Order Code IB94029
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Chemical Weapons Convention:
Issues for Congress
Updated April 30, 2002
Steven R. Bowman
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

---

CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
CWC Ratification and Implementation
Ratifying Legislation in 105th Congress (S.Res. 75)
Implementing Legislation in the 105th Congress (H.R. 1590, H.R. 2709, S. 610)
U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Agreements
U.S.-Soviet Memorandum of Understanding (Wyoming MOU), September 1989
U.S.-/Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Agreement, June 1990
Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993
CWC Issues for Ratification and Implementation
Universality
Verification
Impact on U.S. Industry
Loss of Proprietary Information (Trade Secrets)
Export Controls
Enforcement/Sanctions
Chemical Weapons and Facilities Destruction
The United States CW Demilitarization Program
Russian CW Destruction Program
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
Selected World Wide Web Sites

---

IB94029
04-30-02
Chemical Weapons Convention:
Issues for Congress
SUMMARY
More than 100 years of international efforts
chemical weapons; 2) statutory authority for
to ban chemical weapons culminated January 13,
record-keeping and reporting requirements
1993, in the signing of the Chemical Weapons
relevant to the CWC; 3) various restrictions on
Convention (CWC). The Convention entered
certain chemicals, depending on their likelihood
into force April 29, 1997. One hundred forty-
of being used to produce chemical weapons; and
five of the 174 signatories have ratified the Con-
4) a protective regime for confidential business
vention. On April 24, 1997, the Senate passed
information gathered from private corporations.
the CWC resolution of ratification (S.Res. 75,
The legislation also provides detailed procedures
105th Congress) by a vote of 74-26. President
to be used for on-site inspections by the OPCW,
Clinton signed the resolution and the United
including limitations on access and search warrant
States became the 75th nation to ratify the Con-
procedures, should they be required. Though
vention. Russia and Iran were the most recent
supporting passage, CWC advocates expressed
nations to have ratified the CWC. The CWC
concerns over several sections of the legislation
bans the development, production, stockpiling,
which were added in Judiciary Committee
and use of chemical weapons by members signa-
mark-up, and intended to work for their revision
tories. It also requires the destruction of all
before final enactment. Of particular concern are
chemical weapons stockpiles and production
provisions that allow the President to block
facilities. The Convention provides the most
challenge inspections and that prohibit the
extensive and intrusive verification regime of any
OPCW from sending chemical samples outside
arms control treaty, extending its coverage to not
the United States for analysis. These provisions
only governmental but also civilian facilities. The
are intended to protect U.S. national security
Convention also requires export controls and
interests and proprietary commercial information.
reporting requirements on chemicals that can be
CWC supporters, however, believe that blocking
used as warfare agents and their precursors. The
a challenge inspection would violate a basic
CWC establishes the Organization for the Prohi-
premise of the convention, and that if other
bition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to over-
nations adopt similar provisions it will weaken the
see the Convention’s implementation. Chemical
convention's effectiveness. The opportunity to
Weapons Convention implementing legislation
address concerns in a House-Senate conference
(P.L. 105-277) provides the statutory authority
did not arise, when S. 610 was incorporated
for domestic compliance with the Convention’s
without amendment as Division I of the FY1999
provisions. It sets criminal and civil penalties for
Omnibus Appropriations Act (H.R. 4328, P.L.
the development, production, acquisition, stock-
105-277). Some suggested that these issues be
piling, transfer, possession, or use of chemical
dealt with new legislation, but none has been
weapons. It also establishes: 1) procedures for
introduced.
seizure, forfeiture, and destruction of contraband
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

---

IB94029
04-30-02

MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The Department of Defense Selected Acquisition Report released in April shows an 80%
increase in the cost estimate for the chemical weapons demilitarization program, from $13.2
billion to $23.7 billion. Factors driving the increase were identified as: 1)revised destruction
rates based upon the experience at Johnston Atoll depot; 2) schedule extensions; 3) new
environmental regulations; 4) worse-than-expected stockpile condition; 5) increased
equipment, labor, and construction costs; and 6) higher emergency preparedness costs.
For FY2003, the Defense Department has requested $1.49 billion for the chemical
demilitarization program: R&D $302 million, Procurement $213 million, Operations &
Maintenance $974 million, and Military Construction $167 million.
The Bush Administration led a successful effort to have Jose Bustani, the Director-
General of the OPCW’s Technical Secretariat, removed from office. Citing “disdain for the
OPCW Executive Committee” and inappropriate administrative and budgetary policies
among other charges, the State Department [http://www.state.gov/t/ac/rls/fs/9120.htm] made
a concerted and sustained effort to gain support over the last six months after Bustani
refused to voluntarily resign. On April 21, the Conference of OPCW State Parties voted 48-
7, with 43 abstentions to support the U.S. position. Consideration of a replacement
Director-General was postponed until June when a recommendation is expected from the
OPCW Executive Committee.
The Bush Administration has informed both Russia and the Congress that it currently
cannot provide the certification of Russia’s commitment to arms control compliance
required to permit continued U.S. aid under the Nunn-Lugar Threat Reduction programs.
Financial assistance for the Russian chemical weapons destruction program is one of these
efforts. The points of concern are further information on earlier Russian development of
new chemical warfare agents, and greater access to current operations at former Russian
biological weapons facilities that are still under military control. It is expected that this will
be a topic for discussion at the upcoming U.S.-Russia Summit. Congress has the option to
waive the presidential arms control certification requirement, if it so chooses.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
CWC Ratification and Implementation
The United States signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in the last days of the Bush
Administration (1/13/93), and the Convention was submitted to the Senate for its advice and
consent in the midst of the 103rd Congress (11/23/93). In the 103rd, 104th, and 105th
Congresses, an extensive series of 13 hearings were held by the Foreign Relations, Armed
Services, Intelligence, and Judiciary Committees, complemented with classified briefings from the
intelligence community. (See For Additional Reading) Under a unanimous consent agreement,
CRS-1

