Order Code RL31376
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Trade Promotion (Fast-Track) Authority:
Summary and Analysis of Selected Major
Provisions of H.R. 3005
April 15, 2002
Lenore Sek, Coordinator
Mary Jane Bolle, William H. Cooper, and Vladimir N. Pregelj
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Charles E. Hanrahan
Mary E. Tiemann
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Richard S. Beth
Government and Finance Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Trade Promotion (Fast-Track) Authority:
Summary and Analysis of Selected Major Provisions of
H.R. 3005
Summary
A major trade issue in the 107th Congress is whether or not Congress will
approve authority for the President to negotiate trade agreements and submit the
agreements for implementation under expedited legislative procedures. This
authority, commonly called “fast-track authority” or “trade promotion authority”
(TPA), lapsed in 1994. The House and the Senate Finance Committee each approved
versions of a fast-track/TPA bill (H.R. 3005) in December 2001.
Congressional debate on fast-track/TPA legislation arrives at a period of slow
economic growth for many of the world’s major economies. U.S. bilateral, regional,
and multilateral trade agreements could fall under the proposed TPA legislation.

The versions of H.R. 3005 approved by the House and by the Senate Finance
Committee are similar to each other in their basic structure and in most provisions.
The Senate Finance Committee version, however, gives more attention to small
businesses, trade remedy laws, and trade disputes. Both versions have many
similarities to prior fast-track law, but they depart by giving more importance to labor,
the environment, and other non-traditional priorities as part of U.S. trade policy.
Also, for the first time, they would establish a Congressional Oversight Group to
monitor trade negotiations more closely than before.
Both versions of H.R. 3005 include more detailed requirements on labor than
under prior law. They are similar to each other with the exception of a required labor
rights report. There is also serious disagreement in Congress on whether or not to
attach a trade adjustment bill (S. 1209) to H.R. 3005.
Both versions of H.R. 3005 give greater attention to environmental matters than
previously. One shared negotiating objective is to ensure that parties do not fail to
effectively enforce environmental laws and to make such trade-related failures subject
to dispute settlement. The bills also seek language in trade agreements to discourage
parties from weakening environmental laws to encourage trade.
With regard to agriculture, both versions state that the principal negotiating
objective is to obtain competitive, fairer, and more open market opportunities for U.S.
agricultural exports. In addition to consultation requirements for import-sensitive
products, both bills establish additional requirements for consultation with the
agriculture committees.
Under H.R. 3005, either house could limit the deadline for trade agreements
eligible for expedited implementation by adopting an extension disapproval resolution.
Also, if required consultations do not occur, or if an agreement fails to promote
required objectives, Congress could withdraw expedited implementation through
procedural disapproval resolutions. These and other restrictions might also be
enforced through other procedures available under general rules in each House.

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Contents
The U.S. Trade Negotiating Agenda and Trade Promotion Authority . . . . . . . . 2
World Economic Slowdown and Changes in the International
Trade System . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
U.S. Trade Negotiating Agenda and TPA Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Summary of Major Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Labor-Related Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Labor Provisions of Expired Fast-Track and H.R. 3005 Compared . . . . . . . 8
Principal Negotiating Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Congressional and Administrative Oversight Provisions
(“Certain Priorities”) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Major Controversies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Labor Rights Report . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
TAA Amendments: Attaching S. 1209 to H.R. 3005 . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Environment-Related Provisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Environmental Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Other Environment-Relevant Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Promotion of Certain Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
Agriculture . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
TPA and Agricultural Interest Groups
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Agricultural Negotiating Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Import-Sensitive Agricultural Products . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
Requirements for Consultation with Agriculture Committees . . . . . . . . . . 19
TPA and Agricultural Negotiating Issues . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Congressional Oversight and President’s Consultations with the Congress . . . . 20
Congressional Oversight Group . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
President’s Consultations with the Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Expedited Procedures and
Procedural Controls on Their Use . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Enforcing Time Restrictions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Enforcing Notifications and Consultations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Enforcing Pursuit of Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Enforcing Restrictions on Contents . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Appendix: Expedited Procedures in Current Law . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Section 151: Implementing Bills . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Section 152: Extension and Procedural Disapproval Resolutions . . . . . . . 29
Figure 1. Labor Provisions in H.R. 3005 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

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Trade Promotion (Fast-Track) Authority:
Summary and Analysis of Selected Major
Provisions of H.R. 3005
One of the major trade issues in the 107th Congress is whether Congress will
approve legislation that sets conditions under which the President can negotiate
certain trade agreements and submit the agreements for approval and implementation
under expedited legislative procedures. Under this authority, formerly called “fast-
track authority” and now often called “trade promotion authority” or “TPA,”
Congress agrees to consider legislation to implement certain trade agreements under
a procedure with mandatory deadlines, no amendment, and limited debate; while the
President is required to notify and consult with Congress at various stages of
negotiation.
The President was granted fast-track authority almost continuously from 1974
to 1994. In 1994, the authority lapsed and has not been renewed. Under the current
absence of fast-track authority, if the Administration concludes a trade agreement that
requires congressional action, implementing legislation will be considered under
normal legislative procedures.
This report analyzes a major proposal to renew fast-track authority, H.R. 3005,
the Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001. The long title–“An Act to
Extend Trade Authorities Procedures with Respect to Reciprocal Trade
Agreements”–highlights the fact that the bill does not grant the President any new
authority to negotiate trade agreements, but rather extends to a specified class of
trade agreements the eligibility for an implementing bill to be considered under certain
expedited procedures. Representative Thomas, Chairman of the House Ways and
Means Committee introduced H.R. 3005 on October 3, 2001. The House passed the
bill on December 6, 2001 by a vote of 215-214 along party lines. On December 18,
2001, the Senate Finance Committee ordered the bill reported with an amendment in
the nature of a substitute (S.Rept. 107-139) on an 18-3 vote. The full Senate might
take up the bill before the Memorial Day recess.
The purpose of this report is to review major selected provisions of H.R. 3005.
The report notes differences between the House-passed version and the Senate
Finance Committee-reported version. It also includes comparisons between H.R.
3005 and the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (1988 Trade Act; P.L.
100-418), under which fast-track procedures were last approved.
The report begins with an overview of the U.S. trade policy agenda and what
role TPA plays in trade policy. It then summarizes the major provisions of H.R. 3005
and discusses the labor, environmental, and agriculture provisions in particular. It
includes a review of consultation and notification provisions, and concludes with a

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discussion of expedited procedures and controls that H.R. 3005 proposes on their use.
An Appendix presents expedited procedures for implementing bills for trade
agreements (fast-track/TPA procedures) and other procedures included in the bill.
It should be noted that this report focuses on TPA bill H.R. 3005. As a possible
vote approaches in the Senate, Members are actively debating whether to amend H.R.
3005 to add a proposal on trade adjustment assistance (such a proposal is discussed
in the section of this report on labor). They also might consider amendments to
reauthorize the Generalized System of Preferences and the Andean Trade Preferences
Act. Looking back, the last approval of fast-track procedures (the 1988 Trade Act)
was part of a much larger, omnibus trade bill.
The U.S. Trade Negotiating Agenda and Trade
Promotion Authority *
Congressional consideration of trade promotion authority (TPA) legislation and
the ensuing debate over U.S. trade negotiating objectives are occurring during a
period of growing global economic uncertainty and of a changing international trading
system that shape a very active U.S. trade negotiating agenda. As has been the case
with previous fast-track trade authority legislation, the congressional debate will likely
involve not only whether to grant the President the authority, but also what U.S. trade
negotiating objectives should be. Members of the 107th Congress are deeply divided
over U.S. trade policy objectives, such as to what degree, if any, should non-trade
issues (for example, labor and environment) be included in trade agreements.
World Economic Slowdown and Changes in the International
Trade System
Many of the world’s major economies have been experiencing slow economic
growth or recessions. After a decade of robust growth and low unemployment rates,
the U.S. economy shifted downward with increasing unemployment over the near
term. The European economies have endured slow economic growth, while Japan
continues to suffer its worst economic slowdown of the post-World War II period.
Furthermore, the economic problems of the industrialized countries have spilled over
to developing countries that rely on them as export markets. The Bush Administration
and other supporters of TPA have argued that the United States must take the lead
in trade negotiations to spur economic growth and that TPA is necessary before trade
partners will negotiate with the United States seriously. This argument is also present
in the committee reporting language accompanying both versions of H.R. 3005.
The international trading system is undergoing change by moving beyond
multilateral negotiations among developed nations. For example, an increasing
number of developing countries are active participants in the international trading
system. One hundred of the 142 members of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
*Prepared by William H. Cooper; Specialist in International Trade and Finance; Foreign
Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.

