Order Code IB98030
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Nuclear Arms Control:
The U.S.-Russian Agenda
Updated May 24, 2002
Amy F. Woolf
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
START I
Treaty Provisions
Ratification and Implementation
Ratification
Weapons Deactivation
Monitoring and Verification
Compliance
START II
Treaty Provisions
Ratification
Further Reductions in Offensive Weapons
Proposed Provisions for START III
The Bush Administration Approach
The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
Treaty Provisions
The Demarcation and Succession Agreements
Agreed Statements on Demarcation
Memorandum of Understanding on Succession
The ABM Treaty and National Missile Defenses
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
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Nuclear Arms Control: The U.S.-Russian Agenda
SUMMARY
Although arms control negotiations are
to address measures related to non-strategic
not as important to the U.S.-Russian relation-
nuclear weapons and the warheads removed
ship as they were to the U.S.-Soviet relation-
from weapons eliminated under the treaty.
ship during the Cold War, the United States
Negotiations to turn this framework into a
and Russia have continued to implement
formal agreement proved difficult. The Bush
existing nuclear arms control agreements and
Administration has not continued negotiations
to pursue negotiations on further reductions in
towards START III, but it has pledged to
their strategic offensive weapons and
reduce U.S. nuclear forces below START II
modifications to limits on ballistic missile
levels unilaterally. President Bush plans
defenses. This issue brief summarizes the
informed President Putin of planned reduc-
contents of these agreements and tracks prog-
tions to 1,700-2,200 warheads in November,
ress in their ratification and implementation.
2001.The United States and Russia continue
to abide by the 1972 ABM Treaty, which
The 1991 START I Treaty entered into
limits each side to one anti-ballistic missile
force in December 1994. It limits the United
deployment area with no more than 100 inter-
States and four successors to the Soviet Union
ceptor missiles. In September 1997, the
— Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan
parties signed several documents that estab-
— to 6,000 accountable warheads on 1,600
lished a demarcation line between ABM
strategic offensive delivery vehicles. The
systems and theater missile defense systems,
parties are well along in the elimination sche-
which are not limited by the Treaty. They also
dules outlined in the treaty and will complete
signed a Memorandum that named Russia,
the process by December 4, 2001. The parties
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan as the
also continue to implement the on-site inspec-
successors to the Soviet Union for the ABM
tions that are a part of the Treaty’s complex
Treaty. The Clinton Administration never
verification regimen. The United States and
submitted these to the Senate for advice and
Russia signed START II in January 1993.
consent. It did however, pursue negotiations
This agreement would reduce U.S. and Rus-
on modifications to the Treaty that would
sian strategic offensive forces to 3,500 war-
permit the deployment of national missile
heads. In September 1997, the United States
defenses. The Bush Administration has indi-
and Russia signed a Protocol to START II to
cated that it believes the Treaty is out of date,
extend the elimination period in the treaty to
and that the United States must withdraw to
the end of the year 2007. The U.S. Senate
pursue missile defense. It has suggested that
approved the Treaty’s ratification in January
the United States and Russia agree to set the
1996 and the Russian legislature did so in
Treaty aside. Russia has not accepted this
April 2000, but the treaty has not yet entered
proposal, but it may accept more robust test-
into force. In March 1997, Presidents Clinton
ing of missile defenses as long as the United
and Yeltsin agreed that the United States and
States does not withdraw from the Treaty.
Russia would negotiate a START III Treaty
The United States might accept this alterna-
after START II entered into force. The new
tive, and address the Treaty’s deployment
treaty would reduce their forces to between
restrictions in the future.
2,000 and 2,500 warheads. They also agreed
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On May 24, 2002, President Bush and Russia’s President Putin signed a new Strategic
Offensive Reductions Treaty, known as the Treaty of Moscow, that will limit each nation to
between 1,700 and 2,200 deployed warheads on their strategic offensive nuclear weapons.
Unlike the START I and START II Treaties, this Treaty does not contain sublimits for
particular types of weapons and it does not require the elimination of any missiles or
launchers. It also does not contain any schedule for the reductions, but the two sides have
pledged to reduce their warheads before December 31, 2012. At that time, the Treaty will
expire, unless it is extended or replaced by a subsequent agreement. The two nations also
agreed that the START I Treaty would remain in force; therefore, they can use the
monitoring and verification provisions in that Treaty to monitor deployments and verify
reductions under the new agreement.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
During the Cold War, arms control negotiations were a central feature of U.S.-Soviet
relations. Observers disagreed about whether these would enhance U.S. security by limiting
Soviet weapons and providing information about Soviet capabilities or undermine U.S.
security by limiting U.S. weapons while the Soviet Union continued to pursue more capable
systems. Many noted, however, that arms control negotiations were sometimes the only
place where the two nations could communicate and pursue cooperative efforts — even if
they did little to control arms or reduce the dangers posed by nuclear weapons.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the United States and Soviet Union/Russia signed
several agreements that reduced nuclear weapons. The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty (INF) eliminated all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges
between 300 and 3,400 miles. The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START I,
mandated reductions in numbers of warheads deployed on long-range land-based and
submarine-based missiles and on heavy bombers. In January 1993, the United States and
Russia signed the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START II, which would further
reduce the number of warheads on their strategic offensive forces. The United States and
Russia also held discussions on a START III treaty that would reduce their forces further.
The Bush Administration has argued that arms control negotiations, leading to formal
treaties, should no longer be a central feature of the U.S-Russian relationship.
Administration officials contend that the relationship codified by these treaty regimes reflects
old-style “Cold War” thinking, and that the two sides should, instead, reduce their offensive
forces unilaterally, to the levels that each finds necessary, and eliminate the ABM Treaty’s
restrictions on the deployment of missile defenses. The United States and Russia continue
to implement START I, but START II may never enter into force and that the two sides may
not pursue a START III Treaty. This issue brief reviews developments in these earlier efforts
and summarizes proposals for further arms control agreements. It also tracks discussions on
arms control issues that have occurred since the start of the Bush Administration.
