Order Code IB92109
Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict
Updated May 16, 2002
Carol Migdalovitz
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
History
Warfare
Peace Process
A Cease-fire Took Effect on May 12, 1994
Armenian Perspective
Azerbaijani Perspective
Roles and Views of Others
Iran
Turkey
Russia/CIS
U.S. Policy
Executive Branch
Congress
Public
LEGISLATION

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Armenia-Azerbaijan Conflict
SUMMARY
A clash between the principles of
Armenia and Karabakh, peacekeepers, and,
territorial integrity and self-determination is
most of all, Karabakh’s status. In December
occurring in the Caucasus, creating the longest
1996, an OSCE Chairman’s statement, sup-
interethnic dispute in the former Soviet Union.
ported by all members except Armenia, re-
Armenians of the Nagorno Karabakh region,
ferred to Azeri territorial integrity as a basis
part of Azerbaijan since 1923, seek
for a settlement. Armenian President Ter
independence. Armenians comprised the
Petrosyan’s acceptance of May 1997 Minsk
majority in Karabakh and have a different
Group proposals led to his downfall in Febru-
culture, religion, and language than Azeris.
ary 1998.
Azerbaijan seeks to preserve its national integ-
rity. The dispute has been characterized by
In November 1998, the Minsk Group’s
violence, mutual expulsion of rival nationals,
new proposal took Armenian views more into
charges and countercharges. After the Decem-
account. Armenia accepted it, but Azerbaijan
ber 1991 demise of the Soviet Union and
rejected it. Armenian President Kocharian and
subsequent dispersal of sophisticated Soviet
Azerbaijan President Aliyev have met directly
weaponry, the conflict worsened. Thousands
many times since July 1999. They assessed
of deaths and 1.4 million refugees resulted.
their talks positively but did not report prog-
ress. The October 1999 assassinations of
In May 1992, Armenians forcibly gained
government officials in Armenia and resulting
control over Karabakh and appeared to attack
instability delayed settlement efforts tempo-
the Nakhichevan Autonomous Republic, an
rarily. The two presidents met with the Minsk
Azeri enclave separated from Azerbaijan by
Group co-chairs in Key West, Florida, April
Armenian territory. Fear of possible action by
3-6, 2001. Additional talks set for Geneva in
Turkey, Russia, and others led to demands for
June were postponed indefinitely. In March
action by the Conference on Security and
2002, the two presidents named personal
Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) and the United
representatives to meet with the Minsk Group
Nations. All neighboring nations remain
co-chairs.
involved or concerned.
The U.S. State Department attempts to be
Since 1992, the CSCE/OSCE Minsk
neutral in part because the United States is a
Group has worked for a settlement. In 1993,
Minsk Group co-chair and mediator. Con-
fighting escalated on Azeri territory near
gress has tended to favor Armenia. It passed
Karabakh and a new government in Baku
P.L. 102-511, October 24, 1992, Sec. 907, a
could not reverse a trend of military defeats.
ban on direct U.S. aid to Azerbaijan to pres-
After Armenian territorial conquests, the
sure Baku to lift its blockades of Armenia and
CSCE proposed “urgent measures” and the
Karabakh. Subsequent legislation modified
U.N. Security Council endorsed them – to no
the ban but retained it. P.L. 107-115, January
avail. Russia produced a cease-fire in May
10, 2002, the foreign operations appropria-
1994 that has held despite violations. Intracta-
tions bill for 2002, grants the President author-
ble issues include Armenian withdrawal from
ity to waive 907 for the first time. The Presi-
Azeri territory, the Lachin corridor between
dent did so on January 25.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On May 10, the co-chairs of the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe
(OSCE) Minsk Group, which is seeking to resolve the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, briefed
an Iranian envoy in Paris on their activities. The meeting was pursuant to an April 2001
offer. The State Department said that, as a neighboring state to both Armenia and
Azerbaijan, Iran has legitimate interest in being informed about the peace process.
From May 13-15, in a major format change, the Minsk Group co-chairs held talks in
Prague, Czech Republic with presidential personal envoys, Tatul Markaryan of Armenia and
Araz Azimov of Azerbaijan. Participants characterized their discussions as “useful,” but
no progress was reported.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
The conflict between the Armenian desire for self-determination for Nagorno Karabakh
and Azerbaijan’s insistence on its territorial integrity was violent between 1988 and 1994.
Thousands of deaths and approximately 250,000 Armenian and 1.1 million Azeri refugees
resulted. To stop the bloodshed and contain the conflict, other nations and international
organizations advocated peaceful settlement.
History
The history of the Karabakh region before the Russian period is the subject of
conflicting nationalist interpretations. In 1805, Russia captured the territory, and, in 1828,
the Tsar created an Armenian province excluding Karabakh. The Bolshevik Revolution of
1917 provoked ethnic violence. Armenia and Azerbaijan both claimed Karabakh when they
became independent in 1918. The Soviets established dominion over the two republics in
1920; each then expelled many rival nationals. Karabakh was ceded briefly to Armenia.
According to Armenians, in July 1921, the Transcaucasia politburo voted to join Karabakh
to Armenia. Stalin disagreed, he said, to advance peace between Armenians and Muslims
and acknowledge Karabakh’s economic tie to Azerbaijan, and reportedly to please Turkey.
In 1923, the region became the Nagorno Karabakh Autonomous Oblast, part of Azerbaijan
with a degree of self-rule. The 1936 Soviet Constitution continued the designation.
In 1985, Soviet President Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost or openness unleashed long-
suppressed hostility between Armenia and Azerbaijan. In 1987, Armenians in Karabakh
petitioned the Soviet government to transfer the region to Armenia. Azeris who claimed they
were evicted from Karabakh demonstrated in early 1988; several were killed. Azeris in
Karabakh boycotted local elections and referenda. In February 1988, Karabakh called on the
Armenian and Azerbaijani Supreme Soviets (parliaments) to approve the transfer. Anti-
Armenian violence erupted in Azeri cities. Before the conflict, about 140,000 Armenians
and 48,000 Azeris inhabited Karabakh. Armenians have since fled or were driven from
Azerbaijan and Azeris fled or were driven from Armenia and Karabakh, as well as from
Azeri regions around Karabakh.
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Karabakh seceded from Azerbaijan on July 12, 1988. Azerbaijan declared the act illegal
according to the Soviet Union’s Constitution, which stated that the borders of a republic
could not be changed without its consent. Moscow imposed martial law on some areas in
September and deployed Interior Ministry troops in November and army troops in May 1989.
On December 1, 1989, the Armenian Supreme Soviet declared Karabakh a part of Armenia.
