Order Code IB95017
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Trade and the Americas
Updated March 5, 2002
Raymond J. Ahearn
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Summit of the Americas: Trade Results
Vision of Free Trade in the Americas
U.S. Interests and Concerns
Latin American Interests and Concerns
Policy Issues and Congressional Actions
Chile: Negotiating A Free Trade Agreement
Implementing the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA)
Movement Towards Hemispheric Free Trade
Extending the Andean Trade Preferences Act
A U.S.-Central American Free Trade Agreement
CHRONOLOGY
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Issue Briefs
CRS Reports

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Trade and the Americas
SUMMARY
The Summit of the Americas, held in
expanded access and preferential tariff treat-
December 1994, led to ongoing congressional
ment to certain textile and apparel products
interest in three inter-related trade policy
assembled from U.S. fabric, under specified
issues. The first involves an invitation ex-
conditions. Currently, however, the extent of
tended to Chile to join NAFTA. The second
program benefits could be affected by a House
focuses on preferential tariff treatment for
leadership pledge, made in the debate over
Caribbean and Central American countries.
trade promotion authority last December, to
The third concerns movement towards a Free
require that fabric be dyed and finished in the
Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), the
U.S. to be eligible for duty-free access.
concept of making the entire hemisphere a
free-trade zone. Two other issues that subse-
The third issue involves movement to-
quently have emerged involve a request by the
wards hemispheric free trade. Nearly four
Andean countries to extend and expand the
years after the 1994 Summit of the Americas,
Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA), and
hemispheric leaders formally launched the
consideration of a free trade agreement with
FTAA negotiations in 1998. The course of the
five Central American countries. Following the
negotiations has been affected by political and
Miami Summit, the U.S., Canada, and Mexico
economic problems in the hemisphere and the
invited Chile to enter into negotiations to
continued absence of U.S. fast trade authority.
accede to NAFTA. Envisioned as a first step
Nevertheless, the tariff portion of the negotia-
towards creation of an FTAA, preliminary
tions are scheduled to begin no later than May
negotiations started in July 1995. Chile, how-
15, 2002. A fourth issue that has arisen in-
ever, shortly thereafter suspended the negotia-
volves legislation to extend and expand the
tions pending renewal of U.S. “fast-track”
ATPA. The 1991 ATPA granted Andean
negotiating authority. In August 1999, Chile
countries tariff preferences for 10 years in an
proposed to re-start discussions on a bilateral
effort to help the countries fight narcotics
free trade agreement and negotiations eventu-
trafficking. The House in 2001 approved an
ally commenced December 6-7, 2000 in Wash-
expansion and extension of the program (H.R.
ington. The Bush Administration has contin-
3009). Less expansive legislation has been
ued the negotiations with the hope of reaching
reported out of the Senate Finance Committee,
an agreement sometime in 2002. A second
but the full Senate has not taken up the bill yet.
issue concerns the treatment of the Caribbean
and Central American countries that may have
A fifth issue relates to the Bush
been hurt in trade and investment terms as a
Administration’s interest in negotiating a free
result of the implementation of NAFTA. After
trade agreement with five central American
many years of consideration, Congress in May
nations - Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
2000 enacted the Caribbean Basin Trade
Honduras, and Nicaragua. In announcing an
Partnership Act (Title II of P.L. 106-200) that
interest in pursuing such talks, President Bush
provides benefits for CBI beneficiary countries
on January 16, 2002 noted that it would be
that are similar to the tariff benefits afforded
another step towards completing a Free Trade
Mexico. The new law, in particular, offers
Area of the Americas.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On February 29, 2002, the United States and Chile announced that they will hold the
11th round of negotiations on a U.S.-Chile Free Trade Agreement during the week of April
8 and the 12th round beginning May 6.
The Bush Administration announced on February 14, 2002 that import duties on
eligible products from the Andean Trade Preference Act countries would be suspended for
90 days. Legislation to renew and expand the ATPA is likely to become part of an omnibus
trade package that is expected to be taken up by the Senate in April or May.
Brazil’s Minister for External Relations warned the Bush Administration on February
8, 2002 that a U.S. decision to impose restraints on steel imports and to subsidize
agricultural exports could erode Brazil’s support for the FTAA negotiaions.
In a speech on January 16, 2002, President Bush announced that his administration
wishes to negotiate a free trade agreement with the five countries of Central America - Costa
Rica, Honduras, Guatemala, El Salvador, and Nicaragua.
Brazilian President Cardoso charged on December 10, 2001 that the House passed
trade promotion bill will doom any prospects for approval of the Free Trade Area of the
Americas. He objected strenuously to a provision of the bill that removes import-sensitive
agricultural products from the President’s tariff proclamation authority.
The House on December 6, 2001 approved a bill (H.R. 3005) to provide the President
with trade promotion authority, formerly known as fast-track. In an effort to win support for
the bill, House Republican leaders pledged to bring no future trade bills to the House floor
until legislative action is taken to assure that apparel assembled in Caribbean and Central
American countries for export to the United States is made from fabric that is dyed, printed,
or finished in the United States.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Summit of the Americas: Trade Results
At the Summit of the Americas held December 9-11, 1994 in Miami, 34 hemispheric
democracies agreed to create a “Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA).” Under the
Declaration of Principles, the countries committed to “begin immediately” construction of the
free trade area and to complete negotiations no later than the year 2005.
