi targets in the Southern Watch area on
32 days in 2000 and 19 days during the first 7 months of 2001; in the Northern Watch area,
on 48 days in 2000 and 7 days during the first 7 months of 2001.
U.S. officials have acknowledged increased risks to allied pilots posed by Iraqi
challenges and have made further efforts to counteract them. On June 4, 2001, U.S.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told reporters that “there is a risk to pilots that fly in
areas that are dangerous and defended.” He added that “[t]he risk grows to the extent that
other nations assist Iraq in strengthening its military capability, its air defense capability and
its ability to proceed with its clear and unambiguous desire to have increasingly powerful
weapons and military capabilities.” On August 3, he said: “[i]t does appear that Iraq has
been successful in quantitatively and qualitatively improving their air defenses.” According
to news reports, allied strikes have been increasingly designed to set back recent
improvements in Iraqi air defense capabilities.
The February 2001 Strikes. On February 16, between the hours of 11:20 a.m. and
1:40 p.m. Washington, D.C. time, 24 U.S. and British combat aircraft struck five Iraqi air
defense command-and-control installations, using precision guided munitions. According
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to a U.S. Defense Department spokesman, four of the five installations struck by the allied
aircraft were located north of the 33rd parallel (the northern limit of the southern no-fly zone),
but the aircraft themselves did not go north of the 33rd parallel. The spokesman noted that
this was the first time since Operation Desert Fox that allied aircraft had hit targets outside
the southern no-fly zone, although targets outside the northern zone had been struck during
the fall of 1999.
According to press reports, one goal of the allied strikes was to destroy a fiber optic
cable network that Chinese are reportedly installing to upgrade the effectiveness of Iraqi air
defense radars. On March 6, China’s foreign minister said relevant agencies had investigated
these allegations and found no evidence that Chinese companies had assisted Iraq in
installing fiber optic cables for Iraqi air defenses. A March 17 Washington Post article,
citing U.N. documents and unidentified diplomats, reported that a Chinese company, Huawei
Technologies, has been seeking U.N. approval to sell Iraq telecommunications equipment
and switching systems.
Subsequent press reports indicated that many of the munitions fired by allied units had
missed their targets; according to these reports, a majority of the AGM-154A Joint Stand-Off
Weapons (JSOWs) dropped by U.S. aircraft went astray, although two other types of “smart
weapons” (AGM-130 guided missiles and Stand-Off Land Attack missiles) achieved
somewhat more success. These alleged problems have been attributed by press sources to
several possible factors: human error in programming, heavy wind, software defects,
mechanical failure, or jamming of signals by Iraqis; officials reportedly believe the first two
explanations are the most likely. Defense spokesmen have declined to identify the munitions
used in the strikes.
Additional Strikes and Provocations. Since February 2001, allied forces have
carried out several significant strikes against Iraqi air defense installations, including an Iraqi
mobile early warning radar in southern Iraq on April 19, an air defense site in northern Iraq
on April 20, an air defense installation 180 miles southeast of Baghdad on May 18, and an
air defense site in northern Iraq on August 7. On August 10, in the largest air strike since
February, U.S. and British aircraft hit three installations: a surface-to-air missile battery 170
miles southeast of Baghdad, an associated long-range mobile radar system, and a fiber optic
communications station 70 miles southeast of Baghdad. Before this strike, on July 29, U.S.
National Security Advisor Condoleeza Rice told CNN that the Administration is
contemplating the use of “military force in a more resolute manner” and said that “Saddam
Hussein is on the radar screen for the Administration.”
Meanwhile, some observers believe Iraqi air defense forces may be improving their
ability to target allied aircraft. On July 24, Iraqi forces fired a surface-to-air missile at a U.S.
high altitude U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, and Defense Department sources reportedly said
the missile came close to hitting the plane. On August 27, according to the U.S. Defense
Department, a U.S. Air Force RQ-1B Predator – an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV or
“drone”) – was reported missing over southern Iraq while on a routine mission in support of
Operation Southern Watch. A Defense Department statement described the Predator as “one
of many systems used for reconnaissance and surveillance to monitor Iraqi compliance with
United Nations Security Council Resolutions.” Iraqi media claimed that Iraq's air defense
units successfully hit the UAV, while the U.S. Defense Department statement said the
aircraft may have crashed or may have been shot down. According to the U.S. Defense
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Department, no sensitive technology was compromised by the loss of the aircraft. Press
reports have noted, however, that if the Iraqi claim is correct, it would be the first time that
a U.S. aircraft involved in enforcing the Northern or Southern Watch Operations has been
brought down by enemy fire.
