Order Code RL31292
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Intelligence to Counter Terrorism:
Issues for Congress
February 21, 2002
Richard A. Best, Jr.
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Intelligence to Counter Terrorism: Issues for Congress
Summary
For well over a decade international terrorism has been a major concern of the
U.S. Intelligence Community. Collection assets of all kinds have long been focused
on Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups. Intensive analytical expertise has been
devoted to determining such groups’ memberships, locations, and plans. Intelligence
agencies had been acutely aware of the danger for years. In February 2001, Director
of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet publicly testified to Congress that “the
threat from terrorism is real, it is immediate, and it is evolving.” Furthermore,
“[Osama] bin Ladin and his global network of lieutenants and associates remain the
most immediate and serious threat.”
Nevertheless, the Intelligence Community gave no specific warning of the
September 11, 2001 attacks. Although all observers grant that terrorist groups are
very difficult targets and that undetected movements of small numbers of their
members in an open society cannot realistically be prevented, serious questions
remain. An extensive investigation by the two intelligence committees of the
September 11 attacks was announced on February 14, 2002. Whatever the findings
of the investigation, the roles and missions of intelligence agencies, their
organizational relationships, and their operational capabilities will be reviewed to
enhance capabilities against terrorism.
Counterterrorism is highly dependent upon human intelligence (humint), the use
of agents to acquire information (and, in certain circumstances, to carry out covert
actions). Humint is one of the least expensive intelligence disciplines, but it can be the
most difficult and is undoubtedly the most dangerous for practitioners. Mistakes can
be fatal, embarrass the whole country, and undermine important policy goals.
Congress makes decisions regarding the extent to which the importance of humint
outweighs the inherent risks.
Countering terrorism requires close cooperation between law enforcement and
intelligence agencies; some terrorists will need to be brought to justice in courts, but
others are dealt with by military forces or covert actions. In recent years, important
steps have been taken to encourage closer cooperation between the two communities,
but some believe terrorist acts may have been facilitated by continuing poor
information exchanges between intelligence and law enforcement agencies and by
blurred lines of organizational responsibility. Congress will oversee the
implementation of the evolving relationship that affects important principles of law
and administration, and may choose to modify the roles and missions of intelligence
and law enforcement agencies.
Military operations to counter terrorism will be dependent on the availability of
precise, real-time intelligence to support bombing campaigns using precision guided
munitions. The linkage between sensor and “shooters” will be crucial as will access
to global geospatial databases. As defense transformation progresses, Congress will
also oversee the development of increased intelligence support to military operations
including, especially, counterterrorist missions.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Humint Collection . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Analysis . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Intelligence-Law Enforcement Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Intelligence Support to Counterterrorist
Military Operations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

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Intelligence to Counter Terrorism:
Issues for Congress
Introduction
The struggle against international terrorism places new and difficult demands on
the U.S. Intelligence Community. Acquiring information about the composition,
location, capabilities, plans, and ambitions of terrorist groups is an enormous
challenge for intelligence agencies; meeting this challenge requires different skills than
were needed to keep informed about the capabilities and intentions of Communist
governments. At the same time, requirements continue for coverage of geopolitical
developments around the world and other transnational issues such as narcotics
smuggling.
Observers point to several major challenges that the Intelligence Community will
likely encounter in supporting the counter terrorist effort.
! First is a renewed emphasis on human agents. Signals intelligence and
imagery satellites have their uses in the counterterrorism mission, but
intelligence to counter terrorism depends more on human intelligence (humint)
such as spies and informers. Any renewed emphasis on human intelligence
necessarily will involve a willingness to accept risks of complicated and
dangerous missions, and likely ties to disreputable individuals who may be in
positions to provide valuable information. Time and patience will be needed
to train analysts in difficult skills and languages.

! Second, terrorist activities pose significant analytical challenges. In addition
to acquiring analysts with esoteric language skills, intelligence agencies must
develop expertise in many third world areas that had been of peripheral
concern in years past. Much of the data available will be in open, unclassified
sources that intelligence agencies have often neglected.
! Third is the closer relationship between intelligence and law enforcement
agencies. In counterterrorism efforts, intelligence agencies work alongside
law enforcement agencies that have far different approaches to gathering
evidence, developing leads, and maintaining retrievable databases. Policies
and statutes are being modified to facilitate a closer relationship between the
two sets of agencies, but closer cooperation may raise difficult questions about
using intelligence agencies in the U.S. and about collecting information
regarding U.S. persons.
! Finally, military operations against terrorists will reenforce requirements for
collecting and transmitting precise intelligence to military commanders or

