Order Code IB98030
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Nuclear Arms Control:
The U.S.-Russian Agenda
Updated April 12, 2002
Amy F. Woolf
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
START I
Treaty Provisions
Ratification and Implementation
Ratification
Weapons Deactivation
Monitoring and Verification
Compliance
START II
Treaty Provisions
Ratification
Further Reductions in Offensive Weapons
Proposed Provisions for START III
The Bush Administration Approach
The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
Treaty Provisions
The Demarcation and Succession Agreements
Agreed Statements on Demarcation
Memorandum of Understanding on Succession
The ABM Treaty and National Missile Defenses
FOR ADDITIONAL READING

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Nuclear Arms Control: The U.S.-Russian Agenda
SUMMARY
Although arms control negotiations are
to address measures related to non-strategic
not as important to the U.S.-Russian relation-
nuclear weapons and the warheads removed
ship as they were to the U.S.-Soviet relation-
from weapons eliminated under the treaty.
ship during the Cold War, the United States
Negotiations to turn this framework into a
and Russia have continued to implement
formal agreement proved difficult. The Bush
existing nuclear arms control agreements and
Administration has not continued negotiations
to pursue negotiations on further reductions in
towards START III, but it has pledged to
their strategic offensive weapons and
reduce U.S. nuclear forces below START II
modifications to limits on ballistic missile
levels unilaterally. President Bush plans in-
defenses. This issue brief summarizes the
formed President Putin of planned reductions
contents of these agreements and tracks prog-
to 1,700-2,200 warheads in November,
ress in their ratification and implementation.
2001.The United States and Russia continue to
abide by the 1972 ABM Treaty, which limits
The 1991 START I Treaty entered into
each side to one anti-ballistic missile deploy-
force in December 1994. It limits the United
ment area with no more than 100 interceptor
States and four successors to the Soviet Union
missiles. In September 1997, the parties
— Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan
signed several documents that established a
— to 6,000 accountable warheads on 1,600
demarcation line between ABM systems and
strategic offensive delivery vehicles. The
theater missile defense systems, which are not
parties are well along in the elimination sche-
limited by the Treaty. They also signed a
dules outlined in the treaty and will complete
Memorandum that named Russia, Ukraine,
the process by December 4, 2001. The parties
Belarus, and Kazakhstan as the successors to
also continue to implement the on-site inspec-
the Soviet Union for the ABM Treaty. The
tions that are a part of the Treaty’s complex
Clinton Administration never submitted these
verification regimen. The United States and
to the Senate for advice and consent. It did
Russia signed START II in January 1993.
however, pursue negotiations on modifications
This agreement would reduce U.S. and Rus-
to the Treaty that would permit the deploy-
sian strategic offensive forces to 3,500 war-
ment of national missile defenses. The Bush
heads. In September 1997, the United States
Administration has indicated that it believes
and Russia signed a Protocol to START II to
the Treaty is out of date, and that the United
extend the elimination period in the treaty to
States must withdraw to pursue missile de-
the end of the year 2007. The U.S. Senate
fense. It has suggested that the United States
approved the Treaty’s ratification in January
and Russia agree to set the Treaty aside.
1996 and the Russian legislature did so in
Russia has not accepted this proposal, but it
April 2000, but the treaty has not yet entered
may accept more robust testing of missile
into force. In March 1997, Presidents Clinton
defenses as long as the United States does not
and Yeltsin agreed that the United States and
withdraw from the Treaty. The United States
Russia would negotiate a START III Treaty
might accept this alternative, and address the
after START II entered into force. The new
Treaty’s deployment restrictions in the future.
treaty would reduce their forces to between
2,000 and 2,500 warheads. They also agreed
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Officials from the United States and Russia have continued to meet in an effort to
complete an agreement on reductions in offensive nuclear arms prior to the expected May
summit between Presidents Bush and Putin. Secretary Powell met with Russia’s Foreign
Minister Ivanov on April 12. The two were reportedly “pleased with the progress” they
made during their discussions, but were still unable to resolve differences over how the two
sides would count nuclear warheads.
During a press conference on March 13, 2002, President Bush stated that he did hope
that the United States and Russia could conclude a formal agreement on limits on offensive
nuclear weapons. He stated that it was important to have an agreement that “outlives both
of us.”

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
During the Cold War, arms control negotiations were a central feature of U.S.-Soviet
relations. Observers disagreed about whether these would enhance U.S. security by limiting
Soviet weapons and providing information about Soviet capabilities or undermine U.S.
security by limiting U.S. weapons while the Soviet Union continued to pursue more capable
systems. Many noted, however, that arms control negotiations were sometimes the only place
where the two nations could communicate and pursue cooperative efforts — even if they did
little to control arms or reduce the dangers posed by nuclear weapons.

In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the United States and Soviet Union/Russia signed
several agreements that reduced nuclear weapons. The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty (INF) eliminated all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between
300 and 3,400 miles. The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START I, mandated
reductions in numbers of warheads deployed on long-range land-based and submarine-based
missiles and on heavy bombers. In January 1993, the United States and Russia signed the
second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START II, which would further reduce the number
of warheads on their strategic offensive forces. The United States and Russia also held
discussions on a START III treaty that would reduce their forces further.
The Bush Administration has argued that arms control negotiations, leading to formal
treaties, should no longer be a central feature of the U.S-Russian relationship. Administration
officials contend that the relationship codified by these treaty regimes reflects old-style “Cold
War” thinking, and that the two sides should, instead, reduce their offensive forces
unilaterally, to the levels that each finds necessary, and eliminate the ABM Treaty’s
restrictions on the deployment of missile defenses. The United States and Russia continue
to implement START I, but START II may never enter into force and that the two sides may
not pursue a START III Treaty. This issue brief reviews developments in these earlier efforts
and summarizes proposals for further arms control agreements. It also tracks discussions on
arms control issues that have occurred since the start of the Bush Administration.
