Order Code IB98018
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
China-U.S. Relations
Updated May 17, 2002
Kerry Dumbaugh
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Background
PRC Response To U.S. Anti-Terrorism Initiatives
Other Issues in U.S.-China Relations
U.S. Navy Reconnaissance Plane Collision
Human Rights Issues
Crackdowns Against Religious Beliefs
PRC Prisons/Prison Labor
Family Planning/Coercive Abortion
Religious Freedom
U.N. Resolution on Human Rights
U.S. Commissions on China
Congressional-Executive Commission on the PRC
U.S.-China Security Review Commission
Issues in U.S.-China Security Relations
2002 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate
“China’s National Defense 2000" White Paper
Weapons Proliferation
Satellite Technology Transfer Allegations
Allegations of Espionage
Economic Issues
Most-Favored-Nation (MFN)/?Normal Trade Relations” (NTR) Status
China’s Fragile Banking System
Sovereignty Issues: Taiwan, Tibet, Hong Kong
Taiwan
Tibet
Hong Kong
U.S. Policy Approaches
LEGISLATION
CHRONOLOGY
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Issue Briefs and Reports

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China-U.S. Relations
SUMMARY
In the wake of the September 11, 2001
Moreover, although the anti-terror cam-
terrorist attacks against the United States, U.S.
paign is likely to overshadow more traditional
and PRC foreign policy calculations appear to
U.S.-China bilateral problems, it is unlikely to
be changing. The Administration of George
eliminate them. Sensitivities remain over
W. Bush assumed office in January 2001
long-standing issues such as China’s abusive
viewing China as a U.S. “strategic competi-
record on human rights issues and on accusa-
tor.” Administration officials faced an early
tions that it routinely violates its non-prolifer-
test in April 2001 when a Chinese jet collided
ation commitments, increasing the possibility
with a U.S. Navy reconnaissance plane over
that weapons of mass destruction can fall into
the South China Sea, resulting in strained
the hands of terrorists. The PRC is thought to
relations and PRC accusations that U.S. recon-
remain suspicious about the accidental NATO
naissance activities were unfriendly acts.
bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade
Since September 11, though, U.S. officials
in 1999, concerned about what they see as an
have come to see Beijing as an important
“encircling” U.S. presence in Asia, and wary
potential ally in the fight against global terror-
of U.S. technological advantages and global
ism, while PRC officials see the anti-terror-
influence.
ism campaign as a chance to improve rela-
tions with Washington and perhaps gain
U.S. observers also remain mindful of
policy concessions on issues important to
allegations that Beijing was involved in illegal
Beijing. U.S. anti-terror priorities have led
financial contributions to U.S. political cam-
some to suggest that cooperation against
paigns in 1996, and of allegations that PRC
terrorism could serve as a new strategic frame-
nuclear weapons design has profited greatly
work for Sino-U.S. relations.
from secrets stolen from U.S. nuclear research
labs. In addition, Taiwan remains the most
But there are complexities and pitfalls on
sensitive and potentially explosive issue in
this road to cooperation. For one thing, the
Sino-U.S. relations, with U.S. officials in-
PRC’s definitions of what constitutes terror-
creasingly supportive of Taiwan’s security and
ism are significantly more expansive than
its democratization, and PRC officials ada-
those of the United States, and include any
mant about reunifying Taiwan with the PRC.
political expression of independence – both
violently and peacefully expressed – by Tibet-
One long-standing bilateral issue that
ans, Uighrur Muslims, Taiwanese, and others.
will not be resurfacing is the U.S. debate over
Since the United States maintains that the
China’s normal trade relations (NTR) status.
anti-terror campaign must not be used to
The 106th Congress enacted H.R. 4444 (P.L.
persecute these groups, Sino-U.S. cooperation
106-286), a law granting the PRC permanent
already faces limits. Also, U.S. dominance of
NTR upon its accession to the World Trade
the anti-terrorism effort has made Washington
Organization (WTO). The PRC formally
suddenly appear to be a more threatening
joined the WTO on December 11, 2001.
competitor for influence in Central Asia,
Future trade debates concerning the PRC are
where Beijing had been making successful
likely to occur within this multilateral frame-
political inroads in recent years, and in Paki-
work, over whether or not Beijing is living up
stan, with which Beijing has traditionally
to its WTO agreements.
close relations.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On May 8, 2002, Chinese police entered the compound of the Japanese consulate in
Shenyang to forcibly remove two North Korean refugees seeking asylum. The Japanese
government has protested strongly on the grounds that the action violates the Vienna
Convention guaranteeing the inviolability of foreign government missions.
On April 25, 2002, the Los Angeles Times reported that a new CIA assessment reports
that the Chinese government in Beijing are actively planning hacking and virus attacks
against U.S. computer systems. The allegation was denied by a science and technology
official in the Chinese Embassy in Washington.
Beginning April 23, 2002, Vice-President Hu Jintao, considered to be the prime
candidate for elevation to Communist Party Secretary later this year, left China for what is
thought to be his first visit to the United States.
During the week of April 22, 2002, U.S. Secretary of Commerce Don Evans led a
business delegation to Beijing as part of a meeting of the U.S.-China Joint Commission on
Commerce and Trade.
On April 21, 2002, PRC President Jiang Zemin concluded a five-nation tour of Europe,
Africa, and the Middle East, during which he issued a fairly strong denunciation of U.S.
policy and the U.S. military presence in Central Asia and the Middle East.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Background
Since the early 1990s, U.S.-China relations have followed an uneven course, with
modest improvements overshadowed by various recurring difficulties. Among others,
bilateral difficulties have included U.S. problems with the PRC’s worsening human rights
record, growing tensions over Taiwan’s status and a PRC southern military build-up opposite
Taiwan, continued controversy over allegations of Chinese espionage against the United
States, tension over the accidental NATO bombing of the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade in
May 1999, the PRC’s detention of Chinese American scholars, and the lengthy delay
associated with the return of a U.S. navy crew and reconnaissance plane disabled by a
collision with a Chinese jet fighter. These problems have occurred against a steady drumbeat
of growing mutual suspicion over the perceived security threat that each poses to the other.
