Order Code IB92075
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues
Updated April 4, 2002
Alfred B. Prados
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Syrian Politics and External Relations
Economy and Foreign Affairs
Syrian-U.S. Bilateral Issues
Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations
Syrian and Israeli Roles in Lebanon
Relations with Iraq
Arms Proliferation
Terrorist Activity
Reaction to Terrorist Attacks on the United States
Narcotics Traffic
Syria’s Human Rights Record and Related Issues
Treatment of Jewish Minority
U.S. Aid and Sanctions
General Sanctions Applicable to Syria
Specific Sanctions against Syria
Permitted Activities
Recent Congressional Action
Alternatives and Implications

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Syria: U.S. Relations and Bilateral Issues
SUMMARY
U.S.-Syrian relations have warmed some-
continues to consolidate his position. An array
what in recent years as a result of the collapse
of bilateral issues continue to affect relations
of the Soviet Union, Syria’s participation in
between the United States and Syria: the
the allied coalition against Iraq in 1991, and
course of Arab-Israeli talks; questions of arms
Syrian agreement to participate in Arab-Israeli
proliferation; Syrian connections with terrorist
peace talks. Some Members of Congress
activity and previous involvement in narcotics
remain wary, however, of ties with Syria.
traffic; Syria’s human rights record; treatment
Several legislative initiatives have sought to
of the Syrian Jewish community; Syria’s role in
make any relaxation of aid and trade restric-
Lebanon; and a warming trend in Syrian rela-
tions conditional on further changes in Syrian
tions with Iraq. A variety of U.S. legislative
policies.
provisions and executive directives prohibit
direct aid to Syria and restrict bilateral trade
Syria, governed by President Hafiz
relations between the two countries. On
al-Asad from 1970 until his death in June
September 11, 2001, President Bashar al-Asad
2000, is a prominent player in the Middle East
sent a cable to President Bush in which he
scene. Within the region, a number of border
“condemned the terrorist attacks that targeted
disputes, problems of resource allocation, and
innocent civilians and vital centers in the
political rivalries have caused frequent tensions
United States.”
between Syria and its neighbors. In particular,
the Syrian Golan Heights territory, which
An issue for U.S. policy makers is the
Israel occupied in 1967, has been one of the
degree to which the Administration should go
most intractable issues in the Arab-Israeli
in seeking to enlist Syrian support for U.S.
dispute.
endeavors in the Middle East. Many U.S.
observers question the sincerity of Syrian
Syria participated in U.S.-sponsored
gestures toward the United States and doubt
bilateral peace talks with Israel between 1991
that they augur a fundamental reorientation in
and 1996, when talks were suspended. A few
Syrian policies. They believe removal of
months after the election of Israeli Labor Party
legislative sanctions should be contingent on
leader Ehud Barak as Prime Minister of Israel,
evidence of improvements in Syria’s human
Syrian-Israeli talks resumed briefly under U.S.
rights record, a clear renunciation of terrorism,
auspices in December 1999 and January 2000
and reversal of other policies injurious to U.S.
but stalled again as the two sides disagreed
interests. Others believe Syria’s decision to
over the sequence of issues to be discussed. A
join the allied coalition and participate in
March 26 meeting in Geneva, Switzerland,
Arab-Israeli talks have provided opportunities
between then Presidents and Asad failed to
for further cooperation in achieving U.S.
produce an agreement on restarting the talks.
regional objectives. They favor quiet diplo-
Prospects are uncertain in the aftermath of
macy aimed at encouraging Syria to play a
President Asad’s death on June 10, 2000, and
constructive and responsible role in the Middle
further progress will probably have to wait as
East.
Asad’s successor, his son Dr. Bashar al-Asad,

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
At an Arab summit conference on March 27-28, 2002, Syria joined other Arab states
in endorsing a peace initiative by Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah involving full
Israeli withdrawal from Arab territories occupied since 1967 in return for normal relations
with Israel in the context of a comprehensive peace. In elaborating on Syria’s position,
President Bashar al-Asad described the initiative as a “first step” and said “what is
required is a mechanism” to implement the plan. He also demanded that Israel commit
itself publicly to returning occupied Arab lands and maintained that “for us, terrorism
comes from Israel.”
On March 30, 2002, President Bush told reporters that “[t]he Syrians must
participate” [in the campaign against terrorism] but added that he did not have any
evidence of direct involvement by Syria or Iran in recent suicide bombings in Israel. In a
speech on April 4, the President observed that “Syria has spoken out against Al Qaeda. We
expect it to act against Hamas and Hizballah, as well.” He went on to say that it is time for
Syria “to decide which side of the war against terror it is on.”
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.S.-Syrian relations, frequently strained by longstanding disagreements over regional
and international policy, have warmed somewhat as a result of several developments: the
collapse of the Soviet Union, Syria’s participation in the allied coalition against Iraq in
1990-91, and Syrian agreement to participate in Arab-Israeli peace talks. This thaw in
bilateral relations led some Members of Congress to inquire whether U.S. Administrations had
made any private commitments to Syria, such as an undertaking to relax economic sanctions,
in return for Syrian support on regional issues. Several legislative proposals have sought to
condition relaxation of aid and trade restrictions on further changes in Syrian policy. Recent
U.S. Administrations, though not inclined to lift sanctions on Syria at this time, tend to believe
it is in U.S. interests to encourage Syria to play a positive role in the Arab-Israeli peace
process. The issue for U.S. policy makers is the degree to which the United States should
work for better relations with Syria in an effort to enlist Syrian cooperation on regional issues.
Syrian Politics and External Relations
The death of Syrian President Hafiz al-Asad on June 10, 2000 removed one of the
longest serving heads of state in the Middle East and a key figure in the affairs of the region.
