Order Code RL30588
Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Afghanistan: Current Issues
and U.S. Policy Concerns
Updated May 20, 2002
Kenneth Katzman
Specialist in Middle Eastern Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Afghanistan: Current Issues
and U.S. Policy Concerns
Summary
U.S. and international officials are hopeful that Afghanistan is emerging from
more than 22 years of warfare and instability, although substantial risk to Afghan
stability remains. Before the U.S. military campaign against the orthodox Islamist
Taliban movement began on October 7, 2001, Afghanistan had been mired in conflict
since the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Taliban ruled most of
Afghanistan during 1996 until its collapse at the hands of the U.S. and Afghan
opposition military campaign in November - December 2001. During its rule, the
Taliban was opposed primarily by the Northern Alliance, a coalition of minority
ethnic groups. During 1998 until its rule ended, the Taliban had come under
increasing international pressure to cease hosting of terrorist leader Osama bin Laden
and members of his Al Qaeda organization, the prime suspect in the September 11
terrorist attacks on the United States.
The collapse of the Taliban has enabled the United States and its coalition
partners to send forces throughout Afghanistan to search for Taliban and Al Qaeda
fighters and leaders that remain at large, including bin Laden himself. Afghan
citizens are enjoying new personal freedoms that were forbidden under the Taliban;
women are returning to schools and their jobs. With the Taliban defeated, the United
States and its coalition partners are distributing additional humanitarian aid through
newly opened routes and, in conjunction with international agencies, beginning a
major reconstruction effort.
Although the Northern Alliance has emerged as the dominant force in the
country, the United States and United Nations mediators persuaded the Alliance to
share power with Pashtun representatives in a broad-based interim government. On
December 5, 2001, major Afghan factions, meeting under U.N. auspices in Bonn,
signed an agreement to form an interim government that will run Afghanistan until
a traditional national assembly (“loya jirga”) takes place during June 10-16, 2002.
The interim government, which took office on December 22, 2001, is chaired by a
Pashtun leader, Hamid Karzai. The Northern Alliance holds 17 out of the 30 cabinet
positions, including the three key posts responsible for foreign policy, defense, and
internal security.
As the war against remaining Al Qaeda and Taliban elements continues, the
United States is working to stabilize the interim government, arrange humanitarian
and reconstruction assistance, expand a new Afghan national army, and support the
international security force (ISAF) that is helping the new government provide
security. The United States has reopened its embassy in Kabul and allowed the
interim Afghan administration to reopen Afghanistan’s embassy in Washington.

Contents
Background to Recent Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Rise of The Taliban . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Mullah Muhammad Umar/Taliban Leaders . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Coalescence of the Northern Alliance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Political Settlement Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Pre-September 11 Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The “Six Plus Two” and Geneva Contact Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
King Zahir Shah and the Loya Jirga Processes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Post-September 11 U.N. Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Bonn Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The Interim Government . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
International Security Force/Afghan National Army . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Diplomatic and Governmental Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Regional Context
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Pakistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Iran . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Russia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Central Asian States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Saudi Arabia . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
U.S. Policy Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Harboring of Al Qaeda . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Human Rights/Treatment of Women . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Destruction of Buddha Statues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Hindu Badges . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Counternarcotics . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Retrieval of U.S. Stingers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Landmine Eradication . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Assistance and Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Casualties . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
U.S. Assistance Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Reconstruction Aid . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Promoting Long-Term Economic Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
U.S. and International Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
Map of Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 34
List of Tables
Table 1. Major Factions in Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Table 2. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan in FY1999-FY2002 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan FY1978-1998 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 30

Afghanistan: Current Issues and
U.S. Policy Concerns
Background to Recent Developments
Afghanistan became unstable in the 1970s as both its Communist Party and its
Islamic movement grew in strength and became increasingly bitter opponents of each
other.1 The instability shattered the relative peace and progress that characterized the
rule of King Mohammad Zahir Shah, who reigned during 1933 - 1973. Zahir Shah
was the last King in Afghanistan’s monarchy, which was founded in 1747 by Ahmad
Shah Durrani. Prior to the founding of the monarchy, Afghanistan did not exist as
a distinct political entity, but was a territory inhabited by tribes and tribal
confederations often linked to neighboring nations. Zahir Shah was the only
surviving son of King Mohammad Nadir Shah (1929-1933), whose rule followed
(after a brief rule in 1919 by a Tajik strongman named Bacha-i-Saqqo) that of King
Amanullah Khan (1919-1929), who was considered a secular modernizer and who
presided over a government in which all ethnic minorities participated. Zahir Shah
promulgated a constitution in 1964 that established a national legislature, and he
promoted freedoms for women, including freeing them from the veil. However,
possibly believing that doing so would enable him to limit Soviet support for
communist factions in Afghanistan, Zahir Shah also entered into a significant
political and arms purchase relationship with the Soviet Union.
While undergoing medical treatment in Italy, Zahir Shah was overthrown by his
cousin, Mohammad Daoud, a military leader. Daoud established a dictatorship
characterized by strong state control over the economy. After taking power in 1978
by overthrowing Daoud, the communists, first under Nur Mohammad Taraki and
then under Hafizullah Amin (leader of a rival communist faction who overthrew
Taraki in 1979), attempted to impose radical socialist change on a traditional society.
The communists tried to redistribute land and bring more women into government
positions. These moves spurred recruitment for Islamic parties and their militias
opposed to communist ideology. The Soviet Union sent troops into Afghanistan on
December 27, 1979 to prevent a seizure of power by the Islamic-oriented militias
that later became known as “mujahedin”2 (Islamic fighters), and thereby keep
Afghanistan pro-Soviet. Upon their invasion, the Soviets ousted Hafizullah Amin
and installed its local ally, Babrak Karmal, as Afghan president.
1 For more information, see CRS Report RL31389, Afghanistan: Challenges and Options
for Reconstructing a Stable and Moderate State
, by Richard Cronin; and RL31355,
Afghanistan’s Path to Reconstruction: Obstacles, Challenges, and Issues for Congress, by
Rhoda Margesson.
2 The term refers to an Islamic guerrilla; literally “one who fights in the cause of Islam.”

CRS-2
After the Soviets occupied Afghanistan, the U.S.-backed mujahedin fought
them effectively, and Soviet occupation forces were never able to pacify all areas of
the country. The Soviets held major cities, but the outlying mountainous regions
remained largely under mujahedin control. The mujahedin benefitted from U.S.
weapons and assistance, provided through the Central Intelligence Agency, working
closely with Pakistan’s Inter-Service Intelligence directorate (ISI). That weaponry
included man-portable shoulder-fired anti-aircraft systems called “Stingers,” which
proved highly effective against Soviet aircraft. The Islamic guerrillas also hid and
stored weaponry in a large network of natural and manmade tunnels and caves
throughout Afghanistan. The Soviet Union’s losses mounted, and domestic opinion
shifted against the war. In 1986, perhaps in an effort to signal some flexibility on a
possible political settlement, the Soviets replaced Babrak Karmal with the more
pliable former director of Afghan intelligence (Khad), Najibullah Ahmedzai (who
went by the name Najibullah or, on some occasions, the abbreviated Najib).
On April 14, 1988, the Soviet Union, led by reformist leader Mikhail
Gorbachev, agreed to a U.N.-brokered accord (the Geneva Accords) requiring it to
withdraw. The Soviet Union completed the withdrawal on February 15, 1989,
leaving in place a weak communist government facing a determined U.S. backed
mujahedin. A warming of superpower relations moved the United States and Soviet
Union to try for a political settlement to the internal conflict. From late 1989, the
United States pressed the Soviet Union to agree to a mutual cutoff of military aid to
the combatants. The failed August 1991 coup in the Soviet Union reduced Moscow’s
capability for and interest in supporting communist regimes in the Third World,
leading Moscow to agree with Washington on September 13, 1991, to a joint cutoff
of military aid to the Afghan combatants.
The State Department has said that a total of about $3 billion in economic and
covert military assistance was provided by the U.S. to the Afghan mujahedin from
1980 until the end of the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan in 1989. Press reports
and independent experts believe the covert aid program grew from about $20 million
per year in FY1980 to about $300 million per year during fiscal years 1986 - 1990.
Even before the 1991 U.S.-Soviet agreement on Afghanistan, the Soviet withdrawal
had decreased the strategic and political value of Afghanistan and made the
Administration and Congress less forthcoming with funding. For FY1991, Congress
reportedly cut covert aid appropriations to the mujahedin from $300 million the
previous year to $250 million, with half the aid withheld until the second half of the
fiscal year. Although the intelligence authorization bill was not signed until late
1991, Congress abided by the aid figures contained in the bill.3
3 See “Country Fact Sheet: Afghanistan,” in U.S. Department of State Dispatch. Volume
5, No. 23, June 6, 1994. Page 377.

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With Soviet backing
Population:
25.8 million
withdrawn, on March 18, 1992,
Afghan President Najibullah
Ethnic Groups:
Pashtun 38%; Tajik
25%;
publicly agreed to step down
Uzbek 6%; Hazara 19%; others
12%
once an interim government
was formed. His announcement
Religions:
Sunni Muslim 84%; Shiite
set off a wave of regime
Muslim 15%; other 1%
defections, primarily by Uzbek
and Tajik ethnic militias that
Per Capita Income:
$280/yr (World Bank figure)
had previously been allied with
External Debt:
$5.5 billion (1996 est.)
the Kabul gov e r nment,
including that of Uzbek militia
Major Exports:
fruits, nuts, carpets
commander Abdul Rashid
Dostam (see below).
Major Imports:
food, petroleum
Source: CIA World Factbook, 2000.
Joining with the defectors,
p r o m i n e n t m u j a h e d i n
commander Ahmad Shah
Masud (of the Islamic Society, a largely Tajik party headed by Burhannudin Rabbani)
sent his fighters into Kabul, paving the way for the installation of a mujahedin regime
on April 18, 1992. Masud, nicknamed “Lion of the Panjshir,” had earned a
reputation as a brilliant strategist by successfully preventing the Soviets from
occupying his power base in the Panjshir Valley of northeastern Afghanistan. Two
days earlier, as the mujahedin approached Kabul, Najibullah failed in an attempt to
flee Afghanistan. He, his brother, and a few aides remained at a U.N. facility in
Kabul until the day in September 1996 that the Taliban movement seized control of
the city – Taliban fighters entered the U.N. compound, captured Najibullah and his
brother, and hanged them.
The victory over Najibullah brought the mujahedin parties to power in
Afghanistan but also exposed the serious differences among them. Under an
agreement among all the major mujahedin parties, Rabbani became President in June
1992, with the understanding that he would leave office in December 1994. His
refusal to step down at the end of that time period–on the grounds that political
authority would disintegrate in the absence of a clear successor–led many of the other
parties to accuse him of attempting to monopolize power. His government faced
daily shelling from another mujahedin commander, Pakistan-backed Gulbuddin
Hikmatyar, a radical Islamic fundamentalist who headed a faction of Hizb-e-Islami
(Islamic Party) who was nominally the Prime Minister. Hikmatyar was later ousted
by the Taliban from his powerbase around Jalalabad- despite similar ideologies and
Pashtun ethnicity - and he fled to Iran. Four years (1992-1996) of civil war among
the mujahedin resulted, destroying much of Kabul and creating popular support for
the Taliban. In addition, the dominant Pashtun ethnic group accused the Rabbani
government of failing to represent all of Afghanistan’s ethnic groups, and many
Pashtuns allied with the Taliban.
The Rise of The Taliban
The Taliban movement was formed in 1993-1994 by Afghan Islamic clerics and
students, many of them former mujahedin who had moved into the western areas of