The Azerbaijan Popular Front (PF) began a rail blockade of Armenia and Karabakh,
restricting food and fuel deliveries. Anti-Armenian violence occurred in Baku and Sumgait
in January 1990. Many Azeris died or were wounded in the ensuing Soviet army occupation
of Baku. The Soviet army began to disarm militias and joined in deporting Armenians from
Azerbaijan and Karabakh in spring 1991. The August 1991 Moscow coup attempt ended the
ambiguous Soviet role, but also ended hope of an imposed settlement. In September,
Moscow declared that it would no longer support Azerbaijani military action in Karabakh.
Azerbaijan nullified Karabakh’s autonomous status and declared direct rule on November
26, 1991. On December 10, 1991, a Karabakh referendum chose independence. The
Nagorno Karabakh Republic officially declared independence on January 6, 1992, but it has
not been recognized by any country, including Armenia.
Warfare
The breakdown of the Soviet army led to the nationalization, sale, and/or theft of arms
from its installations and soldiers, enabling Armenians to obtain weapons. The December
1991 demise of the Soviet Union and the withdrawal of Soviet troops from Karabakh
(completed in March 1992) further endowed Karabakh forces with arms and prompted an
early 1992 offensive. On February 26, 1992, Armenians overran Khojaly, the second largest
Azeri town in Karabakh. On March 6, Azeri public outrage over Khojaly led to the ouster
of the Azeri President. Turmoil in Baku provided opportunities for Armenians, who took
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Shusha, the last Azeri town in Karabakh on May 9. Armenians then secured Lachin to form
a corridor joining Armenia and Karabakh. The fall of Shusha provoked a political crisis in
Baku in which the government changed twice in 24 hours. During this melee, Armenians
appeared to launch an offensive against Nakhichevan in which 30,000 people were displaced.
International attention focused on the conflict. Turkey and Iran denounced Armenian
“aggression” and the U.S. State Department issued a strong statement. NATO, the European
Community, and the Conference for Security and Cooperation in Europe (CSCE) declared
that violations of territorial integrity and use of force were not acceptable.
Azerbaijan began an offensive to reclaim Karabakh on June 12, 1992. On July 20,
Armenians began a counteroffensive. By August 8-9, Azeris captured Artsvashen, a pocket
of sovereign Armenia within Azerbaijan and attempted to recapture Lachin and Shusha.
Many Azeri villages surrendered to an Armenian offensive in northern Karabakh in February
1993. The conflict escalated in March-April as Armenians seized Kelbajar and a swath of
territory, displacing thousands of Azeris, and then attacked Fizuli and areas south of
Karabakh. Armenians claimed that they had responded to an Azeri build-up. A U.S. official
observed that the Kelbajar attack could not have been defensive as the site threatened no
nearby Armenian areas. On April 6, the U.N. Secretary General said that heavy weaponry
used indicated more than Karabakh self-defense forces involvement, implying Armenian
army participation. Armenia’s Defense Minister admitted that his forces had fired on Azeri
positions in Kelbajar.
As another Azeri president was deposed, Karabakh Armenians launched an offensive
in the east on June 12, seizing Mardakert on June 27, and taking Aghdam on July 23 after
a long siege. The U.S. State Department “strongly condemned” the Aghdam attack, which
“cannot be justified on the grounds of legitimate self-defense.” In August, Armenians took
Fizuli and a region near the Iranian border, and moved south to seize Jebrail after Azeris fled
in the face of assaults. Armenians threatened Kubatli, which was abandoned, Zangelan, and
Goradiz. Iran denounced Armenian aggression, demanded withdrawal from all Azeri
territory, and declared that it could not remain indifferent. Turkey issued warnings,
reinforced its border, and placed troops on alert. Russia’s Foreign Ministry demanded that
military action cease, noting that it was unjustified because Azeris were no longer a threat
to Armenian forces. Iran set up camps for 100,000 refugees in Azerbaijan and reinforced the
border with army troops and Revolutionary Guards. Karabakh Armenians razed Goradiz and
attacked Zangelan on October 24. They reached the Aras River and took a 40 km. stretch of
the Iranian-Azeri frontier. An Armenian ultimatum provoked 30,000 Azeris to flee to Iran,
but most were returned to camps in Azerbaijan. Karabakh took Zangelan on October 29.
In November, new Azeri President Haidar Aliyev criticized his army, sacked
commanders, and called on veterans to man the army. In December, Azeris chased Karabakh
forces from mountains around Aghdam and from heights in the Mardakert region, but were
unable to reclaim Fizuli. In early 1994, Azeris regained Goradiz, an area along the Iran
border, and positions north of Kelbajar, but suffered heavy losses. Battles occurred at many
sites. Baku blamed Armenians for a March 19 bombing of a Baku subway station. In April,
Armenians reported Azeri air raids on Stepanakert and along the border, and heated action
created 50,000 new Azeri refugees. A cease-fire went into effect in May 1994.
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Peace Process
The CSCE called for a peace conference in Belarus with “Minsk Group” countries. It
has not been held. On April 30, 1993, U.N. Security Council Resolution 822 demanded an
immediate halt to hostilities, withdrawal of occupying forces from Kelbajar and other areas,
and resumption of CSCE negotiations. On May 3, the United States, Russia, and Turkey
proposed an implementation plan, but the parties did not agree. On July 29, Security Council
Resolution 853 condemned the Armenian seizure of Aghdam and other areas, demanded an
immediate cease-fire and unconditional withdrawal of occupying forces, and appealed for
negotiations within the CSCE framework and directly. It urged Armenia to influence
Karabakh to comply. On August 18, the Security Council demanded cessation of hostilities
and withdrawal of occupying forces from Fizuli, Kelbajar, and Aghdam. It called on
Armenia to use its “unique influence” to achieve that end and to ensure that forces involved
were not provided with the means to extend their campaign. On October 14, Security
Council Resolution 874 called for a permanent cease-fire, a withdrawal timetable, and
removal of communication and transportation obstacles.
The Minsk Group did not endorse
talks sponsored by Russia or Russia’s
offer of troops to separate the
combatants. In November 1993, it
asserted that a CSCE force sent to a
conflict in a CSCE area would have to
be supervised by the CSCE and open to
participation by all CSCE members. It
called for the unconditional withdrawal
from territory seized since October 21.
