Order Code RS21055
Updated March 11, 2002
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
NATO Enlargement
Paul E. Gallis
Specialist in European Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
This report provides a brief summary of the last round of NATO enlargement, then
sketches recent events culminating in the alliance’s June 2001 endorsement of the
admission of at least one new member at the NATO summit in Prague in 2002. The
report analyzes the key military and political issues that affect the current debate over 9
candidate states. It then provides an overview of the positions of the allies and of Russia
on enlargement, citing the important potential effects of the terrorist attacks of
September 11, 2001, on the United States. It concludes with a discussion of current
legislation on enlargement before Congress.
Background
Congress is in the early stages of considering enlargement of NATO, an issue that will
be addressed at the next allied summit in Prague, in November 2002. During the last
round of enlargement, the Senate voted 80-19 on April 30, 1998, in favor of admitting
Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary to NATO. (A two-thirds Senate majority is
necessary to admit new states because enlargement is considered an amendment to the
original North Atlantic Treaty.) Other members of the alliance followed suit, and the three
countries became members in March 1999. It was the fourth time that NATO had
admitted new states, with membership increasing from the original 12 to 19 today.
At the last NATO summit in April 1999, the allies underscored that they were open
to further enlargement, but neither set a timetable nor guaranteed membership to any
country. Instead, NATO created a Membership Action Plan (MAP), outlining a structured
set of goals for prospective members, such as ending the danger of ethnic conflict,
developing a democratic society with fully transparent political and economic processes
and civilian control of the military, and pledging commitment to defense budgets to build
military forces able to contribute to missions from collective defense to peacekeeping.
NATO pledged to review the enlargement process in 2002.1
1 Washington Summit Communiqué, paragraph 7, NATO. April 24, 1999.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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In June 2001, the North Atlantic Council stated that the 2002 Prague summit would
yield an invitation to at least one candidate state to begin accession negotiations for
membership. On June 15, President Bush said in Warsaw that “all of Europe’s new
democracies, from the Baltic to the Black Sea and all that lie between, should have the
same chance for security and freedom, and the same chance to join the institutions of
Europe, as Europe’s old democracies.” He did not name countries that the United States
would support. In summer 2001, he also opened the door to possible Russian membership
in the future. Russian President Putin has said that his country is not now interested in
membership, but did not rule out future membership.
The Current Debate
In 1998, the congressional debate over NATO enlargement covered such issues as
costs, mission, and qualifications of the candidates. The issue of costs has now seemingly
been put to rest because entry of Poland, the Czech Republic, and Hungary does not
appear to have required extra U.S. funds. Most observers believe that the three countries
have contributed to stability in Europe, and have made significant political contributions
to the alliance in such matters as enhancing NATO’s understanding of central and eastern
Europe, Russia, and the Balkans, given the history of the new members’ involvement with
these regions. Militarily, their contribution is less apparent; each of the three contributes
forces to the NATO-led peace operations in the Balkans, and is building forces to defend
its borders. Poland, in particular, quickly made available to allies territory and facilities for
training. Pentagon officials believe that Poland has made the greatest strides in
restructuring and modernizing its military, and that the Czech Republic and Hungary have
made considerably less progress.2 It should be noted that a period of years is normally
necessary to rebuild a military that has had an authoritarian tradition and convert it to one
having civilian control, purge it of old-guard elements, reform its training, and purchase
equipment compatible with a new set of allies.
There has been some sentiment that NATO should delay invitations to candidate
states until democratic processes are firmly entrenched. For example, the current
Hungarian government of Victor Orban has been criticized for an ethnic “status law” that
some interpret as cloaking Hungarian aspirations for territory from neighboring states
having Hungarian minorities.3 Others reject such sentiments, noting that Orban was freely
elected, and dismissing the status law as nothing more than a passing example of
nationalist politics before a close election.
The essence of the current enlargement debate is over qualifications, with no apparent
consensus. The generally acknowledged serious candidates for entry in 2002 or somewhat
later are Slovenia, Slovakia, the three Baltic states, and possibly Bulgaria and Romania.4
2 “NATO pushes Czechs on arms,” International Herald Tribune, Feb. 22, 2001, p. 5; and Jeffrey
Simon, “Transforming the Armed Forces of Central and East Europe,” Strategic Forum, June
2000.
3 Jackson Diehl, “New NATO, old values,” Washington Post, March 4, 2002, p. A19.
4 For a review of developments in 9 states seeking admission to NATO, see CRS Report RL30168,
NATO Applicant States: a status report, updated March 11,2002, by Steven Woehrel, Julie Kim,
(continued...)