The late President Asad, a former air force commander and minister of defense who came to
power in a bloodless coup in November 1970, was elected to his fifth 7-year presidential term
on February 10, 1999. Hardworking, ascetic, and usually cautious, the late President
exercised uncontested authority through his personal prestige and his control of the ruling
Arab Socialist Resurrection (Ba’th) Party, the armed forces, and the intelligence apparatus,
which form the triple pillars of the regime. Asad also had strong support among members of
his Alawite religious sect (a small Islamic sect), which comprises approximately 12% of the
population but is disproportionately represented in the country’s political and military
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institutions. Through alliances with key leaders in the region, particularly those of Iran,
Egypt, and Saudi Arabia, and his de facto control of Lebanon, Asad made Syria a leading
force in the region. During the last decade of Asad’s leadership, Syria held sporadic peace
talks with Israel but so far had not accepted the terms Israel was willing to offer (see below).
The late President’s son and
Syria in Brief
successor, Dr. Bashar al-Asad, held no
official position in the government or
Population (2000): 16,305,659 (Growth: 2.58%)
Ba’th party at the time of the elder
Area: 185,180 sq km (71,498 sq mi, slightly larger
Asad’s death. Most observers believe
than North Dakota)
Ethnic Groups: Arabs 90.3%; Kurds, Armenians,
the late President had been grooming
others 9.7%
the 35-year old Bashar for eventual
Religious Sects: Sunni Muslim 74%; Alawite,
succession but had planned on a longer
Druze, Ismaili 16%; Christian 10%; Jewish (less than
period of apprenticeship. A western
0.01%)
educated ophthalmologist who held the
Literacy (1997): 71% (M-86%, F-56%)
rank of colonel in the Syrian army, Dr.
GDP (2000): $19.4 billion
Bashar al-Asad headed the Syrian
External Debt (2000): $17 billion, including up to
Computer Society and has been
$12 billion to Russia (inherited from Syria’s debt to
instrumental in bringing the internet to
the former Soviet Union)
Inflation (1999): 2.3%
Syria, although access is still drastically
Unemployment (2000): 7% (Some estimates are as
curtailed in Syria’s tightly controlled
high as 20%)
society. Dr. Bashar has also been
Armed Forces (2000): personnel, 316,000;
active in a recent anti-corruption
tanks, 4,850 (including ca. 1,200 in storage);
campaign. Since assuming the
combat aircraft, 589
presidency, he has permitted somewhat
freer discussion of political issues and
released approximately 600 political
prisoners; however, probably under conservative pressure, the government has curtailed the
activities of several discussion groups that emerged after Bashar became president, and
President Bashar himself warned reformists against attacking the interests of the Ba’th Party
or the legacy of the late President Hafiz al-Asad.
Economy and Foreign Affairs. For much of its existence, Syria has faced economic
difficulties and problems in its foreign relations. The economy, long based on agriculture and
commerce, is dominated by an inefficient public sector, excessive central planning, and
administrative controls, despite some limited efforts toward economic reform since 1991.
Revenue has increased with the advent of oil production (approximately 500,000 barrels per
day of which about 300,000 is consumed domestically); however, at present production rates,
Syria’s oil reserves will be exhausted in 10-12 years.
Several economic reforms have been undertaken in Syria since early 2000. In April and
May 2000, the late President Hafiz al-Asad approved laws to permit foreign ownership of
land used for business enterprises, relax restrictions on acquiring foreign currencies, and ease
corporate taxation. In his inaugural address on July 17, President Bashar al-Asad called for
“steady, yet gradual, steps toward introducing economic changes” and specifically mentioned
“removing bureaucratic obstacles to the flow of domestic and foreign investments.” Two
projects launched by the new president–a 5-year vocational training program designed to
create 440,000 jobs and a 25% hike in civil service salaries–may succeed in lowering
unemployment and increasing efficiency but will increase pressure on the budget in the short
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term. President Bashar has supported further measures, including abolition of multiple
currency exchange rates, expansion of free trade zones, and tentative approval of draft laws
to establish a stock market and permit private banks as long as they are at least 51% Syrian
owned. On March 18, 2001, the Syrian parliament passed a banking secrecy law designed
to pave the way for establishment of private banks. Appointment of a new cabinet on
December 23, 2001, with new ministers in the economic portfolios is being interpreted by
some analysts as an indication that the Syrian President will try to carry out further economic
reforms.
Syria’s relations with its neighbors have been marred in the past by border problems
(with Turkey and Israel), disputes over water sharing (with Turkey and Iraq), and political
differences (sometimes with Jordan and–until recently–with Iraq, which is governed by a rival
wing of the Ba’th Party); Iraq, in particular, resented Syrian support for Iran during the Iraq-
Iran war of 1980-1988 and Syrian support for the allied coalition that expelled Iraq from
Kuwait in 1991. Syrian relations with all three neighbors have improved, however, since the
late 1990s. Most recently, tensions with Turkey began to diminish in late 1998 after Syria
agreed to expel leaders of a dissident Turkish group, the Kurdistan Labor Party (PKK), which
has carried on an insurgency against the Turkish government since 1984. Syrian-Turkish
trade increased from almost nil in 1998 to $724 million in 2000 and is projected at $1 billion
in 2001.
On October 8, 2001, the United Nations General Assembly elected Syria to a non-
permanent seat on the U.N. Security Council. U.S. officials had earlier expressed concern
about Syria’s candidacy as long as it was not in full compliance with U.N. resolutions on Iraq
(see below). In keeping with long-standing policy, the United States did not disclose its vote.
After the U.N. election, a State Department spokesman said the United States expects Syria
to meet its obligations to respect human rights and fulfill all Security Council resolutions.
Syrian-U.S. Bilateral Issues
Arab-Israeli Peace Negotiations
Syrian-Israeli negotiations remain deadlocked over Syria’s demand that Israel withdraw
unconditionally from the Golan Heights, a 450-square mile portion of southwestern Syria that
Israel occupied during the 1967 Arab-Israeli war. The late President Asad said he accepted
the principle of “full withdrawal for full peace” and would establish peaceful, normal relations
with Israel in return for Israeli’s withdrawal from Golan (and from southern Lebanon as well).
Israeli governments have differed over the question of withdrawal, but all have demanded a
prior Syrian commitment to establish full diplomatic relations and agree to security
arrangements before any withdrawal takes place.
