Order Code IB98038
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Nuclear Weapons in Russia:
Safety, Security, and Control Issues
Updated April 12, 2002
Amy F. Woolf
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Nuclear Weapons After the Demise of the Soviet Union
Location of Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union
Continuing Concerns about Command, Control, Safety, and Security
Russia’s Nuclear Command and Control System
Safety and Security of Stored Nuclear Warheads
Former Soviet Nuclear Facilities and Materials
Cooperative Programs For Nuclear Threat Reduction
The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program
Program Objectives and Funding
Implementing the Programs
International Science and Technology Centers
Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Programs
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention
Nuclear Cities Initiative
Bilateral Meetings
The U.S.-Russian Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation
(The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission)
The Strategic Stability Working Group (SSWG)
Safeguards, Transparency, and Irreversibility Talks
Arms Control Proposals
Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons
Agreement on the Disposition of Weapons-grade Plutonium
Sharing Early Warning Data
Alert Rates for Strategic Nuclear Weapons
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
FOR ADDITIONAL READING

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Nuclear Weapons in Russia:
Safety, Security, and Control Issues
SUMMARY
When the Soviet Union collapsed in late
Reports of Russian nuclear materials for
1991, it reportedly possessed more than
sale on the black market, when combined with
27,000 nuclear weapons, and these weapons
evidence of weaknesses in the security systems
were deployed on the territories of several of
have raised concerns about the possible theft
the former Soviet republics. All of the nuclear
or diversion of nuclear materials from these
warheads have now been moved to Russia, but
facilities.
Russia still has around 6,000 strategic nuclear
weapons and perhaps as many as 12,000
The United States and Russia are cooper-
warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
ating in many fora to improve the safety,
security, and control over Russia’s nuclear
Many analysts in the United States and
weapons and materials. Through the Nunn-
Russia have expressed concerns about the
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,
safety, security, and control over these wea-
the U.S. Department of Defense has provided
pons. Some of these concerns focus on Rus-
assistance worth nearly $2 billion to help
sia’s nuclear command and control structure.
Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus
Financial constraints have slowed the moderni-
safely transport and store weapons and elimi-
zation and replacement of many aging satellites
nate launchers under the START Treaties.
and communications links, raising the possibil-
The Department of Energy’s Materials Protec-
ity that Russia might not be able to identify a
tion, Control and Accounting Program is
potential attack or communicate with troops in
helping Russia and other former Soviet repub-
the field if an attack were underway. Some
lics secure nuclear materials at research and
fear that the misinterpretation of an ambiguous
other facilities in the former Soviet Union.
event might lead to the launch of nuclear
The nations have also held bilateral meetings
weapons. Some also expressed concern that
to identify ways in which they might cooperate
the year 2000 computer bug could affect Rus-
to improve security and resolve concerns.
sia’s command and control system, but it did
not.
Some have proposed that the United
States and Russia negotiate arms control
Some concerns are also focused on the
agreements to reduce their stockpiles of
safety and security of nuclear warheads in
nonstrategic nuclear weapons and to improve
storage facilities in Russia. Press reports and
transparency and confidence in the elimination
statements by Russian officials about possible
of those weapons. Others have proposed that
missing warheads have added to these
the two sides agree to “de-alert” their strategic
concerns. However, General Eugene Habiger,
nuclear weapons to reduce the pressures and
former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Stra-
relieve concerns about Russia’s nuclear com-
tegic Command, stated that he had no major
mand and control system.
concerns about security at Russian nuclear
storage facilities after he visited several stor-
age sites in October 1997 and June 1998.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Reports published in early April 2002 indicate that the Bush Administration will not
certify that Russia is “committed to complying” with its arms control obligations under the
Biological Weapons and Conventional Weapons Conventions. This certification is required
by law before the United States can obligate additional funds to U.S. assistance for Russia
under the DOD CTR program and the State Department nonproliferation programs.
Ongoing projects can continue, but new projects cannot begin and new funds cannot be
obligated to existing projects. The Administration has not indicated that Russia has violated
these agreements, but it has questioned Russia’s commitment to share information and
provide data related to them.
The Bush Administration has requested $416.7 million for DOD’s Cooperative Threat
Reduction program for FY2003; this represents a small increase over the $403 million that
Congress authorized for CTR in FY2002. Within this budget, funding for Strategic Offensive
Arms Elimination would decline, from $133.4 million to $70.5 million in Russia and from
$50 million to $6.5 million in Ukraine. These declines occur because much of the agreed
work has been completed now that START I implementation is complete. At the same time,
the Administration has proposed an increase in funding for the chemical weapons
destruction facility in Russia from $50 million in FY2002 to $133.6 million in FY2003.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Nuclear Weapons After the Demise of the Soviet Union
After the 1991 demise of the Soviet Union, many analysts grew concerned that nuclear
weapons might be lost or stolen, or that some might be launched by accident or without
authorization by responsible officials. Many of these weapons were located outside Russia,
but have since been returned to storage areas in Russia. The United States has offered
through efforts such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program, to enhance
safety and security at nuclear facilities in Russia. Many of the early concerns about the
potential loss of control have eased, but concerns about the long-term effects of economic
hardship and the increasing age of Soviet-era systems continue to prompt questions about the
disposition of Russia’s nuclear weapons. This issue brief highlights continuing concerns about
the safety and security of these weapons and ongoing U.S. assistance programs.
