Order Code RL31355
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Afghanistan’s Path to Reconstruction:
Obstacles, Challenges, and Issues for Congress
April 8, 2002
Rhoda Margesson
Foreign Affairs Analyst
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

Afghanistan’s Path to Reconstruction:
Obstacles, Challenges, and Issues for Congress
Summary
For the past 22 years, Afghanistan has been embroiled in conflict. Humanitarian
assistance programs have been a key part of the overall multilateral effort to relieve
human suffering and assist refugees and internally displaced persons (IDPs). In the
post-September 11 environment, while actions are being taken to eliminate Taliban
and Al Qaeda forces and others supporting terrorism, the needs have only become
more urgent.
The case of Afghanistan may present a special category of crisis, in which the
United States and others play a significant role in the war on terrorism while
simultaneously providing humanitarian and reconstruction assistance to the innocent
civilians caught in the crossfire. Moreover, the conditions in Afghanistan represent
a challenging mix of infrastructure destruction, ongoing security concerns, and
humanitarian needs requiring an immediate response. So far, the international
community has recognized that large amounts of aid and resources will be required
in the reconstruction effort. In addition, a long-term commitment will be necessary
to ensure a stable, democratic Afghanistan emerges and will not fall prey to the twin
evils of drugs and terrorism.
As the Afghan phase of the war is concluded, transitional and reconstruction
assistance will move ahead. It is anticipated that Congress will examine the early
progress of reconstruction efforts, aid priorities, and the long-term role to be played
by the United States. It will likely also look at the contributions by and
responsibilities of key allies partnering in the efforts within Afghanistan. The current
operating environment reveals some of the key challenges that lie ahead such as
security issues, population movements, food security, environment and infrastructure,
health, and education. While the recent international donors conference indicated a
strong willingness on the part of the international community to assist in the
restoration of Afghanistan, it also revealed the cost could amount to more than $15
billion over the next decade.
The many moving parts of the war on terrorism coupled with the uncertainty of
developments within Afghanistan make long-term planning and exit strategies
impossible at this stage. Still, of potential, immediate interest to Congress are security
concerns, support of the interim administration, oversight and coordination of aid
projects, and the plight of women and children.

Contents
The Situation Before September 11, 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
The Situation After September 11, 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Current Operating Environment . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Population Movements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Food Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Environment and Infrastructure . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Land Mines . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Health Sector . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Education and Community Development . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The International Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
U.S. Humanitarian Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Transitional Assistance and Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
International Conference on Reconstruction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
U.S. Reconstruction Assistance . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
U.S. Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Interim Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Oversight and Coordination of Aid Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Aid Priorities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Women and Children . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Collateral Damage . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
List of Tables
Table 1. Pledges from the Tokyo Reconstruction Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Table 2. U.S. Programs to Assist the People of Afghanistan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

Afghanistan’s Path to Reconstruction:
Obstacles, Challenges, and
Issues for Congress
Once hostilities end and the Afghan phase of the war on terrorism starts to wind
down, reconstruction efforts will begin in earnest. International attention will likely
turn to Afghanistan’s short- and medium-term future, raising questions between the
United States and its allies about division of labor, burdensharing, and exit strategies.
It is anticipated that Congress will examine reconstruction efforts underway, aid
priorities, long-term reconstruction proposals, and the implementation role to be
played by the United States.
The Situation Before September 11, 2001
Even before the current crisis, Afghanistan had suffered twenty-two years of
war, which included a long Soviet occupation, followed by civil war, and, beginning
in 1996, harsh Taliban rule in most of the country.1 With a devastated infrastructure
and minimal government and social services, even basic health care and education
were almost nonexistent. The Taliban leadership focused available resources largely
on maintaining internal security and seeking to eliminate the last pockets of ethnic
minority opposition in the North and Northeast. During this internal conflict, the
Taliban placed restrictions on women working outside the home, further aggravating
levels of poverty. These factors, in combination with a severe drought over the last
three years, produced enormous human suffering in Afghanistan.
As of September 10, 2001, according to UNHCR, nearly four million Afghans
(out of a total population of about 26 million) were refugees–two million in Pakistan,
one and a half million in Iran, and the rest in Russia, India, the Central Asian
Republics, Europe, and other places. In addition, as of September 10th, nearly one
million other Afghans were internally displaced persons (IDPs) uprooted by drought
and conflict.2 At that time U.N. agencies were searching for ways to help five million
of the most vulnerable Afghans, i.e., those in critical need of food and shelter. For
IDPs this meant providing assistance close to where they lived to help them return to
their own homes.
1 For further information, please refer to Kenneth Katzman, Afghanistan: Current Issues and
U.S. Policy Concerns
, CRS Report RL30588, February 19, 2002.
2 The conflicts in Afghanistan left approximately 2 million dead, 700,000 widows and
orphans, and 1 million children born in refugee camps.

