Order Code IB10070
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Mexico-U.S. Relations:
Issues for the 107th Congress
Updated March 26, 2002
K. Larry Storrs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.S.-Mexico Relationship
Major Bilateral Linkages
Fox Administration
Economic and Social Challenges
Political and Security Challenges
Foreign Policy Challenges
Bilateral Issues for Congress
Trade Issues
Functioning of NAFTA Institutions
Recent Trade Disputes
Immigration Issues
Nature of the Immigration Problem
Clinton Administration and Congressional Initiatives to Curb Immigration
Bush Administration Initiatives
Drug Trafficking Issues
Nature of the Problem
Presidential Certifications and Congressional Reactions
Political and Human Rights Issues
Concerns over Elections and Political Rights
Allegations of Human Rights Abuses
LEGISLATION
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Products

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Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for the 107th Congress
SUMMARY
The United States and Mexico have a
with greater cooperation and technological
special relationship under the North American
enhancements at the border
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which
removes trade and investment barriers between
Drug Trafficking. After the January
the countries. The friendly relationship has
2001 escape from prison of a major drug lord,
been strengthened by President Bush’s meet-
President Fox announced a national crusade
ings with President Fox. Major issues of
against drug trafficking and corruption.
concern to Congress are trade, immigration,
During the February and September 2001
drug trafficking, and political rights.
Bush-Fox meetings, the leaders agreed to
strengthen law enforcement cooperation. In
Trade. NAFTA institutions have been
late 2001, Congress passed the FY2002
functioning, trade between the countries has
Foreign Operations Appropriations bill (H.R.
tripled since 1994, and allegations of violations
2506/P.L. 107-115), which suspended the
of labor and environmental laws have been
drug certification requirements for one year.
considered. Although the Clinton and Bush
U.S. officials praised Mexico’s counter-
Administrations have argued that NAFTA has
narcotics efforts when the State Department
had modest positive impacts on all three mem-
issued the International Narcotics Control
ber countries, public and congressional criti-
Strategy Report in early March 2002.
cisms of NAFTA have been factors in the
Mexican authorities captured Mexican drug
delay of legislation to give the president fast
lord Benjamin Arellano-Felix on March 9,
track trade negotiation authority. Recent trade
2002, and confirmed the previous killing of his
disputes with Mexico have involved trucking,
brother Ramon in a police shoot-out.
sweeteners, telecommunications, and tuna.
President Fox has been urging an expanded
Political and Human Rights. Recent
European Union-like conception of NAFTA.
human rights concerns in Mexico have focused
on the killing of human rights lawyer Digna
Immigration. Following major immigra-
Ochoa on October 19, 2001, prompting
tion reforms in 1996, Congress acted to en-
criticisms and calls for action. Subsequently,
large the Border Patrol and to strengthen
President Fox freed two anti-logging activists
controls along the border. Despite Mexican
in November 2001, and a military critic in
complaints about these efforts, the two coun-
February 2002, who had been characterized as
tries issued a Binational Study on Migration in
political prisoners by human rights groups.
November 1997, and since the mid-1990s,
President Fox also welcomed a report by the
have been consulting regularly on border
National Human Rights Commission on human
safety and consular issues. In the Bush-Fox
rights violations in the 1970s and early 1980s,
March 2002 meeting, the Presidents praised
and designated a special prosecutor in early
the cabinet-level talks on migration launched
2002 to prosecute those responsible for the
in February 2001 and instructed the group to
past abuses. The State Department’s March
continue to seek agreements to ensure safe,
2002 human rights report on Mexico, while
legal, and orderly migration flows between the
noting progress, found many continuing
countries. The Presidents also announced a
violations of human rights.
U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership Action Plan
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On March 22, 2002, President Bush traveled to Monterrey, Mexico, where he attended
the International Conference on Financing for Development, participated in a NAFTA
trilateral meeting, and discussed Mexico-U.S. issues with President Fox. In the international
conference he reiterated the recent pledge to increase U.S. core development assistance by
50% in three years, adding $5 billion to a Millennium Challenge Account to fund initiatives
in developing countries that pursue good governance and sound economic policies. In the
trilateral meeting, the leaders reaffirmed the importance of NAFTA.
In the bilateral meeting, Presidents Bush and Fox announced a number of initiatives,
including (1) a U.S.-Mexico Border Partnership Action Plan with greater cooperation and
technological enhancements at the border, (2) a “Partnership for Prosperity” Action Plan
with public-private initiatives to promote domestic and foreign investment in less developed
areas of Mexico with high migration rates, (3) agreement to seek legislative support to
expand the mandate of the North American Development Bank (NADBank) and the Border
Environmental Cooperation Commission (BECC) to finance environmental infrastructure
along the border, and (4) agreement to continue the cabinet-level talks to achieve safe, legal,
and orderly migration flows between the countries.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS1
U.S.-Mexico Relationship
Major Bilateral Linkages
Mexico surpassed Japan in 1999 to became the United States’ second most important
trading partner following Canada. It is also one of the leading countries in Latin America in
terms of U.S. investment, with total stock of investment of about $34 billion in 1999. In
addition, cooperation with Mexico is vital in dealing with illegal immigration, the flow of illicit
drugs to the United States, and a host of border issues.
The United States is Mexico’s most important customer by far, receiving about 87% of
Mexico’s exports, including petroleum, automobiles, auto parts, and winter vegetables, and
providing about 77% of Mexico’s imports. The United States is the source of over 60% of
foreign investment in Mexico, and the primary source of important tourism earnings.