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are developing countries; 30 of them are classified as least-developed countries.
These countries have become more assertive in pressing their agendas, which
frequently differ from those of the United States and other developed countries.
Furthermore, China’s recent entry into the WTO, gives more weight to the developing
country agenda. The former communist countries of Central and Eastern Europe and
of the former Soviet Union are also integrating themselves into the international
trading system. In addition, the proliferation of bilateral and regional trade
agreements is changing the international trading system. According to the WTO,
about 100 bilateral and regional agreements have been established since 1995.
The international trade structure is also changing in that a growing number of
activities are considered to be “trade” or “trade-related.” Such activities include
intellectual property rights protection, foreign investment, services, and government
regulations. These changes in the international trading system will require new trade
agreements to be negotiated, and the Bush Administration has argued that it needs
TPA now so that the United States can ensure that the changing international trade
system reflects U.S. interests.1
U.S. Trade Negotiating Agenda and TPA Legislation
The economic slowdown in the United States and other countries and the
changes in the international trading system are shaping the U.S. trade negotiating
agenda. That agenda is reflected in the pending TPA legislation and can be divided
into three overall goals:
! to create favorable conditions for U.S. exporters by eliminating tariff and
nontariff barriers;
! to protect domestic industries from the adverse effects of unfair foreign trade
practices and to provide temporary relief to domestic industries adjusting to
rapid increases in fairly-traded imports; and
! to ensure that international trade rules, that are used to meet the first two
goals, apply to all relevant economic activities.
These three goals have guided U.S. negotiators in previous trade negotiations
and will likely do so in upcoming negotiations. The goals are reflected in the
negotiating objectives set out in the version of H.R. 3005 passed by the House and
the version reported out by the Senate Finance Committee. (The negotiating
objectives are discussed further in other sections of this report.)
U.S. trade negotiators are pursuing the agenda in multilateral negotiations in the
WTO and in negotiations to establish regional and bilateral trade areas. These
negotiations cut across geographical areas and economic activities. Any agreements
reached from these negotiations will probably require congressional approval before
1 Zoellick, Robert B. Falling Behind on Free Trade. The New York Times. April 14, 2002.

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implementation. TPA would provide that implementing legislation be considered
without amendment, thereby increasing prospects for passage.
On November 14, 2001, in Doha, Qatar, trade ministers from 142 WTO-
member countries agreed to launch wide-ranging multilateral negotiations. The new
negotiations will cover a broad range of issues, such as agricultural trade
liberalization, trade in services, industrial tariffs, trade-related intellectual property
rights, and rules on antidumping and countervailing duty investigations. The
negotiations are tentatively scheduled to be completed by 2005.
In the meantime, the United States has been negotiating bilateral and regional
free trade agreements and will likely begin negotiations on even more agreements.
At the end of 2000, the United States launched negotiations with Singapore
(November 2000) and Chile (December 2000), to establish bilateral free trade areas.
Such arrangements would lead, at a minimum, to the elimination of tariffs in bilateral
merchandise trade, the reduction or removal of other barriers in trade in goods and
services, and concessions on treatment of foreign investments. While negotiators
have confronted stumbling blocks in both sets of negotiations, the agreements are
expected to be reached in mid to late 2002. Similarly, the United States and 33 other
countries of the Western Hemisphere agreed in December 1994 to begin negotiations
to establish a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by 2005. In addition, the
Bush Administration has expressed the goal of exploring the possibility of establishing
a free trade agreement with the countries of Central America, and USTR Zoellick has
indicated the Administration will consider forming a free trade area with South Africa.
Australia, New Zealand, Egypt, and other countries have also either expressed strong
interest in forming free trade areas with the United States or have been suggested as
potential FTAs partners.
Committee reporting language for both versions of H.R. 3005 explicitly states
that the authority will be applicable to all trade agreements that are reached before
June 1, 2005 (or before June 1, 2007, if the authority is extended) and that meet the
other conditions for such authority. In addition, unlike the 1988 fast track authority,
no distinction is made between multilateral agreements, on the one hand, and regional
and bilateral agreements on the other hand, in terms of the applicability of the TPA.
Furthermore, section 6 of both bills recognizes that negotiations are already underway
with Chile, Singapore, and the FTAA partner-countries and waives certain notification
requirements in anticipation of such agreements being concluded shortly. The
legislation is thus designed to apply to both the present and future U.S. trade
negotiating agenda.

Summary of Major Provisions*
The provisions of H.R. 3005, like those of many fast-track/trade promotion
authority bills, can be considered in five parts. First, they outline trade negotiating
objectives. Second, they set conditions under which Congress will consider
*Prepared by Lenore Sek; Specialist in International Trade and Finance; Foreign Affairs,
Defense, and Trade Division.

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implementation and approval of trade agreements under expedited procedures. Third,
they set out notification and consultation requirements for the executive branch.
Fourth, they specify actions related to implementation, such as documents the
President must submit. Fifth, they might include other, related provisions.2
Although the executive branch conducts the actual negotiations, Congress,
acting under the section on trade negotiating objectives, communicates to negotiators
the goals that it expects a trade agreement to achieve. Similar to the 1988 Trade Act,
H.R. 3005 outlines these negotiating objectives as “overall negotiating objectives” and
as “principal negotiating objectives,” but unlike before, H.R. 3005 adds a third
category called “promotion of certain priorities.”
“Overall negotiating objectives” are usually broad objectives or goals. The
Trade Act of 1988 had three overall objectives that are included in both versions of
H.R. 3005: market access, elimination of trade barriers, stronger international trading
disciplines. Both versions of H.R. 3005 add four more overall objectives: economic
growth, mutually supportive trade and environmental policies, respect for worker
rights, and provisions to discourage weakening environmental or labor laws to
encourage trade. The Senate Finance Committee version has one more overall
objective (not in the House version): fair and equal treatment for small businesses.
H.R. 3005's enlargement of the section on overall objectives from prior law indicates
that the purpose of trade negotiations is broadened beyond market opening to include
other policies such as labor rights and environmental protection.
“Principal negotiating objectives” usually are more defined goals or issues. The
House version of H.R. 3005 has 13 principal objectives: trade barriers and distortions
to trade, trade in services, foreign investment, intellectual property rights (IPR),
transparency, anti-corruption, improvement of the WTO and multilateral trade
agreements, regulatory practices, electronic commerce, reciprocal trade in agriculture,
labor and the environment, dispute settlement and enforcement, and WTO extended
negotiations. The Senate Finance Committee version includes those 13 objectives and
adds an objective on border taxes.3 The House and Senate language on the 13 shared
objectives is almost identical, although there are some differences in three objectives:
foreign investment, agriculture, and dispute settlement.
A number of the principal objectives in H.R. 3005 were also in the 1988 Trade
Act and are becoming common in trade negotiations–trade barriers, services,
agriculture, and intellectual property rights, for example. However, some principal
objectives are different in H.R. 3005 and the 1988 Trade Act. For example, H.R.
3005 (but not the 1988 Trade Act) includes principal objectives on anti-corruption,
regulatory practices, and electronic commerce. The 1988 Trade Act (but not H.R.
2 For a detailed comparison of the House approved version of H.R. 3005 and Senate Finance
Committee-reported version, see CRS Report RL31249, Trade Promotion (Fast-Track)
Authority: A Comparison of H.R. 3005 as Approved by the House and Reported by the
Senate Finance Committee, by Lenore Sek.
3 The objective on border taxes is to obtain a revision of WTO rules on the treatment of border
adjustments to redress the disadvantage to countries that depend on direct taxes for revenue
rather than indirect taxes.

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3005) included principal objectives on developing countries, current account
surpluses, and access to high technology. On the controversial issues of labor and the
environment, the 1988 Trade Act had a principal objective on “worker rights,” and
H.R. 3005 has a principal objective on “labor and the environment,” but these
objectives (and related language in other principal objectives) are substantially
different and are discussed further in later sections of this report.
H.R. 3005 also includes a third section under negotiating objectives (“promotion
of certain priorities”) that was not in the 1988 Trade Act. This section directs the
President to take actions to promote certain priorities. Beginning in the 1990s, many
fast-track bills added a third section under negotiating objectives in an attempt to
address the role of labor and the environment in trade negotiations. In some cases,
this third section was to separate labor and the environment from overall and principal
objectives. In other cases, it was to give detailed direction to the executive branch on
action to take related to the negotiations. For H.R. 3005, the Senate Finance
Committee explains: “While these priorities are not formally described as negotiating
objectives, their importance as statements of the trade policy of the United States is
equal to the importance of the general and specific objectives set forth in subsections
[on overall and principal objectives].”4 Nine of the 12 actions listed under “promotion
of certain priorities” in H.R. 3005 involve labor and the environment. (These are
discussed in more detail later.) The other actions would require the President to
preserve the right of the United States to rigorously enforce its trade laws, report to
the revenue committees on the effectiveness of a trade remedy, and seek consultation
with other countries on how currency movements affect trade.
After specifying negotiating objectives, H.R. 3005 sets out conditions under
which trade agreements would be considered under the bill’s provisions. Those
conditions are almost identical in both versions and are similar to past law in most
respects. One condition is that a trade agreement (tariff or nontariff) must be entered
into by a given deadline (June 1, 2005), with a possible two-year extension if specified
conditions are met. In the case of certain tariff agreements, the Congress delegates
to the President the authority to enter into those agreements and implement the tariff
changes by proclamation; no implementing legislation is necessary.
In the case of all other trade agreements, H.R. 3005 would allow the President
to enter into those agreements and submit them for approval and implementation
under expedited procedures (mandatory deadlines, limited debate, no amendment),
as long as specified conditions are met. For expedited procedures (called “trade
promotion procedures” in the bill) to apply, the agreement would have to make
progress in meeting the overall and principal objectives (this is the same as the 1988
Trade Act), and the President would have to satisfy the consultation requirements.
Trade promotion procedures would apply to an implementing bill with: (1) provisions
approving a trade agreement and any statement of administrative action; and (2)
provisions “necessary or appropriate” to implement a trade agreement, if changes in
law are required to implement the agreement. (The 1988 Trade Act did not have
comparable provisions on implementing bills that qualify for expedited procedures.)
4U.S. Senate. Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002. Report to accompany
H.R. 3005. S. Rept. 107-139. Feb. 28, 2002. p. 36.