The Declaration stated that concrete progress toward the FTAA will occur before the
close of the century. Based on the view that substantial progress towards economic
integration in the hemisphere has already been made, the declaration called for building on
“existing sub-regional and bilateral arrangements in order to broaden and deepen hemispheric
economic integration and to bring the agreements together.” At the same time, the declaration
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recognized the need to “remain cognizant” of the “wide differences in the levels of
development and size of economies” in the Hemisphere in moving toward tighter economic
integration.
If created, the FTAA would have 34 members (Cuba is not included) with over 800
million people. This population would be more than twice the 375 million of the now 15-
nation European Union.
In the 7 years following the 1994 Miami Summit, Western Hemisphere trade ministers
have met six times under the FTAA process. The first meeting was held in Denver in June
1995; the second in Cartagena, Colombia in March 1996; the third in Belo Horizonte, Brazil
in May 1997; the fourth in San Jose, Costa Rica in March 1998; the fifth in Toronto, Canada
in November 1999, and the sixth in Argentina from April 6-7, 2001.
At the San Jose meeting, the 34 Ministers responsible for trade in the Hemisphere
unanimously recommended that the Leaders formally launch the negotiation of the FTAA at
the Second Summit of the Americas in Santiago. As provided by the San Jose Declaration,
ministers agreed that negotiating groups were to achieve considerable progress by the year
2000, with a conclusion set for December 31, 2004. The San Jose Declaration also provided
recommendations on the initial structure, objectives, venues, and principles of the
negotiations.
Canada was designated as the Chair of the overall negotiating process for the initial 18
months (May 1, 1998-Oct. 31, 1999) and the United States and Brazil were named co-chairs
during the final two years of the negotiations (November 1, 2002-December 31, 2004). As
head of both the Ministerial and Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC), the Chair will provide
overall direction and management of the negotiations.
The Ministers elected to establish nine initial negotiating groups, which cover all the
tariff and non-tariff barrier issue areas identified by the Leaders at the Miami Summit of the
Americas. These groups are market access, agriculture, services, government procurement,
investment, intellectual property, subsidies, competition policy, and dispute settlement. In
addition, the Ministers created two committees and a consultative group. A Committee on
Electronic Commerce, comprised of both government and private sector experts, was
established to make recommendations on how to increase and broaden the benefits to be
derived from the electronic marketplace. A Committee on Civil Society was established to
receive input at the hemispheric level from labor and environmental groups, and academic,
consumer, and other non-governmental groups. And a Consultative Group on Smaller
Economies was established to bring to the attention of the TNC the interests and concerns
of the smaller economies.
The United States (Miami) provided the venue for the negotiating groups and the
administrative secretariat supporting those meeting during the first three years. The last four
years of the negotiations are being held in Panama and Mexico.
The San Jose Declaration contains General Principles for the Negotiations, as well as
General and Specific Objectives. In addition to transparency during the negotiations, the
Ministers agreed that the FTAA should improve upon WTO rules and disciplines wherever
possible and appropriate. This provision was an attempt to ensure that any final agreement
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will break down the most serious trade barriers in the region and provide a single set of rules
for hemispheric trade. It was agreed that bilateral and sub-regional agreements such as
NAFTA and Mercosur can coexist with the FTAA only to the extent that the rights and
obligations under those agreements are not covered or go beyond those of the FTAA. It was
also agreed that the negotiations will be a “single undertaking,” in the sense that signatories
to the final FTAA Agreement will have to accept all parts of it (i.e. cannot pick and choose
among the obligations.)
At the Second Summit of the Americas, held in Chile in April 1998, President Clinton
and 21 other presidents and 12 prime ministers of the Western Hemisphere agreed to begin
the trade negotiations, and to make “concrete progress” toward the free trade goal by 2000.
Since then, some progress has been made in developing a variety of customs-related business
facilitation measures to expedite the conduct of trade even before the negotiations are
completed. In terms of the negotiations, considerable progress has been made in some of the
groups; much less in others.
The sixth ministerial meeting, held April 6-7, 2001 in Buenos Aires, established a more
precise time frame for conclusion and entry into force of the FTAA agreement. These
deadlines, which include that the FTAA countries must agree on how to conduct the market-
opening portion of the talks by April 1, 2002; start tariff negotiations no later than May 15,
2002; and produce an agreement that should enter into force no later than December 2005,
were approved by 33 Heads of State at the Quebec City Summit. Only Venezuela declined
to endorse the timeline, arguing that the leaders’ declaration as worded did not reflect the
process under its national laws for ratifying the agreement. The leaders also added a new
pledge that only democracies would be able to participate in the trade bloc and agreed to
make public the preliminary negotiated texts. (The preliminary draft text covering nine
chapters negotiated is now available on the FTAA website in the four official languages of the
FTAA: English, Spanish, French, and Portuguese).
The seventh Ministerial will be held in Quito, Ecuador by October 2002. Ministers have
instructed negotiators from all FTAA governments to undertake work to revise the draft
chapters of the FTAA text, eliminating brackets in the texts to the maximum extent possible
before the Quito Ministerial.