Furthermore, Syria and Israel disagree over what would constitute full withdrawal,
because of slightly differing boundary lines defined in the past. Israel regards the boundary
as the international border established in 1923 between what was then the British-controlled
territory of Palestine and the French-controlled territory of Syria, while Syria believes it
should be the line where Syrian and Israeli forces were deployed on the eve of the June 1967
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war. The latter boundary line, among other things, would give Syria access to the
northeastern shore of the Sea of Galilee (also known as Lake Kinneret or Lake Tiberias).
After a hiatus of almost four years, teams headed by then Israeli Prime Minister Ehud
Barak and Syrian Foreign Minister Faruq al-Shar’a held two rounds of talks in Washington
and West Virginia in December 1999 and January 2000, respectively, at the invitation of then
President Clinton. Further talks, however, failed to materialize as the parties disagreed over
the sequence of discussions. Syria wanted to address border issues before dealing with other
topics, while Israel wanted to concentrate first on security, water, and future bilateral
relations. A meeting in Geneva between then Presidents Clinton and Hafiz al-Asad in March
2000 produced no agreement; Israeli territorial proposals conveyed by Clinton were
unacceptable to Asad, who insisted on full Israeli withdrawal to the June 1967 border. In his
inaugural address in July 2000, President Bashar al-Asad stated that “we are in a hurry for
peace, because it is our option,” but added that “we are not prepared to concede territory.”
Other Syrian officials have reiterated this position.
President Bush, welcoming the new Syrian Ambassador on March 13, commented that
“Syria and the United States share a commitment to achieving a comprehensive, just, and
lasting peace in the Middle East, based on United Nations Security Council Resolutions 342
and 338, and the land-for-peace principles of the landmark Madrid Conference [of October
1991]. The Syrian Ambassador responded that “(w)e confirm our commitment to the peace
process to achieve a comprehensive, just, and lasting peace that is based on United Nations
relevant resolutions, the Madrid terms of reference, and the land for peace principle...”
Syrian spokesmen, however, have increasingly criticized Israeli policies since the
outbreak of Israeli-Palestinian clashes in late September 2000 and the election of the hard-line
Israeli Prime Minister Ariel Sharon in February 2001. At an Arab summit conference on
March 28, 2001, the Syrian President described Israelis who voted for Prime Minister Sharon
as “more racist than the Nazis.” On May 5, when welcoming Pope John Paul II to Damascus,
Asad condemned Israel for what he described as violations of the sanctity of Muslim and
Christian holy places in Jerusalem and Bethlehem. Without mentioning Israel or the Jewish
people by name, Asad went on to condemn those who “try to kill all the principles of divine
faiths with the same mentality of betraying Jesus Christ ... in the same way that they tried to
commit treachery against the Prophet Muhammad.” (Asad made no public comments after
a subsequent meeting with the Pope in Rome on February 21, 2002.) On January 19, 2002,
Syria’s representative to the United Nations described the demolition of Palestinian homes
in the Israeli-occupied Gaza territory by Israeli military units as “not much different from the
scene of the World Trade Center.” Each of these comments drew rebukes from the U.S.
State Department, and Secretary of State Colin Powell described Syrian remarks comparing
the Gaza house demolitions with the September 11 terrorist attacks as “hysterical.”
At an Arab summit conference on March 27-28, 2002, Syria joined other Arab states in
endorsing a peace initiative by Saudi Arabia’s Crown Prince Abdullah involving full Israeli
withdrawal from Arab territories occupied since 1967 in return for normal relations with
Israel in the context of a comprehensive peace. In elaborating on Syria’s position, President
Bashar al-Asad described the initiative as a “first step” and said “what is required is a
mechanism” to implement the plan. He also demanded that Israel commit itself publicly to
returning occupied Arab lands and maintained that “for us, terrorism comes from Israel.”
Meanwhile, Syria abstained on U.N. Security Council Resolution 1397 (March 12, 2002) and
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boycotted the vote on a follow-on resolution (Resolution 1402, March 30), both calling for
cessation of violence in Israel and the Palestinian territories. Syria objected to the resolutions
on grounds that they did not meet Arab concerns and did not condemn Israeli attacks on
Palestinians.
For additional information on the course of Israeli-Syrian negotiations, see CRS Issue
Brief IB91137, The Middle East Peace Talks, by Carol Migdalovitz. For information on
possible future security arrangements for the Golan Heights territory, see CRS Report 95-
308, The Golan Heights, February 24, 1995, by Clyde R. Mark.
Syrian and Israeli Roles in Lebanon
Syrian Army units moved into large parts of northeastern and central Lebanon shortly
after civil strife began in that country in 1975. Syrian forces have remained there since 1976,
ostensibly under an Arab League peace-keeping mandate; most sources estimate current
Syrian military strength in Lebanon at 30,000-35,000. Meanwhile, Israel occupied a portion
of Lebanon between 1982 and 1985 in an operation designed to root out armed Palestinian
guerrillas from southern Lebanon. From 1985 until May 2000, Israel maintained a 9-mile
wide security zone in southern Lebanon, enforced by Israeli military patrols and an
Israeli-funded Lebanese militia called the Army of South Lebanon (ASL). At an Arab League
sponsored meeting at Taif, Saudi Arabia in October 1989, the Lebanese Parliament agreed
on a revised formula for power sharing within the Lebanese government; it also adopted a
plan for reestablishment of central authority and phased Syrian redeployment to the eastern
Biqa’ (Bekaa) Valley within two years of the agreement’s implementation, after which
Lebanon and Syria would agree on the ultimate status of Syrian forces in eastern Lebanon.
U.S. Administrations and Members of Congress have expressed the view that Syrian
forces should have redeployed in accordance with the Taif Agreement by 1992, and have also
criticized Syrian toleration of the presence of the pro-Iranian Hizballah militia in southern
Lebanon. Syrian officials and pro-Syrian Lebanese have countered that not all conditions of
the Taif Agreement have been met so far, and that the Lebanese armed forces are not yet
capable of maintaining internal security. Prior to May 2000, Syrian and Lebanese leader also
argued that Syrian forces should remain in Lebanon as long as Israel maintained its security
zone in southern Lebanon, and that Hizballah activity constituted legitimate resistance activity
in southern Lebanon as long as Israeli forces were present.