Until the early 1980s, Mexico had a closed and statist economy and its independent
foreign policy was often at odds with the United States. Beginning under President Miguel
de la Madrid (1982-1988), and continuing more dramatically under President Carlos Salinas
1 This issue brief draws from CRS Issue Brief IB10047, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for the 106th
Congress, which contains more information on the Zedillo Administration in Mexico. It is no longer
available online but may be requested from the author, Larry Storrs, at (202) 707-5050.
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de Gortari (1988-1994) and President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), Mexico adopted a series
of economic, political, and foreign policy reforms. It opened its economy to trade and
investment, adopted electoral reforms that leveled the playing field, and increased cooperation
with the United States on drug control, border issues, and trade matters. Cooperation under
NAFTA and the annual cabinet-level meetings of the Binational Commission are the clearest
indications of the growing ties between the countries.
Fox Administration
Vicente Fox of the conservative Alliance for Change was inaugurated as President on
December 1, 2000, for a 6-year term, promising to promote free market policies, to
strengthen democracy and the rule of law, to fight corruption and crime, and to end the
conflictive situation in the state of Chiapas. Fox’s inauguration ended 71 years of presidential
control by the long dominant party.
Fox was elected with 42.52% of the vote in the July 2, 2000 elections, with support from
the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the Green Ecological Party of Mexico
(PVEM), which formed the Alliance for Change. Francisco Labastida from the long-ruling
and centrist Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) came in second with 36.10% of the vote.
Cuauhtemoc Cardenas from the leftist Alliance for Mexico came in third with 16.64% of the
vote, with support from the center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and four
minor leftist parties.
Results from the July 2000 legislative elections produced a pluralistic legislature, with
no party or coalition having a majority in either chamber of Congress. In the 128-member
Senate, the PRI has 60 senators; the PAN has 46 and the PVEM has 5 (giving the Alliance
for Change a total of 51); while the PRD has 16, the Labor Party (PT) has one and the
Democratic Convergence (CD) has one (giving the Alliance for Mexico a total of 18). In the
500-seat Chamber of Deputies, the PAN has 206 seats and the PVEM has 17 seats (giving
the Alliance for Change 223 seats), while the PRI has 211 deputies. The Alliance for Mexico
has a total of 66 seats, with 51 for the PRD, 8 for the PT, 2 for the CD, 3 for the Party of the
Nationalist Society (PSN), and 2 for the Social Alliance Party (PAS). (For more detail on the
2000 elections, see CRS Report RS20611, Mexico’s Presidential, Legislative, and Local
Elections of July 2, 2000, by K. Larry Storrs.)
Economic and Social Challenges. Mexico has suffered from the effects of the
slowdown in the United States, declining oil prices, and the decline in tourism following the
September 2001 terrorist attacks. With over 80% of the country’s exports going to the
United States, Mexico’s economy contracted 0.8% in 2001 and is projected to grow modestly
(1.4%) in 2002, dependent upon recovery in the United States, despite economic growth
averaging over 5% in the previous six years. President Fox was forced to cut the 2001
government budget three times to compensate for a $1.4 billion shortfall in expected
government receipts, and he proposed an austere budget for 2002. With no party having a
majority in Congress, a patchwork version of the tax and fiscal reform was passed at the end
of the year, significantly reducing the anticipated resources to be devoted to health and
education. Facing continuing opposition in Congress, many observers wonder if Fox will be
able to obtain approval of major legislation, including a proposed energy reform that would
permit greater private participation in the hydrocarbon and electricity sectors.
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Political and Security Challenges. President Fox has promised to end corruption
and to operate a more transparent and open government, with examination of some of the
more notorious past cases. He has promised to end government surveillance of opposition
politicians, and to strengthen the government’s commitment to human rights. He has
proposed the professionalization of the police under a new public security ministry to deal
with widespread public concerns with security and police corruption, and he has promised
vigorous efforts against illicit drug traffickers.
President Fox took several steps in 2001 to end the unresolved situation in Chiapas,
including the introduction of indigenous rights legislation, withdrawal of the military from
some areas, and release of over 30 Zapatista prisoners. However, when the Mexican
Congress passed a modified version of the indigenous rights legislation, the Zapatistas
denounced the legislation as inadequate and withdrew from any dialogue with the
government.
Foreign Policy Challenges. President Fox and Foreign Minister Castaneda have
indicated that Mexico will pursue a more activist and diversified foreign policy, with greater
involvement in UN activities, and stronger ties to Latin America and Europe. President Fox
has promoted the so-called Puebla-Panama Plan, which would provide for cooperative
development efforts among the Central American countries and the southeastern states of
Mexico. He is reviving the G-3 group (Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico), seeking better
ties with the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) countries in South America, and he has
sought to expand trade with the European Union under the EU-Mexico Free Trade
Agreement that went into effect in July 2000. The Fox Administration has indicated that it
will be more aggressive in defending the interests of Mexicans living abroad and it established
a Special Office for Mexicans Abroad.
On various occasions, President Fox has indicated that he expects to have warm and
friendly relations with the United States, and he has called for greater cooperation under
NAFTA and for a more open border between the countries over time. In 2001, Presidents
Fox and Bush met in mid-February in Mexico, in mid-April in Canada, in early May in the
United States, in early September in the United States on an official state visit, and in early
October in the United States when President Fox expressed solidarity with the United States
following the terrorist attacks. In 2002, the Presidents met on March 22 in Monterrey,
Mexico, following the U.N. conference on development. The leaders have been discussing
trade, migration, drug trafficking, and other issues.