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United Nations (U.N.)
agencies such as the U.N. High
Afghanistan Statistics
Commissioner for Refugees
(UNHCR), U.N. Children’s Fund
! The average life expectancy is about
(UNICEF), World Food Program
45 years.
(WFP) and U.N. Mine Action
! Afghanistan has the highest maternal
Service (UNMAS), as well as the
mortality rate in the world (1 woman
International Committee of the Red
in 12 dies during childbirth).
Cross (ICRC), and numerous
! Over a quarter of children die before
nongovernmental organizations
reaching age five.
(NGOs) such as Oxfam and Save
! Afghanistan has the lowest per
the Children have provided relief
person caloric intake in the world,
inside Afghanistan and in refugee
and the highest per capita number of
camps in neighboring countries.
amputees.
The United States has been the
! Despite these negative factors, a high
largest provider of humanitarian
fertility rate has caused its population
assistance to the people of
growth rate to exceed 3%. In fact,
A f g h a n i s t a n t h r o u g h i t s
over two decades of war and
contributions to the UNHCR, other
destruction, the Afghan population
agencies, and NGOs. From 1994
may have grown by a net 10 million,
until just recently, the United States
from approximately 16 million
did not have a United States
(according to a 1975 census) to the
A g e n c y f o r I n t e r n a t i o n a l
current estimate of 26 million.
Development (USAID) mission in
Afghanistan.3 U.S. aid was
provided mainly through U.N. agencies and NGOs. Via the WFP, the United States
provided more than 80% of all food shipments to Afghanistan during the last fiscal
year and more than 50% this year.4
The Situation After September 11, 2001
The humanitarian situation deteriorated even further following the September 11
terrorist attacks in the United States. Fears of U.S. reprisals against the Taliban
triggered Afghan population flights from major cities both toward rural areas and the
country’s borders with Iran and Pakistan, despite the risk posed by land mines and
unexploded munitions. Although some humanitarian efforts continued during the
height of the anti-Taliban war, most international relief staff also left, making the
provision of assistance more complicated. Still, food relief efforts can be credited
with preventing a widely-feared famine over the winter.
The U.S.-led campaign in Afghanistan against the Taliban and Al Qaeda,
“Operation Enduring Freedom,” began on October 7. Within two months, by early
3 A USAID/DART office was set up in Islamabad in late December 2001.
4 See Situation Reports made available by the USAID, Bureau for Democracy, Conflict and
Humanitarian Assistance (DCHA), Office of U.S. Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA)
Central Asia Task Force on [http://www.uasid.gov].