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The President can negotiate a trade agreement without meeting the above
requirements, but in that case, implementing legislation will be considered under the
normal legislative process.
H.R. 3005 sets out requirements for the President to notify and consult with
Congress at various stages of negotiation. The two versions of H.R. 3005 are similar
in many respects and expand on the requirements of the 1988 Trade Act. Of note,
H.R. 3005 would establish a new body of congressional trade advisors, the
Congressional Oversight Group (COG), which would be created in addition to the
current body of congressional trade advisors5 and seems intended to be a more active
group of official advisors to negotiations. (Consultation and notification requirements
are discussed further later.)
The section of H.R. 3005 on actions for implementation is similar to the 1988
Trade Act in many respects. Like prior law, H.R. 3005 would require the President
to: (1) notify the House and Senate at least 90 days before entering into the
agreement; (2) describe to Congress any changes to law necessary under the
agreement (within 60 days of signing the agreement in H.R. 3005); and (3) submit to
Congress the agreement, a statement of administrative action, a draft implementing
bill, and other specified information. The version reported by the Senate Finance
Committee adds reporting requirements on prospective changes to trade remedy laws,
both when the President notifies Congress before entering into the agreement and
when the President submits the agreement and supporting materials to Congress. As
under previous law, there is no deadline for submission of these documents, and
expedited legislative procedures would be disallowed if Congress decided that the
President did not give notice or consult as required. The version reported by the
Senate Finance Committee adds a provision that would allow withdrawal of expedited
procedures if the Secretary of Commerce does not transmit to Congress, in a timely
manner, a report on the U.S. strategy toward correcting certain WTO dispute
findings.
Unlike prior law, both versions of H.R. 3005 would require the President to
submit a plan for implementing the trade agreement and request funding in the next
budget. They also recognize that TPA might increase trade-related activities for the
trade committees and COG members and note that the primary committees of
jurisdiction should have adequate staff for these increased activities. The Senate
Finance Committee-reported version has two additional sections not found in the
House-approved version nor in prior law. The first requires the International Trade
Commission to report within one year of enactment on how agreements implemented
under expedited legislative procedures in the past have affected the U.S. economy.
The second requires the USTR to seek an advocate in the WTO for small- or
medium-sized businesses and to report to the revenue committees annually on steps
taken to achieve that goal.
5 19 U.S.C. 2101.

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Labor-Related Provisions*
The versions of H.R. 3005 that were passed by the House and reported out of
the Senate Finance Committee include 13 labor-related provisions. Overall, their
requirements are both more detailed and slightly different from those in previous fast-
track authority under the 1988 Trade Act.

The expanded labor provisions in H.R. 3005 evolved from concerns that
intensified after the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) went into effect
in January, 1994. The next few pages: (a) spell out and compare the labor provisions
in the expired fast-track language with those of H.R. 3005; and (b) address related
issues for Congress, identifying arguments on both sides.
Labor Provisions of Expired Fast-Track and H.R. 3005
Compared
The fast-track authority which expired in 1994 identified as a principal labor
objective:
(a) to promote respect for worker rights;
(b) to secure a review of the relationship between worker rights and GATT
(succeeded by the World Trade Organization – the WTO), aiming to ensure
that the benefits of the trading system are made available to all workers);
and
(c) to adopt as a principle of the GATT that the denial of worker rights should
not be a means for a country or its industries to gain competitive advantage
in international trade.
These above-mentioned objectives were addressed in the two major trade
agreements negotiated and adopted under the expired fast-track authority: NAFTA
includes a labor side agreement which aims to promote respect for worker rights, as
identified in (a) above. It also requires that each country enforce its own laws, as
implied in (c) above. Implementing language for the Uruguay Round trade
agreements, which created the WTO, required the President to seek a working party
in the WTO to examine the relationship between internationally recognized worker
rights and trade, as required in (b) above.
In contrast to the expired fast-track authority, H.R. 3005 includes much more
detailed requirements. It includes about a dozen separate provisions which set out
very specific guidelines and limits for the promotion of worker rights protections in
the international trade arena.
Figure 1 lists all the specific House and Senate provisions within the three
categories: overall negotiating objectives, principal negotiating objectives, and the
*Prepared by Mary Jane Bolle; Specialist in International Trade; Foreign Affairs, Defense and
Trade Division. For further information, see CRS Report RL31178, Trade Promotion
Authority (Fast-Track): Labor Issues (Including H.R. 3005 and H.R. 3019), by Mary Jane
Bolle.

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“promotion of certain priorities,” which has congressional and administrative
oversight provisions.
Figure 1. Labor Provisions in H.R. 3005
Overall Negotiating Objectives
The overall negotiating objectives of H.R. 3005 relating to labor are:
(1) to promote respect for worker rights and the rights of children consistent with core labor standards
in the International Labor Organization (ILO), and an understanding of the relationship between
trade and worker rights [Sec. 2(a)(6)]; and
(2) to seek provisions in trade agreements under which parties strive to ensure that they do not weaken
or reduce the protections afforded in domestic (environmental and ) labor laws as an encouragement
for trade [Sec. 2(a)(7)].
Note: H.R. 3005 defines core labor standards to include: (a) the right of association; (b) the right to
organize and bargain collectively; (c) a prohibition on the use of any form of forced or compulsory labor;
(d) a minimum age for the employment of children; and (e) acceptable conditions of worker with respect
to minimum wages, hours of work, and occupational safety and health.
Principal Negotiating Objectives
The principal negotiating objectives in H.R. 3005 relating to labor are:
(1) to strengthen the capacity of U.S. trading partners to promote respect for core labor standards [Sec.
2(b)(11)(C)];
(2) to ensure that a party does not fail to enforce its own labor laws through a sustained course of action
or inaction in a manner affecting trade [Sec. 2(b)(11)(A)];
(3) to recognize the right of parties to exercise discretion regarding the allocation of resources on
enforcement [Sec. 2(b)(11)(B)];
(4) to ensure that labor policies and practices do not unjustifiably discriminate against U.S. exports or
serve as disguised barriers to trade [Sec. 2(b)(11)(G)]; and
(5) to seek (dispute settlement) procedures that treat U.S. principal negotiating objectives equally with
other negotiating objectives (i.e. treat labor issues equally with foreign investment, intellectual property,
etc.) [Sec. 2(b)(12)(F)].
Congressional and Administrative Oversight Provisions (“Certain Priorities”)
Both House and Senate versions of H.R. 3005 have identical Congressional and Administrative Oversight
requirements with one exception. The identical provisions are:
(1) for the President to seek greater cooperation between the ILO and the WTO [Sec. 2(c)(1)];
(2) for the President to review the impact of future trade agreements on U.S. employment and report to
the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees [Sec. 2(c)(5)];
(3) for the President to seek consultative mechanisms among Parties to promote respect for core labor
standards and report to the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees [Sec. 2(c)(2)];
(4) for the President to have the Secretary of Labor consult with any country seeking a U.S. trade
agreement about its labor laws and provide technical assistance if needed [Sec. 2(c)(7)]; and
(5) for the President to report to the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees within 12
months after a penalty is imposed, on its effectiveness in enforcing U.S. rights under the trade
agreement (i.e., in changing the behavior of the targeted party, and any impacts on parties not
involved in the dispute) [Sec. 2(c)(11)].
The differing House and Senate provisions have to do with a labor rights report to Congress:
The House bill [Sec. 2(c)(8)] requires that the President submit to Congress in general, for any trade
agreement, a report showing the extent to which countries which are party to the agreement have
in effect laws governing exploitative child labor.
The Senate bill [Sec. 2(c)(8)]requires that the President submit to the House Ways and Means and Senate
Finance Committees, for any trade negotiations entered into under this Act, a meaningful labor
rights report on the country with which the President is negotiating, in a time frame determined by
the U.S. Trade Representative’s (USTR) Office in consultation with the Chairmen and Ranking
Minority Members of the two Committees.