CRS-4
Pakistan to study in Islamic seminaries (“madrassas”). They are mostly ultra-
orthodox Sunni Muslims who practice a form of Islam, “Wahhabism” similar to that
practiced in Saudi Arabia. The Taliban was composed overwhelmingly of ethnic
Pashtuns (Pathans) from rural areas of Afghanistan. Pashtuns constitute a plurality
in Afghanistan, accounting for about 38% of Afghanistan’s population of about 26
million. Taliban leaders viewed the Rabbani government as corrupt and responsible
for continued civil war in Afghanistan and the deterioration of security in the major
cities. With the help of defections by sympathetic mujahedin fighters, the movement
seized control of the southeastern city of Qandahar in November 1994 and continued
to gather strength. The Taliban’s early successes encouraged further defections by
local leaders, and by February 1995, it reached the gates of Kabul, after which an 18-
month stalemate around the capital ensued. In September 1995, the Taliban captured
Herat province, on the border with Iran, and expelled the pro-Iranian governor of the
province, Ismail Khan. In September 1996, a string of Taliban victories east of
Kabul led Rabbani/Masud’s outer defenses to crumble, and the Rabbani government
withdrew to the Panjshir Valley north of Kabul with most of its heavy weapons
intact. The Taliban took control of Kabul on September 27, 1996.
The Taliban lost much of its international support as its policies unfolded.4 It
imposed strict adherence to Islamic customs in areas it controls, and used harsh
punishments, including executions, on transgressors. The Taliban regime established
a Ministry for the Promotion of Virtue and the Suppression of Vice, a force of police
officers to enforce its laws and moral rules.5 It banned television, popular music, and
dancing, and required that male beards remain untrimmed. Immediately after
capturing Kabul, the Taliban curbed freedoms for women there, including their
ability to work outside the home (except in health care) and it closed schools for
girls.
Mullah Muhammad Umar/Taliban Leaders. During the war against the
Soviet Union, Taliban founder Mullah Muhammad Umar fought in the Hizb-e-Islam
(Islamic Party) mujahedin party led by Yunis Khalis. During Taliban rule, Mullah
Umar held the title of Head of State and Commander of the Faithful. He lost an eye
during the anti-Soviet war, rarely appeared in public even before U.S. airstrikes
began, and did not take an active role in the day-to-day affairs of governing.
However, in times of crisis or to discuss pressing issues, he summoned Taliban
leaders to meet with him in Qandahar. Considered a hardliner within the Taliban
regime, Mullah Umar forged a close personal bond with bin Laden and was
adamantly opposed to handing him over to another country to face justice. Born near
Qandahar, Umar is about 49 years old. His ten year old son, as well as his stepfather,
reportedly died at the hands of U.S. airstrikes in early October 2001. Umar, having
reportedly fled Qandahar city when the Taliban surrendered the city on December 9,
4 See U.S. Department of State, Country Reports on Human Rights Practices - 2000. Bureau
of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, February 2001. Available online through the
State Department’s web site at [http://www.state.gov/g/drl/rls/hrrpt/2000/sa].
5 Testimony of Zalmay Khalilzad, Director of RAND’s Strategy and Doctrine Program,
before the Subcommittee on Near East and South Asia of the Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations. October 22, 1997.

CRS-5
2001, is still at large, and he is believed to still be in the country, possibly in Uruzgan
Province where he grew up.
Coalescence of the Northern Alliance
The rise of the Taliban movement caused other power centers to make common
cause with ousted President Rabbani and his military chief, Ahmad Shah Masud.
The individual groups allied with Rabbani and Masud’s Islamic Society party in a
“Northern Alliance” sometimes called the “United Front.” Rabbani’s Islamic Society
faction is composed mostly of Tajiks, which constitute about 25% of the Afghan
population. Islamic Society adherents are also located in Persian-speaking western
Afghanistan near the Iranian border. The fighters in the west are generally loyal to
the charismatic militia leader Ismail Khan, who regained the governorship of his
former stronghold in Herat and surrounding provinces after the Taliban collapse of
mid-November 2001.
One non-Tajik component of the Northern Alliance is the Uzbek militia force
(the Junbush-Melli, or National Islamic Movement of Afghanistan) of General Abdul
Rashid Dostam. Uzbeks constitute about 6% of the population. Dostam’s break with
Najibullah in early 1992 helped pave the way for the overthrow of the communist
regime. He subsequently fought against Rabbani during his presidency in an effort
to persuade him to yield power, but then allied with Rabbani and the Northern
Alliance when the Taliban took power in Kabul. Dostam once commanded about
25,000 troops and significant amounts of armor and combat aircraft, but infighting
within his faction left him unable to hold off Taliban forces. The Taliban captured
his power base in August 1998, leaving him in control of only small areas of northern
Afghanistan near the border with Uzbekistan. During the U.S.-led war against the
Taliban, he, in concert with a Tajik commander Atta Mohammad and a Shiite Hazara
commander Mohammad Mohaqqiq, recaptured Mazar-e-Sharif from the Taliban.
There have been tensions among the three in governing the city and its environs
since, sometimes resulting in minor clashes.
Shiite Muslim parties, generally less active against the Soviet occupation than
were the Sunni parties, constituted another part of the Northern Alliance. In June
1992, Iranian-backed Hizb-e-Wahdat (Unity Party, an alliance of eight Hazara tribe
Shiite Muslim groups), agreed to join the Rabbani government in exchange for a
share of power. Hizb-e-Wahdat has traditionally received some material support
from Iran, which practices Shiism and has an affinity for the Hazaras. On September
13, 1998, Taliban forces captured the Hazara stronghold of Bamiyan city, capital of
Bamiyan province, raising fears in Iran and elsewhere that Taliban forces would
massacre the Hazara civilians. This contributed to the movement of Iran and the
Taliban militia to the brink of armed conflict that month. After that time, Hizb-e-
Wahdat forces occasionally retook Bamiyan city but were unable to hold it. They
recaptured Bamiyan during the Taliban collapse of mid-November 2001.
Another mujahedin party leader, Abd-i-Rab Rasul Sayyaf, heads a faction called
the Islamic Union for the Liberation of Afghanistan. Sayyaf lived many years in and
is politically close to Saudi Arabia, which shares his puritanical interpretation of
Sunni Islam. This interpretation is also shared by the Taliban, which partly explains
why many of Sayyaf’s fighters originally defected to the Taliban movement when

CRS-6
that movement was taking power. Sayyaf himself remained allied with the Northern
Alliance and placed his remaining forces at Alliance disposal.
The political rivalries among opposition groups long hindered their ability to
shake the Taliban’s grip on power. In the few years prior to the beginning of the U.S.
war against the Taliban, the opposition had steadily lost ground, even in areas outside
Taliban’s Pashtun ethnic base. The losses extended to the point at which the Taliban
controlled at least 75% of the country and almost all major provincial capitals.
The Northern Alliance suffered a major setback on September 9, 2001, when
Ahmad Shah Masud, the undisputed and charismatic military leader of Northern
Alliance forces, was assassinated by suicide bombers at his headquarters. His
successor was his intelligence chief, Muhammad Fahim, who is a veteran
commander but lacked the overarching authority of Masud. Fahim’s prestige was
enhanced by the Northern Alliance’s defeat of the Taliban in the U.S.-backed military
campaign. Northern Alliance forces now control about 70% of Afghanistan,
including Kabul, which they captured on November 12, 2001. Groups of Pashtun
commanders took control of cities and provinces east and south of Kabul. One
example is Ghul Agha Shirzai, the new governor of Qandahar province and environs.
Despite the overwhelming defeat of the Taliban, small Taliban and Al Qaeda
contingents continue to hold out in small pockets in Afghanistan. The United States
and its Afghan allies conducted “Operation Anaconda” in the Shah-i-Kot Valley
south of Gardez during March 2 - 19, 2002, to eliminate a pocket of as many as 800
Al Qaeda and Taliban fighters. Some less intense military operations by the United
States and its coalition partners have been conducted since, particularly in eastern
Afghanistan. Some pockets are said to straddle the Afghanistan-Pakistan border, and
press reports indicate that Pakistan has been allowing the United States to conduct
low-level military or military support operations inside Pakistan since April 2002.
Political Settlement Efforts
As the war against remaining Al Qaeda guerrillas and Taliban remnants
continues, a longstanding U.N. effort to form a broad-based Afghan government has
borne some fruit.
Pre-September 11 Efforts. For the 8 years prior to the war, the United
States worked primarily through the United Nations to end the Afghan civil conflict,
because the international body is viewed as a credible mediator by all sides. It was
the forum used for ending the Soviet occupation. However, during this time, some
observers criticized U.S. policy as being insufficiently engaged in Afghan conflict
mediation to bring about a settlement. Since the fall of Najibullah, a succession of
U.N. mediators – former Tunisian Foreign Minister Mahmoud Mestiri (March 1994-
July 1996); German diplomat Norbert Holl (July 1996-December 1997); and
Algeria’s former Foreign Minister Lakhdar Brahimi (August 1997-October 1999) –
sought to arrange a ceasefire, and ultimately a peaceful transition to a broad-based
government. The proposed process for arranging a transition incorporated many
ideas advanced by former King Zahir Shah and outside experts, in which a permanent
government was to be chosen through a traditional Afghan selection process, the

CRS-7
hallmark of which is the holding of a loya jirga, a grand assembly of notable
Afghans.
These U.N. efforts, at times, appeared to make significant progress, but
ceasefires and other agreements between the warring factions always broke down.
Brahimi suspended his activities in frustration in October 1999, and another U.N.
mediator, Spanish diplomat Fransesc Vendrell, was appointed.
The “Six Plus Two” and Geneva Contact Groups. In parallel with
direct U.N. mediation efforts, the “Six Plus Two” contact group consisted of the
United States, Russia, and the six states bordering Afghanistan: Iran, China,
Pakistan, Turkmenistan, Uzbekistan, and Tajikistan. Reflecting the common
concerns about Afghan-inspired regional instability, the “Six Plus Two ” contact
group met since early 1997 to discuss ways of bringing peace to Afghanistan. The
Six Plus Two process was created after several informal meetings of some of the key
outside parties in which the United States and others agreed not to provide weapons
to the warring factions. (In June 1996, the Administration formally imposed a ban
on U.S. sales of arms to all factions in Afghanistan, a policy already in force
informally.6) The process was conducted in coordination with U.N. peace efforts for
Afghanistan.
In 2000, possibly because of the lack of progress in the Six Plus Two process,
another contact group began meeting in Geneva, and with more frequency than the
Six Plus Two. The Geneva grouping includes Italy, Germany, Iran, and the United
States. Another Afghan-related grouping multilateral mediating grouping consisted
of some Islamic countries operating under the ad-hoc “Committee on Afghanistan
under the auspices of the Organization of Islamic Conference (OIC). The countries
in that ad-hoc committee include Pakistan, Iran, Guinea, and Tunisia.
King Zahir Shah and the Loya Jirga Processes. The United States also
supported initiatives coming from parties inside and outside Afghanistan. During
1997, Afghans not linked to any of the warring factions began a new peace initiative
called the Intra Afghan Dialogue. This grouping, consisting of former mujahedin
commanders and clan leaders, held meetings during 1997 and 1998 in Bonn,
Frankfurt, Istanbul, and Ankara. Another group, based on the participation of former
King Zahir Shah, was centered in Rome (“Rome Grouping”), where the former King
lived after his ouster in 1973. A third grouping, calling itself the “Cyprus Process,”
consisted of former Afghan officials and other Afghan exiles generally sympathetic
to Iran.
Post-September 11 U.N. Efforts. The September 11 attacks and the start
of U.S. military action against the Taliban injected new urgency into the search for
a government that might replace the Taliban. Many of the hopes for a post-Taliban
government at first appeared to center on the former King. In the aftermath of the
September 11 attacks, Members of Congress and U.S. and U.N. officials visited him
in Rome in the course of discussing a new Afghan government. A 2-day (October
25-26, 2001) meeting of more than 700 Afghan tribal elders in Peshawar, Pakistan
6 Federal Register, Volume 61, No. 125, June 27, 1996. Page 33313.