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START I
Treaty Provisions
START I, signed on July 31, 1991, limits the United States and successors to the Soviet
Union to 6,000 warheads attributed to 1,600 strategic offensive delivery vehicles —
land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) and heavy bombers. The treaty also limits each side to 4,900 warheads attributed
to ballistic missiles, 1,540 warheads attributed to heavy ICBMs, and 1,100 warheads
attributed to mobile ICBMs. Warheads are “attributed” to missiles and heavy bombers
through counting rules that assign each deployed missile or bomber a warhead number. The
number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs usually equals the number actually
deployed on that type of missile, but the number attributed to heavy bombers is far fewer than
the number of bombs or cruise missiles that each type of bomber can be equipped to carry.
The Treaty allows “downloading” of warheads to reduce the number of warheads attributed
and carried on some multiple warhead (MIRVed) missiles.
To monitor forces and verify compliance with START I, the parties rely on their own
national technical means (NTM) and numerous cooperative measures designed to supplement
information received through NTM. These include extensive data exchanges on the numbers
and locations of affected weapons and several types of on-site inspections (OSI), including
baseline inspections to confirm initial data, inspections of closed-out facilities or eliminated
equipment, inspection of suspect sites, and continuous monitoring of certain facilities. The
parties must also notify each other of several types of activities, such as the movement of
items limited by the treaty. The parties agreed to refrain from encrypting or denying the
telemetry (missile test data) needed to monitor many qualitative and quantitative limits. The
treaty established the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), where the parties
meet to discuss treaty implementation issues and compliance questions.
In May 1992, the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan signed a
Protocol to START I that listed those four former Soviet republics as the successors to the
Soviet Union for the Treaty. In this agreement, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan all agreed
to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states and to
eliminate the strategic nuclear weapons on their territories. In separate agreements, these
three states arranged to return the nuclear warheads from those weapons to Russia.
Ratification and Implementation
Ratification. The U.S. Senate gave consent to the ratification of START I on October
1, 1992. Kazakhstan ratified START I in June 1992; it joined the NPT as a non-nuclear state
on February 14, 1994. Belarus approved START I and the NPT on February 4, 1993, and
formally joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state on July 22, 1993. The Russian
parliament approved START I on November 4, 1992, but stated that it would not exchange
the instruments of ratification until all three of the other republics adhered to the NPT as
non-nuclear states. Ukraine delayed action on START I for nearly two years. On January
14, 1994, Presidents Clinton, Yeltsin, and Kravchuk of Ukraine signed a Trilateral Statement
in which Ukraine agreed to transfer all the nuclear warheads on its territory to Russia and to
eliminate the treaty-accountable delivery vehicles for these warheads in exchange for
compensation and security assurances. The Ukrainian parliament approved the Trilateral
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Statement and START I in early February 1994. It eventually approved Ukraine’s accession
to the NPT in November 1994. On December 5, 1994, the United States, Russia, and Great
Britain signed a memorandum granting security assurances to Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakhstan. Ukraine then acceded to the NPT, the five parties to START I exchanged
instruments of ratification, and START I entered into force.
Weapons Deactivation. On December 5, 2001, the United States and Russia
announced that they had eliminated all the weapons necessary to meet the Treaty’s limits of
6,000 accountable warheads on their strategic offensive nuclear weapons. The United States
had removed all of the Minuteman II missiles from their silos and had eliminated or converted
449 of the 450 Minuteman II silos according to the provisions outlined in START. The
United States has also withdrawn from service and removed the missiles from all of its
Poseidon ballistic missile submarines and had eliminated the submarines. It also had
completed the reduction or conversion of heavy bombers that would no longer be equipped
to carry nuclear weapons.
Forces of the former Soviet Union have declined significantly during START I
implementation, from more than 10,000 warheads on 2,500 delivery vehicles in 1990 to 5,988
warheads on 1,211 delivery vehicles on July 31, 2001. All the nuclear warheads from SS-18
missiles and weapons for bombers in Kazakhstan had been returned to Russia by May 1995.
All the nuclear weapons had been removed from Ukraine’s territory by June 1, 1996 and all
81 of the SS-25 missiles based in Belarus had been returned to Russia by late November
1996. Ukraine has eliminated all of the SS-19 and SS-24 ICBM silos on its territory.
Ukraine has also eliminated all 43 heavy bombers that were left on its territory. In late 1999,
Russia and Ukraine reached an agreement for Ukraine to return 11 bombers –3 Bear H
bombers and 8 Blackjack bombers – to Russia in exchange for forgiveness of part of its
natural gas debts to Russia.
Monitoring and Verification. All the parties to START I have conducted on-site
inspections permitted by the treaty. In addition to conducting routine inspections called for
in the Treaty, U.S. inspectors also monitored the elimination of 20 Russian SLBMs in early
December 1997. Although not mandated by the treaty, Russia eliminated these missiles by
launching them from submarines and destroying them shortly after launch.
Compliance. The parties to START I have all noted that there have been few
significant compliance questions. In 1995, the United States raised concerns about Russian
compliance with the treaty’s provisions on the conversion of missiles to space launch vehicles
when Russia used a converted SS-25 ICBM to launch a satellite. According to published
reports, Russia did not allow the United States to inspect the missile to confirm that it was
configured as a space launch vehicle when it exited the Votkinsk missile assembly facility, and
it failed to provide the proper notifications, as specified in START I, about the location of the
missile prior to the satellite launch. Russia claimed that it was not obligated to notify the
United States about the missile or permit the United States to inspect it at the Votkinsk portal
because it was a dedicated space launch vehicle that was not limited by START. The United
States held that the missile was subject to START I inspection and notification provisions
because it was a variant of a missile limited by the treaty. After discussions in the Joint
Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), the two sides agreed that a limited number
these launch vehicles could leave the Votkinsk facility without being subject to imaging
inspections. They would still have to be measured and opened to confirm that they were not
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treaty-limited missiles. In November 1997, the two sides reached a final agreement that would
cover any additional space-launch vehicles assembled at Votkinsk.
In June 1998, the Russian press reported that Russian officials were concerned about
U.S. compliance with START I. For example, tests of the British Trident missiles may have
released 10-12 warheads, rather than the 8 permitted on U.S. Trident missiles. The United
States believes this is consistent with START I because the Treaty does not limit British
missiles, but some in Russia argue that the United States could gain valuable information that
would permit it to deploy its own missiles with 10-12 warheads. Some in Russia also contend
that the United States has altered the B-1 bombers to make it easier for them to carry cruise
missiles. These changes are not banned by the START I Treaty, and the United States could
equip B-1 bombers without violating its obligations, but this would change the accounting for
the bombers under START I. Most of these issues were addressed in the JCIC. Some
observers speculated that the Russian reports were designed to deflect criticism about
Russia’s failure to ratify START II. Officials in the Russian Defense Ministry repeated the
accusations of U.S. non-compliance with START I in late January 1999. The timing of
Russia’s complaint appeared to derive from U.S. funding and support for a national ballistic
missile defense system and its intentions to negotiate amendments in the 1972 ABM Treaty.