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Overall negotiating objectives reiterate the concepts included in the expired 1988
authority of: (1) promoting respect for worker rights, (but specifying that it shall be
done in the International Labor Organization) and (2) seeking provisions in trade
agreements to ensure that domestic labor laws are not weakened as an encouragement
for trade.
The principal negotiating objectives on “labor and the environment” includes
among its goals: (1) strengthen the capacity of U.S. trading partners to promote
respect for worker rights, (2) ensure that a party does not fail to enforce its own labor
laws in a manner affecting trade; and (3) ensure that labor policies do not unjustifiably
discriminate against U.S. exports or serve as disguised barriers to trade.
Congressional and administrative oversight provisions under “promotion of
certain priorities” include several requirements for the President. Among these are
the labor-related actions: (1) to seek greater cooperation between the ILO and the
WTO, (2) to review the impact of future trade agreements on U.S. employment and
report to key congressional committees, (3) to arrange for consultation and technical
assistance by the Secretary of Labor, regarding the labor laws of any country seeking
a U.S. trade agreement, and (4) to report on the effectiveness of penalties in changing
trading behavior.
Major Controversies
Congressional debate over TPA labor issues centers primarily on two key issues.
One is differing House and Senate versions of a provision requiring labor rights
reports. The other issue involves whether or not to amend H.R. 3005 in the Senate,
by attaching or linking provisions of S. 1209, which would renew, expand, and reform
the Trade Adjustment Assistance (TAA) program.
Labor Rights Report. On the first issue, the labor rights report, the Senate
bill would require a much more in-depth report than the House. The House bill
requires that the President submit to Congress a report showing, for any new trade
agreement, the extent to which countries currently have in effect laws governing
exploitative child labor. The Senate bill, in contrast, requires that the President
submit to the House Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees a
“meaningful” labor rights report on the country with which the President is
negotiating. (See actual language for these requirements at the bottom of figure 1.)
Currently, the State Department annually publishes one to several pages on worker
rights practices for roughly 75 countries in Country Reports on Economic Policy and
Trade Practices, in accordance with Section 2202 of the 1988 Trade Act. Therefore,
considerable research to support a labor rights report for many, though not all
countries, may be ongoing within the State Department.
TAA Amendments: Attaching S. 1209 to H.R. 3005.6 The second issue
is whether or not to attach provisions of S. 1209 to H.R. 3005. Many Senate
Democrats have argued that TPA will not get to the floor without an expansion of the
6 Information for this section was taken from CRS Report RS21078, Trade Adjustment
Assistance for Workers: Legislation in the 107th Congress, by Paul J. Graney.

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TAA program. This program provides financial and technical assistance to workers
and firms to help them adjust to import competition. The White House proposal,
offered to the Senate Finance Committee on March 19, 2002, differed on two key
issues from S. 1209 (whose provisions are detailed below). First, it excluded TAA
benefits for secondary workers and farmers, although the Administration more
recently has indicated it will support this proposal. Second, disagreement remains
over the Democrats’ proposal to provide health insurance benefits to TAA
beneficiaries. Republican opponents argue that this would amount to creating a
massive new federal entitlement program, according to the Washington Trade Daily,
April 10, 2002.
S. 1209 was reported by the Senate Finance Committee on February 4, 2002
(S. Report 107-134). On March 19, 2002, the Administration delivered its proposal
in bill form (the Trade Adjustment Assistance [TAA] Reform Act of 2002) to the
Senate Finance Committee. One of two elements of S. 1209 attracting the most
discussion is that S. 1209 would combine the old TAA and NAFTA-TAA programs
and expand both to reach three new groups. These groups are: (a) all workers who
lose their jobs because their plants relocate to foreign countries. (Both the TAA and
NAFTA-TAA programs traditionally cover workers who lose their jobs because of
increased imports. The NAFTA-TAA program also covers workers who lose their
jobs because of a shift in production abroad); (b) secondary workers whose job loss
is dependent on the job loss of workers directly affected by trade; and (c) several
groups of workers not previously covered by TAA legislation. This third group
includes family farmers, ranchers, independent fishermen, taconite workers, truck
operators, and others as identified. The Congressional Budget Office estimates that
these changes will nearly double the TAA caseload. The provision covering
secondary workers would make up about three-fourths of the increase in caseload.
Covering shifts in production would make up about one-fifth of the increase.7
The second element of S. 1209 that is controversial is the inclusion of premium
assistance for health care coverage for TAA recipients. The proposed subsidy would
pay 75% of health insurance premiums for eligible workers and temporary Medicaid
insurance for certain uninsured individuals. The CBO estimates that this would result
in a budget outlay in 2003 of $262 million. The Administration’s proposal would not
include health insurance benefits.8
The controversial premium assistance provision was not included in the House
version of H.R. 3005 or in the House-passed reauthorization of TAA (H.R. 3008).
A linkage of S. 1209 to H.R. 3005 in the Senate would aim to garner the support of
more Members than would H.R. 3005 alone. In a February 26 speech, Senator Max
Baucus, Chairman of the Senate Finance Committee, indicated that TAA is an
essential element in a new trade consensus, and remains the only issue under
discussion that has the potential to deliver a substantial new bloc of votes to the fast-
7 Trade Adjustment Assistance for Workers, Farmers, Fishermen, Communities, and Firms
Act of 1001. Report to accompany S. 1209. S. Report. 107-134, February 4, 2002, p. 52.
8 Ibid., p. 50, table 1.

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CRS-12
track trade bill.9 On March 14, 2002, a majority of Senate Democrats signed a letter
to Senator Tom Daschle, Senate Majority Leader, supporting the retention in TPA
legislation of health care provisions included in S. 1209 as reported.10
The expansion of the TAA program has been long called for by labor proponents
who have argued that all workers who lose their jobs for trade-related reasons
(whether from increased imports or from plant relocations) should be eligible for the
same benefits – benefits that will offer financial support, retraining, and relocation
benefits as they work to upgrade their skills and transition into more complex jobs
that offer them the best opportunity of reclaiming old earnings levels.
On the other hand, some argue, S. 1209 would increase costs significantly.
President Bush proposed in his FY 2003 budget (submitted before the TAA Reform
Act of 2002, which would abolish the NAFTA-TAA program) to extend the TAA and
NAFTA-TAA programs. The Administration’s FY2003 budget request includes total
funding of $462 for the TAA and NAFTA-TAA programs – an increase of $46
million over FY2002 funding levels of $416 million. CBO estimates that the changes
in direct spending for the new TAA program for workers under S. 1209, including the
health insurance coverage, will result in estimated budget outlays in 2003 of $996
million.
Environment-Related Provisions*
The House-passed and Senate-reported versions of H.R. 3005 contain several
environmental objectives and related provisions, and, overall, give substantially
greater consideration to environmental matters than did previous fast-track trade
agreement authority under the 1988 Trade Act. In that Act, environmental concerns
were addressed only in negotiating objectives regarding trade in services and foreign
direct investment. These provisions directed U.S. negotiators, in pursuing stated
goals, to
take into account legitimate United States domestic objectives including, but not
limited to, the protection of legitimate health or safety, essential security,
environmental, consumer or employment opportunity interests and the law and
regulations related thereto.
(1988 Trade Act, §§ 1101(b)(9) and (11); 19 U.S.C. §§ 2901(b)(9), (11))
Agreements entered into under this authority were the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) and the Uruguay Round Agreements which included the
establishment of the World Trade Organization (WTO). Despite the lack of explicit
9Baucus Stresses TAA’s Importance; Signals Minimal Changes Lie Ahead. Inside U.S.
Trade. March 1, 2002.
10Senate Democrats Take Hardline on TAA-Health Care Debate. Inside U.S. Trade, March
15, 2002, p. 36.
*Prepared by Mary Tiemann; Specialist in Environmental Policy; Resources, Science, and
Industry Division.

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CRS-13
environmental directives in the 1988 Trade Act, environmental concerns were
addressed in varying degrees in the NAFTA, the NAFTA environmental side
agreement, and certain Uruguay Round Agreements and Ministerial Decisions.
Environmental Objectives. The versions of H.R. 3005, as passed by the
House, and as reported by the Senate Finance Committee, include two identical
overall negotiating objectives on environment. The first objective is “to ensure that
trade and environmental policies are mutually supportive and to seek to protect and
preserve the environment and enhance the international means of doing so, while
optimizing the use of the world’s resources”. The second objective is to seek
provisions in trade agreements under which parties “strive to ensure that they do not
weaken or reduce the protections afforded in domestic environmental ... laws as an
encouragement for trade” (Sections 2(a)(5), (7)).
This second objective parallels language contained in the U.S.-Jordan Free Trade
Agreement (FTA) and the NAFTA (Chapter 11, Investment). Both agreements assert
that it is inappropriate to encourage trade by relaxing domestic environmental laws
and generally state that a party should not waive or otherwise derogate from such
measures to attract investment. NAFTA, Article 1114, further provides that a party
may request consultations if it considers that another party has done so.
Environmental groups have argued for TPA language that seeks to prevent
countries from weakening environmental standards to promote a trade advantage, and
the language in both bills appears to respond to that issue. Environmental interests
have further called for making such action subject to dispute settlement procedures.
Those opposing this proposal by environmentalists have expressed concern that, in
doing so, legitimate changes in domestic environmental measures could be subject to
challenge by U.S. trading partners. Neither version of H.R. 3005 includes such an
objective.
Additionally, both bills contain several identical principal negotiating objectives
on environment. Perhaps most significantly, Section 2(b)(11) provides that it is a
principal negotiating objective “to ensure that a party to a trade agreement with the
United States does not fail to effectively enforce its environmental ... laws, through
a sustained or recurring course of action or inaction, in a manner affecting trade
between the United States and that party.” A further objective is to recognize that
parties retain the right to exercise discretion with respect to prosecutorial, regulatory,
and compliance matters. These objectives mirror provisions contained in the U.S.-
Jordan Free Trade Agreement (FTA) and the NAFTA environmental side agreement.
The latter objective goes further than the U.S.-Jordan FTA to clarify the rights of a
government to establish its own environmental standards by adding, “no retaliation
may be authorized based on the exercise of these rights or the right to establish
domestic labor standards and levels of environmental protection.”
Other principal negotiating objectives on environment in both versions of the bill
include: strengthening trading partners’ capacity to protect the environment through
the promotion of sustainable development; reducing or eliminating government
practices or policies that unduly threaten sustainable development; seeking market
access for U.S. environmental technologies, goods, and services; and ensuring that