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CRS-2
operators through secure communications systems in real time. The growing
reliance of military operations on the availability of precise intelligence is well
understood, but the availability of collection platforms such as reconnaissance
aircraft, unmanned aerial vehicles, and reconnaissance satellites has been
limited throughout much of the past decade. Such platforms are especially
important for counterterrorist operations.
In large measure, meeting these challenges will be the responsibility of executive
branch officials. The primary role for Congress will be to decide appropriate levels of
budgetary resources and to oversee Intelligence Community efforts to ensure that
resources are well managed and that the Nation’s intelligence needs are met. Some
observers believe that Congress has special responsibilities to provide a clear
statutory framework to guide the unprecedented and uncertain evolution of
intelligence-law enforcement relationships. Such a framework is necessary, they
suggest, to minimize chances for a failure of the campaign against terrorists or,
alternatively, serious erosion of protections of individual liberties that have evolved
over many centuries.
In the aftermath of September 11, 2001, Congress moved rapidly to provide
intelligence agencies with expanded authorities and increased funding to support
counterterrorism. In the year 2002, Congress will investigate the background of the
September attacks and other issues related to terrorism. A joint investigation by the
two intelligence committees was announced on February 14, 2002, that could lay the
foundations for major changes in the Nation’s intelligence efforts. The ongoing
campaign against terrorists in Afghanistan and elsewhere will require intelligence
resources that must be budgeted even as other missions must be supported. Programs
likely will be established to support the long-term struggle against terrorism and
necessary budgetary resources identified. Intelligence support to the Office of
Homeland Defense likely will be considered.
At least one media account has suggested a major reorganization of the
Intelligence Community may be under consideration by the executive branch.1 As
details of the proposal are unavailable, it is not possible to determine which aspects
would most directly affect the counterterrorism effort. Whatever the organizational
relationships, however, intelligence for counterterrorism will be affected by the need
for good humint, analysis, close ties to law enforcement agencies, and for capabilities
to support military operations with precise locating data.
Background
During the Cold War, terrorism was not a major intelligence priority and, in
many cases, terrorist groups were perceived as acting on behalf of, or at least with
important support by, Communist parties. The focus was on the other superpower
and not terrorism per se. As early as 1986, however, a Counterterrorism Center
(CTC), comprised of officials from various intelligence and law enforcement agencies,
1 See Walter Pincus, “Intelligence Shakeup Would Boost CIA; Panel Urges Transfer of NSA,
Satellites, Imagery From Pentagon,” Washington Post, November 8, 2001, A1.

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was established within the Operations Directorate of the Central Intelligence Agency
(CIA) to pull together information on international terrorism from all sources and
devise counterterrorism plans. After the fall of the Soviet Union and the Warsaw
Pact, terrorism was perceived with even greater concern, especially as U.S. military
forces and installations repeatedly were attacked by terrorist groups as in the 1996
Khobar towers barracks in Saudi Arabia, the August 1998 bombing of U.S. embassies
in Kenya and Tanzania, and the attack on the USS Cole in October 2000.
Public statements by senior intelligence officials affirm that the threat to the
United States posed by international terrorism was understood well before September
11, 2001. Last year, the Director of Central Intelligence (DCI) George Tenet, in
prepared testimony before the Senate Intelligence Committee, stated: “the threat from
terrorism is real, it is immediate, and it is evolving. State sponsored terrorism appears
to have declined over the past five years, but transnational groups–with decentralized
leadership that makes them harder to identify and disrupt–are emerging.”
Furthermore, “[Osama] bin Ladin and his global network of lieutenants and associates
remain the most immediate and serious threat.”2 In February 2002 testimony, Tenet
stated that Al Qaeda and other terrorist groups will continue to plan to attack this
country and its interest and have sought to acquire dangerous chemical agents and
toxins as well as nuclear devices.3
The Intelligence Community has long devoted significant resources towards the
terrorist threat. The creation of CIA’s Counterterrorism Center (CTC) was an early
effort to bring together disparate data on terrorist activities. The CTC has not been
considered a complete success;4 collection on terrorist groups did not become an
overriding priority and, although the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) had
representatives in the CTC, the relationship with the law enforcement community did
not evolve as closely as had been hoped. Media accounts indicate that the CTC
doubled in size in the month following the attacks.5
It is difficult to judge how successful the overall counterterrorism effort has
been. The September 11, 2001 attacks were successful, but other terrorist plans have
been thwarted although few details have been revealed. A multi-faceted attack on the
Los Angeles airport and other U.S.-related targets to coincide with millennium
2 Statement by Director of Central Intelligence George J. Tenet before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence on the “Worldwide Threat 2001: National Security in a Changing
World” (as prepared for delivery), 7 February 2001.
3 “Worldwide Threat–Converging Dangers in a Post 9/11 World,” Testimony of Director of
Central Intelligence George J. Tenet Before the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence,
February 6, 2002.
4 For the background to the establishment of the CTC, see Duane R. Clarridge with Digby
Diehl, A Spy for All Seasons: My Life in the CIA (New York: Scribner, 1997), especially pp.
319-429. See also Robert Baer, See No Evil: the True Story of a Ground Soldier in the CIA’s
War on Terrorism (New York: Crown Publishers, 2002), pp. 84-86. For a description of its
more recent functioning, see Paul R. Pillar, Terrorism and U.S. Foreign Policy (Washington:
Brookings Institution, 2001), especially pp. 110-123.
5 Walter Pincus, “CIA Steps Up Scope, Pace of Efforts on Terrorism,” Washington Post,
October 9, 2001, p. A4.