START II
Treaty Provisions
The United States and Russia signed START II on January 3, 1993. It limits each side
to 3,000-3,500 accountable warheads on strategic offensive delivery vehicles, with no more
than 1,750 warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The Treaty also bans
all multiple warhead ICBMS (MIRVed ICBMs). As under START I, the parties can reduce
their deployed warheads and eliminate MIRVed ICBMs by downloading, or removing,
warheads from deployed missiles. Because the parties can remove, at most, 4 warheads from
each missile, ICBMs with 10 warheads must be eliminated, rather than downloaded. The
treaty makes an exception for the Russian SS-19 missile, which carries 6 warheads. Russia
can remove 5 warheads from 105 of these missiles so that they will remain as single-warhead
missiles. For the most part, START II would use rely on the same verification regime as
START I. (For details see CRS Report 93-35, START II: Central Limits and Force
Structure Implications and CRS Report 93-617, The START and START II Arms Control
Treaties: Background and Issues.)
Ratification
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on START II in March 1993,
but delayed further debate until START I entered into force. Hearings resumed in early
1995, but a dispute over plans to reorganize the State Department and eliminate the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency delayed further action. After the Senate leadership reached
agreement on those issues, the Foreign Relations Committee approved the START II
resolution of ratification for START II by a unanimous vote on December 12, 1995. The full
Senate voted 87-4, offering its advice and consent to ratification, on January 26, 1996.
The lower house of Russia’s parliament, the Duma, began considering START II in July
1995 but the debate did not proceed well. In early 1998, leaders in the Duma stated that they
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would probably debate the treaty and vote on its ratification by June 1998, but this date
passed without action. The Duma resumed work on START II during its fall session, and it
had drafted a law on ratification for the treaty by the end of November, 1998. It again
planned to begin the debate in December, but this was delayed because the Duma did not yet
have a draft law on financing for the nation’s strategic nuclear forces. Nevertheless, officials
in the Yeltsin government continued to press for START II approval, and many began to
believe the Duma would act by the end of December. However, it again delayed
consideration after U.S. and British air strikes on Iraq in mid-December. The Treaty’s future
clouded again after the United States announced its plans in January 1999 to negotiate
amendments to the 1972 ABM Treaty. However, the Duma leadership sent the draft law on
ratification to President Yeltsin in late March 1999. On March 19, the Duma’s leadership
announced that it had scheduled a debate for April 2, 1999. This debate was canceled after
NATO forces began their air campaign in Yugoslavia.
After he took office at the end of 1999, President Vladimir Putin expressed his support
for START II and pressed the Duma to approve its ratification. The Duma Foreign Affairs
committee recommended START II ratification in early April, and the Duma voted to
approve ratification on April 14, 2000. The upper chamber of the Parliament, the Federation
council, did the same on April 19, 2000.
Some Duma members objected to START II because they generally opposed President
Yeltsin and his policies. Others argued that Russia should not reduce its offensive forces as
NATO expanded into central Europe because NATO could then move its nuclear weapons
closer to Russia’s borders. And some argued that Russia should not approve START II until
it is certain that the United States will continue to abide by the 1972 ABM Treaty — they
feared that the United States could undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent if it deployed
extensive missile defenses while Russia reduced its offensive forces.
The debate over START II also revealed concerns about the substance of the Treaty.
Some argued the treaty would undermine Russia’s security by eliminating the core of Russia’s
strategic forces — the MIRVed ICBMs. In addition, Russia would need hundreds of new
single-warhead ICBMs to retain 3,500 warheads as it eliminates MIRVed ICBMs. As a
result, some in the Duma suggested that the United States and Russia skip START II and
negotiate further reductions so that the United States would have to reduce to levels that
Russia might end up at anyway. (For details, see CRS Report 97-359, START II Debate in
the Russian Duma: Issues and Prospects.)
In March 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to extend the elimination timelines
in START II and established guidelines for a START III Treaty that would reduce both sides’
forces to 2,000-2,500 warheads. On September 26, 1997, Secretary of State Albright and
Russia’s Foreign Minister Primakov signed a protocol to START II that formalized the
extension of START II deadlines. They also exchanged letters repeating the Presidents’
agreement that the two sides would deactivate all the weapons to be eliminated under START
II by the end of 2003. The two sides agreed to work out methods for deactivation as soon
as the treaty entered into force. Russia added another provision to its letter, noting that it
expected a START III treaty to enter into force before the deactivation deadline for START
II. The United States acknowledged this statement but did not agree.
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Both Yeltsin and Putin reportedly told the Duma committees that Russia could not
afford to retain strategic offensive forces at START I levels. Ratification of START II would
not only ensure that the United States reduces its forces along with Russia, but would also
permit the two nations to move on to deeper reductions in START III. These arguments
apparently swayed enough members of the Duma to win approval for the Treaty.
The Duma attached several conditions to its Federal Law on Ratification. The Law
indicates that U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty would be considered an
extraordinary event that would give Russia the right to withdraw from START II. President
Putin appeared to endorse this view when he stated that Russia would pull out of the entire
system of arms control agreements on strategic nuclear forces if the United States dismantled
the ABM Treaty. Furthermore, the Federal Law on Ratification states that Russia will not
exchange the instruments of ratification on START II until the United States approves the
ratification of the 1997 Agreed Statements on Demarcation and Memorandum of
Understanding on Succession to the ABM Treaty. The Clinton Administration never
submitted these agreements to the U.S. Senate.