Location of Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union
When the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991, it possessed, according to most estimates,
more than 27,000 nuclear weapons. These included more than 11,000 strategic nuclear
weapons — warheads on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and in bombers with the range needed to
attack the continental United States — and over 15,000 warheads for nonstrategic tactical
nuclear weapons (such as artillery shells, short-range missiles, nuclear air-defense and ballistic
missile defense interceptors, nuclear torpedoes and sea-launched cruise missiles, and nuclear
weapons for shorter-range aircraft). Bye the end of 2001, Russia reportedly retained around
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5,900 warheads on its strategic nuclear weapons and, according to some reports, between
7,000 and 12,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
In 1991, more than 80% of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons, including all ballistic
missile submarines, were deployed at bases in Russia. The remaining strategic nuclear
weapons were deployed in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. By the end of 1996, these
states had all returned their nuclear warheads to Russia and begun to eliminate the launchers
for strategic nuclear weapons under the terms of the START I Treaty. By the end of 1998,
only Ukraine still had Soviet-era strategic missiles in silos on its territory, and it continued its
efforts to eliminate these missiles and their silos. The last SS-19 ICBM was eliminated at the
end of February 1999, and all SS-24 silos were eliminated by October, 2001. After lengthy
and unsuccessful negotiations with Russia, Ukraine began to dismantle the Soviet-era
bombers on its territory. However, in August 1999, Ukraine and Russia announced that
Russia would take 8 of these aircraft as partial payment for Ukraine’s debt for natural gas
deliveries from Russia. In October, the two nations completed the details of the transaction
and noted that Russia would buy 11 of the strategic bombers from Ukraine. Table 1 depicts
the number of nuclear weapons deployed in these states in late 1991 and their status today.
Table 1. Strategic Nuclear Weapons in the Non-Russian Republics
Strategic Nuclear Weapons in
Strategic Nuclear Weapons
State
1991
Today
Belarus
81 SS-25 single-warhead mobile
All SS-25 single-warhead mobile
ICBMs
ICBMs, with warheads and
launchers, removed in Nov. 1996
Kazakhstan
104 SS-18 10-warhead silo-based
All SS-18s removed from silos and
ICBMs (1,040 warheads)
silos destroyed; all warheads,
40 Bear H bombers
bombers and cruise missiles
returned to Russia.
Ukraine
130 SS-19 6-warhead silo-based
All SS-19 silos and SS-24 silos
ICBMs
have been destroyed. Ukraine has
46 SS-24 10-warhead silo-based
completed dismantling of
ICBMs
bombers, after transferring 11 to
About 40 strategic bombers
Russia, and transferred or
More than 500 air-launched cruise
dismantled all cruise missiles.
missiles
Source: U.S. Department of Defense.
Many of the Soviet Union’s tactical nuclear weapons were also stationed outside Russia,
in Eastern Europe or in republics that were closer to prospective theaters of operation. The
weapons in Eastern Europe had reportedly been returned to Russia by 1989. In late 1991,
the majority of weapons outside Russia reportedly were in Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan,
with perhaps less than 5% in Georgia and the Central Asian states (Kirghizia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.) According to officials in Russia and these other states, all
the weapons had been moved to storage areas in Russia by the end of 1992.
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According to American and Russian sources, the command and control system for all
Soviet strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is centered in Moscow. This central command
would have to authorize the use of any nuclear weapons. As the Soviet Union dissolved in
December 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin replaced Soviet President Gorbachev at the
top of the command authority, but the rest of the system remained the same.

Continuing Concerns about Command, Control, Safety, and
Security
Many in the United States and Russia remain concerned about safety, security, and
control over nuclear weapons in Russia. These concerns center on three general areas —
concerns about weaknesses in Russia’s command and control system; concerns about the
possible loss of nuclear warheads due to lax security or accounting at nuclear weapons
facilities; and concerns about the loss or theft of nuclear materials from the former Soviet
Union’s nuclear weapons facilities might.
Russia’s Nuclear Command and Control System
Russia’s nuclear command and control system consists, generally speaking, of early
warning satellites and sensors that would warn of an imminent attack on Russian territory; the
senior political and military leaders who would assess the nature of the attack and, if
necessary, authorize a response using Russia’s nuclear weapons; and the communications
links that these commanders would use to consult with each other and to transmit messages
authorizing the use of nuclear weapons to commanders in the field. These messages would
contain the authorizing and enabling codes needed to “unlock” the permissive action links
(PALs) and other technologies used to make sure that nuclear weapons could not be armed
and launched without authorization from the central command authority. (For a more detailed
description of this command and control system, see CRS Report 97-586, Russia’s Nuclear
Forces: Doctrine and Force Structure Issues.)
Analysts in the United States and Russia have pointed to the degradation of Russia’s
early warning network of satellites and radars to note that Russia may soon lack the ability
to monitor and react to strategic threats to its own territory. In early 1997, Russia’s Defense
Minister Rodionov stated that he feared a loss of control over Russian strategic nuclear forces
in the future if additional funding were not available to maintain and modernize the
communications links in the nuclear command and control structure. Furthermore, in June
and July 1998, both of Russia’s geostationary early warning satellites failed; this leaves Russia
relying on its older satellites and ground radar stations for early warning of ballistic missile
attacks. These systems cannot provide continuous coverage of U.S. missile launch sites. At
the end of August, Latvia shut down the Skrunda radar, which had provided Russia with early
warning of ballistic missile attacks. Russia had hoped that Latvia would allow this radar to
continue operating until a new radar in Belarus was completed.
The U.S. Defense Department has downplayed concerns about a loss of control over
Russia’s nuclear weapons, noting that the central command structure remains in place. But
some analysts fear that Russia could respond to the degradation of the system by
disseminating codes needed to launch nuclear weapons to commanders in the field to make
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sure that these commanders could launch missiles in a conflict. This might increase the
possibility of an accidental or unauthorized use of these weapons.
According to Russian press reports, strategic rocket forces personnel have faced serious
financial hardship. Inadequate funding for training and maintenance, along with low morale,
could lead to an eventual breakdown of authority. Shooting incidents at facilities that house
nuclear weapons or materials and onboard a nuclear-powered attack submarines have raised
further concerns about the reliability of Russia’s military personnel. Although problems with
the troops probably would not lead to the unauthorized use of nuclear weapons, they could
make it difficult for Russia to remain confident in the reliability and effectiveness of its nuclear
deterrent. The National Intelligence Council reported, in February 2002, that these concerns
had eased somewhat in recent years, as the Russian economy had improved and wages were
restored. Russia has also implemented several programs that screen troops responsible for
nuclear weapons for psychological, drug, and alcohol problems.