Many of these tensions were played out during the Clinton Administration, which had
inherited a Sino-U.S. relationship that was already shaky due to repercussions from the
Tiananmen Square crackdown. President Clinton was elected in 1992 with a heavy focus on
a domestic U.S. economic agenda and less emphasis on a broad or well-articulated foreign
policy agenda. When it came to China policy, the early Clinton Administration staked out
a position – markedly different from that of its own predecessor, the Administration of
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George H.W. Bush – that the United States should use its economic leverage to promote
democracy in the PRC. In his first year in office, President Clinton announced he would link
the PRC’s future most-favored-nation (MFN) trade status with improvements in its human
rights policies, and he made political appointments and took other actions that suggested he
would pursue a fairly tough policy. This initial approach soon was abandoned, and the
following year, Mr. Clinton “de-linked” the PRC’s human rights policies and its MFN status,
and began to alter his policy approach.
Like President Bush before him, President Clinton came to favor a policy of
“engagement” with China. He generally moved to solidify and improve aspects of Sino-U.S.
relations, annually extended the PRC’s MFN status, periodically waived various sanctions,
authorized resumption of Sino-U.S. nuclear cooperation and, in 1997, re-initiated high-level
summitry with the PRC’s senior leader, Party Secretary Jiang Zemin. In a joint statement
issued at that summit, both sides agreed to establish “a constructive strategic partnership.”
U.S. critics of the Clinton policies charged that the PRC continued to violate its non-
proliferation commitments and its pledges on human rights. Some of these critics described
the PRC as America’s principal threat, and they increasingly objected to the overall U.S.
policy of “engagement” with the PRC pursued by successive U.S. Administrations.
Upon assuming office in January 2001, the George W. Bush Administration promised
a tougher approach, describing the PRC as a “strategic competitor” of the United States.
Bush Administration officials indicated they would broaden the focus of American policy
in Asia, concentrating more on Japan and other U.S. allies and de-emphasizing Sino-U.S.
relations.
The September 11 terrorist attacks against the United States appeared to alter, at least
temporarily, the policy calculus for both Washington and Beijing. Bush Administration
officials appeared to see the potential for Sino-U.S. cooperation against global terrorism as
a priority, and they down-played other key differences and problems in the relationship
evident during much of 2001. U.S. officials have sought PRC support with countries in the
region and in initiatives put before the United Nations Security Council, where the PRC is
a permanent member. Nevertheless, Bush Administration officials also have suggested that
only limited cooperation is possible with the PRC. Statements made by the President and
by others in his Administration in 2002 have been much more positive toward Taiwan – the
most sensitive issue in U.S.-China relations, than in previous U.S. Administrations.
Beijing, for its part, appeared to see the U.S. anti-terrorism effort as a chance to improve
Sino-U.S. relations, soften U.S. criticism, and demonstrate that China can be a responsible
global player. PRC leaders offered to share intelligence and take other steps to cooperate
with the U.S. anti-terror initiative. But some American observers also have warned that
Beijing may see current U.S. anti-terrorism priorities as an opportunity to gain U.S.
concessions on Taiwan, Tibet, and other issues of importance to the PRC.
PRC Response To U.S. Anti-Terrorism Initiatives
The PRC itself has been the target of bombings, sabotage, and other terrorist attacks,
primarily thought to be committed by small groups of Muslim extremists (largely Uighurs)
based in Xinjiang, in China’s far northwest. For years there have been unconfirmed reports
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that some Muslim activists may, in fact, be based in Afghanistan, receiving training from
the Taliban – reports that appeared to gain more credence late in 2001 when it was revealed
that a number of Uighurs from Xinjiang had been captured in Afghanistan. PRC officials
also have strong connections to and influence with Pakistan, which in the past had aided the
Taliban government and is now a key country for the U.S.-led anti-terrorism coalition. In
addition, in 1996, the PRC took the lead in establishing what is now the Shanghai
Cooperative Organization (SCO), a six-member consortium involving the PRC, Russia, and
the Muslim countries of Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Kazakstan, and Kyrgyzstan. Part of the
group’s stated goal is to curb fundamentalist terrorist activities in the region.
Despite these common interests, it is not yet clear how much actual support the PRC
ultimately can give the U.S.-led effort. To many, the early signs were encouraging. In a
message to President Bush on September 11, 2001, PRC President Jiang Zemin condemned
the terrorist attacks and offered condolences, promising to cooperate with the United States
to combat terrorism. The PRC also voted with others in the U.N. Security Council for
Resolution 1368 (2001), which among other things “unequivocally” condemned the terrorist
attacks and expressed its “readiness to take all necessary steps to respond to the terrorist
attacks.” On September 20, Party Secretary Jiang Zemin declared that the PRC offered
“unconditional support” in the anti-terrorism campaign, and the PRC’s foreign minister,
Tang Jiaxuan, reportedly assured President Bush late in September that Beijing would share
intelligence with the United States. On September 24, 2001, a group of counter-terrorism
experts from the PRC arrived for meetings with their counterparts in Washington.
But the PRC also has sent mixed signals about its support for the anti-terrorism
campaign. Strong statements of support have been qualified by other statements – for
instance, by expressions of concern about U.S. or NATO military action and fault-finding
with U.S. intelligence information. Also, the PRC strongly prefers that such global efforts
be conducted through the auspices of the U.N. Security Council, where it has a voice, and
not purely through a U.S. unilateral effort or a coalition of U.S. allies. Given past Sino-U.S.
difficulties, Beijing may be cautious about appearing too “pro-American,” a political
problem that working through U.N. auspices could mitigate. PRC officials in the past have
attempted to exact policy concessions from the United States – such as on Taiwan or Tibet
– in exchange for their support for U.S. initiatives. On December 12, 2001, for instance, a
PRC spokesman was quoted as saying that if PRC Uighurs are captured in Afghanistan, they
should be returned to the PRC to face charges of terrorism – a sentiment the United States
has rejected. More recently, in April 2002, PRC President and Party Secretary Jiang Zemin
was quoted by Agence France-Presse as using harsher rhetoric during a trip to Europe,
Africa, and the Middle East – saying that “One of the primary issues for China is to protect
developing countries from the pretensions of the United States.”
Other Issues in U.S.-China Relations
President’s 2002 Asia Visit
In conjunction with a visit to Japan and South Korea, President Bush also visited China,
stopping in Beijing for February 21-22, 2002, his second visit with PRC President Jiang
Zemin in four months. The China visit was notable for the subtle but decided change in the
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atmosphere of U.S.-China relations since the President first took office. Having begun their
relations with a crisis in the South China Sea, both Bush Administration and Chinese
officials now apparently see the potential for Sino-U.S. cooperation against global terrorism
as an opportunity to craft a more productive and less hostile relationship over the short term.