Bilateral Issues for Congress
Trade Issues
Trade between Mexico and the United States has grown dramatically in recent years,
encouraged by the adoption of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between
the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Total U.S. trade with Mexico increased from $81.5
billion in 1993 (exports of $41.6 billion; imports of $39.9 billion) to $247.2 billion in 2000
(exports of $111.3 billion; imports of $135.9 billion) and declined slightly to $232.9 billion
in 2001 (exports of $101.5 billion; imports of $131.4 billion). However, the U.S. trade
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balance with Mexico has shifted from a surplus of $1.3 billion in 1994 to a generally growing
deficit of $29.9 billion in 2001, in part because of the late 1994 devaluation of the peso which
made Mexican products cheaper. This change in the trade balance has caused some Members
of Congress to question the benefits of NAFTA. Despite the deficit, Mexico is one of the
fastest growing export markets for the United States in recent years, and it became the second
most important trading partner after Canada in 1999.
The NAFTA agreement was negotiated in 1991 and 1992; side agreements on labor and
environmental matters were completed in 1993; the agreements were approved by the
respective legislatures in late 1993 and went into force on Jan. 1, 1994. Under the
agreements, trade and investment restrictions are being eliminated over a 15 year period, with
most restrictions eliminated in the early years of the agreement. On July 11, 1997, the Clinton
Administration released a required report on the first 3 years of operations under NAFTA that
argued that NAFTA had had a modest positive impact on U.S. jobs and income, and had
facilitated Mexico’s economic recovery following the peso crisis of 1994-1995. In
subsequent statements, Clinton and Bush Administration spokesmen argued that NAFTA has
been successful in increasing U.S. exports to Mexico, particularly heavily protected areas such
as agricultural products, and in creating jobs and strengthening the economy.
At the Miami Summit of the Americas, in December 1994, the NAFTA partners
announced that they would begin negotiations with Chile on accession to NAFTA, and the
hemispheric presidents pledged to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by the
year 2005. These negotiations have been hampered by the inability of the legislative and
executive branches in the United States to agree on conditions for granting the President fast
track negotiation authority for new free trade agreements. Hemispheric negotiations leading
toward the FTAA have continued and the goal was reaffirmed at the Summit of the Americas
in Quebec City, Canada in April 2001, despite the executive branch’s lack of free trade
negotiating authority. In November 2000, the Clinton Administration began strictly bilateral
free trade talks with Chile, and the Bush Administration is continuing these talks.
Functioning of NAFTA Institutions. Since 1994, the NAFTA institutions
mandated by the agreements have been functioning. The tripartite Commission on
Environmental Cooperation (CEC) was established in Montreal, Canada; and the Commission
for Labor Cooperation (CLC) was established in Dallas, Texas. In addition, the bilateral
Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC), located in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico;
and the North American Development Bank (NADBank), headquartered in San Antonio,
Texas, were created to promote and finance border environment projects along the
U.S.-Mexico border. During the Bush-Fox talks in Monterrey, Mexico, on March 22, 2002,
the two presidents agreed to propose to the respective congresses a broadening of the
mandates of the NADBank and the BECC to extend financing for environmental
infrastructure along the border.
The NAFTA institutions have operated to encourage cooperation on trade,
environmental and labor issues, and to consider non- governmental petitions under the labor
and environmental side agreements. Under the labor side agreement, 23 petitions have been
submitted alleging non-compliance by one of the NAFTA countries with existing labor
legislation, and 14 of these have been against Mexico: five submissions were advanced to the
next stage of ministerial consultations, although negotiations are ongoing in two cases; two
submissions were essentially dropped on grounds that the workers who were fired in Mexico
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accepted severance pay; two submissions were withdrawn, in one case when Mexico
recognized a union just before a scheduled hearing; one submission was rejected on
procedural grounds, although a study on reconciliation of the right to strike and national
interests was initiated; and one submission is pending.
In one case advanced to ministerial consultation, involving the dismissal of workers for
union organizing activities at a SONY electronics plant in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, the labor
ministers agreed to a plan of action including meetings with the affected workers, public
seminars, and studies of union registration procedures. In the case of alleged discrimination
against pregnant Mexican workers in border assembly (maquiladora) plants, ministerial
consultations led to an implementation agreement and a conference on the rights of working
women. With regard to the union association and health and safety issues in the Han Young
maquiladora plant in Tijuana and the Itapsa maquiladora plant in the state of Mexico,
ministerial consultations were held and negotiations are continuing.
Under the trilateral CLC, the countries are cooperating in many areas, especially
occupational safety and rights of working women and children. Some argue that the
provisions have encouraged Mexico to enforce its own labor legislation. Others argue that
the provisions have been extremely weak and that numerous abuses persist. (For more
information on the functioning of this institution, see CRS Report 97-861, NAFTA Labor Side
Agreement: Lessons for the Worker Rights and Fast-Track Debate, by Mary Jane Bolle.)
Under the environmental side agreement, 26 petitions have been submitted alleging
non-compliance with environmental legislation, but only 9 of these have involved Mexico:
in the major case involving the environmental impact of the construction of a cruise boat port
in Cozumel, Mexico, the Council requested a response from the Mexican government and
after evaluation directed the CEC Secretariat to prepare a full factual record on the case to
highlight deficiencies; in two cases involving pollution of the Magdalena River and Lake
Chapala the Council is reviewing the response from the Mexican government; in three recent
cases the Council has requested responses from the Mexican government; in another case the
complaint is still being reviewed; and another case was rejected on grounds that it did not
allege a violation of environmental law. The CEC is cooperating on many environmental
projects, including the North American Bird Conservation Initiative to protect birds and
conserve bird habitats; the Upper San Pedro River Initiative to protect this Sonora-Arizona
eco-system that is an important corridor for millions of migratory birds; and the Sound
Management of Chemicals Project to dramatically reduce the use of PCBs, DDT, chlordane,
mercury, and other pollutants. (For more information, see CRS Report 97-291, NAFTA:
Related Environmental Issues and Initiatives, by Mary Tiemann.)