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(“Peshawar Grouping”) issued a concluding statement calling for the return of the
former King. However, even though the gathering was supportive of the former
King, neither the King’s representatives nor those of the Northern Alliance actually
attended the gathering because of their suspicions that the meeting was orchestrated
by Pakistan for its own ends.
In late September 2001, Brahimi was brought back as the U.N. point person to
help arrange an alternative government to the Taliban; Vendrell became his deputy,
although he retired shortly thereafter. The State Department appointed Policy
Planning Director Richard Haass to be the U.S. liaison with Brahimi and to assist in
the search for an alternative regime that might hasten the demise of the Taliban and
keep order in the event the Taliban collapses. A U.S. envoy to the Northern Alliance,
Ambassador James Dobbins, was appointed in early November 2001 and, until April
2002, coordinated U.S. reconstruction assistance efforts. On November 14, 2001, the
U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution 1378, calling for a “central” U.N. role in
establishing a transitional administration and inviting member states to send
peacekeeping forces to promote stability and secure the delivery of humanitarian
assistance.
Bonn Conference. As the U.S. war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda began
to achieve success, delegates of the various major Afghan factions – most
prominently the Northern Alliance and representatives of the former King – gathered
in Bonn, Germany, at the invitation of Brahimi and the United Nations. The Taliban
was not invited. On December 5, 2001, the factions signed an agreement to form a
30-member interim administration, to govern until June 2002. At that time, a loya
jirga
, to be opened by the former King, would choose a new government to run
Afghanistan for the next 2 years until a new constitution is drafted by another loya
jirga
and elections held. The loya jirga, which is to be held June 10-16, 2002, will
also establish a 111-member parliament. The loya jirga might elect to confirm the
interim government in power until the elections are held, or it might select another
interim government. The last loya jirga that was widely recognized as legitimate was
held in 1964 to ratify a constitution. Communist leader Najibullah convened a loya
jirga
in 1987 largely to approve his policies; that gathering was widely viewed by
Afghans as illegitimate.
As of May 2002, preparations are under way for the convening of the loya jirga.
In late January 2002, the 21 members of the commission, including two women, were
chosen to prepare for the assembly. They initially traveled around Afghanistan to
solicit opinions on how to convene it. By the end of May, the 362 districts of
Afghanistan are to have chosen the 1,500 delegates to the loya jirga. After several
delays due to security concerns, the former King returned to Afghanistan on April
18, 2002, and he has been meeting with Afghan notables and local leaders since. The
King’s long-term role in Afghan politics, if any, has not yet been determined.
The Interim Government. The interim administration began operations on
December 22, 2001. In the interim administration, a slight majority (17 out of 30)
of the positions in the new cabinet are held by the Northern Alliance, with this block
holding the key posts of Defense (Mohammad Fahim), Foreign Affairs (Dr. Abdullah
Abdullah), and Interior (Yunus Qanuni). The three are ethnic Tajiks, with the
exception of Dr. Abdullah, who is half Tajik and half Pashtun. This trio, all of whom

CRS-9
are in their mid-40s and were close aides to Ahmad Shah Masud, is considered
generally well disposed toward the United States, although they also have ties to Iran
and Russia, and all three are suspicious of Pakistan.
Northern Alliance leader Rabbani was not given a role in the interim
administration, on the grounds that doing so would have weighted the interim
administration too heavily to the Northern Alliance. Instead, the post of chairman of
the interim administration went to Pashtun tribal leader Hamid Karzai, who is about
45 years old. Karzai, leader of the powerful Popolzai tribe of Pashtuns, had entered
Afghanistan in October 2001 to organize resistance to the Taliban, and he was
supported in that effort by U.S. special forces. He has relatives in and close ties to
the United States. Other notables in the new cabinet include:
! Finance Minister Hedayat Amin Arsala, a Pashtun affiliated with
Zahir Shah. He was a foreign minister in the Rabbani government
that preceded the Taliban (1992-1996).
! Minister of Women’s Affairs Sima Samar, a Hazara who was an
Afghan women’s rights activist from her exile in Pakistan.
! Minister of Communications Abdul Rahim, an ethnic Tajik who is
the former Ambassador of Afghanistan to the United States during
the Rabbani government.
! Minister of Labor and Social Affairs Mir Wais Sadeq, a Tajik, who
is the son of Herat Province governor Ismail Khan.
! Minister of Urban Development Hajji Abdul Qadir, a Pashtun, who
is also governor of Nangahar Province, the capital of which is
Jalalabad. Abdul Qadir has been criticized in some press accounts
for agreeing to bin Laden’s relocation to the Jalalabad area in 1996
after bin Ladin’s expulsion from Sudan. Abdul Qadir, a member of
the Northern Alliance delegation to the Bonn Conference, had
walked out of the conference to protest what he said was
underrepresentation of Pashtuns at the meeting.
! Deputy Defense Minister Abdul Rashid Dostam, appointed in late
December 2001 in response to Dostam’s calls for more Uzbek
representation in the transitional government
International Security Force/Afghan National Army. The Bonn
conferees agreed to establish an international peace keeping force to maintain
security, at least in Kabul. The force (International Security Assistance Force, ISAF),
which has reached its agreed strength of about 5,000, is led by Britain but will be
headed by Turkey as of June 2002. The force is operating in conjunction with
Afghan security forces in Kabul and is coordinating, to an extent, with the
approximately 7,000 U.S. military forces in and immediately around Afghanistan.
In an effort to assuage Turkish concerns about the costs of heading the force, the
United States offered Turkey $228 million in new U.S. aid to compensate for those
costs. Because of several threats to Afghanistan’s internal security since the interim
government was constituted, the interim government wants the force to eventually
be expanded and deploy to other major cities. However, the Bush Administration has
decided instead to help build an Afghan national army rather than expand ISAF.
Training by U.S. special forces has begun, and the first 2,500 recruits (three ground
combat battalions and two border patrol battalions) will complete their training by

CRS-10
July 2002. The exact size of the army has not yet been decided, but common
estimates say that the new army will need to number about 60,000 - 80,000 to be
effective. It will take several years to build a force that large. On May 3, President
Bush pledged to Karzai an additional $2 million in U.S. aid to help equip the new
army. Some analysts have expressed concern that the national army will likely not
be ready in a timely enough manner to deal with the security threats now facing the
country, although the Administration and others indicate that U.S. forces will be
engaged in Afghanistan for a long enough period to ensure security until the Afghan
army can assume its full mission.
At this time, ISAF has forces from the following 18 countries: Austria,
Belgium, Bulgaria, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Italy, the
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Romania, Spain, Sweden, Turkey, and
the United Kingdom (leader). The Bonn conference’s conclusions were endorsed by
U.N. Security Council Resolution 1385 (December 6, 2001), and the international
peacekeeping force was authorized by Security Council Resolution 1386 (December
20, 2001).
Diplomatic and Governmental Activity. Since the constitution of the
interim government, several countries have reopened embassies in Kabul, including
the United States. In conjunction with the formation of the interim administration,
career diplomat Ryan Crocker was appointed Charge D’Affaires and NSC official
Zalmay Khalilzad was appointed a special envoy to Afghanistan in December 2001
and has made a few extended visits there. In late March 2002, the new U.S.
Ambassador to Afghanistan, Robert Finn, was confirmed by the Senate and sworn
in in Kabul. The United States has permitted the interim administration to reopen the
Afghan embassy in Washington and Northern Alliance spokesman Harun Amin was
appointed Charge D’Affaires on January 14, 2002. A new Afghan ambassador, U.S.-
educated and U.S.-based energy entrepreneur Ishaq Shahryar, has been designated.
He previously was an adviser to former King Zahir Shah.
The priorities of the new government thus far have been expanding
governmental capabilities, guiding reconstruction efforts, and attempting to bring
security to all parts of Afghanistan. Karzai has sought and received some
international funds to pay government workers who had not been paid in many
months. The national airline, Ariana, is also in the process of resuming operations,
although its fleet is very small. In a major setback to the new government’s efforts
to achieve stability, the Aviation Minister, Abdul Rahman, was killed on February
14, 2002, by what some reports said was a mob of Afghans angry that their flight to
the Hajj in Saudi Arabia had been severely delayed. Karzai said the killing was the
result of a plot by other interim administration officials, an assertion later
contradicted by Foreign Minister Abdullah. Since then, there have been isolated
clashes among rival factions and a failed attempt on the life of Defense Minister
Fahim. However, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld said in late April that the security
situation has been improving.
On March 23, 2002, schools reopened following the Persian/Afghan new year
(Nowruz). Girls returned to the schools for the first time since the Taliban came to
power.

CRS-11
Regional Context 7
Even before September 11, several of Afghanistan’s neighbors were becoming
alarmed about threats to their own security interests emanating from Afghanistan.
All of these governments endorsed the Bonn agreement, but some experts believe
that the neighboring governments will likely attempt to manipulate Afghanistan’s
factions and its political structure to their advantage.
Pakistan8
Pakistan reversed course on Afghanistan in the aftermath of the September 11
attacks. Pakistan initially saw the Taliban movement as an instrument with which
to fulfill its goals. Pakistan has always sought an Afghan central government strong
enough to prevent calls for unity between ethnic Pashtuns in Afghanistan and
Pakistan, while at the same time sufficiently friendly and pliable to give Pakistan
strategic depth against rival India. In the wake of the Soviet pullout in 1989, Pakistan
was troubled by continued political infighting in Afghanistan that was enabling drug
trafficking to flourish and to which Afghan refugees did not want to return. Pakistan
saw Afghanistan as essential to opening up trade relations and energy routes with the
Muslim states of the former Soviet Union.
Pakistan was the most public defender of the Taliban movement and was one
of only three countries (Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates are the others)
to formally recognize it as the legitimate government. Prior to September 11, the
government of General Pervez Musharraf, who took power in an October 1999 coup,
previously resisted U.S. pressure to forcefully intercede with the Taliban leadership
to achieve bin Laden’s extradition. Pakistan’s links to the Taliban were a major
focus of a visit to Pakistan by Undersecretary of State Thomas Pickering in May
2000, although Pakistan made no commitments to help the United States on bin
Laden. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, of December 19, 2000, was partly
an effort by the United States and Russia to drive a wedge between the Taliban and
Pakistan and to persuade Pakistan to cease military advice and aid to the Taliban.
Pakistan did not completely cease military assistance, but it abided by some
provisions of the resolution, for example by ordering the Taliban to cut the staff at
its embassy in Pakistan.9 Prior to the September 11 terrorist attacks in the United
States, Pakistan had said it would cooperate with a follow-on U.N. Security Council
Resolution (1363 of July 30, 2001) that provided for U.N. border monitors to ensure
that no neighboring state was providing military equipment or advice to the Taliban.
7 For further information, see CRS Report RS20411, Afghanistan: Connections to Islamic
Movements in Central and South Asia and Southern Russia
. December 7, 1999, by Kenneth
Katzman.
8 For further discussion, see Rashid, Ahmed. “The Taliban: Exporting Extremism.” Foreign
Affairs,
November - December 1999.
9 Constable, Pamela. New Sanctions Strain Taliban-Pakistan Ties. Washington Post,
January 19, 2001.