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START I
Treaty Provisions
START I, signed on July 31, 1991, limits the United States and successors to the Soviet
Union to 6,000 warheads attributed to 1,600 strategic offensive delivery vehicles —
land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) and heavy bombers. The treaty also limits each side to 4,900 warheads attributed
to ballistic missiles, 1,540 warheads attributed to heavy ICBMs, and 1,100 warheads
attributed to mobile ICBMs. Warheads are “attributed” to missiles and heavy bombers
through counting rules that assign each deployed missile or bomber a warhead number. The
number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs usually equals the number actually
deployed on that type of missile, but the number attributed to heavy bombers is far fewer
than the number of bombs or cruise missiles that each type of bomber can be equipped to
carry. The Treaty allows “downloading” of warheads to reduce the number of warheads
attributed and carried on some multiple warhead (MIRVed) missiles.
To monitor forces and verify compliance with START I, the parties rely on their own
national technical means (NTM) and numerous cooperative measures designed to
supplement information received through NTM. These include extensive data exchanges on
the numbers and locations of affected weapons and several types of on-site inspections (OSI),
including baseline inspections to confirm initial data, inspections of closed-out facilities or
eliminated equipment, inspection of suspect sites, and continuous monitoring of certain
facilities. The parties must also notify each other of several types of activities, such as the
movement of items limited by the treaty. The parties agreed to refrain from encrypting or
denying the telemetry (missile test data) needed to monitor many qualitative and quantitative
limits. The treaty established the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC),
where the parties meet to discuss treaty implementation issues and compliance questions.
In May 1992, the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan signed a
Protocol to START I that listed those four former Soviet republics as the successors to the
Soviet Union for the Treaty. In this agreement, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan all agreed
to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states and to
eliminate the strategic nuclear weapons on their territories. In separate agreements, these
three states arranged to return the nuclear warheads from those weapons to Russia.
Ratification and Implementation
Ratification. The U.S. Senate gave consent to the ratification of START I on October
1, 1992. Kazakhstan ratified START I in June 1992; it joined the NPT as a non-nuclear state
on February 14, 1994. Belarus approved START I and the NPT on February 4, 1993, and
formally joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state on July 22, 1993. The Russian
parliament approved START I on November 4, 1992, but stated that it would not exchange
the instruments of ratification until all three of the other republics adhered to the NPT as
non-nuclear states. Ukraine delayed action on START I for nearly two years. On January
14, 1994, Presidents Clinton, Yeltsin, and Kravchuk of Ukraine signed a Trilateral Statement
in which Ukraine agreed to transfer all the nuclear warheads on its territory to Russia and to
eliminate the treaty-accountable delivery vehicles for these warheads in exchange for
compensation and security assurances. The Ukrainian parliament approved the Trilateral
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Statement and START I in early February 1994. It eventually approved Ukraine’s accession
to the NPT in November 1994. On December 5, 1994, the United States, Russia, and Great
Britain signed a memorandum granting security assurances to Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakhstan. Ukraine then acceded to the NPT, the five parties to START I exchanged
instruments of ratification, and START I entered into force.
Weapons Deactivation. On December 5, 2001, the United States and Russia
announced that they had eliminated all the weapons necessary to meet the Treaty’s limits of
6,000 accountable warheads on their strategic offensive nuclear weapons. The United States
had removed all of the Minuteman II missiles from their silos and had eliminated or
converted 449 of the 450 Minuteman II silos according to the provisions outlined in START.
The United States has also withdrawn from service and removed the missiles from all of its
Poseidon ballistic missile submarines and had eliminated the submarines. It also had
completed the reduction or conversion of heavy bombers that would no longer be equipped
to carry nuclear weapons.
Forces of the former Soviet Union have declined significantly during START I
implementation, from more than 10,000 warheads on 2,500 delivery vehicles in 1990 to
5,988 warheads on 1,211 delivery vehicles on July 31, 2001. All the nuclear warheads from
SS-18 missiles and weapons for bombers in Kazakhstan had been returned to Russia by May
1995. All the nuclear weapons had been removed from Ukraine’s territory by June 1, 1996
and all 81 of the SS-25 missiles based in Belarus had been returned to Russia by late
November 1996. Ukraine has eliminated all of the SS-19 and SS-24 ICBM silos on its
territory. Ukraine has also eliminated all 43 heavy bombers that were left on its territory.
In late 1999, Russia and Ukraine reached an agreement for Ukraine to return 11 bombers –3
Bear H bombers and 8 Blackjack bombers – to Russia in exchange for forgiveness of part
of its natural gas debts to Russia.
Monitoring and Verification. All the parties to START I have conducted on-site
inspections permitted by the treaty. In addition to conducting routine inspections called for
in the Treaty, U.S. inspectors also monitored the elimination of 20 Russian SLBMs in early
December 1997. Although not mandated by the treaty, Russia eliminated these missiles by
launching them from submarines and destroying them shortly after launch.
Compliance. The parties to START I have all noted that there have been few
significant compliance questions. In 1995, the United States raised concerns about Russian
compliance with the treaty’s provisions on the conversion of missiles to space launch
vehicles when Russia used a converted SS-25 ICBM to launch a satellite. According to
published reports, Russia did not allow the United States to inspect the missile to confirm
that it was configured as a space launch vehicle when it exited the Votkinsk missile assembly
facility, and it failed to provide the proper notifications, as specified in START I, about the
location of the missile prior to the satellite launch. Russia claimed that it was not obligated
to notify the United States about the missile or permit the United States to inspect it at the
Votkinsk portal because it was a dedicated space launch vehicle that was not limited by
START. The United States held that the missile was subject to START I inspection and
notification provisions because it was a variant of a missile limited by the treaty. After
discussions in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), the two sides
agreed that a limited number these launch vehicles could leave the Votkinsk facility without
being subject to imaging inspections. They would still have to be measured and opened to
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confirm that they were not treaty-limited missiles. In November 1997, the two sides reached
a final agreement that would cover any additional space-launch vehicles assembled at
Votkinsk.