In 1999, concerns focused on the possibility that the Y2K bug could pose problems for
Russia’s military systems. The two nations established the Y2K Center for Strategic Stability
at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado in late 1999. Together they monitored ballistic
missile launches world-wide from December 30, 1999 through January 15, 2000. Russian
officers manned the center and had access to data from U.S. early warning assets. The New
Year passed with no apparent or reported missile warning problems.
Safety and Security of Stored Nuclear Warheads
In the early 1990s, Russia withdrew most nonstrategic nuclear weapons from
deployment and placed them in secure storage areas. Russia has consolidated these weapons,
reducing from several hundred to, perhaps, less than one hundred storage facilities. Russian
officials also contend that they have begun to dismantle these warheads at a rate of around
2,000 per year. The United States does not have independent confirmation of this number,
and some analysts suspect that Russia could still have 12,000 warheads for nonstrategic
nuclear weapons in its storage facilities. Many in the United States remain concerned about
the level of security at these facilities and some fear that, as a result of poor security and
inadequate record-keeping, Russia may not be able to keep track of all its warheads.
In March 1992, reports suggested that a few nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan might
have been sold to Iran. These reports stated that Iran did not have codes needed to detonate
the weapons but that it might use them to gain design information it needs for its own nuclear
weapons programs. At the time, Russian and Kazakh officials denied that nuclear weapons
were missing, and U.S. officials stated that the United States has no evidence of such a
transfer. Nevertheless, these reports resurfaced in April 1998 — the Jerusalem Post
newspaper reported that an Israeli politician had received Iranian documents showing that
Iran had received these weapons. Russia repeated its denials and U.S. officials repeated that
the United States had no evidence that any nuclear warheads were missing from Russia. The
1998 reports surfaced amidst concerns about Russia construction of nuclear power reactor
in Iran and reports that Russian firms were assisting Iran’s missile development program.
Some believe the timing was intended to apply added pressure on Russia to cease its
cooperation with Iran and on the U.S. Congress to impose sanctions on Russia.
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In September 1997, former Russian Security Council head and national security advisor
Alexander Lebed alleged that Russian authorities could not locate 100 out of 250 small
portable nuclear demolition munitions. The Russian Defense Ministry responded by noting
that “the Russian system of nuclear weapons safety keeps nuclear weapons under full control
and makes any unauthorized transport of them impossible.” It also stressed that all nuclear
weapons had been withdrawn to Russia from the former Soviet republics. Other Russian
observers also discounted Lebed’s allegations. In early October 1997, Lebed appeared to
withdraw his allegation, stating that he had investigated the matter and had found no evidence
of missing nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the debate in Russia continued, with some alleging
that Russia never had such small munitions and others confirming that the munitions existed
but denying that any are unaccounted for. The White House stressed that the United States
had “no credible information that any [Russian] nuclear weapon ... has ever been available
on the black market.”
In late 1997, George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence indicated that the United
States remained concerned about the possible loss or theft of nuclear weapons and materials
in Russia due to declining social and economic conditions. He did not, however, offer any
evidence that such losses had already occurred. But conditions continued to deteriorate, and
some wages went unpaid for several months during the financial crisis that began in mid-
1998. As a result, many analysts have continued to express concerns about the “human
factor” and the possibility that low morale and poor living conditions may combine to weaken
security and controls over nuclear weapons.
General Eugene Habiger, the former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Strategic
Command, visited nuclear weapons storage facilities in Russia to observe safety and security
procedures on two occasions, in October 1997 and June 1998. He stated that he was
impressed with what he saw, although he acknowledged the tour only focused on strategic
nuclear weapons and provided no information about security procedures at storage facilities
for nonstrategic nuclear weapons. He also noted that Russia lacked many high-tech devices
the United States used to maintain security at its nuclear bases and seemed to rely more
heavily on added manpower. But he stated that he did not have any serious concerns about
the security of Russia’s nuclear weapons.
Some in Congress remain concerned about Russia’s stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear
weapons. The Senate added an amendment to the FY1999 Defense Authorization Act (P.L.
105-261) and the FY2000 Defense Authorization Bill (S. 1059) calling on the President to
press Russia to reduce these weapons in accordance with its pledges from 1991 and 1992.
The amendment also requires that the Secretary of Defense submit a report detailing the
numbers, types, strategic implications, and proliferation risks associated with Russia’s
nonstrategic nuclear weapons. A request for this report remained in the House and Senate
versions of the FY2001 Defense Authorization Bill.
After the terrorist attacks in Washington and New York in September 2001, Russian
officials reportedly increased security at nuclear weapons facilities. They also denied, on
several occasions, that any Russian nuclear weapons were missing. They insisted that
terrorists had not gained access to Russia’s nuclear arsenal.
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Former Soviet Nuclear Facilities and Materials
Concerns about the loss or theft of nuclear materials from Russia have grown since the
September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center and Pentagon. Analysts and government
officials have noted that Osama bin Laden may have sought to acquire nuclear materials,
possibly to construct a nuclear explosive device, but, more likely, to construct a “dirty bomb.”
With this type of weapon, nuclear waste or other radioactive materials would be combined
with conventional explosives and dispersed over a wide area.
There have been numerous reports of nuclear materials from facilities in the former
Soviet Union appearing on the black market in Europe. In most cases, the materials lacked
the purity to be used to manufacture nuclear weapons. However, in several of the reported
cases, the materials could have been useful to a nation seeking to develop nuclear weapons.
In May 1999, the National Research Council, an arm of the U.S. National Academy of
Sciences, issued a report stating that security at Russia’s nuclear materials facilities was worse
than previously reported. The report argued for sustained cooperation between the United
States and Russia to improve security and prevent the diversion of these materials. Officials
from the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry disputed these reports and argued that some
safeguards are Russian facilities were more stringent than those at U.S. facilities. The
National Intelligence Council also highlighted the risks of theft or diversion from facilities
housing nuclear materials in its report to Congress in February 2002.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) estimates that there may be enough weapons-
usable nuclear materials to produce 40,000 nuclear weapons at facilities in 8 countries that
were once a part of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union secured most of these facilities by
placing them in closed cities or by using with gates and armed guards. But, according to
DOE, budget cuts and political upheavals have this system. Many facilities lacked fences,
monitors, alarms, and comprehensive accounting systems to keep track of materials. Reports
indicate that even those facilities with security and monitoring systems often disconnected
them to save money on electric bills and to reduce false alarms. They also have been unable
to pay the guards and officers charged with maintaining security at the facilities.