CRS-12
Pakistan’s modest pre-September 11 steps toward cooperation with the United
States reflected increasing wariness that the Taliban movement was radicalizing
existing Islamic movements inside Pakistan and was becoming an increasing
embarrassment to Pakistan itself. Pakistan also feared that its position on the Taliban
was propelling the United States into a closer relationship with Pakistan’s arch-rival,
India. Some Islamic movements in Pakistan were seeking to emulate the Taliban,
according to press reports, and Pakistani terrorist groups, such as the Harakat al-
Mujahedin (HUM), Jaish e-Mohammad, and Lashkar-e-Tayyiba,10 are allied with Al
Qaeda, according to the State Department’s report on international terrorism for 2000
(“Patterns of Global Terrorism, 2000"). HUM and other Pakistani Islamist groups
are seeking to challenge India’s control over its portion of Kashmir and, according
to some observers, could provoke a war with India over Kashmir, as has nearly
happened following the Pakistani Islamist attack on India’s parliament on December
13, 2001.
These considerations, coupled with U.S. pressure as well as offers of economic
benefit, prompted Pakistan to cooperate with the U.S. response to the September 11
attacks. Pakistan provided the United States with requested access to Pakistani
airspace, ports, airfields. Pakistan has also arrested hundreds of Al Qaeda fighters
fleeing Afghanistan and turned them over to the United States and deployed
substantial forces to the Afghan border to capture Al Qaeda fighters attempting to
flee into Pakistan. Pakistani authorities helped the United States track and capture
top bin Laden aide Abu Zubaydah in early April 2002, and Pakistani forces
reportedly are helping the United States track and fight Al Qaeda forces along the
Pakistan-Afghanistan border. Some reports say bin Laden might have escaped into
Pakistan but U.S. officials have expressed confidence that he will be captured
eventually by Pakistan if he is there. Many feared that the U.S. military presence in
Pakistan would place the government under increased political threat from pro-
Taliban Islamist groups in Pakistan that sympathize with the Taliban and bin Laden.
However, those fears did not materialize and the collapse of the Taliban appears to
have alleviated that pressure. In return for Pakistan’s cooperation, the
Administration, in some cases with new congressional authority enacted after
September 11, has waived most of the U.S. sanctions on Pakistan and has begun
providing foreign aid that will total about $1 billion, according to U.S.
announcements.11
At the same time, Pakistan has sought to protect its interests by fashioning a
strong Pashtun-based component for a post-Taliban government. Pakistan is wary
that a post-Taliban government dominated by the Northern Alliance, which is
backed by India, would amount to Indian encirclement of Pakistan. To counter that
perceived threat, Pakistan was instrumental in ensuring that Northern Alliance leader
Rabbani would not be chairman of the interim government. Pakistan also succeeded
in building a role for the former King in selecting a permanent government, although
the former King’s role appears to be limited. Karzai visited Pakistan in late January
10 The State Department has designated HUM as a foreign terrorist organization.
11 For more information on U.S. sanctions on Pakistan, see CRS Report RS20995, India and
Pakistan: Current U.S. Economic Sanctions,
by Dianne E. Rennack.

CRS-13
2002, and the two countries pledged to look to the future rather than to the recent
history of strains.
Iran
Iran’s key national interests in Afghanistan are to exert influence over western
Afghanistan, which Iran borders and was once part of the Persian empire, and to
protect Afghanistan’s Shiite minority. Iran strongly supported the Northern Alliance
and its Tajik (Persian-speaking) leaders who have traditionally been strong in western
Afghanistan as well as northern Afghanistan. Since Taliban forces ousted Ismail
Khan from Herat (the western province that borders Iran) in September 1995, Iran
has seen the Taliban movement as a threat to its interests in Afghanistan. Iran
provided fuel, funds, and ammunition to the Northern Alliance12 and hosted fighters
loyal to Khan, who was captured by the Taliban in 1998 but escaped and fled to Iran
in March 2000. In September 1998, Iranian and Taliban forces nearly came into
direct conflict when Iran discovered that nine of its diplomats were killed in the
course of Taliban’s offensive in northern Afghanistan. Iran massed forces at the
border and threatened military action, but the crisis cooled without a major clash,
possibly because Iran lacked confidence in its military capabilities.
The United States and Iran have long had common positions on Afghanistan,
despite deep U.S.-Iran differences on other issues. U.S. officials have long
acknowledged working with Tehran, under the auspices of the Six Plus Two contact
group and Geneva group. Secretary of State Powell shook hands with Iran’s Foreign
Minister Kamal Kharrazi on November 12, 2001 during a Six Plus Two meeting on
prospects for a new government in Afghanistan.
U.S. and Iranian common interests on Afghanistan might explain why Iran
generally expressed support for the U.S. effort to forge a global coalition against
terrorism, although it has publicly opposed U.S. military action against Afghanistan.
Iran has confirmed that it offered search and rescue assistance in Afghanistan should
the United States need it, and it has also agreed to allow U.S. humanitarian aid to the
Afghan people to transit Iran. However, the United States and Iran are too far apart
in general for tacit cooperation on Afghanistan to lead to a dramatic breakthrough in
U.S.-Iran relations. Some Iranian leaders have been harshly critical of U.S. military
action against the Taliban; in late September Supreme Leader Ali Khamene’i
compared that action to the September 11 terrorist attacks themselves.
Amid reports Iran is seeking to exert influence over the new government by
arming pro-Iranian Afghan factions, in early January 2002 President Bush warned
Iran against meddling in Afghanistan. The President listed Iran as part of an “axis
of evil” in his January 29, 2002 State of the Union message, partly because of Iran’s
actions in Afghanistan. Since then, the Bush Administration has continued to accuse
Iran of trying to build influence over the interim government and of failing to attempt
to locate or arrest Al Qaeda fighters who have fled to Iran from Afghanistan. Partly
in response to the U.S. criticism, in February 2002 Iran reportedly expelled a major
12 Steele, Jonathon, “America Includes Iran In Talks On Ending War In Afghanistan.”
Washington Times, December 15, 1997. A14.

CRS-14
critic of the interim administration, Gulbuddin Hikmatyar, from Iran. Hikmatyar
subsequently returned to Afghanistan but escaped an early May 2002 U.S. strike by
a CIA-controlled Predator-launched missile. For his part, Karzai has said that Iran
is an important neighbor of Afghanistan and visited Iran in late February 2002,
pledging to build ties with the Islamic republic.
About 1.5 million Afghan refugees are still in Iran; most of these have been
permitted to integrate into Iranian society.13 In mid-1994, Iran reportedly began
forcing Afghan refugees to leave Iran and return home, although Iran denies it has
forcibly repatriated any Afghans and some repatriation reportedly is voluntary.
Russia
A number of considerations might explain why Russia has supported the U.S.
effort against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, including the use of bases in Central Asia
to conduct the war. Russia’s main objective in Afghanistan has been to prevent the
further strengthening of Islamic or nationalist movements in the Central Asian states
or Islamic enclaves in Russia itself, including Chechnya. For Russian leaders,
instability in Afghanistan also reminds the Russian public that the Soviet occupation
of Afghanistan failed to pacify or stabilize that country.
Russia’s fear became acute following an August 1999 incursion into Russia’s
Dagestan region by Islamic guerrillas from neighboring Chechnya. Some reports link
at least one faction of the guerrillas to bin Laden.14 This faction is led by a Chechen
of Arab origin who is referred to by the name “Hattab” (full name is Ibn al-Khattab);
Russia claimed to have killed Hattab in April 2002. In January 2000, the Taliban
became the only government in the world to recognize Chechnya’s independence,
and some Chechen fighters integrated into Taliban forces were captured or killed
during the October - November 2001 war.
The U.S. and Russian positions on Afghanistan became coincident well before
the September 11 attacks.15 Even before the U.S.-led war, Russia was supporting the
Northern Alliance with some military equipment and technical assistance.16 U.S.-
Russian cooperation led to the passage of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267 on
October 15, 1999. That resolution, adopted in response to the Taliban’s harboring
of bin Laden, banned commercial flights by the Afghan national airline and directed
U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets abroad (see section on Sanctions,
below). When the Taliban repeatedly refused to turn over bin Laden, the two co-
sponsored a follow-on – Security Council Resolution 1333 – that banned arms sales
13 Crossette, Barbara, “U.S. and Iran Cooperating on Ways to End the Afghan War.” New
York Times
, December 15, 1997.
14 Whittell, Giles. “Bin Laden Link To Dagestan Rebel Fightback.” London Times,
September 6, 1999.
15 Constable, Pamela. “Russia, U.S. Converge on Warnings to Taliban.” Washington Post,
June 4, 2000.
16 Risen, James. “Russians Are Back in Afghanistan, Aiding Rebels.” New York Times, July
27, 1998.

CRS-15
and military advice to the Taliban, among other provisions, but did not ban such aid
to the Northern Alliance or other opposition factions.
On the other hand, the United States has not blindly supported Russia’s apparent
attempts to place a large share of the blame for the rebellion in Chechnya on the
Taliban and Al Qaeda. The Clinton Administration did not endorse Russian threats,
issued by President Vladimir Putin in May 2000, to conduct airstrikes against training
camps in Afghanistan that Russia alleges are for Chechen rebels. President Bush has
been highly critical of Russian tactics in Chechnya, although that position has
softened substantially after September 11. Some outside experts believe that Russia
exaggerated the threat emanating from Afghanistan in an effort to persuade the
Central Asian states to rebuild closer defense ties to Moscow.
At the same time, some are wary that Russia might again seek influence in
Afghanistan. It has offered humanitarian and some military aid to the new
government. Several members of the interim administration, including Karzai and
Defense Minister Fahim, have visited Moscow since the administration took over.
Central Asian States 17
Former communist elites still in power in Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, and
Kyrgyzstan have grown increasingly concerned that Central Asian radical Islamic
movements are receiving safe haven in Afghanistan. In 1996, several of them banded
together with Russia and China into a regional grouping called the Shanghai
Cooperation Organization to discuss the threat emanating from Afghanistan’s
Taliban regime. The organization groups China, Russia, Uzbekistan, Tajikistan,
Kazakhstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan,
two of them – Uzbekistan and Tajikistan – had seen themselves as particularly
vulnerable to militants harbored by the Taliban. Uzbekistan saw its ally, Abdul
Rashid Dostam, the Uzbek commander in northern Afghanistan, lose most of his
influence in 1998, although he has now regained power in the north. Prior to the U.S.
war on the Taliban and Al Qaeda, Uzbek officials had previously said that more
active support from Uzbekistan would not have enabled Dostam to overturn Taliban
control of the north.18
Uzbekistan has long asserted that the group Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU), allegedly responsible for four simultaneous February 1999 bombings in
Tashkent that nearly killed President Islam Karimov, is linked to Al Qaeda.19 One
of its leaders, Juma Namangani, reportedly was killed while commanding Taliban/Al
Qaeda forces in the battle for Mazar-e-Sharif in November 2001. Uzbekistan has
been highly supportive of the United States in the wake of the September 11 attacks
and has placed military facilities at U.S. disposal for use in the combat against the
17 For further information, see CRS Report RL30294. Central Asia’s Security: Issues and
Implications for U.S. Interests
. December 7, 1999.
18 CRS conversations with Uzbek government officials in Tashkent. April 1999.
19 The IMU was named a foreign terrorist organization by the State Department in
September 2000.

