Order Code RS20557
Updated June 3, 2002
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Navy Network-Centric Warfare Concept:
Key Programs and Issues for Congress
Ronald O'Rourke
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
Network-centric warfare (NCW) is the Navy’s central concept for organizing its
efforts to transform itself for military operations in the 21st Century. NCW focuses on
using information technology to link together Navy ships, aircraft, and shore
installations into highly integrated networks. It could significantly improve U.S. naval
capabilities and lead to substantial changes in naval tactics, doctrine, and organization.
Key programs for implementing NCW include the Cooperative Engagement Capability
(CEC), the Naval Fires Network (NFN), the IT-21 program, and the Navy-Marine Corps
Intranet (NMCI). Congress has closely followed and expressed concern for some NCW
programs, particularly NMCI. This report may be updated if developments warrant.
Network-Centric Warfare
The concept of network-centric warfare (NCW) emerged in 1997 and has become
the Navy’s central concept for organizing its efforts to change and transform itself for 21st
Century military operations. NCW focuses on using advanced information technology
(IT) – computers, high-speed data links, and networking software – to link together Navy
ships, aircraft, and shore installations into highly integrated computer and
telecommunications networks. Within these networks, ships, aircraft, and shore
installations will share large amounts of critical information on a rapid and continuous
basis. The Navy believes that NCW will dramatically improve Navy combat capability
and efficiency by helping the fleet to achieve what Navy officials have called "speed of
command" (an ability to generate and execute commands at much higher speeds), which
will permit U.S. naval forces to outpace adversary decisionmaking and thereby lock out
(i.e., foreclose) potential adversary strategies.1
1 For discussions of NCW, see Alberts, David S., et al. Network Centric Warfare, Developing
and Leveraging Information Superiority. Washington, Department of Defense, 1999. 256 p.;
Cipriano, Joseph R. A Fundamental Shift in the Business of Warfighting. Sea Power, March
(continued...)
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Key NCW Programs
The Navy’s effort to implement NCW involves several IT procurement efforts. Key
among these are the Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) program, the Naval Fires
Network (NFN), the IT-21 investment strategy, and the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet
(NMCI). Each of these is discussed below.
In addition to these programs, the Navy in March 2002 announced that it was
establishing a new Naval Network Warfare Command (NETWARCOM), headed by an
admiral, to be the central operational authority responsible for coordinating all IT,
information operations, and space requirements and operations within the Navy. The
command is scheduled to begin operating in June 2002.
CEC. The Cooperative Engagement Capability (CEC) system uses antennas and
data processors to link U.S. Navy ships and aircraft operating in a particular area into a
single, integrated air-defense network in which radar data collected by each platform is
transmitted on a real-time (i.e., instantaneous) basis to the other units in the network.
Each unit in the CEC network fuses its own radar data with data received from the other
units. As a result, units in the network share a common, composite, real-time air-defense
picture. CEC will permit a ship to shoot air-defense missiles at incoming anti-ship
missiles that the ship itself cannot see, using radar targeting data gathered by other ships
and aircraft. It will also permit air-defense missiles fired by one ship to be guided by
other ships or aircraft. The Navy wants to install the system on its aircraft carriers, Aegis-
equipped cruisers and destroyers, selected amphibious ships, and E-2C Hawkeye carrier-
based airborne early warning aircraft over the next several years.2 The system has
potential for being extended to include systems such as the Army’s Patriot surface-to-air
missile system and the Air Force’s Airborne Warning and Control System (AWACS).3
Tests of CEC aboard Navy ships in 1998 revealed significant interoperability (i.e.,
compatibility) problems between the CEC system’s software and the software of the air-
defense systems on some ships, particularly surface combatants equipped with the
Baseline 6 version (the most recent version) of the Navy’s Aegis air defense system. In
response, the Navy undertook a major two-year effort, now completed, to identify,
understand, and fix the problems. The CEC system, with the new fixes, passed its
technical evaluation (TECHEVAL) testing in February and March 2001 and final
operational evaluation (OPEVAL) testing in April and May 2001. In April 2002, DoD
acquisition chief E.C. “Pete” Aldridge, Jr. approved the program to enter “Milestone III”
1 (...continued)
1999: 39-42; Bender, Bryan. Buying Into Networked Warfare. Jane's Defence Weekly, May 13,
1998; West, Leslie. Network-Centric Warfare Realizes Its Promise. Sea Power, March 1998:
38-40; and Cebrowski, Arthur K., and John J. Garstka. Network-Centric Warfare: Its Origins and
Future. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, January 1998: 28-35.