---

IB94029
04-30-02
the CWC ratification resolution was to have been brought to the Senate floor in mid-September
1996. However, uncertain of sufficient votes to ensure passage, it supporters postponed its
consideration.
Ratifying Legislation in 105th Congress (S.Res. 75)
In his 1997 State of the Union address, President Clinton pledged he would make the CWC
a high priority in 1997, pressing for Senate consent early in the 105th Congress. After extensive
negotiations between the White House and key Senators, and within the Senate itself, a unanimous
consent agreement was reached to bring the Chemical Weapons Convention ratification resolution
(S.Res. 75) to the Senate floor on April 23, 1997. The resolution contained 33 conditions, 28 of
which were agreed to by the White House and within the Senate. Under the unanimous consent
agreement, these were not subject to further amendment or motions. Five conditions were not
agreed to, and each was struck by roll-call vote during floor debate, prior to passage of the
resolution. The summary of the conditions below provides only the general intent of each; the
ratification resolution itself should be consulted for a full understanding of the requirements each
condition establishes.
The CWC ratification resolution, including agreed upon conditions:
! Asserts the Senate’s right under the Constitution to add reservations to the
Convention.
! Assures congressional oversight of all funds provided under the CWC.
! Requires Presidential certification that the OPCW has an Inspector-General and
specifies report requirements.
! Requires cost-sharing for R&D expenditures for verification.
! Establishes standards for U.S. intelligence sharing and reports to Congress.
! Requires submission of any CWC amendments to the Senate.
! Requires the President to obtain assurances from Australia Group members that
Article XI is consistent with continued export controls.
! Requires a report on the assurances offered to countries that forswear the use of
nuclear weapons.
! Requires Presidential certification that restrictions on Schedule 1 chemicals do not
adversely affect the chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical industries.
! Requires annual country reports of CW activities, compliance, and intelligence
monitoring.
! Requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure the Armed Forces are effectively
equipped, organized, trained, and exercised for operations in CBW
environments.
! Asserts the primacy of the U.S. Constitution.
! Requires the President to use the full range of his authority to enforce
compliance.
! Requires the United States to reject any Russian effort to make its ratification
contingent on U.S. financial assistance.Requires the United States to limit its CW
defensive assistance under Article X, to countries of concern, to medical
antidotes and treatments.
CRS-2

---

IB94029
04-30-02
! Prescribes U.S. responses to unauthorized release of confidential business
information by the OPCW or other parties.
! States the sense of the Senate that U.S. negotiators should not agree to treaties
that bar reservations.
! Prohibits transfer of inspection samples collected in the United States to
laboratories outside the United States.
! States the Senate finding that chemical weapons terrorism is still a threat.
! States the Senate declaration that the United States should not be denied its vote
in the CWC organization.
! Sense of the Senate that the U.S. On-Site Inspection Agency should provide
assistance to facilities subject to routine inspection under the CWC.
! Limits U.S. assessment for OPCW to $25 million; ties increases to the Consumer
Price Index; provides for certain exceptions, e.g., verification costs. Reaffirms the
Senate’s role in treaty interpretation.
! Reaffirms the Senate’s role regarding arms control treaties.
! Requires Presidential certification that the CWC does not restrict U.S. use of riot
control agents in certain specified circumstances. Requires notification and
consultation when a chemical is added to CWC Schedules.
! Requires the President to explore alternative technologies for the destruction of
the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile. Requires criminal search warrant for
challenge inspections and administrative search warrant for routine inspections,
if not permitted voluntarily.
Implementing Legislation in the 105th Congress (H.R. 1590, H.R.
2709, S. 610)
On May 23, 1997 the Senate unanimously passed S. 610. This legislation, as reported by
the Judiciary Committee, was an amendment in the nature of a substitute for the Administration bill.
CWC supporters with objections to provisions of S. 610 as reported hoped they could be
resolved before final enactment, perhaps in House-Senate conference. (Congressional Record,
May 23, p. S5078). However, S. 610's language was incorporated, without amendment, by the
House International Relations Committee as Title II of the Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act
of 1997 (H.R. 2709), which passed the House by voice vote , Nov. 12, 1997. The Senate
passed H.R. 2709 on May 22, 1998 with no amendment to the CWC-related element of the
legislation. On June 9, 1998 the House concurred with a Senate amendment to the Title I missile
sanctions regime, permitting submission of the legislation to the President, who vetoed the legislation
on June 23. The veto stemmed from the Administration's disapproval of the Iran sanction elements
of the legislation, not the CWC-related elements. In October 1998, the House incorporated S.
610's language, without amendment, into the FY1999 Omnibus Appropriations Act. This passed
the House and Senate, and was signed into law October 20th, 1998 (P.L. 105-277)
The implementing legislation sets criminal and civil penalties for the development, production,
acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, possession, or use of chemical weapons. These penalties would
also apply to anyone who assists, encourages, induces, attempts, or conspires to carry out these
proscribed activities. It also establishes: 1) procedures for seizure, forfeiture, and destruction of
contraband chemical weapons; 2) statutory authority for record-keeping and reporting
CRS-3