Deterioration of economic conditions and the decline in military spending has also
displaced many scientists and engineers who worked in Soviet nuclear programs. Although
reports of scientists moving to other countries have waned, the economic problems continue.
For example, on July 23, 1998, several thousand staff members at Arzamas-16, one of
Russia’s premier nuclear research facilities, stopped work during a three-hour strike. They
sought back payment for wages and budget allocations for 1997 and a pay increase for 1998.
Nuclear workers from several of the closed cities participated in a strike in mid-September
1998, with many traveling to Moscow for protests at the Atomic Ministry (MINATOM).
Cooperative Programs For Nuclear Threat Reduction
The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program
Program Objectives and Funding. In November 1991, Congress allocated $400
million in Department of Defense funds to help the former Soviet republics secure their
nuclear weapons. The funds were to provide Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan
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assistance in 1) the transportation, storage, safeguarding and destruction of nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons and the dismantlement of missiles and launchers; 2) the prevention
of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and, 3) the prevention of diversion of
weapons-related scientific expertise. (For details on the CTR program, see CRS Report 97-
1027, Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs: Issues For Congress.)
Although some Members have questioned the benefits and administration of the Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, Congress has consistently supported
the central objectives of the program, allocating $400 million each year in FY1993, 1994, and
1995 and an additional $300 million in FY1996. In FY1997, the Senate passed a new
amendment sponsored by Senators Nunn, Lugar and Domenici that added $94 million to
DOD and DOE budgets to expand U.S. efforts to contain and control nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons in the former Soviet Union. These funds were included in the
House-Senate Conference Report, which provided $364.9 million to DOD for CTR, in
addition to the funds for DOE, in the FY1997 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 104-201).
Congress also approved $382.2 million for CTR in FY1998 (P.L. 105-85, H.Rept. 105-340),
and $440.4 million in FY1999 (P.L. 105-261, H.Rept. 105-736). In FY1999, the House
sought to eliminate funding for chemical weapons destruction, but the Senate restored the
funding and prevailed in conference.
The Clinton Administration requested $475.5 million for CTR in FY2000. The Senate
(S. 1059) approved the full request, but expressed concerns about Russia’s financial
commitment and about other areas of Russia’s nuclear weapons programs. The House
approved $444.1 million for CTR and again eliminated funding for the construction of a
chemical weapons destruction facility. The Conference Committee (H.Rept 106-301)
approved the Administration’s request of $475.5 million, but it also approved House position
precluding funding for the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility. The
Clinton Administration requested $458.4 million for CTR in FY2001. The Senate Armed
Services Committee again approved the full amount, but limited the use of funds for the
construction of the chemical weapons destruction facility. The House again eliminated
funding for the chemical weapons destruction facility and provided only $433.4 million. The
House prevailed and the Conference Report (H.Rept. 106-945) authorized the appropriation
of only $433.4 million for CTR and precluded any expenditures on the construction of a
chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia. It expressed the sense of Congress that the
international community should do more to help Russia eliminate its chemical weapons.
The Bush Administration requested $403 million for CTR programs in FY2002, a
reduction of $40 million from the amount authorized in FY2001. This reduction results
primarily from the absence of funding for the Mayak plutonium storage facility. The
Administration has stated that Russia did not need additional assistance with this project. The
Administration did, however, requested $50 million to resume construction at the chemical
weapons destruction facility in Russia. Congress had denied funding for this project in
FY2000 and FY2001, but it approved the request for FY2002, along with its approval of the
full request for $403 million. The Bush Administration has requested $416.7 million for CTR
for FY2003. Within this budget, funding for Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination would
decline, from $133.4 million to $70.5 million in Russia and from $50 million to $6.5 million
in Ukraine. These declines occur because much of the agreed work has been completed now
that START I implementation is complete. At the same time, the Administration has
proposed an increase in funding for the chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia from
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$50 million in FY2002 to $133.6 million in FY2003. The new budget also increases funding
for biological weapons nonproliferation programs.
In late December 2001, the Administration completed its review of the CTR program,
and concluded that it should continue with most of the programs currently underway. It
concluded that these programs were “effectively managed” and did serve U.S. interests.
However, in April 2002, reports indicated that the Administration had decided that it would
not certify that Russia was committed to its arms control obligations under the Chemical
Weapons and Biological Weapons Conventions. The law states that this certification is
necessary for a recipient nation to receive assistance under the CTR program or the State
Department nonproliferation programs. The Administration did not accuse Russia of
violating these agreements, and but it indicated that Russia had not cooperated fully with the
United States in sharing information relevant to the implementation of these treaties. It has
asked Congress to waive the requirement for the certification, but, in the meantime, Russia
will not receive any additional funding to advance ongoing CTR projects or to begin new
projects. Some observers have criticized this policy, noting that even the Administration
agrees that these programs serve U.S. security interests, and that their suspension could
undermine U.S. nonproliferation policy. Some believe the Administration’s action reflects
less concern about Russia’s compliance with arms control agreements then it does the
Administration’s belief that these agreements do not work and should not remain in force.
Implementing the Programs. By January 2002, the Department of Defense had
obligated nearly $3 billion for CTR projects and had spent nearly $2.4 billion implementing
those efforts. Early projects focused on transportation of nuclear warheads; the United States
provided secure rail cars, storage containers, and kevlar blankets to protect nuclear warheads
moving to storage areas inside Russia. The United States is also helping Russia with nuclear
weapons control and accounting systems at storage facilities. CTR projects have also helped
Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan eliminate Soviet-era strategic nuclear weapons and facilities
on their territories. In FY1999, DOD requested funds to begin helping Russia with a warhead
dismantling project. The two sides are also building a storage facility at Mayak for plutonium
removed from Russia’s nuclear weapons. The facility’s design has been completed and
construction is underway. However delays have occurred because Russia has been unable to
fund its portion of the project and the two sides have been unable to agree on transparency
measures that will ensure that materials stored in the facility are not removed and returned to
nuclear weapons uses.
