Order Code RL30957
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990
Updated June 18, 2002
Shirley A. Kan
Specialist in National Security Policy
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990
Summary
This CRS Report discusses U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, or Republic of China
(ROC), including policy issues for Congress and current legislation. The Taiwan
Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, has governed U.S. arms sales to Taiwan since 1979,
when the United States recognized the People’s Republic of China (PRC) instead of
the ROC. There are two other relevant elements of the “one China” policy: the
August 17, 1982 U.S.-PRC Joint Communique and the “Six Assurances” made to
Taiwan. (For more on policy, see CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution
of the “One China” Policy – Key Statements from Washington, Beijing, and Taipei
.)
Despite the unofficial nature of relations, U.S. arms sales to Taiwan have been
significant. In addition to transfers of hardware, the United States has expanded
military exchanges with Taiwan after the PRC’s missile exercises in 1995-1996, and
the Pentagon has reportedly conducted assessments of Taiwan’s defense needs.
For 2001, U.S.-Taiwan annual arms sales talks took place on April 24.
According to the Administration and various news reports, President George W.
Bush approved Taiwan’s request for: diesel-electric submarines (perhaps a German
or Dutch design with U.S. technology), P-3 maritime search/anti-submarine aircraft
(linked to the submarine sale), 4 decommissioned U.S. Kidd-class destroyers, and
other items. He also deferred approval for Aegis-equipped destroyers and other
items, while denying other requests.
Several policy issues are of concern to Congress. One policy issue concerns the
effectiveness of the Administration in assisting Taiwan’s defense, as it faces the
People’s Liberation Army (PLA)’s missile buildup and arms acquisitions, primarily
from Russia. Another issue is the role of Congress in determining arms sales to
Taiwan. A third issue, raised by President Bush on April 24, 2001, is how to replace
the process of annual arms talks with Taiwan.
This CRS Report concludes with a list of sales of major defense articles and
services to Taiwan, as approved by the President, proposed in Letters of Offer and
Acceptance, and notified to Congress since 1990. Based on unclassified notices,
reports, and interviews, this list includes the date of notification, major item proposed
for sale, and estimated value of the defense package.

Contents
U.S. Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Policy Statements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Broad Indicators of Arms Transfers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Military Exchanges and Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
April 2001 Approvals of Arms Requests . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Policy Issues and Congressional Action . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Arms Sales . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Role of Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Arms Talks Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Current Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Sales of Major U.S. Defense Articles and Services . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8

Taiwan: Major U.S. Arms Sales Since 1990
U.S. Policy
This CRS Report discusses U.S. arms sales to Taiwan, or Republic of China
(ROC), including policy issues for Congress. It also lists sales of major defense
articles and services to Taiwan, as approved by the Administration, proposed in
Letters of Offer and Acceptance, and notified to Congress since 1990. Based on
unclassified notices, reports, and interviews, this list includes the date of notification,
major item proposed for sale, and estimated value of the defense package.
Policy Statements
The Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), P.L. 96-8, has governed U.S. arms sales to
Taiwan since 1979, when the United States recognized the People’s Republic of
China (PRC) instead of the ROC.1 The TRA specifies a congressional role in
decision-making on security assistance for Taiwan. Sec. 3(a) states that “the United
States will make available to Taiwan such defense articles and defense services in
such quantity as may be necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-
defense capability.” Sec. 3(b) stipulates that both the President and the Congress
shall determine the nature and quantity of such defense articles and services based
solely upon their judgment of the needs of Taiwan. Sec. 3(b) also says that “such
determination of Taiwan’s defense needs shall include review by United States
military authorities in connection with recommendations to the President and the
Congress.” The TRA set up the American Institute in Taiwan (AIT), a nonprofit
corporation, to handle the unofficial relationship with Taiwan. AIT implements
policy as directed by the Departments of Defense and State, and the National Security
Council of the White House.