Vision of Free Trade in the Americas
The vision of free trade in the Americas was put forth initially by President George Bush
in June 1990. Proposed as the cornerstone of the Enterprise for the Americas Initiative
(EAI), President Bush envisaged the creation of a “ free trade system that links all of the
Americas: North, Central, and South ... a free trade zone stretching from the port of
Anchorage to the Tierra del Fuego” (the southern tip of Chile). The free trade vision was
enthusiastically received in Latin America.
Bush Administration officials at the time emphasized that the goal of hemispheric free
trade was long-term, and could take a decade or more to come to fruition. Moreover, the
hemispheric free trade vision entailed a variable pattern of economic integration, perhaps
involving a number of free trade agreements with individual countries or with the region’s
economic groupings. Given that the timing, terms, and actual dimensions of the proposal were
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uncertain, its main significance was an offer of a special relationship with the countries of the
Western Hemisphere.
Upon assuming office, President Clinton supported the hemispheric free trade concept.
Like his predecessor, Clinton viewed movement towards hemispheric economic integration
as supportive of U.S. economic and political interests.
Initially, Clinton Administration efforts to clarify the process by which it would work
toward creation of a hemispheric free trade area awaited the outcome of the congressional
vote on NAFTA, a trade agreement that was touted as a first step in moving towards the
vision of hemispheric free trade. Since NAFTA was approved in late 1993, the Administration
restated its intention of negotiating a free trade agreement with Chile first, but declined from
naming other specific countries as candidates for future free trade agreements.
The 1994 Clinton Summit of the Americas in Miami helped create a political consensus
in the Administration to take further steps in moving towards hemispheric integration. In
remarks delivered at the Summit, President Clinton hailed the proposal to build a free trade
area from Alaska to Argentina as producing more jobs in the United States and improving the
quality of life for residents of the Western Hemisphere.
Since Miami, the vision of hemispheric free trade has been promoted both by the formal
negotiations held as a part of the FTAA process, and by the expansion of sub-regional groups
and the proliferation of bilateral free trade agreements. Under the former approach, the trade
ministers of the hemisphere laid the groundwork for the formal launching of the negotiations,
which was agreed to at the Second Summit of the Americas in Santiago. Under the latter
approach, Mercosur (the Southern Cone Common Market) has expanded and countries such
as Chile and Mexico have negotiated bilateral free trade agreements. Lacking fast-track
negotiating authority, the Clinton Administration was not active under this process.
President George W. Bush, who is a strong supporter of promoting close economic ties
with Latin America, has enthusiastically backed the FTAA process. At the Quebec City
meeting, he committed to obtaining fast-track authority by the end of 2001, thereby giving
the FTAA process, which was in danger of stalling, another push forward.
U.S. Interests and Concerns
Supporters view hemispheric integration as bolstering U.S. economic and political
interests in a variety of ways. Movement towards freer markets is viewed as supportive of
U.S. prosperity, while the strengthening of democratic regimes is viewed as supportive of
U.S. values and security. Closer economic ties are also seen improving cooperation on a
range of bilateral issues, including environmental concerns and anti-drug efforts.
In most general terms, a reciprocal reduction of trade barriers by two or more countries
usually contributes to improved efficiency and higher living standards for both. As average
tariffs in Latin America are roughly three times higher than U.S. tariffs (12% compared to
3%), supporters argue that the lowering of tariffs and other trade barriers should facilitate
significant increases in U.S. exports.
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Supporters point out that the Western Hemisphere (which includes Canada and Mexico)
has become the largest regional destination for U.S. exports of goods over the past three
years. The region usually accounts for about 40% of total U.S. merchandise exports.
Excluding Canada and Mexico, U.S. exports to the region have grown 38 percent faster than
to countries outside the hemisphere, reaching $59 billion in 2000.
Supporters also believe that a higher degree of economic integration should contribute
to the consolidation of economic and political reforms that have taken place throughout the
hemisphere. They maintain that the reforms have not only contributed to an improved
economic performance in Latin America overall, but they have also made Latin America a
more attractive setting for U.S. foreign investment. Similarly, they maintain that the stronger
Latin America becomes economically, the more likely democratic institutions will continue
to proliferate and deepen.
Opponents of an FTAA are concerned that hemispheric free trade would lead to the
export of jobs that otherwise would be in the United States. Some critics believe that an
FTAA will induce an outflow of American capital to take advantage of much lower wages
and weak safety and environmental standards. Many opponents of the FTAA have argued
that free trade with poorer countries will put pressure on the United States to lessen its
workforce protections and environmental requirements.
Other critics are concerned that an FTAA will inevitably involve the United States in the
instabilities, class tensions, and economic turmoil of many southern hemisphere societies.
Some cite Mexico’s financial crisis in 1995 as an example of potential costs. According to
this view, costs include a deterioration in the U.S. trade balance, an increase in immigration
pressures, and the need to extend a large amount of credit.
From a very different perspective, some opponents also argue that hemispheric free trade
could undermine the achievement of a stronger and more open multilateral trading system.
According to this perspective, regional free trade agreements that may weaken the multilateral
trading system do not serve the interests of the United States because it has major commercial
interests in all regions of the world — Asia, Europe, and North America, and Latin America.