The Bush Administration does not intend to complete the ratification process. As a
result, the Russians will not be required to eliminate their large MIRVed ICBMs, which has
long been a goal of U.S. arms control policy. Many experts believe Russia will retire the SS-
18s by the end of the decade, but, without START II in force, it could retain them longer or
deploy its new SS-27 ICBM with multiple warheads. Even though the Treaty will not enter
into force, the Bush Administration plans to implement many of the reductions that would
have been needed for the United States to comply with the Treaty. When announcing the
results of its Nuclear Posture Review, the Administration indicated that it would eliminate by
2007 the 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs and 4 Trident submarines that would have been eliminated
under START II. It will also download warheads from deployed missiles, leading to a
deployed force of around 3,800 warheads by 2007. Congress authorized funding in the
budget for the Defense Department for FY2002 to being to dismantle the 50 Peacekeeper
ICBMs. Congress had prevented any expenditures to begin this retirement prior to START
II’s entry into force, but it has lifted the restriction for FY2002. According to Secretary of
Defense Rumsfeld, the United States no longer needs these missiles and the Air Force had not
provided any funds to maintain or operate them.
Further Reductions in Offensive Weapons
Proposed Provisions for START III
In March 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that the United States and Russia
would negotiate a START III treaty as soon as START II entered into force. This treaty
would limit each side to between 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads by December 31,
2007. The Presidents also agreed that START III should contain measures to promote the
irreversibility of the weapons elimination process, including transparency measures and the
destruction of strategic nuclear warheads removed from delivery vehicles. This responds to
a condition that the Senate added to the START I resolution of ratification and it could
address concerns about the possible theft or sale of warheads to nations seeking their own
nuclear weapons. The two sides have attempted, with little progress, to implement warhead
data exchanges for several years.
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Finally, the Presidents agreed the two sides would explore possible measures for
long-range, nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missiles and other tactical nuclear weapons.
These could include transparency and confidence-building measures. Russia has long sought
restrictions on U.S. sea-launched cruise missiles. The United States unilaterally withdrew
these missiles from deployment in 1991, but Russia fears that the these missiles could threaten
targets in Russia if the United States redeployed them. The United States would like further
restrictions on Russian tactical nuclear weapons because these may pose a proliferation risk;
Russia would like restrictions on U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to ensure that they are not
deployed on the territory of new NATO members.
During discussions on START III, both sides introduced numerous provisions that
would address all the issues outlined in the Helsinki framework, but they could not resolve
their differences. For example, the Russians proposed that the treaty reduce strategic nuclear
forces to 1,500 or fewer warheads on each side. The United States has resisted such deep
reductions in the past, and when it tabled a new proposal in January 2000, it reportedly
continued to insist that START III reduce forces to 2,000 or 2,500 warheads.
Press reports indicate that the Clinton Administration had asked DOD to assess the
implications of lower levels again, in early May 2000, in preparation for President Clinton’s
summit with President Putin scheduled for early June 2000. Military leaders reportedly
rejected lower levels again. At the time, many analysts expected the Clinton Administration
to negotiate a “Grand Bargain,” where the United States would accept lower limits for
START II if Russia accepted ABM Treaty modifications that would permit the deployment
of a U.S. NMD. However, the summit did not produce any arms control agreements.
Presidents Clinton and Putin did, however, agree to intensify their negotiations on START
III. Furthermore, during a press conference after their meetings, President Clinton said that
the United States would have to alter its strategic plans to reduce its forces to 1,500
warheads. And he indicated that such a change in plans would be more complete if the United
States knew what role missile defenses would play in the U.S. plan.
In November 2000, President Putin outlined a new proposal for reductions in offensive
forces, stating that Russia would be willing to reduce to 1,500 warheads or lower if the
United States remained committed to the ABM Treaty. President Clinton did not respond
directly to this proposal. Many analysts doubt that the United States would accept such a
proposal because U.S. officials have indicated that the United States would only be willing
to cut its forces that deeply if Russia agreed to modify the ABM Treaty.
The Bush Administration Approach
President Bush has stated that he believes the United States and Russia could move away
from formal arms control treaties and reduce forces unilaterally or in parallel to whatever level
each side decided was appropriate. He stated that he would reduce U.S. forces to the lowest
possible level after military leaders conducted a thorough review of U.S. defense plans. At
their meeting following the G-8 summit in Genoa, Italy, Presidents Bush and Putin agreed
that the two nations would begin consultations on offensive and defensive weapons. The
Russians apparently expected these consultations to produce agreed limits on offensive forces
and minor modifications of the ABM Treaty. The Bush Administration, however, stated that
the United States did not expecting lengthy negotiations or the completion of a formal arms
control treaty. Instead, the Administration wanted to use these consultations as a forum to
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inform Russia of U.S. plans with respect to offensive and defensive forces and to convince
Russia to set aside the ABM Treaty with the United States.
The consultations made little progress for several months, with Russia complaining that
the United States had not outlined its proposals for deep reductions in offensive nuclear
weapons. The Bush Administration responded that it was not yet ready to make these
proposals because DOD had not completed its review of U.S. nuclear forces. However, on
November 13, 2001, during meetings with President Putin in Washington, President Bush
announced that he would reduce the number of operationally deployed warheads on U.S.
strategic offensive nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and 2,200 over 10 years. The reference
to “operationally deployed” warheads indicates that the United States would not include
warheads on submarines or bombers undergoing overhauls in this total. As a result, it might
not count several hundred warheads that would be included in a tally using START treaty
counting rules. A tally that included these warheads would be closer to the level of 2,500
warheads proposed for START III. The Bush Administration has also indicated that it would
not eliminate many of the warheads removed from deployed forces, but would hold them in
reserve as part of a “responsive force” that could be returned to service if conditions
warranted.
During the November summit, the Bush Administration indicated that it did not intend
to negotiate a formal treaty; but would reduce U.S. forces unilaterally, regardless of Russian
reciprocity. President Putin reiterated Russian intentions to reduce its forces to much lower
levels. In the past, he has called for reductions to 1,500 warheads or less. But he stated that
these reductions should be codified in a formal treaty that including control and verification
measures. Some analysts have doubted that this informal arrangement would appeal to
President Putin. It would not reduce U.S. forces as far as he would like and it would leave
the United States with the ability to increase its forces with little warning. Others, however,
expected Putin to accede to the U.S. proposal. Pressing for a formal treaty would not change
the Bush Administration’s approach. Furthermore, it would be difficult to criticize the U.S.
reductions when Russia had proposed numbers close to the U.S. offer for years. Some
analysts expected that Putin would accept the U.S. offer and approach as the best outcome
he could hope for.