There are two other elements of the “one China” policy relevant to the issue of
arms sales to Taiwan. In 1982, President Reagan issued the August 17 Joint
Communique on reducing arms sales to Taiwan, but he also stated that those sales
will continue in accordance with the TRA and with the full expectation that the
PRC’s approach to the resolution of the Taiwan issue will be peaceful. In referring
to what have been known as the “Six Assurances” made to Taipei, U.S. policy-
makers have said that, in 1982, Washington did not agree to set a date for ending
arms sales to Taiwan nor to consult with Beijing on arms sales to Taiwan. The “Six
Assurances” also included the assurance of not revising the TRA.
1 For more on policy, see CRS Report RL30341, China/Taiwan: Evolution of the “One
China” Policy – Key Statements From Washington, Beijing, and Taipei
, by Shirley Kan.

CRS-2
Broad Indicators of Arms Transfers
From worldwide sources, including the United States, Taiwan received $21
billion in arms deliveries in the 8-year period from 1993 to 2000 – with Taiwan
ranked 2nd behind Saudi Arabia among leading recipients in the developing world.
Of that total, Taiwan received $5.6 billion in arms in 1993-1996, and $15.4 billion
in 1997-2000.2
As for U.S. arms transfers to Taiwan, they have been significant despite the
unofficial nature of relations. Deliveries of U.S. defense articles and services to
Taiwan totaled $4 billion in the 1993-1996 period, and $7.6 billion in 1997-2000,
ranking first among Asian recipients. Worldwide, Taiwan ranked third (behind Saudi
Arabia and Egypt) in 1993-1996, and second (behind Saudi Arabia) in 1997-2000.
In 2000 alone, Taiwan received $1.2 billion in U.S. defense articles and services.3
Military Exchanges and Assessments
In addition to transfers of hardware, beginning after tensions in the Taiwan
Strait in 1995-1996, the Clinton Administration quietly expanded the sensitive
military relationship with Taiwan to levels unprecedented since 1979.4 The broader
exchanges reportedly have increased attention to “software,” including discussions
over strategy, training, logistics, command and control, and plans in the event of an
attack from the PRC. These increased exchanges were said to have been prompted
by U.S. concerns over how well Taiwan has upgraded its capabilities to defend itself.
The George W. Bush Administration has continued the closer military
exchanges. In July 2001, after U.S. and Taiwan media reported on a U.S.-Taiwan
military meeting in Monterey, CA, the Pentagon revealed that there were seven
meetings since 1997 held with Taiwan military authorities “to discuss issues of
interaction and means by which to provide for the defense of Taiwan.”5 In March
2002, Taiwan’s Defense Minister Tang Yiau-ming attended a conference held by the
U.S.-Taiwan Business Council in Florida and met with Deputy Secretary of Defense
Paul Wolfowitz who also spoke at the gathering.
The Pentagon has also conducted its own assessments of Taiwan’s defense
needs. In September 1999, to enhance cooperation, a Pentagon team was said to have
2 CRS Report RL31083, Conventional Arms Transfers to Developing Nations, 1993-2000,
August 16, 2001
, by Richard F. Grimmett.
3 CRS Report RL31113, U.S. Arms Sales: Agreements with and Deliveries to Major Clients,
1993-2000
, September 5, 2001, by Richard Grimmett, compiled from U.S. official,
unclassified data as reported by the Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA).
4 Mann, Jim, “U.S. Has Secretly Expanded Military Ties with Taiwan,” LA Times, July 24,
1999; Kurt M. Campbell (former Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Asian and
Pacific Affairs) and Derek J. Mitchell, “Crisis in the Taiwan Strait?”, Foreign Affairs,
July/August 2001.
5 China Times (Taiwan), July 18, 2001; Washington Times, July 18, 2001; Department of
Defense News Briefing, July 19, 2001.