Nonetheless, U.S. officials left without having made progress on resolving the “November
2000 agreement,” in which the PRC promised the Clinton Administration that it would stop
making missile sales to unstable Middle East and South Asia regimes and would institute an
export control regime, and the United States promised to lift existing restrictions against
certain technology exports. During the visit, the PRC maintained that it is legally obligated
to follow through on missile sales agreements that pre-date the November 2000 agreement
– the so-called “grand-fathering” issue – and that it is still working on an export control
regime. U.S. officials interviewed by CRS claimed they had not expected the issue to be
resolved during the Bush visit.
U.S. Navy Reconnaissance Plane Collision
On April 12, 2001, the PRC released the 24 American crew members it had held since
the mid-air collision of a U.S. Navy EP-3 plane with a Chinese jet fighter on April 1, 2001.
The PRC government decision to release the crew came after U.S. Ambassador Joseph
Prueher delivered a letter stating the United States was “very sorry” the U.S. plane entered
China’s airspace and made an emergency landing without receiving a verbal clearance.
Official Chinese media sources insist that the U.S. plane “rammed” the Chinese jet fighter.
They claimed that the plane landed at the Hainan military base without permission.
Many observers believe that the heart of the crisis ultimately concerns the status of the
island of Taiwan, which Beijing claims as part of China. One important function of U.S.
military reconnaissance flights off southern China is presumed to be monitoring the
systematic military build-up the PRC has been conducting on its coast opposite Taiwan. It
also may be that the stand-off became caught up somehow in China’s ongoing political
succession arrangements, scheduled to occur in late 2002. According to some observers, no
PRC official who hopes to benefit in those leadership decisions can be seen to be “soft” in
dealing with the United States in such cases. In the wake of the September 11 attacks, both
U.S. and PRC officials have said that the EP-3 incident is behind them.
Human Rights Issues
The PRC’s human rights abuses have been among the most visible and constant points
of contention in Sino-U.S. relations since the 1989 Tiananmen Square crackdown. According
to the latest State Department Report on Human Rights, released on March 4, 2002, the
PRC’s human rights record remained poor in 2001, and that the government continued to
maintain strict controls over religious organizations, political discourse, and publications;
that law enforcement agencies continued to carry out extrajudicial killings, executions after
summary trials, torture and other cruel punishment; and that there continued to be lack of
adequate medical care, arbitrary arrest and detention, judicial corruption, denial of fair trial,
and other arbitrary official interferences with individual privacy and liberty. The report also
cited major flaws and deficiencies in China’s Criminal Procedure Law, and stressed that the
judiciary is not independent, despite constitutional provisions to the contrary, and that
judicial and police corruption is “endemic” in China. In addition, the report indicated that
there are ongoing government efforts to correct systemic weaknesses in the legal and judicial
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systems, that there is growing public debate in China over the inadequacies in the legal
system, and that an increasing number of citizens are seeking redress through the courts and
making use of the new legal remedies available to them.
Previously, the PRC government signed two key human rights agreements – the U.N.
Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (October 27, 1997) and the International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (March 12, 1998) – and announced on February 28,
2001, that it would ratify the former, with qualifications. The U.N. Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, which requires signatory countries to ensure their citizens have
access to food, medical care, housing, and education, also requires countries to guarantee
workers the right to strike and form labor unions. In ratifying the agreement, China appeared
to equivocate on the labor provision, saying it would deal with such issues “in line with
relevant provisions” of the Chinese constitution. The only labor union now permitted in
China is controlled by the Chinese Communist Party.
Crackdowns Against Religious Beliefs. Over the past year, the PRC intensified
its campaign against independent religious groups that it began in 1999, when American
news accounts began to give wide coverage to reports that the government was arresting
religious practitioners and giving them harsh jail sentences. On July 22, 1999, the
government outlawed Falun Gong, a spiritual movement in China said to combine Buddhist
and Taoist meditation practices with a series of exercises. The November 6, 1999 People’s
Daily suggested that Falun Gong presented the greatest danger to the nation that had ever
existed in its 50-year history. Since then, the government has continued to arrest Falun Gong
leaders, impose harsh prison sentences, close the sect’s facilities, and confiscate its literature.
As a consequence of Falun Gong, the National People’s Congress on October 30, 1999,
adopted a resolution outlawing religious sects and cults in China. The resolution gave no
comprehensive definition of a cult or a sect. In an extraordinary display of public dissent,
on March 5, 2002, Falun Gong practitioners cut into the cable network in the northeast city
of Changchun and broadcast pro-Falun Gong programs until PRC authorities interceded and
terminated the broadcasts.
PRC officials have also ruthlessly suppressed dissent among ethnic minorities,
particularly in Tibet and in the Xinjiang-Uighur Autonomous Region, which has a significant
ethnic Muslim population. Amnesty International issued a report in April 1999 which
accused the Chinese government of “gross violations of human rights” in Xinjiang, including
widespread use of torture to extract confessions, lengthy prison sentences, and executions.
In August 1999, during the visit of an American congressional staff delegation to Xinjiang,
a wealthy and well known Uighur businesswoman, Rebiya Kadeer, was arrested by Chinese
security forces on her way to a meeting with a delegation member.
Since September 11, PRC officials have sought to link their ongoing crackdown against
Uighur and other Muslim separatists in Xinjiang with the global anti-terrorism campaign.
On October 12, 2001, a PRC Foreign Ministry spokesman said, “We hope that our fight
against the East Turkistan [Xinjiang] forces will become a part of the international effort
against terrorism.” According to a December 16, 2001 New York Times article, PRC
officials in Xinjiang in October of this year held a public rally at a stadium in Hotan to
condemn ethnic Uighurs for separatist activities. The article reported that 6 men were given
12-year prison sentences, while one man was condemned to death and later executed. U.S.
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officials have warned that the anti-terror campaign should not be used to persecute Uighur
separatists or other minorities with political grievances against Beijing.
PRC Prisons/Prison Labor. Prisons in the PRC are criticized for their conditions,
treatment of prisoners, and stringent work requirements. For U.S. policy, a key issue has
been the extent to which products made by prisoners are exported to the U.S. market. Prison
labor imports have been a violation of U.S. customs law since 1890 under the McKinley
Tariff Act [19 U.S.C., section 1307); criminal penalties also apply under 18 U.S.C., section
1761 and 1762. Because of concerns about prison labor exports, the United States signed
a Memorandum-of-Understanding (MOU) with China on the subject in 1992. Since then,
there have been repeated allegations that China is failing to adhere to the agreement. Recent
U.S. Congresses have considered legislation to increase funding for monitoring prison labor
abuses in China.