Azerbaijan rejected the measures for
failing to mention Lachin and Shusha
and Karabakh Azeris’ rights, and
rejected Russian troops. Armenia and
Karabakh accepted a Russian troop offer
and the CSCE timetable. On November
12, Security Council Resolution 884
expressed alarm at escalating hostilities,
the Armenian occupation of Zangelan
and Goradiz, demanded unilateral
withdrawal, and called on Armenia to
use its influence to achieve Karabakh
Nagorno-Karabakh
compliance and to ensure that forces
were not provided with means to extend their military campaign. A November 30-December
1 CSCE meeting referred to but did not name Russia, and agreed to ensure that a third-party
military role is consistent with CSCE objectives. Any action would have to respect
sovereignty, have consent of the parties, and be multinational.
On February 18, 1994, the Russian Defense Minister presented a plan for a cease-fire,
disengagement and withdrawal, including a leading Russian military role. He said that a
summit of Russian, Armenian, and Azeri Presidents would decide Karabakh’s status, with
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Karabakh participating. The Azeri parliament rejected a revised version of the plan. The
Russian Speaker arranged a cease-fire, called the Bishkek Protocol.
A Cease-fire Took Effect on May 12, 1994. Some argued that a May 16 revised
Russian plan was designed to thwart the CSCE. The Minsk Group chairman suggested a
unified CSCE/Russian approach, and in July, the Group directed him to clarify the CSCE
role in Russia’s plan. Azerbaijan insisted that no country provide more than 30% of the
peacekeepers. A revised Russian plan called for a 3,000-6,000 man force, 60% to 90%
Russian, with 254 CSCE observers to be deployed after a political agreement. Tension
increased between CSCE and Russian mediators. On September 15-18, CSCE Senior
Officials objected to Russia’s unilateral actions and its pressure for Russian/Commonwealth
of Independent States (CIS) peacekeepers, and called for “harmonization.” Russia demanded
a CSCE mandate for negotiations, with it having prime responsibility. The December 6
OSCE Budapest Summit directed the chairman to name a Minsk co-chair to realize full
coordination. A Russian diplomat was named Minsk co-chair on January 6, 1995.
In December 1995, OSCE foreign ministers demanded more active steps, such as direct
contacts. Azeri and Armenian Presidential Advisors met several times. Aliyev announced
that he was prepared to grant Karabakh a “special autonomous political status” in exchange
for Armenian recognition of Azerbaijan sovereignty and return of Lachin and added that
Azerbaijan will never agree to Karabakh independence. Karabakh leader Kocharian said that
he was not interested in autonomy because Karabakh is, de facto, independent.
Armenian-Azeri differences prevented the OSCE from referring to the conflict in a final
summit communique on December 3, 1996. Instead, a Chairman’s statement, called the
Lisbon principles, agreed to by all members, including the United States, but excepting
Armenia, referred to Azeri territorial integrity, legal status for Nagorno Karabakh with the
highest degree of self-government within Azerbaijan, and security guarantees for the
Karabakh population as the basis for a settlement. Armenia charged that reference to Azeri
territorial integrity predetermined the outcome of negotiations, and questioned any security
guarantees provided by Azerbaijan. During a break in talks, it was revealed that the Russian
military had illegally supplied arms worth more than $1 billion to Armenia and Karabakh.
On February 11, 1997, France and the United States became joint co-chairs with Russia
of the Minsk Group. On May 30-31, the co-chairs proposed that, sequentially, the
Armenians cede all Azerbaijani territory outside of Karabakh and Shusha within Karabakh,
OSCE peacekeepers be stationed on these lands and be responsible for security of returning
Azeri refugees and the Karabakh population; Baku allow Karabakh Armenians to retain
armed forces, their constitution, and flag; international mediators guarantee control of and
inventory military equipment in Karabakh; Karabakh Armenians’ weapons be included in
Armenia’s Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty quota; international forces guarantee the
functioning of the Lachin corridor; Baku and Stepanakert hold talks on Karabakh status;
when talks are completed, Karabakh forces be reduced to a militarized police force.
On September 27, Armenia’s President Ter-Petrosyan said that the plan was realistic.
He argued that the international community would not accept Karabakh independence or its
unification with Armenia and that political status discussions had to be postponed because
neither Karabakh nor Azerbaijan was ready. Armenia’s Prime Minister and Defense
Minister openly disagreed with Ter-Petrosyan. The debate within Armenia ended with Ter-
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Petrosyan’s resignation on February 3, 1998. (See CRS Report 98-430, Armenia:
Unexpected Change in Government.)
Robert Kocharian became Acting President of Armenia on February 4, 1998. During
his presidential campaign, he outlined negotiating principles: (1) the right of the Karabakh
people to self-determination, (2) guarantees of Karabakh’s security, widely interpreted to
include a role for Armenia, (3) a permanent geographic link between Armenia and Karabakh,
i.e., Armenian retention of the Lachin corridor. Kocharian was inaugurated as President on
April 9. On April 28, he met Aliyev and agreed to continue the cease-fire and negotiations.
On May 7, Foreign Minister Oskanian, called on the OSCE to take a “package approach”
to negotiations, whereby Karabakh forces would withdraw from some Azeri territories
simultaneously with decisions on Karabakh’s political status.
In November 1998, representatives of the Minsk Group co-chairs proposed a “common
state.” 1 The Russian negotiator said that the term had been used in talks between Moldavia
and Transdneister and between Georgia and Abhazia. In those instances, breakaway regions
interpreted the idea as entitling them to statehood, while Moldavia and Georgia interpreted
it as grounds for a solution based on regional autonomy. In both cases, talks stalemated.
Azerbaijan rejected the proposal, while Armenia and Nagorno Karabakh accepted it as a
basis for talks.
Kocharian and Aliyev met five times in 1999, amid positive atmospherics. Their
defense ministers met twice to strengthen the cease-fire. In the fall, Armenian and Azeri
officials met each other and U.S. officials often, suggesting possible movement toward a
settlement. On October 1, Vice President Gore met Armenian Prime Minister Vazgen
Sarkisyan and advised him to sign a framework agreement with Azerbaijan because it would
open prospects for economic cooperation.
But political turmoil enveloped Armenia and Azerbaijan. The Azeri Foreign Minister
was dismissed or resigned on October 26; several presidential advisors had resigned
previously, reportedly because they disagreed with compromises on Karabakh; and the
political opposition stepped up its criticism of the President. On October 27, gunmen killed
Armenia’s Prime Minister, Speaker, and six others, and took about 40 hostages. The
gunmen’s stated motive was not related to the peace talks. On November 5, Oskanian noted
that the assassinations had produced a “slowdown in the resolution of the conflict.”
Kocharian and Aliyev met with the OSCE Chairman and with the foreign ministers of
Russia, France, and the United States at the OSCE summit on November 18. On November
19, the two leaders met separately with President Clinton; they did not negotiate directly.