The two sides resumed their discussions on offensive reductions in January 2002. The
Russian side reportedly hoped the two nations would devise a formal agreement that would
include limits on deployed and non-deployed warheads, along with specific monitoring and
verification provisions. Russia would also like the agreement to contain a commitment that
neither side would deploy missile defenses that could interfere with the offensive forces of the
other side. In contrast, reports indicate that the United States remained uninterested in a
formal treaty and would prefer a less-formal agreement that called for data exchanges and
cooperative measures that would allow each side to monitor the reductions implemented by
the other side. On February 6, Secretary of State Powell told Congress that the United States
would be willing to sign a “legally binding” document on nuclear reductions. This document
might not be a treaty, but it could be an executive agreement or a joint declaration. Russian
officials praised the change in the U.S. position, but the two sides remain at odds over the
content of the agreement. Russia continues to insist that it include legally binding limits on
nuclear warheads, with strict counting rules and formal elimination procedures, while the
United States would prefer a less formal declaration of intended reductions, with formal
provisions allowing monitoring and verification of the number of remaining warheads.
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At a press conference on March 13, President Bush stated that the two sides should seek
a formal agreement, although not necessarily a Treaty, that would “outlive both of us.” He
also emphasized that the agreement should focus on transparency, calling verification “the
most important thing.” This differs from statements the President made in November 2001,
when he argued that the two sides did not need a formal agreement, and, as friends, they
could reach an agreement based on a handshake. At the same time, though, the emphasis on
verification reflects the long-standing U.S. position that the agreement should focus on
monitoring provisions rather than strict limits on offensive strategic weapons.
Russia’s Defense Minister Sergei Ivanov noted, after meetings in Washington on March
13-14, that the two sides remained at odds about the content of the formal agreement, but he
claimed that they had not reached an impasse. He also commented on progress that the sides
had made on transparency and verification measures, possibly signaling a shift in Russia’s
position towards the U.S. approach in favor of an agreement that focuses on monitoring and
verification. He met again with Secretary Powell in early April 2002. After that meeting,
Secretary Powell was reportedly “pleased with the progress” made during the talks, even
though the two sides remained at odds over the means they would use to count warheads
under the new agreement.
The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
Treaty Provisions
The 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty prohibits the deployment of
ABM systems for the defense of the nations’ entire territory. It permits each side to deploy
limited ABM systems at two locations, one centered on the nation’s capital and one at a
location containing ICBM silo launchers. A 1974 Protocol further limited each nation to one
ABM site, located at the nation’s capital or around an ICBM deployment area. Each ABM
site can contain no more than 100 ABM launchers and 100 ABM interceptor missiles.
(Russia deployed its ABM site around Moscow; the United States deployed its site around
ICBM silos near Grand Forks, North Dakota. The United States ceased operations at its
ABM site in 1975, but the facilities continue to count under the ABM Treaty.) The Treaty
also specifies that, in the future, any radars that provide early warning of strategic ballistic
missile attack must be located on the periphery of the national territory and oriented outward.
The Treaty bans the development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-
based, or mobile land-based ABM systems and ABM system components (these include
interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars or other sensors that can substitute for radars).
The numerical limits and deployment restrictions in the ABM Treaty do not apply to
other types of defensive systems — such as defenses against shorter-range battlefield or
theater ballistic missiles. However, the Treaty does state that the parties cannot give these
other types of defenses the capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements
in flight trajectory. The parties also cannot test these other types of defenses “in an ABM
mode.” But the ABM Treaty does not define the capabilities of a “strategic” ballistic missile
or the characteristics of a test that would be “in an ABM mode.”
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The Demarcation and Succession Agreements
Questions about the difference between ABM systems and theater missile defense
(TMD) systems grew in importance after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Iraq’s scud missile
attacks on Israel and allied forces alerted many in the United States to the growing threat
from ballistic missiles in regional conflicts and generated new interest in the ongoing
development of advanced theater missile defenses (TMD). By 1993, some analysts and
officials in the Clinton Administration had begun to ask whether advanced TMD systems
would be limited by the ABM Treaty. To avoid possible compliance questions, the Clinton
Administration sought to reach an agreement with Russia on a “demarcation line” to
distinguish between ABM systems and TMD systems.
Questions about the future of the ABM Treaty and its relationship to U.S. National
Missile Defenses were further complicated by the fact that the Soviet Union no longer existed.
Many critics of the ABM Treaty and supporters of U.S. missile defense deployments found
the situation to be advantageous; they believed the Treaty could lapse and the United States
could deploy missile defenses without limits. But the Clinton Administration believed that the
ABM Treaty remained in the U.S. national security interest and it began negotiations in late
1993 on an agreement that would identify the treaty successors to the Soviet Union.
Agreed Statements on Demarcation. When the ABM/TMD demarcation
negotiations began, the United States sought to maintain the flexibility to develop advanced
theater missile defense (TMD) systems without having those systems fall under the limits in
the ABM Treaty. It sought a simple rule that defining an ABM interceptor as one that
demonstrated the capability to destroy a target ballistic missile with a velocity greater than 5
kilometers per second (this would essentially define a “strategic” ballistic missile). Russia,
on the other hand, feared that the United States might deploy advanced TMD systems that
would allow it to intercept Russia’s strategic ballistic missiles, and, therefore, undermine
Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Hence, Russia proposed a more restrictive formula to define an
ABM interceptor as one with the capability to intercept targets with a velocity of 3 kilometers
per second, rather than 5 kilometers per second, and a range of 3,500 kilometers. And, it
sought to limit the velocity of TMD interceptor missiles to 3 kilometers per second. Russia
also suggested that the parties link the number and location of deployed TMD systems to size
and scope of threat and that they restrict the power of TMD radars. (For a more detailed
discussion see CRS Report 98-496, Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Demarcation and
Succession Agreements: Background and Issues.)