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environmental, health or safety policies or practices of the parties do not arbitrarily
discriminate against U.S. exports or serve as disguised barriers to trade.
Other Environment-Relevant Objectives. The bills set forth other
objectives that have implications for environmental laws and related disputes under
trade agreements. These include the objectives on dispute settlement, foreign
investment, transparency, and regulatory practices.
Dispute Settlement and Enforcement. The effectiveness of trade
agreement obligations is related to the strength of an agreement’s dispute settlement
process. Environmental interests argue that environmental obligations should be
included within trade agreements and that disputes involving these obligations should
be treated the same as commercial disputes, including using the same remedies. Some
business interests and others favor flexibility in addressing various kinds of disputes.
Provisions in both versions of H.R. 3005 parallel the U.S.-Jordan FTA and go beyond
NAFTA by calling for the inclusion of an obligation to enforce domestic
environmental laws within the texts of trade agreements. The dispute settlement
objectives of H.R. 3005, at Section 2(b)(12)(F), call for seeking provisions that treat
all principal negotiating objectives equally with respect to the ability to resort to
dispute settlement, and to have available equivalent dispute settlement procedures and
remedies; thus, the bill envisions that environmental obligations in a trade agreement
would be subject to dispute settlement under the agreement.
A further negotiating objective for dispute settlement shared by the House and
Senate bills, set forth at Section 2(b)(12)(F), is to seek provisions to impose a penalty
upon a party to a dispute that encourages compliance with the agreement and “is
appropriate to the parties, nature, subject matter, and scope of the violation, and has
the aim of not adversely affecting parties or interests not party to the dispute while
maintaining the effectiveness of the enforcement mechanism.” H.R. 3005, Section
2(b)(12), thus seeks to make all disputes equally subject to dispute settlement but
would provide flexibility in procedures and remedies.
Foreign Investment. Investment provisions have become an environmental
issue because of the types of claims that have been brought under NAFTA investment
provisions allowing foreign investors to arbitrate disputes with NAFTA parties. In
some cases, foreign investors have sought compensation for the negative impacts of
government environmental regulations, claiming that the government action is a form
of “indirect expropriation” or is “tantamount to expropriation.” NAFTA provides that
compensation must be equal to the fair market value of the expropriated investment.
These NAFTA provisions and related claims have prompted concerns by some that
this language may dampen the enforcement of environmental regulations in signatory
countries, and that foreign investors may have greater rights under the NAFTA with
respect to expropriations by federal, state, or local government in the United States
than domestic investors have under the Fifth Amendment Takings Clause.11
11 For further discussion, see CRS Report RS20904, International Investor Protection:
“Indirect Expropriation” Claims Under NAFTA Chapter 11, by Robert Meltz.

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CRS-15
Both versions of H.R. 3005, Section 2(b)(3) in each, appear to attempt to
address this concern to some degree, although the bills’ provisions differ in several
regards. The principal negotiating objectives for investment in each bill seek to reduce
barriers to trade-related foreign investment, and to “secure for investors important
rights comparable to those that would be available under United States legal principles
and practice.” The Senate-reported bill further calls for ensuring that U.S. investors
in the United States “are not accorded lesser rights than foreign investors in the
United States.” Both bills call for achieving these objectives by seeking the
establishment of “standards for expropriation and compensation for expropriation,
consistent with United States legal principles and practice.”
The bills also call for negotiators to seek to improve mechanisms used to resolve
disputes between an investor and a government through various means, including
mechanisms to eliminate frivolous claims. The Senate bill further calls for mechanisms
that would in addition deter the filing of frivolous claims; procedures to enhance
opportunities for public input into the formulation of government positions; and the
establishment of an appellate body to review decisions in investor-to-government
disputes and, thus, “provide coherence to the interpretations of investment provisions
in trade agreements.” In contrast, the House bill calls for negotiators to provide in
trade agreements an appellate or “similar” review mechanism to correct “manifestly
erroneous” legal interpretations.
Both bills call for negotiators to ensure the “fullest measure of transparency” in
investment disputes by: ensuring that requests for dispute settlement are promptly
made public, ensuring that proceedings, submissions, findings and decisions are made
public; and establishing a mechanism for accepting amicus curiae submissions from
businesses, unions, and nongovernmental organizations.
Environmental groups favor adding language in TPA investment objectives that
directs negotiators to seek provisions in trade agreements that provide explicit
protection for environmental measures that may affect foreign investors. Other
stakeholders want to ensure checks are maintained against the potential for disguised
or unfair barriers to foreign investment. Neither bill calls for negotiators to seek
explicit exceptions for environmental measures in the investment-related provisions
of trade agreements.
Transparency. Various interests, including the Administration, environmental
groups and others, have put a priority on increasing transparency (i.e., openness) in
trade matters and increasing public access to the dispute resolution process.
Environmental and business interests agree that greater openness would allow
increased awareness of the possible impacts of trade decisions relevant to their
concerns. Both bills contain identical provisions to significantly increase public
participation in trade matters, compared to current practice. Section 2(b)(5) provides
that a principal negotiating objective is to obtain wider application of the principle of
transparency through: increased and more timely public access to information on trade
issues and activities of international trade institutions; increased openness at the WTO
and other trade fora, including with regard to dispute settlement and investment; and
increased and more timely public access to all notifications and supporting
documentation submitted by WTO parties. Each bill contains additional transparency
provisions for the principal trade negotiating objective on investment.

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Regulatory Practices. Further, with respect to transparency, both versions
of H.R. 3005, Section 2(b)(8), include an identical principal negotiating objective on
regulatory practices, addressing the use of government practices to provide a
competitive advantage for domestic producers, service providers, or investors. The
goal of this provision is to lessen the use of regulations for the purpose of reducing
market access for U.S. goods, services or investments. This objective calls for U.S.
negotiators “to achieve increased transparency and opportunity for the participation
of affected parties in the development of regulations.” This objective would seemingly
benefit both U.S. business and environmental interests. Additionally, the negotiating
objective is “to require that proposed regulations be based on sound science, cost-
benefit analyses, risk assessment, or other objective evidence.” This language has
drawn criticism from environmental groups that have called for language that would
protect the ability of federal, state, and local governments to take precautionary
measures against risks in cases where scientific or other knowledge may be suggestive
but incomplete. Proponents argue that, without such disciplines, regulations can too
easily be used to create barriers to trade.
Promotion of Certain Priorities. In addition to negotiating objectives,
Section 2(c) in each bill requires the President to promote certain priorities “in order
to address and maintain U.S. competitiveness in the global economy.” The Senate
committee report accompanying H.R. 3005 (S. Rept. 107-139), explains that the
priorities are not negotiating objectives themselves, but that they “should inform trade
negotiations or be pursued parallel to trade negotiations.”12
Among these priorities, the bills contain several identical environmental
provisions. Specifically, under each bill, the President must: (1) seek to establish
consultative mechanisms to strengthen U.S. trading partners’ capacity to develop and
implement standards for protecting the environment and human health based on sound
science, and to report to the House Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate
Committee on Finance; (2) conduct environment reviews of trade and investment
agreements, consistent with Executive Order 13141,13 and report to the House
Committee on Ways and Means and the Senate Committee on Finance; (3) take into
account other legitimate U.S. domestic objectives including the protection of
legitimate health or safety interests and related laws and regulations; (4) continue to
promote consideration of multilateral environmental agreements (MEAs) and consult
with parties to MEAs regarding the consistency of an MEA containing trade measures
with existing environmental exceptions under the GATT; and (5) report to the House
Ways and Means and Senate Finance Committees no later than 12 months after the
United States imposes a penalty or remedy permitted by the trade agreement on its
effectiveness in enforcing U.S. rights.
12 U.S. Senate. Bipartisan trade Promotion Authority Act of 2002. Report to accompany H.R.
3005. S. Rept. 107-139. Feb. 28, 2002. p. 8.
13E.O. 13141, issued by President Clinton on November 16, 1999, commits the United States
to “a policy of careful assessment and consideration of the environmental impacts of trade
agreements and to factor environmental considerations into the development of its negotiating
objectives.” The order requires an assessment be “undertaken sufficiently early in the process
to inform the development of negotiating positions.”