2 For descriptions of CEC, see Balisle, Phil. CEC Provides Theater Air Dominance. U.S. Naval
Institute Proceedings, May 2002: 60-62; Busch, Daniel, and Conrad J. Grant. Changing The
Face of War. Sea Power, March 2000, 37-39; O'Driscoll, M. [Michael] J., and J. [Jerry] A. Krill.
Cooperative Engagement Capability. Naval Engineers Journal, March 1997: 43-57.
3 Statement of The Honorable John W. Douglass, Assistant Secretary of the Navy (Research,
Development and Acquisition), et al, op. cit., p. 20.

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in the acquisition process, and approved production of CEC systems for FY2002 and
FY2003 at a rate of 5 units per year. A further “Milestone B” review of the program is
scheduled for April 2003.4
Navy officials have acknowledged that the CEC system (and NCW in general) will
place strains on the limited data-transmission bandwidth capability currently available to
the Navy. One contractor has proposed modifying CEC with a capability called the
Tactical Component Network (TCN). Advocates of TCN argue that incorporating it into
CEC will reduce the bandwidth required by CEC without reducing CEC effectiveness.5
NFN. The Naval Fires Network uses commercial off-the-shelf (COTS) IT
technology to link naval forces operating in an area into a single real-time targeting
network for coordinating gun and missile fire to attack surface and land targets,
particularly time-critical targets, in support of friendly forces ashore. The Navy has been
experimenting with NFN in numerous exercises and is working to accelerate the
introduction of the system into the fleet. In March 2002, the Navy announced that the
aircraft carrier Abraham Lincoln would be the first warship to conduct operations with
a full NFN capability. Some NFN components were installed a few months earlier on the
aircraft carrier John C. Stennis.6
IT-21. IT-21, which stands for IT for the 21st Century, is the Navy’s investment
strategy for procuring the desktop computers, data links, and networking software needed
to establish an intranet for transmitting tactical and administrative data within and
between Navy ships. The IT-21 network uses COTS desktop computers and networking
software and will provide a multimedia (text, data, graphics, images, voice, and video)
organizational intranet similar to the Capitol Hill intranet or corporate intranets. The IT-
21 concept originated in the Pacific Fleet in 1995-1996. The Navy plans to link most of
the fleet into the IT-21 intranet within the next few years. The Navy believes IT-21 will
significantly improve U.S. naval warfighting capability and achieve substantial cost
reductions by significantly reducing the time and number of people required to carry out
various tactical and administrative functions.7
4 Woods, Randy. CEC Enters Milestone III; Milestone B Review Expected In April. Inside the
Navy, April 8, 2002.
5 Hodge, Nathan. TCN Undergoes Key Test During Cobra Gold. Defense Week, May 28, 2002;
Hodge, Nathan. Navy Needs CEC ASAP: Admiral. Defense Week, May 28, 2002: 8; Pierce
Terry C. Sunk Costs Sink Innovation. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, May 2002: 32-35;
Bohmfalk, Christian. Lockheed Martin Pushing TCN As Cooperative Engagement Backbone.
Inside the Navy, April 16, 2001.
6 Nagle, David. Naval Fires Network: The Transformation of Naval Warfare. Navy News
Service, May 17, 2002; Woods, Randy. Abraham Lincoln Carrier Will Deploy With Full Naval
Fires Suite. Inside the Navy, March 18, 2002.
7 For more on IT-21 and the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI), see Clemins, Archie. Standby
for Big Reform – A Navy-Marine Corps Intranet. Navy Times, March 6, 2000: 58; Kreisher,
Otto. Breaking Down the Barriers. Sea Power, March 2000: 34-36; Clemins, Archie. It’s More
Than E-Mail. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 2000: 56-58; Dawson, Cutler J., et al.
The IT-21 Advantage. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, December 1999: 28-32.