In June 1998, the Russian press reported that Russian officials were concerned about
U.S. compliance with START I. For example, tests of the British Trident missiles may have
released 10-12 warheads, rather than the 8 permitted on U.S. Trident missiles. The United
States believes this is consistent with START I because the Treaty does not limit British
missiles, but some in Russia argue that the United States could gain valuable information that
would permit it to deploy its own missiles with 10-12 warheads. Some in Russia also
contend that the United States has altered the B-1 bombers to make it easier for them to carry
cruise missiles. These changes are not banned by the START I Treaty, and the United States
could equip B-1 bombers without violating its obligations, but this would change the
accounting for the bombers under START I. Most of these issues were addressed in the
JCIC. Some observers speculated that the Russian reports were designed to deflect criticism
about Russia’s failure to ratify START II. Officials in the Russian Defense Ministry repeated
the accusations of U.S. non-compliance with START I in late January 1999. The timing of
Russia’s complaint appeared to derive from U.S. funding and support for a national ballistic
missile defense system and its intentions to negotiate amendments in the 1972 ABM Treaty.
START II
Treaty Provisions
The United States and Russia signed START II on January 3, 1993. It limits each side
to 3,000-3,500 accountable warheads on strategic offensive delivery vehicles, with no more
than 1,750 warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The Treaty also
bans all multiple warhead ICBMS (MIRVed ICBMs). As under START I, the parties can
reduce their deployed warheads and eliminate MIRVed ICBMs by downloading, or
removing, warheads from deployed missiles. Because the parties can remove, at most, 4
warheads from each missile, ICBMs with 10 warheads must be eliminated, rather than
downloaded. The treaty makes an exception for the Russian SS-19 missile, which carries 6
warheads. Russia can remove 5 warheads from 105 of these missiles so that they will remain
as single-warhead missiles. For the most part, START II would use rely on the same
verification regime as START I. (For details see CRS Report 93-35, START II: Central
Limits and Force Structure Implications and CRS Report 93-617, The START and START
II Arms Control Treaties: Background and Issues.)
Ratification
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on START II in March 1993,
but delayed further debate until START I entered into force. Hearings resumed in early
1995, but a dispute over plans to reorganize the State Department and eliminate the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency delayed further action. After the Senate leadership
reached agreement on those issues, the Foreign Relations Committee approved the START
II resolution of ratification for START II by a unanimous vote on December 12, 1995. The
full Senate voted 87-4, offering its advice and consent to ratification, on January 26, 1996.
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The lower house of Russia’s parliament, the Duma, began considering START II in July
1995 but the debate did not proceed well. In early 1998, leaders in the Duma stated that they
would probably debate the treaty and vote on its ratification by June 1998, but this date
passed without action. The Duma resumed work on START II during its fall session, and
it had drafted a law on ratification for the treaty by the end of November, 1998. It again
planned to begin the debate in December, but this was delayed because the Duma did not yet
have a draft law on financing for the nation’s strategic nuclear forces. Nevertheless, officials
in the Yeltsin government continued to press for START II approval, and many began to
believe the Duma would act by the end of December. However, it again delayed
consideration after U.S. and British air strikes on Iraq in mid-December. The Treaty’s future
clouded again after the United States announced its plans in January 1999 to negotiate
amendments to the 1972 ABM Treaty. However, the Duma leadership sent the draft law on
ratification to President Yeltsin in late March 1999. On March 19, the Duma’s leadership
announced that it had scheduled a debate for April 2, 1999. This debate was canceled after
NATO forces began their air campaign in Yugoslavia.
After he took office at the end of 1999, President Vladimir Putin expressed his support
for START II and pressed the Duma to approve its ratification. The Duma Foreign Affairs
committee recommended START II ratification in early April, and the Duma voted to
approve ratification on April 14, 2000. The upper chamber of the Parliament, the Federation
council, did the same on April 19, 2000.
Some Duma members objected to START II because they generally opposed President
Yeltsin and his policies. Others argued that Russia should not reduce its offensive forces as
NATO expanded into central Europe because NATO could then move its nuclear weapons
closer to Russia’s borders. And some argued that Russia should not approve START II until
it is certain that the United States will continue to abide by the 1972 ABM Treaty — they
feared that the United States could undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent if it deployed
extensive missile defenses while Russia reduced its offensive forces.
The debate over START II also revealed concerns about the substance of the Treaty.
Some argued the treaty would undermine Russia’s security by eliminating the core of
Russia’s strategic forces — the MIRVed ICBMs. In addition, Russia would need hundreds
of new single-warhead ICBMs to retain 3,500 warheads as it eliminates MIRVed ICBMs.
As a result, some in the Duma suggested that the United States and Russia skip START II
and negotiate further reductions so that the United States would have to reduce to levels that
Russia might end up at anyway. (For details, see CRS Report 97-359, START II Debate in
the Russian Duma: Issues and Prospects.)
In March 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to extend the elimination
timelines in START II and established guidelines for a START III Treaty that would reduce
both sides’ forces to 2,000-2,500 warheads. On September 26, 1997, Secretary of State
Albright and Russia’s Foreign Minister Primakov signed a protocol to START II that
formalized the extension of START II deadlines. They also exchanged letters repeating the
Presidents’ agreement that the two sides would deactivate all the weapons to be eliminated
under START II by the end of 2003. The two sides agreed to work out methods for
deactivation as soon as the treaty entered into force. Russia added another provision to its
letter, noting that it expected a START III treaty to enter into force before the deactivation
deadline for START II. The United States acknowledged this statement but did not agree.
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Both Yeltsin and Putin reportedly told the Duma committees that Russia could not
afford to retain strategic offensive forces at START I levels. Ratification of START II would
not only ensure that the United States reduces its forces along with Russia, but would also
permit the two nations to move on to deeper reductions in START III. These arguments
apparently swayed enough members of the Duma to win approval for the Treaty.
The Duma attached several conditions to its Federal Law on Ratification. The Law
indicates that U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty would be considered an
extraordinary event that would give Russia the right to withdraw from START II. President
Putin appeared to endorse this view when he stated that Russia would pull out of the entire
system of arms control agreements on strategic nuclear forces if the United States dismantled
the ABM Treaty. Furthermore, the Federal Law on Ratification states that Russia will not
exchange the instruments of ratification on START II until the United States approves the
ratification of the 1997 Agreed Statements on Demarcation and Memorandum of
Understanding on Succession to the ABM Treaty. The Clinton Administration never
submitted these agreements to the U.S. Senate.