The CTR program also funded projects that addressed a particular proliferation concern.
In November 1997, the United States purchased 21 nuclear-capable MIG-29 aircraft from the
Republic of Moldova. The United States feared that Moldova might sell these aircraft to a
nation seeking nuclear delivery capabilities. In April 1998, the United States and Great
Britain moved 8.8 pounds of highly enriched uranium and 17.6 pounds of highly radioactive
spent fuel from a nuclear reactor outside Tbilisi, Georgia to Dounreay, Scotland. According
to officials in the U.S. State Department, Georgia had first requested assistance in securing
these materials in 1996. The U.S. Department of Energy worked to improve security at the
facility, with both physical improvements and changes in security procedures. But the U.S.,
U.K. and Georgia eventually agreed that the only way to be sure the materials were safe was
to remove them from the country. In September 1998, the government of Kazakhstan
announced that it planned to move 3 tons of weapons-useable nuclear materials from a facility
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near the Iranian border to Semipalatinsk, on the other side of the nation, over the next several
years. Funds from the CTR program would help secure this material, as well.
International Science and Technology Centers
The United States, several European countries, and Japan have all provided funding to
International Science and Technology Centers (ISTC) in Moscow and Kiev. These centers
— which were originally funded through the CTR program, but are now funded by the State
Department — are designed to provide research and peaceful employment opportunities for
nuclear scientists and engineers. The Centers began operations in 1992 and have, thus far,
funded around 450 projects at a cost of $145 million. More than 17,000 scientists and
engineers have participated in ISTC projects. Many continue to work at their primary jobs
in Russia’s research facilities. But, because most have not received their full salaries at their
primary jobs, the grants from the ISTC permit them to support their families without
contemplating selling their knowledge to nations seeking nuclear weapons. The Bush
Administration will reportedly recommend expanding the ISTCs, in part due to concerns
about the potential risk that biological weapons scientists might be lured to programs in other
nations. Its budget for FY2003 contains $52 million, an increase of $25 million over its
request from FY20002.
Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Programs
As was noted above, many in the United States have expressed concerns about the safety
and security of nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union. Although some of the materials
believed to be at risk are located at nuclear weapons facilities, many others are located at
civilian nuclear research facilities. Although the Nunn-Lugar CTR program focused on
securing nuclear weapons, not materials, it did include some funding for materials control and
protection. But government-to-government negotiations with Russia and the other republics
proceeded slowly, so projects at facilities with these materials did not begin until 1994. In a
parallel effort that sought to reduce these delays, experts from the U.S. nuclear laboratories
also began, in 1994, less formal contacts with their counterparts in Russia to identify and
solve safety and security problems at Russian facilities. Together, the government-to-
government and lab-to-lab projects constitute the Material Protection, Control and
Accounting (MPC&A) program, which is funded through the U.S. Department of Energy;
these merged into a single program in 1997.
The MPC&A program began with less than $3 million in the FY1993 Nunn-Lugar
budget and $11 million in FY1994. This amount grew to $73 million in FY1995. In FY1996,
Congress expanded these programs through the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Amendment, and
provided $99 million in the DOE budget for MPC&A. The program received an additional
$115 million in FY1997 and $137 million in FY1998. The Administration requested and the
Congress approved $152 million for MPC&A activities in FY1999. The Clinton
Administration requested $145 million for MPC&A activities for FY2000 and nearly $145
million in FY2001; Congress approved both these requests.
According to GAO, the Department of Energy has identified 332 buildings that require
nuclear security systems. By late 1999, DOE had helped upgrade security systems at 113
buildings that contained about 50 metric tons of nuclear materials, or 7% of the 650 metric
tons that DOE believed were at risk of theft. These upgrades include the installation of
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improved security systems that use modern technology and strict material control and
accounting systems. The program has also provided security training for Russian nuclear
specialists. DOE officials have noted that the program had has experienced some problems
and results have been limited because most of the materials are in Russia’s closed nuclear
cities and nuclear weapons complex. MINATOM, which is responsible for these facilities,
has been slow to provide DOE with information about and access to these facilities because
of the sensitive nature of the nuclear weapons complex.
In August 2000, the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, a private
organization, issued a report that praised the past efforts of the MPC&A program, but
criticized DOE and the Administration for moving too slowly and with too little priority to
secure nuclear materials in the Former Soviet Union. The report outlined a number of steps
that it believed the next Administration should take to accelerate and strengthen the program.
It repeated many of these suggestions in a paper released in October, 2001, noting that the
September 11 attacks had renewed and strengthened concerns about the safety and security
of Russia’s nuclear materials.
The Clinton Administration requested $145 million for MPC&A activities for FY2001.
It also requested an additional $100 million for a new initiative, the Long Term
Nonproliferation Program for Russia. DOE planned to use $70 million of this amount to help
Russia strengthen security and accounting for existing civil plutonium stockpiles and to
prevent the further accumulation of separated plutonium from spent fuel produced by civil
nuclear power programs. The remaining $30 million would support a number of
nonproliferation programs related to Russia’s nuclear infrastructure, including new initiatives
for securing weapons-usable materials in Russia and to accelerate the closure of Russian
nuclear weapons assembly facilities. Congress approved the Administration’s request for the
MPC&A program, but did not fund the new Long Term initiative, noting that funding for this
program was premature.
The Bush Administration sharply reduced the planned funding for MPC&A programs
in FY2002. DOD had planned to request more than $200 million, but the Administration’s
budget reduced the program to 138.8 million. The Senate Armed Services Committee added
$5 million to this request and expressed its concern about that the reduced level of funding
would be inadequate to meet current and future needs. The Senate and House Appropriations
Committees, in the Energy and Water Appropriations bills for FY2002, also sought to
increase funding for the DOE programs. In the final version of the bill, which was passed in
early November 2001, Congress restored funding for the MPC&A program to its FY2001
level. But, in spite of wide-spread concerns about the vulnerability of Russia’s nuclear
materials after the September 11 attacks, it did not increase funding beyond that level.