1 In February 2001, Armenian media disclosed the common state peace proposal in detail and
government officials confirmed its authenticity. Armenia had largely accepted the proposal, while
Azerbaijan had rejected it. Under the plan, Karabakh would form a loose confederation with
Azerbaijan, have internationally recognized status as a republic, a constitution, “national guard” and
police, and power to veto Azerbaijani laws that contradict Karabakh’s. Azeri refugees would have
the right of return to Shusha in Karabakh and Armenian refugees to Shaumyan. Armenia’s armed
forces would return home. Those of Karabakh would withdraw from areas around Karabakh, which
would become an unpopulated, demilitarized buffer zone controlled by a multi-national OSCE
peacekeeping force. The United States, France, and Russia would guarantee the settlement.
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On January 24, 2000, Kocharian and Aliyev met during a CIS summit in Moscow. Then
Acting President Putin said that Russia is prepared to guarantee a settlement and that it
stands for the “absolute recognition of territorial integrity,” while Kocharian emphasized his
“separate position on that issue.” The two Caucasus leaders met on January 28 in Davos,
Switzerland, where they also met individually with Secretary of State Albright.
In a February 12 interview, Kocharian said that it was preferable for the parties
involved, including Karabakh, to find a solution themselves. If they exhausted the
possibilities, then they would ask the Minsk Group to step up its efforts to settle the conflict.
On May 18, Aliyev declared, “the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict must be settled in a
peaceful way on the basis of mutual concessions ...” and not by force.
While in the region from July 1 to 5, 2000, the Minsk Group co-chairs appeared to focus
more on regional economic integration for confidence-building than on the peace process per
se. Aliyev opposes economic ties while Armenians occupy Azeri territory.
Kocharian and Aliyev met in August, September, and November. The Minsk Group
co-chairs visited the region in December and, in addition to Baku, Yerevan, and Stepanakert,
traveled to regions of Turkey bordering Armenia and to the Nakhichevan region of
Azerbaijan. At their urging, the defense ministers of Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed on
additional measures to prevent breaches of the cease-fire and to maintain permanent contact.
Kocharian and Aliyev met in Paris on January 26, 2001. French President Chirac met with
them and suggested general principles for solving the conflict.
The Azerbaijan parliament engaged in an unprecedented debate on the Karabakh issue
on February 23 and 24, 2001. In it, Aliyev observed, “Nagorno Karabakh and Armenia are
one country. They have been one country for 11 years.” He said that all proposals want to
solve the problem by giving Karabakh status close to independence or complete
independence, but Azerbaijan cannot agree. Aliyev insisted that the meetings between the
presidents should proceed parallel with, not replace, the activities of the Minsk Group. The
two presidents met with President Chirac again in Paris, March 4-5.
On April 3, Secretary of State Powell, as co-chair of the Minsk Group, opened peace
talks in Key West, Florida, saying that the Bush Administration was “prepared to accept any
agreement acceptable” to Kocharian and Aliyev. Aliyev chided the co-chairs for their
“passivity.” Kocharian said that he had come to “work constructively to seek a settlement.”
The talks were held mostly in a proximity format, with mediators meeting with the presidents
separately. Details were kept confidential. News reports and officials of Armenia and
Azerbaijan say that the parties discussed creating a corridor from Azerbaijan across Armenia
to the Azeri province of Nakhichevan in exchange for allowing the Lachin corridor to
continue to link Armenia and Karabakh. (See map in History, above.) The talks concluded
on April 6. On April 9, President Bush met the two presidents separately to encourage them
to overcome differences. Secretary Powell subsequently characterized the negotiation as
difficult, and said “if it is successful at the end, will be difficult for the two presidents to
present to their people.”
Minsk Group negotiators postponed talks that were to be held in Geneva in June
indefinitely after concluding that the two presidents had not prepared their publics
sufficiently for compromises needed for a settlement. On July 11, while in the region, the
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mediators said, “We are increasingly concerned that bellicose rhetoric ... only exacerbates
tensions and increases the risk of renewed conflict.” They declared “calls for a military
solution are irresponsible.” (The calls emanated from Baku.) On August 1, Aliyev met
Kocharian at a CIS summit in Russia, and they agreed to continue direct contacts. The
Minsk Group co-chairs visited the region from November 3 to 8, bringing ideas concerning
details of what had been agreed upon in Paris and Key West. Kocharian met Aliyev in the
presence of Putin at a CIS summit in Moscow on November 30, but the two Caucasian
leaders did not meet directly.
On February 13, 2002, Kocharian declared, “Nagorno Karabakh has not been and will
never be a constituent part of Azerbaijan.... The upheavals that took place left an indelible
mark in the mentality of the residents of Nagorno Karabakh, and this fact cannot be ignored.”
On February 21, Defense Minister Sarkisyan explained that Kocharian did not mean that
Armenia was not ready to resolve the conflict through compromises. He said that Yerevan
would be ready to give Azerbaijan some territories in return for its recognition of the
independence of Nagorno Karabakh but that “peace must have guarantees and guarantors.”
After a Minsk Group co-chairs’ visit March 8-10, Aliyev and Kocharian decided that,
because they had difficulty meeting very often, they would appoint personal representatives
to meet every 2 or 3 months with the co-chairs. The first meeting will be in Prague in May.
The presidents also will continue to meet with each other.
Armenian Perspective
Armenians and Azeris have sharply contrasting views of the conflict. Former President
Levon Ter-Petrosyan appeared more willing to consider Karabakh remaining in Azerbaijan
than members of his own government, Armenian refugees from Azerbaijan and Karabakh,
the Karabakh government, or diaspora Armenians, including many Americans. In March
1997, Ter-Petrosyan appointed Robert Kocharian, “president” of the self-declared Republic
of Nagorno Karabakh (not recognized by any state, including Armenia), as his Prime
Minister, largely for domestic reasons.
The Committee, which aimed to incorporate Karabakh in Armenia, had been the
nucleus of Armenia’s nationalist movement and opposition to Soviet domination. Many
Armenians declare unity of Armenia and Karabakh ineluctable. They assume that Azerbaijan
intends to oust them from Karabakh, the way they believe it did from Nakhichevan in the
1920s. Armenia condemns Azerbaijan’s “aggression,” “pogroms” against and expulsions
of Armenians. A December 1, 1989, resolution Armenian parliamentary resolution declaring
Karabakh a part of Armenia has not been rescinded. Armenia has not recognized Karabakh’s
independence because recognition might constitute a declaration of war on Azerbaijan with
the potential to involve Turkey. On July 8, 1991, Armenia’s parliament passed a decree
rejecting any international document stipulating that the NKR is part of Azerbaijan.