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December, many of the Taliban strongholds had collapsed. An interim government
was formed on December 22, 2001. Led by Hamid Karzai, the new Afghan Interim
Administration (AIA) began a transition to recovery and reconstruction.
Current Operating Environment
The humanitarian needs and support required for a recovery in Afghanistan must
be understood in the context of the continuing vast numbers of refugees and IDPs,
the variations among the regions in which they are located, and the political and
security situation throughout the country. The collapsed infrastructure, rugged
terrain, and extreme weather are significant factors with regard to access, food aid
and logistics, and plans for reconstruction. The current operating environment is
complex with a number of urgent challenges. Included in the next section are brief
references to some initiatives under way.
Security
The International Security Assistance Force (ISAF), installed in Afghanistan in
December, includes 4,500 peacekeepers drawn from 18 countries.5 It is led by the
British (Operation Fingal) and only operates in Kabul and immediate surrounding
areas.6 Its mission is to provide security to the capital, dispose of mines and
unexploded ordinance, and eventually train soldiers for an Afghan army. The Kabul
airport is open for military flights, and there are plans to accommodate civilian flights
as well. Separate from ISAF, the total number of U.S. military personnel on the
ground is roughly 5,200 with a focus on logistics, airlifts, and intelligence. U.S.
troops and personnel, along with the British and other coalition troops, are continuing
the war effort against Taliban and Al Qaeda remnants with actions such as Operation
Anaconda in March 2002, which focused on areas in the east around the Shah-e-Kot
valley.
Armed factions are feuding in different parts of the country. The goals of these
warlords and other elements are to try to seize local power and territory and maintain
profits from drugs and smuggling. IDPs caught in this situation, particularly
minorities, face dire choices. If they decide to leave, they become vulnerable and
homeless; if they stay, they risk harassment and violence and the possibility of U.S.
bombing. Reports of rape, assault, and theft come from camps in different areas. Aid
workers are also often placed in untenable positions. If they leave, they fear the IDPs
will not survive; if they stay, they are unlikely to be able to prevent these atrocities.
There is great concern about the security of aid workers delivering food and
emergency care. Similar reports of theft and beatings have made drivers wary and
highlighted the fragile environment under which humanitarian assistance is operating.
Stolen food has been distributed to local residents and military units.
5 Approximately 1,800 of the peacekeepers are UK personnel. See Ministry of Defence,
United Kingdom: [http://www.mod.uk].
6 It is expected that the follow-on peacekeeping force will be under Turkish command.

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Clearly related to security are questions concerning the effectiveness of the AIA
in administering the government, facilitating the implementation of recovery
initiatives, and addressing broader concerns of security and terrorism throughout
Afghanistan. The AIA faces threats to security from three potential directions. First,
the country’s lack of resources have encouraged a thriving drug trade. Before the
Taliban, Afghanistan’s major export was opium. It produced 75% of the world
supply. Under the Taliban, which enforced a ban on opium cultivation in 1999,
according to some estimates, opium poppy cultivation dropped from 3,000 tons to
200 tons. However, these numbers are deceiving. It is believed that drugs continued
to be a lucrative source of income both for the Taliban and their opponents because
large stockpiles built up under Taliban rule, which may well have been intended for
the world market, were held back as supply exceeded demand and caused a
depression in price. Indeed, this spring may see the largest poppy crop in recent
years. Controlling the drug trade is a huge challenge in a country with few other
resources and the incentive of profits from heroin on the world market. While the
Karzai-led interim government has ordered a ban on the production, use, and
trafficking of all drugs, the government has little or no power of enforcement. Sources
report a recent increase in cultivation linked to lawlessness and banditry on the one
hand, and the great need among farmers for some form of livelihood on the other.
Second, former combatants can have a direct impact on humanitarian assistance
and recovery efforts. If local struggles for power continue to prevent refugees and
IDPs from returning to their homes, this will severely hamper any recovery efforts.
Third, Afghanistan’s neighbors–Pakistan, Iran, and Uzbekistan–can also play key
roles, depending on whether or not they provide support to these local contenders for
power.
Population Movements
Population movements continue in and out of and within Afghanistan. It is
estimated that there are 3.7 million refugees, mostly in Iran and Pakistan. The
approximate number of IDPs remaining to date is 1.3 million. The total number of
people requiring relocation assistance is therefore around 5 million. In coordination
with government initiatives, UNHCR has set up voluntary return programs for
refugees. These Tripartite Agreements on repatriation between UNHCR,
Afghanistan, and the governments of Pakistan and Iran, respectively, outline the
framework for the voluntary return of Afghan refugees. UNHCR reports that since
March 1, nearly 150,000 Afghan refugees have repatriated from Pakistan, and more
than 3,800 IDPs have returned to their homes. UNHCR plans to begin assisting
refugees in Iran at the beginning of April, where eight registration centers have
already been established.
However, new waves of Afghan refugees are causing some alarm. While tens
of thousands have returned home, still other refugees have fled to Pakistan because
of crime, fighting, and lack of food. With no sustainable livelihood, many of these
refugees are forced to seek assistance.
UNHCR expects to repatriate 800,000 refugees from Pakistan and Iran and
400,000 IDPs this year. It will probably take several years for returns to be
completed, security permitting. Given the conditions in Afghanistan, the