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Agriculture*
TPA and Agricultural Interest Groups
TPA enjoys support throughout most, but not all, of the agricultural community.
For example, some 80 farm, agribusiness, and related organizations signed a June 18,
2001 letter to President Bush pledging their active support for TPA. On the other
hand, some farm groups, including the National Farmers Union (NFU), have opposed
TPA. The NFU joined nearly 50 labor, environmental, consumer, and allied
organizations in signing a June 19, 2001, letter to Members of Congress opposing
what then was the leading Republican alternative, because, they argued, it would not
address labor, environmental, and related concerns.
Key House Members with agricultural constituencies – including the chairman
of the House Agriculture Committee – threatened to withhold support for TPA unless
the Administration promised to support increases in U.S. farm subsidies in the House
farm bill (H.R. 2646). The Administration initially criticized the House-passed
omnibus farm bill for its cost ($73.5 billion in new spending over 10 years) and
potential for undermining U.S. efforts to expand agricultural trade. However, the
House committee chairman, and the ranking Democrat, ultimately pledged their
support for TPA after receiving assurances that the Administration would agree to the
new farm spending. (The farm bill currently is in conference.)
Both the House-passed version of H.R. 3005 and the Senate Finance Committee
version contain a principal negotiating objective with respect to agriculture as well as
extensive provisions requiring consultation between the Office of the U.S. Trade
Representative (USTR) and the House Agriculture Committee and the Senate
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committee. These provisions serve in part to
shore up support for TPA among agricultural groups and to address their specific
trade concerns, especially with respect to import-sensitive products.
Agricultural Negotiating Objectives
Both TPA bills state that the principal negotiating objective for agriculture is to
obtain competitive, fairer, and more open market opportunities for U.S. agricultural
exports by (among other things):

! Reducing or eliminating tariffs and other charges by a date certain, and
reducing foreign ones to levels the same as or lower than U.S. levels;

! Reducing or eliminating subsidies that harm U.S. exports or unfairly distort
markets;

! Allowing for the preservation of programs that support family farms and rural
communities;
*Prepared by Charles E. Hanrahan, Senior Specialist in Agricultural Policy, Resources,
Science and Industry Division.

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CRS-18

! Developing disciplines for domestic farm support so that production in excess
of domestic food security needs is sold at world prices, and eliminating policies
that create price-depressing surpluses;

! Eliminating whenever possible state trading enterprises (STEs);

! Strengthening dispute settlement mechanisms in order to eliminate practices
(including unfair or trade-distorting STE activities; unjustified labeling that
affects new technologies, including biotechnology; unjustified technical,
sanitary and other technical barriers to trade; and restrictive administration of
tariff rate quotas) that impair U.S. market opportunities;

! Eliminating practices that adversely affect trade in perishable or cyclical
products and addressing their trade problems; and ensuring that import relief
mechanisms for such products are as accessible and useful to U.S. growers as
they are to producers in other countries;

! Considering whether other countries have not lived up to existing trade
agreements, and how such agreements have impacted U.S. agriculture;

! Eliminating agricultural export subsidies, while maintaining bona fide food
assistance programs, and preserving U.S. market development and export
credit programs.
The bills call for U.S. negotiators to establish, as the base year for calculating
each country’s “Aggregate Measurement of Support” (i.e., the level of spending on
the most trade-distorting domestic agricultural subsidies), to be the end of its Uruguay
Round Agreement on Agriculture (URAA) implementation period. Likewise, both
bills call upon the USTR, before commencing negotiations on agriculture, in
consultation with Congress, to seek to develop a position on the treatment of seasonal
and perishable agricultural products in the negotiations. The position developed
would be used in negotiations to develop an international consensus on treatment of
seasonal or perishable products in dumping and safeguard investigations.
The Senate Finance Committee version of H.R. 3005 expands on the House bill’s
broadly worded objective of reducing or eliminating subsidies that decrease market
opportunities or unfairly distort agricultural markets. The Senate version calls for
eliminating all export subsidies on agricultural commodities while maintaining bona
fide food aid and preserving U.S. agricultural market development and export credit
programs that will allow the United States to compete with other foreign export
promotion efforts.
Import-Sensitive Agricultural Products
To garner more support from agricultural members, the bill’s House sponsors
added language to the committee-passed version which removes import-sensitive
agricultural products from the President’s tariff proclamation authority. At the same
time, the House bill expanded the consultation requirements that U.S. officials must
follow before undertaking tariff reduction negotiations on agricultural products
considered “import-sensitive” (defined in both House and Senate Finance Committee
versions as those subject to the minimum 2.5% annual reduction required under the
1994 URAA). The USTR would have to identify such products – likely more than
200 specific items ranging from cheese and many other dairy products to citrus and
various other fresh fruits and vegetables, sugar and other sweeteners, beef and lamb,
oilseeds, wine, tobaccos, cotton, wool, and chocolate – and consult with Congress on

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how domestic producers would be affected by tariff cuts, among other requirements.
The Senate Finance Committee version of H.R. 3005, which includes fish and
shellfish in the requirement for special consultation, contains somewhat different
language but with the same intent.
Requirements for Consultation with Agriculture Committees
In addition to consultation requirements for import-sensitive agricultural
products, both bills establish additional requirements for consultation with House and
Senate Agriculture Committees. Before initiating (or continuing) a negotiation, the
President is required to assess whether U.S. tariffs are lower than tariffs of other
WTO member countries and whether negotiations provide an opportunity to address
tariff disparities. Following the assessment, the President must consult with the
House Agriculture and the Senate Agriculture, Nutrition and Forestry Committees in
addition to consulting with both House Ways and Means and Senate Finance
Committees on the appropriateness of the United States agreeing to further tariff
reductions. Both bills also require the USTR to consult closely and on a timely basis
(including immediately before initialing an agreement) and to keep the agriculture
committees in each chamber fully informed.
Both bills establish a new Congressional Oversight Group (see discussion infra).
Membership in this group would include the chairman and ranking member, plus three
additional members, from the House Ways and Means Committee and from of the
Senate Finance Committee. Membership in this group also would include the
chairman and ranking member of committees which would have jurisdiction over
provisions of law affected by trade agreement negotiations. Thus agriculture
committee leadership would become members of this group if provisions of
agricultural laws were affected by negotiations.
TPA and Agricultural Negotiating Issues
Some analysts note that while both versions of H.R. 3005 would give the
President the authority he sought to proceed with negotiations, provisions in those
bills also could make it difficult for the President to achieve stated negotiating
objectives for agriculture. In particular, analysts say both versions’ requirement to
consult in advance with Congress before negotiating cuts in tariffs on import-sensitive
products, will make negotiating tariff reductions more difficult and could prevent
negotiations of trade-offs between sectors. Similarly, the Senate committee bill, by
including the preservation of U.S. export credit and food aid programs among the
negotiating objectives for agriculture, may render negotiations on export subsidy
reduction or elimination (a stated U.S. position in WTO agriculture negotiations)
more difficult. The Administration, however, has expressed the view that while the
fast track bills pose additional hurdles for lowering tariffs on import-sensitive
products, in the long-run (because they involve extensive consultation with Congress)
they provide a “better basis” for negotiations.

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Congressional Oversight and President’s
Consultations with the Congress*
There are only a few differences between the House-passed and Senate-reported
versions of H.R. 3005. Such differences are identified by their alphanumerical
designation in italics. The numbering of sections deferred to follows the Senate-
reported version of the bill.

Congressional Oversight Group
The Bipartisan Trade Promotion Authority Act of 2001 (H.R. 3005), in Section
7, provides for the establishment of the Congressional Oversight Group, a new,
formally constituted congressional body to facilitate timely exchange, with the U.S.
Trade Representative (USTR), of information related to the negotiation of trade
agreements, including regular briefings, access to pertinent documents, and
coordination at all critical periods during the negotiations. The Group would consult
with and provide advice to the USTR regarding the formulation of specific
objectives, negotiating strategies and positions, the development of the applicable
trade agreement, and compliance with and enforcement of the commitments
negotiated under the agreement. The guidelines for the Group’s functions would be
developed by the USTR in consultation with the chairmen and ranking minority
members of the House Ways and Means and the Senate Finance committees.
Members of the Group would be accredited by the USTR on behalf of the President
as official advisers to the U.S. delegation in the negotiations of trade agreements to
which the Act applies.
The Group would be convened, initially within 60 days after the enactment date
of the Act and subsequently within 30 days after the convening of each Congress, by
the chairmen of the House Ways and Means, and the Senate Finance committees, and
would consist of the chairmen and ranking members of those two committees, or their
designees, and three additional members of each of those committees (not more than
two of whom may be members of the same political party). Moreover, in the
negotiations of a trade agreement concerning matters within the jurisdiction of any
other House or Senate committee, the chairmen and ranking members of such
committees, or their designees, would be included in the membership of the Group.
The Group would be chaired by the chairmen of the House Ways and Means, and the
Senate Finance committees.
In its functions, the Congressional Oversight Group would complement, with
respect to agreements negotiated and implemented under the authority of the Act, the
similar, but more general, functions of the slightly more numerous congressional
advisers for trade policy and negotiations, provided for in Section 161 of the Trade
Act of 1974, as amended (19 USC 2211) and appointed to their positions at the
beginning of each session by the Speaker of the House and the President pro tempore
of the Senate.
*Prepared by Vladimir N. Pregelj; Specialist in International Trade and Finance; Foreign
Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division.