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CRS-4
celebrations in January 2000 was foiled as a result of a chance apprehension of an
individual with a car loaded with explosives by an alert Customs Service official.6
Within the past year, attacks on U.S. embassies and facilities in Paris, Singapore, and
other parts of the world have reportedly been thwarted because of intelligence leads.
Inevitably there has been public discussion of the question of whether September
11 was an “intelligence failure.”7 The House in passing its version of the FY2002
intelligence bill (H.R.2883) endorsed the establishment of a commission of individuals
with experience in intelligence and national security matters to report on the national
security readiness of the United States with respect to the events of September 11.
The Senate version of intelligence authorization legislation did not contain a similar
provision; but, some Senators argued that an investigation ought to be undertaken by
congressional committees. The House provision was deleted by the Conference
Committee. Subsequently, legislation was introduced that would establish
independent boards of inquiry.8 A joint investigation by the House and Senate
intelligence committees was announced on February 14, 2002.
Some observers suggest comparisons to the investigations that were undertaken
during and after World War II concerning the Japanese attack on Pearl Harbor.9
Those investigations were viewed by many observers as politicized–either seeking or
deflecting mistakes by the Roosevelt Administration. By the time of the conclusion
of the congressional investigation in July 1946, almost a year after the end of the war,
the public was concentrating on other issues and, as a result, there was little political
fall-out.10 The investigations did, however, indicate the need for better coordination
among intelligence agencies and between intelligence agencies, policymakers, and
military commanders.
It is argued that “lessons” of Pearl Harbor, as viewed by senior congressional
and executive branch officials, laid the groundwork for the establishment of a national
6 Neil King Jr. and David S. Cloud, “Casting a Global Net, U.S. Security Survived a Rash
of Millennial Plots,” Wall Street Journal, March 8, 2000; also, Laura Mansnerus and Judith
Miller, “Bomb Plot Insider Details Training,” New York Times, July 4, 2001, p. A1.
7 An oft-cited analysis of the phenomenon of intelligence failures is Richard K. Betts,
“Analysis, War and Decision: Why Intelligence Failures Are Inevitable,” World Politics,
October, 1978.
8 S.1837 and S. 1867.
9 These are described in Martin V. Melosi, The Shadow of Pearl Harbor: Political
Controversy over the Surprise Attack, 1941-1946 (College Station, Texas: Texas A&M
University Press, 1977).
10 None of the various Pearl Harbor investigations definitively resolved the issue of the
“blame” for Pearl Harbor. In particular, controversy has persisted over the roles of two senior
U.S. officers at Pearl Harbor, Rear Admiral Husband E. Kimmel, USN and Major General
Walter C. Short, USA, who, some believe, were unfairly held responsible for shortcomings
of Roosevelt Administration officials. Almost fifty-nine years after the Japanese attack, the
National Defense Authorization Act of FY2001 expressed the sense of Congress that both
officers had performed their duties “competently and professionally” and asked that the
retirement status of Kimmel and Short be upgraded posthumously (P.L. 106-398, sec. 546).

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CRS-5
intelligence effort by the National Security Act of 1947. Similarly, the investigation
of the events leading up to the September 11 attacks might lay the groundwork for
a greater public understanding of the evolving relationship between intelligence and
law enforcement. Furthermore, Congress could explore the extent to which current
trends have support among legal experts as well as the general public.
Aside from the investigation into the background of the September 11 attacks,
intelligence agencies will be adapting their efforts in 2002 to the requirements of the
campaign against terrorism. Renewed emphasis is likely to be placed on human
intelligence, on improved analysis, on cooperation with law enforcement agencies, and
on ensuring that real-time intelligence about terrorist activities gets to the hand of
those who can most effectively counter it.
Humint Collection
Many observers believe that intelligence required for the campaign against
terrorism will require significant changes in the human intelligence (humint) collection
effort. The CIA’s Operations Directorate is responsible for the bulk of humint
collection although the Defense Humint Service (DHS) within DOD is a smaller entity
more directly focused on military-related issues. Overall budget requirements for
humint are dwarfed by the major investment required for satellites and signals
intelligence collection. Humint, however, undoubtedly can be dangerous for those
involved and it is, of course, for many in the media and the general public the core
intelligence discipline.11
Both the emphasis on humint and on the exchange of data between intelligence
and law enforcement agencies will influence the evolution of the U.S. Intelligence
Community in the coming decade. These two efforts will not in themselves have
major budgetary implications–humint is both difficult and dangerous, but not
necessarily expensive and information exchanges between agencies ordinarily involve
only information technology costs. Placing priorities on these two aspects of the
intelligence effort will almost inevitably detract from other missions and disciplines.
In the view of many observers there may be a tendency to give less emphasis to
traditional intelligence collection and analysis regarding foreign political, economic,
and military developments. Whereas to some extent intelligence analysts experienced
in looking at foreign policy, economic, and defense issues can shift from one country
to another, it may be more difficult for an analysts to turn from issues of diplomacy,
11 Humint collection must be distinguished from covert actions even though the two efforts
may be undertaken by the same people or organizations. In the aftermath of September 11,
the CIA’s Special Activities Division rapidly mounted covert paramilitary operations in
Afghanistan. Media accounts suggest that this effort is being mounted by retired military
specialists brought back into government to supplement much smaller numbers of longtime
CIA officials with experience in the region. Much of their assignment reportedly involved
identifying specific targets for airborne attack and other liaison with Northern Alliance units.
See Bob Woodward, “Secret CIA Units Playing a Central Combat Role,” Washington Post,
November 18, 2001, p.A1. For background on covert actions, see CRS Report 96-844,
Covert Action: An Effective Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy?, by Richard A. Best, Jr.