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organizations coordinating aid to Afghanistan and the international community may
be forced to rethink the timetable for repatriation of refugees and return of IDPs.
Longer-term care in refugee camps and other measures may be required to allow for
recovery to take hold while providing life-saving measures in the form of food,
security, shelter, and basic medical care.
Food Security
Afghanistan has had three years of drought, although there have been periods of
precipitation in different parts of the country. A USAID-funded assessment indicates
that the drought can be expected to last another 12-18 months. In the meantime, rain
and snow have reduced access to certain areas, caused housing problems at some
shelters and camps, and increased assistance and protection needs. The weather, like
the terrain, is varied and harsh and creates “pockets of need” which are difficult to
reach by relief agencies.
Food insecurity is relatively less severe but likely to continue in southern
Afghanistan, whereas in the “hunger belt” in the north and north east, food shortages
and distribution problems are exacerbating already difficult conditions. This in turn
is worsening existing ethnic tensions between the Pashtuns and either Uzbeks or
Tajiks and encouraging further population movements to southern Afghanistan or
across the border to Pakistan.
The U.S. strategy has been to move as much food as possible into villages where
people reside. In order to avoid diversion and theft of commodities, most food has
been stored in bordering countries and moved into Afghanistan by various means,
including trucks, pack animals, and airdrops. Free distribution and food-for-work
programs direct the efforts of able-bodied recipients into community development
projects. Recently the WFP began rapid helicopter deliveries in highly inaccessible
areas. Between October and mid February, the WFP delivered 322,500 tons of food.
NGOs report that they have delivered 263,700 tons to six million people.
Environment and Infrastructure
Afghanistan’s environment has also been severely compromised by the war and
drought. The drought will have direct bearing not only on the upcoming planting
season, livestock production, and agricultural recovery, but more short-term concerns
as well. An inadequate supply of water has an impact on basic human needs, such as
health, consumption, and shelter (building brick houses requires water). Dried-up
wells, poor irrigation practices, and lack of overall water management systems are
critical factors as Afghanistan enters its fourth year of drought. Deforestation, lack
of energy, and poor infrastructure, including roads and bridges, are also significant
factors that present formidable obstacles to reconstruction.
Almost every basic humanitarian need has an environmental component that will
continue to be important for the foreseeable future and will require careful planning
in the transition to reconstruction. For example, the restoration of electric power
either could involve rebuilding conventional, dirty diesel and oil power plants or
constructing distributed, clean micro turbines to provide electricity and heat, and the

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development of wind and solar energy. The provision of clean water could be
improved with the reconstruction of wells, development of efficient irrigation systems,
and monitoring of water quality. Innovative sanitation and waste treatment facilities
could be designed to reduce risks to human health and ultimately destruction to the
environment.
Land Mines
Land mines remain a huge problem throughout Afghanistan. Afghanistan is
believed to have one of the worst mine and unexploded ordnance problems in the
world, with 5-7 million still littered about the country. The Land Mine Monitor
estimates that of 724 million square meters of contaminated land, over half, 344
million square meters is classified as high-priority land for agriculture. With over 80%
of the Afghan population relying on agriculture for its livelihood, this is a substantial
obstacle not only to refugee and IDP returns, but to the basic recovery and
reconstruction plans as well.
Health Sector
The World Health Organization (WHO), regional health officials, health-related
UN agencies, and key NGOs are assisting the Afghan Ministry of Health and
discussing ways to rebuild the almost non-existent public health services. Issues to
be covered range from the provision of quality health care, increasing the supply of
pharmaceuticals, to health care access for millions of Afghans. A meeting is planned
in March to outline an agenda for reconstruction of the health sector. There have
been recent reports of outbreaks of influenza and scurvy in several parts of
Afghanistan; security concerns have prevented access to some of the areas in
question. The joint UNHCR/WHO campaign has immunized 1.5 million children
against measles since the beginning of January. Tuberculosis is also considered to be
a growing problem. Significant health impacts which are symptoms of much larger
problems include heroin addiction and landmine injuries.
Education and Community Development
The education system, particularly for women and girls, requires a great deal of
assistance if schools are to function with even the most basic infrastructure and tools
in the upcoming school year. USAID is providing 4 million textbooks over the next
few weeks. Other projects are underway to rebuild schools. An assessment is being
conducted by USAID’s Office of Transition Initiatives (OTI) to design a strategy for
building political stability, particularly through community-based programming. In
addition, through the International Organization for Migration (IOM) the Afghanistan
Emergency Information Project provides a daily humanitarian information bulletin for
radio broadcast. Up to 30,000 radios are being distributed to vulnerable segments of
the Afghan population. An agreement with Voice of America is expanding the
project’s regional capacity and increasing its special broadcasts on important
information pertaining to the relief effort.