The United States briefly considered accepting limits on the velocity of TMD interceptor
missiles, but by 1995 it returned to its initial position that the demarcation line should be
based on the characteristics of the target ballistic missile used during tests of TMD interceptor
missiles. Russia eventually accepted this standard for TMD systems with slower velocity
interceptors, i.e. those with interceptors with velocities below 3 km/second, but it wanted
added restrictions on TMD systems with faster velocity interceptors because these were the
systems that might threaten Russia’s strategic offensive forces.
In March 1997. Secretary of State Albright and Russia’s Foreign Minister Primakov
signed Agreed Statements on Demarcation on September 26, 1997. In the First Agreed
Statement, the two sides agreed that TMD systems with interceptors tested at speeds at or
below 3 km/sec that were tested against a target with a speed at or below of 5 km/sec and a
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range of less than 3,500 km would be exempt from the limits in the ABM Treaty. The
Second Agreed Statement outlined parameters for higher speed systems, those with
interceptor velocities above 3 km/second. These systems could not be tested against a target
missile with a velocity greater than 5 km/sec and a range greater than 3,500 km. In addition,
the agreement banned TMD systems with space-based interceptors. However, the agreement
did not state whether these more capable TMD systems would be covered by the limits in the
ABM Treaty. Each nation would decide whether its systems had been “tested in an ABM
mode.” (See CRS Report 98-496, Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Demarcation and Succession
Agreements: Background and Issues.)
The demarcation agreements would not limit the speed of U.S. TMD systems. They use
the interceptors’ speed as a dividing line between those systems that are not limited by the
ABM Treaty and those that would need further analysis to determine whether they are exempt
from the Treaty limits. Many in Congress believe the TMD demarcation provisions will
restrict U.S. TMD capabilities, even though the Clinton Administration stated that they were
consistent with all current programs, because they believe the United States will “dumb
down” its systems to avoid compliance debates with Russia. Some in the arms control
community believe that the demarcation agreements permit too much TMD capability, and
that the deployment of more advanced TMD systems could undermine the ABM Treaty.
Memorandum of Understanding on Succession. The 1997 Memorandum of
Understanding on Succession names Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan as successors
to the Soviet Union in the ABM Treaty. Together, these states are limited to a single ABM
deployment area with no more than 100 launchers and interceptors. The MOU also states
that the geographic area covered by the provisions in the treaty would be the combined
territories of these successor states. Russia could continue to operate Soviet ABM facilities
and radars in Ukraine and Kazakhstan and construct a new early warning radar in Belarus.
The MOU also states that the Successor States may continue to use any facility covered by
the Treaty that is “currently located on the territory of any State that is not Party to the
Treaty, with the consent of such State....” Consequently, Russia can continue to operate the
early warning radar in Azerbaijan (it closed the radar in Latvia in September 1998) even
though it is outside the periphery of the participating nations.
The Clinton Administration and supporters of the ABM Treaty argued that this
agreement would allow the ABM Treaty to remain in place. They argued that, without limits
on the deployment of strategic ballistic missile defenses, Russia would be unwilling to reduce
its strategic offensive forces. Some in Congress, however, believe that the United States
should have allowed the ABM Treaty to lapse. They believe that, by adding parties to the
ABM Treaty, it will be more difficult for the United States to negotiate amendments that
would permit deployment of effective national missile defenses.
The Clinton Administration agreed to submit the demarcation and succession agreements
for Senate advice and consent as amendments to the ABM Treaty, but never did so for fear
that the Senate would defeat them. Instead, it declared in May 1998 that the United States
and Russia “clearly are parties” to the ABM Treaty. Many in Congress objected to this
declaration. On August 5, 1998, the House passed an amendment to the FY1999 Commerce,
Justice, and State Department Appropriations Bill (H.R. 4276, H.Amdt. 859) stating that the
U.S. delegates to the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), could not use any of the
funds to implement the MOU on succession. Representative Weldon argued that this would
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force the Administration to submit the MOU to the Senate for its advice and consent to
ratification. Others argued that the United States should cease its participation in the ABM
Treaty so that it could build nationwide defenses. Critics of the amendment argued that it
would preclude any U.S. participation in the SCC, and therefore, undermine continued
implementation of the treaty.
The ABM Treaty and National Missile Defenses
In the mid-1990s, concerns about the possibility of an unintended missile launch from
Russia and the growing ballistic missile threat from other nations stimulated interest in
national missile defenses (NMD). Some members of Congress argued that the United States
should deploy limited defenses to protect against unintended and rogue missile launches.
Others, like Senators Jon Kyl and Jesse Helms, have argued that the United States should
abandon the ABM Treaty and deploy whatever defenses it needed to protect its territory from
missile attacks. Still others, like Representative Curt Weldon, supported an approach where
the United States would cooperate with Russia both to modify the ABM Treaty and deploy
ballistic missile defenses. Others, however, argued that the United States should not rush to
deploy an NMD system. They noted that rogue nations are years away from deploying
missiles that could threaten U.S. soil. And, they argued that U.S. plans to deploy an NMD
system could interfere with offensive force reductions if Russia reacts by withdrawing from
the START I and START II treaties.
In January 1999, the Clinton Administration added $6.6 billion to the Defense budget
for FY1999-2005 to support the deployment of an NMD system. It still planned to decide
in June 2000 whether to deploy the system, but these funds in the out-years of the budget
would preserve that option. The Administration announced that the growing missile threat
from North Korea would support a decision to deploy in 2000, if the technology were
sufficiently mature. The Administration also moved the projected deployment date from 2003
to 2005, to reduce the amount of risk in the program.
Some in Congress argued that the Administration should accelerate, not delay the
schedule for NMD because the threat from uncertainties in Russia and missiles in rogue
nations exists now. Some also argued that the United States may have too little warning
when new threats emerge. They point to the 1998 “Rumsfeld Report,” which notes that
nations may acquire long-range ballistic missiles without pursuing long development and
testing programs. Some Members praised the Administration for adding deployment funds
to the budget. But they continued to question the Administration’s commitment to
deployment. Others, including Senator Helms, criticized the Administration’s intention to
negotiate ABM Treaty amendments with Russia. He argued that the Treaty was no longer
in force due to the demise of the Soviet Union, and, by negotiating amendments, the
Administration would only give Russia a chance to veto U.S. NMD plans.
In 1998 and 1999, Congress sought to pass legislation that would mandate the
deployment of nationwide ballistic missile defenses. On April 21, 1998, the Senate Armed
Services Committee approved the American Missile Protection Act of 1998 (S. 1873, S.Rept.