Family Planning/Coercive Abortion. Bitter controversies in U.S. family planning
assistance have surrounded the PRC’s population programs. Abortion, and the degree to
which coercive abortions and sterilizations occur in the PRC’s family planning programs, has
been a prominent issue in these debates. PRC officials have routinely denied that coercion
is an authorized part of national family planning programs, but they have acknowledged that
some provincial and local officials have pursued coercive policies. Direct U.S. funding for
coercive family planning practices is already prohibited in provisions of several U.S. laws,
as is indirect U.S. support for coercive family planning, specifically in the PRC. In addition,
legislation in recent years has expanded these restrictions to include U.S. funding for
international and multilateral family planning programs, such as the U.N. Population Fund
(UNFPA), that have programs in China. On December 20, 2001, for instance, Congress
cleared for the President’s signature H.R. 2506, the Foreign Operations, Export Financing,
and Related Programs Act, which among other things provides a U.S. contribution to the
UNFPA of $34 million, with the conditions that UNFPA not fund abortions and that it
segregate U.S. funds from other UNFPA money so they are not used for programs in China.
Religious Freedom. Membership data on religious organizations in the PRC
suggests that the number of religious adherents continues to grow. Nevertheless, Chinese
officials decided in 1994 to tighten restrictions on religious practices, and one result was a
marked increase in American criticism. Among other things, new restrictions prohibit
evangelical activities and require all religious groups to register with the Religious Affairs
Bureau (RAB). Registration requires religious groups to reveal the names and addresses of
members, their contacts in China and abroad, and details about leadership activities and
finances. The RAB, charged with policing and regulating religious activities, is part of the
PRC’s State Council and reports to the Communist Party’s United Front Work Department.
Over the past year, the PRC has further tightened its control over religious practices. Among
these measures is the establishment, at the central government level, of an “Office for
Preventing and Handling Cults” – a measure targeted primarily at the Falun Gong but which
many fear may come to include Christian churches and other more mainstream groups. PRC
authorities also are conducting a vigorous campaign against so-called “unofficial” or “house”
churches – Christian church groups whose members have refused to register with the RAB.
Labor Unrest. Economic reforms and greater stress on the need to make state-owned
enterprises profitable have led to rising labor unrest in China. In 2002, laid-off and
unemployed workers estimated to number in the tens of thousands have demonstrated to
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protest job losses, insufficient severance pay, lack of a social safety net, and local
government decisions to shut-down, sell-off, or privatize unprofitable state-owned factories.
Worker unrest is a particularly troubling issue for Beijing, a regime founded originally on
communist-inspired notions of a workers’ paradise. Increasing labor unrest is also likely to
place greater pressure on the authority and credibility of the All-China Federation of Trade
Unions (ACFTU), China’s only legal labor organization, under the leadership of the Chinese
Communist Party.
U.S. Commissions on China
In the year 2000, Congress mandated the establishment of two commissions focusing
on various aspects of U.S.-China relations:
Congressional-Executive Commission on the PRC. Considered a trade-off for
passage of legislation to give PNTR to the PRC (P.L. 106-286), an amendment to the bill
created a permanent body – the Congressional-Executive Commission on the People’s
Republic of China – to monitor human rights in the PRC. Including both House and Senate
Members as well as presidential appointees, the Commission’s chairmanship rotates between
the Senate (odd-numbered Congress) and the House (even-numbered Congress). Members
include (Senate): Max Baucus (Chair), Carl Levin, Dianne Feinstein, Byron Dorgan, Evan
Bayh, Chuck Hagel, Bob Smith, Gordon Smith, Sam Brownback, and Tim Hutchinson; and
(House): Doug Bereuter (Co-chair), Jim Leach, David Dreier, Frank Wolf, Joe Pitts, Sander
Levin, Marci Kaptur, Nancy Pelosi, and Jim Davis. Presidential appointees include: Paula
Dobriansky (Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs), Lorne Craner (Deputy Assistant
Secretary of State for Human Rights and Labor), Jim Kelly (Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for East Asia and the Pacific), Grant Aldonas (Undersecretary of Commerce for
International Trade), and D. Cameron Findlay (Deputy Secretary of Labor). For a variety of
reasons, including the September 11 terrorist attacks, this commission got off to a slow start;
it did no business in 2001, and is not expected to file its first report until late 2002.
U.S.-China Security Review Commission. Now calling itself simply the U.S.-
China Commission, this 12-member body was established in 2000 under the Floyd D. Spence
National Defense Authorization Act FY2001 (P.L. 106-398) to review the security
implications of U.S. economic and trade ties with the PRC. Commissioners are private
citizens appointed by the House and Senate. Beginning in 2002, the Commission is to
submit an annual report of its assessment to Congress in both classified and unclassified
format.
Issues in U.S.-China Security Relations
Once one of the stronger linchpins of the relationship, U.S.-China military relations
have never fully recovered after they were suspended following the 1989 Tiananmen Square
crackdown. At a Sino-U.S. summit in October 1997, both countries announced they would
work to improve military-to-military relations, including an increase in military contacts and
a Military Maritime Consultative Agreement (MMCA) meant to reduce the chance of
accidents or misunderstandings at sea. What was reported as a “special” meeting of the
MMCA was held on September 14-15, 2001, on Guam; the U.S. delegation was led by U.S.
Pacific Command representative, Rear Adm. Tom S. Fellin. The Chinese delegation was led
by Major Gen. Zhang Bangdong from the PRC’s Ministry of National Defense.
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2002 U.S. National Intelligence Estimate. On January 9, 2002, the CIA issued
an unclassified summary of its latest National Intelligence Estimate (NIE), Foreign Missile
Developments and the Ballistic Missile Threat Through 2015. According to the unclassified
report, the PRC is expected to up to 100 long-range nuclear missiles, many on mobile
launchers, targeted at the United States by 2015. Currently, the PRC has about 20 fixed silos
containing nuclear-armed missiles capable of reaching the United States. The report asserts
that the PRC is upgrading its missile forces out of concern that a U.S. missile defense system,
if developed and deployed, could effectively neutralize its current nuclear deterrent.
“China’s National Defense 2000" White Paper. On October 16, 2000, China
published its third national security white paper, entitled “National Defense in 2000.”