The Bush Administration does not intend to complete the ratification process. As a
result, the Russians will not be required to eliminate their large MIRVed ICBMs, which has
long been a goal of U.S. arms control policy. Many experts believe Russia will retire the SS-
18s by the end of the decade, but, without START II in force, it could retain them longer or
deploy its new SS-27 ICBM with multiple warheads. Even though the Treaty will not enter
into force, the Bush Administration plans to implement many of the reductions that would
have been needed for the United States to comply with the Treaty. When announcing the
results of its Nuclear Posture Review, the Administration indicated that it would eliminate
by 2007 the 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs and 4 Trident submarines that would have been
eliminated under START II. It will also download warheads from deployed missiles, leading
to a deployed force of around 3,800 warheads by 2007. Congress authorized funding in the
budget for the Defense Department for FY2002 to being to dismantle the 50 Peacekeeper
ICBMs. Congress had prevented any expenditures to begin this retirement prior to START
II’s entry into force, but it has lifted the restriction for FY2002. According to Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld, the United States no longer needs these missiles and the Air Force had
not provided any funds to maintain or operate them.
Further Reductions in Offensive Weapons
Proposed Provisions for START III
In March 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that the United States and Russia
would negotiate a START III treaty as soon as START II entered into force. This treaty
would limit each side to between 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads by December 31,
2007. The Presidents also agreed that START III should contain measures to promote the
irreversibility of the weapons elimination process, including transparency measures and the
destruction of strategic nuclear warheads removed from delivery vehicles. This responds to
a condition that the Senate added to the START I resolution of ratification and it could
address concerns about the possible theft or sale of warheads to nations seeking their own
nuclear weapons. The two sides have attempted, with little progress, to implement warhead
data exchanges for several years.
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Finally, the Presidents agreed the two sides would explore possible measures for
long-range, nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missiles and other tactical nuclear weapons.
These could include transparency and confidence-building measures. Russia has long sought
restrictions on U.S. sea-launched cruise missiles. The United States unilaterally withdrew
these missiles from deployment in 1991, but Russia fears that the these missiles could
threaten targets in Russia if the United States redeployed them. The United States would like
further restrictions on Russian tactical nuclear weapons because these may pose a
proliferation risk; Russia would like restrictions on U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to ensure
that they are not deployed on the territory of new NATO members.
During discussions on START III, both sides introduced numerous provisions that
would address all the issues outlined in the Helsinki framework, but they could not resolve
their differences. For example, the Russians proposed that the treaty reduce strategic nuclear
forces to 1,500 or fewer warheads on each side. The United States has resisted such deep
reductions in the past, and when it tabled a new proposal in January 2000, it reportedly
continued to insist that START III reduce forces to 2,000 or 2,500 warheads.
Press reports indicate that the Clinton Administration had asked DOD to assess the
implications of lower levels again, in early May 2000, in preparation for President Clinton’s
summit with President Putin scheduled for early June 2000. Military leaders reportedly
rejected lower levels again. At the time, many analysts expected the Clinton Administration
to negotiate a “Grand Bargain,” where the United States would accept lower limits for
START II if Russia accepted ABM Treaty modifications that would permit the deployment
of a U.S. NMD. However, the summit did not produce any arms control agreements.
Presidents Clinton and Putin did, however, agree to intensify their negotiations on START
III. Furthermore, during a press conference after their meetings, President Clinton said that
the United States would have to alter its strategic plans to reduce its forces to 1,500
warheads. And he indicated that such a change in plans would be more complete if the
United States knew what role missile defenses would play in the U.S. plan.
In November 2000, President Putin outlined a new proposal for reductions in offensive
forces, stating that Russia would be willing to reduce to 1,500 warheads or lower if the
United States remained committed to the ABM Treaty. President Clinton did not respond
directly to this proposal. Many analysts doubt that the United States would accept such a
proposal because U.S. officials have indicated that the United States would only be willing
to cut its forces that deeply if Russia agreed to modify the ABM Treaty.
The Bush Administration Approach
President Bush has stated that he believes the United States and Russia could move
away from formal arms control treaties and reduce forces unilaterally or in parallel to
whatever level each side decided was appropriate. He stated that he would reduce U.S.
forces to the lowest possible level after military leaders conducted a thorough review of U.S.
defense plans. At their meeting following the G-8 summit in Genoa, Italy, Presidents Bush
and Putin agreed that the two nations would begin consultations on offensive and defensive
weapons. The Russians apparently expected these consultations to produce agreed limits on
offensive forces and minor modifications of the ABM Treaty. The Bush Administration,
however, stated that the United States did not expecting lengthy negotiations or the
completion of a formal arms control treaty. Instead, the Administration wanted to use these
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consultations as a forum to inform Russia of U.S. plans with respect to offensive and
defensive forces and to convince Russia to set aside the ABM Treaty with the United States.
The consultations made little progress for several months, with Russia complaining that
the United States had not outlined its proposals for deep reductions in offensive nuclear
weapons. The Bush Administration responded that it was not yet ready to make these
proposals because DOD had not completed its review of U.S. nuclear forces. However, on
November 13, 2001, during meetings with President Putin in Washington, President Bush
announced that he would reduce the number of operationally deployed warheads on U.S.
strategic offensive nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 over 10 years. The reference
to “operationally deployed” warheads indicates that the United States would not include
warheads on submarines or bombers undergoing overhauls in this total. As a result, it might
not count several hundred warheads that would be included in a tally using START treaty
counting rules. A tally that included these warheads would be closer to the level of 2,500
warheads proposed for START III. The Bush Administration has also indicated that it would
not eliminate many of the warheads removed from deployed forces, but would hold them in
reserve as part of a “responsive force” that could be returned to service if conditions
warranted.