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economics, and warfare to the study of obscure terrorist groups that may be involved
in religious indoctrination or various criminal fund-raising activities.
Although humint is not in itself an expensive discipline, it requires large amounts
of support and an awareness by senior officials of possible negative consequences.
Potential complications, including imprisonment of U.S. agents in foreign countries
and loss of friendly lives, have to be given careful consideration. Major diplomatic
embarrassment to the United States can result from revelations of covert efforts,
especially those that go awry; such embarrassment can jeopardize relationships that
have been developed over many years.
Collecting humint to support the counterterrorism effort will require significant
changes in the work of intelligence agencies.12 Terrorists do not usually appear on the
diplomatic cocktail circuit nor in gatherings of local businessmen. In many cases they
are also involved in various types of criminal activities on the margins of society.
Terrorist groups may be composed almost wholly of members of one ethnic or
religious group. They may routinely engage in criminal activities or human rights
abuses. Developing contacts with such groups is obviously a difficult challenge for
U.S. intelligence agencies; it requires long-lead time preparation and a willingness to
do business with unsavory individuals. It cannot in many cases be undertaken by
intelligence agents serving under official cover as diplomats or military attaches. It
may require an in-depth knowledge of local dialects and customs. Furthermore, the
list of groups around the world that might at some point in the future be involved in
terrorist activities is not short; making determinations of where to seek agents whose
reporting will only be important under future eventualities is a difficult challenge with
the risk of needlessly involving the U.S. with corrupt and ruthless individuals.
Critics of the current U.S. humint collection effort point to these and other
institutional problems. One report quotes a former CIA official:
The CIA probably doesn’t have a single truly qualified Arabic-speaking officer of
Middle Eastern background who can play a believable Muslim fundamentalist who
would volunteer to spend years of his life ... in the mountains of Afghanistan....13
12 A discussion of current weaknesses in the CIA’s humint effort is found in Seymour M.
Hersh, “What Went Wrong,” New Yorker, October 8, 2001. Hersh claims that CIA has
“steadily reduced its reliance on overseas human intelligence and cut the number of case
officers abroad;” in recent years CIA “has relied on liaison relationships–reports from friendly
intelligence services and police departments around the world–and on technical collection
systems.” Page 35.
13 Reuel Marc Gerecht, “The Counterterrorist Myth,” Atlantic Monthly, July/August 2001.
The former CIA Inspector General, L. Britt Snider (who has also recently been named staff
director of the joint investigation of the September 11 attacks by the two intelligence
committees), concluded that the CIA “has a relatively unstructured assignment process which
seems tilted more towards satisfying the preferences of employees than mission needs. It has
a personnel evaluation process that defies any effort to weed out poor performers.” “A
Message from the Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency, January 19,
(continued...)

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Some observers have claimed that CIA personnel in key positions do not know the
major languages of the areas for which they are responsible.14 A former CIA official
stationed in Tajikistan in the early 1990s recalled that “As the civil war in Afghanistan
started to boil, I repeatedly asked for a speaker of Dari or Pashtun, the two
predominant languages in Afghanistan, to debrief the flood of refugees coming across
the border into Tajikistan. They were a gold mine of information. We could have
even recruited some and sent them back across the border to report on Afghanistan.
I was told there were no Dari or Pashtun speakers anywhere. I was also told the CIA
no longer collected on Afghanistan, so those languages weren’t needed.”15 Although
such broad claims are disputed and cannot be evaluated without access to classified
information, it is not clear what steps the Intelligence Community has taken to realign
its humint operations. Developing a humint collection strategy under these
circumstances is a difficult challenge for the Intelligence Community, especially for
the CIA’s Operations Directorate, the FBI, and the smaller Defense Humint Service.
Observers suggest the need for a series of policy decisions involved in a reorientation
of humint collection.
! A move towards greater reliance on non-official cover (NOC). Agents serving
under non-official cover, e.g. working as an employee or owner of a local
business, are removed from the support and protections of American embassies
that would be available if the agent had cover as a U.S. Government official of
a non-intelligence agency. If the agent must be seen as engaged in business,
considerable time must be devoted to the “cover” occupation. Providing
travel, pay, health care, administrative services, etc. is much more difficult.
The agent will not have diplomatic immunity and cannot be readily returned to
the U.S. if apprehended in the host country. He or she may be subject to
arrest, imprisonment, or, potentially, execution. There is a potential for agents
working in businesses to become entangled in unethical or illegal activities–to
“go into business for themselves”–that could embarrass the U.S. and detract
from their official mission.16
! Requirements for U.S. intelligence agents with highly developed skills in
foreign languages are difficult to meet. Few graduates of U.S. colleges have
such skills and language education is expensive. Recruiting U.S. citizens who
have ethnic backgrounds similar to members of the societies in which the
terrorist groups operate may subject individuals to difficult pressures especially
if the agent has family in the targeted area. The House Intelligence Committee
13 (...continued)
2001,”reprinted on the Web site of the Federation of American Scientists
[http://www.fas.org].
14 E.g., Richard Perle, a Defense Department consultant, quoted by Ken Adelman, “Facing
the Enemy,” Washingtonian, November 2001, p. 33.
15 Baer, See No Evil, pp. 164-165.
16 The need to reorient the humint collection effort to a greater reliance on non-official cover
is discussed by Gregory F. Treverton, a senior intelligence official in the Clinton
Administration, Reshaping National Intelligence for an Age of Information (New York:
Cambridge University Press, 2001), pp. 152-157.

