Order Code RS21237
June 11, 2002
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Indian and Pakistani Nuclear Weapons Status
Sharon Squassoni
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
During the last 5 years, India and Pakistan have tested nuclear weapons and
deployed ballistic missiles, enunciated nuclear doctrine, and made organizational
changes to their nuclear establishments while teetering on the brink of war in Kashmir.
This paper summarizes Indian and Pakistani nuclear weapon capabilities and thinking
in light of the current crisis, and discusses some confidence-building measures in place
intended to help avert nuclear war. It will be updated as events warrant.
Background
Almost 50 years of nuclear ambiguity were swept away by the May 1998 nuclear
tests of India and Pakistan. Optimists hoped that overt nuclear weapons capabilities could
help provide more conventional stability and that limited nuclear arsenals might dampen
competition in missile development.1 The 1999 conflict in Kargil and current crisis in
Kashmir challenge this viewpoint.2 With a million troops now massed along the Line of
Control in Kashmir the potential for drastic miscalculation is heightened by uncertainties
about what India and Pakistan might do with their nuclear weapons.
Indian Nuclear Weapon Capabilities and Thinking
India began its nuclear program shortly after independence in 1947. After a
humiliating defeat in a border war with China in 1962, followed by China’s first nuclear
test in 1964, the drive for a nuclear weapons capability intensified. The 1974 test of a
“peaceful nuclear device” was an important milestone, but it took several more years to
develop a nuclear weapons capability. Simultaneously, India developed a nuclear
infrastructure that supported both civilian and military purposes. For example, India’s
development of reprocessing capabilities supported both its use of mixed oxide fuel
(plutonium and uranium) for its nuclear power plants and its plutonium-based weapons.
1 See Joeck, Neil, Maintaining Nuclear Stability in South Asia, Adelphi Paper 312, International
Institute for Strategic Studies, 1997.
2 Riedel, Bruce O., “American Diplomacy and the 1999 Kargil Summit at Blair House,” Policy
Paper Series, Center for the Advanced Study of India, University of Pennsylvania.
[http:/www.sas.upenn.edu/casi].
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CRS-2
The size of India’s nuclear stockpile has been the subject of considerable debate
within the scientific and defense communities.3 Current estimates vary from a few to 100,
but several converge on around 30-35 weapons, probably stored in component form. The
U.S. Department of Defense believes that India is capable of manufacturing complete sets
of components for plutonium-based weapons and has a small stockpile of such
components. India “probably can deploy a few nuclear weapons within a few days to a
week...and can deliver these weapons with fighter aircraft.”4 Most agree that India is
expanding its stockpile, and that if India uses unsafeguarded reactor-grade plutonium, the
potential to expand its stockpile is very significant.
India’s delivery capability has long reflected two very different contingencies –
China and Pakistan. Because of the distances involved and India’s lack of long-range
bombers, capability against China inevitably required ballistic missiles. Against Pakistan,
however, Indian officials recognized early on that aircraft would be more valuable,
particularly in a retaliatory strike; the Indian air force is significantly more sophisticated
and capable than Pakistan’s.5 India has some 35 Mirage 2000 fighters that are nuclear-
capable, although other aircraft could also be used.
Ballistic missiles add considerable instability into the security equation because they
are high priority targets; the pressure to use them quickly and, for the other side, to strike
them preemptively, is great. Indian officials have said short-range Prithvi ballistic
missiles (150km and 250km ranges) are conventionally armed. While nuclear-capable
and able to reach almost all of Pakistan, the use of nuclear-armed Prithvis could pose
major risks of fallout to India.6 India has deployed Agni-II missiles with a 1500 km range
and tested an 800 km range version of the Agni earlier this year. These solid-fueled
missiles, which reportedly can be launched within minutes, considerably enhance India’s
ability to respond rapidly in a crisis situation.
In November 1998, Indian Prime Minister Vajpayee set up a three-tiered structure
to review strategic policy. It included a National Security Council, a Strategic Policy
Group (including heads of armed services and senior officials) and a National Security
Advisory Board, or NSAB, composed of 27 members.7 In August 1999, the Indian
government released a draft document on nuclear doctrine produced by the NSAB. Never
officially adopted, it contained the following elements indicating Indian nuclear thinking:
3 The Stockholm Peace Research Institute estimated 60-120 warheads in 1995, but 25-40
warheads in 2000. The Bulletin of Atomic Scientists estimated 50 in 1998 but 30-35 in 2002.