According to reports, the document lists China’s national defense expenditures for 2000 at
121.29 billion renminbi – roughly U.S. $14.65 billion. In describing its view of the current
international security situation, the white paper declares that there are “new negative
developments in the security situation” in the region. A number of these are attributed to
U.S. actions, including a stronger U.S. military presence in the region, continued sale of
weapons to Taiwan and consideration of the Taiwan Security Enhancement Act by the 106th
Congress, consideration of theater missile defense (TMD) development, and revision of the
U.S.-Japan Defense Cooperation Guidelines. In addition, the paper cites the uncertain
environment on the Korean Peninsula, the situation in South Asia, and what it calls
“encroachments on China’s sovereignty” in the South China Sea.
Weapons Proliferation. A key security issue for the United States, now enhanced
in light of the September 11 terrorist attacks on American soil, has been the PRC’s track
record of weapons sales, technology transfers, and nuclear energy assistance, particularly to
Iran and Pakistan. Officials in the Clinton Administration believed China had taken a
number of steps in the 1990s suggesting it was reassessing its weapons sales and assistance
policies. Among other things, the PRC: (1992) promised to abide by the Missile Technology
Control Regime (MTCR) and acceded to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT); (1993)
signed the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC); (1996) signed the Comprehensive Test
Ban Treaty; and (1997) joined the Zangger Committee of NPT exporters.
Congressional critics, however, charged that confidence in China’s non-proliferation
policies is misplaced. They pointed out that for years, reputable sources have reported China
to be selling technology for weapons of mass destruction and ballistic missiles in the
international market, primarily to Pakistan and the Middle East. Although these allegations
have always created problems in Sino-U.S. relations, the issue became more serious in light
of nuclear weapons tests conducted by Pakistan in May 1998 in response to earlier nuclear
weapons tests by India (May 11 and 28, 1998). Critics cite Pakistan’s nuclear weapons tests
as proof of PRC assistance. Some U.S. observers are concerned about the security of
Pakistan’s nuclear weapons, afraid that they may be vulnerable to theft or purchase by radical
Muslims associated with Osama bin Laden and other terrorist groups.
Iran also has purchased PRC weapons, including small numbers of SA-2 surface-to-air
missiles, F-7 combat aircraft, fast-attack patrol boats, and C-802 anti-ship cruise missiles.
Some Members of Congress have questioned whether Iran’s possession of C-802's violates
the Iran-Iraq Arms Non-Proliferation Act of 1992 (U.S.C. 1701), which requires sanctions
on countries that sell destabilizing weapons to Iran or Iraq. In light of the PRC’s assistance
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to Pakistan’s acquisition of nuclear weapons, congressional critics question PRC promises
to halt nuclear cooperation with Iran.
Satellite Technology Transfer Allegations. On January 9, 2002, the Loral Space
and Communications Company announced it will pay the U.S. government $14 million in
a settlement relating to long-standing allegations it had helped the PRC improve its space
program. The incident first came to light in a New York Times front-page article on April 13,
1998, alleging that a classified May 1997 report by the U.S. Department of Defense had
concluded that scientists from Hughes and Loral Space and Communications, involved in
studying the 1996 crash of a Chinese rocket launching a Loral satellite, had turned over
scientific expertise to China that had significantly improved the reliability of China’s missile
launch abilities. The doomed Loral satellite had been granted an export license as a result
of President Clinton’s waiver of restrictions in P.L. 101-246 that relate to satellite exports
to China. The allegations prompted a special House Select Committee and a number of
Senate committees to investigate and find fault with the Administration’s decision to grant
the satellite export waiver as well as the broader range of U.S. technology transfer policies
with respect to China.
Allegations of Espionage. In the late 1990s, U.S. media sources began reporting
on investigations into four cases of alleged PRC espionage against the United States dating
back to the 1980s. The most serious case involved China’s alleged acquisition of significant
information about the W-88, the most advanced miniaturized U.S. nuclear warhead, as a
result of serious security breaches at the Los Alamos nuclear science lab between 1984 and
1988. In late April 1999, the New York Times reported that a Taiwan-born Chinese
American scientist, Wen Ho Lee, may have downloaded critical nuclear weapons codes,
called “legacy” codes, from a classified computer system at Los Alamos to an unclassified
computer system accessible by anyone with the proper password. Lee was fired and indicted
on 59 counts of mishandling nuclear data. He pled guilty to one count, and the others were
dismissed. On December 12, 2001, a U.S. Justice Department was released alleging that the
FBI’s investigation of the Lee case was “deeply and fundamentally flawed.”
Allegation of Cyber-attack plans. According to an April 25, 2002 article in the
Los Angeles Times, an assessment by the CIA has concluded that the Chinese military is
actively pursuing plans to attack and damage U.S. computer systems. According to the
newspaper, the CIA report alleges that the “intended goal” of these plans is to inflict broad
damage on U.S. and Taiwan computer systems. The Times report quotes a U.S. intelligence
official as saying that Beijing is “aggressively working on [its] cyber-war capability.” A
science and technology official in the Chinese Embassy in Washington denied the allegation.
Economic Issues
China is one of the world’s fastest growing economies, and trade analysts agree that its
potential as a market will increase significantly in the future. Issues involving trade with
China have factored heavily into U.S. policy debates. Between 1991 and 1996, U.S. exports
to China increased by 90.5%, while U.S. imports from China surged by 171.4%. The U.S.
trade deficit with China has surged accordingly, from a $17.8 billion deficit in 1989 to
$100.1 billion in 2000. (See CRS Issue Brief IB91121, China-U.S. Trade Issues.)
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Economic issues have been continuing sources of tension in U.S.-China relations.
China’s past ineffectiveness in protecting U.S. intellectual property, its lack of transparent
trade regulations, and its high tariff rates all have contributed to these debates. At the
October 1997 summit, Presidents Clinton and Jiang agreed to intensify talks on China’s
application to join the World Trade Organization (WTO), in which China has sought
membership 1986, when Beijing began negotiating to join the General Agreement on Tariffs
and Trade (GATT), the WTO’s predecessor. Failure to reach agreement on a WTO accord
during Premier Zhu Rongji’s visit in April 1999 led many to conclude that the opportunity
to resolve trade issues and gain China’s admittance to the WTO had passed for the
foreseeable future. But on September 17, 2001, WTO members voted to accept the PRC for
membership. The PRC formally joined the WTO on December 11, 2001.