CRS-16
Taliban and Al Qaeda. About 1,000 U.S. troops from the 10th Mountain Division,
as well as U.S. aircraft, have been based at the Khanabad air base there. Following
the fall of the Taliban, in December 2001 Uzbekistan reopened the Soviet-built
“Friendship Bridge” over the Amu Darya river in order to facilitate the flow of aid
into Uzbekistan.
Over the past few years, Tajikistan has feared that its buffer with Afghanistan
would disappear if the Taliban defeated the Northern Alliance, whose territorial base
borders Tajikistan. Some of the IMU members based in Afghanistan, including
Namangani, fought alongside the Islamic opposition United Tajik Opposition (UTO)
during the 1994-1997 civil war in that country. Tajikistan, heavily influenced by
Russia, whose 25,000 troops guards the border with Afghanistan, initially sent mixed
signals on the question of whether it would give the United States the use of military
facilities in Tajikistan. However, on September 26, 2001, Moscow officially
endorsed the use by the United States of military facilities in Tajikistan, paving the
way for Tajikistan to open facilities for U.S. use. In early November 2001, following
a visit by Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Tajikistan agreed to allow the U.S. the use
of three air bases in that country.
Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan do not directly border Afghanistan. However, IMU
guerrillas have transited Kyrgyzstan during past incursions into Uzbekistan.20
Kazakhstan had begun to diplomatically engage the Taliban over the past year, but
it publicly supported the U.S. war effort against the Taliban. In early December
2001, Kyrgyzstan offered to host some U.S. warplanes, and U.S. forces have begun
using the Manas air base there. Kyrgyzstan said in March 2002 that there is no time
limit on the U.S. use of military facilities there.
Of the Central Asian states that border Afghanistan, only Turkmenistan was not
alarmed at Taliban gains and chose to seek close relations with the Taliban
leadership. An alternate interpretation is that Turkmenistan viewed engagement with
the Taliban as a more effective means of preventing spillover of radical Islamic
activity from Afghanistan. Turkmenistan’s leadership also saw Taliban control as
bringing the peace and stability that would permit construction of a natural gas
pipeline from Turkmenistan through Afghanistan. That pipeline would help
Turkmenistan bring its large gas reserves to world markets. However, the September
11 events stoked Turkmenistan’s fears of the Taliban and its Al Qaeda guests and the
country supported the U.S. anti-terrorism effort. There are no indications the United
States requested basing rights in Turkmenistan.
China
China has a small border with a sliver of Afghanistan known as the “Wakhan
corridor” (see map) and had become increasingly concerned about the potential for
Al Qaeda to promote Islamic fundamentalism among Muslims (Uighurs) in
northwestern China. A number of Uighurs fought in Taliban and Al Qaeda ranks in
the U.S.-led war. China expressed its concern through active membership in the
Shanghai Cooperation Organization, as noted above. In December 2000, sensing
20 Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1999, pp. 14, 92.

CRS-17
China’s increasing concern about Taliban policies, a Chinese official delegation met
with Mullah Umar at the Taliban’s invitation.
Although it has long been concerned about the threat from the Taliban and bin
Laden, China did not enthusiastically support U.S. military action against the
Taliban. Many experts believe this is because China, as a result of strategic
considerations, was wary of a U.S. military buildup on its doorstep. China is an ally
with Pakistan, in part to balance out India, which China sees as a rival. Pakistan’s
cooperation with the United States appears to have allayed China’s opposition to U.S.
military action, and President Bush praised China’s cooperation with the anti-
terrorism effort during his visit to China in October 2001. There were no indications
of U.S.-China strains on this issue during President Bush’s visit to Beijing in late
February 2002.
Saudi Arabia
During the Soviet occupation, Saudi Arabia channeled hundreds of millions of
dollars to the Afghan resistance, and particularly to hardline Sunni Muslim
fundamentalist resistance leaders. Saudi Arabia, which itself practices the strict
Wahhabi brand of Islam practiced by the Taliban, was one of three countries to
formally recognize the Taliban government. (The others are Pakistan and the United
Arab Emirates.) The Taliban initially served Saudi Arabia as a potential counter to
Iran, with which Saudi Arabia has been at odds since Iran’s 1979 revolution.
However, Iranian-Saudi relations have improved significantly since 1997, and
balancing Iranian power has ebbed as a factor motivating Saudi policy toward
Afghanistan. Instead, drawing on its intelligence ties to Afghanistan during the anti-
Soviet war, Saudi Arabia worked with Taliban leaders to persuade them to suppress
anti-Saudi activities by Al Qaeda. Saudi Arabia apparently believed that Al Qaeda’s
presence in Afghanistan drew Saudi Islamic radicals away from Saudi Arabia itself
and thereby reduced their opportunity to destabilize the Saudi regime. Some press
reports indicate that, in late 1998, Saudi and Taliban leaders discussed, but did not
agree on, a plan for a panel of Saudi and Afghan Islamic scholars to decide bin
Laden’s fate. In March 2000 and again in May 2000, the Saudi-based Organization
of Islamic Conference (OIC) sponsored indirect peace talks in Saudi Arabia between
the warring factions, but the talks were not productive.
According to U.S. officials, Saudi Arabia has generally cooperated with the U.S.
war effort. Along with the UAE, Saudi Arabia broke diplomatic relations with the
Taliban in late September. It quietly permitted the United States to use a Saudi base
for command of U.S. air operations over Afghanistan. It did not serve as a staging
point for U.S. aircraft to launch strikes on Afghanistan from Saudi bases, although,
among the Gulf states, Oman served as a better staging point due to its closer
proximity to Afghanistan. The Saudi position has generally been to allow the United
States the use of its facilities as long as doing so is not publicly requested or highly
publicized.

CRS-18
U.S. Policy Issues
U.S. policy objectives in Afghanistan have long been multifaceted, although in
recent years U.S. goals had largely narrowed to ending the presence of the leadership
of the Al Qaeda leadership and infrastructure there. Since the Soviet withdrawal,
returning peace and stability to Afghanistan has been a U.S. goal, pursued with
varying degrees of intensity. Other goals have included an end to discrimination
against women and girls, the eradication of narcotics production, and alleviating
severe humanitarian difficulties.
The United States attributed most of these concerns to Taliban rule, although
drug production flourished in regions under Northern Alliance control and there
were some restrictions on women’s rights under Rabbani’s 1992-1996 government.
U.S. relations with the Taliban progressively deteriorated during the 5 years that the
Taliban were in power in Kabul. The United States had withheld recognition of
Taliban as the legitimate government of Afghanistan and formally recognized no
faction as the government, although it had a dialogue with all the different factions,
including the Taliban. During the period of Taliban rule, the United Nations, based
on the lack of broad international recognition of Taliban, continued to seat
representatives of the former Rabbani government, not the Taliban. The United
States closed its embassy in Kabul in January 1989, and the State Department
ordered the Afghan embassy in Washington, D.C. closed in August 1997 because of
a power struggle within the embassy between Rabbani and Taliban supporters.
Although press reports in May 2002 said the Bush Administration was
considering a plan to give military aid to the Northern Alliance prior to the
September 11 attacks, the Bush Administration continued the previous
Administration’s policy of maintaining a dialogue with the Taliban. During the
Clinton Administration, Assistant Secretary of State for South Asian Affairs Karl
Inderfurth and other U.S. officials met periodically with Taliban officials. In April
1998, then Ambassador Bill Richardson met with Taliban officials and the opposition
during his visit to Afghanistan, in an effort to demonstrate presidential commitment
to peace in Afghanistan and to discuss bin Laden. In compliance with U.N. Security
Council Resolution 1333, in February 2001 the State Department ordered the closing
of a Taliban representative office in New York. The Taliban complied with the
directive, but its representative, Abdul Hakim Mujahid, continued to operate
informally. In March 2001, Bush Administration officials received a Taliban envoy,
Rahmatullah Hashemi, to discuss bilateral issues. Three State Department officers
visited Afghanistan in April 2001, the first U.S. visit since the August 1998
bombings of Afghan camps, although the visit was primarily to assess humanitarian
needs and not to further U.S.-Taliban relations.
As did the executive branch, Congress became highly critical of the Taliban well
before the September 11 attacks. Congress’ views were generally expressed in non-
binding legislation. A sense of the Senate resolution (S.Res. 275) that resolving the
Afghan civil war should be a top U.S. priority passed that chamber by unanimous
consent on September 24, 1996. H.Con.Res. 218, which was similar to this
resolution, passed the House on April 28, 1998. In the 107th Congress, H.Con.Res.
26 was introduced on February 8, 2001. The resolution expressed the sense of

CRS-19
Congress that the United States should seek to prevent the Taliban from obtaining
Afghanistan’s U.N. seat and should not recognize any government in Afghanistan
that does not restore women’s rights.
After September 11, legislative proposals on Afghanistan became significantly
more adversarial toward the Taliban. One bill, H.R. 3088, stated that it should be the
policy of the United States to remove the Taliban from power and authorized a
drawdown of up to $300 million worth of U.S. military supplies and services for the
anti-Taliban opposition. The bill, as well as another bill (H.R. 2998, introduced
October 2, 2001), would establish a “Radio Free Afghanistan” broadcasting service
under RFE/RL. On February 12, 2002, the House passed the Senate version of H.R.
2998 providing $17 million funding for the radio broadcasts for FY2002. President
Bush signed the bill into law on March 11, 2002 (P.L. 107-148).
Harboring of Al Qaeda
Even before the September 11, 2001 attacks, the Taliban’s refusal to yield Al
Qaeda leader Osama bin Laden to the United States (or a U.S. ally) for trial – and its
protection of radical Islamic movements more broadly – had become the overriding
bilateral agenda item in U.S. policy toward Afghanistan.21 Bin Laden, identified by
the Bush Administration as the main organizer of the September 11 attacks,
reportedly remains alive in Afghanistan or Pakistan, attempting to avoid U.S. efforts
to locate him and his associates.
Over the past few years, the United States had placed progressively more
pressure on the Taliban to extradite bin Laden, adding sanctions, military action, and
the threat of further punishments to ongoing diplomatic efforts.
! During his April 1998 visit, Ambassador Richardson asked Taliban
to hand bin Laden over to U.S. authorities, but he was rebuffed.
! On August 20, 1998, the United States fired cruise missiles at
alleged bin Laden-controlled terrorist training camps in retaliation
for the August 7, 1998 bombings of U.S. embassies in Kenya and
Tanzania.
! On July 4, 1999, because of the Taliban’s hosting of bin Laden,
President Clinton issued Executive Order 13129, imposing a ban on
U.S. trade with Taliban-controlled portions of Afghanistan and
blocking Taliban assets in U.S. financial institutions. The Taliban
was not designated as a terrorist group, nor was Afghanistan named
a state sponsor of terrorism. On August 10, 1999, the Clinton
Administration determined that Ariana Airlines represents Taliban-
controlled property, thereby preventing Americans from using the
21 For more information on bin Laden and his Al Qaeda organization, see CRS Report
RL31119, Terrorism: Near Eastern Groups and State Sponsors, 2001, September 10, 2001.
See also CRS Report RS20411, Afghanistan: Connections to Islamic Movements in Central
and South Asia and Southern Russia
.