A second RQ-1B was lost over southern Iraq on September 11 and a third on October
10. Again, Iraqi media claimed responsibility for both losses but U.S. military spokesmen
said they had not confirmed the cause. Conflicting reports indicate that a fourth Predator
may have been lost on May 27, 2002; Iraq claimed to have forced an unmanned
reconnaissance plane (nationality not indicated) on a mission over northern Iraq to land,
while unnamed defense sources in Kuwait said a Predator malfunctioned and crashed in
northern Kuwait. According to a U.S. military spokesman commenting on the first incident,
U.S. officials are aware of efforts by Iraq to bring down a manned allied aircraft. Press
articles on April 23, 2002, reported that Iraq had significantly reinforced its surface-to-air
missiles in the no-fly zones; however, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Richard
B. Myers said Iraq frequently moves anti-aircraft systems in and out of these zones.
Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks. The Iraqi government was the only Middle
East regime that did not send condolences to the United States after the September 11
attacks, although Iraq officials did express sympathy to several U.S. non-government
organizations known to oppose U.S. containment policies toward Iraq. According to
numerous press reports, U.S. officials have found no hard evidence of an Iraqi hand in the
attacks or subsequent cases of anthrax, although some U.S. officials suspect Iraqi
involvement. Some commentators have pointed to several alleged meetings in recent years
between Iraqi intelligence officials and members of Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda
organization and speculated that Iraq could provide Al Qaeda with money and expertise on
chemical and biological warfare. Other commentators counter that Saddam and bin Laden
have different views and ideologies and note that Iraq has been trying recently to cultivate
better relations with western countries in an effort to gain support for terminating economic
sanctions imposed after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990. In testimony before the Senate Armed
Services Committee on March 19, 2002, Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet said
“the jury’s out” regarding any Iraqi involvement in the September 11 attacks but added that
“it would be a mistake to dismiss the possibility of state sponsorship, whether Iranian or
Iraqi, and we’ll see where the evidence takes us.”
On October 11, U.S. Defense Department spokesmen were quoted as saying that there
had been no significant increase in skirmishes between allied forces and Iraqi forces since
the September 11 attacks. According to a November 19 press article, however, even in the
absence of evidence linking Iraq to the attacks, some U.S. officials are in favor of more
strikes against Iraq because of its efforts to acquire mass destruction weapons, its refusal to
readmit U.N. weapons inspectors, and its long-standing support for terrorism. In the spring
of 2002, according to news media, allied pilots reported a series of Iraqi attacks against allied
aircraft with surface-to-air missiles and antiaircraft artillery.

On January 29, 2002, in his State of the Union address, President Bush described Iraq,
Iran, and North Korea as constituting “an axis of evil.” During a speech on June 1, 2002 to
graduating West Point cadets, President Bush promised to “confront regimes that sponsor
terror” and said we must “confront the worst threats before they emerge,” while not
mentioning Iraq directly. On June 6, Vice President Cheney described Iraqi President
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Saddam Hussein as a dictator who is pursuing “deadly capabilities” and said such a regime
“must never be permitted to threaten America with weapons of mass destruction.” On the
previous day, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld warned that “with every month that goes by,
their [Iraq’s] programs mature.” According to a Washington Post report of June 16,
President Bush signed an order earlier in the year directing the CIA to undertake a
comprehensive, covert program aimed at overthrowing Saddam Hussein, including the use
of lethal force to capture him. State Department and CIA spokesmen declined to comment
on these reports. On June 17, State Department spokesman Richard Boucher told reporters
that “[w]e have made very clear that we think the world would be better off with a different
regime in Iraq. Regime change has always been part of our policy.” Iraq’s Foreign Minister
appeared to downplay the significance of the Washington Post report, telling foreign
journalists on June 17 that “the United States has been conspiring against Iraq over the last
30 years.”