---

IB94029
04-30-02
requirements relevant to the CWC; 3) various restrictions on certain chemicals, depending on their
likelihood of being used to produce chemical weapons; and 4) a protective regime for confidential
business information gathered from private corporations. It also provides detailed procedures to
be used for on-site inspections by the OPCW, including limitations on access and search warrant
procedures, should they be required.
The provisions, now enacted into law, which raise concerns from CWC supporters and the
OPCW include:
! Section 213 — sets procedures for U.S. firms to seek compensation from the
U.S. government, should they suffer the loss of proprietary information through
the actions of OPCW employees. Critics, however, maintain that, as worded,
this section does not place a high enough burden of proof on the claimants, and
consequently could lead to excessive and unfounded claims against the
government. Sections 237 — grants the President the right to deny a request for
inspection if it “may cause a threat to U.S. national security interests.” The CWC
contains no provision permitting denial of an inspection, and critics note that doing
so could place the United States in non-compliance. They maintain that even if
never exercised, this section’s existence will encourage other nations to enact
similar exemptions, thereby weakening the CWC verification regime.
! Section 253 — exempts discrete organic chemicals not on the CWC control lists
and incidental chemical by-products or waste-streams from reporting and
inspection requirements. This is intended to ease the potential burdens,
particularly on paper manufacturers, but critics believe the exemption is too
broadly worded and would rule out an effective non-intrusive sampling technique
for inspectors. Sections 212 & 238 prohibit requiring that government
contractors waive any constitutional rights for any purpose related to the CWC.
Some believe that this could hinder the CWC routine inspection regime.
U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Agreements
U.S.-Soviet Memorandum of Understanding (Wyoming MOU), September
1989. In 1989, as the multilateral negotiations slowed, the U.S.-Soviet bilateral talks took on
greater importance and assumed a much higher public profile. On September 23, 1989, the United
States and the Soviet Union signed a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) agreeing
to data declarations on CW stockpiles and trial inspections. U.S. intelligence officials believe that
Russian declarations have been incomplete, particularly in the area of binary chemical weapons and
novel chemical agents. High level consultations continue to try to resolve these discrepancies.
Compliance with this agreement is a factor in the Bush Administration’s decision not to provide
the certification of Russia’s commitment to arms control upon which further Nunn-Lugar Threat
Reduction aid is contingent. The Russian chemical weapons destruction program is a beneficiary
of this aid program.
U.S.-/Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Agreement, June 1990. On
June 1, 1990, the United States and Russia signed an agreement covering the production of
chemical weapons and the destruction of current CW stockpiles. This agreement, as yet not
CRS-4

---

IB94029
04-30-02
implemented, would permit bilateral routine monitoring and challenge inspections of the CW
destruction process conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. Russia has communicated to the Administration that the Bilateral Destruction
Agreement (BDA) described below has “outlived its usefulness”, and should be superseded by the
Chemical Weapons Convention. U.S. officials, however, still support the BDA and are continuing
talks on the issue. Russian cost estimates have concluded that the BDA verification regime would
be more expensive than OPCW monitoring and inspections.
Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention of
1993
More than 100 years of international efforts to ban chemical weapons culminated January 13,
1993, in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The United States was one
of the original signatories of the Convention and has been joined by 173 other nations. The Clinton
Administration submitted the Convention to the Senate on November 23, 1993. The United
States ratified the convention May 25, 1997. The Convention came into force on April 29, 1997,
180 days after the 65th ratification was received. One hundred forty-five nations have ratified the
Convention: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain,
Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei,
Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Canada, Chile, China, Cook Islands, Costa Rica,
Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Ecuador, El
Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Former Republic of
Yugoslavia, Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia,
Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guyana, Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran,
Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Laos, Latvia,
Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius,
Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco, Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nauru,
Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Mauritania, New Zealand, Niger, Norway,
Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal,
Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Santa Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles,
Singapore, Slovak Republic, Slovenia, South Korea, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan,
Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia,
Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United
States, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
The CWC bans the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons
(CW) by its signatories. It also requires the destruction of all chemical weapons and production
facilities. The Convention provides the most extensive and intrusive verification regime of any arms
control treaty, extending its coverage to not only governmental but also civilian facilities. The
verification package includes instrument-monitoring, both routine and random onsite inspections,
and challenge inspections for sites suspected of CW storage or production. The Convention also
requires export controls and reporting requirements on chemicals that can be used as warfare
agents and their precursors.
CRS-5