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reported in September 2001 that the Intelligence Community’s “most pressing
need is for greater numbers of foreign language-capable intelligence personnel,
with increased fluency in specific and multiple languages. The Committee has
heard repeatedly from both military and civilian intelligence producers and
consumers that this is the single greatest limitation in intelligence agency
personnel expertise and that it is a deficiency throughout the Intelligence
Community.”17
! It is administratively difficult to develop resources throughout the world over
a long period of time and costs are higher than adding intelligence staff to
embassies. Few observers could have predicted the intense U.S. concern with
Somalia, Kosovo, or Afghanistan that eventually developed. Ten years from
now there may be a whole set of challenges from groups that no one today is
even aware of.
In short, reorienting humint collection to give significantly greater attention to
terrorist or potentially terrorist groups would have important administrative
implications for the Intelligence Community. While budgetary increases would not
necessarily be dramatic given the size of the existing intelligence budget (even paying
hundreds of human agents would be far less costly than deploying a satellite), the
infrastructure needed to train and support numerous agents serving under non-official
cover would grow significantly. Extensive redundancy would be required to cover
terrorist groups that may never pose significant threats to U.S. interests.
A central issue for Congress is the extent to which it and the public are prepared
to accept the inherent risks involved in maintaining many agents with connections to
terrorist groups. Statutory law18 requires that congressional intelligence committees
be kept aware of all intelligence activities; unlike the situation in the early Cold War
years when some intelligence efforts were designed to be “deniable,” it will be
difficult for the U.S. Government to avoid responsibility for major mistakes or ill-
conceived efforts of intelligence agencies. Although there is a very widespread
consensus that Al Qaeda poses a threat to all Americans and to fundamental American
interests, it cannot be assumed that the U.S. public, or Members of Congress, will
view other groups in the same light. Intelligence professionals recall that earlier
associations with anti-communist elements in Central America came under sustained
public criticism (because some of the anti-communists were guilty of human rights
violations and because they were, or appeared to be, propping up reactionary and
oppressive regimes). These criticisms came to be shared by many Members of
Congress and, as a result, intelligence agencies perceived that they were operating
under excessive scrutiny and a cloud of suspicion for many years.19 The direct attacks
17 U.S. Congress, 107th Congress, 1st session, House of Representatives, Permanent Select
Committee on Intelligence, Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 2002, H.Rept. 107-
219, September 26, 2001, pp. 18-19.
18 50 USC 413(a)(1). Separate provisions require notice of presidential findings authorizing
covert actions (50 USC 413b).
19 Many of the statutory restrictions on intelligence activities imposed in response to public
(continued...)

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on the U.S. homeland on September 11, 2001, may well have produced a willingness
on the part of the American public to accept greater risks, but intelligence
professionals will undoubtedly be concerned to ensure that the work of their agencies
not be jeopardized by shifts in public opinion.
Analysis
Terrorist activities present intelligence analysts with major challenges. First,
there must be an awareness of the social and political environment in which terrorist
movements develop. Such awareness usually requires detailed knowledge of
geographic, ethnic, religious, economic, and political situations in obscure regions.
There is no ready supply of analysts with command of such skills except perhaps
among recent emigrants who may have complex ties to their homelands. Moreover,
areas of concern are likely to shift over time. As one longtime observer has noted,
such analysts could “serve their whole careers without producing anything that the
U.S. government really needs, and no good analyst wants to be buried in an inactive
account with peripheral significance.”20
Much of the information required to analyze terrorist environments derives from
extensive study of open source documents–newspapers, pamphlets, journals, books,
religious tracts, etc. Some observers believe that the Intelligence Community overly
emphasizes sophisticated technical collection systems and lacks a comprehensive
strategy for collecting and exploiting such open source information (osint).21
Although efforts are underway by intelligence agencies to expand the use of osint,
many observers believe that intelligence agencies should continue to concentrate on
the collection and analysis of secret information. In this view, the Intelligence
Community should not attempt to become a government center for research that can
more effectively be undertaken by think tanks and academic institutions.
Once a terrorist group hostile to American interests has been identified, the
Intelligence Community will be called upon to focus closely upon its membership,
plans, and activities. Many collection resources will be targeted at it and much of the
information will be classified and highly sensitive. The most challenging problem for
analysts at this point is to attempt to discern where the terrorists will strike and
through what means. Open societies are inevitably vulnerable to terrorists, especially
19 (...continued)
criticism have, nonetheless, been widely accepted and congressional oversight of intelligence
agencies is now routine.
20 Richard K. Betts, “Fixing Intelligence,” Foreign Affairs, January/February 2002, p. 48.
21 The principal advocate of greater use of open source information is Robert D. Steele, On
Intelligence: Spies and Secrecy in an Open World (Fairfax, Virginia: AFCEA International
Press, 2000). A recent media account suggests that U.S. Special Forces sent on a mission
to destroy an Al Qaeda tunnel were surprised by the vast size of the compound and the amount
of supplies; in fact, according to the report, the complex had been described in detail on an
unclassified website months earlier. See Steve Vogel, “Al Qaeda Tunnels, Arms Cache
Totaled,” Washington Post, February 16, 2002, p. A27.