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visited Taiwan to assess its air defense capability.6 The Pentagon reportedly
completed its classified assessment in January 2000, finding a number of problems
in the Taiwan military’s ability to defend against aircraft, ballistic missiles, and cruise
missiles, and those problems included international isolation, inadequate security,
and sharp inter-service rivalries.7 In September 2000, the Pentagon reportedly
conducted a classified assessment of Taiwan’s naval defense needs – as the Clinton
Administration had promised in April 2000 while deferring a sale of Aegis-equipped
destroyers. The report, “Taiwan Naval Modernization,” was said to have found that
Taiwan’s navy needed the Aegis radar system, Kidd-class destroyers, submarines, an
anti-submarine underwater sonar array, and P-3 anti-submarine aircraft.8 In January
2001, a Pentagon team reportedly examined Taiwan’s command and control, air
force equipment, and defense against a first strike.9 In September 2001, a Defense
Department team was said to be in Taiwan to assess its army, as the Bush
Administration promised in the April 2001 round of arms sales talks.10 Congress
could inquire about these and any other assessments of Taiwan’s defense needs.
April 2001 Approvals of Arms Requests
In 2001, arms sales talks took place on April 24 in Washington, DC, and Taiwan
was represented by its Vice Chief of General Staff, General Huoh Shou-yeh.
According to the Administration and various news reports,11 President Bush
approved Taiwan’s request for: 8 diesel-electric submarines (perhaps a German or
Dutch design with U.S. technology), 12 P-3C Orion anti-submarine warfare (ASW)
aircraft (linked to the submarine sale), 54 Mark-48 ASW torpedoes, 44 Harpoon
submarine-launched anti-ship cruise missiles, 144 M109A6 Paladin self-propelled
howitzers, 54 AAV-7A1 amphibious assault vehicles, AN/ALE-50 electronic
countermeasure (ECM) systems for F-16s, and 12 MH-53 mine-sweeping
helicopters. Also approved for sale are 4 decommissioned Kidd-class destroyers
(considered as Excess Defense Articles (EDA), not FMS). The Administration also
approved a briefing of the PAC-3 theater missile defense missile.
6 “U.S. Military Team Arrives in Taiwan for Visit,” Lien-ho Pao [United Daily News], Sept.
19, 1999, in FBIS.
7 Ricks, Thomas, “Taiwan Seen as Vulnerable to Attack,” Washington Post, March 31,
2000.
8 Tsao, Nadia, “Pentagon Report Says Taiwan Can Handle AEGIS,” Taipei Times, Sept. 27,
2000; Michael Gordon, “Secret U.S. Study Concludes Taiwan Needs New Arms,” New York
Times
, April 1, 2001.
9 China Times (Taiwan), January 14, 2001; Taipei Times, January 15, 2001.
10 Taipei Times (Taiwan), September 10, 2001.
11 White House, press briefing, April 24, 2001; Department of Defense, news briefing, April
24, 2001;David Sanger, “Bush is Offering Taiwanese Some Arms, But Not the Best,” New
York Times
, April 24, 2001; Steven Mufson and Dana Milbank, “Taiwan to Get Variety of
Arms,” Washington Post, April 24, 2001; Neil King Jr., “Bush Defers Sale of Aegis to
Taiwan, Will Offer Four Kidd-Class Destroyers,” Wall Street Journal, April 24, 2001; “U.S.
Refuses Taiwan Request for JDAM, HARM, and PAC-3 Missiles,” Aerospace Daily, April
25, 2001; and “U.S. Formally Informs ROC of Arms Sales Decision,” Central News Agency
(Taiwan), April 25, 2001.

CRS-4
Deferred for approval were destroyers equipped with the Aegis combat system.
(The U.S. Navy currently deploys the Aegis combat system (e.g., on the Arleigh
Burke-class destroyer) for air defense and applies it in development of a future Navy
missile defense system. An alternative to the Arleigh Burke that retains the Aegis
Spy-1D radar, called the Evolved Advanced Combat System (EACS), or “Aegis lite,”
has been considered.) Also deferred for approval were M1A2 Abrams main battle
tanks and AH-64D Apache Longbow attack helicopters, pending a Pentagon
assessment of Taiwan’s army. (By May 2002, the Bush Administration approved the
request for Apaches, and Taiwan began negotiations to purchase 30 helicopters.12)
President Bush denied approval for Taiwan’s requests for Joint Direct Attack
Munitions (JDAM) and HARM anti-radiation missiles.