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NMCI. The Navy-Marine Corps Intranet (NMCI) is a corporate-style intranet that
will link together Navy and Marine Corps shore installations in much the same way that
the IT-21 effort will link together Navy ships. When completed in 2003, the NMCI will
include a total of about 360,000 computer work stations, or “seats,” at scores of Navy and
Marine Corps installations in the continental United States, Hawaii, Guam, Puerto Rico,
Guantanamo Bay (Cuba), and Iceland. In October 2000, the Navy awarded an industry
team led by Electronic Data Systems (EDS) Corporation a $6.9 billion contract for
installing , supporting, and periodically upgrading the NMCI over the next 8 years. The
first 42,000 NMCI seats at 29 sites have been installed. Based on tests of this first phase
of installation, DoD on May 3, 2002 authorized the installation of the next 100,000 seats
in the program.8 Navy officials reportedly have decided to link the IT-21 and NMCI
networks together under a common information architecture called Forcenet.9
The 106th Congress expressed concern over the difficulty of identifying the total cost
of the NMCI effort in Navy budget documents, the Navy’s ability to finance NMCI effort
without disrupting other important Navy programs, the pace at which the Navy planned
to implement NMCI, the Navy’s ability to properly structure and manage the huge NMCI
contract (the largest networking-services IT contract undertaken by a federal agency), the
potential impact of NMCI implementation on employees of current naval networking and
telecommunications systems, and whether the network should be extended to cover
installations in the Marine Corps, which already has its own service-wide network.
In response, the Navy took actions to improve the visibility of NMCI costs in its
budget, stated that the NMCI would be financed to a large degree using funds
programmed for older IT procurement programs that the NMCI will supercede, stated that
implementing NMCI would have only a small net employment impact, and argued that
implementing NMCI in the Marine Corps as well as the Navy would result in greater
efficiencies and lower overall costs for the two services. At Congress’ direction, the plan
for implementing NMCI was restructured to begin with a smaller number of initial
installations, so that the success of the NMCI effort could be more carefully assessed
before the program is expanded to cover larger parts of the Navy and the Marine Corps.
Responding to a direction in the FY2002 defense authorization bill for the Secretary
of the Navy to name a single person to oversee the NMCI program as his or her sole
responsibility, the Navy in February 2002 announced that it had created a single program
office to manage the NMCI program, headed by an admiral. An NMCI senior executive
council headed by the Navy’s acquisition executive will provide senior-level review of
the program office.10
8 Mazzacone, Eric T. Navy-Marine Corps Intranet Set to Move Forward. Navy News Service,
May 15, 2002; Stephens, Hampton. OSD Gives Go-Ahead for Ordering 100,000 More NMCI
Seats. Inside the Navy, May 6, 2002; Weinberger, Sharon. DOD Authorizes Another 100,000
Seats For Navy-Marine Corps Intranet. Aerospace Daily, May 6, 2002.
9 Jonson, Nick. Navy Plan To Integrate Land And Sea Networks Will Be Evident Soon, Official
Says. Aerospace Daily, March 28, 2002.
10 Bohmfalk, Christian. Navy Creates NMCI Program Office, Responding to Congress’ Demand.
Inside the Navy, February 11, 2002; Keeter, Hunter. NMCI TO Get Own Program Office,
Consolidated Management. Defense Daily, February 6, 2002: 10.

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Issues for Congress
Potential issues for the 107th Congress pertaining to NCW include the following:
Tracking implementation of NMCI. Potential NMCI issues concern the success
of the initial NMCI installation efforts, potential ways to improve the installation process
for subsequent installation phases, and potential steps for reducing program costs.11 The
conference report (H.Rept. 107-333 of December 12, 2001) on the FY2002 defense
authorization act (S. 1438/P.L. 107-107) contains a provision (Section 362) permitting the
Navy to proceed with the NMCI project after meeting certain testing requirements. The
provision also required the Navy to submit to Congress a report on the scope and status
of NMCI testing and the implementation of the NMCI network, and to identify a single
individual whose sole responsibility will be to direct and oversee the NMCI program. The
provision also required GAO to study the impact of NMCI implementation on the rate
structure of naval shipyards and other repair depots. The conferees expressed concern
about delays in implementing the program and the resulting shortage of data bout the
viability and performance of NMCI. (See pages 55-57 and 641-642 of the conference
report.)
Resolving implementation issues with CEC. Issues include whether the
interoperability problems have been fully resolved, whether the Navy’s restructured
installation schedule is appropriate, and what, if anything, CEC implementation problems
reveal about the challenges of incorporating advanced IT into complex weapon systems.