---

IB94029
04-30-02
Administratively, the Convention establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical
Weapons (OPCW) to oversee the Convention’s implementation. It is a permanent international
organization charged with ensuring compliance with the Convention, and monitoring the chemical
industry worldwide. The OPCW has three components: 1) the Conference of States Parties,
comprising all signatories; 2) the Executive Council, composed of 41 signatories chosen in a
rotation based upon geographic region and significance of commercial chemical production; and
3) the Technical Secretariat, which will conduct day-to-day administration of the Convention.
Each signatory will also designate a National Authority that will be the liaison with the OPCW, and
will administer the implementation of the CWC domestically. On June 25, 1999 President Clinton
issued an Executive Order designating the State Department as the National Authority for the
implementation of the CWC, and establishing an interagency group [http://www.cwc.gov/]
comprising the Secretaries of State, Defense, Commerce, and Energy, and the Attorney-General
to coordinate the implementation.
Declarations required from each state party by the CWC include:
! Location and detailed inventory of all chemical weapons storage sites.
! Location and capacities of all chemical weapons production and research
facilities.
! All transfers of chemical weapons and CW production equipment since 1946.A
detailed plan and schedule for the destruction of chemical weapons and CW
production facilities. Location and activities of any facilities using or producing
controlled chemicals.
Destruction of chemical weapons agents, munitions, and production facilities must be
completed within 10 years of the Convention’s entry into force (1997) or a State Party’s
ratification date, whichever is earlier. In extraordinary circumstances, this deadline can be
extended for up to 5 years, with the approval of two-thirds of the states parties. Russia has applied
for such an extension, and the United States may also need an extension, depending upon the
progress of the CW stockpile demilitarization program.
The Convention establishes three lists (Schedules) of chemical warfare agents and their
precursor chemicals arranged in order of their importance to CW production and range of
legitimate peaceful uses. These chemical Schedules will be updated as needed by the OPCW
Technical Secretariat. Above certain quantitative thresholds, these chemicals’ production, use, or
transfer must be projected and subsequently reported annually to the OPCW. All facilities capable
of producing, or that use scheduled chemicals must be registered. In addition, all facilities that
produce over 30 metric tons of a discrete chemical containing phosphorous, sulphur, or fluorine
must be registered.
The OPCW inspection regimes will vary, depending on the type of facility:
! Declared CW production, storage, or destruction sites: systematic on-site
inspection and continuous instrument monitoring.
! Declared non-CW chemical facilities: routine or random inspections, depending
on the Schedule and amounts of chemicals produced or used.
CRS-6

---

IB94029
04-30-02
! All other facilities: on-site challenge inspections upon request of a state party.
Signatories also agree not to export Schedule 1 chemicals to any non-signatory. As of 2000,
Schedule 2 chemicals may be traded with non-States Parties.. Schedule 3 chemicals may be freely
traded, with end-use certification, until 2002, at which time additional controls will be considered.
CWC Issues for Ratification and Implementation
The CWC raises a variety of issues for congressional consideration. Although the vast
majority of the world’s nations have signed the CWC, some nations suspected of having chemical
weapons have not — Egypt, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria. What effect does this lack of
universality have upon the value of the Convention? The CWC’s verification provisions are
extensive, but they have not stilled the debate over whether they will be effective enough to deter
violations. And, if violations are detected, are enforcement procedures and sanctions sufficiently
stringent? Because the CWC extends its provisions to the civilian sector, the impact of inspections,
reporting requirements, and export controls on commercial enterprise raises concerns unique to
arms control treaties. The destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles, though
congressionally-mandated independently of the CWC, presents technical, environmental, and
financial challenges at home and abroad. Issues deserving attention in consideration of the CWC
and its implementing legislation can be grouped in six general areas: 1) universality; 2) verification;
3) impact on U.S. industry; 4) enforcement; 5) technology transfer; 6) destruction of chemical
weapons; and 7) cost.
Universality
How many nations are willing to ratify the CWC and, more importantly, which nations are
not? As noted, 173 have signed, and 145 have ratified the Convention. Examining the signatory
list, most are heartened to see China, Iran, and Israel — nations believed to have, or be
developing, significant CW capability. However, Israel has not ratified the Convention, and both
Iran and China remain under suspicion with regard to compliance. Some particularly troublesome
nations, such as Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria have not signed. In addition, a number of
middle eastern states, notably Egypt and Jordan, have refused to sign, linking their participation to
the removal of Israel’s suspected nuclear capability.
Indicative of the difficulties that lack of universality brings is the continued concern about
Iraq’s intentions. In an effort to have the United Nations maintain economic sanctions on Iraq, the
United States has shown Security Council members satellite photographic evidence that Iraq has
rebuilt a plant formerly used to produce chemical weapons. U.S. analysts believe that Iraq could
resume CW production almost immediately if monitoring ceased. U.S. officials also provided
evidence that Iraq continues to try to import ballistic missile fuel and guidance system components.
CRS-7