Policy Issues and Congressional Action
Since the PLA’s provocative exercises and missile launches in 1995 and 1996,
Congress has increasingly asserted its role vis-a-vis the Administration in
determining arms sales to Taiwan, as stipulated by Section 3(b) of the TRA, as well
as in exercising its oversight of the TRA, including Section 2(b)(6) on the U.S.
capacity to resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion against Taiwan.
Policy issues center on how effectively the Administration is helping Taiwan’s
defense, the role of Congress in determining arms sales to Taiwan, and how to revise
the annual arms sales process.
Arms Sales. One policy issue concerns the effectiveness of the
Administration in assisting Taiwan’s defense, as it faces the People’s Liberation
Army (PLA)’s missile buildup and arms acquisitions, primarily from Russia.13
In the 105th Congress, the FY1999 National Defense Authorization Act (P.L.
105-261) required the Secretary of Defense to study the U.S. missile defense systems
that could protect and could be transferred to Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan.14 In
addition, the conference report (H.Rept. 105-746 of the FY1999 Defense
Appropriations Act, P.L. 105-262) required a report from the Pentagon on the
security situation in the Taiwan Strait, in both classified and unclassified forms.15
12 Taipei Times, May 26, 2002; Jane’s Defence Weekly, June 5, 2002.
13 See CRS Report 97-391, China: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles, by Shirley Kan, and CRS
Report RL30700, China’s Foreign Conventional Arms Acquisitions, by Shirley Kan,
Christopher Bolkcom, and Ronald O’Rourke.
14 Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Theater Missile Defense Architecture
Options for the Asia-Pacific Region,” unclassified version, May 1999; CRS Report
RL30379, Missile Defense Options for Japan, South Korea, and Taiwan: A Review of the
Defense Department Report to Congress
, November 30, 1999, by Robert D. Shuey and
Shirley A. Kan.
15 Department of Defense, “Report to Congress Pursuant to the FY99 Appropriations Bill,
The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,” unclassified version, February 1, 1999; CRS
(continued...)

CRS-5
In the 106th Congress, Members debated whether the House-passed “Taiwan
Security Enhancement Act (TSEA)” (S. 693; H.R. 1838) was needed to better assist
Taiwan or was unnecessary and counterproductive in a delicate situation, as the
Clinton Administration maintained. The TSEA also increased attention to U.S.-
Taiwan military exchanges, including that on communication and training. The
Pentagon is said to have supported the spirit of the bill, although not its passage.16
Also, Representative Gilman, Chairman of the House International Relations
Committee, wrote President Clinton on April 19, 1999, to urge approval for the sale
of long-range early warning radars to Taiwan. He also wrote Secretary of State
Albright on April 22, 1999, saying that if the Administration did not approve the sale,
he would introduce legislation to do so. In the end, the Clinton Administration
decided in principle to sell early warning radars to Taiwan. The State Department
spokesperson confirmed that the United States agreed on the request in principle and
acknowledged that under the TRA, “the President and Congress determined which
defense articles and services Taiwan needs.”17 The Pentagon spokesperson also
confirmed that the United States “agreed to work with the Taiwanese to evaluate their
early warning radar needs, and that will take place over the next year or so, but there
is no specific agreement on a specific type of radar, specific sale, or specific terms
of sale at this time.”18 (Taiwan is not reported to have concluded a contract to procure
the long-range early warning radars.)
Seeking more information from the Pentagon on which to base its
considerations, Congress passed the FY2000 National Defense Authorization Act
(P.L. 106-65), requiring annual reports on PRC military power and the security
situation in the Taiwan Strait.19 Also, in consolidated appropriations legislation for
FY2000 (P.L. 106-113), Congress required a report on the operational planning of
the Department of Defense to implement the TRA and any gaps in knowledge about
PRC capabilities and intentions affecting the military balance in the Taiwan Strait.20
In the 107th Congress, some Members opposed the sale of Aegis-equipped
Arleigh Burke-class destroyers, because they could be interpreted as offensive rather
than defensive sales and could involve significant interaction with the U.S. military,
as Senators Feinstein and Thomas (chairman of the Foreign Relations Subcommittee
15 (...continued)
Report RS20187, Taiwan’s Defense: Assessing the U.S. Department of Defense Report,
“The Security Situation in the Taiwan Strait,”
April 30, 1999, by Robert Sutter.