Armenia claims that Armenians in Karabakh engaged in self-defense. The Karabakh
Chief of Staff said that about 10% of his force were volunteers; other sources estimate that
there were 7,000 to 8,000 volunteers. Armenia’s Defense Minister affirmed a coordinating
role. Armenia’s Defense Minister visited Karabakh in March 1993 to review the troops; his
successor had been head of the Karabakh self- defense force. A Helsinki Watch report found
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evidence, especially after December 1993, pointing to involvement of Armenia’s military.
Karabakh officials participate in sessions of Armenia’s Security Council and Armenia’s
Foreign Ministry assists their foreign travels and contacts. Armenia furnishes military
advisers, arms (including an anti-aircraft system), food and supplies, and funds to Karabakh.
The Armenian diaspora provides funds and materiel. Armenia and Karabakh say that
Karabakh was given some weapons from former Soviet army forces who were stationed in
the region and captured more weapons from Azeris.
Armenia was frustrated by the CSCE because it appeared to put a higher premium on
territorial integrity than on self-determination. Kocharian asserted that Azerbaijan will never
rule Karabakh again and that only de jure recognition of Karabakh independence would
provide a rapid settlement. Gukasyan, elected “President” of the NKR in September 1997,
vowed to strive for recognition, while proposing that Karabakh and Azerbaijan become equal
partners in a quasi-federated state, with Karabakh retaining limited sovereignty and
delegating functions to Baku. Kocharian won the March 30, 1998, election to become
President of Armenia. The question of his eligibility to run (raised because he is from
Karabakh) was resolved when the Central Election Commission noted, among other factors,
that Armenia’s 1989 resolution reunifying Armenia and Karabakh was still in force and
ignored Karabakh’s 1992 declaration of independence. Kocharian has participated in the
peace talks directly. As a breakthrough appeared possible in 2001, however, it became clear
that there was little support among Armenians for a compromise. For example, on April
27, 2001, all parties and groups in the Armenian parliament endorsed a statement of
principles for a settlement: the unification of Karabakh with Armenia or an international
confirmation of its independent status; the participation of Karabakh authorities in drafting
the final settlement; a sufficient common border of Armenia and Karabakh that would
guarantee the security of Karabakh; and the fixing of a border with Azerbaijan.
Armenians trace U.S. policy to a need to have Turkey to counterbalance Iran. Many
Armenians do not distinguish between Azeris and Turks and fear encirclement by
Turkish/Islamic expansionism. They view the fight for Karabakh as one to preserve their
unique Armenian Christian culture, as revenge for the 1915-18 genocide at the hands of the
Turks, and for anti-Armenian violence in Azerbaijan. Armenia has close relations with
Russia, views it as a benign influence, and would welcome Russian peacekeepers.
Azerbaijani Perspective
Azeris view Armenians in Karabakh as latecomers who have been the majority for
“only” 150 years, or since Russia encouraged them to immigrate from Iran. Azeris consider
Soviet-imposed Karabakh autonomy an insult to their territorial integrity. They contend that
Azerbaijan had given up its claim to Zangezur (land bridge between Armenia and Iran) in
the 1920s, balancing Armenia’s loss of Karabakh. The present conflict is evidence of
Armenia’s “bad faith” and territorial ambitions on Nakhichevan, Karabakh, and other Azeri
lands. Azeris disdain what, in their view, is Armenia’s attempt to create an ethnically pure
domain. They discount Armenian claims of cultural and religious repression, noting that
their Turkic culture also had been fettered by Russification and communism.
Azerbaijan contends that the dispute is a domestic one which Armenia, by interfering
in Azerbaijan’s internal affairs, deepened into a war between two independent states. Baku
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is under domestic pressure to preserve its patrimony. It resisted the idea of international
peacekeepers, who might lessen its sovereignty over Karabakh, until military defeats
mounted. Azerbaijan said that it was willing to negotiate with Karabakh Armenians, but not
the “illegitimate” NKR government, which it views as a ploy to enable Armenia to elude
accusations that it seeks to annex the region. Azeri officials said that Armenia’s recognition
of the NKR would be a declaration of war. Azerbaijan views its blockade of Armenia and
Karabakh as a suspension of economic ties prompted by aggression.
Former President Elchibey suspected that Russia was using the conflict to manipulate
Azerbaijan, viewed Russia as favoring and aiding Armenia, and blamed it for his
predecessor’s weak defense of Karabakh. Azerbaijan’s kinship with 15 million Azeris in
Iran complicates ties between those two governments. Elchibey referred to all Azeris as one
people, pledged to broaden ties with them, and called for the 15 million Iranian Azeris to
have autonomy, leading Teheran to suspect his intentions. Azerbaijan and Iran tension also
is religious. Both are predominantly Shi’a, but Azerbaijan favors secular government.
Azerbaijan’s repeated setbacks in the war and economic collapse produced a mutiny led
by a sacked military commander, a bungled PF government attempt to suppress the rebellion
in June 1993, and a political crisis. Within weeks, former Communist Party general secretary
and head of the Nakhichevan autonomous province Haidar Aliyev replaced Elchibey. Aliyev
supported the CSCE peace plan, brought Azerbaijan into the CIS, and warmed ties to
Moscow somewhat, by giving it a stake in Azeri oil while trying to avoid a Russian troop
presence. He would give Karabakh a status guaranteeing more rights, not independence.
Roles and Views of Others
Iran. Iran mediated in 1992, seeking to end the conflict and prevent U.S. or Turkish
intervention. It wanted to contain instability to its north, enhance its regional power, appear
constructive to attract Western creditors and investors, and find new markets for its goods.
Iran views the Armenian-Azeri conflict partly through the prism of relations with Russia.
Iran traditionally dealt cautiously with Russia and competed with it for regional influence.
Russia now supplies arms to Iran, and Teheran wants to keep this link. Iran is a not a
member of the OSCE and, therefore, is excluded from the Minsk process.