CRS-20
airline and triggering the blocking of about $500,000 in Ariana
assets identified in the United States.
! On October 15, 1999, with Russian support, the United States
achieved adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1267, the
first U.N. resolution sanctioning the Taliban regime. The resolution
banned flights outside Afghanistan by Ariana airlines and directed
U.N. member states to freeze Taliban assets. The resolution was in
response to the Taliban’s refusal to hand bin Laden over to justice,
and it threatened further sanctions if it did not do so.
On December 19, 2000, again by combining diplomatic forces with Russia, the
United States achieved adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333, a follow-
on to Resolution 1267, imposing even stricter sanctions against the Taliban. The
major additional provisions of the Resolution included: (1) a worldwide prohibition
against the provision of arms or military advice to the Taliban, and a requirement
(directed against Pakistan) that all countries withdraw any military advisers that are
helping the Taliban; (2) a call for all countries that recognize the Taliban to reduce
the size of Taliban representative missions in their countries, and for all other
countries to close completely all Taliban offices and Ariana Afghan airline offices
and ban all nonhumanitarian assistance flights into or out of Taliban-controlled
Afghanistan; (3) a requirement that all countries freeze any bin Laden/Al Qaeda
assets that can be identified; (4) a prohibition on any supply to areas under Taliban
control of the chemical acetic anhydride, which is used to produce heroin; and (5) a
ban on foreign travel by all Taliban officials at or above the rank of Deputy Minister,
except for the purposes of participation in peace negotiations, compliance with the
resolution or 1267, or humanitarian reasons, including religious obligations.
On July 30, 2001, the U.N. Security Council adopted an implementing
Resolution 1363. The resolution provided for the stationing of monitors in Pakistan,
to ensure that no weapons or military advice was being provided by the Taliban.
Pakistan’s pledge to cooperate with the U.S. response to the September 11, 2001
attacks led to the virtual end of Pakistan’s supply of arms and military advice to the
Taliban. In the aftermath of the Taliban’s ouster from power, these provisions were
narrowed to focus on Al Qaeda, and not the Taliban, by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1390 of January 17, 2002. Ariana has resumed some international
service, limited mainly by its lack of equipment and resources.
Human Rights/Treatment of Women
The groups that have assumed power from the Taliban are widely considered
far less repressive of women than was the Taliban, although some of the factions now
ruling the country have been accused of other major human rights abuses in the past.
Taliban human rights practices, and especially its treatment of women, received U.S.
and international condemnation. Seeking to enforce its brand of puritan Islam, the
Taliban subjected women to limitations on social participation, working, and
education. At various times in the past, the Taliban’s treatment of women had forced
many United Nations and other aid organizations, including the U.N. High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), UNICEF, Save the Children, and Oxfam, to

CRS-21
cut back or cease operations, either in protest or for lack of available (female) staff.22
Women were forced to wear a head-to-toe veil (burqa) in public, and they could not
ride in vehicles unless accompanied by a male relative.
Following the Taliban collapse, women in Kabul are said to be reverting to the
less restrictive behavior practiced before the Taliban fled. The burqa is no longer
obligatory, although many women continue to wear it by tradition or because of fear
or uncertainty of the new government’s attitudes on the issue. Two women hold
positions in the new interim cabinet that took office on December 22, 2001, and
many women are returning to the jobs they held before the Taliban came to power.
As noted above, girls returned to school March 23, 2002, for the first time since the
Taliban took over, and many female teachers have resumed their teaching jobs.
Before the war, there was significant U.S. and U.N. pressure on the Taliban
regime to moderate its treatment of women. Several U.N. Security Council
resolutions, including 1193 (August 28, 1998), and 1214 (December 8, 1998), urged
the Taliban to end discrimination against women. During a November 1997 visit to
Pakistan, then Secretary of State Madeleine Albright attacked Taliban policies as
despicable and intolerable. U.S. women’s rights groups like Feminist Majority and
the National Organization for Women (NOW) mobilized to stop the Clinton
Administration from recognizing the Taliban government unless it alters its treatment
of women. On May 5, 1999, the Senate passed S.Res. 68, a resolution calling on the
President not to recognize any Afghan government that refuses to end discrimination
against women. On November 27, 2001, the House unanimously adopted S. 1573,
the Afghan Women and Children Relief Act, which had earlier passed the Senate.
The law (signed December 12, 2001) calls for the use of supplemental funding
(appropriated by P.L. 107-38) to fund educational and health programs for Afghan
women and children.
Destruction of Buddha Statues. The Taliban’s critics pointed to its March
2001 destruction of two large Buddha statues, dating to the 7th century, as evidence
of the Taliban’s excesses. The Taliban claimed it ordered the destruction of the
statues, which it considered un-Islamic, after representatives of the United Nations
Economic, Social, and Cultural Organization (UNESCO) offered to fund
preservation of the statues. Others believe the move was a reaction to new U.N.
sanctions imposed in December 2000 (see below). The destruction provoked
widespread condemnation, even among other Islamic states, including Pakistan.
Some international groups are looking at the possibility of rebuilding the statues,
although at least one group has said doing so will be extremely difficult technically.
Hindu Badges. In May 2001, the Taliban said it was considering requiring
non-Muslims to wear identity labels on their clothing to distinguish them from
Muslims. The Taliban explained the move as an effort to prevent non-Muslims from
being harassed by Taliban security forces for not attending Muslim prayer, which is
compulsory for Muslims. The announcement received worldwide condemnation and
was not implemented before the Taliban was ousted. There are believed to be only
22 Cooper, Kenneth, “Kabul Women Under Virtual House Arrest.” Washington Post,
October 7, 1996. A1.

CRS-22
two Jews left in Afghanistan, so the move was not viewed as being directed against
Jews, even though the policy evoked memories of the treatment of Jews in Nazi
Germany.
On the other hand, many say that the Taliban brought order and peace to the
areas it captured by disarming independent militiamen. By imposing central
authority and cracking down on banditry, it opened some roads to free commerce
leading to a greater availability of food in many areas under its control. Press
accounts say that the streets were safer, fewer people carried guns, and there were
very few murders during Taliban rule.23 Others add that Taliban rule approximated
the traditional practice of Islam found in those parts of Afghanistan dominated by
Pashtuns and did not represent a radical departure for Afghanistan.
Since the interim administration took office, there have been some reports of
reprisals and other abuses based on ethnicity in certain parts of Afghanistan,
particularly against Pashtuns living in largely Tajik and Uzbek northern Afghanistan.
Virtually all observers agree that Afghans are freer than they were under the Taliban,
although the interim administration is relatively young, and many want to evaluate
its human rights practices over a longer period of time.
Counternarcotics
One issue on which the Taliban apparently satisfied much of the international
community was counternarcotics. The Taliban apparently enforced its July 2000 ban
on poppy cultivation. In February 2001, U.N. International Drug Control Program
(UNDCP) officials said that surveys showed a dramatic drop in poppy cultivation in
the areas surveyed.24 The Northern Alliance did not issue a similar ban in areas it
controlled. Despite the Taliban’s performance on drug issues, in March 2002,
Afghanistan was determined by the Bush Administration to have “failed
demonstrably to make substantial efforts” during the past 12 months to adhere to
international counternarcotics agreements and take certain counternarcotics measures
set forth in U.S. law. (This is equivalent to the listing by the United States, as
Afghanistan has been listed every year since 1987, as a state that is uncooperative
with U.S. efforts to eliminate drug trafficking or has failed to take sufficient steps on
its own to curb trafficking.) With the Taliban defeated, President Bush waived
sanctions resulting from this listing on the grounds that providing assistance is in the
vital national interest of the United States (see section on sanctions, below).
In April 2001, amid signs the Taliban was enforcing its poppy ban, the United
States began funding a UNDCP program to assist former poppy cultivators in
Afghanistan. The United States contributed $1.5 million to that crop substitution
program in FY2001. The Bonn agreement mentions the need for a post-Taliban
Afghanistan government to prevent Afghanistan’s re-emergence as a haven for drug
cultivation, and the Bush Administration is focusing some post-Taliban resources on
23 Schork, Kurt, “Taleban Admits To Problem Of Image, Not Substance.” Reuters,
November 25, 1997.
24 Crossette, Barbara. “Taliban Seem to Be Making Good on Opium Ban, U.N. Says.” New
York Times
, February 7, 2001.

CRS-23
counter-narcotics. In early February 2002, the U.S. military exerted pressure on
Afghan opium dealers in Qandahar to close the operations of their market. This came
amid Bush Administration warnings that opium trafficking and heroin processing had
continued unabated in 2001, suggesting substantial stockpiling despite the Taliban
ban. In addition, preliminary estimates indicated that the spring 2002 opium poppy
crop might return to levels reached before the Taliban ban. The U.N. Drug Control
Program estimated in February 2002 that 111,000 - 160,000 acres of opium poppy
had been planted, which could yield 2,000 - 3,000 tons of crop, restoring Afghanistan
to its previous place as the world’s top opium producer.25 On the other hand, the U.S.
military is opposed to its conducting poppy crop eradication in Afghanistan, as some
in the Bush Administration are proposing.26
Retrieval of U.S. Stingers
Beginning in late 1985 and following an internal debate, the Reagan
Administration provided “hundreds” of man-portable “Stinger” anti-aircraft missiles
to the mujahedin for use against Soviet combat helicopters and aircraft. Prior to the
U.S.-led war against the Taliban and Al Qaeda, common estimates among experts
suggested that 200-300 Stingers remained at large in Afghanistan out of about 1,000
provided during the war against the Soviet Union.27 In the aftermath of the Soviet
withdrawal from Afghanistan, the United States had tried to retrieve the at-large
Stingers.28 The United States feared that the missiles could fall into the hands of
terrorist groups for possible use against civilian airliners. Iran bought 16 of the
missiles in 1987 and fired one against U.S. helicopters; some reportedly were
transferred to Lebanese Hizballah, according to press reports in January 2002. India
claimed that it was a Stinger, supplied to Islamic rebels in Kashmir probably by
sympathizers in Afghanistan, that shot down an Indian helicopter over Kashmir in
May 1999.29
The practical difficulties of retrieving the weapons had caused this issue to fade
from the U.S. agenda for Afghanistan. In 1992, the United States reportedly spent
about $10 million to buy the Stingers back, at a premium, from individual mujahedin
commanders. The New York Times reported on July 24, 1993, that the buy back
effort failed because the United States was competing with other buyers, including
Iran and North Korea, and that the CIA would spend about $55 million in FY1994
in a renewed Stinger buy-back effort. On March 7, 1994, the Washington Post
reported that the CIA had recovered only a fraction of the at-large Stingers. Many
observers speculate that the CIA program retrieved perhaps 50 or 100 Stingers.
25 Armitage, Tom. U.N. Sees Afghan Opium Cultivation Soaring in 2002. Reuters, February
28, 2002.
26 Gertz, Bill. Military Opposes Spraying Poppies. Washington Times, March 25, 2002.
27 Saleem, Farrukh. Where Are the Missing Stinger Missiles? Pakistan, Friday Times.
August 17-23, 2001.
28 Gertz, Bill. Stinger Bite Feared in CIA. Washington Times, October 9, 2000.
29 “U.S.-Made Stinger Missiles – Mobile and Lethal.” Reuters, May 28, 1999.