16 Steven M. Goldstein and Randall Schriver (former official in the Office of the Assistant
Secretary of Defense for International Security Affairs), “An Uncertain Relationship: The
United States, Taiwan, and the Taiwan Relations Act,” China Quarterly, March 2001.
17 Shenon, Philip, “U.S. Plans to Sell Radar to Taiwan to Monitor China,” New York Times,
April 30, 1999; Department of State, Daily Press Briefing, April 29, 1999.
18 Defense Department News Briefing, April 30, 1999.
19 Department of Defense, “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s Republic
of China,” unclassified version, June 2000.
20 Department of Defense, “Report to Congress on Implementation of the Taiwan Relations
Act,” unclassified version, December 2000.

CRS-6
on East Asian and Pacific Affairs) wrote in the Washington Times on March 28,
2001. Other Members called for President Bush to approve the sale of those
destroyers, in letters sent on April 3, 2001, by 83 in the House (led by
Representatives Cox and Wu) and 20 in the Senate (led by Senators Helms and
Torricelli). A March 2001 staff report to Senator Helms of the Foreign Relations
Committee called for meeting Taiwan’s defense needs, particularly for submarines
and destroyers.21
Role of Congress. Another issue is the role of Congress in determining arms
sales to Taiwan, in reference to Section 3(b) of the TRA discussed above. As for all
U.S. arms sales, months or years after the President’s decision on Taiwan’s requests
and Taiwan’s subsequent decisions on which sales to pursue, the role of Congress
includes review of major proposed FMS deals notified to Congress (during which
Congress may enact a joint resolution of disapproval) as stipulated under Section
36(b) of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) (P.L. 90-629).22
However, concerning Congress’ role before the Administration’s decisions on
arms sales, the 106th Congress passed language, introduced by Senator Lott, in the
FY2000 Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (in Div. B of P.L. 106-113),
requiring the Secretary of State to consult with Congress to devise a mechanism for
congressional input in determining arms sales to Taiwan. Again, in the FY2001
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act (Sec. 581 of P.L. 106-429), Congress passed
the Taiwan Reporting Requirement, requiring the President to consult on a classified
basis with Congress 30 days prior to the next round of arms sales talks. (Those
required consultations took place on March 16, 2001.)
Arms Talks Process. A third issue is how to revise the annual process of
arms talks with Taiwan. Because of unofficial relations, successive administrations
used a process in determining arms sales to Taiwan that was institutionalized in the
early 1980s as annual rounds of talks with Taiwan defense authorities consisting of
several phases leading up to final meetings usually in April.23 On April 24, 2001, the
day of the last annual arms talks with Taiwan military authorities, President Bush
announced he would change the process from one with annual reviews to normal,
routine considerations on an “as-needed basis.”24 In overseeing a new process,
factors or implications to consider include the following:
! Congress’ role in decision-making and ability to exercise oversight
21 Senate Foreign Relations Committee, “U.S. Defense Policy Toward Taiwan: In Need of
an Overhaul,” a Staff Trip Report to the Committee on Foreign Relations, by James Doran,
S. Prt. 107-26.
22 See CRS Report 96-971, Arms Sales: Congressional Review Process, December 2, 1996,
by Richard Grimmett.
23 See CRS Report RS20365, Taiwan: Annual Arms Sales Process, October 21, 1999,
updated June 5, 2001, by Shirley Kan.
24 Milbank, Dana and Mike Allen, “Bush to Drop Annual Review of Weapons Sales to
Taiwan,” Washington Post, April 25, 2001.