Most-Favored-Nation (MFN)/?Normal Trade Relations” (NTR) Status. In a
move that eliminated the annual process for renewing the PRC’s trade status, the 106th
Congress enacted H.R. 4444 (P.L. 106-286), a law that granting the PRC permanent NTR
upon its accession to the World Trade Organization. The PRC formally joined the WTO on
December 11, 2001, and on January 1, 2002, the PRC formally received permanent normal
trade relations status from the United States. The action eliminates the controversial annual
U.S. debate over renewal of the PRC’s normal trade relations (NTR), under which the
President each year by June 3 had to recommend that Congress renew his authority to waive
restrictions on the PRC’s eligibility to receive NTR. (The U.S. designation for MFN was
changed to “Normal Trade Relations” – or NTR – under P.L. 105-206, enacted in 1998.)
China’s Fragile Banking System. The Asian financial crisis of 1997 led some
economists to become increasingly concerned about the ultimate prospects for China’s own
fragile banking and financial systems. According to leading authorities on China’s economy,
official Chinese statistics show that a staggering 27% of the total lending of China’s four
principal banks is judged to be in non-performing loans, primarily to insolvent state
enterprises, while other financial studies put the amount at closer to 44%. By comparison,
in South Korea, which averted early financial collapse during the Asian financial crisis only
with the help of a record $60 billion international bailout, the percentage of non-performing
loans compared to total bank loans was just over 6%. While China’s economic situation has
a number of mitigating factors — primarily a high savings rate (42%), lots of foreign direct
investment, and insulations against currency speculators — a financial crisis similar to South
Korea’s in an economy the size of China’s could have a significant global impact.
Sovereignty Issues: Taiwan, Tibet, Hong Kong
Taiwan. Taiwan remains the most sensitive and complex issue in Sino-U.S. relations.
Beijing has not foresworn the use of force should Taiwan declare independence from China,
and Chinese officials repeatedly block Taiwan’s efforts to gain greater international
recognition. At the same time, officials in Taiwan are maneuvering for more international
stature and for independent access to multilateral institutions. Since 1978, when the United
States had to break relations with Taiwan in order to normalize relations with Beijing, U.S.
policy toward Taiwan has been shaped by the three U.S.-China communiques and the Taiwan
Relations Act (P.L. 96-8). (See CRS Issue Brief IB98034, Taiwan: Recent Developments
and U.S. Policy Choices.)
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The “Three Noes”. During his summit visit to China in June 1998, President Clinton
made a controversial statement about Taiwan that some interpreted as being a change in U.S.
policy. In response, both the House and Senate in the 105th Congress passed resolutions
(H.Con.Res. 301 and S.Con.Res. 107) reaffirming U.S. policy toward Taiwan. President
Clinton’s statement was made in response to a question during a roundtable discussion in
Shanghai on June 30, 1998. According to a White House transcript, the President said:
I had a chance to reiterate our Taiwan policy, which is that we don’t support
independence for Taiwan, or two China’s, or one Taiwan-one China. And we don’t
believe that Taiwan should be a member in any organization for which statehood is a
requirement. So I think we have a consistent policy.
Taiwan’s Presidential Election, 2000. On March 18, 2000, Taiwan voters went
to the polls for only the second time to elect a national president. In a stunning upset for the
ruling Nationalist Party, voters elected Chen Shui-bian, a member of the Democratic
Progressive Party (DPP), a pro-independence party that Beijing finds highly objectionable.
Chen has tried to maintain a balance between the more radical, pro-independence advocates
in his party while trying to avoid antagonizing Beijing on the cross-strait issue.
Taiwan’s December 2001 Legislative Elections. In elections on December 1,
2001, Taiwan’s Nationalist Party lost its legislative majority for the first time in 50 years,
dropping from 123 seats to 68. This leaves the Democratic Progressive Party with the largest
bloc in the legislature, at 87 seats. As a result, current DPP President Chen Shui-bian may
gain more legislative support for his policy agenda, which until now has largely been blocked
by the Nationalist-controlled body. Since the DPP is associated with views promoting
independence from China, the election has implications for U.S.-Taiwan-China relations.
(See CRS Report RS21093, Taiwan’s December 2001 Election Results.)
Taiwan-China Dialogue. Official talks between China and Taiwan, always
problematic, last occurred in October 1998, when Koo Chen-fu, Chairman of Taiwan’s
Straits Exchange Foundation (SEF) and Wang Daohan, president of China’s Association for
Relations Across the Taiwan Straits (ARATS), held meetings in Shanghai. At that meeting,
the two agreed to resume regular discussions and arrange a reciprocal visit to Taiwan by Mr.
Wang. Progress toward further talks halted, however, when Taiwan’s then-president, Lee
Teng-hui, gave a radio interview in July 1999, stating that future cross-strait talks, scheduled
to resume in October 1999, should be conducted on a “special state-to-state basis.” Beijing
protested this statement vehemently as a radical departure from Taiwan’s former embrace
of a “one China” policy. The pro-independence DPP party, now in power, has backed away
from its earlier embrace of independence for Taiwan. For instance, early in January 2001,
President Chen announced that he would establish direct links between China and Taiwan’s
outlying islands of Matsu and Quemoy – a small but significant step in the direction of
further contacts. Still, prospects for renewed Taiwan-PRC talks soon appear slight.
Tibet. As a matter of policy, the U.S. government recognizes Tibet as part of China
and has always done so, although some dispute the historical consistency of this U.S.
position. Since normalization of relations with the PRC in 1979, both Republican and
Democratic U.S. Administrations have sought to minimize areas of potential tension with
Beijing on sensitive topics, such as on the question of Tibet’s political status.
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But the Dalai Lama, Tibet’s exiled spiritual leader, has long had strong supporters in
the U.S. Congress, and these Members have continued to pressure the White House to
protect Tibetan culture and give Tibet greater status in U.S. law despite Beijing’s objections.
Because of this congressional pressure, Presidents George Bush (Sr.) Bill Clinton, and
George W. Bush each met with the Dalai Lama in the United States — meetings that were
deliberately kept low-key and informal, but which nevertheless offended Chinese leaders.
Congress in recent years attempted to insert language in Foreign Relations Authorizations
bills to create a Special Envoy for Tibet, with ambassadorial rank, to promote good relations
between the Dalai Lama and Beijing and to handle negotiations with China on the Dalai
Lama’s behalf. U.S. Administration officials opposed the sovereignty implications of a
“Special Envoy” provision, and a compromise of sorts was reached on October 31, 1997,
when a State Department press statement reported that Secretary of State Albright had
designated a Special Coordinator for Tibetan issues within the State Department. The current
Special Coordinator is Paula Dobriansky, Under Secretary of State for Global Affairs.