Recent Trade Disputes. The major trade disputes between the countries involve the
access of Mexican trucks to the United States, opening the Mexican telecommunications
sector to international long distance competition, the access of Mexican sugar and tuna to the
U.S. market, and the access of U.S. sweeteners to the Mexican market.
With respect to trucking issues, the Mexican government objects to the United States
failure to allow Mexican trucks to have access to U.S. highways under the terms of the
NAFTA pact, and a NAFTA dispute resolution panel supported Mexico’s position in
February 2001. President Bush indicated a willingness to implement the provision, but the
U.S. Congress required additional safety provisions in the FY2002 Department of
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Transportation Appropriations Act (P.L. 107-87). According to press accounts, the
additional inspection requirements and facility enhancements may be in place by June 2002.
Regarding telecommunications issues, the United States filed a complaint with the WTO
in August 2000, following previous warnings, over Mexico’s failure to reduce Telmex’s
continuing dominant position in the telecommunications industry. A late December 2000
agreement between Telmex and rival carriers Alestra and Avantel, under which Telmex
agreed to lower interconnection fees, was said to reduce the likelihood that the United States
will pursue the complaint with the WTO. However, the USTR’s April 2001 report on
telecommunication trade barriers cited Mexico for continued failure to open its long-distance
market to competition, and in mid-February 2002, it requested a WTO dispute resolution
panel to rule on the U.S. complaint.
With regard to sugar and sweetener issues, Mexico argues that it is entitled to ship its
net sugar surplus to the United States duty free under NAFTA, while the United States argues
that a sugar side letter negotiated along with NAFTA limits Mexican shipments of sugar.
Mexico also complains that imports of high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) sweeteners from the
United States constitute dumping, and it continues to impose anti-dumping duties, even
though NAFTA and WTO dispute resolution panels have upheld U.S. claims that the Mexican
government has colluded with the Mexican sugar and sweetener industries to restrict HFCS
imports from the United States. In the last days of 2001, the Mexican Congress imposed a
20% tax on soft drinks made with corn syrup sweeteners to aid the ailing domestic cane sugar
industry, but President Fox suspended the duties until September 30, 2002, in part because
of U.S. objection to the tax and the devastating impact on HFCS and corn sales from the
United States.
On tuna issues, the United States lifted the embargo on Mexican tuna in April 2000, after
procedures were worked out to permit the unharmed release from nets of dolphins. However,
a federal judge in San Francisco blocked the Clinton Administration’s plan to loosen the
standards of a 1990 law for a dolphin-safe label, saying that the standards of the law had not
been met. While the Administration appealed the case, the Federal Appeals Court in San
Francisco ruled unfavorably on July 23, 2001, prompting criticism from Mexican fishers who
had hoped to be rewarded for their efforts.
With respect to other issues, both countries have alleged dumping of beef and cattle;
Mexico has alleged U.S. dumping of apples, cotton, and sorghum; and the United States has
alleged Mexican dumping of tomatoes and steel, although many of these complaints have been
resolved to some extent. Mexico as a NAFTA partner was exempted from the Bush
Administration’s imposition of temporary safeguard tariffs on steel in March 2002. The
United States has also claimed that Mexican sanitary standards have posed barriers to U.S.
exports, and that Mexico’s lax enforcement has permitted widespread piracy of recording and
software products. Mexico has objected to U.S. sanctions against third countries with
investments in Cuba under the Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996,
commonly called the Helms-Burton legislation.
Immigration Issues
Nature of the Immigration Problem. The Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) has estimated that there were about 2.7 million undocumented Mexican migrants
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residing in the United States in late 1996, accounting for 54% of the total estimated illegal
alien population of 5.1 million, but preliminary data from the 2000 Census suggest
considerably higher numbers. Mexico regularly expresses concern about alleged abuses
suffered by Mexican workers in the United States, and takes the view that the migrants are
“undocumented workers,” not illegal immigrants, making the point that since the U.S. market
attracts and provides employment for the migrants, it bears some responsibility. Mexico also
regularly voices concern for the loss of life and other maladies suffered by Mexican migrants
as they are forced by increasing border controls to utilize increasingly dangerous routes and
methods to enter the United States without proper documentation.
Mexico benefits from illegal migration in at least two ways: (1) it is a “safety valve” that
dissipates the political discontent that could arise from higher unemployment in Mexico; and
(2) it is a source of remittances by workers in the United States to families in Mexico,
ranging, according to widely varying estimates, from $1 billion to $10 billion.
The main U.S. mechanism for controlling illegal immigration in the past was the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-603), which was passed by Congress
in late 1986. Main provisions of the Act include civil and criminal penalties for U.S.
employers who knowingly hire undocumented workers; increased border control and
enforcement measures; anti-discrimination safeguards; provision for amnesty or legalization
for illegal aliens who resided continuously in the United States before 1982; and a special
legalization for farm workers previously employed on American farms.
In the face of criticisms that illegal aliens deprive American citizens of jobs and are a
growing burden on the educational, health, and welfare resources of certain states, recent
Administrations sought to control illegal immigration to protect U.S. borders and to preserve
the program of legal immigration. Suits by the most affected states (California, Florida,
Texas, and Arizona) against the federal government, and the passage in California in late 1994
of Proposition 187, which sought to deny health and educational benefits to illegal aliens,
stimulated additional state and federal legislative proposals. Mexican authorities strongly
criticized passage of Proposition 187, even though it was blocked by subsequent court action,
and other restrictive immigration legislation as racist and discriminatory.
Clinton Administration and Congressional Initiatives to Curb Immigration.