---

IB94029
04-30-02
It is assumed that a resurgence of Iraq’s missile program will see a continuance of its previous
efforts to develop CW warheads.
Critics of the CWC believe that its value is significantly reduced if all nations with the
capability to develop and use chemical weapons are not parties, particularly in a region as volatile
as the Middle East. The rationale is that even one nation having chemical weapons will create an
incentive for its neighbors to follow suit. ” They believe that it is unwise for the United States to
relinquish its chemical weapons capability while other nations retain theirs. They also generally
maintain that the possibility of retaliation in kind, i.e. with chemical weapons, is an important
component of CW deterrence.
CWC supporters, while agreeing to the importance of persuading all CW-capable nations
to join, believe that a small number of hold-outs does not pose a sufficient threat to justify not
ratifying the Convention. They note that in the Persian Gulf War, the United States forswore
retaliation with chemical weapons, even if Iraq used them against coalition forces. This decision
was based on the assessment that the U.S. arsenal was adequate for both limited or massive
retaliation without the use of chemical weapons. CWC supporters further argue that without the
Convention there would be even greater incentive to acquire chemical weapons, and it would be
easier to accomplish. The CWC would provide an international regime of export controls and a
widely accepted international norm, to which all nations — signatories or not — could be held.
Verification
Verification is undoubtedly the thorniest issue. Devising an acceptable verification regime was
the most difficult task for CWC negotiators and will be the most challenging for those implementing
the Convention. The CWC provides for the most intrusive and extensive verification regime of any
arms control agreement to date. The regime, for the first time in arms control, provides for routine
monitoring and inspection not only of military facilities but also of certain civilian chemical facilities
. In addition, challenge inspection provisions expand compliance verification to suspect facilities
of any sort. The Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons will oversee the
Convention’s compliance verification. Two of the most salient verification concerns are its
effectiveness and its impact on the rights and property of the U.S. chemical industry.
The most serious question is whether the OPCW will be able to detect all clandestine
production or stockpiling of chemical weapons. Ironically, the CWC’s supporters and detractors
generally agree: the answer is no. Acknowledging that the verification regime will not be absolute
carries differing significance for the Convention’s critics and advocates. Those who question the
Convention’s value believe that if compliance verification cannot be guaranteed, and undetected
CW possession may be possible, the Convention is not worth the cost and effort. Worse, perhaps,
they are concerned that the Convention would engender a false sense of security. They point out
that in certain circumstances, the selective use of relatively small amounts of chemical weapons
could be significant militarily, particularly against unprotected personnel. Consequently, would-be
violators need not produce or stockpile vast amounts.
Advocates argue that, though CWC may be imperfect, it provides the most intrusive and
extensive verification regime in the history of disarmament and represents a notable improvement
CRS-8

---

IB94029
04-30-02
over current CW non-proliferation regimes. For signatories, this fact could change the cost/benefit
analysis of CW production or stockpiling enough to deter violations. Provision for challenge
inspections creates the likelihood that violations would become public breaches of the international
norm, something not possible without the CWC.
The most difficult challenge would be to detect existing chemical weapons that a nation does
not declare and continues to store clandestinely. Detecting illicit transfers of controlled chemicals
may also prove a challenging task. Covert production of chemical warfare agents and the
subsequent manufacture of chemical munitions are higher-profile activities and consequently more
vulnerable to detection. This assessment assumes that the OPCW and signatories’ national
intelligence resources will seek to uncover Convention violators. The extent of intelligence sharing
will have a significant impact on the CWC’s effectiveness. It can be anticipated that those nations
with highly developed intelligence collection capabilities, the United States particularly, will be
depended upon to cooperate with the OPCW.
Congress may wish to encourage the U.S. intelligence community explicitly to maintain close
liaison with the OPCW. Congress could also require that the intelligence community provide
periodic independent evaluations of the verification regime or that the President certify to Congress
that the regime is performing effectively. This could be made part of the President’s annual report
to Congress on proliferation currently required under the Chemical and Biological Weapons
Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-182) or the State Departments annual
report, Adherence to and Compliance with Arms Control Agreements.
Another factor that will affect the OPCW’s verification capabilities will be the amount and
reliability of its funding by the Convention’s signatories. Without adequate funding to maintain the
technological and personnel resources necessary to monitor the international chemical industry and
government activities, the rigor of the verification regime will undoubtedly suffer. This issue has
been of particular concern the last two years, as the United States and Russia, among others, have
been consistently delinquent in their dues and required reimbursement to the OPCW for inspection
costs. At U.S. insistence, the OPCW Executive Committee has denied budgetary increases to
remove an inspection backlog. The approved OPCW 2002 budget increase is not expected cover
inflation costs.
Concerns over verification have been heightened by press reports that U.S. officials believe
that Russia has withheld information on its chemical weapons research programs. In a data
exchange called for under a 1989 U.S.-Russian agreement, Russia acknowledged no binary
chemical research program. (Binary chemical weapons use two non-lethal chemicals that combine
to form a lethal agent after launching.) The United States worked on developing binary weapons
sporadically from the 1950s, ending the effort in 1992, when the signing of the CWC became
imminent. U.S. intelligence has long believed that Russia was undertaking a similar program. In
1992, a Russian scientist, Vil Mirzayanov, publicly claimed that Russia had developed a binary
agent significantly more effective than current nerve agents. He also asserted that the Russian
military leadership continued the program after President Gorbachev declared Russia’s chemical
weapons development at an end. Concern over this Russian program rekindled with the leaking
of a classified DOD report to the press. Written at the U.S. Ground Intelligence Center, the report
supposedly maintains that the new agent can be manufactured in significant amounts in modified
CRS-9