On May 24, 2000, Prime Minister Barak carried out a 1999 campaign promise to
withdraw Israeli forces from the security zone in southern Lebanon. Barak had hoped to do
this in the context of an agreement with Syria that would guarantee the security of northern
Israel. With the continued stalemate in Syrian-Israeli talks, however, Barak decided to
withdraw Israel forces unilaterally. On June 7, then Secretary of State Albright noted that
Israel had fulfilled its obligations by withdrawing from Lebanon and said “I think that the
Syrians should do so also.” Lebanon and Syria claim that a complete Israeli withdrawal
should have included a small enclave at the eastern end of the Israeli security zone called “the
Shib’a (Chebaa) Farms,” which they assert is part of Lebanon but Israel considers part of the
Golan Heights. (For further information, see CRS Report RL31078, The Shib’a Farms
Dispute and its Implications, August 7, 2001, by Alfred B. Prados.) The Shib’a Farms
enclave remains a source of tension, as Israeli forces periodically target Hizballah, as well as
Syrian, positions in retaliation for Hizballah raids on Israeli forces in the Shib’a Farms area.
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(For further information on the Syrian role in Lebanon, see CRS Issue Brief IB89118,
Lebanon, by Clyde R. Mark.)
In June 2001, Syria redeployed approximately 6,000 troops that had been stationed in
Beirut and its environs, leaving only a few Syrian outposts in the greater Beirut area. It is not
clear whether these redeployments resulted in a reduction in overall Syrian strength in
Lebanon. According to press reports, some of the redeployed Syrian troops joined other
Syrian units in more distant parts of Lebanon, while others returned to Syria. Observers
variously described the Syrian move as an effort to mollify Lebanese opponents of the Syrian
troop presence, to avoid a potential confrontation with Israel, or to protect the Syrian regime
in Damascus against some internal threat. In April 2002, a further redeployment apparently
began, as additional Syrian troops reportedly moved from the central mountains of Lebanon
to the eastern Biqa’ Valley or back to Syria. On April 3, Lebanese Army radio announced
that “[a]n agreement has been reached on practical steps to redeploy units of the brother
Syrian Army to complete the Taif accord.” Some observers thought the redeployments were
designed to avoid Israeli retaliation against Syrian forces following increased friction between
Hizballah and Israeli forces in the Shib’a Farms area and northern Israel since March.
Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri, however, denied that the redeployments were related
to regional tensions and echoed the Lebanese Army statement.
Relations with Iraq
Since 1997, Syria’s relations with its former adversary Iraq have improved markedly.
The two countries have exchanged diplomatic missions, though not at the ambassadorial level,
and trade relations have expanded. Iraqi officials have predicted that bilateral trade would
increase from $500 million in 2000 to $1 billion in 2001. In August 2001, Syrian Prime
Minister Muhammad Mustafa Mero visited Iraq in an effort to strengthen diplomatic ties and
implement trade agreements. In recent years, Syria has expressed opposition to the use of
military force against Iraq and called for lifting economic sanctions, while publicly urging Iraq
to comply with pertinent U.N. Security Council resolutions. During a visit to Italy on
February 17, 2002, President Bashar al-Asad said an attack on Iraq “would be an attack on
justice and human rights” and would cause “popular fury.” At the March 27-28 Arab summit
conference, President Asad welcomed improved relations between Iraq and Kuwait and urged
Arabs “to cooperate with Iraq [so] as to reach a clear vision regarding how to return Iraq to
its normal position.”
Since November 2000, there have been reports that Iraq has been shipping between
120,000 and 200,000 barrels of oil per day through a recently reopened 550-mile pipeline
through Syria. Analysts believe Syria is buying Iraqi oil at a discount of $2 or $3 per barrel
and selling its own oil at international market prices. According to a Los Angeles Times
article of January 29, 2002, Syria may be earning $50 million or more per month from these
oil transactions. Syrian and Iraqi officials have maintained that the pipeline is only being
tested for future use. After a visit to Damascus on February 27, 2001, U.S. Secretary of State
Colin Powell told reporters that President Bashar al-Asad had agreed to handle any oil
shipments from Iraq through Syria in accordance with the U.N.-approved oil-for-food
program for Iraq. There is no evidence yet that Syria has complied with this commitment;
however, no international agreement has been reached to place these shipments and similar
illicit Iraqi oil shipments to other countries under U.N. control.
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At a closed door meeting of a U.N. Security Council committee on sanctions on January
29, 2002, Britain reportedly asked for clarification of allegations that Syria is importing oil
from Iraq , but Syria did not respond at the time. According to subsequent press reports, in
a statement on February 1, Syria’s delegate to the sanctions committee denied that Syria is
illicitly importing Iraqi oil and claimed that Syria is building a new pipeline that it hopes will
be put under U.N. control. Meanwhile, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John
Negroponte reportedly raised the same question with Syrian officials earlier during a visit to
Damascus in late January. On February 14, 2002, the Washington Post quoted Syrian
Ambassador to the United States Rostom Zoubi as saying that Syria received some Iraqi oil
in the process of checking the pipeline but did not pay for it; Zoubi reportedly said Syria
would apply to the U.N. Security Council to handle future shipments through this pipeline (as
well as shipments through a second more economical pipeline they hope to build) under the
U.N.-approved oil-for-food program for Iraq.
Arms Proliferation
On June 25, 1998, the Clinton Administration reportedly said Syria has an active
chemical weapons program and has armed missiles, combat aircraft, and artillery projectiles
with the nerve gas sarin. Also, in February 1998, a Syrian-Russian joint commission
reportedly discussed bilateral cooperation in economic and military fields, including “the use
of nuclear energy for development purposes.” In May 1999, the two countries reportedly
signed a 10-year agreement for cooperation in the peaceful use of nuclear power. An Israeli
press article on September 15, 1999, averred that Syria is developing a longer-range SCUD
type surface to surface missile, and a year later Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak expressed
concern over reports that Syria had successfully tested a longer-range SCUD-D missile, which
Barak said would put all of Israel within range of Syrian missiles. On July 2, 2001, the Syrian
Minister of Defense denied an Israeli report that Syria had fired a SCUD missile toward the
Israeli border.