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The International Response
U.S. Humanitarian Assistance
According to USAID, during FY2001 the U.S. government provided $183
million in humanitarian assistance to Afghanistan ranging from airlifts of tents and
blankets to assistance with polio eradication, from tons of wheat to crop substitution
assistance for poppy growers. On October 4, 2001, President Bush announced that
the United States would provide $320 million for FY2002 in U.S. humanitarian
assistance to Afghans both inside and outside Afghanistan’s borders. Multiple U.S.
agencies are providing some form of humanitarian assistance, including
USAID/Office of Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA), USAID/Food For Peace
(FFP), Democracy & Governance (USAID/DG), United States Department of
Agriculture (USDA), Department of State’s Bureau of Population, Refugees, and
Migration (State/PRM), Department of State’s Demining Program, the Department
of State’s Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement Affairs
(State/INL), the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), and the
Department of Defense (DOD).
U.S. humanitarian assistance covers a wide variety of aid, services, and projects.
Thus far, the United States has provided over $300 million in FY2002 Afghan
humanitarian assistance directly through government agencies or as a result of grants
to international organizations and NGOs.7 With the UNDP Trust Fund, support is
being provided to the operations and activities of the AIA. Humanitarian assistance
from other countries has also been forthcoming since October 2001. While exact
figures are difficult to ascertain, both bilateral and multilateral donors have made
contributions toward immediate and transitional assistance programs.
Transitional Assistance and Reconstruction
International Conference on Reconstruction. UNDP and World Bank
officials estimate that the reconstruction of Afghanistan will require $1.7 billion in the
first year, $10 billion over 5 years, and $15 billion in the next decade. Others argue
these numbers may be low, and put the overall cost at closer to $30 billion.
The International Conference on Reconstruction Assistance to Afghanistan held
in Tokyo on January 21 and 22, 20028 gave the AIA a chance to demonstrate its
commitment to the next phase of Afghanistan’s recovery and the international donor
community an opportunity to come together and formally demonstrate support for
this initiative. The sixty-one countries and twenty-one international organizations
7 According to Andrew Natsios, Administrator, USAID, and witness to the House
International Relations Committee Hearing on March 14, 2002, $83.9 million has come from
OFDA, $75 million from Food for Peace, and $14.2 is from OTI. In addition to humanitarian
assistance, $167 million is being put towards recovery and reconstruction initiatives.
8 The Asian Development Bank, the UNDP and the World Bank convened a Ministerial
Meeting to conduct a preliminary needs assessment for external funding required to assist
Afghanistan in its reconstruction efforts.

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represented pledged $1.8 billion for 2002. The U.S. government alone pledged $297
million.9 The cumulative total was $4.5 billion, with some states making pledges over
multiple years and commitments of different time frames. Some countries offered
support in kind but with no monetary value. See table below.
Table 1. Pledges from the Tokyo Reconstruction Conference
(U.S. $ - millions)
Country
Pledge
Time Frame
European Union
495
in the first year
India
100
line of credit
Iran
560
over the next 5 years
Japan
500
over the next 2.5 years
Pakistan
100
over 5 years
Saudi Arabia
220
over 3 years
South Korea
45
over the next 2.5 years
United Kingdom
86
in 2002
United States
297
over the next year
Source: The New York Times, January 22, 2002.
The U.S. contribution is just under 25%, about on par with the U.S. share of
funding in the United Nations and International Financial Institutions (IFIs).10 The
United States hopes that other nations will carry a greater portion of the costs for
reconstruction and peacekeeping since it has paid for most of the military campaign
against the Taliban and Al Qaeda. By comparison, the EU pledged the euro
equivalent of $495 million for 2002, which comes to nearly 30% of the assessed need
and amount pledged at the conference. Within this pledge the European Commission
recently approved an Initial Recovery Program for Afghanistan.
U.S. Reconstruction Assistance. The U.S. pledge to assist the people of
Afghanistan in 2002 is broken down as follows:
9 Of the amount pledged by the United States, much of the money was already available and
drawn from existing funds. However, a FY2002 supplemental is expected to substantially
increase amounts allocated to Afghanistan’s relief and recovery.
10 By contrast, in Kosovo, Congress capped U.S. reconstruction aid to 15 % of donor pledges.