105-175), which called for the deployment of a national missile defense system to protect all
U.S. territory as soon as the technology is ready. When the Senate bill came to the floor on
May 13, 1998, Democrats succeeded with a filibuster. The effort to invoke cloture failed by
one vote, 59 to 41, with only 4 Democrats joining all 55 Republicans in support of the
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legislation. The Senate failed, again, to invoke cloture, in a vote on September 9, 1998.
Once again, the vote was 59-41. Senator Cochran introduced this bill again in January 1999
(S. 257). The Administration threatened a veto because it bill would used only the state of
technology as the measure for deployment, ignoring considerations about cost, threat, and
treaty-compliance. The Senate approved the bill, by a vote of 97-3, on March 17, 1999.
Democrats dropped their opposition, and the White House withdrew its threat of a veto, after
the Senate approved an amendment stating that it is U.S. policy to continue to negotiate with
Russia on reductions in offensive nuclear weapons.
Representative Curt Weldon introduced similar legislation on August 5, 1998 (H.R.
4402) and, again, in early February 1999 (H.R. 4). This legislation simply stated that it is
“the policy of the United States to deploy a National Missile Defense.” This legislation
passed the House, by a vote of 317-105, on March 18, 1999. The House and Senate did not
hold a conference to resolve the differences in their bills. Instead, the Senate took up H.R.
4, replaced its language with the language in S. 257, and passed the new bill. The House then
approved the new H.R. 4 on May 20, 1999. President Clinton signed the bill on July 23,
1999. However, he remained at odds with congressional Republicans about the implications
of the legislation. He contended that it was not equivalent to a deployment decision because
NMD remains subject to annual authorizations and appropriations. But congressional
supporters of NMD argued that the bill makes it clear that the United States will deploy and
NMD, no further decisions about that possibility are needed.
In February 1999, a team, led by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, met with
Russian officials in Moscow to begin discussions on possible amendments to the ABM Treaty.
The United States sought to reassure Russia that the planned NMD would not interfere with
Russia’s strategic nuclear forces and that the United States still views the ABM Treaty as
central to the U.S.-Russian strategic balance. The Russians were reportedly unconvinced;
they continued to argue that the United States has overstated the threat from rogue nations
so that it can build a defense that will be able to intercept Russian missiles.
During their meeting at the G-8 summit in Germany in June 1999, the Presidents
repeated their support for the ABM Treaty as the “cornerstone of strategic stability.” But
they also noted that the parties are obligated, under Article XIII of the Treaty to consider
possible changes in the strategic situation that have a bearing on the Treaty and to consider
proposals for further increasing the viability of the Treaty. In November 1999, President
Yeltsin warned that any U.S. move beyond the limits in the ABM Treaty would “have
extremely negative consequences” for other arms control treaties. Russian officials also
stated that Russia could deploy new multiple-warhead missiles or retain older ones to have
the forces needed to penetrate U.S. missile defenses. And many Russian officials continued
to insist that the United States had overstated the threat from rogue nations.
In January 1999, the United States reportedly tabled a proposed Protocol to the ABM
Treaty that would allow for the deployment of a U.S. NMD site in Alaska. This Protocol,
which was published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Magazine, would allow for the
deployment of 100 interceptors and an ABM radar at a single site, other than the sites
permitted by the ABM Treaty (i.e. Alaska) and for the modification of several other early
warning radars so that they could perform ABM radar functions and support the NMD
system. The Protocol also stated that either side could request negotiations on further
modifications after March 1, 200l. These talks would presumably allow the United States to
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seek further changes in the Treaty’s limits on ABM interceptors and space-based sensors.
The United States also offered to exchange data and permit inspections so that Russia could
remain confident in the limited nature of the U.S. NMD. Russia reportedly did not table a
counter-proposal or begin discussions about the specific provisions in the U.S. proposal.
Some in Congress criticized these negotiations because, they argued, the resulting
agreement would prove too limiting for U.S. missile defenses. In mid-April 2000, 25
Republican Senators signed a letter to President Clinton stating that they would vote against
any agreement the Administration reached with the Russians on modifications to the ABM
Treaty. Furthermore, on April 26, 2000, Senator Jesse Helms informed the Administration
that the Foreign Relations Committee would not address or vote on any arms control
agreements reached by this Administration in its final months. But the United States and
Russia remained far apart on the question of modifying the ABM Treaty.
During their summit in Moscow in early June 2000, and again at the G-8 summit in late
June, Presidents Clinton and Putin failed to resolve their differences. At the Moscow summit,
Putin did agree that the threat from proliferation was increasing and that the ABM Treaty
could be modified to remain viable in the face of changing circumstances, but he did not agree
that the proliferation threat justified such modifications. After the summit, other Russian
officials continued to dispute the U.S. assessment of emerging threats and to argue that the
U.S. NMD system would undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent. But Putin did propose that
Russia work with European nations to develop defenses against shorter-range ballistic
missiles. Russia repeated this offer in February 2001.
On September 1, 2000, President Clinton announced that he had decided not to
authorize deployment of a National Missile Defense system. He stated that he could not
conclude “that we have enough confidence in the technology, and the operational
effectiveness of the entire NMD system, to move forward to deployment.” He also noted that
the delay in a deployment decision would permit the United States to continue its efforts to
convince Russia to modify the ABM Treaty. He stated that he believed it would be “far better
to move forward in the context of the ABM Treaty.” Russian officials praised the delay in
the deployment decision, but some in Moscow may mistakenly believe that Russia’s resistance
to changes in the ABM Treaty caused the delay. President Clinton indicated that it was the
technology that caused the delay, even though the Treaty remains an issue.
The Bush Administration has taken a different approach to the ABM Treaty, arguing that
the United States would need to “leave behind the constraints” of the Treaty to pursue the
development and deployment of missile defenses. The President called on Russia to join the
United States in developing a new framework for strategic stability and international security
in the post-Cold War era. During the President’s visit to Europe in mid-June, some officials
from the Administration argued that the United States would need to abandon the Treaty
soon because the Treaty would inhibit testing of ballistic missile defense concepts.