---

IB94029
04-30-02
pesticide plants from chemicals not covered by the CWC. (Washington Times, February 4, 1997,
p.1) CWC opponents believe this latest information highlights the difficulties of verification and the
lack of Russian trustworthiness. CWC supporters have responded that without the CWC such a
program is legal, but with the CWC and accession to it, it would be illegal and suspect facilities
would be subject to inspection.
The United States, having specifically requested an accounting of the Russian binary program
and received inadequate responses, is continuing discussions to resolve these discrepancies.
Although the current data exchange is independent of the CWC, Russian recalcitrance on this issue
could adversely affect support for the Convention. If Russia is unwilling to be forthright in what is
generally judged to be an “open secret,” it raises the question of how seriously it considers the
prohibitions of the CWC and consequently places greater emphasis on effective verification. The
Bush Administration has highlighted this point by its decision not to provide the certification of
Russia’s commitment to arms control upon which further Nunn-Lugar Threat Reduction aid is
contingent, unless Russia provides further information on these programs,
Impact on U.S. Industry
Many U.S. enterprises may not meet the threshold requirements for reporting, others may
have minimal obligations (e.g. one-page reports) because of the nature of the chemicals they
handle. For the most part, the heaviest burden (annual reports on production/consumption/transfer
and at least one initial inspection) will fall upon enterprises that deal with substantial amounts of
chemicals that could be very useful in the production of CW warfare agents.
Implementing legislation for the CWC, addressed some issues that are novel for arms control
agreements. The Convention grants the OPCW inspection rights (routine, random, and challenge)
over purely civilian, privately owned facilities. These inspection rights are harmonized with U.S.
constitutional protections against unreasonable search and seizure through procedures for obtaining
administrative or criminal search warrants if necessary.
Loss of Proprietary Information (Trade Secrets). Potential loss of trade secrets
is of great concern to private industry. And the question arises whether forced or incidental
disclosure of such information during a CWC inspection would constitute a “seizure” under the
Fourth Amendment. Implementing legislation addressed this issue by restricting information
collection, providing non-disclosure protection, and penalties for unauthorized disclosure of
Convention-related information. Chemical industries contend that it is essential to protect
proprietary information (or trade secrets) to maintain a competitive advantage in the marketplace.
And, the CWC, through its enforcement and verification procedures, will require a greater level
of openness regarding production processes and rates, product composition, and market
distribution. However, the U.S. chemical industry represented through the Chemical
Manufacturer’s Association and the Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, strongly endorsed
the Convention’s confidentiality measures and supported the CWC’s ratification. The National
Federation of Independent Business, a small businesses association, also extended its endorsement
to the CWC, its spokesman noting that the NFIB did believe its members would be affected. (Wall
Street Journal, February 14, 1997, pp. 1,16)
CRS-10

---

IB94029
04-30-02
Export Controls. The CWC requires restrictions on the export or transfer of controlled
chemicals to non-states parties. These restrictions vary in severity depending upon the chemicals
involved. Also, as an incentive for nations to sign the CWC, the restrictions will tighten the years
following the Convention coming into force. The United States already has a variety of export
controls on CW-related chemicals, equipment, and technology. (See CRS Report 95-537,
Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status.) The question arises as to what extent
the United States will need to review and revise its current export controls in light of the CWC
regime. U.S. industry is hoping for loosening of controls, particularly with regard to the transfer
of chemicals and technology to U.S. subsidiaries in other countries. Others believe that the U.S.
must keep tight controls in place until the CWC has demonstrated its effectiveness and the threat
of CW proliferation has demonstrably abated. Nevertheless, continued pressure can be expected
from developing countries and domestic industry to loosen export controls.
Enforcement/Sanctions
The question of sanctions was addressed late in the CWC negotiations. The consultative
nature of the Convention’s provisions and the lack of specificity regarding sanctions to be levied
reflect the difficulty of those negotiations. It is generally anticipated that international sanctions
would consist of trade and, perhaps, arms embargoes. CWC critics believe that its enforcement
sanctions are too vague to be an effective deterrent. They question the effectiveness of economic
and arms embargoes, maintaining that 1) embargoes are almost impossible to enforce
internationally; 2) they historically have seldom achieved their foreign policy objectives; and 3) if
they are effective at all, it is only over the long term. CWC supporters argue that the lack of
specificity regarding possible sanctions heightens a potential violator’s uncertainty about breaking
the Convention. They believe that this uncertainty and the international approbation that would be
generated by the enforcement procedure will sufficiently affect the “cost/benefit” analysis of
chemical weapons production to deter a potential violator.
Chemical Weapons and Facilities Destruction
The CWC mandates the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles and production
facilities within 10 years of the Convention’s coming into force. This deadline is now 2007. With
the approval of the States’ Conference, this deadline can be extended up to 5 years. This
extension clause was included specifically in anticipation of Russia’s not being able to meet the
destruction deadline, given its current political and economic instability. There is, however, the
possibility that the United States could experience legal and regulatory difficulties in meeting a
10-year deadline.
The United States CW Demilitarization Program. The United States is by far the
country most advanced in its CW destruction program. In the early 1980s, DOD declared
approximately 90% of the U.S. chemical stockpile (28,000 agent tons) obsolete. This decision,
coupled with a 1985 congressional directive to destroy these munitions, led DOD to begin planning
a destruction program over a decade ago. Nevertheless, it is not entirely assured that the United
States will be able to meet the 2007 CWC deadline. DOD estimates have called for completing
destruction on time, but a number of factors could intervene. Indeed, in August, 1999, an
independent analysis commissioned by DOD and conducted by the Arthur Anderson firm
CRS-11