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Table 2. U.S. Programs to Assist the People of Afghanistan
(U.S. $ - millions)
Account
Amount
Purpose
Development Assistance/ Child
12
Food security and health
Survival/Health
assistance and education
International Disaster Assistance
72
Incentives for stability
Office of Transition Initiatives
6
Community development;
quick impact projects
PL 480 - Title II (food)
77
Relief and recovery
416 (b)
44.9
Food for relief and recovery
Population, Refugees, Migration
52.6
Migration/refugee assistance
Economic Support Funds
17.25
Development assistance
Other sectors
8
Counternarcotics
Other sectors
7
Humanitarian demining11
Total
296.75
Source: The U.S. Department of State, The White House, Office of the Press Secretary, January 28,
2002
It is important to note that the U.S. allocation covers humanitarian needs (food
relief, refugee assistance) and transition-to-reconstruction initiatives (development
assistance, community programs, quick impact projects). Assistance requirements
cover a wide range of tasks due to the extreme conditions and complexity of the
operating environment in Afghanistan. These initiatives must be viewed along
parallel, but integrated, tracks rather than the more usual progression over time from
one stage to another.
According to the State Department, there will also be a $50 million line of credit
to finance U.S. projects through the Overseas Private Investment Corporation. The
Department of Labor will also make available $3 million to implement job programs.
In addition, the United States has freed up assets frozen when the Taliban regime
was in power and made them available to the AIA. Through the Federal Reserve
Bank of New York the Central Bank of Afghanistan already has access to $193
million worth of gold and $24.9 million in cash. There is an additional $25 million in
Afghan Central Bank Funds held in other accounts; $23 million held by the
International Transport Association (for overflights of Afghanistan), and $1.3 million
from Ariana Afghan Airlines.
11 Donors have pledged $60 million for humanitarian demining (from Tokyo and before). The
United States is putting up $7 million, Japan $18.2 million and the EU $9.3 million. U.S.
government sources say that demining over seven years will cost approximately $670 million.

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U.S. Legislation. In December 2001, H.R. 3427, to provide assistance for the
relief and reconstruction of Afghanistan, and for other purposes, was referred to the
House Committee on International Relations. A similar bill, S.1880, was introduced
in the Senate and referred to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee. The
Afghanistan Freedom Support Act of 2002, legislation referred to the House
Committee on International Relations (H.R. 3944), would provide $1.05 billion of
reconstruction aid to Afghanistan over four years. It focuses on creating a stable
environment for Afghanistan, addressing such issues as counternarcotics, terrorism,
and enforcement, the coordination of U.S. efforts, given its multiple-agency
involvement, and humanitarian and relief assistance. The bill was introduced on
March 14 by Committee Chairman Henry Hyde and later co-sponsored with Ranking
Member Tom Lantos, and Middle East Subcommittee Chairman Benjamin Gilman and
Ranking Democrat Gary Ackerman. The Committee approved the bill by voice vote
following markup on March 20, 2002.
Issues for Congress
Security
If reconstruction is to be a success, most observers believe it must occur in a
secure environment without threat to the new government and initiatives on the
ground. As U.S. troops make headway on finishing the Afghan phase of the war,
there are many questions about ensuring a secure environment for reconstruction.
Can peace occur without U.S. involvement in the peacekeeping effort? How involved
will the U.S. troops be in assembling and training an Afghan army? What role should
the United States play in drug enforcement and the war on terrorism inside
Afghanistan?
Many believe a peacekeeping force is essential and the United States must be
part of such a force. So far, the Bush Administration maintains that it will not take
part in a peacekeeping force in Afghanistan. However, the U.N. has called for more
foreign troops to disarm various groups and control warlords. The upsurge in conflict
in early March suggests the possibility that the U.S. decision may be reconsidered.
Under the current mandate, peacekeepers are in Kabul and have no impact outside the
capital. Some argue that the ISAF is too small and too limited to be effective. Amid
discussion about the type of peacekeeping force required has been the question of
how long peacekeepers will be required to stay.
Part of the current security plan includes the set up of an Afghan army for border
control and stability. Under consideration is how such an army is to be assembled,
which armed forces would be involved in its training, and how it would work with the
international forces already in place. A Training Task Force (made up of roughly 150
Special Forces troops plus any troops contributed by allied nations) may begin
training a new Afghan national army beginning as soon as May 2002. Apart from
preparation for combat and border patrols, the Afghan forces would eventually be