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CRS-21
President’s Consultations with the Congress
In view of the fact that the legislation to implement a bilateral or multilateral
trade agreement dealing with matters other than solely tariff concessions, as
authorized by the Act, and qualifying for the expedited (“fast track”) legislative
procedure, may not be amended, the Congress has — since the original authorization
of such procedure by the Trade Act of 1974 — required that the President report to
and/or consult with the Congress at various stages before and during the negotiation
of such an agreement. With this requirement, the Congress has retained for itself a
means whereby it can be currently informed on and play an active role in fashioning
the language of the agreement and of the implementing legislation to reflect the
agreement’s required statutory objectives as well as its own diverse interests and
goals. Consultation with the Congress is also called for with respect to certain aspects
of any type of trade agreement.
Like the earlier versions of comparable legislation, both versions contain virtually
identical provisions which require the President (in this context including also the
USTR as the President’s principal trade official) to consult with Congress at specified
stages of the trade agreement negotiation process. Except for the addition of several
requirements for advance notices of certain stages of negotiations, specific provisions
regarding consultations on agricultural trade, and the inclusion of the newly created
Congressional Oversight Group in the consultations, other consultation requirements
and sanctions for failure to consult provided in H.R. 3005 do not differ essentially
from those enacted most recently by the 1988 Trade Act.
The required consultations are arranged below in the approximate sequence in
which they would take place.
(1) In the preliminary stage of setting the comprehensive trade negotiating
objectives in agricultural trade, the USTR is required to seek to develop before
commencing negotiations, in consultation with the Congress, a negotiating position
with respect to the treatment of seasonal or perishable agricultural products,
particularly in dumping and safeguards investigations (Section 2(b)(10)).
(2) With respect to agreements dealing with tariff barriers, the President is
required to notify Congress of his intent to enter into an agreement (Section 3(a)(1).
(3) With respect to agreements dealing with tariff and nontariff barriers (e.g.,
implementing free trade agreements), the President is required to submit to the
Congress, at least 90 days before initiating negotiations, a written notice of his
intention to enter into negotiations, together with sundry other information, and,
before and after its submission, consult regarding the negotiations with the Senate
Finance Committee, House Ways and Means Committee, such other House and
Senate committees as the President deems appropriate, and the Congressional
Oversight Group (Section 4(a)).
(4) Before initiating negotiations to provide a “level playing field” for American
agriculture (one of the negotiating objectives), the President is required to assess
whether there are disparities between the U.S. and foreign tariffs on agricultural
products and to consult concerning the results of the assessment with respect to

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CRS-22
objectives to be achieved in this regard, with the House Ways and Means, and
Agriculture committees, and the Senate Finance, and Agriculture, Nutrition, and
Forestry committees (Section 4(b)(1)).
(5) Before initiating negotiations with regard to agriculture, and, with respect to
the Free Trade Area of the Americas and with regard to agriculture under the auspices
of the World Trade Organization, as soon as practicable after enactment, the USTR
is required to identify import-sensitive agricultural products and consult with the
House Ways and Means, and Agriculture Committees, and the Senate Finance, and
Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry Committees, on various aspects of their
importation (Section 4(b)2)).
(6) Before initiating negotiations on fish and shellfish trade, the President is
required to consult with the House Ways and Means, and Resources Committees and
the Senate Finance, and Commerce, Science, and Transportation Committees (Section
4(b)(3)).
(7) Before initiating negotiations on textiles and apparel, the President is required
to assess the post-Uruguay Round disparities between U.S. and other countries’ tariff
rates on textiles and consult thereon with the House Ways and Means and the Senate
Finance Committees (Section 4(c)).
(8) In the course of any negotiation conducted under the authority of the Act,
the USTR must consult “closely and on a timely basis” with the Congressional
Oversight Group and all committees of both Houses with jurisdiction over laws that
would be affected by the agreement being negotiated (Section 2(d)(1)).
(9) At least 90 days before the President enters into a trade agreement, he must
notify the House Ways and Means and the Senate Finance Committees of any
amendments of the countervailing, antidumping, and safeguards law, proposed to be
included in the agreement-implementing legislation, and report on the reasons for such
changes (Section 4(d)(3)).
(10) The USTR must consult (including immediately before initialing an
agreement) with the congressional trade advisers, the House Committee on Ways and
Means, the Senate Committee on Finance, and the Congressional Oversight Group.
In addition, such consultations must be held with the House Committee on
Agriculture and the Senate Committee on Agriculture, Nutrition, and Forestry with
regard to negotiations and agreements relating to agricultural trade (Section 2(d)(2)).
(11) Before entering into an agreement dealing with tariff and nontariff matters,
the President is required to consult with the House Ways and Means Committee and
the Senate Finance Committee, with any other committee of either House and any
joint committee with jurisdiction over legislation in matters affected by the trade
agreement, and with the Congressional Oversight Group, with respect to the nature
of the agreement, how and to what extent the agreement will achieve applicable
purposes policies and objectives of the Act, and the implementation of the agreement
(Section 4(d)(1)).

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CRS-23
(12) The President’s failure or refusal to notify or consult with Congress with
respect to a tariff and nontariff agreement would result in the denial of the trade
authorities (fast-track) procedures for the consideration of a bill implementing that
agreement, if both Houses separately agree (under a specific expedited procedure)
within 60 days of each other to a procedural disapproval resolution denying such
procedures to the implementing bill in question due to failure to consult (Section
5(b)(1)(A)).
(13) Such disapproval resolution, however, is not in order in the event that the
President’s failure to give the 90-days notice prior to initiating negotiations and to
consult in connection with the negotiations of any of the four specified agreements
(which are likely to be negotiated in the foreseeable future), if the negotiations were
already in progress at the time of enactment of H.R. 3005. The President, however,
must notify the Congress of such negotiations and consult on them with the entities
listed in Section 4(a) (see (3) above) as soon as feasible (Section 6).
Expedited Procedures and
Procedural Controls on Their Use*
Although H.R. 3005 is said to provide “trade agreements authority,” it does not
itself grant the President any new authority. With or without specific statutory
authority, the President can negotiate trade agreements, and their implementation
would normally require new legislation. Instead, as its official title (“An Act to
Extend Trade Authorities Procedures...”) indicates, H.R. 3005 only “extends trade
authorities procedures.” That is, it extends to a specified class of trade agreements
the eligibility for an implementing bill to be considered under certain expedited
procedures. These expedited procedures, originally established by section 151 of the
Trade Act of 1974,14 are also called “fast track” procedures. Their intent is to ensure
that each house of Congress will (1) consider and vote on the implementing bill and
(2) entertain no amendments to the bill.
The availability of this expedited treatment encourages trade negotiations, by
assuring the President and other participants that Congress will vote on any agreement
they reach in the form they negotiated it. For just this reason, however, these
procedures significantly constrain the discretion Congress normally exercises over its
legislative agenda. H.R. 3005 compensates for these constraints by (1) restricting the
class of trade agreements that are eligible for expedited consideration, and (2)
ensuring that procedural means are available for each house to ensure that these
restrictions will not be breached. Through these procedural enforcement mechanisms,
Congress retains substantial control over whether trade agreements may be considered
under expedited procedures. Each mechanism is derived from similar ones that
* Prepared by Richard S. Beth; Specialist in the Legislative Process; Government and Finance
Division.
14 P.L. 93-618 (88 Stat. 1978), as amended; 19 U.S.C. 2191. The appendix provides
specifics.

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CRS-24
appeared in earlier statutes making trade authorities procedures available and
proposals for doing so.
The restrictions H.R. 3005 would place on trade agreements eligible for
expedited implementation, identified in earlier sections of this report, are principally
of four kinds:
! the agreement must be reached within a specified time period;
! specified notifications to and consultations with Congress must occur during
its negotiation;
! it must promote specified objectives; and
! the implementing bill must contain only specified kinds of provisions.
To enforce the first three restrictions, H.R. 3005 adapts specific mechanisms provided
for in previous legislation. Also, all four could be enforced through various
applications of the general constitutional power of each house of Congress to
determine its own rules.
Enforcing Time Restrictions
H.R. 3005 makes the expedited procedures of section 151 available for bills to
implement trade agreements entered into before June 1, 2005. This sunset provision
is one way in which Congress limits the extent of the constraint that the trade
authorities procedures place on its legislative discretion. H.R. 3005 also allows the
President to extend the availability of the expedited procedures to agreements entered
into until June 1, 2007, by so requesting, unless either house, before June 1, 2005,
disapproves the request by adopting an “extension disapproval resolution” (referred
to below as an “EDR”).
An EDR is to be considered under a separate set of expedited procedures,
intended to guarantee consideration and prohibit amendment, which is contained in
section 152 of the Trade Act of 1974.15 Under H.R. 3005, the House would refer the
resolution to the Committees on Ways and Means and Rules, and the Senate to the
Committee on Finance. In each house, the resolution could be considered on the floor
only if reported. This requirement effectively affords the revenue committees control
over this means regulating the availability of the trade authorities procedures.
Enforcing Notifications and Consultations
H.R. 3005 establishes a similar remedy if Congress finds that the notifications
and consultations required for any covered trade negotiation have not occurred. The
bill makes the expedited procedures of section 152 applicable to a “procedural
disapproval resolution” (here called a “PDR”), stating that the President has “failed
or refused to notify or consult” as required with respect to specified trade
negotiations. If both houses adopt PDR’s with respect to the same negotiation,
within 60 days of one another, the trade agreement becomes ineligible for expedited
consideration.
1519 U.S.C. 2192. The appendix provides specifics.