Force Deployments and Costs
The 1998 Build-Up
U.S. force levels have fluctuated somewhat since the latest series of confrontations that
began in the fall of 1997. During the mid-1990s, U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf region on
an average comprised 15,000 to 20,000 personnel (many of them Navy and Marine Corps
personnel embarked on ships), together with up to 200 aircraft and 20 ships, usually but not
always including an aircraft carrier. The first phase of the crisis saw U.S. force levels
increase to more than 40,000 personnel in late February and March, reinforced with British
and other allied contingents. As the crisis receded later in the spring, forces were briefly
drawn back down to their pre-1997 levels.
As the crisis worsened again in the fall of 1998, U.S. force levels in the Gulf began to
climb once more. Additional deployments begun on November 11 were briefly halted after
November 16, following cancellation of planned allied strikes in response to a last-minute
understanding reached with Iraq. As Iraq failed to honor its November commitments,
Secretary Cohen announced “a sharp increase in our forces in the Gulf” (approximately
24,100 personnel as of December 15). Cohen and General Shelton announced the
deployment of a “crisis response force” consisting of nearly 60 additional Air Force and
Marine jet fighters (including 10 F-117A radar-evading stealth fighters), additional Patriot
missiles, elements of an Army brigade (some 2,700 troops), and a second aircraft carrier, the
U.S.S. Carl Vinson with up to 60 Navy jet fighters, to the Gulf region. According to
subsequent reports, up to 15,000 additional military personnel were deployed or ordered to
the region. During Operation Desert Fox, Defense Department officials said U.S. force
strength in the Gulf reached 29,900 on December 19, together with 37 ships and 348 aircraft.
After Desert Fox
These forces were once more reduced after Operation Desert Fox was over, even though
smaller scale military action continued. U.S. commanders pointed out that the lack of an
effective Iraqi response to Desert Fox made the reinforcements unnecessary at this time, and
said the United States would return to a normal continuous presence in the Gulf. Most U.S.
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personnel in the region, including those conducting Operation Southern Watch, are assigned
to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), whose area of responsibility covers large parts
of the Middle East, southern and central Asia, and northeast Africa. U.S. forces conducting
Operation Northern Watch are based in Turkey and assigned to U.S. European Command
(EUCOM). The task forces responsible for enforcing the two no-fly zones are linked by a
hot line and coordinate many of their operations. On September 12, 2000, a Defense
Department official said that at any given time the United States has between 20,000 and
25,000 personnel in the region, most of them afloat. The total number of U.S. military
aircraft (Navy and Air Force) in the Gulf region has generally averaged about 200 in recent
years. Ship totals have varied; as of June 2001, the U.S. Navy had 20 ships (including one
aircraft carrier and eight other combatants) in the Gulf region.
U.S. and other allied forces in the region have increased significantly since the
September 11 attacks. Recent official figures are not available; however, according to a
February 24, 2002 Washington Post article, Defense Department officials said there are
60,000 U.S. troops in the CENTCOM area of operations, of which 4,000 are on the ground
in Afghanistan. Many other troops in the CENTCOM area are involved in supporting allied
operations Afghanistan. Asked by reporters on June 11, 2002, if the United States has any
plans to reduce U.S. military presence in the Gulf region, Secretary Rumsfeld answered “we
don’t discuss the size of our military presence around the world” and added: “Do we have
any plans at the moment to make significant changes [in force presence] up or down? Not
that I know of.”
Costs
A Defense Department spokesman told reporters on November 17, 1998 that expanded
military operations and crisis build-ups in the Gulf since the war in 1991 had cost a total of
$6.9 billion. Much of this figure represents the costs of enforcing the no-fly zones over
northern and southern Iraq. Following are costs estimates for several other crisis build-ups
and retaliatory operations undertaken by the United States between 1991 and 1997.