The Clinton Administration sought to control illegal entry into the United States with
improved technology and additional Border Patrol agents and INS inspectors, using a strategy
known as “prevention through deterrence,” modeled upon two border initiatives, Operation
Hold the Line in the El Paso area and Operation Gatekeeper in the San Diego area. With
regard to bilateral cooperation with Mexico under Clinton, the countries formalized
consultations through the Border Liaison Mechanisms, issued a Binational Study on
Migration in 1997 that found that unauthorized migration carries costs for both countries, and
pursued a Border Safety Campaign in recent years to reduce violence on the border through
public information campaigns, search and rescue programs, and cooperation between U.S.
and Mexican officials. In mid-May 2000, following expressions of concern over private
ranchers detaining Mexican migrants in Arizona, the governments announced at the Binational
Commission meetings that they would prosecute any unlawful behavior by private citizens,
combat migrant smugglers, and expand regular consultation mechanisms.
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Congress passed two major immigration reform measures in 1996 to control illegal
immigration and to limit the eligibility of aliens for federal programs. One was the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of the Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY1997 (H.R. 3610/P.L. 104-208). The other was the
1996 welfare law entitled the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 (H.R. 3734/P.L. 104-193). The first measure sought to control illegal
immigration by adding 1,000 Border Patrol agents per year for 5 years (FY1997-FY2001),
along with additional personnel, equipment, and procedures. Both measures reduced the
attractiveness of immigration by restricting the eligibility of aliens for federal programs. (See
CRS Report 95-881, Immigration Legislation in the 104th Congress, by Joyce Vialet, et al.)

Congress also increased funding for the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
including the Border Patrol, through the regular Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary
Appropriations Acts, more than tripling INS’s budget from $1.5 billion in FY1993 to $6.2
billion in FY2002. (For more details, see CRS Report RS20908, Immigration and
Naturalization Service’s FY2002 Budget.) With various groups, including the AFL-CIO in
February 2000, calling for amnesty for illegal immigrants in the United States and a more
lenient immigration policy, legislation was enacted in 2000 to increase the number of
temporary H-1B professional workers, and Congress considered measures to increase the
number of H-2A agricultural workers and to legalize the status of undocumented aliens
through registry and various forms of amnesty. (See the following CRS reports by Ruth Ellen
Wasem: CRS Report RL30780, Immigration Legalization and Status Adjustment Legislation,
and CRS Report RL30852, Immigration of Agricultural Guest Workers: Policy, Trends, and
Legislative Issues.)
Bush Administration Initiatives. When President Bush met with President Fox in
mid-February 2001, migration issues were among the main topics, with Mexican officials
expressing concern about the number of migrants who die each year while seeking entry into
the United States. President Fox has been pressing proposals for legalizing undocumented
Mexican workers in the United States through amnesty or guest worker arrangements as a
way of protecting their human rights. In the Joint Communique following the Bush-Fox
meeting, the two presidents agreed to begin at the earliest opportunity cabinet-level
negotiations aimed at achieving short- and long-term agreements to constructively address
migration and labor issues between the countries. Several months later, on May 25, 2001,
President Bush telephoned President Fox to express condolences for the recent deaths of 14
Mexican migrants in the Arizona desert, and both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to
enhance safety along the border and to continue to make progress on migration issues. Press
reports suggested that proposals to regularize the status of Mexican workers in the United
States were being considered by the Administration and by Congress, but President Bush has
indicated that blanket amnesty will not be proposed.
During the opening day of President Fox’s official visit to Washington, D.C., in early
September 2001, he called for the two governments to reach agreement on migration
proposals by the end of the year. The Joint Communique at the end of the meeting called for
the countries to reach agreement as soon as possible on a range of issues, including border
safety, a temporary worker program, and the status of undocumented Mexicans in the United
States. However, following the September 2001 terrorist attacks, some policy makers called
for tighter border controls. On October 29, 2001, President Bush issued a presidential
directive calling for measures to improve the tracking of terrorists, to review student visa
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policies, and to better coordinate the sharing of immigration and customs information with
Mexico and Canada.
In the period leading to President Bush’s trip to Mexico, the House approved H.Res.
365 on March 12, 2002, under suspension of rules, to concur with the Senate version of H.R.
1885, with an amendment changing the title of the measure and combining immigration and
border security provisions. The measure would extend the filing deadline for the adjustment
to legal status of undocumented persons, including Mexicans, under Section 245(i) of the
Immigration and Nationality Act to the earlier of November 30, 2002, or four months after
the issuance of regulations; and it would provide for enhanced border security and visa entry
reform, including biometric identification of applicants and sharing of information among
agencies. The New York Times reported on March 20, 2002, that President Bush was poised
to approve and propose to Congress a new border control agency in the Justice Department
that would merge Customs and INS/Border Patrol.
During the Bush-Fox meeting in Monterrey, Mexico, on March 22, 2002, the Presidents
noted that important progress had been made to enhance migrant safety, and they agreed to
continue the cabinet-level talks launched in earlier meetings to achieve safe, legal, and orderly
migration flows between the countries. In the press conference, President Bush called for
passage of legislation to extend the period for adjustment to legal status of undocumented
persons under Section 245(i) of the immigration act. The Presidents also announced a U.S.-
Mexico Border Partnership Action Plan with greater cooperation and technological
enhancements at the border and a “Partnership for Prosperity” Action Plan with public-private
initiatives to promote domestic and foreign investment in less developed areas of Mexico with
high migration rates.
Drug Trafficking Issues
Nature of the Problem. Mexico remains a major supplier of heroin,
methamphetamine, and marijuana, and the transit point for more than one half of the cocaine
sold in the United States. Although U.S.-Mexico counter-narcotics efforts have been marked
by distrust at times, relations have been improving in recent years. Responding to U.S.
criticisms of widespread corruption, Mexican officials point to the policemen and soldiers
killed in confrontations with narcotics traffickers as evidence of their commitment to
controlling the problem. They also criticize U.S. officials for failing to do more to control
U.S. demand for drugs, noting that the problem is one of supply and demand.