Russian officials have talked of reviving former Syrian-Soviet military links and helping
Syria modernize its inventory of older Soviet equipment, much of which is now obsolescent.
On April 2, 1999, the Clinton Administration imposed sanctions on three Russian firms–Tula
Design Bureau, Volsky Mechanical Plant, and Central Research Institute for Machine Tool
Engineering–for supplying antitank weapons to Syria. The Administration also determined
that the Russian government was involved in the transfer but waived sanctions against the
Russian government on grounds of national interest. News agencies have reported that Syria
is seeking a $2 billion arms package including fighter jets (SU-17s or MiG-29s), T-80 tanks,
and antitank and antiaircraft weapons from Russia; reports continue to mention the SA-10 (S-
300) air defense system. Current status of the package is uncertain. A defense journal in
November 2001 mentioned reports that Syria is receiving up to 16 advanced SU-27 fighters
from Russia.
U.S. officials are concerned that Syrian acquisition of additional weapons including
improved missiles will cause further regional tensions, increase potential threats to Israel, and
undermine arms control efforts. Syria resents what it regards as U.S. interference in its
attempts to resupply its armed forces.
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Terrorist Activity
Allegations of Syrian involvement with terrorist groups have been a longstanding point
of contention between Washington and Damascus. Some observers believe Syria was
involved in the 1983 bombing of the U.S. Marine barracks by Shi’ite Muslim militants in
Lebanon, although others have blamed Iran, which had closer ties with the group responsible
for this atrocity. Syrian intelligence was implicated in an abortive attempt to place a bomb
on an El Al airliner in London in 1986, after which the United States withdrew its ambassador
to Syria for a year. Initial reports indicated that the destruction of the Pan American Flight
103 over Lockerbie, Scotland in December 1988 was the work of a Palestinian group
headquartered in Damascus and responsive to Syria; however, subsequent international police
investigations led the international community to charge Libya with responsibility. Syria
agreed to expel PKK leaders in late 1998 at Turkey’s insistence (see above), and the State
Department believes Syria has “generally upheld its agreement with Ankara not to support
the Kurdish PKK.”
Since 1979, Syria has appeared regularly on a list of countries which the State
Department identifies as supportive of international terrorism (see below). According to the
State Department’s April 2001 report on terrorism, Syria continued to provide safehaven and
support to several Palestinian terrorist groups maintaining camps or facilities in Damascus or
in Lebanon’s eastern Biqa’ (Bekaa) Valley. Moreover, Syria has continued to facilitate
resupply of the Lebanese Shi’ite Muslim militia Hizballah, which has conducted raids against
Israeli forces in southern Lebanon and sometimes against northern Israel (see above). The
State Department adds that Syria appears to have maintained its long-standing ban on attacks
launched from Syrian territory or against Western targets. Syria, on its part, maintains that
it is prepared to expel militant Palestinian and other groups if provided with direct evidence
of their involvement in terrorist activity. On the other hand, Syria acknowledges its support
for Palestinians pursuing armed struggle in Israeli occupied territories and for Shi’ite Muslim
militias resisting the former Israeli military presence in southern Lebanon; Syria claims that
such operations constitute legitimate resistance activity, as distinguished from terrorism.
Reaction to Terrorist Attacks on the United States. On September 11, 2001,
Syria’s official radio reported that President Bashar al-Asad had sent a cable to President
Bush “in which he condemned the terrorist attacks that targeted innocent civilians and vital
centers in the United States.” According to the broadcast, President Asad offered
condolences and called for “international cooperation to eradicate all forms of terrorism and
guarantee the protection of basic human rights, notably the right of humans to live in security
and peace wherever they are.” On September 16, U.S. Secretary of State Colin Powell said
the United States had received “a rather forthcoming statement” from Syria and speculated
that there might be a role for Syria in combating terrorist groups; however, he said he was
“not under any illusions about the nature of the Syrian Government.” On October 11,
President Bush alluded to signals from Syria that it might help in the war against terrorism and
said “[w]e take that seriously and we’ll give them an opportunity to do so.” He added,
however, that “I appreciate diplomatic talk, but I’m more interested in action and results.”
On the same day, a high-level State Department official expressed disappointment with
Syria’s role in the war against terrorism so far, saying that “I don’t consider Syria part of the
[allied] coalition.” He noted that “[t]hey’ve indicated from time to time that they’d like to
perhaps take part and then they seem to back up a little bit.”
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Representatives of Syria and Iran, on their part, repeated their previous positions that
there is a distinction between terrorism and resistance to foreign occupation (see above). In
a meeting with Secretary of State Colin Powell on November 11, Syrian Foreign Minister
Faruq al-Shar’a specifically disagreed with the U.S. description of Hizballah as a terrorist
organization. According to a State Department official, Secretary Powell told Shar’a that
“we need to stop the violence; we need you to help stop the violence.” According to Syria’s
official news agency, Syrian President Bashar al-Asad told a visiting U.S. congressional
delegation on January 7, 2002, that “fighting terrorism must depend on analyzing the causes
that have led to its outbreak.”
Although the two countries disagree on organizations such as Hizballah, there are
reports that Syrian intelligence may have shared information with the United States on several
other militant Islamic fundamentalist organizations. In October 2001, a New York Times
article reported that U.S. intelligence officials had visited Syrian counterparts in Damascus
to discuss possible cooperation against Osama bin Laden’s network. Syrian officials have
cited their suppression of the fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood in 1982–an action widely
decried at the time on human rights grounds–as an early example of their efforts to contain
terrorism. In January 2002, the Syrian Minister of Information was quoted as saying “[t]he
kind of terrorism we faced was the same kind and probably the same persons now fighting the
United States.”