! Troop movements and retaliatory strikes against Iraq, December 1992-
January 1993: $400 million
! Troop deployments to counter Iraqi force movements, October 1994
(Operation Vigilant Warrior): $257 million (partially defrayed by Kuwait
and Saudi Arabia)
! Retaliatory strikes following Iraqi incursion into protected northern zone,
August-September 1996 (Operation Desert Strike): $102.7 million.
Incremental costs of U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf since FY1997 appear in Table
1, below. Cost figures since FY2001 are not available.
Britain, according to an August 23, 1999 London Times report, is spending
approximately 4.5 million pounds ($7.19 million at exchange rate of U.K. 1 pound=U.S.
$1.5974) per month on its deployments in the Gulf. Current figures are not available.
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Table 1. Costs of Persian Gulf Operations
(in U.S. $ millions)
Operation
FY1998
FY1999
FY2000
FY2001*
Southern Watch
1,497.2
933.2
755.4
678.0
Northern Watch
136.0
156.4
143.7
138.7
Desert Spring (Kuwait training)**
5.6
13.8
239.8
241.8
Desert Thunder (Nov. 1998 build-up)
n/a
43.5
n/a
n/a
Desert Fox (Dec. 1998 air strikes)
n/a
92.9
n/a
n/a
Totals
1,638.8
1,239.8
1,138.9
1,058.5
Source: Department of Defense, Comptroller.
*Estimate.
**Known as Intrinsic Action until FY2000.
U.S. and International Reactions
Administration Position on Use of Force
U.S. administrations have taken the position that they already have sufficient authority
to use military force to compel Iraqi compliance. On February 3, 1998, during an earlier
phase of the present confrontation, Clinton Administration officials reportedly cited the joint
resolution passed by Congress on the eve of the 1991 Gulf war (P.L. 102-1) as the basis for
this authority. P.L. 102-1 has no expiration date, and some specialists in international law
agree that this law provides sufficient authority to U.S. administrations to use force against
Iraq.
In the international context, the United States believes that two previous U.N. Security
Council resolutions provide sufficient authority to use force against Iraq: Resolution 678
(November 29, 1990), which authorized military action after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and
Resolution 687 (April 3, 1991), which made a cease-fire conditional on Iraqi compliance
with various specified terms, including the inspection and dismantling of Iraq’s lethal
weapons programs. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1154 of March 2, 1998 (see above)
does not specifically mention the use of force, but warns Iraq of “severest consequences” for
violation. In a news conference on March 11, President Clinton said “We believe that the
resolution gives us the authority to take whatever actions are necessary. But, of course, we
would consult [with other Security Council members].” Subsequently, U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1205 of November 5, 1998 condemned Iraq’s refusal to cooperate with
UNSCOM as a “flagrant violation” of Resolution 687 and other relevant agreements, and
expressed full support for efforts by the Secretary General to seek full implementation of the
February 23 agreement. Other members of the Security Council, however, with the notable
exception of Britain, do not believe that the wording of recent U.N. Security Council
resolutions provides an automatic trigger authorizing military force.
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Congressional Reactions
Congress has been largely supportive of Administration efforts to compel Iraqi
compliance with U.N. resolutions. Some Members have argued for even stronger measures
against Iraq, although others believe the Administration should seek further congressional
authorization before engaging in any significant escalation of hostilities. Congress has also
appropriated funds to defray the cost of increased U.S. force deployments to the Gulf since
1997 (see CRS Report 98-386, Iraq: Post-War Challenges and U.S. Responses, 1991-1998,
updated March 31, 1999, for further information on costs and appropriations).
Some Republican Members of Congress questioned the timing of the Clinton
Administration’s decision to launch the strikes in December 1998, noting that the decision
coincided with the floor debates in the House on impeachment of then President Clinton.
The President denied that issue of impeachment was related to his decision to launch air
strikes, and said the timing was dictated by the need for surprise, along with his desire to
avoid starting hostilities during the month of Ramadan. On December 17, 1998, the House
of Representatives passed H.Res. 612, expressing unequivocal support for the men and
women of our Armed Forces carrying out missions in the Persian Gulf region, and supporting
efforts to remove Saddam Hussein from power, by 417 to 5, with one voting “present” (Roll
No. 539).