About 200,000 Armenian citizens are in Iran, and some hold official positions. Iran has
good relations with Armenia; they signed an economic cooperation agreement and a
friendship pact in 1992. Trade has flourished. They now plan to build a gas pipeline from
Iran to Armenia in 2001. Armenia has resolved some transport problems caused by the Azeri/
Turkish blockades through Iran (and Georgia). Iran’s relations with Azerbaijan are more
complex. In December 1989, Azeris on both sides of the international border tore down
barriers to assure free passage. Although his predecessor did so, Aliyev does not question
existing borders. Some Iranian clerics advocate support for Muslim Azerbaijan, but some
officials fear Azerbaijan might incite Iranian Azeris (who are more numerous than Azeris of
Azerbaijan). After Armenian attacks on Nakhichevan in May 1992, Iranian Azeris
demonstrated and Iran accused Armenia of aggression. Iran viewed the Armenian assault
on Fizuli, 18 km. from Iran, in August 1993 as a security threat that could produce a refugee
influx. In June 1999, the Azeri National Security Ministry accused Iran of spying for
Armenia and of training Islamist fighters to undermine the Azeri government. Iran harbors
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the leader of a 1995 troop rebellion in Azerbaijan and refuses to extradite him. Iran agreed
in 1994 to allow Azerbaijan to open a consulate in northern Iran in exchange for an Iranian
one in Nakhichevan, but it has never followed through, while Azerbaijan has done so.
Iran and Azerbaijan also have had differing views on Russia’s role in their region, on
Azerbaijan’s relations with the United States, NATO, Turkey, and Israel, on division of the
Caspian Sea, and on proposed oil pipeline routes. In late 1999, bilateral relations appeared
to warm as Iran reiterated its support for Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity and invited Aliyev
to visit. In July 2001, however, an Iranian warship threatened an Azeri research vessel under
contract to British Petroleum operating in the Caspian. The unusual incident was related to
the two countries’ conflicting claims to the Caspian. Despite this still-unresolved incident,
Aliyev was planning to make an official visit to Iran in May 2002 .
Turkey. Turkey has historic, linguistic, and cultural ties to Azeris and was first to
recognize Azerbaijan, on November 9, 1991, prior to the December 31 end of the Soviet
Union. Recognition resulted as much from Turkey’s domestic politics, where Turkic pride
was ascendant, as from foreign policy considerations, and was accompanied by economic,
commercial, and cultural ties.
Turkey’s relations with Armenia are more complex. Landlocked Armenia needs links
with Turkey. Turkey set Armenia’s explicit abandonment of territorial designs on Turkey
(i.e., on Kars and Ardahan provinces that Lenin ceded to Turkey in 1921), of allegations of
Turkey’s culpability for the “genocide” of Armenians, and a Karabakh solution as
preconditions to diplomatic ties. Ter-Petrosyan signed the Turkey-inspired Black Sea
Economic Cooperation accord in June 1992, and called for bilateral relations without
preconditions. A modus vivendi with Armenia would provide a bridge for Turkey to Central
Asia and a cheaper route for an oil pipeline from Azerbaijan to the Mediterranean. In
November 1992, Turkey agreed to act as a conduit for international aid to Armenia. After
Kelbajar fell in April 1993, Turkey suspended aid and foreign transit through its airspace and
territory. In 1995, Armenia said that it would exclude the genocide from the bilateral agenda,
if Turkey excluded Karabakh. That April, Turkey announced the reopening of an air corridor
to Armenia and flights resumed in October. In March 1996, Prime Minister Yilmaz said that
if Armenia and Azerbaijan simply agree on principles, then borders could be opened before
a formal accord; he later added that Armenia first must recognize Azerbaijan’s territorial
integrity. The Armenian government elected in March 1998 insists that recognition of the
genocide be a subject of bilateral talks with Ankara. Because Turkey denies that there was
“genocide,” the warming of relations is unlikely.
Turkey tries to balance friendship with Azerbaijan and relations with the United States,
Europe, or Russia, which sympathize with Armenia. The government does not support its
own or Russia’s military intervention. Turkish border troops were placed in a state of
vigilance and reinforced in April 1993. With each Azeri setback, Turkish politicians called
for increased aid and expressed outrage. They condemned Armenian aggression, and called
on Armenia to abandon the pretext that it was not a party to the dispute. In 1993, Turkish
media reported that about 160 Turkish current and retired military officers were aiding the
Azeri army and that Turkey had extended a $30 million credit for Turkish arms to
Azerbaijan. Turkey participates in the Minsk process, emphasizing the principle of territorial
integrity, and calls for multinational peacekeepers under OSCE supervision.
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Russia/CIS. Russia supports the Minsk process and U.N. resolutions. Initially,
because it was preoccupied domestically, feared being accused of imperialism, sought
influence with all Caucasians, and was wary of complicating relations with Turkey and Iran,
Russia was non-interventionist. Russian mothers of soldiers obtained their withdrawal from
Karabakh after casualties in February 1992. Moscow shares Yerevan’s distrust of Turkey
and aided the Armenian war effort. Russian troops defend Armenia’s borders with Iran and
Turkey. On June 9, 1994, Armenia agreed to Russian military bases in Armenia. Yet,
withdrawing Russian forces provided arms to Azeri mutineers, easing Aliyev’s rise.
Russia, Armenia, Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, and Tajikistan signed a
Treaty on Collective Security on May 15, 1992, providing that, in case of an act of
aggression against any state, all others will give necessary, including military, assistance.
Russia condemned the May 1992 Armenian seizure of Lachin and attack on Nakhichevan,
saying, “Nobody can count on Russia’s support for such illegal action.” That August,
Ter-Petrosyan declared that aggression had been committed against Armenia and invoked
the Treaty. Moscow responded that the Treaty does not envision quick intervention and that
it only planned consultations. The CIS said that the Treaty could be implemented only by
a decision of all members, knowing that Central Asians would not act against Azerbaijan.
Russia has been torn between security and other ties to Armenia and interest in Azeri
oil. Russia condemned Karabakh’s 1993 conquests, concerned that regional unrest could
affect Russia’s nationalistic northern Caucasus. Its mediation intensified that fall as it
competed with the OSCE. Russia has sought to return troops to Azerbaijan’s borders with
Iran and Turkey and to reclaim military sites.
On July 4, 1997, Azerbaijan and Russia signed a Treaty of Friendship and Cooperation
which condemns “separatism” and promotes conflict settlements according to the principle
of territorial integrity. On August 29, 1997, Armenia and Russia signed a Treaty of
Friendship which describes the parties’ coincidence of military and strategic views. Both
characterized it as a strategic partnership and Ter-Petrosyan said that it provides “elements
of an alliance.” The Russian-Azerbaijan treaty has no comparable provisions, and Azeri
officials expressed concern about Russia’s ability to act as an impartial mediator. Russia’s
Foreign Minister stressed that the Treaty “is not directed against Azerbaijan” and “will never
be invoked to the advantage of those opposed to Azerbaijan’s territorial integrity.”