Furthermore, this argument is that a multilateral agreement offers far greater
economic benefits than regional agreements.
Latin American Interests and Concerns
Latin American nations made considerable progress in implementing far-reaching trade
reforms and opening their economies to outside competition during the first half of the 1990s.
. The prospects of hemispheric economic integration have spurred new sub- regional
integration schemes and breathed life into sub-regional groups that had lost their stamina.
Most importantly, the political commitment at the Miami Summit to create an FTAA by the
year 2005 was a product largely of pressures from many of the countries in the region.
If the 1980s were Latin America’s lost decade, the 1990s, particularly the first five years,
may be the catchup years. From 1990-1999, the economies of the region have averaged
roughly 3.5% growth, up from 1.1% in the 1980s. Inflation has been reduced dramatically,
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averaging around 10% in recent years compared to 550% in 1990. And fiscal deficits are
now approximately 2% of gross domestic product, compared to 9% in 1983.
One of the central aspects of the economic transformation of the region has been
impressive market-oriented reforms and unilateral trade liberalization. This trend has been,
until Argentina’s financial crisis of 2001-2002, complemented by a surge of sub-regional
integration efforts and growing hemispheric interdependence.
Since 1990, four sub-regional groups have made considerable progress breaking down
intra-regional trade barriers. MERCOSUR, the Common Market of South, consists of
Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay and is the second largest preferential trading group
in the Western Hemisphere. Argentina’s recent financial crisis and devaluation, however, is
severely challenging the viability of Mercosur today. The Andean Community, consisting of
Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Venezuela (Peru dropped out in 1997), currently is the third
largest preferential trading group in the Western Hemisphere. Acting unilaterally as well as
under the auspices of the Community (formerly the Andean Pact), individual members have
liberalized their own trade and investment regimes in recent years. The Caribbean Community
and Common Market (CARICOM), consisting of 13 English-speaking Caribbean nations, has
agreed to implement a common external tariff over a period of six years, although members
will be allowed to maintain their own non-tariff barriers. The Central American Common
Market, (CACM), originally established in 1961, gained new stimulus after a 1990 summit
of Central American Presidents. Within CACM, the Central American Group of four — El
Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Nicaragua—has taken measures to liberalize and
harmonize their trade regimes.
The likelihood of eventual hemispheric free trade could provide a further boost to the
economies of the region. Hemisphere-wide free trade could boost the region’s economic
growth through increased trade and inflows of foreign investment.
Most Latin American leaders generally support the establishment of a hemispheric free
trade area, believing that an FTAA will help bring about greater prosperity, competition, and
entrepreneurial activity. A number of critics, however, caution that the United States will
benefit the most from the arrangement.
Similarly, many Latin Americans understand that negotiating a free trade agreement with
the United States opens themselves to increased trade competition and potential U.S.
involvement in such issues as environmental standards, workers’ rights, and intellectual
property rights protection. Some worry that as tariffs fall, the United States would
increasingly resort to other procedural ways (such as the imposition of anti-dumping or
countervailing duties) to protect its producers and workers. Consequently some nations might
not be willing to move as quickly as others toward the goal of free trade. And others, such
as Brazil, may attach greater importance and priority to the consolidation and strengthening
of sub-regional trade groups before moving towards a hemispheric free trade area.
Beyond that, opposition to hemispheric free trade could grow if the region’s
unemployment and staggering poverty does not begin to decline. Despite the overall
improvement in economic growth in the 1990s, the number of people living in poverty
(defined as less than $1 a day) has remained at an alarming 40% of the population. As a
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result, too many Latin Americans have seen little evidence that the shift towards freer trade
and more open markets has improved their living standards.
Policy Issues and Congressional Actions
Chile: Negotiating A Free Trade Agreement
Canada’s Prime Minister Jean Chretien was widely quoted at the conclusion of the first
Summit of the Americas on the invitation to Chile from the United States, Canada, and
Mexico to join NAFTA: “For one year we have been the three amigos. Starting today, we
will be the four amigos.”
Accession negotiations were formally initiated on June 7, 1995 in Toronto, but they
remained preliminary due to the fact that the Clinton Administration lacked fast- track
negotiating authority. Chile elected not to negotiate on any “sensitive” issues unless fast track
authority is renewed to cover the negotiations (Chile subsequently negotiated an FTA with
Canada and already had one with Mexico). Such authority allows the Administration to
negotiate a trade agreement with assurances that the legislation implementing the agreement
will be treated under special, expedited floor procedures. Differences between most House
Democrats, on the one hand, and most Republicans, on the other hand, on the inclusion of
labor and environmental objectives in future free trade agreements has been a major reason
for the fast-track (now called trade promotion) stalemate.
From 1995-1999, the significance of the inability of the Clinton Administration to carry
through on its pledge to negotiate Chilean accession to NAFTA or to negotiate a bilateral free
trade agreement was mostly political, not economic. In economic terms, NAFTA accession
or a free trade agreement would unlikely have any demonstrable effect on the overall U.S.
economy because trade between the two countries, although growing, is a minuscule percent
of overall U.S. trade flows (approximately ½ of 1 percent). Chile ranks as the 32th most
important market for U.S. exports worldwide, accounting for $3.5 billion in 2000. U.S.
imports from Chile also totaled $3.2 billion in 2000, representing the 40th largest supplier. As
a country of only 13 million people, with an economy the size of Dallas, and located some
4,000 miles from the United States, Chile is unlikely to become a major trading partner of the
United States.