Congress did, however, include $120 million in additional funds for this program in a
supplemental appropriations bill passed at the end of 2001. The Bush Administration has
requested $233 million for MPC&A programs in its budget for FY2003.
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention
The Department of Energy’s Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program,
which began in 1994, funds projects with non-military applications that have commercial
value for both the United States and the former Soviet republics. This effort is designed to
discourage scientists and engineers in Russia’s nuclear complex from seeking employment in
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other nations seeking nuclear weapons. The program has coordinated lab-to-lab contacts
that sought to identify technologies at former Soviet weapons facilities that might have
commercial applications. It also matches U.S. government funds with funds provided by U.S.
companies in projects that seek to commercialize these technologies.
The IPP program received $35 million in the FY1994 Foreign Operations Appropriations
Act, and funded 193 projects in 1995. In FY1996, Congress provided $10 million in the DOE
budget and the program received another $20 million from the Nunn-Lugar CTR budget.
IPP received $30 million in the DOE budget each year in FY1997 and FY1998. Through
FY1998, the IPP program had obligated $115 million to 435 projects throughout the former
Soviet republics. In FY1999, DOE requested only $15 million, noting that it had sufficient
unexpended funds from previous years to continue ongoing projects with this funding level.
The Senate, however, in its version of the FY1999 Defense Authorization Bill (S. 2057)
provided $30 million for the IPP program. The Conference Report on the Defense
Authorization Bill (H.Rept. 105-736) provided $20 million for the IPP Program. It also
required that the Secretary of Defense submit a study on the number of former Soviet nuclear
weapons scientists and engineers who are likely to be unemployed or unpaid and the extent
to which commercialization projects, such as those sponsored by IPP, might employ these
people and discourage them from selling their knowledge to other nations. The Clinton
Administration requested $30 million for the IPP program for FY2000 and $22.5 million for
FY2001. The Bush Administration requested $22.1 million for FY2002, and this was
supported by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.
In February 1999, the General Accounting Office issued a report that reviewed and
criticized the IPP program. The report noted that Russian institutes had received only
around one-third of the funds allocated to IPP projects — around 50% of the funds had gone
to the DOE labs for oversight and implementation and around 12% had gone to U.S.
companies that were participating in the program — and that taxes, fees, and other charges
had further reduced the amount of money available to Russian scientists. The report also
questioned DOE’s oversight of the programs, noting that program officials do not always
know how many scientists are receiving funds through the IPP program. Finally, the report
questioned whether the program was contributing to U.S. nonproliferation objectives because
none of the projects was yet a commercial success and because some scientists who received
IPP funding might still be working in Russia’s WMD programs. DOE agreed that the IPP
program needed improved oversight, but it questioned the conclusions about its contributions
to U.S. nonproliferation objectives. DOE noted that IPP has temporarily employed thousands
of scientists in around 170 institutes. DOE also stated that the program did not subsidize
scientists who were performing weapons-related work.
In response to the GAO report, the House and Senate both reduced the Administration’s
request for funding for the IPP program in FY2000 and limited the proportion of the funding
that can be allocated to the U.S. national labs. In the Conference Report on the FY2000
Defense Authorization Bill, Congress approved $25 million for IPP and specified that no
more than 35% of the funds be spent at the U.S. labs. It also mandated that the United States
seek to negotiate agreements with Russia to ensure that funds provided under this program
are not subject to taxes in Russia. Furthermore, it requested that the Secretary of Energy
review IPP programs for their commercialization potential.
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Nuclear Cities Initiative
In August 1998, Vice President Gore and then-Prime Minister Kiriyenko signed an
agreement establishing the Nuclear Cities Initiative. This program is designed to bring
commercial enterprises to Russia’s closed nuclear cities, so that scientists and engineers will
not be tempted to sell their knowledge to nations seeking nuclear weapons. In September
1998, Secretary of Energy Richardson and Russia’s Minister of Atomic Energy signed an
implementing agreement for this program. It is designed to promote nonproliferation goals
by helping to redirect the work of nuclear weapons scientists, engineers, and technicians and
to develop commercial opportunities in those cities. For example, it helped finance a
computing center in Sarov, formerly known as Arzamas-16, that will produce software for
sale around the world.
The Clinton Administration requested $30 million for the NCI program in FY2000. In
its February 1999 report, the GAO recommended that DOE move slowly with this initiative
to ensure that it met its stated goals and objectives. As a result, Congress reduced funding
for this program to $7.5 million in FY2000, limiting U.S. assistance to only one of three
nuclear cities that were included in the Administration’s initiative. The Clinton Administration
has requested $17.5 million for this program in FY2001. Although most members of Congress
have questioned the value of this program, in April 2000, Senator Domenici announced that
he was considering introducing legislation that would expand funding for the NCI program.
He stated that his goal would be to expand U.S. efforts to help Russia downsize its nuclear
complex. This legislation became S.Amdt. 3760 to the Senate version of the Defense
Authorization Bill. It authorized $30 million for the NCI program for FY2001, and passed
the Senate on July 13, 2000. The Conference Committee accepted this level of funding for
NCI in FY2001 but limited the amount that could be expended until the Secretary of Energy
implemented a review process for the program.
The Bush Administration cut funding for the NCI program sharply, requesting $6.6
million for FY2002. With this low level of funding, the program would have to withdraw from
two of the three nuclear cities that participate. The Administration has also indicated that it
would like to eliminate the NCI program and merge its remaining projects into the IPP
program. The Senate Armed Services supported the Administration’s funding request for
NCI, but did not support the Administration’s plan to merge the NCI program with the IPP
program. The House, however, required that DOE merge the NCI program with the IPP
program in by July 1, 2001. In the Conference Report on the FY2002 Defense Authorization
Bill, Congress approved the merger of the two programs, into a new Russian Transition
Initiative, but, at the Senate’s insistence, required that DOE continue to plan for and fund the
NCI programs separately. It also increased funding for the combined program from the
President’s request of $28.8 million to $42 million in the Energy and Water Appropriations
Bill and an additional $15 million in the Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Bill. The
Bush Administration has requested $39 million for this combined program in its budget for
FY2003.