During the November summit, the Bush Administration indicated that it did not intend
to negotiate a formal treaty; but would reduce U.S. forces unilaterally, regardless of Russian
reciprocity. President Putin reiterated Russian intentions to reduce its forces to much lower
levels. In the past, he has called for reductions to 1,500 warheads or less. But he stated that
these reductions should be codified in a formal treaty that including control and verification
measures. Some analysts have doubted that this informal arrangement would appeal to
President Putin. It would not reduce U.S. forces as far as he would like and it would leave
the United States with the ability to increase its forces with little warning. Others, however,
expected Putin to accede to the U.S. proposal. Pressing for a formal treaty would not change
the Bush Administration’s approach. Furthermore, it would be difficult to criticize the U.S.
reductions when Russia had proposed numbers close to the U.S. offer for years. Some
analysts expected that Putin would accept the U.S. offer and approach as the best outcome
he could hope for.
The two sides resumed their discussions on offensive reductions in January 2002. The
Russian side reportedly hoped the two nations would devise a formal agreement that would
include limits on deployed and non-deployed warheads, along with specific monitoring and
verification provisions. Russia would also like the agreement to contain a commitment that
neither side would deploy missile defenses that could interfere with the offensive forces of
the other side. In contrast, reports indicate that the United States remained uninterested in a
formal treaty and would prefer a less-formal agreement that called for data exchanges and
cooperative measures that would allow each side to monitor the reductions implemented by
the other side. On February 6, Secretary of State Powell told Congress that the United States
would be willing to sign a “legally binding” document on nuclear reductions. This document
might not be a treaty, but it could be an executive agreement or a joint declaration. Russian
officials praised the change in the U.S. position, but the two sides remain at odds over the
content of the agreement. Russia continued to insist that it include legally binding limits on
nuclear warheads, with strict counting rules and formal elimination procedures, while the
United States would prefer a less formal declaration of intended reductions, with formal
provisions allowing monitoring and verification of the number of remaining warheads.
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In March, President Bush stated that the two sides should seek a formal agreement –
although not necessarily a Treaty – that would “outlive both of us.” But he emphasized that
the agreement should focus on transparency, calling verification “the most important thing.”
This differs from statements he made in November 2001, when he argued that the two sides
could reach an agreement based on a handshake. At the same time, though, the emphasis on
verification reflects the long-standing U.S. position that the agreement should focus on
monitoring provisions rather than strict limits on offensive strategic weapons.
Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov noted, after meetings in Washington on March
13-14, that the two sides remained at odds about the content of the formal agreement, but he
claimed that they had not reached an impasse. He also commented on progress that the sides
had made on transparency and verification measures, possibly signaling a shift in Russia’s
position towards the U.S. approach in favor of an agreement that focuses on monitoring and
verification. After a meeting in April 2002, Secretary Powell was reportedly “pleased with
the progress” made during the talks, even though the two sides remained at odds over the
means they would use to count warheads under the new agreement.
In late April, the two sides reportedly remained at odds about many features of the
proposed agreement, with key differences focusing on how to account for the number of
deployed warheads and how to monitor reductions. Russia apparently has sought to
incorporate counting rules and elimination procedures, such as those used in the START
Treaties, that would complicate U.S. efforts to restore warheads to deployed delivery
vehicles. This type of approach would provide a measure of predictability and irreversibility
in the reductions. But the United States has sought to count only those warheads actually
deployed on operational delivery vehicles, and it has resisted proposals to eliminate either
excess warheads or delivery vehicles. It wants to maintain the ability to reverse reductions
if conditions warrant. Instead, it has offered Russia a greater number of monitoring
opportunities, in essence, providing transparency into the existing state of U.S. strategic
nuclear forces without offering predictability or irreversibility in the future. After meetings
between Secretary of State Powell and Foreign Minister Ivanov in early May, the two sides
reported that they had made progress, and in mid-May, President Bush announced that they
had reached an agreement.
Presidents Bush and Putin signed the Treaty, during their summit meeting in Moscow
on May 24, 2002. The Treaty contains a declaration by the two parties that they will reduce
the number of warheads deployed on their strategic offensive forces to between 1,700 and
2,000 by the end of 2012. It contains no counting rules or definitions that would identify
which warheads are to count under the limits. It also states that each party shall determine
the structure and composition of its forces itself; thus it does not provide deeper limits on any
leg of either side’s triad or eliminate any particular type of weapon, as the START Treaties
had. Hence, because the START II Treaty had never entered into force, both sides can retain
multiple-warhead ICBMs (MIRVed ICBMs) under this new agreement. Furthermore, does
not contain any new monitoring and verification provisions. Reports indicate that the two
sides had been unable to reach agreement, and had decided to continue discussions on
transparency measures at a later date. The Treaty does state that the START I Treaty (which
it refers to as the START Treaty, because START II is not in force) will remain in force. The
two sides will be able to use the inspections, data exchanges, and other cooperative measures
outlined in that agreement to monitor progress with the reductions in the new agreement.
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Either side can withdraw from the Treaty with 3 months notice, and both could exceed its
limits after it expired in 2012.
The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
Treaty Provisions
The 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty prohibits the deployment
of ABM systems for the defense of the nations’ entire territory. It permits each side to
deploy limited ABM systems at two locations, one centered on the nation’s capital and one
at a location containing ICBM silo launchers. A 1974 Protocol further limited each nation
to one ABM site, located at the nation’s capital or around an ICBM deployment area. Each
ABM site can contain no more than 100 ABM launchers and 100 ABM interceptor missiles.
(Russia deployed its ABM site around Moscow; the United States deployed its site around
ICBM silos near Grand Forks, North Dakota. The United States ceased operations at its
ABM site in 1975, but the facilities continue to count under the ABM Treaty.) The Treaty
also specifies that, in the future, any radars that provide early warning of strategic ballistic
missile attack must be located on the periphery of the national territory and oriented outward.
The Treaty bans the development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-
based, or mobile land-based ABM systems and ABM system components (these include
interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars or other sensors that can substitute for radars).
The limits and restrictions in the ABM Treaty do not apply to defenses against shorter-
range battlefield or theater ballistic missiles. However, the Treaty does state that the parties
cannot give these types of defenses the capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or
their elements in flight trajectory. The parties also cannot test these other types of defenses
“in an ABM mode.” But the ABM Treaty does not define the capabilities of a “strategic”
ballistic missile or the characteristics of a test that would be “in an ABM mode.”