On March 30, 2002, President Bush told reporters that “[t]he Syrians must participate”
[in the campaign against terrorism] but added that he did not have any evidence of direct
involvement by Syria or Iran in recent suicide bombings in Israel. Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld said on April 1 that Syria along with Iraq and Iran is “inspiring and
financing a culture of political murder and suicide bombing.” He referred tp Syria’s role in
facilitating or allowing the movement of terrorists and weapons from Iran to southern
Lebanon where they launch attacks against Israel. In a speech on April 4, President Bush
noted that “Syria has spoken out against Al Qaeda. We expect it to act against Hamas and
Hizballah, as well.” He went on to say that “[i]t’s time for Iran to focus on meeting its own
people’s aspirations and for Syria to decide which side of the war against terror it is on.”
Narcotics Traffic
For some years, the United States classified Syria as a transit country for the drug trade
and a suspected site for refining small amounts of narcotics. On November 10, 1997,
however, then President Clinton informed Congress of his decision to remove Syria (and
Lebanon) from a list of major drug producers or traffickers (see below), citing the
effectiveness of joint eradication efforts by these two countries. State Department officials
said the decision was taken on its own merits after a standard review process and “it would
be an error to read something more into it.” The President warned, however, that the two
countries could be reinstated on the list if evidence should so warrant. In a letter to the
President on November 14, 1997, 24 Members of Congress questioned the President’s
decision and noted that it had not been discussed with Congress. Bills were introduced in
both the 105th and 106th Congress to reverse the President’s decision but not enacted.
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Syria’s Human Rights Record and Related Issues
Syria has been under a state of emergency tantamount to martial law since 1963, except
for a brief interval in 1973-1974. In its annual 2000 report to Congress on human rights
practices (published in March 2001), the State Department commented that the human rights
situation remained poor, and the Government continues to restrict or deny fundamental rights,
although there were improvements in some areas. It notes that citizens do not have the right
to change their government and that there is no organized political opposition. According to
the report, serious abuses include the widespread use of torture in detention; poor prison
conditions; arbitrary arrest and detention; prolonged detention without trial; fundamentally
unfair trials in the security courts; an inefficient judiciary that suffers from corruption and, at
times, political influence; infringement on citizens’ privacy rights; denial of freedom of speech
and of the press, despite a slight loosening of censorship restrictions; denial of freedom of
assembly and association; some limits on freedom of religion; and limits on freedom of
movement.”
Particularly serious human rights violations took place in the northern cities of Aleppo
and Hama in 1980 and 1982, respectively, when the government suppressed uprisings by the
fundamentalist Muslim Brotherhood and other opposition groups with much violence. (See
above.) Estimates of the number killed in Hama by government forces range from 3,000
(from Syrian government sources) to 20,000 (from some independent sources). Syrian
officials have pointed out, however, that by acting quickly to suppress Muslim extremists in
the early 1980s, the Syrian regime spared the country from the outbreaks of Islamic
fundamentalist violence that have marred domestic tranquility in several Middle East
countries, notably Algeria and to a lesser extent Egypt.
Syria claims that it detains persons only for criminal or security offenses; however, the
U.S. State Department believes Syria holds an undetermined number of political prisoners as
well. Amnesty International in its 1999 annual report estimated that hundreds of political
prisoners remain in detention, although it says that hundreds were released during 1999
following presidential amnesties. The State Department cited reports that up to 600 prisoners
may have been released in July 1999, but believes that the practice of detaining individuals on
sometimes loosely defined security charges continues. On November 16, 2000, according to
press reports, President Bashar al-Asad ordered the release of 600 political prisoners out of
an estimated total of 1,500 in Syrian prisons. Another 140 were reportedly released late in
2001. But two Syrian members of parliament were sentenced to five-year jail terms in 2002
for hosting discussion forums without permission.
Syria supports freedom of religion and women’s rights to a greater degree than do many
Middle East governments. Aside from Lebanon, Syria is the only Arab- speaking country
whose constitution does not establish Islam as the state religion, although it does require that
the President be a Muslim. In accordance with the largely secular philosophy of the ruling
Ba’th Party, the country’s Christian community and tiny Jewish minority (see below) have
been free to practice their religion without interference; some Christians have held high-level
positions in the government and armed forces. Syrian law specifies equal rights for women;
government policies stipulate equal pay for similar work; the government discourages
conservative religiously based restrictions on women; and women serve in governmental and
diplomatic posts. (Twenty-six women won seats in the most recent parliamentary elections.)
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Treatment of Jewish Minority
Syria’s Jewish community, estimated at 3,770 in early 1992, were targets of
discrimination and periodic oppression in the past; however, their situation gradually
improved under the regime of the late President Hafiz al-Asad. On April 27, 1992, then
President Asad issued an order lifting travel restrictions and real estate controls on the Syrian
Jewish community, and the government intermittently began permitting Syrian Jews to travel
abroad freely. On February 24, 1994, Syria’s Deputy Chief Rabbi announced that the Syrian
government had issued exit visas to all the estimated 1,000 Jews remaining in Syria; he added
that three or four Syrian Jewish families had returned to Syria after facing financial and
language problems abroad.
According to the State Department human rights report published in February 1995, the
Syrian government “completed issuance of travel permits to all Jews wishing them.” By
October 1994, Israeli officials estimated that 3,670 Jews had left Syria since April 1992, about
one third of whom had secretly moved to Israel. In the same month, a Syrian Jewish
businessman said approximately 400 Jews remained in Syria of their own accord, since all of
them had exit visas. In early 1997, U.S. officials said several hundred Syrian Jews remain in
Syria. Press reports in September 2000, recounting a meeting of Syrian Jewish leaders with
President Bashar al-Asad, estimated that some 3,500 out of a previous total of 4,000 Syrian
Jews had emigrated to the United States or Israel. (This base figure of 4,000 is higher than
the more detailed estimate of 3,770 in 1992.)
Some Syrian Jews hesitate to leave their relatively prosperous lives in Syria, especially
since the liberal decrees of April 1992, for a more uncertain economic future abroad, and
some have remained because of age, health, or reluctance to move. Others want to join
relatives and friends who have already departed, and fear a return to earlier repression if a
different regime should come to power in Syria.
U.S. Aid and Sanctions
Since 1950, the United States has provided a total of $627.5 million in aid to Syria:
$34.0 million in development assistance, $438.0 million in economic support, $155.4 million
in food assistance, and $61 thousand in military training assistance. Most of this aid was
provided during a brief warming trend in bilateral relations between 1974 and 1979.