Estimates often calculate how much material theoretically is available, but few estimates are
based on information about actual weapons. Another variable is how much material is needed per
weapon; traditionally it is thought to be 25kg of highly-enriched uranium or 8kgs of plutonium,
but estimates often use smaller figures. One Indian researcher estimated in May 1998 that India
had fewer than 10 weapons.
4 U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 24.
5 Perkovich, George, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The Impact on Global Proliferation, (University of
California Press, CA, 1999) p. 248-249.
6 Perkovich, op cit. p. 248.
7 See Hilary Synnott, The Causes and Consequences of South Asia’s Nuclear Tests, Adelphi
Paper 332, International Institute for Strategic Studies, December 1999, p. 57.

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(1) The role of nuclear weapons is to deter the use or threat of use of nuclear weapons
against India; India therefore adopts a policy of no-first-use and no use against non-
nuclear weapon states; (2) India will pursue “credible minimum deterrence”; (3) a
strategic triad based on aircraft, mobile land-based systems, and sea-based platforms
would provide a redundant, widely dispersed and flexible nuclear force; and (4) the Prime
Minister or his designated successor would authorize nuclear weapons use.
India’s doctrine clearly emphasizes civilian control and the goals of preventing
accidental or unauthorized launch. There are reports that India will create a national
command authority later in June. Given India’s significant superiority over Pakistan in
conventional weapons capabilities, including in aircraft and air defenses, most observers
believe India has fewer incentives for a nuclear first strike than Pakistan. India has also
publicly stated it will not use nuclear weapons first against an adversary, whereas Pakistan
explicitly has rejected a no-first-use policy.
Pakistani Nuclear Weapon Capabilities and Thinking
Pakistan’s nuclear program dates back to the 1950s, but it was the humiliating loss
of East Pakistan (now Bangladesh) that reportedly triggered a political decision in January
1972 (just one month later) to begin a crash nuclear weapons program. Unlike India,
Pakistan focused on the uranium route to weapons. Pakistan sought technology from
many sources, including China and North Korea.8 This extensive assistance is reported
to have included, among other things, uranium enrichment technology from Europe,
blueprints for a small nuclear weapon from China and missile technology from China.
Most observers estimate that Pakistan has enough nuclear material (highly enriched
uranium and a small amount of plutonium) for 30 to 50 nuclear weapons.9 Like India,
Pakistan is thought to have “a small stockpile of nuclear weapons components and can
probably assemble some weapons fairly quickly.”10
Pakistan could deliver its nuclear weapons using F-16s it purchased from the United
States (28 F-16 and 12 trainer aircraft; 8 are no longer in service), provided the
appropriate “wiring” has been added to make them nuclear-capable. In the 1980s,
Pakistan moved assiduously to acquire ballistic missile capabilities and now deploys
short-range ballistic missiles and a small number of medium-range missiles. AQ Khan,
a leading Pakistani scientist, maintains that only the medium-range Ghauri missiles would
be usable in a nuclear exchange (given fall-out effects for Pakistan of shorter-range
missiles). Other observers view the 30 to 50 Hatf2 short-range (300km) missiles
(modified Chinese M-11s) as potential delivery vehicles for nuclear weapons. Ghauri
8 A 1976 cooperation agreement with China greatly aided the program but Pakistan also acquired
significant technology from the West in the 1980s (through the present), triggering a rash of
sanctions. See CRS Report RS20995, India and Pakistan: Current U.S. Economic Sanctions.
9 SIPRI Yearbook 1995: 5-10 warheads; SIPRI Yearbook 2000: 15-20 warheads. Bulletin of
Atomic Scientists, 1998: 12 warheads. January 2002: 30 to 50. Carnegie Endowment 2002: 50-55
(Joseph Cirincione, with Jon B. Wolfsthal and Miriam Rajkumar, Deadly Arsenals: Tracking
Weapons of Mass Destruction, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Washington, DC,
2002).