The Demarcation and Succession Agreements
Agreed Statements on Demarcation. Questions about the difference between
ABM systems and theater missile defense (TMD) systems grew in importance after the 1991
Persian Gulf War. Iraq’s scud missile attacks alerted many in the United States to the
growing threat from shorter-range ballistic missiles and generated new interest in advanced
theater missile defenses (TMD). By 1993, some analysts and officials in the Clinton
Administration had begun to ask whether advanced TMD systems would be limited by the
ABM Treaty. To avoid possible compliance questions, the Clinton Administration sought
to reach an agreement with Russia on a “demarcation line” to distinguish between ABM
systems and TMD systems. The United States sought a simple rule that would define an
ABM interceptor as one that demonstrated the capability to destroy a target ballistic missile
with a velocity greater than 5 kilometers. This would have allowed the United States to
develop advanced theater missile defense (TMD) systems without having those systems fall
under the limits in the ABM Treaty. Russia proposed a more restrictive formula to define
an ABM interceptor as one with the capability to intercept targets with a velocity of 3
kilometers per second, rather than 5 kilometers per second, and a range of 3,500 kilometers.
And, it sought to limit the velocity of TMD interceptor missiles to 3 kilometers per second.
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(For a more detailed discussion of the negotiations, see CRS Report 98-496, Anti-Ballistic
Missile Treaty Demarcation and Succession Agreements: Background and Issues.)
After several years of negotiations, Secretary of State Albright and Russia’s Foreign
Minister Primakov signed Agreed Statements on Demarcation on September 26, 1997. In
the First Agreed Statement, the two sides agreed that TMD systems with interceptors tested
at speeds at or below 3 km/sec that were tested against a target with a speed at or below of
5 km/sec and a range of less than 3,500 km would be exempt from the limits in the ABM
Treaty. The Second Agreed Statement outlined parameters for higher speed systems, those
with interceptor velocities above 3 km/second. These systems could not be tested against a
target missile with a velocity greater than 5 km/sec and a range greater than 3,500 km. In
addition, the agreement banned TMD systems with space-based interceptors. However, the
agreement did not state whether these more capable TMD systems would be covered by the
limits in the ABM Treaty. Each nation would decide whether its systems had been “tested
in an ABM mode.” The demarcation agreements would not have limited the speed of U.S.
TMD systems. They would have used the interceptors’ speed as a dividing line between
those systems that are not limited by the ABM Treaty and those that would need further
analysis to determine whether they are exempt from the Treaty limits.
Memorandum of Understanding on Succession. The 1997 Memorandum of
Understanding on Succession names Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan as successors
to the Soviet Union in the ABM Treaty. Together, these states are limited to a single ABM
deployment area with no more than 100 launchers and interceptors. The MOU also states
that the geographic area covered by the provisions in the treaty would be the combined
territories of these successor states. Russia could continue to operate Soviet ABM facilities
and radars in Ukraine and Kazakhstan and construct a new early warning radar in Belarus.
The MOU also states that the Successor States may continue to use any facility covered by
the Treaty that is “currently located on the territory of any State that is not Party to the Treaty,
with the consent of such State....” Consequently, Russia can continue to operate the early
warning radar in Azerbaijan (it closed the radar in Latvia in September 1998) even though
it is outside the periphery of the participating nations.
The Clinton Administration and supporters of the ABM Treaty argued that this
agreement would allow the ABM Treaty to remain in place. They argued that, without limits
on the deployment of strategic ballistic missile defenses, Russia would be unwilling to
reduce its strategic offensive forces. Some in Congress, however, believe that the United
States should have allowed the ABM Treaty to lapse. They believe that, by adding parties
to the ABM Treaty, it will be more difficult for the United States to negotiate amendments
that would permit deployment of effective national missile defenses.
The Clinton Administration agreed to submit the demarcation and succession
agreements for Senate advice and consent as amendments to the ABM Treaty, but never did
so for fear that the Senate would defeat them. Instead, it declared in May 1998 that the
United States and Russia “clearly are parties” to the ABM Treaty. Many in Congress
objected to this declaration. On August 5, 1998, the House passed an amendment to the
FY1999 Commerce, Justice, and State Department Appropriations Bill (H.R. 4276, H.Amdt.
859) stating that the U.S. delegates to the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), could
not use any of the funds to implement the MOU on succession. Representative Weldon
argued that this would force the Administration to submit the MOU to the Senate for its
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advice and consent to ratification. Others argued that the United States should cease its
participation in the ABM Treaty so that it could build nationwide defenses. Critics of the
amendment argued that it would preclude any U.S. participation in the SCC, and therefore,
undermine continued implementation of the treaty.
The ABM Treaty and National Missile Defenses
In the mid-1990s, concerns about the possibility of an unintended missile launch from
Russia and the growing ballistic missile threat from other nations stimulated interest in
national missile defenses (NMD). In January 1999, the Clinton Administration added $6.6
billion to the Defense budget for FY1999-2005 to support the deployment of an NMD
system. It planned to decide in June 2000 whether to deploy the system, but these funds in
the out-years of the budget would preserve that option. The Administration announced that
the growing missile threat from North Korea would support a decision to deploy in 2000, if
the technology were sufficiently mature. The Administration also moved the projected
deployment date from 2003 to 2005, to reduce the amount of risk in the program.
Some in Congress argued that the Administration should accelerate, not delay the
schedule for NMD because the threat from uncertainties in Russia and missiles in rogue
nations exists now. Some also argued that the United States may have too little warning
when new threats emerge. They point to the 1998 “Rumsfeld Report,” which notes that
nations may acquire long-range ballistic missiles without pursuing long development and
testing programs. Some Members praised the Administration for adding deployment funds
to the budget. But they continued to question the Administration’s commitment to
deployment. Others, including Senator Helms, criticized the Administration’s intention to
negotiate ABM Treaty amendments with Russia. He argued that the Treaty was no longer
in force due to the demise of the Soviet Union, and, by negotiating amendments, the
Administration would only give Russia a chance to veto U.S. NMD plans.