Presidential Certifications and Congressional Reactions. In general, the
Clinton Administration’s drug control policy in the domestic area stressed drug treatment and
prevention, and in the international area it devoted more attention to eradication and source
country institution building, particularly law enforcement and judicial institutions.
Under recent pressure from Congress, through mechanisms like the Western Hemisphere
Drug Elimination Act and the Supplemental FY1998 Appropriations Act, additional funding
was provided to strengthen the Border Patrol and international interdiction efforts, including
$90 million in Southwest Border enhancements. In other actions, congressional resolutions
to disapprove President Clinton’s certification of Mexico as fully cooperative in drug control
efforts were introduced in 1997, 1998, and 1999, in both houses but never fully enacted. In
1999, Congress passed the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act, Title VIII of the
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Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2000 (H.R. 1555/P.L. 106-120), which strengthened
the President’s authority under the International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA)
to block the assets in the United States of designated international drug traffickers, and six
well known Mexican drug lords were designated in June 2000. In early 2000, while some
Members of Congress criticized Mexico’s counter-drug efforts, no resolutions of disapproval
were introduced in either house to overturn President Clinton’s certification of Mexico.
Following the July 2000 election of Vicente Fox as President of Mexico, bills were introduced
but not enacted to exempt Mexico from the drug certification requirements or to modify the
requirements. (For details, see CRS Report 98-174, Mexican Drug Certification Issues: U.S.
Congressional Action, 1986-2001.)
President Bush certified, on March 1, 2001, as previous presidents had done, that
Mexico had been a fully cooperative country in efforts to control drug trafficking. He cited
the arrest of two key members of the Tijuana-based Arellano Felix Organization, aggressive
eradication programs, and growing cooperation with the United States by the new Fox
Administration. President Fox came to office pledging to attack corruption and drug
trafficking, and he renewed that pledge in January 2001 following the escape from a high
security prison in the state of Jalisco of reputed Mexican drug lord Joaquin “El Chapo”
Guzman. The Fox administration has fired many customs and anti-drug agents for corruption
and has permitted the extradition of Mexican drug lords to the United States for prosecution
following a favorable decision by the Mexican Supreme Court in January 2001, although the
Supreme Court ruled in October 2001 that life imprisonment is unconstitutional and a bar to
extradition for fugitives facing that penalty in another country.
In presidential meetings, Presidents Bush and Fox have agreed to enhance law
enforcement and counter-narcotics cooperation, and President Fox has called for reform of
the U.S. drug certification process. The Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out
S. 219 in April 2001 and S. 1401 (Foreign Relations Authorization for FY2002-FY2003) in
August 2001, with similar language in Sections 741-745, that would modify the drug
certification process for 3 years, require designation of the countries subject to sanctions only,
and encourage development of a multilateral strategy. Although congressional action on S.
219 or S. 1401 is still pending, the drug certification requirements were temporarily modified
in late 2001 by enactment of the Foreign Operations Appropriations Act for FY2002 (H.R.
2506/P.L. 107-115). This measure waived the drug certification requirements for FY2002
and required the President to designate only countries that had demonstrably failed to meet
international counter-narcotics obligations in line with provisions in S. 1401. (For details on
the various measures, see CRS Report RL30892, Drug Certification Requirements and
Congressional Modifications in 2001; and CRS Report RL30950, Drug Certification
Procedures: A Comparison of Current Law to S. 219 and S. 1401 as Reported, by K. Larry
Storrs.)
The Bush Administration’s overall drug control policy, as articulated in February 2002,
seeks to prevent drug use before it starts through education and community action, to provide
adequate treatment resources for drug users, and to disrupt the marketplace for drugs at home
and abroad through eradication, interdiction, and anti-money-laundering activities. According
to the State Department’s March 2002 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report,
Mexico remains a major supplier of heroin, methamphetamine, and marijuana, and the transit
point for more than one-half of the cocaine sold in the United States. The report stated that
Mexico’s efforts have resulted in tangible successes against the three major drug cartels in the
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country – the Arellano Felix Organization (AFO), the Carrillo Fuentes Organization (CFO),
and the Gulf Cartel. It also noted that the Fox Administration sustained the aggressive
eradication program carried out by past administrations and increased the quantities of drugs
seized. On March 9, 2002, Mexican authorities announced the arrest of drug lord Benjamin
Arellano-Felix and the probable death of his brother Ramon Arellano Felix in a police shoot-
out a month earlier. On March 14, 2002, the authorities announced the arrest of Manuel
Herrera Barraza, another key figure in the Arellano Felix organization.
During the Bush-Fox meeting in Monterrey, Mexico in March 2002, the Presidents
acknowledged “major successes achieved by Mexico in the fight against narco-trafficking”
and agreed on “the importance of redoubling judicial cooperation” between the countries.
Political and Human Rights Issues
Concerns over Elections and Political Rights. Over the years, major attention
has focused on the fairness of elections in Mexico since the Institutional Revolutionary Party
or PRI controlled the presidency until 2000, all gubernatorial posts until the 1990s, and had
solid control of the two chambers of the Mexican Congress until 1997, although the PAN had
made progress in capturing control of major cities for several decades.
Following the controversial July 1988 presidential election, President Salinas proposed
and Congress enacted three electoral reforms. In subsequent years, opposition governors
were elected in several states, and nationwide mid-term legislative elections in August 1991
were considered to be generally fair. Presidential and legislative elections were held under
peaceful conditions on August 21, 1994, with Ernesto Zedillo of the long ruling PRI winning
the presidency with 50.18% of the valid votes. In subsequent local elections, the opposition
PAN won governorships in many states, particularly in the period following the 1995-1996
period of financial crisis and austerity.