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those willing to commit suicide in the process of seeking their goals. The skills
necessary to anticipate the unpredictable are extremely rare; some suggest a useful
approach may be to assemble a “war room” comprised of a number of analysts to sift
through all available data. Such an effort was created to follow Al Qaeda but did not
foresee September 11. The bottom line is that anticipating such attacks is
intellectually difficult; hiring more people and spending more money will not
guarantee success.22
Others suggest greater reliance on outside consultants or an intelligence reserve
corps when terrorist threats become imminent. Such an approach might also allow
agencies to acquire temporarily the services of persons with obscure language skills.
While there are security problems involved in bringing outside experts into a highly
classified environment, this may be one approach that can provide needed personnel
without unnecessarily expanding the number of government analysts.
In regard to analysis, major issues for Congress include holding intelligence
agencies responsible for the quality of their work, the effective and efficient use of
open source information, and the appropriate use of outside consultants. Analytical
judgment is not easily mandated or acquired; leadership is key, along with
accountability and a willingness to accept that even the best analysts cannot foresee
all eventualities.
Intelligence-Law Enforcement Cooperation
In the past, the Intelligence Community focused on threats from the military
forces of hostile countries and in large measure left terrorism to law enforcement
agencies, especially the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI). Since the end of the
Cold War in the early 1990's steps have been taken both by the executive branch and
Congress to encourage closer coordination between the two communities. This effort
was expanded by P.L. 107-56, the USA Patriot Act, enacted in the wake of the
September attacks.
A recurring concern reflected in reports about the activities of those involved in
the September 11 attacks has been the perception that information about possible
terrorist involvement of individuals may not be available to immigration and law
enforcement officials who encounter the individuals. There has not been a centralized
database containing intelligence information by which individual names could be
checked. Although there are many potential concerns about the establishment of any
centralized database, most observers see the need to ensure that law enforcement
22 Ibid., p. 58. Betts makes the interesting point that “expertise can get in the way of
anticipating a radical departure from the norm.” (P. 49) Terrorists succeed by undertaking
actions that are unprecedented or, to American eyes, irrational. Thus, trained analysts with
years of experience may be less inclined to “think outside the box” although ignorance of the
terrorist group’s composition and goals would not guarantee unique insights.

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agencies, including those of states and localities, have better access to information
acquired by intelligence agencies about potential terrorist activities.23
Among some observers a major concern has been the Foreign Intelligence
Surveillance Act (FISA). FISA was enacted in 1978 to establish a system for
authorizing surveillance to collect information related to national security concerns.
The process for obtaining a warrant under FISA differs from that for obtaining a
warrant for criminal activities; there are different procedures and special FISA courts.
The fundamental purpose is to provide judicial branch overview of a process that
could be abused by zealous investigators. Enactment of FISA resulted from
congressional concern about instances of politically-motivated surveillance efforts
directed at U.S. citizens and residents. Over the years there have been a number of
modifications to FISA to extend its procedures to cover physical searches as well as
to cover new communications technologies.24
FISA procedures, however, have been blamed by some for restraining efforts to
track foreign terrorists.25 They cite, for instance, the inability of the FBI in August
2001 to obtain a FISA warrant for one individual, Zacarias Moussaoui, who was
reportedly connected to an Algerian terrorist group.26 After September 11, a warrant
was obtained and Moussaoui’s computer was found to contain information that
suggested some involvement with terrorist activities. Although criticism has been
levied at the Justice Department office (the Office of Intelligence Policy and Review)
responsible for preparing FISA applications, some observers raise larger questions
about FISA.
FISA retains strong support, however, by other observers who argue that it has
in general functioned effectively and has served to deter surveillance of U.S. residents
for strictly legal political activity. During the Cold War–and especially in the Vietnam
era–there was considerable concern that legitimate dissent over foreign and military
23 See CRS Report RL31019, Terrorism: Automated Lookout Systems and Border Security:
Options and Issues, by William J. Krouse and Raphael F. Perl.
24 See CRS Report RL30465, The Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act: An Overview of the
Statutory Framework for Electronic Surveillance, by Elizabeth B. Bazan.
25 See U.S., General Accounting Office, FBI Intelligence Investigations: Coordination Within
Justice on Counterintelligence Criminal Matters is Limited, GAO-01-780, July 2001. Also,
John F. Harris and David A. Vise, “With Freeh, Mistrust was Mutual; Relations Soured over
FBI’s Role: For or Against Administration?” Washington Post, January 10, 2001, p. A1.
Former DCI R. James Woolsey has claimed information about the 1993 World Trade Center
bombing, whose perpetrators had ties to foreign terrorists, was not made available to
intelligence agencies by the Justice Department. R. James Woolsey, “Blood Baath: the Iraq
Connection,” New Republic, September 24, 2001, p. 20. On the other hand, one federal
investigator claimed that in trying to track down those responsible for the February 1993
attack, he “had zero cooperation from the intelligence community, zero.” Quoted in Evan
Thomas, “The Road to Sept. 11,” Newsweek, October 1, 2001, p. 38.
26 David Johnston and Philip Shenon, “F.B.I. Limited Inquiry of Man Now a Suspect in the
Attacks,” New York Times, October 6, 2001; James Risen, “In Hindsight, C.I.A. See Flaws
that Hindered Efforts on Terror,” New York Times, October 7, 2001, p. A1; see also Dan
Eggen, “Moussaoui Probe Pushed U.S. Limits,” Washington Post, January 31, 2002, p. A1.