10 U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 28.

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missiles (1350 and 2300km), which reportedly are based on the North Korean No-Dong
and Taepo-Dong-1, are capable of reaching New Delhi with large payloads.11
Pakistan has not yet enunciated a nuclear doctrine, but it is clear that Pakistan’s
nuclear arsenal is seen as the key to military parity with India. Because of its fears of
being overrun by larger Indian forces, Pakistan has rejected the doctrine of no-first-use.
In May 2002, Pakistan’s ambassador to the UN, Munir Akram, stated that “We have not
said we will use nuclear weapons. We have not said we will not use nuclear weapons.
We possess nuclear weapons. So does India ...We will not neutralize the deterrence by
any doctrine of no first use.”12 On June 4, 2002, President Musharraf went further: “The
possession of nuclear weapons by any state obviously implies they will be used under
some circumstances.”13
In recent years, Pakistan apparently has taken steps toward refining command and
control of nuclear weapons. In April 1999, General Musharraf announced that the Joint
Staff Headquarters would have a command and control arrangement and a secretariat, and
a strategic force command would be established.14 The connection to civilian leadership
was unclear, given a recent account of the 1999 Kargil incursion which suggested that
Prime Minister Sharif was unaware that his own nuclear missile forces were being
prepared for action.15 Pakistan established a National Command Authority (NCA) in
February 2000, but little is publicly known about it. Pakistani officials have repeatedly
said that their nuclear capabilities are safe. The new NCA is believed to be responsible
for nuclear doctrine, as well as nuclear research and development, wartime command and
control, and advice to President Musharraf about the development and employment of
nuclear weapons.16
Crisis in Kashmir
Kashmir has been a flashpoint since Indian and Pakistani independence in 1947. The
potential for nuclear weapons use is generally viewed in the context of conventional
hostilities over Kashmir spiraling out of control, especially if, as in 1965 Indo-Pakistan
conflict, India were to open a new front on the Punjab plains to break a stalemate in
Pakistan or attempt to settle the issue decisively by confronting Pakistan with a mortal
threat to its territorial integrity.17 Under these circumstances, some have suggested
11 Bulletin of Atomic Scientists, January/February 2002, pp. 70-71.
12 Barbara Crossette,“Pakistan Asks U.N. Council for Action on Kashmir,”New York Times, May
30, 2002.
13 Laurinda Keys, “Pakistan President Says There are Circumstances For Use of Nuclear
Weapons,” Associated Press Newswire, June 4, 2002.
14 “Pakistan Should Respond, Says COAS,” Dawn, April 13, 1999.
15 Riedel, op. cit., p. 12. Since the military coup, there may be, ironically, less concern about civil
vs. military control, but this may be an issue for future concern.
16 Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 27.
17 The war was preceded by a major tank engagement along the border with Pakistan’s Sind
Province in the Spring, which went in Pakistan’s favor, and a subsequent war over Kashmir in
August-September 1965. Pakistani troops only narrowly defeated an Indian counter-attack in

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Pakistan might be tempted to detonate a small nuclear weapon on its own territory to halt
forward Indian movement. Other observers, however, believe such a strategy would be
akin to a state acting as a suicide bomber.18 Some media reports have suggested that
paradoxically, “the fact that both countries have very small nuclear arsenals increases the
pressure on both sides to use their weapons against high-value targets.”19 Regardless of
whether nuclear weapons might be used to stop war or to gain a military advantage, many
observers agree that uncertainty about intentions could worsen stability. The1987 Indian
Operation Brass Tacks military exercise offers a chilling example of how India’s and
Pakistan’s misreading of each other’s defensive posturing almost led to war. Today’s
environment, with its bands of militants, greatly intensifies that hair-trigger atmosphere.20
Since 1998, both India and Pakistan appear to be integrating nuclear weapons into
security strategy and planning. With the ominous logic of nuclear deterrence, each side’s
desire to make its nuclear forces more credible may make those nuclear forces more
usable. Ballistic missiles offer both sides advantages over using aircraft as delivery
vehicles, but the short ranges create a hair-trigger situation. From launch to impact,
missile flight times may be as short as 5 minutes. In the past, both sides appeared to use
the separation of warhead components as a form of command and control (in the sense
of lowering the risk of unauthorized or accidental use). Some observers have noted that
this approach becomes risky when the other side can launch short-range ballistic missiles
against which there is no defense. These observers have called for improving command
and control of nuclear forces, while noting, ironically, that reduced ambiguity could
conversely increase the likelihood of war.21
The Defense Intelligence Agency reportedly has estimated that a nuclear exchange
could kill between 9 and 12 million persons on both sides, with 2 to 6 million injured.