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! role of arms sales talks in the broader long-range and joint defense
strategy for Taiwan (vs. a narrower focus on specific requests)
! role of arms sales in U.S. diplomatic and defense policies (including
various elements of the “one China” policy)
! U.S. objectives for the Taiwan military
! nature of the U.S.-Taiwan military relationship
! extent of high-level U.S.-Taiwan military exchanges
! effect of an annual high-profile controversy on U.S. interests
! usefulness to Congress and Taiwan of a deadline for decisions
! influence of various interest groups in a more defused process
! changes in high-level, intensive attention given by the White House
and its coordination of the inter-agency debates
! changes in the Pentagon’s basis for recommendations
! Taiwan’s desire to receive similar treatment given to others
! implications for U.S.-led alliances, especially that with Japan.
Current Legislation. In the 107th Congress, some Members have called for
regular and senior consultations with Taiwan and a role for Congress, after President
Bush announced on April 24, 2001 that he would drop the annual arms talks process
with Taiwan in favor of normal, routine considerations on an “as-needed” basis. The
House-passed Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FYs 2002 and 2003 (H.R.
1646, Hyde
) contains provisions on arms sales to Taiwan. First, H.R. 1646 includes
authority (in section 851) for the President to sell the 4 Kidd-class destroyers to
Taiwan (not as FMS, but EDA), under Section 21 of the AECA). Second, in the
House International Relations Committee, an amendment proposed by Representative
Brad Sherman resulted in section 813 to require that Taiwan be treated as the
“equivalent of a major non-NATO ally” for defense transfers under the Arms Export
Control Act or the Foreign Assistance Act, while the language stops short of
designating Taiwan as a major non-NATO ally. According to the Member’s office,
the provision would show tangible support for Taiwan’s defense, provide it with
status similar to that given to Australia, New Zealand, and Argentina, offer it the
“right of first refusal” for EDA, and treat it with enhanced status for anti-terrorism
assistance, cooperative research and development projects in the defense area, and
expedited review in satellite licensing. Some observers say that authority exists
under the TRA to provide defense assistance to Taiwan.25 Third, Representative
Gary Ackerman introduced an amendment (section 814) to require the President to
consult annually with Congress and Taiwan about the availability of defense articles
and services for Taiwan (the consultations with Taiwan to occur at a level not less
than that of the Vice Chief of General Staff, as has been the case, and in
Washington).
The Senate’s Foreign Relations Authorization Act (S. 1401, Biden), introduced
September 4, 2001, would require the Administration to brief Congress every three
months on discussions between any Executive agency and Taiwan on arms sales
(section 603). The Committee on Foreign Relations said that it wished to ensure that
25 Sherman, Jason, “Proposal Gives Taiwan U.S. Defense Privileges,” Defense News, May
21, 2001.

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consultations between the Executive Branch and Congress on arms sales to Taiwan
and the congressional role are maintained (S.Rept. 107-60).
Final language in the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2002 (P.L.
107-115), as enacted on January 10, 2002, brings unprecedented close coordination
between the Executive and Legislative branches on arms sales to Taiwan. With
language similar to that in S. 1401, Section 573 requires the Departments of State and
Defense to provide detailed briefings (not specified as classified) to congressional
committees (including those on appropriations) within 90 days of enactment and not
later than every 120 days thereafter during FY2002. The briefings are to report on
U.S.-Taiwan discussions on potential sales of defense articles or services to Taiwan.
Aside from the question of a congressional role in arms sales to Taiwan, the
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2002 (P.L. 107-107), enacted December
28, 2001, authorizes the President to transfer (by sale) the four Kidd-class destroyers
to Taiwan (Sec. 1011), under Section 21 of the AECA. Also, Section 1221 of the act
requires a new section in the annual report on PRC military power (as required by
P.L. 106-65 discussed above) to assess the PLA’s military acquisitions and any
implications for the security of the United States and its friends and allies. The arms
transfers to be covered would not be limited to those from Russia and other former
Soviet states, as in the original House language (H.R. 2586).
The House has legislation (H.R. 1283, Vitter), introduced March 28, 2001,
seeking to establish that U.S. policy is to provide for deployment of effective missile
defense systems capable of defending Israel, Japan, the Republic of Korea, Taiwan,
and NATO countries against ballistic missile attack.