Significant projects funded under U.S. aid included water supply, irrigation, rural roads and
electrification, and health and agricultural research. No aid has been provided to Syria since
1981, when the last aid programs were closed out. At present, a variety of legislative
provisions and executive directives prohibit U.S. aid to Syria and restrict bilateral trade.
Principal examples follow. (For a more comprehensive list of sanctions applicable to Syria,
see CRS Report RL30644, Syria: Sanctions and Aid, August 20, 2000.)
General Sanctions Applicable to Syria
The International Security Assistance and Arms Export Control Act of 1976 [P.L.
94-329]. Section 303 of this act [90 Stat. 753-754] required termination of foreign assistance
to countries that aid or abet international terrorism. This provision was incorporated into the
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Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 as Section 620A [22 USC 2371]. (Syria was not affected by
this ban until 1979, as explained below.)
The Export Administration Act of 1979 [P.L. 96-72]. Section 6(i) of this act [93 Stat.
515] required the Secretary of Commerce and the Secretary of State to notify Congress
before licensing export of goods or technology valued at more than $7 million to countries
determined to have supported acts of international terrorism (Amendments adopted in 1985
and 1986 re-lettered Section 6(i) as 6(j) and lowered the threshold for notification from $7
million to $1 million.)
A by-product of these two laws was the so-called “terrorism list.” This list is prepared
annually by the State Department in accordance with Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act. The list identifies those countries that repeatedly have provided support
for acts of international terrorism. Syria has appeared on this list ever since it was first
prepared in 1979; it appears most recently in the State Department’s annual publication
Patterns of Global Terrorism: 1998, published in April 1999. Syria’s inclusion on this list in
1979 triggered the above-mentioned aid sanctions under P.L. 94-329 and trade restrictions
under P.L. 96-72.
Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Antiterrorism Act of 1986 [P.L. 99-399]. Section
509(a) of this act [100 Stat. 853] amended Section 40 of the Arms Export Control Act to
prohibit export of items on the munitions list to countries determined to be supportive of
international terrorism, thus banning any U.S. military equipment sales to Syria. (This ban
was reaffirmed by the Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Amendments Act of 1989 — see
below.) Also, 10 U.S.C. 2249a bans obligation of U.S. Defense Department funds for
assistance to countries on the terrorism list.
Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1986 [P.L. 99-509]. Section 8041(a) of this Act
[100 Stat. 1962] amended the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 to deny foreign tax credits on
income or war profits from countries identified by the Secretary of State as supporting
international terrorism. [26 USC 901].
The Anti-Terrorism and Arms Export Control Amendments Act of 1989 [P.L. 101- 222].
Section 4 amended Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act to impose a congressional
notification and licensing requirement for export of goods or technology, irrespective of dollar
value, to countries on the terrorism list, if such exports could contribute to their military
capability or enhance their ability to support terrorism.
Section 4 also prescribed conditions for removal of a country from the terrorism list:
prior notification by the President to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the
chairmen of two specified committees of the Senate. In conjunction with the requisite
notification, the President must certify that the country has met several conditions that clearly
indicate it is no longer involved in supporting terrorist activity. (In some cases, certification
must be provided 45 days in advance of removal of a country from the terrorist list.)
The Anti-Economic Discrimination Act of 1994 [Part C, P.L. 103-236, the Foreign
Relations Authorization Act, FY1994-1995]. Section 564(a) bans the sale or lease of U.S.
defense articles and services to any country that questions U.S. firms about their compliance
with the Arab boycott of Israel. Section 564(b) contains provisions for a presidential waiver,
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but no such waiver has been exercised in Syria’s case. Again, this provision is moot in Syria’s
case because of other prohibitions already in effect.
The Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 [P.L. 104-132] requires the
President to withhold aid to third countries that provide assistance (Section 325) or lethal
military equipment (Section 326) to countries on the terrorism list, but allows the President
to waive this provisions on grounds of national interest. A similar provision banning aid to
third countries that sell lethal equipment to countries on the terrorism list is contained in
Section 549 of the Foreign Operations Appropriation Act for FY2001 (H.R. 5526, passed by
reference in H.R. 4811, which was signed by President Clinton as P.L. 106-429 on November
6, 2000).
Also, Section 321 of P.L. 104-132 makes it a criminal offense for U.S. persons (citizens
or resident aliens) to engage in financial transactions with governments of countries on the
terrorism list, except as provided in regulations issued by the Department of the Treasury in
consultation with the Secretary of State. In the case of Syria, the implementing regulation
prohibits such transactions “with respect to which the United States person knows or has
reasonable cause to believe that the financial transaction poses a risk of furthering terrorist
acts in the United States.” (31 CFR 596, published in the Federal Register August 23, 1996,
p. 43462.) In the fall of 1996, the Chairman of the House International Relations Committee
reportedly protested to then President Clinton over the Treasury Department’s implementing
regulation, which he described as a “special loophole” for Syria. Several subsequent measures
were introduced in previous Congresses to forbid virtually all financial transactions with Syria
but were not enacted.
Section 434 of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2001 (H.R. 5526,
passed by reference in H.R. 4811, P.L. 106-429, November 6, 2000) bars arms sales to any
country not in compliance with U.N. Security Council sanctions against Iraq. This ban would
be applicable to Syria if Iraq exports oil to Syria without U.N. permission. In practice, the
issue would be moot because of similar sanctions already in effect against Syria.