In late July 1996, the parties agreed on major electoral reforms for the July 1997
legislative and local elections. These included the direct election of the mayor of the Mexico
City Federal District, access to the media, and controls on campaign spending. On July 6,
1997, Mexico held nationwide midterm legislative elections along with gubernatorial contests
in 6 states and the first direct election of the Mayor of the Mexico City Federal District.
Although the Zedillo-supported PRI remained the single largest party, it lost its long-held
majority in the Chamber of Deputies, it lost the two-thirds majority in the Senate, it lost two
of the six governorships, and it lost the all-important race for Mayor of Mexico City. This
prompted observers to suggest that the system was becoming more pluralistic and that
passage of legislation would require more negotiation among the parties.
In the period leading to the July 2000 elections, former Government Minister Francisco
Labastida was selected as the candidate of the PRI in an open nation-wide primary. Efforts
by the PAN and the PRD to agree on a common candidate for the opposition came to an
impasse, and former Governor of Guanajuato Vicente Fox was designated as the presidential
candidate for the PAN, and former mayor of the Mexico City Federal District Cuauhtemoc
Cardenas was designated as the presidential candidate for the PRD. On July 2, 2000, Vicente
Fox of the Alliance for Change (PAN/PVEM) was elected President with 42.52% of the vote,
marking the first election of a president from an opposition party in 71 years and erasing many
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doubts about the fairness of elections. (For more detail, see CRS Report RS20611, Mexico’s
Presidential, Legislative, and Local Elections of July 2, 2000, by K. Larry Storrs.)
In subsequent elections, a coalition of opposition parties (PAN, PRD, etc.) won the
governorship in the state of Chiapas in August 2000, the PRI won a majority in municipal and
state legislature elections in the state of Veracruz in September 2000, the PRI won a
governorship in disputed elections in the state of Tabasco in October 2000 (subsequently
annulled by the Federal Electoral Tribunal), and the PAN won a governorship in a close race
in the state of Jalisco in November 2000. After intervention by the Federal Electoral Tribunal
to ensure the neutrality of the State Electoral Council in Yucatan, the candidate of the PAN-
PRD coalition won the governorship of Yucatan in June 2001. The PRI won the
governorship in Tabasco in the re-run election in August 2001, ending a string of PRI defeats
in southern states. In other recent elections, on July 1, 2001, the PRI won control of the state
legislature and most municipalities in the state of Chihuahua but lost to the PAN in a disputed
mayoral election in the major border city of Ciudad Juarez. On July 8, 2001, the PAN
demonstrated continuing dominance in Baja California, winning the governorship, 4 of 5
mayoral races, and 14 of 16 seats in the state legislature. On November 11, 2001, PRD
candidate Lazaro Cardenas, the scion of a famous family, won the gubernatorial election in
Michoacan.

Allegations of Human Rights Abuses. Charges of human rights abuse in Mexico,
cited by human rights groups and the State Department’s annual reports, include allegations
of torture, harassment, and extra-judicial killings by law enforcement agents; threats against
journalists, academics, and human rights monitors; and killings or “disappearances” of
opposition politicians. Other abuses include prison deficiencies, discrimination against women
and indigenous peoples, and extensive child labor in the informal sector.
President Zedillo took a number of steps to deal with these abuses, including continuing
support for the National Human Rights Commission. He named Antonio Lozano of the
opposition PAN as Attorney General in 1994 and ordered him to carry out a major reform
of the judicial and law enforcement system to eliminate corruption and human rights abuse.
Judicial reform was approved in December 1994, increasing the independence and autonomy
of the Supreme Court and of the Attorney General’s Office. Under Zedillo, major attention
focused on the December 1997 killing of 45 indigenous peasants in the village of Acteal in
the state of Chiapas by armed men said to be linked to the PRI. President Zedillo urged
prompt prosecution, and some 82 remain in detention, 51 serving prison sentences after
conviction and others awaiting trial, with six freed on appeal for lack of evidence.
President Fox, even before taking office, appointed well known human rights activist
Mariclaire Acosta as a Special Ambassador for Human Rights, and Mexican spokesmen have
asserted that Mexico will be open to visits by human rights organizations and foreign visitors
and will take strong human rights positions. Immediately after his inauguration, President Fox
signed an agreement with the United Nations to provide technical assistance on human rights.
The killing of human rights lawyer Digna Ochoa y Placido on October 19, 2001, has raised
questions about the government’s human rights policies, and prompted calls for prompt action
by the government from domestic and foreign human rights organizations. President Fox
freed two well known Mexican environmentalists that Digna Ochoa had represented and
defended, namely Rodolfo Montiel and Teodoro Cabrera, on November 8, 2001. The
National Commission on Human Rights presented a report to President Fox, on November
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27, 2001, that documented human rights abuses and disappearances of persons in the 1970s
and early 1980s, and President Fox named legal scholar Ignacio Carrillo as a Special
Prosecutor to investigate these and other cases on January 4, 2002. President Fox ordered
the release from prison of General Jose Francisco Gallardo on February 9, 2002, but did not
pardon him, despite the fact that human rights groups argue that his conviction in military
courts for theft and corruption was fabricated because of his advocacy of a human rights
ombudsman for the Mexican military. The State Department’s March 2002 human rights
report on Mexico states that Fox Administration efforts to improve the human rights situation
continued to meet with limited success.