CRS-24
According to Defense Intelligence Agency testimony in 1996,30 an unspecified
number of man-portable surface-to-air missiles (Stingers) remain in Afghanistan.31
The Stinger issue resurfaced in conjunction with the U.S. war effort. U.S. pilots
reported that the Taliban fired some Stingers at U.S. aircraft during the war, but they
recorded no hits. Any Stingers that survived the anti-Taliban war are likely
controlled by Afghans now allied to the United States and would presumably pose
less of a threat. In early February 2002, the interim government collected and
returned to the United States “dozens” of Stingers and said it would continue to try
to find and return additional Stingers.32
Landmine Eradication
Landmines laid during the Soviet occupation constitute one of the principal
dangers to the Afghan people. The United Nations estimates that 5 -7 million mines
remain scattered throughout the country, although some estimates by outside
organizations are significantly lower. An estimated 400,000 Afghans have been
killed or wounded by landmines. U.N. teams have succeeded in destroying one
million mines and are now focusing on de-mining priority-use, residential and
commercial property, including land surrounding Kabul. As shown in the U.S. aid
table for FY1999-FY2002, the United States Humanitarian Demining Program
provides about $3 million per year for Afghanistan demining activities. Most of the
funds go to the HALO Trust, a British organization, and the U.N. Mine Action
Program for Afghanistan.
Assistance and Reconstruction
Since the Soviet invasion, Afghanistan has faced major humanitarian problems,
some of which deteriorated further under Taliban rule. In addition to 3.6 million
Afghan refugees at the start of the U.S.-led war,33 another 500,000 Afghans were
displaced internally even before U.S. military action began, according to Secretary
General Annan’s April 19, 2001 report on Afghanistan. Many of the displaced
persons had fled the effects of a major drought that affected the 85% of the
population that directly depends on agriculture. Some Afghan refugees are now
members of a third generation to live outside Afghanistan, although many are
beginning to return now that the Taliban has fallen from power in Kabul, and
repatriation has accelerated in spring 2002.
The conflicts in Afghanistan, including the war against the Soviet Union, have
reportedly left about 2 million dead, 700,000 widows and orphans and about one
30 John Moore, before the House International Relations Committee. May 9, 1996.
31 Common estimates in a variety of press reports suggest that 200-300 Stingers may remain
at large in Afghanistan.
32 Fullerton, John. “Afghan Authorities Hand in Stinger Missiles to U.S.” Reuters,
February 4, 2002.
33 About 1.4 million Afghan refugees are in Iran; 1.2 million in Pakistan; 20,000 in Russia;
17,000 in India, and 9,000 in the Central Asian states.

CRS-25
million Afghan children who were born and raised in refugee camps outside
Afghanistan.
Casualties. No reliable Afghan casualty figures for the U.S.-led war on the
Taliban and Al Qaeda have been announced, but estimates by researchers of Afghan
civilian deaths generally cite figures of “several hundred” civilian deaths. (U.S.
Central Command said in April 2002 that there had been 41 deaths involving U.S.
and allied military personnel in the war as of that time. The 22 “hostile deaths” –
which include friendly fire – are 17 U.S., 4 Canadian, and 1 Australian. All 19 “non-
hostile” deaths – accidents – have been Americans.
As part of its military operations, the United States air-dropped food rations to
help alleviate suffering. Following the Taliban collapse, aid routes via Uzbekistan
and Pakistan reopened, largely eliminating the need for the airdrops. The United
Nations continues to coordinate humanitarian relief efforts through the U.N. High
Commission for Refugees (UNHCR), the International Committee of the Red Cross
(ICRC), and UNOCHA (U.N. Office of the Coordinator of Humanitarian Affairs in
Afghanistan). UNHCR supervises Afghan refugee camps in Pakistan and Afghan
repatriation.
U.S. Assistance Issues. To address humanitarian concerns, the United
States had become the largest single provider of assistance to the Afghan people,
even before the crisis triggered by the September 11 attacks. In 1985, the United
States began a cross-border aid program for Afghanistan, through which aid was
distributed in Afghanistan, via U.S. aid workers in Pakistan. However, citing
budgetary constraints and the difficulty of administering a cross-border program,
there was no USAID mission for Afghanistan after the end of FY1994, and U.S. aid
has been provided through various channels, mostly U.N. agencies and NGO’s.
Primarily because of a drought and the widely publicized suffering of the
Afghan people, U.S. aid to the Afghan people in FY2001 greatly exceeded that
provided in FY2000 or FY1999. No U.S. assistance went directly to the Taliban
government. Table 2 breaks down FY1999-FY2002 aid by program. According to
the USAID fact sheet issued September 27, 2001, the United States provided about
$183 million in assistance to the Afghan people in FY2001. For a history of U.S. aid
to Afghanistan (FY1978-FY1998), see Table 3.
On October 4, 2001, in an effort to demonstrate that the United States has an
interest in the welfare of the Afghan people and not just the defeat of the Taliban,
President Bush announced that aid to the Afghan people would total about $320
million for FY2002. This includes food, blankets, medicine, and shelter for Afghan
refugees in states bordering Afghanistan and the people inside Afghanistan. The
amounts provided thus far in FY2002 are listed in the table.
The United States also pledged substantial reconstruction assistance for a post-
Taliban Afghanistan. Common estimates of reconstruction needs run up to about $10
billion. The conference report on the FY2002 foreign aid appropriation (H. Rept.
107-354, P.L. 107-115) contains a sense of Congress provision that the United States
should contribute substantial humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan, although no
dollar figures are mentioned. A separate bill (H.R. 3427) would authorize at least

CRS-26
$875 million in FY2002-FY2005 for Afghan rehabilitation and reconstruction, and
additional funds for related purposes.
Another bill, H.R. 3994, which was marked up by the House International
Relations Committee on March 19, 2002 and was prepared for floor action as of
April 25, authorizes $1.05 billion in U.S. reconstruction assistance during FY2002 -
FY2005 ($200 million in FY2002; $300 million in each of FY2003 and FY2004, and
$250 million in FY2005). The bill also authorizes $15 million per year for FY2002-
2005 for counternarcotics, and $10 million per year for FY2002-2005 for the loya
jirga
and local political development. The House Appropriations Committee has
developed a FY2002 supplemental appropriation that would provide $370 million in
additional aid to Afghanistan, $120 million more than the FY2002 supplemental
funding requested by the Bush Administration in March 2002. These funds would
likely be used for U.S. aid to Afghanistan, humanitarian and reconstruction, during
FY2003.
Reconstruction Aid. In conjunction with a donors’ conference in Tokyo
during January 20-21, 2002, the United States pledged $296 million in reconstruction
aid for Afghanistan for FY2002. That amount is drawn from existing FY2002
appropriations and the emergency September 11-related supplemental appropriation
enacted in September 2001.
U.S. reconstruction funds have been used for various “quick impact” programs.
These programs included $6.5 million for 9.7 million school textbooks; $7 million
for agricultural rehabilitation, programs for women, and support to the interim
administration; $5 million for health services infrastructure; $1 million for the
rehabilitation of landmine victims and other disabled persons (Leahy War Victims
Fund); and funding to rebuild the Ministry of Women’s Affairs building and to
distribute radios to localities to disseminate information on humanitarian aid. The
United States is forwarding donations from American citizens for the rebuilding of
Kabul University.
At the donors’ conference, the following additional reconstruction pledges were
announced: European Union - $500 million in 2002; Japan - $500 million over the
next 30 months; Germany - $362 million over the next 4 years; Saudi Arabia - $220
million over the next 3 years; Iran - $560 million over the next 5 years; Pakistan -
$100 million over the next 5 years; India - a $100 million line of credit; South Korea
- $45 million over 30 months; and United Kingdom - $86 million in 2002. Total
pledges in Tokyo for reconstruction amounted to $1.8 billion to be spent in 2002 and
$4.5 billion over the next 5 years.
In addition, the U.S. Treasury Department (Office of Foreign Assets Control,
OFAC) has unblocked over $145 million in assets of Afghan government owned
banking entities that were frozen under U.S. sanctions imposed on the Taliban in
1999 (see below). These funds are to be used by the new government for currency
stabilization, not for recurring costs of the interim government. Most of the funds
consist of gold that will be held in Afghanistan’s name in the United States to back
up Afghanistan’s currency. In January 2002, the United States also has agreed to
provide $50 million in credit for U.S. investment in Afghanistan, provided by the
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC). The United States also has

CRS-27
successfully pressed the International Air Transport Association to pay Afghanistan
$20 million in overflight fees that were withheld because of U.N. sanctions on the
Taliban. In April 2002, OFAC unblocked $17 million in privately-owned Afghan
assets. In May 2002, the World Bank reopened its office in Afghanistan after twenty
years.
Promoting Long-Term Economic Development
In an effort to find a long-term solution to Afghanistan’s acute humanitarian
problems, the United States has, when feasible, tried to promote major development
projects as a means of improving Afghan living standards and political stability over
the long term. During 1996-98, the Administration supported proposed natural gas
and oil pipelines through western Afghanistan as an incentive for the warring factions
to cooperate. One proposal by a consortium led by Los Angeles-based Unocal
Corporation34 was for a Central Asia Oil Pipeline (CAOP) that would originate at the
Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan border and extend through the western region of
Afghanistan to Pakistan. A $2.5 billion Central Asia Gas Pipeline (CentGas) would
originate in southern Turkmenistan and pass through Afghanistan to Pakistan, with
possible extensions into India.
However, the deterioration in U.S.-Taliban relations since 1998 largely ended
hopes for the pipeline projects while the Taliban was in power. Immediately after the
August 20,1998 U.S. strikes on bin Laden’s bases in Afghanistan, Unocal suspended
all its Afghan pipeline-related activities, including a U.S.-based training program for
Afghans who were expected to work on the project. With few prospects of improved
U.S. relations with Taliban, Unocal withdrew from its consortium in December 1998.
Saudi Delta Oil was made interim project leader, although Delta lacks the financing
and technology to make the consortium viable. The rival consortium led by Bridas
of Argentina reportedly continues to try to win approval for its proposal to undertake
the project, although virtually no new developments on this project have been
announced over the past few years. Many experts believe this project might be
revived if a stable, internationally-recognized government takes hold in Afghanistan.
34 Other participants in the Unocal consortium include: Delta of Saudi Arabia, Hyundai of
South Korea, Crescent Steel of Pakistan, Itochu Corporation and INPEX of Japan, and the
government of Turkmenistan. Some accounts say Russia’s Gazprom would probably
receive a stake in the project. Moscow Nezavisimaya Gazeta, October 30, 1997. Page 3.