In political terms, the Clinton Administration’s inability to carry through on its promise
to achieve a free trade agreement with Chile perhaps weakened its negotiating leverage in the
context of the FTAA. The promise of Chilean accession to NAFTA, for some interest
groups, was that NAFTA obligations and rules could be adopted to serve as the foundation
for hemispheric integration. After Chile acceded, it was believed that other countries would
be eager to join NAFTA when they were ready as well. Lacking fast-track, the
Administration, however, arguably was forced to make a number of compromises concerning
the objectives and structure of the FTAA negotiations as enunciated in the San Jose
Declaration.
Despite the obvious set-backs and delays, the idea of free trade negotiations with Chile
took an unexpected turn on August 10, 1999. On this day, Chile’s Foreign Minister Juan
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Gabriel Valdes announced that Chile was prepared to start preliminary discussions on a
bilateral FTA with the United States without fast-track negotiating authority in place. The
United States termed the proposal “constructive” and “positive” at the October 5-6, 1999
meeting of the U.S.-Chile Joint Commission on Trade in Investment in Santiago, Chile. And
on November 29, 2000, President Clinton proposed that formal negotiations begin. Chile
accepted and the negotiations formally commenced December 6-7, 2000 in Washington, D.C.
The Bush Administration, which continued the negotiations during March 26-30, 2001
in Chile, had expected an agreement to be reached early this year. But negotiators said in a
joint January 25, 2002 press release that they have scheduled two more rounds of meetings
for March and April. Whether the negotiations can be completed in April remains to be seen.
After ten negotiating rounds, a number of major agriculture and services issues remain
unresolved. Differences on how to handle labor and environmental issues are likely to be
significant. In the area of services, U.S. industry hopes that Chile will agree to broad
commitments in a number of sectors such as telecommunications so that other countries in
later FTAA negotiations would have adhere to the same obligations. Chile, however, has
resisted making the entire FTA a “model” for U.S. free trade expansion elsewhere in Latin
America. Officials say they want the agreement to be more specific in dealing with the reality
of U.S.-Chile trade.
While the Chilean economy is relatively open, it still has a number of agricultural
barriers. Chile uses a price band system that keeps the price of food imports level by applying
a charge on top of its regular tariff. Chile’s sanitary and phytosanitary measures do not
recognize U.S. meat grading system nor allow unprocessed livestock plants not inspected by
Chile’s agriculture department to enter the country. And some U.S. industries, such as sugar
and fruits and vegetables, want limits placed on Chile’s access to the U.S. market.
For its part, Chile is pushing for better access for its professionals to work in the United
States. In addition, Chile is expected to try to negotiate a waiver from U.S. antidumping laws
and to end certain U.S. farm payments that are said to distort trade. Reportedly, negotiators
from both sides are confident that they can resolve these issues pending passage of a trade
promotion authority bill by Congress.
Implementing the Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act
Ever since NAFTA was proposed in the early 1990s, Caribbean Basin leaders have
expressed concern that Mexico’s more preferential trading status would erode its own
preferential access to the U.S. market as provided by the 1984 Caribbean Basin Economic
Recovery Act (CBERA). At the Summit of the Americas, President Clinton and key
legislators supported legislation to address the concerns of the CBERA countries. Legislation
to prevent an erosion of the CBERA countries’ preferential access to the U.S. market has
been introduced in every Congress since 1993, but it was not until 2000 that legislation was
enacted.
The CBERA, which is commonly referred to as the Caribbean Basin Initiative or CBI,
was enacted in 1983 in an effort to bolster the economic development and political stability
of this strategically important region. A key objective was to help these countries diversify
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their exports away from traditional agricultural and raw material based exports such as
petroleum, sugar cane, coffee, cocoa, bananas, and aluminum ores.
The centerpiece of this U.S. government program is a unilateral, non-reciprocal, grant
of duty-free or reduced duty access for certain Caribbean exports to the U.S. market. Most
textiles and apparel, certain footwear, canned tuna, petroleum and petroleum derivatives, and
certain watches are not eligible for any preferential treatment. The CBERA was amended by
Caribbean Basin Economic Recovery Act of 1990, so-called CBI II. This act made the trade
benefits permanent and included measures to promote tourism and establish a scholarship
assistance program for the region.
Currently, 24 Caribbean, and Central and South American countries enjoy these trade
preferences. (Four countries — Anguilla, Cayman Islands, Suriname, and Turks and Caicos
Islands — are eligible to become a CBERA beneficiary country, but have not requested to be
designated). Benefits under CBI are conditioned on various mandatory and discretionary
conditions, including intellectual property rights protection, investment protection, improved
market access for U.S. exports, and workers rights. In its 18-year history, CBERA has been
popular with Caribbean exporters, and in recent years about one-fifth of overall U.S. imports
from CBERA countries have entered the U.S. under CBERA preferential provisions.