Some Members of Congress have expressed support for expanding the campaign against
terrorism to Iraq, in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States.
On December 20, 2001, the House of Representatives passed H.J.Res. 75, entitled
“Regarding inspection and monitoring to prevent the development of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq”, by 392 to 12, with 7 present, Roll no. 511. Among other things, this
resolution stated that Iraq “remains in material and unacceptable breach of its international
obligations” and that Iraq’s refusal to allow U.N. weapons inspectors “immediate,
unconditional, and unrestricted access ... presents a mounting threat to the United States, its
friends and allies, and international peace and security.” According to press articles on June
17, 2002, congressional leaders from both parties expressed support for an order reportedly
issued by President Bush earlier in the year directing the CIA to undertake a comprehensive
program aimed at overthrowing Saddam Hussein. (See above.)
International Reactions
International reactions to U.S. reprisals against Iraq have been mixed and have varied
according to the nature of the crisis that precipitated a U.S. military response. On the whole,
altered international conditions have caused some erosion since 1991 in international support
for the use of force against Iraq. Contributing factors include U.S.-Russian tensions, Arab
disillusionment with broader U.S. Middle East policies, diminished Arab concerns over a
potential threat from Iraq, and increasing sympathy for the sufferings of the Iraqi people.
Most European allies supported Desert Fox, as did Japan, South Korea, Australia, and
Canada. Britain, on its part, has continued to participate in U.S. military actions against Iraq
and, along with the United States, takes the position that existing U.N. resolutions provide
the necessary legal basis for such action. France, on the other hand, regretted the air strikes
and China and Russia condemned them. France also suspended its participation in the allied
overflights of southern Iraq. The latter three countries have continued to criticize the U.S.-
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British retaliatory responses to Iraqi challenges in the no-fly zones since December 1998.
Criticism increased after the February 16, 2001 allied strikes on Iraq’s air defense
installations. According to the Kremlin, Russian President Vladimir Putin described the
strikes as “counter-productive for the process of a political settlement” and the French
Foreign Minister said there was “no legal basis for this type of bombardment.” Turkey’s
Prime Minister said “[t]he U.S. Administration should have informed us beforehand” of the
strikes. In east Asia, Japan declined either to endorse or to criticize the strikes, but South
Korea’s national news agency warned that the “policy of strangling Iraq” has failed to
achieve its goals. Meanwhile, according to a U.S. official, the U.S. State Department has
been in touch with China about reports of Chinese assistance in upgrading Iraqi air defense
units.
Most Arab leaders were restrained in their comments on the December 1998 strikes, but
hostile demonstrations took place in several countries including Egypt, Jordan, Yemen,
Palestinian areas, and Syria (where they briefly turned violent). The 55-member Islamic
Conference Organization appealed for a halt to the attacks on Iraq. Kuwait and Oman, alone
among the six pro-western Gulf states, allowed U.S. and British combat aircraft to launch
strikes from bases on their territory. The other four, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE), allowed support operations and including air space clearance
and take-off by refueling planes. Saudi Arabia expressed hopes that the strikes would end
quickly, and the UAE Defense Minister went so far as to say “the option of force should not
even have been considered, as the only ones who suffer are the Iraqi people.” On December
30, 1998, Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan reaffirmed that Saudi Arabia would not agree
to air strikes from its territory, but called on Iraq to implement U.N. Security Council
resolutions.
Arab countries have reacted ambivalently to follow-on allied military operations against
Iraq during 1999 and 2000. Gulf states have not publicly endorsed U.S. responses to Iraqi
challenges in the no-fly zones and Qatar’s foreign minister expressed concern during a joint
news conference with then Secretary of Defense Cohen on March 9, 1999, commenting that
“We do not wish to see Iraq bombed daily or these attacks which are being made in the no-fly
zones.” An Arab League foreign ministers’ meeting on March 18 called for an end to all
operations against Iraq not backed by the U.N. Security Council, but urged all countries to
abide by Security Council resolutions in “spirit and letter.” A year later, on April 9, 2000,
Saudi Minister of Defense Prince Sultan made the following statement in a news conference:
... the [U.S.] troops which have been in Saudi Arabia since the end of Desert Storm are
within the frame of United Nations assignments and directions to continue the
surveillance of southern Iraq, and also the border of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, as well as
the other GCC countries. And these troops are doing their duties to protect peace only,
and not for aggression.