The FY 2003 National Defense Authorization Act (H.R. 4546, Stump), passed
in the House on May 10, 2002, contains Section 1202 that seeks to “enhance
interoperability” with Taiwan’s military.
Sales of Major U.S. Defense Articles and Services
The following list provides information on U.S. sales (not deliveries) of major
defense articles and services to Taiwan, as approved by the President, proposed in
Letters of Offer and Acceptance, and notified to Congress since 1990. Based on
unclassified notices, reports, and interviews, this list includes the date of notification,
major item or service proposed for sale, and estimated value of the defense package.
The list was compiled based on unclassified notifications to Congress or
announcements by the Administration as well as press reports. These were primarily
government-to-government FMS. Major FMS are notified to Congress as required
by Section 36(b) of the AECA. Not all of these approved sales were necessarily
purchased by Taiwan. There have been other transfers of U.S. defense articles and
services not included in this list (that amounted to billions of dollars), including sales
and technical assistance with smaller individual values not required to be notified to
Congress, those with classified notifications, and other direct commercial sales
licensed for export by the Department of State and notified to Congress under section
36(c) of the AECA (but subject to the confidentiality requirements of section 38(e)).

CRS-9
There have also been leases of naval vessels and other equipment. Moreover, each
year, hundreds of Taiwan’s military personnel at different levels receive training and
education at U.S. military institutions and facilities.
Value of
Date of
Major Item or Service as Proposed
Package
Notification (usually part of a package)
($ million)
1990
07/26
Cooperative Logistics Supply Support
$108
09/06
(1) C-130H transport aircraft
$45
1991
01/07
(100) MK-46 torpedoes
$28
07/24
(97) SM-1 Standard air defense missiles
$55
09/13
(110) M60A3 tanks
$119
11/18
Phase III PIP Mod Kits for HAWK air defense
systems
$170
1992
05/27
Weapons, ammunition, support for 3 leased ships
$212
05/27
Supply support arrangement
$107
08/04
(207) SM-1 Standard air defense missiles
$126
09/14
(150) F-16A/B fighters
$5,800
09/14
(6) Patriot-derived Modified Air Defense System
(MADS) launchers (with PAC-2 Guidance
Enhanced Missiles)26
$1,300
09/18
(12) SH-2F LAMPS anti-submarine helicopters
$161
1993
06/17
(12) C-130H transport aircraft
$620
06/25
Supply support arrangement
$156
07/29
(38) Harpoon anti-ship missiles
$68
07/30
Logistics support services for 40 leased T-38
trainers
$70
08/
(4) E-2T Hawkeye airborne early warning aircraft27
$700
09/08
Logistics support services for MADS
$175
26 Commercial sale. Opall Barbara and David Silverberg, “Taiwanese May Soon Coproduce
Patriot,” Defense News, February 22-28, 1993; Military Balance 1999-2000.
27 Flight International, September 1-7, 1993.

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11/04
(150) MK-46 Mod 5 torpedoes
$54
11/09
Weapons, ammunition, and support for 3 leased
frigates
$238
11/23
MK-41 Mod (short) Vertical Launch Systems for
ship-based air defense missiles
$103
1994
08/01
(80) AN/ALQ-184 electronic counter measure
(ECM) pods
$150
09/12
MK-45 Mod 2 gun system
$21
1995
03/24
(6) MK-75 shipboard gun systems,
(6) Phalanx Close-In Weapon Systems
$75
06/07
Supply support arrangement
$192
1996
05/10
Improved Mobile Subscriber Equipment
communications system
$188
05/10
(30) TH-67 training helicopters,
(30) sets of AN/AVS-6 night vision goggles
$53
05/23
(465) Stinger missiles,
(55) dual-mounted Stinger launcher systems
$84
06/24
(300) M60A3TTS tanks
$223
08/23
(1,299) Stinger surface-to-air missiles,
(74) Avenger vehicle mounted guided missile
launchers,
(96) HMMWVs (high-mobility multi-purpose
wheeled vehicle)
$420
09/05
(110) MK-46 MOD 5 anti-submarine torpedoes
$66
1997
02/14
(54) Harpoon anti-ship missiles
$95
05/23
(1,786) TOW 2A anti-armor guided missiles,
(114) TOW launchers, (100) HMMWVs
$81
07/24
(21) AH-1W Super Cobra helicopters8
$479
09/03
(13) OH-58D Kiowa Warrior Armed Scout
helicopters
$172
11/09
Pilot training and logistics support for F-16 fighters
$280
8 Taiwan reportedly ordered 63 AH-1W helicopters, 42 of which were delivered by early
2000, and Taiwan may order an additional 24 helicopters (Defense News, March 6, 2000).