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Each of these countries is small, with comparably small militaries potentially capable of
specialized functions, such as transport or medical care, for example, but only minimally
capable of building forces able to contribute to high-intensity conflict. In the view of some
observers, to adhere to the letter of the military qualifications outlined in the 1999 summit
communiqué, requiring new members to contribute to missions from peacekeeping to
collective defense, is tantamount to excluding their entry.
Many participants in the debate favor different standards that, in their view, reflect
the current political situation in Europe, where Russia is no longer a military threat but
ethnic conflict, nationalism, and terrorism are a danger. In such circumstances, they
contend, political stability and a modernized military at least able to contribute to border
defense and to peace operations are an appropriate standard. Secretary of State Powell
seemed to suggest such a standard in his confirmation hearing when he stressed a need for
candidates to modernize their militaries, and to strengthen their democratic structures.5
An opposing view is that NATO should first clearly define its mission, above all with
an agreement on what types of out-of-area threats, such as terrorism or a disruption of the
flow of oil, should be met with a possible military response. At that point, enlargement
should be considered, with a determination about which candidate states could contribute
to the mission. Some observers, also hesitant about enlargement, note that the United
States flew over 60 percent of combat missions in the Kosovo conflict. They prefer
candidate states that could relieve the U.S. burden.
Yet another view is that there is no clear dichotomy between collective defense (high-
intensity conflict undertaken in response, for example, to the attacks of September 11,
2001) and collective security (peace operations and humanitarian assistance). In this view,
countries contributing to peace operations assist in building stable societies and preventing
“black holes,” such as Bosnia or Afghanistan, where terrorism may take root. Countries
involved in peace operations, then, are contributing to the prevention of terrorism, and
thereby to collective defense.
The terrorist attacks against the United States on September 11, 2001, are affecting
the enlargement debate. A likely part of the enlargement debate will be how candidate
states might contribute to the conflict against terrorism. NATO seemed partially to settle
one aspect of the debate over its mission shortly after the attacks when member states
invoked Article V, the alliance’s collective defense clause, to come to the aid of the United
States in the conflict against terrorism. Previously, the European allies had resisted any
statement that Article V should be invoked in an out-of-area action against terrorism.
However, not all member states have sufficiently mobile or appropriately trained forces for
the current military tasks in Afghanistan. For example, few allies besides the United States
have special forces with the potential to contribute meaningfully to the conflict. At the
same time, a number of allies have an intelligence capability, transport, medical units, and
political influence that might assist in the conflict. However, it is possible that future
aspects of the conflict against terrorism will require larger, more conventional forces,
4 (...continued)
and Carl Ek.
5 Confirmation hearing of Colin Powell, Senate Foreign Relations Committee, 1st sess., 107th
Congress, Jan. 18, 2001.

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depending upon the location and terrain where terrorists base themselves, or if the
government of a state should fall into the hands of terrorists.
As the terrorism conflict unfolds, current members may examine the means by which
candidate states might be able to contribute. These means might include political influence
and support, for example in the United Nations or with Russia or Muslim states, and not
simply or necessarily military potential. It might also include the level of internal security
in the candidate countries and their ability to control their borders, disrupt terrorist
financial networks or apprehend terrorist suspects on their soil. Elements of the MAP that
emphasize an end to corruption may also be increasingly underscored, given the post-
September 11 importance of preventing money-laundering and combating a black
economy.
Views of the Allies
The debate over enlargement is quite different in 2001 than it was in 1998. In 1998,
Germany strongly supported enlargement. Today, most member states couch discussion
of enlargement in careful terms. Governments might state their support in principle for
enlargement, or name states that are good candidates but offer no date for their entry;
most member governments then note that they do not wish to name their own candidates
for the Prague summit too early due to concern that candidate states might become
complacent and curtail their efforts to fulfil MAP requirements.
Most member states agree that Slovenia is politically qualified for membership; in
addition, Hungary urges Slovenia’s membership, once NATO criteria for entry are met,
for strategic reasons. Hungary is not contiguous with any other NATO state. Slovenia’s
entry into the alliance would provide Hungary with a land bridge to Italy, a clear advantage
given neutral Austria’s refusal during the Kosovo war to permit NATO overflights to
Hungary. Slovakia is a credible candidate in some NATO capitals, as long as elections in
September 2002 do not turn out the current reform government and replace it with old-line
anti-democratic leaders. Some northern European allies, such as Poland, strongly support
membership for the Baltic states; they contend that the Baltic states have met OSCE and
EU political guidelines for democracy, and cite the three countries’ work to build stability
in the region and to establish better relations with Russia.
Italy, Greece, and Turkey are mounting a quiet campaign for invitations to Bulgaria
and Romania at Prague. They contend that these two candidates can contribute to stability
in the Balkans, where Europe’s greatest security needs lie. Critics counter that Romania
continues to suffer from corruption in its governing structure, and that Bulgaria must make
further efforts at military modernization.
The views of the Russian government play a role in the debate. Germany and several
allies, such as France, had held the view until recently that NATO enlargement and the
U.S. missile defense program had antagonized Moscow, and that a new round of
enlargement would only contribute more tension to the Russia-NATO equation. Putin’s
softer rhetoric against NATO enlargement since the September 11 terrorist attacks, and
the possibility that Washington and Moscow might reach an accommodation over missile
defense, appear to have moved Paris and Berlin closer to more assertive support for
inviting several candidate states at the Prague summit. The German foreign minister has
virtually endorsed an invitation to the Baltic states at the Prague summit.