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instructed on a set of more complex issues–respect for human rights, loyalty to
government, and civilian-military affairs.12
Finally, there are the twin evils of drugs and terrorism, inextricably linked, but
requiring different forms of intervention and enforcement. Moreover, in addition to
cracking down on the problem itself, alternative forms of livelihood are critical, such
as crop substitution, community projects, and other programs to benefit those directly
involved in these activities.
Interim Administration
Critical to Afghanistan’s recovery in the short term and stability in the long term
is the credibility and effective functioning of its government. In a few months the
interim Afghan government is scheduled to face another transition. King Zahir Shah
is to open the loya jirga, which will choose a new government to run Afghanistan for
the next two years until a new constitution is drafted and elections are held. What
role will the United States play in helping to build administrative capacity in the form
of a national government and institutional development? What is the United States
currently doing to help the Afghan government function and prepare for its next
phase?
Oversight and Coordination of Aid Projects
In order to keep the support of the international community, reconstruction
efforts need to demonstrate the effective use of funds and their distribution. What is
the United States doing to make sure aid is being spent wisely? What role is the
United States playing to facilitate international collaboration on oversight and
coordination of aid projects? How is the United States coordinating its various
agencies participating in reconstruction efforts?
From coordination mechanisms to a system of accountability, future donations
depend on the way in which current funds are used and whether they reach those for
whom they are intended. The work of the U.N. (in particular UNDP), other
international organizations, NGOs, and governments will be critical. The number of
international actors on the ground create some concerns about aid assistance and how
projects will be managed and coordinated. The United States has made a substantial
pledge to Afghanistan, but its role in the overall aid coordination effort is less clear.
Few rules exist about how the money is to be spent. Moreover, the lack of
experience by the AIA coupled with its many competing priorities (not least of which
is that a financial infrastructure is not yet in place), mean that assistance and guidance
on monetary matters (including agreements with lenders and contributions by donors)
by the international community remain critical.
A number of U.S. agencies are involved in the relief and recovery effort in
Afghanistan. A single coordinator of U.S. assistance has not been appointed to
spearhead the initiatives underway. While systems have been put in place in the field
12 The New York Times, March 26, 2002 Section A, Page 12, Column 6.

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to better coordinate day-to-day activities under the U.S. Ambassador, there is no
single person coordinating U.S. policy from Washington, DC.
Aid Priorities
So far, there is little development-type aid in the U.S. pledge, although some is
focused on quick impact programs, long-term agriculture, women and children, and
education. Where should the United States concentrate its aid priorities and efforts?
With what level and mix of assistance? What is the Bush Administration’s objective
and strategy? Will Congress begin to earmark sectors and, if so, based upon what
priorities?
Women and Children
The Taliban treatment of women and restrictions it imposed not only severely
curtailed the work force, but reduced women’s basic rights, education, and access to
health. On December 12, 2001 Congress passed the Afghan Women and Children
Relief Act of 2001 (S. 1573, P.L. 107-81) to address some of these concerns. How
much impact will this legislation have on reconstruction initiatives specifically focused
on women and children? To what extent will their needs be a primary point of focus
in aid distribution and the recovery effort? What are the barriers to the
implementation of women’s projects?
Collateral Damage
In recent months claims of erroneous bombing targets have raised the question
of victim compensation and U.S. responsibility and also highlighted the difficulty of
intelligence gathering and security problems on the ground. Although statutes and
legislation exist to protect victims of war, these are typically worked out on a case-by-
case basis. The issue is blurred by the recognition that the end result may not be a
matter of simple human error, but rather a complex combination of factors for which
it is more difficult to determine responsibility. Collateral damage includes civilian
losses, considered to be a by-product of war, despite efforts to minimize innocent
civilian casualties. Extensive press coverage and a series of claims of mistaken targets
have made this a point of concern in recent weeks. Should legislation be developed
specifically for Afghan citizens who are victims of collateral damage?