In mid-July 2001, the Bush Administration offered Congress a more detailed description
of its missile defense plans when it submitted its amended defense budget for FY2002. The
Administration requested $8.3 billion, an increase of more $3 billion, or 57%, from the
FY2001 budget, to support a robust research and development program into a wide range of
missile defense technologies. The Administration also reorganized BMDO to eliminate the
distinctions between theater missile defense and national missile defense, instead dividing the
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programs into boost-phase, mid-course, and terminal technologies. Furthermore, in testimony
before Congress on July 13, 2001, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz stated that the
United States might soon test the ability of Aegis theater defense radars to track strategic
ballistic missiles. This type of test could be interpreted to be an effort to test non-ABM
systems in an ABM mode, which is forbidden by the ABM Treaty. Consequently, Secretary
Wolfowitz noted that the United States could bump up against the limits in the Treaty “in
months” rather than in years. However, he said that the United States would not violate the
ABM Treaty. Instead, the Administration would seek Russia’s agreement and understanding
on a framework that would allow the United States to move beyond the ABM Treaty, and,
if this was not possible, the United States could withdraw. DOD delayed the problematic
tests in October of 2001, for technical reasons. But Secretary Rumsfeld stated that the Aegis
radars would not be used in the tests when they did occur because this would violate the
Treaty. Some interpreted these comments as evidence that the United States was seeking to
reach an agreement with Russia that would not involve violations of the Treaty. Others,
however, stated that Secretary Rumsfeld hoped the cancellations would emphasize how much
the Treaty constrained U.S. missile defense programs and would highlight the need for the
United States to withdraw from the Treaty.
During their meeting after the G-8 summit in Genoa, Italy in June, Presidents Bush and
Putin agreed that the two nations would hold “intensive consultations on the interrelated
subjects of offensive and defensive systems.” Many observers interpreted this statement as
an indication that two sides would begin negotiations on a new agreement limiting offensive
nuclear weapons and on possible amendments or modifications to the ABM Treaty. This may
have been the type of framework President Putin had in mind. His Defense Minister, Ivanov
indicated that he would recommend accepting modifications to the ABM Treaty if the
resulting defenses would not undermine Russia’s security; this acceptance would be in
exchange for deep cuts in U.S. and Russian offensive forces. However, officials from the
Bush Administration, and the President himself, have stated that the United States does not
intend to participate in lengthy negotiations in search of formal arms control limits. They
viewed these consultations as an opportunity for the United States to outline its policies and
programs for both offensive and defensive weapons, and to seek Russian agreement on a
mutual withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The President has said that the United States
would withdraw from the treaty unilaterally if Russia did not accept the U.S. approach.
Furthermore, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Undersecretary
of State John Bolton stated that the Bush Administration would not seek to negotiate
amendments to the ABM Treaty or a new formal agreement to replace it. Instead, the
Administration would seek to win Russian acquiescence with U.S. plans and to convince
Russia to jointly withdraw from the ABM Treaty with the United States.
These consultations began with several meetings in August and September 2001. In
early August, a Russian delegation visited the Department of Defense and received extensive
briefings on U.S. plans for missile defense in early August. These meetings were billed as
an “exchange of information” not an exchange of ideas. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
traveled to Moscow in mid-August, reportedly in an unsuccessful effort to convince Russia
that the two nations should withdraw from the ABM Treaty simultaneously. He did not
engage in discussions about possible modifications to the ABM Treaty or in negotiations on
reductions in offensive forces. He stated that the United States did not yet know how low
it would reduce its forces because it had not yet completed its strategic review. In late
August, Undersecretary of State John Bolton seemed to indicate that the United States would
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withdraw from the ABM Treaty in November, if the United States and Russia had not agreed
on a plan for mutual withdrawal by the time President Bush and President Putin met in Texas.
He, and other officials, later stated that he had not intended to set a firm deadline. The
following day, however, President Bush stated that the United States would withdraw from
the ABM Treaty, but would do so on its own timetable. Press reports indicate that
Undersecretary of State John Bolton was prepared to inform Russian officials of the U.S.
intention to move forward with withdrawal from the ABM Treaty during meetings in Moscow
on September 17, but he did not do so.
Russian officials complained that the two sides could not make progress in these
negotiations because they still did not know what kind of missile defense the United States
intends to build or what parts of the Treaty would cause problems for this defense.
Furthermore, in early September, Russian officials ruled out an early agreement on missile
defenses. They indicated that it could take a year or more for the two sides to reach
agreement on a framework to replace the ABM Treaty. However, at the same time, Russia
appeared willing to accept some minor modifications to the Treaty, although it continued to
reject the U.S. proposal for a joint withdrawal.
Many analysts expected President Bush to inform Russia’s President Putin of U.S.
intentions to withdraw from the ABM Treaty when they met in Shanghai in October, 2001.
He did not do this. Instead, the two nations appeared to be close to an agreement that would
allow the United States to proceed with its missile defense testing plans without withdrawing
from or violating the ABM Treaty. Reportedly, Russia would have been willing to allow the
United States to proceed with some tests of missile defense technologies as long as Russia
had the opportunity to review and approve the tests before they occurred and as long as the
Treaty’s limits on deployment remained in place. The Bush Administration reportedly
rejected this approach, arguing that it needed more flexibility to pursue its missile defense
programs. It was willing to keep Russia informed about these plans but it was not willing to
allow Russia to review and reject them. Consequently, the November summit concluded
without the announcement of such an agreement. In early December, Secretary Powell
informed Russia’s Foreign Minister that the United States planned to withdraw from the
ABM Treaty. President Bush reportedly called President Putin and told him the same thing.
On December 12, the White House informed Congressional leaders of the U.S. intent to
withdraw from the Treaty, and, on December 13, the President gave formal notice to Russia
of the U.S. intent to withdraw. Because the Treaty mandates 6-months notice for withdrawal
from the Treaty, the United States will leave the ABM Treaty in June 2002.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Report RL31111. Missile Defense: The Current Debate
CRS Report RL31222. Arms Control and Strategic Nuclear Weapons: Unilateral vs.
Bilateral Reductions
CRS Report RL30345. U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Policy, Force Structure, and Arms Control
Issues
CRS Report 97-359. START II Debate in the Russian Duma: Issues and Prospects
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