Hong Kong. On July 1, 1997, Hong Kong reverted from British back to Chinese
sovereignty in a remarkably smooth transition. The former British colony is now known as
the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region (SAR) of the People’s Republic of China.
On May 24, 1998, elections for the first official LegCo of the SAR were held under
agreements adopted on September 28, 1997, by the provisional legislature. Elections for the
second LegCo were held on September 10, 2000. When they were put forward, the new
election laws were criticized in the United States for being excessively complicated and for
dismantling key portions of the electoral reforms put into place in 1995 by Hong Kong’s last
British Governor, Chris Patten. Still, these election laws, used in both the May 1998 and
September 2000 elections, adhered to the major electoral requirements set forward in Sino-
British agreements on Hong Kong. For the 2000 elections, this meant that 24 LegCo
members were directly elected by popular vote; 30 were elected by select peer groups, or
“functional constituencies;” and 6 were chosen by a special Election Committee.
U.S. policy toward Hong Kong is spelled out in the Hong Kong Policy Act (P.L. 102-
383), enacted in 1992. Among other things, the Act declares Congress’ support for the
holding of free and fair elections for Hong Kong’s legislature. (See CRS Report RL30895,
Hong Kong’s Ongoing Transition: Implications of Chinese Sovereignty in 2001.)
U.S. Policy Approaches
Since 1989, the U.S. policy community has generally sorted itself out into three basic
camps over Sino-U.S. policy. First is a moderate, “engaged,” and less confrontational
posture toward the PRC. Some proponents of this approach perceive fundamental
weaknesses in the PRC, and they urge moderation fearing that to do otherwise could promote
divisions in and a possible breakup of the PRC, with potentially disastrous policy
consequences for U.S. interests. Others are impressed with China’s growing economic and
national strength and the opportunities this provides for the United States and for American
business. They promote closer U.S. engagement with the PRC as the most appropriate way
to guide the newly emerging power into channels of international activity compatible with
American interests.
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Underlying this approach, for some, is a belief that trends in China are moving
inexorably in the “right” direction. That is, the PRC is becoming increasingly interdependent
economically with its neighbors and the developed countries of the West and therefore will
be increasingly unlikely to take disruptive action that would upset these advantageous
international economic relationships. They contrast this behavior favorably with that of
disruptive states such as Iraq or Afghanistan – those who are not part of the international
system and who may support the kind of global terrorism that struck the United States on
September 11, 2001. Some also believe that greater wealth in the PRC will push Chinese
society in directions that will develop a materially better-off, more educated, and
cosmopolitan populace that will, over time, press its government for greater political
pluralism and democracy. Therefore, according to this view, U.S. policy should seek to work
more closely with the PRC in order to encourage these positive long-term trends.
A second approach is more cautious, encouraging U.S. leaders to be less
accommodating. Rather than trying to persuade Beijing of the advantages of international
cooperation, these critics say, the United States should keep military forces as a
counterweight to rising PRC power in Asia; remain firm in dealing with economic, arms
proliferation, and other disputes with China; and work closely with traditional U.S. allies and
friends in the region to deal with any suspected assertiveness or disruption from Beijing.
Proponents of this policy stress that Beijing officials still view the world as a
state-centered, competitive environment where power is respected and interdependence
counts for little. PRC leaders are seen as determined to use whatever means is at their
disposal to increase their nation’s wealth and power. They suggest that PRC leaders may be
biding their time and conforming to many international norms as a strategy, until China
builds its economic strength and can take more unilateral actions. Once it succeeds with
economic modernization, the argument goes, Beijing will be less likely to curb its narrow
nationalistic or other ambitions because of international constraints or sensitivities.
A third approach is based on the premise that the political system in the PRC needs to
change before the United States has any real hope of reaching a constructive relationship
with the PRC. According to these proponents, Beijing’s communist leaders are inherently
incapable of long-term positive ties with the United States. Rather, Beijing seeks to erode
U.S. power and arm U.S. enemies in the region. Despite the statements of support for the
U.S. anti-terrorism campaign, according to this view, the PRC’s repeated violations of its
non-proliferation commitments have actually contributed to strengthening and arming
nations that harbor global terrorists. U.S. policy should focus on mechanisms to change the
PRC from within while maintaining a vigilant posture to deal with disruptive PRC foreign
policy actions in Asian and world affairs.
At the moment, it is unclear what the long-term effect will be on Sino-U.S. relations as
a consequence of the September 11 terrorist attacks. Combating global terrorism could serve
as a new framework on which to build Sino-U.S. cooperation, filling the void left when the
Soviet Union collapsed and strategic cooperation ceased to be a viable basis for the
relationship. The devastating possibilities of global terrorism could alter the recent trend in
which some policymakers in each country have viewed the other as a principal threat. The
benefits of Sino-U.S. cooperation on anti-terrorism initiatives could help mute more hardline,
anti-American elements in the PRC, and could change the focus of Congress toward broader
anti-terrorism measures and away from measures targeting the PRC. Cooperation on anti-
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terrorism could also give the United States greater leverage with issues involving the PRC’s
reported transfer of nuclear, missile, and/or chemical weapons technology to countries
thought to support terrorism, like Iraq, North Korea, Libya, and Syria.
Cooperating on an anti-terrorism campaign, however, brings other complications to the
relationship, particularly if the PRC links its cooperation with other policy objectives of its
own. One problem for U.S. policymakers, for example, is that Beijing commonly makes no
distinction between terrorists who perform violent acts and “separatists” – the PRC’s term
for advocates of Uighur, Tibetan, and Taiwan independence from or greater autonomy within
China, even when those advocates are entirely peaceful. PRC efforts to seek tacit U.S.
support for these policies in exchange for anti-terrorism cooperation would exacerbate
internal U.S. policy differences on the PRC and complicate U.S. policies toward Taiwan and
the Tibetan community-in-exile. Moreover, U.S. resolve to build an international coalition
to fight terrorism brings its own complications. The PRC may balk at support for a U.S.-led
military action if Japan lends active support, as promised by Prime Minister Junichiro
Koizumi on September 19, 2001. U.S. policymakers also face pressure by the PRC and other
regional actors who believe that the U.S. decision to build a theater missile defense system
(TMD) could be destabilizing to an already uneasy region.