Saudi officials continue to cite provocations by Iraq. On June 4, 2001, the Saudi
Ambassador to the United Nations charged that Iraq had staged 11 raids on Saudi border
outposts during recent months.
Arab governments, including those friendly to the United States, denounced the allied
strikes conducted against Iraqi air defense installations on February 16, 2001. The Secretary
General of the Arab League stated that the raid “has no justification, violates international
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law, and has provoked anger and resentment in the Arab world.” Egypt’s Foreign Minister
called the raid “a serious negative step that we cannot accept,” while his Jordanian
counterpart said Jordan “never condones the use of military force against Iraq.” Saudi Arabia
initially withheld official comment and a senior Saudi official said his country was not
previously informed of the strikes. On February 21, 2001, however, Saudi Foreign Minister
Prince Saud al-Faysal during a visit to Damascus issued a joint statement with the Syrian
Foreign Minister that “[b]oth sides expressed feelings of denunciation and anxiety over the
recent escalation against south Baghdad.” In nearby Oman, the Minister of State for Foreign
Affairs commented that “[t]hose attacks will not benefit regional security or negotiations and
discussions.”
Since the September 11, 2001 attacks, friendly Arab leaders have urged the United
States not to expand the current war against terrorism to target Iraq or other Arab countries.
At a summit conference in Beirut, Lebanon on March 27-28, 2002, Arab leaders adopted a
resolution that contained several clauses dealing with Iraq. The resolution welcomed
assurances by Iraq that it will respect “the independence, sovereignty, and security of the
state of Kuwait”; it called on Iraq to cooperate with Kuwait in identifying and returning
missing Kuwaiti persons and property; it called for lifting economic sanctions on Iraq; it
rejected “threats of aggression against some Arab states, particularly Iraq”; and it reiterated
a “categorical rejection” of attacking Iraq or threatening any Arab state. After subsequent
talks between President Bush and Saudi Crown Prince Abdullah on April 25, Saudi Foreign
Minister Prince Saud al-Faysal told reporters that “we see no need for any military or other
action” against Iraq, inasmuch as Iraq and U.N. representatives are discussing the issue of
re-admitting weapons inspectors.
Some U.S. officials and commentators believe Arab leaders would secretly welcome
the overthrow of the Saddam Hussein regime, notwithstanding public statements to the
contrary. On his return from a trip to the Middle East, Vice President Dick Cheney told
reporters on March 21 that he had found regional leaders “uniformly concerned about the
situation in Iraq, in particular about Saddam Hussein's failure to live up to the U.N. Security
Council resolutions, especially number 687, that he pledged to at the end of the war, that said
he'd get rid of all of his weapons of mass destruction.” But news reports indicated that the
Vice President’s hosts expressed more concern over mounting Israeli-Palestinian tensions
in the Israeli-occupied West Bank territory than with issues related to Iraq.
Plans and Alternatives
Military options present various challenges. Ship-borne missile strikes against selected
Iraqi targets incur relatively few risks and have the added advantage of not requiring
overflight permission or logistical support from Gulf allies; however, missile strikes by
themselves have had only limited effects in the past. Supplementing missile strikes with a
more massive bombing campaign could succeed in destroying some key military
organizations, weapons production facilities, and command and logistical installations, as
in the 1998 Desert Fox operation. A bombing campaign, however, entails risks to U.S. pilots
and aircrews, inflicts more civilian casualties, and elicits significant opposition within the
Arab world. A further limiting factor is the reluctance of Saudi Arabia and some other Gulf
states to permit air strikes from their territory. Similarly, ground action would be difficult
without more widespread allied support than currently exists; it is doubtful that Saudi Arabia
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or other neighboring states would allow the U:nited States to stage a ground invasion of Iraq
from their territory.