“NAFTA parity” or CBI enhancement bills introduced in Congress since 1993 were
premised, in part, on the notion that Mexico’s more favorable tariff treatment under NAFTA
would lead to a diversion of exports and investment, particularly in the textile and apparel
sectors, from the CBERA region. To remedy potential trade and investment diversion, most
bills proposed extending NAFTA equivalent provisions to CBERA countries for products that
did not enjoy equivalent preferential treatment under CBERA.
In the 106th Congress, both the House and Senate passed bills that provided a form of
parity. The House bill (H.R. 984) provided more expansive benefits than the Senate bill (S.
1389). The differences related most basically to the minimum U.S.-origin content under
which textile apparel assembled in a CBI country would qualify for the preference. After
protracted informal negotiations between the two houses, the final language was agreed to,
passed by both houses and signed into law on May 18, 2000 (Caribbean Basin Trade
Partnership Act -Title II, P.L. 106-200; Trade and Development Act of 2000).
The Caribbean Basin Trade Partnership Act (CBTPA) focuses primarily on the
preferential treatment of textile and apparel products. Articles accorded duty-free and quota-
free treatment include apparel assembled in a beneficiary country from fabric wholly formed
and cut in the United States from U.S. made yarn, or from a fabric made in the United States
from U.S. made yarn, cut in a beneficiary country and sewn together there with U.S. made
yarn. Other items granted preferential treatment include hand-loomed, handmade, and folklore
articles.
The preferential treatment becomes effective for each beneficiary country when the U.S.
Trade Representative determines that the country has satisfied the statutory eligibility customs
requirements for such treatment. Such determinations have to date been made for 14
countries. How to allocate the expanded benefits has been among the most controversial
implementation issues. In addition, U.S. Customs Service rulings on how to interpret a
number of provisions have led to continuing controversy.
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One of the most controversial provisions involves whether Caribbean textile and apparel
can qualify for duty-free treatment if the dyeing and finishing process is done outside the
United States. U.S. yarn spinners and cotton growers have argued that allowing these
processes to take place in CBI countries would allow more trade because it would speed the
process from greige goods to finished garments. This position is supported by U.S. apparel
importers but opposed by U.S. textile manufacturers who want the U.S. Customs Service to
issue a ruling that fabric must be dyed and finished in the United States to qualify as U.S.
fabric.
The dye and finishing provision took on added significance in the House debate on H.R.
3005, a bill to provide the President trade promotion authority. House leaders pledged in
writing to bring no future trade bills to the House floor until legislative action is taken to
assure that apparel assembled in Caribbean and Central American countries for export to the
United States is made from fabric that is dyed, printed, or finished in the United States. They
also promised that the same requirement would be included in any Andean Trade Preference
Act renewal measure containing textile preferences before it would be considered on the
floor. To date, the House has not yet moved legislation to implement this promise to roll-
back apparel preferences granted to CBI countries.

Movement Towards Hemispheric Free Trade
Since the 1994 Summit of the Americas, the goal of hemispheric free trade has been
advanced by two different processes. The first process involves the expansion of sub-regional
groupings such as MERCOSUR and the proliferation of bilateral free trade agreements. Most
all countries of the Western Hemisphere — except the United States— have been active in
this process.
The second process involves the formal negotiations among 34 democratic countries of
the hemisphere to create an FTAA. As described above, the March 1998 San Jose
Declaration formulated a framework for the negotiations and the Leaders formally launched
the FTAA negotiations during the second Summit meeting in Santiago in April 1998. And at
the third Summit of the Americas held April 20-22, 2001 in Quebec City, leaders agreed to
complete the negotiations by January 2005, with the agreement entering into force no later
than December 2005. Only Venezuela declined to endorse the timeline, arguing that the
leaders’ declaration as worded did not reflect the process under its national laws for ratifying
an agreement.
Assessments differ on whether this combined movement toward hemispheric free trade
is “on-track” or “off-track.” The former perspective maintains that a solid foundation and
structure for FTAA negotiations has been agreed to and that on-going efforts to expand
sub-regional groupings are accelerating hemispheric integration. The latter perspective holds
that the United States, lacking fast-track authority, has been unable to provide the kind of
leadership that is necessary to ensure that the FTAA negotiations proceed according to
schedule or in a manner that is supportive of U.S. interests.
Those who see positive developments over the past several years point to the
accomplishments of the San Jose Trade Ministerial and the Second Summit of the Americas
in getting the FTAA negotiations off to an official start. While some critics doubt much
progress can be made in the negotiations until the U.S. President obtains fast-track
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negotiating authority, others point to agreement on a range of business facilitation measures
to date. These include temporary admission of certain goods related to business travelers,
express shipments, simplified procedures for low value shipments, compatible data
interchange systems, harmonized commodity description and coding system, hemispheric
guide on customs procedures, codes of conduct for customs officials, and risk
analysis/targeting methodology. The development of a draft “bracketed” text is also
considered a major accomplishment, providing an opportunity for political negotiations to
begin anytime. Moreover, the “Action Plan” agreed to at the Quebec City Summit also
specified deadlines for interim steps in the negotiations to be completed. And the leaders also
agreed to help build public support by publishing the draft bracketed text in its current form.