Bilateral Meetings
Officials from the United States and Russia have met in several groups over the past 5
years to address specific problems in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex. Some groups have
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produced numerous agreements and cooperative efforts; others have shown few results. This
section briefly reviews the objectives of some of these bilateral working groups.
The U.S.-Russian Commission on Economic and Technological
Cooperation (The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission). In April 1993, Presidents
Clinton and Yeltsin established the U.S.-Russian Commission on Economic and
Technological Cooperation, to be chaired by Vice President Gore and Russia’s Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin. Although the Commission was created to foster cooperation on space and
energy issues, its mandate has expanded to include a number of other different policy areas.
In addition, Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin often used their meetings
to address issues, such as arms control and missile defense cooperation, on the agenda for
upcoming Presidential summits.
The Energy Committee had a working group that addressed fissile materials (e.g.
weapons-grade uranium and plutonium) in an effort to ensure that they do not pose a
proliferation or environmental threat. This working group has agreed on numerous projects,
most of which were subsequently funded by the Nunn-Lugar CTR program. For example,
in 1994, the commission announced that the two sides would cooperate in building a storage
facility at Mayak (described above) for plutonium removed from Russia’s nuclear weapons.
In 1994, Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin also signed the agreement
that established the program through which the United States will purchase 500 metric tons
of uranium removed from Russian nuclear weapons for use in nuclear power reactors.
In June 1994, the two sides signed an agreement requiring the shutdown of nuclear
reactors that produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. Russia initially balked at this because
it used the same reactors to produce light and heat in the cities of Tomsk and Krasnoyarsk,
but the two sides agreed to find ways to replace these energy sources. Russia announced that
it had stopped producing plutonium for weapons in these reactors by the end of 1994, but it
did not shut them down because these alternatives were not yet available. The United States
had planned to contribute $80 million, through the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program, to convert the
reactors to a type that did not produce weapons materials and the two sides signed an
implementing agreement in September 1997. However, in February 2000, the Russian
government reportedly told the Clinton Administration that it wanted to cancel the project
because of delays, cost overruns, and fears of a catastrophic accident. Instead, Russia
suggested that it would close the reactors altogether if the United States would help fund
conventional energy sources for the affected cities. However, Congress has prohibited the use
of CTR funds for the construction of “fossil fuel energy plants.”
During their June 24, 1998 meeting, Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Kiriyenko
signed two agreements on nuclear issues. The United States agreed to provide Russia with
assistance in converting plutonium from nuclear weapons to fuel for nuclear reactors. In the
second agreement, the United States pledged $3.1 million for 9 projects that are designed to
help scientists in Russia’s closed nuclear cities convert their efforts to peaceful civilian
endeavors, a project known as the Nuclear Cities Initiative. The Bush Administration has
indicated that it will not continue to address U.S-Russian issues through this high-level
bilateral commission. Instead, the Administration will establish working groups to address
individual security and economic issues as the need arises.
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The Strategic Stability Working Group (SSWG). In September 1993, Secretary
of Defense Aspin and Defense Minister Grachev established a working group of experts from
the U.S. DOD and the Russian MOD, to discuss ways to improve strategic stability, increase
mutual confidence, and relax the Cold War nuclear force postures. One of the first topics the
SSWG addressed was ballistic missile “detargeting.” In an agreement that took effect on May
30, 1994, the two nations agreed that no country would be targeted by any strategic forces
on either side. Many observers praised this agreement as an overdue sign that the United
States and Russia no longer consider each other enemies. Some also saw it as a move away
from the nuclear hair-trigger and a concrete step to reduce the risk of accidental missile
launches. Others, however, argued that its benefits were strictly symbolic because both sides
could quickly retarget missiles during a crisis. Many also noted that the measure was not
verifiable, so neither side could be sure that the other’s missiles were actually detargeted.
During the mid-1990s the United States shared information with the Russians about
threats to both sides from short-range ballistic missiles, and the two sides held joint table-top
exercises their defenses against short-range ballistic missile attacks. The first phase of this
project occurred in June 1996, in Colorado Springs. At that time, the Russians deployed
SA-12 interceptors and the U.S. deployed Patriot batteries in a simulated combat scenario to
defend against a common enemy. Another joint exercise took place in 1998, and a third
occurred in early 2001. The exercises involved computer simulations, rather than actual
military operations, and focused on scenarios where the two nations might practice
coordinating and communicating in engaging targets in a theater of operations.
Safeguards, Transparency, and Irreversibility Talks. In January 1994,
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin established a working group to consider steps to ensure the
transparency and irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons. The Safeguards,
Transparency, and Irreversibility working group produced an agreement, in principle, for the
two sides to exchange data on warhead stockpiles. But they were unable to complete an
agreement that would permit the exchange of classified data on nuclear warheads. Congress
had amended U.S. law to permit this exchange in 1994, but Russia has neither passed
legislation nor issued the necessary executive decree.
Arms Control Proposals
Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons. In 1991, the United States and Soviet Union each
announced the withdrawal of most of their deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons. The
United States and Russia have periodically exchanged information updating the status of the
withdrawals and assuring the other side that the remaining weapons are in safe and secure
storage areas. During their summit meeting in Helsinki in March 1997, Presidents Clinton and
Yeltsin agreed to explore possible arms control measures relating to tactical nuclear weapons
and warheads removed from strategic nuclear weapons during the proposed START III
negotiations, but these talks did not materialize.
Some in the United States would like further restrictions on Russian tactical nuclear
weapons both because they believe these might pose a proliferation risk and because Russia
has a far greater number of these weapons than does the United States. Russia has resisted
formal limits. In late April 1998, officials from NATO and Russia exchanged information
about their nonstrategic nuclear weapons. This effort was designed not only to ease Russia’s
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concerns about NATO’s nuclear weapons, but also to provide NATO with information about
the thousands of tactical nuclear weapons still in service in Russia.