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policies might be viewed as illegitimate support to foreign governments and that law
enforcement and intelligence services would be “turned loose” to conduct surveillance
in ways that would undermine democratic government. At present, there are concerns
that members of certain religious or quasi-religious organizations with ties to foreign
countries will be placed under surveillance without sufficient cause. There is a
concern that such surveillance could undermine First Amendment constitutional rights
to free association and freedom of religion.
In the aftermath of the September 11 attacks, Congress passed modifications to
FISA in the USA Patriot Act (P.L. 107-56). In addition, FBI officials have indicated
that earlier barriers between FBI and the Justice Department have been removed.27
President Bush stated in his press conference of October 11, 2001, that “information-
sharing between the CIA and the FBI is seamless, so that the reaction to any threat
is real-time.”28

Placing emphasis on law enforcement by the Intelligence Community can have
major implications on U.S. foreign policy. Over the years the U.S. Government has
maintained good relations, based on shared appreciation of common interests, with
many governments whose legal systems are far different from our own. In some cases
the U.S. has chosen to accept the fact that a foreign government may shield narcotics
smugglers or members of groups the U.S. considers terrorist and to try to build a
relationship of mutual interests with the hope that the foreign country’s involvement
with terrorists will eventually abate. Such a policy inevitably runs counter to the ethos
of law enforcement agencies seeking to apprehend suspected criminals and put them
on trial. Reportedly senior FBI officials during the Clinton Administration sought
better cooperation from Saudi Arabia in prosecuting terrorists responsible for the
Khobar Towers attack and resented a lack of support from State Department officials
who believed that pressing the Saudis would complicate efforts to work with Riydah
on other important issues.29
The relationship of intelligence collection to law enforcement in dealing with
terrorism poses complex issues for policymakers. Terrorism can, of course, be
attacked militarily without concern for domestic law enforcement, but most observers
believe that such an approach is appropriate and practical only when terrorists directly
threaten the U.S. homeland. In other cases, law enforcement may be the approach that
can effectively deal with the problem while not undermining support for larger policy
interests or leading to significant U.S. casualties.
27 See George Lardner Jr., “Report Criticizes Stumbling Block Between FBI, Espionage
Prosecutors,” Washington Post, December 13, 2001, p. A3.
28 Federal News Service, Press Conference with U.S. President George W. Bush, October 11,
2001.
29 See Elsa Walsh, “Louis Freeh’s Last Case,” New Yorker, May 14, 2001, p.76. Former
National Security Adviser Samuel Berger responded to this perception, New Yorker, July 2,
2001, p. 5.

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Information used in judicial proceedings is often of a different type than that
usually collected by intelligence agencies.30 It is collected differently, stored
differently, and must usually be shared to some extent with opposing counsels.
Nevertheless, over the past decade a series of initiatives have been undertaken to
enhance the usefulness of information collected by intelligence agencies to law
enforcement agencies and vice versa.31 The barriers to flow of information between
the two communities were both administrative and statutory. Both types have been
addressed by executive branch policies32 and by the passage of the USA-Patriot Act
of 2001 (P.L. 107-56) which specifically lays the groundwork for making information
collected by law enforcement agencies, including grand jury testimony, available to
intelligence agencies.
Bringing law enforcement and intelligence closer together is not without
challenges. First, the two sets of agencies have long-established roles and missions
that are separate and based on constitutional and statutory principles. The danger of
using intelligence methods as a routine law-enforcement tool is matched by the danger
of regularly using law enforcement agencies as instruments of foreign policy.
Bureaucratic overlap and conflicting roles and missions are not unknown in many
governmental organizations, but such duplication is viewed with great concern when
it affects agencies with power to arrest and charge individuals or to affect the security
of the country. Congress may explore the ramifications of bringing the two
communities closer together.
Most observers believe that, even if statutes and policies encourage closer
cooperation between intelligence and law enforcement agencies, there will many
bureaucratic obstacles to be overcome. Within the Intelligence Community there has
been a tendency to retain information within agencies or to establish special
compartments to restrict dissemination for security reasons. Similar tendencies exist
among law enforcement agencies that guard information necessary for their particular
prosecutions. Some observers suggest that channels for transferring information must
be clearly established and that close encouragement and oversight by both the
executive branch and congressional committees would be required to ensure a smooth
functioning of transfer arrangements.
A key issue is the overall direction of the effort. As has been noted, the only
person with responsibility for the direction of both intelligence and law enforcement
efforts is the President. The Bush Administration, like its recent predecessors, has
instituted arrangements by which the Justice Department is included in the
30 See CRS Report 95-1204, Intelligence Agencies’ Information Support to Law
Enforcement, and CRS Report RL30252, Intelligence and Law Enforcement: Countering
Transnational Threats to the U.S., by Richard A. Best, Jr.
31 Recently, there have been media reports that the Defense Department’s major regional
commanders have requested that the FBI and Treasury Department assign representatives to
their staffs to help speed interrogation of suspected terrorists and coordinate efforts to freeze
bank accounts. See Eric Schmitt, “4 Commanders Seek Staff Role for the F.B.I.” New York
Times, November 20, 2001.
32 See Intelligence and Law Enforcement.