Specific Sanctions against Syria
In addition to the general sanctions listed above, specific provisions in foreign assistance
appropriations enacted since 1981 have barred Syria by name from receiving U.S. aid. The
most recent ban appears in the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act, FY2002 (P.L. 107-
115, January 10, 2002). Section 507 bars the obligation or expenditure of funds appropriated
under this act for any direct assistance or reparations to seven specified countries, including
Syria. Section 523 also prohibits indirect assistance or reparations to seven specified
countries including Syria; however, it provides for a presidential waiver, which has been
exercised routinely on grounds that withholding funds to multilateral development banks and
other international organizations and programs under this limitation would be contrary to the
national interest. Section 527 bans bilateral aid to countries identified as supporting
international terrorism. Section 307 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, amended by
Section 431 of the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY1994-1995 (P.L. 103-236,
April 30, 1994), requires the United States to withhold a proportionate share of contributions
to international organizations for programs that benefit eight specified countries or entities,
including Syria. Section 512 of H.R. 5526 (P.L. 106-429), sometimes known as the Brooke
Amendment after an earlier version of this provision, bans assistance to any country in default
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of to the United States for over a year. As of December 31, 1998 (latest figures available),
Syria owed the United States $238 million, mainly in loans under the Commodity Credit
Corporation or from the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID) remaining
from the period when Syria received U.S. assistance.
Drawing on appropriate legislation, U.S. Administrations have imposed detailed trade
restrictions on exports to Syria. Under Section 6(j) of the Export Administration Act of
1979, trade controls were instituted after Syria was designated as a country supporting
international terrorism in 1979, and further controls were imposed after Syrian intelligence
was implicated in an abortive airline bombing in 1986. At present, the Department of
Commerce list 31 categories of exports requiring a validated license for shipment to Syria;
these include aircraft, vessels, most vehicles, parts, machine tools, computer equipment, and
other high technology goods. (Routine exports like foodstuffs are exempt from these
controls.) Moreover, the Commerce Department generally denies export licenses for dual use
equipment or to military end-users in Syria. According to news reports, Syria and other
countries on the terrorism list were not covered by the Clinton Administration’s decision on
September 16, 1999, to remove export controls on encryption hardware and software. In
2000, Syria ranked 99th among U.S. trading partners, with $149.6 million in U.S. imports
from Syria (mainly mineral oils and fuels, antiques, apparel, spices) and $219.0 million in U.S.
exports to Syria (mainly cereals, machinery, appliances and parts, tobacco). These figures
represent a moderate increase over 1999 levels ($95.0 million in U.S. imports from Syria and
$172.7 million in U.S. exports to Syria).
Permitted Activities
Syria continues to be eligible for small programs not funded by the Foreign Operations,
Export Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations Act. For example, small groups of
Syrian government and professional representatives have visited the United States on
orientation tours under the International Visitor Program, which is administered by the U.S.
Information Agency (USIA) and funded under Department of State appropriations.
Approximately 15 usually participate each year at an annual cost averaging approximately
$100,000.
Recent Congressional Action
H.Con.Res. 133, introduced on May 15, 2001, would condemn Syrian President Bashar
al-Asad for his comments about Israel in March and May 2001, as described above. This
resolution has been referred to the Committee on International Relations.

The conference report (H.Rept. 107-345) on H.R. 2506, the Foreign Operations
Appropriations bill for FY2002, reiterates previous provisions banning direct and indirect aid
to Syria (Sections 507 and 523) and banning aid to countries that support international
terrorism (Section 527). The House passed the conference report on December 19, 2001, by
357-66 (Roll no. 505), and the Senate passed it on December 20 by unanimous consent.
President Bush signed the bill as P.L. 107-115 on January 10, 2002.
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Alternatives and Implications
Debate has continued within U.S. Administrations and Congress over the lengths to
which the United States should go in seeking to enlist Syrian support for U.S. endeavors in
the Middle East. According to one theory, normal bilateral relations should be contingent
upon improvements in Syria’s human rights record, a clear renunciation of terrorism and
narcotics trafficking, and reversal of other policies deemed inimical to U.S. interests.
Advocates of this view are particularly concerned over any possibility that the Administration
has made promises to ease sanctions (for example, removing Syria from the terrorism list) to
obtain Syrian cooperation in regional affairs. They tend to discourage bilateral contacts such
as visits by Syrian officials, which they see as a potential vehicle for trapping a U.S.
Administration into premature concessions. They favor continued legislation to ensure that
relaxation of sanctions can occur only with congressional approval.
Those who support this first approach see little prospect for a long-term relationship
with the Syrian regime, which they consider basically antithetical to U.S. interests and values.
They see Syria’s alignment with the coalition and agreement to attend peace talks as tactical
moves that offered Syria an end to regional isolation, a free hand in Lebanon, and access to
financial support from the Gulf states. They point to Syria’s lack of flexibility on Arab-Israeli
issues, periodic bellicose pronouncements from Damascus, unwillingness to consider Israeli
compromise proposals on border definition, friendship with Iran (and warmer relations with
Iraq), and ongoing rearmament efforts as indications that Syria will remain a threat to regional
stability. They warn that efforts to bring about a closer relationship with Syria’s leaders risk
repeating the earlier disastrous policy of courting Saddam Hussein.
According to a second theory, quiet diplomacy aimed at encouraging Syria to play a
constructive and responsible role in regional affairs could yield benefits. Proponents of this
approach do not advocate the immediate termination of sanctions (such as removing Syria
from the terrorism list) without further action on Syria’s part; however, they support wider
contacts between diplomatic and security officials of the two countries to discuss sensitive
issues, seek common ground, and identify possible areas of cooperation. They favor a series
of small, reciprocal steps that could lead to a warmer relationship over time. Rather than
legislative sanctions, they generally prefer an arrangement under which the Administration has
the flexibility to apply or ease sanctions in accordance with the current state of bilateral
relations.
Those who favor the second approach believe that a better relationship with Syria could
enhance prospects for achieving U.S. objectives. They see Syria as a useful counterweight
to Iraq and a potential contributor to security arrangements in the Gulf region. More
important, they see Syrian support as an essential ingredient in the search for an Arab-Israeli
settlement; previous peace efforts, like the Camp David Accords of 1978 and the Reagan plan
of 1982, have shown that a lasting solution is unlikely without Syrian involvement.
Advocates of this approach point out that the late President Asad, though a difficult
negotiator, proved generally reliable in honoring agreements once he has accepted them. (For
example, Syria has routinely observed the terms of the 1974 disengagement agreement in the
Golan region.) They believe the future course of U.S.-Syrian relations will affect significantly
the outlook for regional security and lasting peace in the Middle East.
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