Agreement on the Disposition of Weapons-grade Plutonium. In Sept. 1998,
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that each nation would convert 50 metric tons of
weapons-grade plutonium to a form that could not be returned to nuclear weapons. Clinton
Administration officials estimated that this amount was approximately half of the U.S.
stockpile and perhaps 25% of Russia’s stockpile. The agreement highlighted two means for
converting the plutonium — the parties could either convert it to fuel for nuclear power
reactors or mix it with other nuclear wastes and dispose of it in a way the would preclude its
use in nuclear weapons. This agreement is designed to ease concerns about the possible theft
or diversion of weapons-grade plutonium by nations or others seeking to develop their own
nuclear weapons. However, the Clinton Administration emphasized that this effort could cost
hundreds of millions of dollars, and it called on other nations to help Russia implement the
program. Congress allocated $200 million for this program in the Omnibus Appropriations
Act passed at the end of the 105th Congress. The Clinton Administration had planned to
request $400 million for this program in FY2002, but the Bush Administration has indicated
that funding would remain at around $200 billion. After its review of U.S. nonproliferation
programs with Russia, the Bush Administration indicated that it would seek an alternative
plan, that would be less costly and less complex, to address concerns with Russia’s stockpile
of weapons-grade plutonium.
Sharing Early Warning Data. In September 1998, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin
agreed that the United States and Russia would share early warning data for all space
launches and ballistic missile launches world wide. The two sides have agreed that they will
share data on a continual basis, in real time (rather than providing it annually or biannually);
they agreed that data would include information on strategic, theater, and intermediate range
missiles, and on space launches; they agreed the data would be derived from early warning
satellites and ground-based radars; and they agreed to establish a multilateral pre-launch
notification system that would be open to all nations who agreed to share data prior to missile
or space launches from their territories. The Clinton Administration emphasized that this
agreement would strengthen stability and protect against the possibility of a nuclear launch
triggered by false warning of an attack. Administration officials have also highlighted the
cooperative nature of this endeavor; this Center will provide the first opportunity for U.S. and
Russian military personnel to be permanently involved in a joint military operation.
In mid-December 2000, the United States and Russia signed an agreement outlining the
types of information that would be exchanged in the newly-formed Joint Data Exchange
Center (JDEC) near Moscow. This agreement establishes a pre-launch and post-launch
notification system for ballistic missile and space launches and designed to reduce the risk that
a test, experiment, or space launch, could be misread as a ballistic missile attack. Some critics
of the planned center argued it would hinder U.S. access to space by requiring that
notifications before launches, but the military space community reportedly reviewed all the
provisions and approved of the plan because it allows for exceptions to the notification
requirement in the interest of national security. Most experts hoped the center, which is to
be based in an old school building near Moscow, would begin operations in 2001. However,
the building’s renovations have not yet begun. Disagreements between the United States and
Russia about tax issues, along with a general cooling in the relationship between the two
countries, have been cited as reasons for the delay. Congress authorized funding for the
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JDEC in 2002, but withheld 50% of the funds until Russia and the United States reach a cost-
sharing agreement and an agreement on taxes and liability for U.S. participants.
Alert Rates for Strategic Nuclear Weapons. Many analysts argue that Russia’s
aging satellite and communication systems, when combined with the high alert rates for U.S.
and Russian nuclear forces (both can launch on very short notice), increase the possibility of
a nuclear attack. Many analysts note that Russia may lack complete information about the
status of U.S. forces and, therefore, might interpret ambiguous events as a missile launch.
The agreement on sharing early warning data seeks to address this problem by providing
Russia with information about ambiguous events. Some in the United States, such as Bruce
Blair and former Senator Sam Nunn, have proposed that the United States and Russia “de-
alert” their nuclear weapons. They argue that, if U.S. weapons were not on alert, Russia
would be less likely to assume that it were under attack if it detected ambiguous activities.
In addition, if Russia took its forces off alert, it would not have to loosen controls over them
to ensure their launch in a crisis because the missiles would not be ready to be launched in a
crisis. Those who support de-alerting have outlined several different measures, from
removing warheads from missiles and storing them separately, to removing launch keys from
control centers or removing critical data from launch computers.
Those who oppose “de-alerting” argue that it will undermine, not enhance stability.
They note that warheads in a few storage depots may be far more vulnerable to a preemptive
attack than warheads deployed on hundreds of missiles in hardened silos. They also argue
that each side might feel compelled to “re-alert” its forces quickly if it suspected that the other
side had started the process, and that this could lead to a destabilizing “alert” race, with each
trying to gain an advantage over the other. Finally, some have noted that officials in Russia
have shown no interest in this proposal; instead, some Russians have argued that “de-alerting”
appears to be a U.S. attempt to disarm Russian missiles.
In late 1997, an inter-agency working group assessed possible measures to “de-alert”
U.S. nuclear forces. This effort stemmed, in part from the U.S.-Russian agreement to
deactivate weapons that would be eliminated under START II by the end of 2003, even
though they would not have to be eliminated until 2007. But it also was an effort to explore
the idea of a more comprehensive change in nuclear weapons alert status. The effort,
however, did not result in any changes in the alert status of U.S. nuclear forces. During
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Eugene Habiger, the
Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, noted that the reductions in offensive
forces mandated by the START Treaties would serve to reduce the number of alert weapons
in the U.S. force from about 2,300 today to less than 1,000 under START II and less than
700 under START III because only a portion of the U.S. force is on alert at any one time.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
Executive Branch Reports
U.S. Department of Defense. Cooperative Threat Reduction. August 1997.
U.S. Department of Energy. MPC&A Strategic Plan. January 1998.
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CRS Products
CRS Issue Brief IB98030. Nuclear Arms Control: The U.S.-Russian Agenda.
CRS Report 97-1027. Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs: Issues for
Congress.
CRS Report 97-586. Russia’s Nuclear Forces: Doctrine and Force Structure Issues.
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