CRS-11
11/09
Spare parts for various aircraft
$140
1998
01/28
(3) Knox-class frigates,9
(1) MK 15 Phalanx Close-In Weapons System
(CIWS)
$300
06/01
(28) Pathfinder/Sharpshooter navigation and
targeting pods for F-16 fighters10
$160
08/27
(58) Harpoon anti-ship missiles
$101
08/27
(61) Dual-mount Stinger surface-to-air missiles
$180
08/27
(131) MK 46 Mod 5(A)S anti-submarine torpedoes
$69
10/09
(9) CH-47SD Chinook helicopters
$486
1999
05/26
(240) AGM-114KS Hellfire II air-to-surface
missiles
$23
05/26
(5) AN/VRC-92E SINCGARS radio systems, (5)
Intelligence Electronic Warfare systems, (5)
HMMWVs
$64
07/30
Spare parts for F-5E/F, C-130H, F-16A/B, and
Indigenous Defense Fighter (IDF) aircraft
$150
07/30
(2) E-2T Hawkeye 2000E airborne early warning
aircraft
$400
2000
03/02
Modernization of the TPS-43F air defense radar
to TPS-75V configuration
$96
03/02
(162) HAWK Intercept guided air defense missiles11
$106
06/07
(39) Pathfinder/Sharpshooter navigation and
targeting pods for F-16 fighters
$234
06/07
(48) AN/ALQ-184 ECM pods for F-16s
$122
09/28
(146) M109A5 howitzers, 152 SINCGARS radio
systems
$405
9 In 1992, the Bush Administration submitted legislation that Congress passed to lease 3
Knox-class frigates to Taiwan. Reports say that Taiwan leased a total of 6 (and
subsequently bought them in 1999) and purchased 2 in 1998 (plus 1 for spares).
10 The sale of the navigation/targeting pods excluded the laser designator feature, but the
Pentagon notified Congress on May 16, 2000, that 20 sets would be upgraded to include the
feature.
11 On June 23, 2000, the Pentagon notified Congress of a sale of 156 excess HAWK air
defense missiles to Taiwan for about $7 million.

CRS-12
09/28
(200) AIM-120C Advanced Medium-Range Air-to-
Air Missiles (AMRAAMs) for F-16 fighters12
$150
09/28
(71) RGM-84L Harpoon anti-ship missiles
$240
09/28
Improved Mobile Subscriber Equipment (IMSE)
communication system
$513
2001
07/18
(50) Joint Tactical Information Distribution Systems
(JTIDS) terminals (a version of Link 16) for data
links between aircraft, ships, and ground stations
$725
09/05
(40) AGM-65G Maverick air-to-ground missiles for
F-16s
$18
10/26
(40) Javelin anti-tank missile systems
$51
10/30
Logistical support for spare parts for F-5E/F, C-
130H, F-16A/B, and IDF aircraft
$288
2002
06/04
(3) AN/MPN-14 air traffic control radars
$108
12 In April 2000, the Clinton Administration approved the sale of AMRAAMs to Taiwan,
with the understanding that the missiles would be kept in the United States and transferred
later to Taiwan, if/when the PLA acquires a similar Russian missile, like the R-77 (AA-12)
air-to-air missile, or threatens to attack Taiwan.