The “on-track” perspective also points to a continuing trend of greater market opening
at both the bilateral and sub-regional level as contributing to an expansion of trade flows. In
recent years, intra-hemispheric trade has been growing more rapidly than exports to the rest
of the world. This trade growth, in turn, has bolstered the economic performance of the
countries of the region and enabled Latin American leaders to negotiate with the United
States more confidently, as well as to embrace the long-term goal of hemispheric free trade.
Those who judge that the process is “off-track” make several points. The first is that
more than seven years have passed since the commitment was made to create an FTAA and
that only modest progress has been made since then. Negotiators have established a
framework for negotiations and have produced a heavily bracketed text, but the differences
among the key countries on basic issues remain large. Most of the hard negotiating work
remains to be done. The United States, lacking fast-track authority, has not been able to
provide strong leadership to making greater progress.
Most importantly, Brazil and the United States, the two key countries in the negotiation,
remain far apart on key issues. Much of Brazilian industry is not supportive of the FTAA.
Long protected by high tariffs and quotas, many Brazilian companies are wary that they
would be overwhelmed by U.S. competition if the FTAA were to come to fruition. The
United States, for its part, is determined to maintain protection in sectors most coveted by
Brazil, including textiles, steel, and agriculture. Brazil has made it clear that agricultural
domestic support programs and export subsidies need to be addressed in the FTAA. The
United States, however, maintains that these issues must be dealt with in the WTO Doha
round because the United States does not wish to “unilaterally” disarm its farm programs with
respect to the European Union. And Brazil has made it clear that it will not begin
negotiations on sensitive issues until the U.S. President has fast-track implementing authority.
Public support for hemispheric free trade appears to be low both in the United States and
in Latin America. Labor and environmental interest groups in the United States oppose free
trade agreements that lack strong protections for basic labor and environmental standards.
And many Latin American businesses and citizens fear the effects of greater exposure to the
competitive pressures of large U.S. companies.
Extending the Andean Trade Preferences Act
The Andean Trade Preferences Act (ATPA) authorizes the President to grant certain
unilateral preferential tariff benefits to Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru. The ATPA,
which went into effect on December 4, 1991, expired on December 4, 2001. Often referred
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to as the trade component of then President Bush’s “war on drugs,” the ATPA attempted to
encourage the economic development of Andean countries and economic alternatives to drug
production and trafficking.
The Andean countries have asked the United States to extend the program beyond its
expiration date for more than three years, and to reduce the list of products excluded from
tariff benefits, and to add Venezuela as a beneficiary country. Colombian President Andres
Pastrana in his February 27, 2001 visit to Washington urged the U.S. to expand coverage to
agriculture, leather goods, apparel, and footwear.
The Clinton Administration did argue that the APTA has been successful in encouraging
a move away from narcotics trade to legitimate business in the region and in increasing U.S.
exports. Since APTA was passed in 1991, the four Andean countries have increased their
exports to the United States by about 80%. Products benefitting from ATPA tariff
preferences include cut flowers from Colombia, Ecuador, and Bolivia; precious metals and
jewelry from Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru; and fish and fish products from Ecuador. By
some estimates, the ATPA has created some 140,000 new jobs for these four countries since
its inception.
ATPA countries hope that any extension will provide preferences for their textile and
apparel products. They want unlimited duty-free access for apparel articles made from
regional fabric and regional yarn, as well as duty-free treatment for other products currently
excluded – such as tuna, dairy products, leather, meat, and sugar – could create an additional
200,000 jobs over the next four years.
On November 16, 2001, the House passed a bill (H.R. 3009) that extends the program
through December 31, 2006, and provides similar, but more expansive benefits to those in the
Senate version (S. 525). H.R. 3009 provides apparel items assembled in beneficiary countries
from U.S.-made fabrics using U.S.-made yarn with unlimited duty-free access, as would
processed tuna. Apparel items assembled from regional fabrics using U.S.-made yarn would
get quantity-limited duty-free access. Other product groups excluded from duty-free
treatment, such as footwear and petroleum, would be eligible for duty-free treatment provided
the President determines that they are not “import sensitive.”
On November 29, 2001, the Senate Finance Committee reported S. 525 with an
amendment in the nature of a substitute for language in H.R. 3090 , the Economic Security
and Recovery Act. This would amend and extend the program through September 30, 2005.
The bill allows new unlimited duty-free access to non-knit-to-shape apparel assembled in a
beneficiary country from entirely U.S.-made fabrics and yarns. The bill awaits Senate action
on the floor. In the meantime, the Bush Administration announced on February 14, 2002 that
import duties on eligible products from the ATPA countries would be suspended for 90 days.
The administration hopes to have the ATPA renewed before President Bush’s scheduled
March 23, 2002 trip to Lima, Peru.
U.S.- Central American Free Trade Agreement
President Bush announced the administration’s interest in exploring a free trade
agreement with five Central American countries – Costa, Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala,
Honduras, and Nicaragua – on January 16, 2002 in a speech before the Organization of
American States. The President stated that “our purpose is to strengthen the economic ties
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we already have with these nations, to reinforce their progress toward economic, political,
and social reform, and to take another step toward completing the Free Trade Area of the
Americas.” The President, however, gave no indication about the scope or timing of the
negotiations.