In 1998 and 1999, Congress sought to pass legislation that would mandate the
deployment of nationwide ballistic missile defenses. On April 21, 1998, the Senate Armed
Services Committee approved the American Missile Protection Act of 1998 (S. 1873, S.Rept.
105-175), which called for the deployment of a national missile defense system to protect all
U.S. territory as soon as the technology is ready. When the Senate bill came to the floor in
May and September 1998, Democrats succeeded with a filibuster. Senator Cochran
introduced this bill again in January 1999 (S. 257). The Administration threatened a veto
because it bill would used only the state of technology as the measure for deployment,
ignoring considerations about cost, threat, and treaty-compliance. The Senate approved the
bill, by a vote of 97-3, on March 17, 1999. Democrats dropped their opposition, and the
White House withdrew its threat of a veto, after the Senate approved an amendment stating
that it is U.S. policy to continue to negotiate with Russia on reductions in offensive nuclear
weapons.
Representative Curt Weldon introduced similar legislation on August 5, 1998 (H.R.
4402) and, again, in early February 1999 (H.R. 4). This legislation simply stated that it is
“the policy of the United States to deploy a National Missile Defense.” This legislation
passed the House, by a vote of 317-105, on March 18, 1999. The House and Senate did not
hold a conference to resolve the differences in their bills. Instead, the Senate took up H.R.
4, replaced its language with the language in S. 257, and passed the new bill. The House
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then approved the new H.R. 4 on May 20, 1999. President Clinton signed the bill on July
23, 1999. However, he remained at odds with congressional Republicans about the
implications of the legislation. He contended that it was not equivalent to a deployment
decision because NMD remains subject to annual authorizations and appropriations. But
congressional supporters of NMD argued that the bill makes it clear that the United States
will deploy and NMD, no further decisions about that possibility are needed.
In February 1999, a team, led by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, met with
Russian officials in Moscow to begin discussions on possible amendments to the ABM
Treaty. The United States sought to reassure Russia that the planned NMD would not
interfere with Russia’s strategic nuclear forces and that the United States still views the ABM
Treaty as central to the U.S.-Russian strategic balance. The Russians were reportedly
unconvinced; they continued to argue that the United States has overstated the threat from
rogue nations so that it can build a defense that will be able to intercept Russian missiles.
During their meeting at the G-8 summit in Germany in June 1999, the Presidents
repeated their support for the ABM Treaty as the “cornerstone of strategic stability.” But
they also noted that the parties are obligated, under Article XIII of the Treaty to consider
possible changes in the strategic situation that have a bearing on the Treaty and to consider
proposals for further increasing the viability of the Treaty. In November 1999, President
Yeltsin warned that any U.S. move beyond the limits in the ABM Treaty would “have
extremely negative consequences” for other arms control treaties. Russian officials also
stated that Russia could deploy new multiple-warhead missiles or retain older ones to have
the forces needed to penetrate U.S. missile defenses. And many Russian officials continued
to insist that the United States had overstated the threat from rogue nations.
In January 1999, the United States reportedly tabled a proposed Protocol to the ABM
Treaty that would allow for the deployment of a U.S. NMD site in Alaska. This Protocol,
which was published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Magazine, would allow for the
deployment of 100 interceptors and an ABM radar at a single site, other than the sites
permitted by the ABM Treaty (i.e. Alaska) and for the modification of several other early
warning radars so that they could perform ABM radar functions and support the NMD
system. The Protocol also stated that either side could request negotiations on further
modifications after March 1, 200l. These talks would presumably allow the United States to
seek further changes in the Treaty’s limits on ABM interceptors and space-based sensors.
The United States also offered to exchange data and permit inspections so that Russia could
remain confident in the limited nature of the U.S. NMD. Russia reportedly did not table a
counter-proposal or begin discussions about the specific provisions in the U.S. proposal.
Some in Congress criticized these negotiations because, they argued, the resulting
agreement would prove too limiting for U.S. missile defenses. In mid-April 2000, 25
Republican Senators signed a letter to President Clinton stating that they would vote against
any agreement the Administration reached with the Russians on modifications to the ABM
Treaty. Furthermore, on April 26, 2000, Senator Jesse Helms informed the Administration
that the Foreign Relations Committee would not address or vote on any arms control
agreements reached by this Administration in its final months. But the United States and
Russia remained far apart on the question of modifying the ABM Treaty.
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During their summit in Moscow in early June 2000, and again at the G-8 summit in late
June, Presidents Clinton and Putin failed to resolve their differences. At the Moscow
summit, Putin did agree that the threat from proliferation was increasing and that the ABM
Treaty could be modified to remain viable in the face of changing circumstances, but he did
not agree that the proliferation threat justified such modifications. After the summit, other
Russian officials continued to dispute the U.S. assessment of emerging threats and to argue
that the U.S. NMD system would undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent. But Putin did
propose that Russia work with European nations to develop defenses against shorter-range
ballistic missiles. Russia repeated this offer in February 2001.
On September 1, 2000, President Clinton announced that he had decided not to
authorize deployment of a National Missile Defense system. He stated that he could not
conclude “that we have enough confidence in the technology, and the operational
effectiveness of the entire NMD system, to move forward to deployment.” He also noted that
the delay in a deployment decision would permit the United States to continue its efforts to
convince Russia to modify the ABM Treaty. He stated that he believed it would be “far
better to move forward in the context of the ABM Treaty.” Russian officials praised the
delay in the deployment decision, but some in Moscow may mistakenly believe that Russia’s
resistance to changes in the ABM Treaty caused the delay. President Clinton indicated that
it was the technology that caused the delay, even though the Treaty remains an issue.
The Bush Administration has taken a different approach to the ABM Treaty, arguing
that the United States would need to “leave behind the constraints” of the Treaty to pursue
the development and deployment of missile defenses. The President called on Russia to join
the United States in developing a new framework for strategic stability and international
security in the post-Cold War era. During the President’s visit to Europe in mid-June, some
officials from the Administration argued that the United States would need to abandon the
Treaty soon because the Treaty would inhibit testing of ballistic missile defense concepts.