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Like an EDR, a PDR (1) is to be referred in the House to the Committees on
Ways and Means and on Rules, and in the Senate to the Committee on Finance, and
(2) in each house, may be considered on the floor only if reported. As with the EDR,
these arrangements vest in the revenue committees effective control over this means
to limit the availability of the trade authorities procedures.
As currently proposed in H.R. 3005, this mechanism is stronger and more
flexible than in either previous law or earlier versions. First, the House-passed and
Senate-reported versions contain new language providing explicitly that “failure to
consult” includes failure to develop guidelines for consultations with the
Congressional Oversight Group (described in earlier sections) or to meet with the
Group on request.
Second, under the 1988 Trade Act, adoption by both houses of PDR’s
terminated the trade promotion authority altogether. H.R. 3005 as introduced would
have allowed Congress to use this procedure to make a single trade agreement
ineligible for expedited implementation, while reserving its potential use for any
subsequent agreement. Under the House-passed and Senate-reported versions, the
mechanism can be used against any specified set of otherwise eligible trade
agreements. These versions, however, also introduce the new restriction that each
house may consider only one PDR with respect to any given trade agreement under
the expedited procedure during the same Congress.
Third, under both the 1988 Trade Act and the House-reported version of H.R.
3005, a PDR could be introduced in the House only by the chairman or ranking
minority member of the Committee on Ways and Means or on Rules, and in the
Senate had to be originated by the Committee on Finance. The House-passed bill and
Senate committee substitute eliminate this restriction, which increases the ability of
individual Members to influence the availability of the trade authorities procedure.
The retention of the reporting requirement nevertheless preserves committee control
over this decision.
The Senate committee substitute also excludes agreements negotiated under the
auspices of the World Trade Organization (WTO) from expedited consideration
unless the Secretary of Commerce submits a report to Congress on plans for
correcting dispute resolutions by the WTO that have "added to obligations or
diminished rights of the United States." This requirement, however, is not specifically
associated with any procedural enforcement mechanism.
Enforcing Pursuit of Objectives
As reported in the House, H.R. 3005 established no specific procedural means
for Congress to enforce the requirements it places on the objectives covered trade
agreements must serve. This limitation maintained the situation that existed under the
1988 Trade Act and other earlier statutes. For example, one of the revenue
committees might become convinced, through the required consultations, that a given
negotiation was not fostering the statutory negotiating objectives. Under the House-
reported version of H.R. 3005, the committee could not use a PDR to withdraw
eligibility for expedited consideration for this reason, as long as the consultations were
in fact taking place.

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The House-passed version of H.R. 3005 and the Senate committee substitute,
however, introduce a new provision under which “failure or refusal to notify or
consult” also includes failure of the pertinent trade agreement to “make progress in
achieving the purposes, policies, priorities, and objectives” the bill would establish.
This language extends the applicability of the PDR mechanism, enabling Congress to
withdraw eligibility for expedited consideration from a bill to implement a trade
agreement that Congress believes does not promote the established objectives.
Enforcing Restrictions on Contents
H.R. 3005 also contains no specific procedural mechanisms to enforce the
requirements it establishes for the contents of implementing bills and supporting
information required to be submitted to Congress. Instead, each house would
presumably be able to enforce these requirements by use of its constitutional power
to determine its own rules and their application. (In principle, the various means by
which the two houses exercise this power might also be available as additional, non-
statutory means for enforcing the other restrictions on trade authorities procedures
already discussed.)
For example, if an implementing bill included provisions of kinds not authorized
under H.R. 3005, it might be possible in either house to raise a point of order that the
measure did not meet the statutory description of a measure eligible for expedited
consideration. If the chair sustained the point of order, it would in effect vitiate the
opportunity for that trade agreement to receive expedited consideration. Each house
also always retains the ability permanently to alter or supersede any statutory
procedure by adopting a resolution amending the procedure, just as it may do for its
own standing rules. Like most statutes establishing expedited procedures, existing
trade law and H.R. 3005 explicitly reserve to each house this use of the constitutional
rulemaking power.
In the House, if an implementing bill did not meet statutory requirements, it
would be more likely for the Committee on Ways and Means to ask the Committee
on Rules to report a special rule proposing that the measure be considered other than
under the statutory expedited procedures. This special rule could make amendments
in order, or even provide that some alternative measure be considered instead of the
implementing bill. Even when a measure does meet the criteria of eligibility for
expedited consideration, in fact, the House has sometimes considered it under the
terms of a special rule instead. The Senate normally alters its established procedures
for considering a measure only by entering into a unanimous consent agreement. Yet
it also retains the ability to reject the motion to proceed to consider an implementing
bill that the statute authorizes, and then instead take up the measure (or an alternative)
under its general procedures.
In this context, extension and procedural disapproval resolutions appear as
having a function parallel to, though in a sense opposite from, special rules in the
House. Like special rules, the two kinds of disapproval resolution have the function
of regulating procedure. Whereas special rules establish the procedures under which
a specified measure shall be considered, disapproval resolutions determine that certain
procedures shall not be used to consider specified measures. In this light, for
example, the statutory prohibition on amending an implementing bill appears not as

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CRS-27
a conclusive limitation on the authority of Congress, but rather as parallel to the
closed rule that the Committee on Ways and Means customarily requests for
consideration of revenue measures.

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CRS-28
Appendix: Expedited Procedures in Current Law*
Section 151: Implementing Bills
Section 151 of the Trade Act of 1974 establishes expedited procedures for bills
to implement trade agreements. The following paragraphs list provisions of this
section that would apply to the new class of implementing bills that H.R. 3005 would
establish.
The implementing bill is to be introduced in each house, jointly by the two floor
leaders or their designees, on the first day each house meets after the President
submits his draft bill.
The bill is to be referred to the committees of jurisdiction. The principal
committees involved will normally be the House Committee on Ways and Means and
the Senate Committee on Finance. In each chamber, if committees of referral do not
report by the end of 45 days of session, they are automatically discharged. (If the
implementing bill contains revenue provisions, however, the Senate must for
constitutional reasons pass the House bill. In this case, the Senate committee is to
report the House bill, received after House passage. If necessary, the 45-day deadline
is extended so that the Senate committee has 15 days to report after it receives the
House bill.)
Once the committees have reported or been discharged, a motion to proceed to
consider the bill is privileged (and nondebatable) in each house, so that no special rule
(in the House) or other special leadership action is necessary to call it up. The motion
to consider may not be amended, and the vote on it may not be reconsidered.
The time for floor consideration is limited to 20 hours, equally divided and
controlled (between the two party floor leaders, in the Senate; between supporters
and opponents, in the House). A nondebatable motion to reduce this time further is
made in order. Each house is to complete floor action within 15 days of session after
committees report or are discharged. No separate mechanism to enforce this deadline
is established.
In the House, no motion to recommit the bill is in order. Also, appeals and
motions to postpone consideration or turn to other business are nondebatable. In the
Senate, debate on an appeal or debatable motion is limited to one hour.
In both chambers, no amendment may be offered to the implementing bill, either
in committee or on the floor. This prohibition may not be suspended by motion or
unanimous consent.
Because the bills must be introduced in identical form and cannot be amended,
the versions passed by both chambers will presumably be identical. After one house
passes an implementing bill, the final vote in the other house is to occur on the bill
*Prepared by Richard S. Beth; Specialist in the Legislative Process; Government and Finance
Division.

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already received from the house that acted first. Since both bills will be identical, no
action to resolve House-Senate differences can become necessary, and this action will
clear the measure to be presented to the President.
If the President were to veto the bill, any attempt to override the veto would take
place under the general rules of each house. Section 151 establishes no special
procedures for this purpose.
Section 152: Extension and Procedural Disapproval
Resolutions
Section 152 of the Trade Act of 1974 establishes expedited procedures for
certain congressional actions to make certain implementing bills ineligible for
expedited consideration under section 151. As explained in the body of the report,
H.R. 3005 makes these extension disapproval resolutions and procedural disapproval
resolutions eligible for expedited consideration only if they are reported from the
committees of referral (the respective revenue committees and, in the House, the
Committee on Rules). The following paragraphs list provisions of section 152 that
would apply to these resolutions under the terms of H.R. 3005.
Once the resolution is reported, a motion to proceed to consider it is privileged
and not debatable in both houses. Amendments to, or motions to reconsider the vote
on, the motion are not in order.
Debate on the resolution is limited to 20 hours, equally divided (in the House,
between supporters and opponents; in the Senate, between the two floor leaders).
In both houses, amendments to, or motions to recommit, the resolution are not
in order. In the House, motions to reconsider the vote on the resolution also are not
in order.
In the House, appeals and motions to postpone consideration of the resolution,
or to proceed to consider other business, are not debatable. In the Senate, debate on
an appeal or debatable motion is limited to one hour. A nondebatable motion is in
order to limit this debate time further.
No provisions are made for the resolution of any differences between the houses,
because both extension and procedural disapproval resolutions are simple resolutions
of each house separately

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