LEGISLATION
P.L. 107-87, H.R. 2299
Department of Transportation Appropriations, FY2002. H.R. 2299 was reported out
by the House Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 107-108) on June 22, 2001. It passed in
the House on June 26, 2001, with the Sabo amendment, approved 285-143, to prohibit the
use of funds to process applications by Mexico-domiciled motor carriers for authority to
operate beyond border commercial zones. The Senate version of the bill (S. 1178) was
reported out on July 13, 2001, with provisions proposed by Senators Murray and Shelby
requiring various safety inspections of Mexican trucks for access to U.S. highways. The text
of S. 1178 was subsequently offered as a substitute amendment (S.Amdt. 1025) to H.R. 2299.
The Senate considered H.R. 2299 on July 19-20 and 23-27, but action was not completed
because of various parliamentary delays by Senators Gramm and McCain, who argued that
the Mexican truck provisions were contrary to NAFTA and that President Bush was prepared
to veto the measure for that reason. A motion to invoke cloture on debate was passed 70-30
on July 26, but another vote to invoke cloture failed 57-27 on July 27. On August 1, 2001,
the Senate reconsidered and invoked cloture 100-0, after which H.R. 2299 with the Murray-
Shelby restrictions was passed by voice vote. On November 29, 2001, House and Senate
conferees reached agreement on a compromise in Section 350 that generally retained the
Senate-passed safety provisions but gave the Administration more flexibility in
implementation. The conference report (H.Rept. 107-308) was passed by the House on
November 30, 2001, and by the Senate on December 4, 2001. Signed into law December 18,
2001.
P.L. 107-115, H.R. 2506
Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2002. H.R. 2506 was reported in the House
by the House Appropriations Committee on July 17, 2001 (H.Rept. 107-142) and passed by
the House on July 24, 2001. It was reported in the Senate by the Senate Appropriations
Committee with an amendment in the nature of a substitute on September 4, 2001 (S.Rept.
107-58). It was passed by the Senate on October 24, 2001, with an amendment (S.Amdt.
1959) by Senators Dodd and Hutchison to modify the existing drug certification procedures.
The amendment contains provisions similar to the provisions in S. 219 and S. 1401
summarized above, except that the amendment would modify the drug certification
procedures for FY2002 only, and for Western Hemisphere countries only. The conference
version, approved by the House on December 19 and by the Senate on December 20, waived
the drug certification requirements for all relevant countries in FY2002 and required the
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President to designate for sanctions only those countries that demonstrably failed to meet
international counter-narcotics obligations. Signed into law January 10, 2002.
S. 219 (Dodd) / S. 1401 (Biden)
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee acted to suspend the existing drug certification
procedures for a 3-year trial period in early April 2001 when it approved S. 219, and in early
August 2001 when it approved the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2002-FY2003
(S. 1401) which included similar language in Sections 741-745. In place of the existing
procedures, the approved measures would require the President to identify by October 1 of
each year major drug-transit or major illicit drug producing countries, and to designate each
country that has failed demonstrably, during the previous 12 months, to make substantial
efforts to adhere to its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements
(multilateral and bilateral) and other standards. U.S. assistance would be withheld from any
designated countries unless the President determined that the provision of assistance was vital
to the national interest of the United States or until the country made substantial counter-
narcotics efforts. The measures express the sense of Congress that the United States should
at the earliest feasible date in 2001 convene a multilateral conference of relevant countries to
develop multilateral drug reduction and prevention strategies, and they urge the President to
request legislative changes to implement the strategies no later than one year after enactment.
They continue the requirement for the yearly International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
(INCSR) detailing the performance of individual countries, and add the requirement to report
on major drug trafficking organizations. They also amend the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Designation Act to allow judicial review of executive branch decisions to freeze the assets of
suspected drug kingpins. S. 219 was introduced on January 30, 2001; referred to the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee, which considered it on February 7 and March 1, 2001; marked
up on April 3, and reported out on April 5, 2001, with an amendment in the nature of a
substitute and an amendment to the title. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for
FY2002-FY2003 (S. 1401) was approved by the Committee on August 1, 2001, and was
reported out on September 4, 2001 (S.Rept. 107-60).
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Products
CRS Report RL31008. Appropriations for FY2002: Department of Transportation and
Related Agencies, by Robert S. Kirk and David Randall Peterman.
CRS Report RL30950. Drug Certification Procedures: A Comparison of Current Law to
S. 219 and S. 1401 as Reported, by K. Larry Storrs.
CRS Report RL30949. Drug Certification Procedures: Side-by-side Comparison of Existing
Procedures and S. 219 as Reported, by K. Larry Storrs.
CRS Report RL30892. Drug Certification Requirements and Congressional Modifications
in 2001, by K. Larry Storrs.
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CRS Issue Brief IB88093. Drug Control: International Policy and Options, by Raphael Perl.
CRS Report RS20908. Immigration and Naturalization Service’s FY2002 Budget, by
William J. Krouse.
CRS Report RL30780. Immigration Legalization and Status Adjustment Legislation, by
Ruth Ellen Wasem.
CRS Report RL30852. Immigration of Agricultural Guest Workers Policy, Trends, and
Legislative Issues, by Ruth Ellen Wasem and Geoffrey K. Collver.
CRS Report 98-174. Mexican Drug Certification Issues: U.S. Congressional Action, 1986-
2001, by K. Larry Storrs.
CRS Report RL30886. Mexico’s Counter-Narcotics Efforts Under Zedillo and Fox,
December 1994 to March 2001, by K. Larry Storrs.
CRS Report RS20611. Mexico’s Presidential, Legislative, and Local Elections of July 2,
2000, by K. Larry Storrs.
CRS Report 97-861. NAFTA Labor Side Agreement: Lessons for the Worker Rights and
Fast-Track Debate, by Mary Jane Bolle.
CRS Report 97-291. NAFTA: Related Environmental Issues and Initiatives, by Mary
Tiemann.
CRS Report RL31028, North American Free Trade Agreement: Truck Safety
Considerations, by Paul Rothberg.
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