These estimates are likely predicated on nuclear exchanges aimed at cities; e.g., Indian
Defense Secretary Yogendra Narain recently suggested that “India would retaliate against
Pakistani aggression and that both sides should be prepared for mutual destruction.”
President Musharraf’s June 1st interview with CNN offered respite from the nuclear
rhetoric when he stated, “I don’t think either side is that irresponsible to go to that limit
[i.e., nuclear conflict]. ... One shouldn’t even be discussing these things, because any sane
individual cannot even think of going into this unconventional mode, whatever the
pressures.”22 Nonetheless, if current Indian and Pakistani nuclear capabilities push them
away from polar opposites of preemption or revenge, and towards more limited use of
nuclear weapons, according to some observers it may be time to engage intensively in
efforts to lengthen the nuclear fuse.
the direction of Lahore, illuminating Pakistan’s vulnerability.
18 Salman Rushdie, “The Most Dangerous Place in the World,” New York Times, May 30, 2002.
19 David S. Cloud and Carla Anne Robbins, “U.S. is Limited in Ways it Can Act To Subdue
India-Pakistan Tension,” Wall Street Journal, June 3, 2002. It is not clear what those “high-
value targets” might be – military installations, key infrastructure or cities.
20 A description of the crisis can be found in Perkovich, George, India’s Nuclear Bomb: The
Impact on Global Proliferation, (University of California Press: CA, 1999).
21 Jock, op. cit., p. 50, p. 76.
22 [http://www.cnn.com/2002/WORLD/asiapcf/south/06/01/musharraf.transcript/index.html]

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Confidence-Building Measures
India and Pakistan have a 30-year history of confidence-building measures. These
include hotlines between army commanders and prime ministers, a joint India-Pakistan
Military Commission (created in 1990), and agreements to provide prior notification of
troop movements and ballistic missile tests. In 1991, both sides agreed not to attack
nuclear facilities.23 Implementation, however, has been sporadic.24 In February 1999, the
two parties concluded the Lahore Agreement. The memorandum of understanding in that
agreement included a plan for future work, to include measures to reduce the risk of
unauthorized or accidental use of nuclear weapons, reviews of confidence-building
measures and communications links, prior notification of ballistic missile tests,
continuation of unilateral moratoria on nuclear testing, and dialogue on nuclear and
security issues. Unfortunately, the Lahore process was undermined by the summer 2001
military incursion by Pakistan in the vicinity of Kargil.
Issues for Congress
Since the passage of the 1978 Nuclear Nonproliferation Act, Congress has been
closely involved in efforts to prevent or slow the development of nuclear arsenals by India
and Pakistan. In the light of the current situation in Afghanistan and the war on terrorism,
Congress might consider the following questions:
! How does the risk of war between India and Pakistan, possibly using
nuclear weapons, affect U.S. military missions in Afghanistan?
! What sources of leverage does the U.S. now have toward India and
Pakistan?
! Are new sources of leverage vis-a-vis Indian and Pakistani proliferation
needed? Should new leverage be focused on averting nuclear use rather
than on limiting nuclear proliferation?
! As the Bush administration considers options for ensuring that nuclear
weapons, material or technology stays out of the hands of terrorists, are
there options for assisting India and/or Pakistan in this regard that do not
undermine U.S. obligations as a party to the Nuclear Nonproliferation
Treaty?
! How effective are economic or other sanctions, and which might work
best?
23 Annual data exchanges on the facilities, according to some, were at first less than forthcoming.
See Hibbs, Mark, “India and Pakistan Fail to Include New SWU Plants on Exchanged Lists,”
Nuclear Fuel, March 30, 1992, p. 6.
24 The hotlines were not used to good effect either in Operation Brass Tacks in 1987 or in May
1998 around the nuclear tests.

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