Adequacy of transmission bandwidth for CEC. Another issue is whether
TCN should be incorporated into CEC as part of the effort to manage limits on available
bandwidth, and what implications TCN would have for the evolution of, and acquisition
strategy for, the CEC system.
Questions concerning NCW in general. Congress may consider other
potential issues relating to NCW in general, including the following:12
! Tactics, doctrine and organization: The Navy recognizes that it needs
to develop new tactics, doctrine, and organizations to take full advantage
of NCW; this could significantly alter current practices, if not the
leadership culture itself, and pose challenges for retraining Navy
personnel.
! Overall fleet design: The Navy is currently adding NCW to an overall
fleet architecture that has evolved in a gradual fashion over the last
several decades. The issue is whether the Navy has taken the relatively
11 For discussions, see Woods, Randy. Navy, EDS Say They Are Working To Improve NMCI
Rollout Procedures. Inside the Navy, May 20, 2002; Keeter, Hunter. Navy, EDS Say Current
Processes Inadequate For Higher-Volume NMCI Roll-out. Defense Daily, May 16, 2002; Tiboni,
Frank. U.S. Navy Targets NMCI Software Cuts. DefenseNews, May 6-12, 2002: 36.
12 For a survey of potential issues relating to NCW, see Jenik, Douglas A. Beyond the Rose-
Colored Glasses. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings, February 2000: 60-63; Barnett, Thomas P.
M. The Seven Deadly Sins of Network-Centric Warfare. U.S. Naval Institute Proceedings,
January 1999: 36-39.

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new concept of NCW adequately into account in its thinking and
planning for future ship and aircraft designs and the future overall
architecture of the fleet.
! Allied interoperability: If NATO and other allied navies invest in NCW-
enabling technologies, U.S.-allied naval interoperability (the ability to
operate together effectively in multinational efforts) could be
significantly increased; if they do not, maintaining naval interoperability
could become increasingly difficult.
! Information security: The Navy acknowledges that it needs to work on
measures for preventing, detecting, and responding to attempts by
outsiders to illegally enter the computer networks being created to
implement NCW.
Legislative Activity
In its markup of the FY2003 defense authorization bill (H.R. 4546), the House
Armed Services Committee included a provision (Section 351) that extends the duration
of the NMCI contract from the current 5 years to 7 years, notwithstanding the law (10
U.S.C. 2306(c) that normally limits multiyear contracts to a term of 5 years. In its report
(H.Rept. 107-436 of May 3, 2002), the committee stated that
it believes this extension is necessary for the continued success of this program....
The committee recognizes the enormous infrastructure the contractor has built and
implemented in order for the Navy-Marine Corps Intranet to be successful. The
committee believes it is appropriate for the contractor to have a longer period of time
to recoup its investment costs. The committee, however, continues to have significant
concerns over this program. At this time, the primary concerns are cost and funding.
The [FY2003] budget request for NMCI is $1.4 billion. This funding request,
however, does not include the costs for maintaining legacy systems, being connected
to the SIPRNET, or to fund a transition office. The committee is concerned these
unfunded requirements for fiscal year 2003 will exceed $600 million. (page 298)
In its markup of the FY2003 defense authorization bill (S. 2514), the Senate Armed
Services Committee included a provision (Section 342) that would authorize DoD to
modify the start date of the NMCI contract for the purposes 10 U.S.C. 2306(c). As stated
in the committee’s report on the bill (S. Rept. 107-151 of May 15, 2002), the 5-year
period would begin on the date that DoD officials “approve ordering the ‘second
increment’ beyond the initial test population of additional NMCI work stations. In
accordance with the National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, this
approval is contingent upon successful completion of testing that has been independently
validated and approved by the Institute for Defense Analyses.” (pages 291-292)
The committee also recommended reducing the Administration’s $20-million
FY2003 research and development (R&D) funding request for starting a new Forcenet
program to $12 million. The committee’s report stated that “The new program appears
to be overly ambitious in the ramp-up of funding for such a broadly described effort. It
also appears to be premature based on the limited deployment of a Navy and Marine
Corps intranet, the cooperative engagement concept programs, and the research and
development still required for the seven projects requested in [this part of the Navy’s
R&D account] and the naval fires network.” (page 184)

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