In 1999, the Azeri Ministry of Foreign Affairs expressed concern about Russia’s
stationing of S-300 surface-to-air missiles and 18 to 20 MiG-29 fighter aircraft at its bases
in Armenia, completing the integration of Russian and Armenian air defense systems. Russia
reportedly also shipped Scud-B ballistic missiles and associated launchers to Armenia. The
Commander in Chief of the Russian Air Force said that the S-300s are needed to protect
Armenia and the CIS from Turkey and NATO. Later, the Russian Defense Minister
reiterated that Russian-Armenian military cooperation is not directed against a third party.
By November 11, 2000, Russia had moved 76 armored personnel carriers from a base in
Georgia to its base in Armenia. Armenia and Russia asserted that the hardware would not
exceed Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty quotas. Azerbaijan said that it was not
convinced that the Russian hardware cannot be transferred to Armenia and generally
regarded Russian-Armenian military cooperation as a threat to its security and to the stability
of the Caucasus.
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Azerbaijan did not renew its membership in the CIS Collective Security Treaty because,
it said, it could not participate in a security system in which one country (Russia) provides
military support to another (Armenia) at war with a third (Azerbaijan). Azerbaijan joined
Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan, and Moldova in the GUUAM security and economic forum.
Azeri officials suggested that Azerbaijan might host U.S., Turkish, or NATO military bases,
disquieting Russia. The U.S. Ambassador in Baku restated U.S. policy of not giving military
assistance to a country in conflict with another, while the NATO Secretary-General said, “we
are not thinking of deploying troops in the region.”
On January 9-10, 2001, Russian President Vladimir Putin paid an official visit to
Azerbaijan in an effort to improve relations. Russia appeared to cooperate constructively in
2001 with the United States and France as a Minsk Group co-chair to improve settlement
prospects for Karabakh. Aliyev paid an unusually friendly return state visit to Moscow on
January 24-26, 2002, when he agreed to lease the Gabala radar station to Russia for 10 years
and allow Russia to station 1,500 troops there, thereby fulfilling one of Russia’s long-term
goals. The two governments also agreed to work on drawing a median line in the Caspian
Sea between Russia and Azerbaijan. These developments indicate a warming of previously
tense bilateral and may have implications for the peace process.
U.S. Policy
Executive Branch. U.S. goals in the former Soviet Union include stability,
democracy, market economies, and peace among states. Caucasus conflicts threaten these
aims. The United States recognized Armenia (December 1991) before Azerbaijan (February
1992), because, that Bush Administration said, Armenia had adhered to Helsinki principles
earlier. Some discerned a pro-Armenia tilt and feared it would drive Azerbaijan toward Iran.
But Azerbaijan’s relations with Iran have been complex and the State Department acted
neutrally. The State Department preferred OSCE peacemaking to the U.N. because Iran is
not an OSCE member, the U.N. is overextended and costly, and an OSCE framework might
control Russia.
The Clinton Administration sought not to offend Armenian-Americans, while ensuring
good relations with Azerbaijan to ease access for the U.S. energy industry there. As
Armenians took ground and seized Karabakh, the State Department was mildly critical. State
Department officials oppose restrictions on aid to Azerbaijan which they say hamper U.S.
attempts to be an honest broker. (See Congress, below.)
The State Department was sensitive to Russian interests. Officials said that, with any
peace plan, there will be no U.S. military presence. At a 1994 summit with President Yeltsin,
President Clinton said that “the United States does not object to Russia taking an active role
in the resolution of Nagorno Karabakh .... Russia is doing things in pursuit of stability,
without being inconsistent with sovereignty and territorial integrity and independence, that
were appropriate.”
The Clinton Administration also was concerned about spillover effects of the Karabakh
conflict on U.S.-Turkish relations. In February 1996 and May 1997, President Clinton
determined that it was in the national interest to waive the Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act
(below) and allow economic aid to Turkey. He said that U.S. relations with Turkey, a NATO
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ally, are important and multidimensional and should not be impeded by a single issue. On
August 23, 2001, President Bush named career foreign service officer and current U.S.
Ambassador to Moldova Rudolf Vilem Perina to be special U.S. negotiator for the Nagorno
Karabakh conflict and co-chair of the “Minsk Group” effective November 1.
Congress. Congress tends to favor Armenia and uses foreign aid legislation to
pressure Azerbaijan and, formerly, Turkey to change their policies. P.L. 102-511, October
24, 1992, FREEDOM Support Act, Section 907, effective January 1993, bans aid to
Azerbaijan until it ceases blockades and use of force against Armenia and Karabakh.
Concern over the plight of Azeri refugees and the increasing importance of U.S. investment
in the Azeri energy sector led Congress incrementally to soften the ban. P.L. 103-306, August
23, 1994, called for the President to report on the impact of 907 on private voluntary
organizations’ (PVO) efforts to provide assistance. Members indicated that sanctions on
direct U.S. aid were not intended to impede PVO humanitarian aid.
P.L. 104-107, February 12, 1996, allowed U.S. humanitarian aid to Azerbaijan if the
President determined that non-governmental aid was inadequate. That law also included the
Humanitarian Aid Corridor Act, banning U.S. economic aid to countries that prohibit or
restrict the transfer or delivery of U.S. humanitarian assistance (i.e., Turkey for its
“blockade” of Armenia, actually closure of the land border) unless the President determines
that it is in the national interest. P.L. 104-208, September 30, 1996, said that PVOs may use
Azeri government facilities to deliver humanitarian aid. It restated the Humanitarian Aid
Corridor Act, made it permanent, and required the President to notify committees of his
intent to waive it and of the effective date of and reason for the waiver. (FY1998 was the last
year in which Turkey received foreign aid, thereby depriving the act of its intended target.)
P.L. 105-118, November 26, 1997, appropriated $12.5 million in aid for victims of the
Karabakh conflict for the first and only time. It explicitly exempted humanitarian aid to
refugees and displaced persons from 907 to facilitate assistance to Karabakh residents and
to persons displaced from regions of Karabakh. It funded reconstruction and remedial
activities relating to the consequences of conflicts in the Caucasus, including Karabakh, but
did not exempt reconstruction aid for Azerbaijan from 907. Exceptions to 907 were made
to support democracy in Azerbaijan and for the Trade and Development Agency (TDA) and
Foreign Commercial Service, both of which assist U.S. businesses. The U.S. Agency for
International Development programmed $15 million in FY1998 for health, shelter, and
economic aid for victims of the Karabakh conflict: $8.3 million for programs in Karabakh
and $6.7 million for programs near Karabakh.