---

IB94029
04-30-02
estimated that the program has less than a 1% chance of meeting the 1997 deadline. This
assessment is based on the assumption that incineration facility construction would be halted while
alternative technologies are examined. Opponents to incineration do not regard the 2007 deadline
as particularly significant, pointing to the CWC’s provisions for extending it, if necessary.
The controversy over whether the United States will be able to complete destruction of its
CW stockpile even by 2012 was rekindled by an internal Army report Operations Schedule Task
Force 2000-Final Report obtained by the Appropriations Subcommittee on Defense. The report
detailed the actual munition destruction rates at the Johnston Atoll depot, showing them to be much
lower than previous official estimates, and indicated that substantially the same destruction rates
should be expected at other incineration facilities. If so, the CW stockpile destruction program
could extend beyond 2014. DOD initially contended that the report was a “worst case scenario”,
but the most recent DOD Selected Acquisition Report, released in April, shows an 80% increase
in the program costs owing specifically to “revised destruction rates” and “schedule extensions.”
An unpredictable factor is the length of time that will be required to obtain the necessary
Federal and State permits to build and operate the destruction facilities, and this has been cited as
another reason for the 80% program cost increase. Destruction facilities are to be built at each of
the eight CW storage depots. These storage facilities are located in Aberdeen Proving Ground,
MD; Anniston Army Depot, AL; Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot, KY; Newport Army
Ammunition Plant, IN; Pine Bluff Arsenal, AR; Pueblo Depot Activity, CO; Tooele Army Depot,
UT; Umatilla Depot Activity, OR; and Johnston Atoll Depot in the South Pacific. For each site,
the U.S. Army must obtain separate permits under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA) and the Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977. In addition, environmental impact
statements are required under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969.
Adding to the Federal requirements, the destruction program will face additional obstacles
at the state level. In the last few years, public concern in the regions where destruction facilities are
planned or under construction has heightened considerably. The primary fears are of toxic
emissions from the destruction process and the possibility of catastrophic accident. The Chemical
Weapons Working Group, an alliance of citizens’ groups in communities with CW stockpiles,
vigorously opposes incineration as a means of disposal.
The Army’s chosen method (called “baseline”) is to drain the munitions and incinerate the
chemical agent and munition parts. Although the choice of this method came after extensive study
of alternatives, incineration has still raised objections from some who oppose incineration. As a
consequence, Congress directed the Army to reconsider alternative technologies. In the FY1997
DOD Appropriations Act ( P.L. 104-208) Congress created the Assembled Chemical Weapons
Assessment program (ACWA) to evaluate alternative approaches to incineration. Legislative
provisions included:
! prohibiting obligation of funds for incinerator construction at the Pueblo, CO and
Blue Grass, KY sites pending a report to Congress on the feasibility of alternative
technologies, specifying that the ACWA program manager be independent of the
Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization
CRS-12

---

IB94029
04-30-02
! allocating $40 million to “identify and develop at least two possible disposal
alternatives”requiring a report to Congress no later than April 1999 on the initial
safety and environmental assessments for the alternative technologies.
ACWA initially identified six possible alternative technologies; and, in the summer 1998
selected three for demonstration and possible pilot programs. This met the statutory requirement
for at least two alternative pilots, but continuing public and congressional pressure has led DOD
to undertake demonstrations for five alternatives. The ACWA program is currently preparing
engineering design studies for two technologies (The contractors are General Atomics and
Parsons/Honeywell), On August 24, 1999, the National Research Council submitted its own report
to Congress on alternative technologies, Review and Evaluation of Alternative Technologies
for Demilitarization of Assembled Chemical Weapons. [http://www.nap.edu/catalog/9660.html]
The report does not recommend any specific technology, but rather identifies the strengths and
weaknesses, and assesses their potential for full-scale development.
As a result of these efforts, it has been decided that the Newport, IN and Aberdeen, MD
stockpiles, which are mustard agent in bulk containers, will be destroyed through a chemical
neutralization process rather than incineration.
Cost estimates for the U.S. chemical weapons destruction program have grown steadily since
its inception. In 1985, for example, DOD estimated the total program cost would be between $1.2
to $2.0 billion. The cost estimates routinely increased, with the 2001 estimate reaching $13.2
billion. Then, in April 2002, the Department of Defense Selected Acquisition Report announced
a new 80% increase in the cost estimate, raising it from $13.2 billion to $23.7 billion. Factors
driving the increase were identified as: 1)revised destruction rates based upon the experience at
Johnston Atoll depot; 2) schedule extensions; 3) new environmental regulations; 4) worse-than-
expected stockpile condition; 5) increased equipment, labor, and construction costs; and 6) higher
emergency preparedness costs.
The FY2000 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 2561) provided $1.029 billion for chemical
demilitarization, reducing the Administration’s request by $141 million, including a $94 million cut
in military construction funding. The Department of Defense submitted an FY2001 budget request
for $1.003 billion for the CW stockpile demilitarization program, including: $607 million for
operations and maintenance; $121.9 million for procurement, and $274 for research and
development. The DOD FY2001 Appropriations Act (P.L. 106-259) provided $980 million, with
the reductions owing to program delays and terminating some contract services in the procurement
and O&M accounts. For FY2002, DOD has requested $1.153 billion for the CW demilitarization
program, including $200.4 million for R&D, $164.2 million for procurement, and $789 million for
operations and maintenance. The FY2002 DOD Appropriations Act reduced this by $48 million
primarily from the operations and maintenance account.