CRS-28
Table 1. Major Factions in Afghanistan
Ideology/
Party/Commander
Leader
Areas of Control
Ethnicity
Taliban
Mullah
ultra-orthodox
Small pockets
(Islamic cleric)
Islamic, Pashtun
throughout
Muhammad Umar
Afghanistan; no
representation in
interim government.
Northern Alliance/Islamic
Burhannudin
moderate Islamic, Most of northern and
Society (dominant party in
Rabbani (political
mostly Tajik
western Afghanistan,
the Northern Alliance)
leader),
including Kabul; 17 out
Muhammad Fahim
of 30 cabinet seats in
(military leader)
interim administration,
including defense,
foreign ministry, and
interior ministry.
Rabbani holds no
official position.
Forces of Ismail Khan (part
Ismail Khan
Tajik
Herat Province and
of Northern Alliance)
environs; Khan’s son in
interim cabinet.
Eastern Shura (loosely allied
Hajji Abdul Qadir
moderate Islamic, Jalalabad and environs;
with Northern Alliance)
Pashtun
Qadir is in interim
administration.
National Islamic Movement
Abdul Rashid
secular, Uzbek
Mazar Sharif and
of Afghanistan (part of
Dostam
environs; Dostam is
Northern Alliance)
deputy defense minister
in interim government.
Hizb-e-Wahdat
Abd al-Karim
Shiite, Hazara
Bamiyan province.
(part of Northern Alliance)
Khalili
tribes
Independent Pashtun
Ghul Agha Shirzai, mostly orthodox
Southern Afghanistan,
Commanders
and other tribal
Islamic, Pashtun
including Qandahar;
leaders

CRS-29
Table 2. U.S. Aid to Afghanistan in FY1999-FY2002
($ in millions)
FY1999
FY2000
FY2001
FY2002
(as of 5/3)

Demining Program
$2.615
$3.0
$2.8
U.S.Department of
$42.0 worth of wheat
$68.875 for 165,000
$131.0
$123.0
Agriculture (DOA)
(100,000 metric tons)
metric tons. Of this,
(300,000
(Food for
and USAID Food
under DOA’s “416(b)”
60,000 tons were for
metric tons
Peace), for
For Peace, via World
program.
May 2000 drought
under
72,700
Food Program(WFP)
relief.
P.L.480, Title
metric tons
II, and
of
416(b)
foodstuffs
WFP and the Aga
$2.6 for Afghan
$14.0 for the same
Khan Foundation
refugees inside
purpose
Afghanistan
State/Bureau of
$16.95 for Afghan
$14.03 for the same
$22.03 for
$86.8 to
Population, Refugees
refugees in Pakistan
purposes
similar
U.N.
and Migration
and Iran, and to assist
purposes
agencies
(PRM) via UNHCR
their repatriation
and ICRC
State Department/
$7.0 to various NGO’s
$6.68 for drought
$18.934 for
$89.9 to
Office of Foreign
to aid Afghans inside
relief and health,
similar
various
Disaster Assistance
Afghanistan
water, and sanitation
programs
U.N.
(OFDA)
programs for
agencies
Afghans
and NGO’s
State
7.0 to Halo
Department/HDP
Trust and
(Humanitarian
other
Demining Program)
demining
programs
Aid to Afghan
$5.44, of which $2.789
$6.169, of which
$5.31 for
Refugees in Pakistan
went to health and
$3.82 went to similar
similar
(through various
training for Afghan
purposes
purposes
NGO’s)
women and girls in
Pakistan
U.N. Drug Control
$1.50
Program
USAID
$0.45 for
$14.3 for
Office of Transition
Afghan
broadcasts
Initiatives
women in
and UNDP
Pakistan
trust to
support
interim
gov’t
Dept. of Defense
$50.9
(aidrop of
2.4 million
rations)
Center for Disease
$0.57 polio
Control
eradication
Totals
$76.6 $113.2
$182.6
$367.8

CRS-30
Table 3. U.S. Assistance to Afghanistan FY1978-1998
($ in millions)
Econ.
Other
Fiscal
Devel.
P.L. 480
Supp.
Military
(Incl. regional
Total
Year
Assist.
(Title I and II)
(ESF)
refugee aid)
1978
4.989

5.742
.269
.789
11.789
1979
3.074

7.195

.347
10.616
1980

(Soviet invasion - December 1979)


1981






1982






1983






1984






1985
3.369




3.369
1986


8.9


8.9
1987
17.8
12.1
2.6


32.5
1988
22.5
22.5
29.9


74.9
1989
22.5
22.5
32.6


77.6
1990
35.0
35.0
18.1


88.1
1991
30.0
30.0
20.1


80.1
1992
25.0
25.0
31.4


81.4
1993
10.0
10.0
18.0

30.2
68.2
1994
3.4
2.0
9.0

27.9
42.3
1995
1.8

12.4

31.6
45.8
1996


16.1

26.4
42.5
1997


18.0

31.9**
49.9
1998


3.6

49.14***
52.74
Source: U.S. Department of State.
** Includes $3 million for demining and $1.2 million for counternarcotics.
*** Includes $3.3 million in projects targeted for Afghan women and girls, $7 million in earthquake
relief aid, 100,000 tons of 416B wheat worth about $15 million, $2 million for demining, and $1.54
for counternarcotics.

CRS-31
U.S. and International Sanctions
Shoring up a post-Taliban government of Afghanistan with financial and other
assistance requires waivers of restrictions or the permanent modification of U.S. and
U.N. sanctions previously imposed on Afghanistan. Some of these modifications or
waivers are in progress. Sanctions in place include the following:
! On May 2, 1980, Afghanistan was deleted from the list of designated
beneficiary countries under the U.S. GSP, denying Afghanistan’s
exports duty free treatment, by Executive Order 12204 (45 F.R.
20740). This was done under the authority of Section 504 of the
Trade Act of 1974, as amended [P.L. 93-618; 19 U.S.C. 2464].
! On June 3, 1980, as part of the sanctions against the Soviet Union
for the invasion of Afghanistan, the United States imposed controls
on exports to Afghanistan of agricultural products, oil and gas
exploration and production equipment, and phosphates. This was
implemented at 15 CFR Part 373 et seq (45 F.R. 37415) under the
authority of Sections 5 and 6 of the Export Administration Act of
1979 [P.L. 96-72; 50 U.S.C. app. 2404, app. 2405]. On April 24,
1981, these sanctions were modified to terminate controls on U.S.
exports to Afghanistan of agricultural products and phosphates.
! In mid-1992, the Bush Administration determined that Afghanistan
no longer had a “Soviet-controlled government.” This opened
Afghanistan to the use of U.S. funds made available for the U.S.
share of U.N. organizations that provide assistance to Afghanistan.
! On October 7, 1992, President George H.W. Bush issued
Presidential Determination 93-3 that Afghanistan is no longer a
Marxist-Leninist country. The designation as such a country had
prohibited Afghanistan from receiving Export-Import Bank
guarantees, insurance, or credits for purchases under Sec. 8 of the
1986 Export-Import Bank Act, which amended Section 2(b)(2) of
the Export-Import Bank Act of 1945 (P.L. 79-173, 12 U.S.C. 635).
However, President George H.W. Bush’s determination was not
implemented before he left office.
! President Bush’s October 7, 1992 determination (93-3) also found
that assistance to Afghanistan under Section 620D of the Foreign
Assistance Act is in the national interest of the United States because
of the change of regime in Afghanistan. The presidential
determination, had it been implemented in regulations, would have
waived restrictions on assistance to Afghanistan provided for in the
Act, as amended [P.L. 87-195; 22 U.S.C. 2374]; as added by Section
505 of the International Development Cooperation Act of 1979 [P.L.
96-53]. These provisions prohibit foreign assistance to Afghanistan
until it apologizes for the death of U.S. Ambassador to Afghanistan
Adolph Dubs, who was kidnapped in Kabul in 1979 and killed when
Afghan police stormed the hideout where he was held, unless the

CRS-32
President determines that such assistance is in the national interest
because of changed circumstances in Afghanistan.
! On May 3, 2002, President Bush restored normal trade treatment to
the products of Afghanistan. Section 552 of the Foreign Assistance
Appropriations for FY1986 [P.L. 99-190] authorized the President
to deny any U.S. credits or most-favored-nation (MFN) tariff status
for Afghanistan. Under that law, on February 18, 1986, the height
of the Soviet occupation, President Reagan had issued Presidential
Proclamation 5437, suspending (MFN) tariff status for Afghanistan
(51 F.R. 4287).
! On March 31, 1993, President Clinton, on national interest grounds,
waived restrictions provided for in Section 481 (h) of the Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, as amended [P.L. 87-195]; as amended and
restated by Section 2005(a) of the Anti-Drug Abuse Act of 1986
[P.L. 99-570]. The waiver was renewed in 1994. Mandatory
sanctions include bilateral aid cuts and suspensions, including denial
of Ex-Im Bank credits; the casting of negative U.S. votes for
multilateral development bank loans; and a non-allocation of a U.S.
sugar quota. Discretionary sanctions included denial of Generalized
System of Preferences (GSP); additional duties on country exports
to the United States; and curtailment of air transportation with the
United States. On February 25, 2002, President Bush waived
restrictions on FY2002 aid to Afghanistan under this Act.

! On June 14, 1996, Afghanistan was formally added to the list of
countries prohibited from receiving exports or licenses for exports
of U.S. defense articles and services. This amended the International
Traffic in Arms Regulations (22 CFR Part 121 et seq.) under the
authority of Section 38 of the Arms Export Control Act, as amended
(P.L. 90-629; 22 U.S.C. 2778) by adding Afghanistan at Section
126.1 of 22 CFR Part 126.
! In a ruling largely redundant with the one above, on May 15, 1997,
the State Department designated Afghanistan under the
Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (P.L. 104-
132), as a state that is not cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism
efforts. The designation, made primarily because of Taliban’s
harboring of bin Laden, makes Afghanistan ineligible to receive U.S.
exports of items on the U.S. Munitions List. The designation was
repeated every year since 1997.
! On July 4, 1999, the President declared a national emergency with
respect to Taliban because of its hosting of bin Laden, and issued
Executive order 13129 that imposed sanctions. The sanctions
include the blocking of Taliban assets and property in the United
States, and a ban on U.S. trade with Taliban-controlled areas of
Afghanistan. On August 10, 1999, the Administration determined
that Ariana Afghan Airlines was a Taliban entity. That

CRS-33
determination triggered a blocking of Ariana assets (about $500,000)
in the United States and a ban on U.S. citizens’ flying on the airline.
Now that the Taliban has lost power, this ban has ended
! On October 15, 1999, the U.N. Security Council adopted Resolution
1267. See section on the harboring of bin Laden for the sanctions
imposed under this resolution.
! As noted above, U.N. Security Council Resolution 1333 of
December 19, 2000, imposed a number of new sanctions against the
Taliban. For the provisions, see the section on the harboring of bin
Laden. As noted, this sanction was narrowed to penalize only Al
Qaeda by virtue of the adoption of U.N. Security Council Resolution
1390 of January 17, 2002.

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