Since the attacks of September 11, 2001, however, reports that the Bush Administration
is considering expanding the war on terrorism to Iraq have prompted further discussion in
news media over the nature, timing, and military feasibility of an attack against that country.
According to a New York Times article of April 28, 2002, for example, the Administration
is developing plans for a potential combined air and ground invasion that would deploy
between 70,000 and 250,000 U.S. troops, depending on the mission and force mix. Another
report alleges that planners are studying two broad options: a heavy invasion force with a
strong ground force component, perhaps on the order of 200,000 troops; and a smaller force
with the main emphasis on air power and special operations forces, somewhat more akin to
the Afghanistan model. Yet another article in late June alleged that the Administration is
considering three options: logistical and intelligence support to the opposition to foment a
mutiny or coup against Saddam Hussein; air and limited ground support for an assault by
Iraqi opposition groups; or an outright U.S. invasion of Iraq. Other variant options have
appeared in the media.
Administration spokesmen have said the President has not made a decision on launching
an attack. In congressional testimony on May 1, Secretary of State Colin Powell said “the
President does not have a military plan on his desk now of the kind described in the [April
28 New York Times] press story.” A press article of June 19 points to indications that
President Bush may give covert strategy and international sanctions more time to work
before adopting other approaches.
U.S. officials and analysts have suggested various other options that could be used in
conjunction with or as a substitute for a conventional military attack. These options include
further curtailments on Iraqi military activity, more emphasis on unconventional warfare, or
more active support for anti-government militia or other opposition groups in their efforts
to topple the regime of Saddam Hussein. For example, the United States could consider
extending the two no-fly zones imposed by the allies over northern and southern Iraq to cover
the entire country, coupled with a ban on helicopter flights and imposition of “no-drive”
zones forbidding movement of Iraqi armored forces in designated areas. To enforce such
measures, however, the United States and its allies would have to allocate more assets, incur
greater risks, and deal with further challenges by Iraq. Another approach would involve
covert action against the Iraqi regime, combined with an expanded program to buttress the
efforts of opposition groups. (For more information, see CRS Report RS20843, Iraq: U.S.
Efforts to Change the Regime,
by Kenneth Katzman.) Many analysts believe the opposition
is too fragmented and lacking in support within the Iraqi heartland to be effective, and cite
the failure of previous efforts to build a viable opposition in Iraq. Others maintain that the
United States has provided insufficient support to opposition groups and missed key
opportunities to further their efforts.
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Table 2. Comparative Military Strengths and Inventories: Gulf States
Field Artillery
Naval Units
Other
Attack
Surface
Military
Self-
Combat
Sub-
Country
Tanks Armored Towed
Heli-
Combat-
Personnel
Propelled
Aircraft
marines
Vehicles
copters
ants
Saudi
205,500
910
5,017
160
200
33
348
8
0
Arabia
United Arab
65,000
411
1,360
80
181
49
101
2
0
Emirates
Oman
43,400
117
290
96
24
0
40
0
0
Kuwait
15,500
293
556
0
68
20
82
0
0
Qatar
12,330
35
302
12
28
19
18
0
0
Bahrain
11,000
106
306
22
62
40
34
1
0
Total: Allies
348,730
1,872
7,831
370
563
161
623
11
0
Iraq
424,000
2,200
3,700
1,900
150
100
316
0
0
Iran
513,000
1,565
1,455
2,085
310
104
288*
3
5
Source:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2001-2002. (Note: Figures
shown here do not include materiel believed to be in storage and inoperable.)
* Includes aircraft flown from Iraq to Iran during 1991 Gulf war.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Issue Brief IB92117. Iraqi Compliance with Cease-Fire Agreements, by Kenneth
Katzman.
CRS Report 98-386. Iraq: Post-War Challenges and U.S. Responses, 1991-1998, by Alfred
B. Prados.
CRS Report RS20843. Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime, by Kenneth Katzman.
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