Russian CW Destruction Program.
Russia possesses the world’s largest chemical
weapons stockpile, estimated to be 40,000 to 50,000 tons. Its plans for a destruction program
are embryonic, and the country’s ongoing political and economic turmoil leads most observers to
believe it will not be able to meet CWC deadlines on its own. Russia has established a commission
to oversee the destruction program. Russian officials have made it clear that Russia desires both
CRS-13

---

IB94029
04-30-02
technological and financial assistance to destroy its chemical weapons. Russia is also seeking
foreign assistance to fund infrastructure improvements in the regions surrounding their CW depots,
claiming that approval from local authorities to build destruction facilities is dependent upon such
assistance. In addition to direct foreign assistance, Russia is considering establishing an investment
bank to encourage commercial participation and hopes to recycle some commercially valuable
compounds from the destruction process for sale.
Congress responded initially to Russia’s call for assistance, appropriating $55 million in aid
to be used for the initial planning and evaluation stages of the Russian program. In addition, the
United States agreed to share destruction technology and participate in the exchange of technical
experts. To facilitate these efforts, the United States has opened a Chemical Weapons Destruction
Support Office (CWDSO) in Moscow.
The Administration sought for two years to gain funding to assist Russia in construction a CW
demilitarization facility at Shchuch’ye. Both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees
expressed strong reservations about Russia’s ability to fund operation of the facility if constructed,
and noted the relative paucity of assistance from other nations for this program. Consequently, the
FY2000 DOD Authorization Act (P.L. 106-65, Sec. 1305) forbids funding designing, planning,
or construction a chemical weapons facility in Russia. DOD’s efforts in the FY2001 budget
considerations to have this provision repealed and $35 million appropriated for a Shchuch’ye
facility met continued congressional skepticism. House and Senate Armed Services Committee
conferees accepted a Senate amendment in the DOD FY2001 Authorization Act (H.R. 4205)
which amends the existing statutory prohibition to permit Shchuch’ye funding only after DOD
certification that:
! Russia has agreed to provide $25 million annually for construction and operation.
! Russia has agreed to use the facility to destroy it four other nerve agent
stockpiles.
! The United States has obtained multi-year commitments from the international
community to assist infrastructure improvement around Shchuch’ye.
! Russia has agreed to destroy it CW production facilities at Volgograd and
Novocheboksark.
These conditions were coupled with a DOD reporting requirement on Russian and
international financial contributions towards the safeguarding and destruction of Russia’s nerve
agent stockpiles. (H.Rept 106-945, Sec. 4205)
For FY2002, both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, satisfied that sufficient
progress has been made in meeting these conditions, approved authorization of $35 million for the
Shchuch’ye facility. Most recently, however, The Bush Administration has informed both Russia
and the Congress that it currently cannot provide the certification of Russia’s commitment to arms
control compliance required to permit continued U.S. aid under the Nunn-Lugar Threat Reduction
programs. Financial assistance for the Russian chemical weapons destruction program is one of
these efforts. The points of concern are further information on earlier Russian development of new
chemical warfare agents, and greater access to current operations at former Russian biological
weapons facilities that are still under military control. It is expected that this will be a topic for
CRS-14

---

IB94029
04-30-02
discussion at the upcoming U.S.-Russia Summit. Congress has the option to waive the presidential
arms control certification requirement, if it so chooses.
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
U.S. Congress. Chemical Weapons Convention: A Message from the President of the
United States. Treaty Document 103-21. 103 Congress, 1st Session.
U.S. Congress. Chemical Weapons Convention. Hearings, Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, S.Hrg. 103-869.
U.S. Congress. Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997. Report, House Committee
on International Relations, 105 Congress, 2nd Session, H.Rept. 105-375
U.S. Congress. Military Implications of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Hearings, Senate
Armed Services Committee. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, S.Hrg. 103-835.
U.S. Congress. U .S. Capability to Monitor Compliance with the Chemical Weapons
Convention. Report, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 103rd Congress, 2nd
Session, S.Rept. 103-390.
U.S. Congress. Convention on Chemical Weapons. Hearing, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, 104th Congress, 2nd Session, S.Hrg. 104-668.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
Selected World Wide Web Sites
Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program
[http://cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/cbwnp/index.htm]
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
[http://www.opcw.nl/ptshome.htm]
U.S. Army Chemical Demilitarization Program
[http://www-pmcd.apgea.army.mil/]
CRS-15

---