LEGISLATION
P.L. 107-10 (H.R. 428)
Legislation authorizing the President to initiate a plan to endorse and obtain observer
status for Taiwan at the annual week-long summit of the World Health Assembly in May
2001 in Geneva, Switzerland. Introduced on February 6, 2001, and referred to the House
Committee on International Relations, which marked it up on March 28, 2001. The House
passed the bill on April 24, 2001, by a vote of 407-0. The Senate passed the bill by
unanimous consent, with an amendment, on May 9, 2001. The House agreed to the Senate
amendment on May 15, 2001, by a vote of 415-0, and the measure was cleared for the
President’s signature. It became P.L. 107-10 on May 28, 2001.
H.R. 1779/S. 852 (Lantos/Feinstein)
The Tibetan Policy Act of 2001. Introduced in the Senate and House on May 9, 2001,
the bills reaffirm the view that Tibet is an illegally occupied country, establish semi-annual
reporting requirements on the status of Chinese negotiations with the Dalai Lama, and
establishes certain U.S. policies with respect to international lending to projects in Tibet.
The bill was referred to the House Committee on International Relations.
H.R. 1646/S. 1401/S. 1803 (Hyde/Biden/Biden)
The House version of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of FY2002/2003, H.R.
1646, contains a number of China provisions. The more substantive deal with U.S. policy
and practices toward Tibet and Taiwan. New Tibet-related provisions also include: opening
a U.S. consular office in Lhasa; Tibetan language training for U.S. foreign service officers;
expansion of the responsibilities of the Congressional-Executive Commission on the
People’s Republic of China (CECPRC) to include monitoring and reporting on the status of
dialogue between the Chinese government and the Dalai Lama; support in international
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organizations for economic development on the Tibetan Plateau; $500,000 in each of fiscal
years 2002 and 2003 for exchange programs between the United States and the people of
Tibet; and $2 million in each of fiscal years 2002 and 2003 for humanitarian assistance to
Tibetan refugees. These provisions are similar to provisions in The Tibetan Policy Act of
2001 (H.R. 1779 and S. 852, above.) The bill also contains provisions on Taiwan, including
a requirement that the State Department provide quarterly briefings on the status of any U.S.-
Taiwan discussions on weapons sales (S. 1401). H.R. 1646 provides that for the purposes
of U.S. arms sales, Taiwan should be treated as the equivalent of a major non-NATO ally.
It also requires the President to consult with Congress on various sales of defense articles and
equipment to Taiwan.
While the original Senate version, S. 1401, contained substantially similar provisions
to the House-passed bill, on May 1, 2002, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee was
discharged from further consideration of the measure. The same day, the full Senate struck
the language of H.R. 1646 and, by unanimous consent, passed as an amendment the text of
S. 1803, the Security Assistance Act of 2001, which had been introduced by Senator Biden
on December 11, 2001, and which the Senate had passed by unanimous consent on
December 20, 2001 (S.Rept. 107-122.)
CHRONOLOGY
05/08/02 — Chinese police entered the compound of the Japanese consulate in Shenyang
and forcibly removed North Korean refugees, bringing strong protests from
the Japanese government that the action violated the Vienna Convention.
04/30/02 — Chinese Vice-Premier Hu Jintao began his first official visit to the United
States.
03/08/02 —
Falun Gong practitioners cut into the cable TV network in the northeast city
of Changchun, enabling them btirgly to broadcast pro-Falun Gong programs.
03/04/02 — The U.S. State Department issued its annual report on human rights
violations, saying that China’s human rights record “remained poor.”
02/21/02 —
On February 21-22, 2002, President Bush visited China, Japan, and South
Korea. The visit resulted in no new agreements, were any anticipated.
01/14/02 —
The Wall St. Journal reported that the United States was investigating the
Bank of China’s U.S. activities.
01/01/02 —
China received permanent normal trade relations from the United States.
12/11/01 —
The PRC formally joined the World Trade Organization, thus gaining
permanent normal trade relations (PNTR) status from the United States, as
enacted in P.L. 106-246.
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09/11/01 —
Terrorists hijacked four U.S. commercial airliners and crashed them into the
World Trade Center, the Pentagon, and in rural Pennsylvania. Senior PRC
officials expressed their sympathy, condolences, and qualified support.
08/23/01 —
U.S.-China missile talks began in Beijing on allegations that the PRC had
violated its non-proliferation pledges.
07/13/01 —
Beijing was awarded the right to host the 2008 Olympic Games.
06/04/01 — Defense Secretary Rumsfeld told journalists that the United States was
resuming military contacts with the PRC, suspended since the EP-3 incident.
04/24/01 —
President Bush authorized the sale of defense articles and services to Taiwan,
including diesel-powered submarines, anti-submarine aircraft, and destroyers.
04/18/01 —
The U.N. Commission on Human Rights voted 23-17 for a PRC “no action”
motion on a U.S. resolution condemning China’s human rights practices.
04/12/01 —
China released 24 American EP-3 crew members held since April 1, 2001.
04/01/01 —
A PRC F8 fighter collided with a U.S. Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane over
the South China Sea. The EP-3 made an emergency landing on Hainan island.
02/28/01 —
China ratified, with qualifications, the International Covenant on Economic,
Social, and Cultural Rights, a U.N. agreement it signed on October 27, 1997.

01/29/01 —
The U.S. Trade and Development Agency (TDA) announced it was reopening
its grant assistance program in China, suspended since 1989, based on a
presidential “national interest” waiver on January 13, 2001.
03/08/00 —
The Administration made public an unclassified version of an annual report
mandated by P.L. 105-107, on Chinese espionage in the United States.
12/16/99 —
U.S. and PRC negotiators reached agreement on compensation for damages
in the accidental NATO bombing of the PRC Embassy in Belgrade.
07/22/99 —
China outlawed the Falun Gong spiritual sect in China.
05/08/99 —
NATO forces mistakenly bombed the Chinese Embassy in Belgrade.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Issue Brief IB91121. China-U.S. Trade Issues.
CRS Issue Brief IB98034. Taiwan: Recent Developments and U.S. Policy Choices.
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CRS Report RS21093. Taiwan’s December 2001 Election Results.
CRS Report RL31183. China’s Maritime Territorial Claims: Implications for U.S. Interests.
CRS Report RL30990. Political Succession and Leadership Issues in China: Implications
for U.S. Policy.
CRS Terrorism Briefing Book, [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebter1.shtml].
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