For the United States, these Central American countries comprise a small trading
partner. In 2001, both U.S. imports and exports to the region accounted for only around 1
percent of total U.S. trade. But for each of these Central American countries, the United
States is their most important trading partner. For Costa Rica, the United States accounts for
40 percent of total trade; for El Salvador, 47 percent; for Guatemala, 48 percent; for
Honduras, 63 percent; and for Nicaragua, 43 percent.
The five Central American countries benefit from a number of U.S. preferential tariff
programs, including the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) and the Caribbean Trade
Partnership Act. These countries hope that a free trade agreement with the United States
could provide greater assurance that these preferences would not be reduced or rolled-back
in the future. Moreover, their hope is that a free trade agreement would produce more duty-
free access for textiles and apparel products beyond what the preference programs now
provide, as well as expand their access to the U.S. market for beef and sugar.
CHRONOLOGY
01/16/02 – President Bush announced that his administration wishes to negotiate a free
trade agreement with Central America.
12/06/01 – The House approved a bill (H.R. 3005) by a vote of 215-214 to provide the
President with trade promotion authority.
10/05/01 —
The House Ways and Means Committee reported out by a voice vote a bill
(H.R. 3009) to extend the Andean Trade Preference Act.
08/21/01 — U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick announced that he will meet with
the trade ministers of Argentina, Brazil, Paraguay, and Uruguay to pursue a
common interest in free trade as an engine of economic growth.
07/02/01 —
A draft FTAA bracketed text of the nine chapters negotiated to date was
released to the public.
05/01/01 —
The Bush Administration announced that it supports an expansion of the
Andean Trade Preferences Act to provide the broadest possible benefits for
Colombia, Bolivia, Peru, and Ecuador.
04/22/01 —
The Third Summit of Americas, held in Quebec City, concluded with an
agreement to complete the negotiations by January 2005 and to implement
the agreement by year-end 2005.
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02/01/01 — U.S. Trade Representative Robert Zoellick stated that the U.S. would look
for alternatives to the FTAA for promoting trade in the hemisphere if it
proves impossible to revive the lagging initiative.
01/08/01 –-
Chile and the United States begin formal negotiations to establish a free trade
agreement.

05/18/00 — President Clinton signed into law (P.L. 106-200) legislation aimed at
expanding U.S. trade with African and Caribbean Basin Initiative countries.
The conference bill (H.R. 434) was approved by the House on May 4, 2000
by a vote of 309-110 and by the Senate on May 11, 2000 by a vote of 77-19.
05/04/00 — By a vote of 309-110, the House approved the conference report on H.R.
434, the Trade and Development Act of 2000. Title II expands trade
preferences for Caribbean Basin exports of apparel products.
02/18/00 — Brazilian Foreign Minister Luiz Felipe Lampreia announced that Brazil is not
going to commit to an FTAA until it sees what the final package is and
whether the U.S. Congress will approve it.
08/10/99 —
Chile’s Foreign Minister Juan Gabriel Valdes announced that Chile was ready
to start preliminary work on a bilateral free trade agreement without U.S. fast-
track negotiating authority in place.
07/28/99 —
At a meeting of the Trade Negotiations Committee (TNC) of the FTAA,
representatives of 27 countries reached agreement on nine business facilitation
measures. The measures will be reviewed at the November 1999 ministerial
summit in Canada.
09/25/98 —
The House defeated H.R. 2621, a Republican leadership sponsored fast-track
bill, by a vote of 180 to 243.
06/11/98 —
Commerce Secretary William Daley expressed doubts that the 2005 deadline
for completion of the FTAA can be met given an enormous negotiating
agenda and the large number of diverse economies involved in the process.
04/19/98 —
34 Leaders meeting at the second Summit of the Americas in Santiago, Chile
agree to formally launch FTAA negotiations.
03/19/98 —
Trade ministers meeting in San Jose, Costa Rica agree on the principles,
objectives, and venues that will guide the FTAA negotiations.
11/04/97 —
The House defeated by a vote of 234-182 the United States-Caribbean Trade
Partnership Act (H.R. 2644).
07/25/95 —
Negotiations for Chilean accession to NAFTA officially began in Mexico City.
12/9-11/94 — Summit of the Americas held in Miami. Political commitment was made to
negotiate a “Free Trade Area of the Americas” by the year 2005. In a
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separate action, the United States, Canada, and Mexico invited Chile to enter
into negotiations to join NAFTA.
01/01/94 — The North American Free Trade Agreement entered into force.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Issue Briefs
CRS Issue Brief IB95050. Caribbean Basin Interim Trade Program (NAFTA/CBI PARITY),
by Vladimir N. Pregelj.
CRS Reports
CRS Report RL30935. Agricultural Trade in the Free Trade Area of the Americas, by
Remy Jurenas.
CRS Report RL30790. The Andean Trade Preference Act: Background and Issues for
Reathorization, by J.F. Hornbeck.
CRS Report 97-56. Chilean Trade and Economic Reform: Implications for NAFTA
Accession, by J.F. Hornbeck.
CRS Report RS20864. A Free Trade Area of the Americas: Status of Negotiations and
Major Policy Issues, by J.F. Hornbeck.
CRS Report RS20436. Textile and Apparel Trade Issues, by Bernard Gelb.
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