In mid-July 2001, the Bush Administration offered Congress a more detailed description
of its missile defense plans when it submitted its amended defense budget for FY2002. The
Administration requested $8.3 billion, an increase of more $3 billion, or 57%, from the
FY2001 budget, to support a robust research and development program into a wide range of
missile defense technologies. The Administration also reorganized BMDO to eliminate the
distinctions between theater missile defense and national missile defense, instead dividing
the programs into boost-phase, mid-course, and terminal technologies. Furthermore, in
testimony before Congress on July 13, 2001, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz stated
that the United States might soon test the ability of Aegis theater defense radars to track
strategic ballistic missiles. This type of test could be interpreted to be an effort to test non-
ABM systems in an ABM mode, which is forbidden by the ABM Treaty. Consequently,
Secretary Wolfowitz noted that the United States could bump up against the limits in the
Treaty “in months” rather than in years. However, he said that the United States would not
violate the ABM Treaty. Instead, the Administration would seek Russia’s agreement and
understanding on a framework that would allow the United States to move beyond the ABM
Treaty, and, if this was not possible, the United States could withdraw. DOD delayed the
problematic tests in October of 2001, for technical reasons. But Secretary Rumsfeld stated
that the Aegis radars would not be used in the tests when they did occur because this would
violate the Treaty. Some interpreted these comments as evidence that the United States was
seeking to reach an agreement with Russia that would not involve violations of the Treaty.
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Others, however, stated that Secretary Rumsfeld hoped the cancellations would emphasize
how much the Treaty constrained U.S. missile defense programs and would highlight the
need for the United States to withdraw from the Treaty.
During their meeting after the G-8 summit in Genoa, Italy in June, Presidents Bush and
Putin agreed that the two nations would hold “intensive consultations on the interrelated
subjects of offensive and defensive systems.” Many observers interpreted this statement as
an indication that two sides would begin negotiations on a new agreement limiting offensive
nuclear weapons and on possible amendments or modifications to the ABM Treaty. This
may have been the type of framework President Putin had in mind. His Defense Minister,
Ivanov indicated that he would recommend accepting modifications to the ABM Treaty if
the resulting defenses would not undermine Russia’s security; this acceptance would be in
exchange for deep cuts in U.S. and Russian offensive forces. However, officials from the
Bush Administration, and the President himself, have stated that the United States does not
intend to participate in lengthy negotiations in search of formal arms control limits. They
viewed these consultations as an opportunity for the United States to outline its policies and
programs for both offensive and defensive weapons, and to seek Russian agreement on a
mutual withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The President has said that the United States
would withdraw from the treaty unilaterally if Russia did not accept the U.S. approach.
Furthermore, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Undersecretary
of State John Bolton stated that the Bush Administration would not seek to negotiate
amendments to the ABM Treaty or a new formal agreement to replace it. Instead, the
Administration would seek to win Russian acquiescence with U.S. plans and to convince
Russia to jointly withdraw from the ABM Treaty with the United States.
These consultations began with several meetings in August and September 2001. In
early August, a Russian delegation visited the Department of Defense and received extensive
briefings on U.S. plans for missile defense in early August. These meetings were billed as
an “exchange of information” not an exchange of ideas. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
traveled to Moscow in mid-August, reportedly in an unsuccessful effort to convince Russia
that the two nations should withdraw from the ABM Treaty simultaneously. He did not
engage in discussions about possible modifications to the ABM Treaty or in negotiations on
reductions in offensive forces. He stated that the United States did not yet know how low
it would reduce its forces because it had not yet completed its strategic review. In late
August, Undersecretary of State John Bolton seemed to indicate that the United States would
withdraw from the ABM Treaty in November, if the United States and Russia had not agreed
on a plan for mutual withdrawal by the time President Bush and President Putin met in
Texas. He, and other officials, later stated that he had not intended to set a firm deadline.
The following day, however, President Bush stated that the United States would withdraw
from the ABM Treaty, but would do so on its own timetable. Press reports indicate that
Undersecretary of State John Bolton was prepared to inform Russian officials of the U.S.
intention to move forward with withdrawal from the ABM Treaty during meetings in
Moscow on September 17, but he did not do so.
Russian officials complained that the two sides could not make progress in these
negotiations because they still did not know what kind of missile defense the United States
intends to build or what parts of the Treaty would cause problems for this defense.
Furthermore, in early September, Russian officials ruled out an early agreement on missile
defenses. They indicated that it could take a year or more for the two sides to reach
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agreement on a framework to replace the ABM Treaty. However, at the same time, Russia
appeared willing to accept some minor modifications to the Treaty, although it continued to
reject the U.S. proposal for a joint withdrawal.
Many analysts expected President Bush to inform Russia’s President Putin of U.S.
intentions to withdraw from the ABM Treaty when they met in Shanghai in October, 2001.
He did not do this. Instead, the two nations appeared to be close to an agreement that would
allow the United States to proceed with its missile defense testing plans without withdrawing
from or violating the ABM Treaty. Reportedly, Russia would have been willing to allow the
United States to proceed with some tests of missile defense technologies as long as Russia
had the opportunity to review and approve the tests before they occurred and as long as the
Treaty’s limits on deployment remained in place. The Bush Administration reportedly
rejected this approach, arguing that it needed more flexibility to pursue its missile defense
programs. It was willing to keep Russia informed about these plans but it was not willing
to allow Russia to review and reject them. Consequently, the November summit concluded
without the announcement of such an agreement. In early December, Secretary Powell
informed Russia’s Foreign Minister that the United States planned to withdraw from the
ABM Treaty. President Bush reportedly called President Putin and told him the same thing.
On December 12, the White House informed Congressional leaders of the U.S. intent to
withdraw from the Treaty, and, on December 13, the President gave formal notice to Russia
of the U.S. intent to withdraw. Because the Treaty mandates 6-months notice for withdrawal
from the Treaty, the United States will leave the ABM Treaty in June 2002.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Report RL31111. Missile Defense: The Current Debate
CRS Report RL31222. Arms Control and Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Unilateral vs.
Bilateral Reductions
CRS Report RL30345. U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Policy, Force Structure, and Arms Control
Issues
CRS Report 97-359. START II Debate in the Russian Duma: Issues and Prospects
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