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In the broadest sense, the debate may eventually widen to address strategic issues.
One element of this question, the military contribution that a prospective member can
make, has been mentioned. Another element is whether states now having their security
threatened should be considered. The argument was raised during the 1998 debate over
enlargement: “NATO is bringing in states that are not threatened, and leaving to fend for
themselves countries that are in the greatest need of security.” Today, for example,
Macedonia is under pressure from a restive ethnic Albanian minority within its borders and
from rebel Albanian forces who until recently had fought for control of part of the
Macedonian state. In the 1998 debate, the argument that states should join NATO that are
in the greatest need of security failed, largely because their instability might have saddled
the alliance with unwanted internal problems. The Senate and allied governments decided
to choose countries that had demonstrated stability, had promised to make a military
contribution to the alliance, and were not under threat from ethnic strife.
As already noted, Russian President Putin has softened his public opposition to
enlargement since the terrorist attacks on the United States. It is possible that he now
views a unified front against terrorism, in part due to Moscow’s ongoing conflict in
Chechnya, as more important than potential divisions with the allies over enlargement.
The Duma and much of Russia’s military and intelligence bureaucracy remain adamantly
opposed to enlargement, which they view as a U.S.-led effort to move a military alliance
closer to their territory. U.S. and officials from other allied states often counter such an
argument by underscoring that enlargement’s purpose in large part is to ensure stability
in Europe, and that the addition of new member states provides stability, and therefore
security, to Russia’s west.
Congressional Views
The issue of NATO enlargement has not yet fully engaged the 107th Congress. Some
individual Members, however, have expressed their views, and relevant legislation has
recently been introduced. Senator Helms has strongly backed the entry of the Baltic states
into the alliance, and a number of Members have endorsed Slovenia’s qualifications for
entry. Rep. Shimkus and others have introduced H.Con.Res. 116, which calls for NATO
invitations to the Baltic states for membership at the 2002 summit, as long as they satisfy
the alliance’s qualifications.
On October 24, 2001, legislation was introduced in both the House of
Representatives and the Senate supporting further enlargement, legislation that the Bush
Administration has endorsed. Representative Bereuter introduced H.R. 3167, the
Freedom Consolidation Act of 2001; Speaker Hastert, Reps. Bonior, Goss, Hyde, and
Lantos, among others, cosponsored the bill. The bill received rapid consideration, and
passed the House 372-46 on November 6. Senator Helms introduced an identical bill, S.
1572, simultaneously in the Senate; cosponsors included Senators Durbin, Lieberman,
Lott, Lugar, and McCain. The bills recall and approve legislation of the four previous
Congresses that urged enlargement and provided funding for particular candidates. The
bills note the bipartisan support given to the last round of enlargement, citing statements
by President George W. Bush and former President Clinton. While the bills do not
champion any particular candidate for entry at the Prague summit, they encourage the
continued efforts of the current 9 formal candidates, as well as Moldova and Ukraine.
They designate Slovakia as eligible to receive U.S. assistance under section 203(a) of the
NATO Participation Act of 1994 (title II of P.L. 103-447). This section gives the

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President authority to establish a program of assistance with a government if he finds that
it is meeting the requirements of NATO membership. The bills also authorize a total of
$55.5 million made available for FY2002 under section 23 of the Arms Export Control Act
(22 U.S.C. 2763) for Foreign Military Financing (FMF) to Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania,
Slovakia, Slovenia, Bulgaria, and Romania.

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