P.L. 105-277, October 21, 1998, provided 17.5% of $228 million for reconstruction and
activities related to the peaceful resolution of Southern Caucasus conflicts, including
Karabakh, but did not earmark funds for Karabakh. Exceptions to 907 were made for
activities to support democracy in Azerbaijan, the TDA, Foreign Commercial Service,
Overseas Private Investment Corporation (OPIC), EX-IM Bank, and humanitarian assistance.
P.L. 106-113, November 29, 1999, repeated that, of funds made available for the Southern
Caucasus, 17.5% should be used to further the peaceful resolution of conflicts, including
Karabakh. The conference report, H.Rept. 106-339, contained no earmarks for Karabakh.
It said that 15% of the funds made available for the Southern Caucasus were to be used for
confidence-building measures (CBMs) and activities in furtherance of peaceful resolution
of conflicts, including Karabakh. Section 907 was retained with the same exceptions as in
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P.L. 105-277. P.L. 106-429, November 6, 2000, retained the 907 ban with exceptions as in
the two prior years and earmarked 15% of aid for the Southern Caucasus for CBMs.
Section 907 remains an active issue. Proponents of lifting the ban say it has not
produced an end to the Karabakh conflict, which was the cause, not result, of the Azeri
blockade, and punishes victims of the conflict. Opponents argue that lifting the ban would
reward a corrupt, authoritarian regime with a poor human rights record. Moreover, Armenia
maintains that lifting the ban, while Azerbaijan continues its blockade, could be wrongly
interpreted by Baku and negatively affect the process of settlement. Members have
attempted to work around the ban on aid to Azerbaijan, in addition to the exceptions to it that
Congress has passed. Senator Brownback introduced the Silk Road Strategy Act (S. 579)
on March 10, 1999, to authorize assistance to support the economic and political
independence of South Caucasian and Central Asian countries. It would have allowed the
President to waive 907 if he determined that assistance is “important to the national interests
of the United States.” On June 30, 1999, the Senator offered the Act as an amendment to the
Foreign Operational Appropriations Act, but Senator McConnell offered a secondary
amendment deleting the waiver authority and it passed.
Taking a different approach, P.L. 106-280, October 6, 2000, the Security Assistance Act
of 2000, Section 516, authorized security assistance for the GUUAM countries, a group of
five former Soviet republics, including Azerbaijan. The conference report (H.Rept. 106-868,
September 21, 2000) noted that Azerbaijan was subject to 907 but that assistance could be
provided to it for anti-terrorism, non-proliferation, and export control projects. After the
September 11, 2001 terrorist attacks on the United States, Senator Brownback again tried to
repeal or amend 907 to enable Azerbaijan to aid the war on terrorism. (See Legislation,
below.) On October 15, Secretary of State Powell agreed, writing to congressional leaders
requesting support for a national security interest waiver, noting that 907 constrains U.S.
ability to support Azerbaijan’s assistance in the war against terrorism.
Public. About one million Armenian-Americans are a well-organized and well-funded
constituency. Groups include the Armenian National Committee of America (ANCA),
related to the Armenian Revolutionary Federation (ARF/Dashnaks), which demands that any
settlement “recognize Karabakh’s reunification with Armenia or at least Karabakh’s
independence.” It also wants some of the adjacent conquered territories, which it calls
“liberated,” to be part of Karabakh. Dashnak members are in the Armenian cabinet and
parliament and support Kocharian. ANCA critiques congressional performance on Armenian
issues. The Armenian Assembly of America (AAA) agrees with Kocharian’s settlement
principles and supports Armenia but does not participate in Armenia’s domestic politics.
LEGISLATION
P.L. 107-115, H.R. 2506
Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for 2002. The House bill, H.R. 2506, continued
the Section 907 ban on aid to Azerbaijan, with the same exceptions as in 3 prior years. (See
U.S. Policy/Congress, above.) Of funds made available for the Southern Caucasus, 15% may
be used for confidence-building measures (CBMs) and other activities in furtherance of the
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peaceful resolution of regional conflicts, including Nagorno Karabakh. Introduced and
reported as an original measure on July 17, 2001. In H.Rept. 107-142, the Committee
directed that the remainder of the $20 million in humanitarian aid initially provided in the
FY1998 Act be immediately released for obligation. It reiterated that assistance to any
Caucasus country should be proportional to its willingness to cooperate with the Minsk
Group. The Committee supported CBMs. Passed in the House on July 24 by a vote of 381-
46. Received in the Senate, referred to the Committee on Appropriations, ordered to be
reported as an amendment in the nature of a substitute on July 26. S.Rept. 107-58,
September 4, 2001, also retained 907 with the same exceptions as in past years but allowed
the President to waive 907 under specific conditions through December 31, 2002. The
Senate passed the bill on October 24.
Section 599 of the conference report, H.Rept. 107-345, provides that Section 907, as
in prior years, shall not apply to activities to support democracy or nonproliferation
assistance; assistance provided by the TDA; activities of the Foreign Commercial Service;
assistance provided by the OPIC; financing provided by the Ex-Im Bank; or humanitarian
assistance. For the first time, the President is granted authority to waive Section 907 if it is
necessary to support U.S. efforts to counter terrorism; or to support the operational readiness
of the U.S. armed forces; is important to Azerbaijan’s border security; and will not
undermine or hamper efforts to negotiate a peaceful settlement between Armenia and
Azerbaijan or be used for offense purposes against Armenia. The waiver authority may be
exercised through December 31, 2002, but the President may extend it if he determines and
certifies that the need continues. Within 60 days of a waiver, the President shall report on
the nature and quantity of training and assistance provided to Azerbaijan; the status of the
military balance between Azerbaijan and Armenia and the impact of U.S. assistance on that
balance; and the status of negotiations for a peaceful settlement and the impact of U.S.
assistance on those negotiations. Conference report passed House on December 19 by a vote
of 357 to 66; passed Senate on December 20 by unanimous consent. Signed into law January
10, 2002. On January 25, President Bush waived Section 907.
Effective March 29, the State Department removed Armenia and Azerbaijan from the
U.S. Munitions List of proscribed destinations for defense sales “in our foreign policy and
national security interest.” In FY2002, Azerbaijan will receive $4.4 million in military aid
and Armenia will receive $4.3 million.
S.Amdt. 1631 to S. 1438 (Brownback)
An amendment to the Defense Authorization Act for 2002, to repeal Section 907 of the
FREEDOM Support Act. Introduced on September 24, 2001. The Senate passed S. 1438 on
October 2 without considering the amendment.
S. 1521 (Brownback)
To amend the FREEDOM Support Act to authorize the President to waive Section 907
if he determines that it is in the national security interest. Introduced on October 9.
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