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CRS-14
deliberations of the National Security Council (NSC).33 There are few complaints that
such arrangements do not work effectively at present, but there were situations during
the Clinton Administration when it was believed that FBI Director Louis Freeh did
not share important information with the NSC and the White House.34 Law
enforcement may require that some information be closely held and not shared outside
the Justice Department, but if law enforcement and intelligence efforts are to work
more closely in dealing with international terrorist threats, procedures will have to be
in place to ensure that important information is shared. Such arrangements would
arguably require close monitoring by the President himself, but that could prove a
burden upon his time.
A significant issue for Congress is how to budget and conduct oversight of
intelligence and law enforcement efforts engaged in counterterrorist efforts. The fact
that intelligence and law enforcement agencies are in separate functional categories
for budgeting purposes has contributed, in the view of some observers, to different
resource environments and indirectly to the acquisition of incompatible information
technologies. In general, they argue that for many years the budgets of law
enforcement agencies have faced significantly tighter constraints than have those of
intelligence agencies. In particular, sophisticated information technology (IT) systems
have been acquired by intelligence agencies that, while expensive, have absorbed only
a small percentage of annual national defense spending. Acquisition of the similar
levels of IT capabilities by the FBI and other law enforcement agencies was not
feasible since much higher percentages of administration of justice spending would
have been needed. Hence a seamless system encompassing all echelons of intelligence
and law enforcement agencies for storing and exchanging information in real time on
potential terrorist threats has yet to be developed.
Observers believe that any effort to enhance intelligence and law enforcement IT
resources across agencies boundaries will require a determination by both the
executive and legislative branches since the budgeting process is a shared
responsibility. The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) forwards to Congress
each year a proposed budget broken down into functional categories with most
intelligence agencies falling into the National Defense (050) category and the FBI and
other law enforcement agencies being in the Administration of Justice (750) category.
When Congress passes the annual budget resolution, funding levels for the various
functional categories are allocated to separate Appropriations sub-committees (in a
process known as the 302(b) allocations). This process can create procedural hurdles
to the shifting of funds from one functional category to another. Therefore, both
branches may review the need to make a coordinated inter-agency examination of law
enforcement and intelligence spending on counterterrorism.
33 See CRS Report RL30840, The National Security Council: An Organizational
Assessment, by Richard A. Best, Jr.
34 See Walsh, “Louis Freeh’s Last Case,” pp. 72-73. Other reports suggest, perhaps in
retaliation, that Freeh was not given advance notice of the August 1998 missile attack on the
Al Shifa pharmaceutical plant in Khartoum. See Seymour M. Hersh, “The Missiles of
August,” New Yorker, October 12, 1998, p. 35.

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Intelligence agencies are overseen by the two select intelligence committees, the
appropriations committees, the armed services committees, and others that monitor
intelligence efforts of various Cabinet departments. Most observers believe that the
Intelligence Community receives reasonably thorough oversight even if comparatively
little is shared with the public. Intelligence committees are widely perceived as taking
a bipartisan approach to oversight. Despite a widely-perceived need for greater
centralized coordination of the Community, the fact that most of the Nation’s
intelligence effort is undertaken in the Defense Department complicates oversight.
Law enforcement agencies receive oversight from the two judiciary committees and
the appropriators, but observers point out that the primary oversight of law
enforcement agencies is provided by the courts in which success or failure is
ultimately judged. Judiciary committees have often reflected strong differences over
legal issues and nominations. As a result, the nature and extent of congressional
oversight for intelligence and law enforcement agencies are different.
Nevertheless, some observers believe that, given the scope of law enforcement
involvement in the counterterrorism effort, there may be a need for greater
congressional scrutiny of the overall intelligence-law enforcement relationship. The
emphasis on homeland defense issues may lead some to call for different forms of
congressional oversight.
Intelligence Support to Counterterrorist
Military Operations
The campaign against Afghan-based terrorists has graphically demonstrated the
importance of changes in military operations that have occurred since the end of the
Cold War. Beginning with Desert Storm in 1991, U.S. military operations have
increasingly depended on precision guided munitions (PGMs) to hit targets while
minimizing losses of civilian lives. Precision attacks in turn depend upon accurate and
precise intelligence. Some of this data is acquired by humint–especially important in
identifying structures in which key terrorist leaders may be located. Much also
derives from imagery collected overhead by unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs),
manned aircraft, and satellites. Other information derives from the signals intelligence
(sigint) effort. These new operational concepts, part of the larger effort to transform
the Nation’s defense strategy and force structure, have proven useful in operations
conducted against terrorist organizations where the focus is on attacking small groups
or facilities and avoiding wide-scale strikes on population centers.
The growing dependence of U.S. military forces on precise and real-time
intelligence support requires a significant investment by the Intelligence Community
as well as new organizational arrangements. Although satellite imagery is
undoubtedly useful, especially in locating fixed installations, much of the tactical
intelligence used in military campaigns against terrorist units is provided by manned
aircraft such as the U-2s and UAVs such as the Predator and the long-range, high
altitude Global Hawk. The linkage of such platforms to platforms armed with PGMs
contributed significantly to Allied success in the Persian Gulf War of 1991 and to

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Operation Allied Force in Kosovo in 1999.35 The recent Afghan campaign has once
again graphically demonstrated their value in operations against terrorist targets.
Although the value of such intelligence collection platforms is almost universally
recognized, the numbers available to DOD are limited.36 At present, there are some
30 U-2s, some 50 Predator airframes, and four operational Global Hawks. As
recently as mid-2000 DOD was considering decommissioning U-2s in order to make
additional funding available for future Global Hawk procurement.37 The Defense
reviews undertaken in 2001 as well as operations in Afghanistan have indicated a need
for additional UAVs and for more manned surveillance aircraft as well. President
Bush, in his Citadel speech of December 11, 2001, noted that “This combination-real-
time intelligence, local allied forces, special forces, and precision air power-has really
never been used before. The conflict in Afghanistan has taught us more about the
future of our military than a decade of blue ribbon panels and think-tank symposiums.
. . . Now it is clear the military does not have enough unmanned vehicles. We’re
entering an era in which unmanned vehicles of all kinds will take on greater
importance–in space, on land, in the air, and at sea.”38 In the January 29, 2002 State
of the Union address, the President said, “Afghanistan proved that expensive precision
weapons defeat the enemy and spare innocent lives, and we need more of them.”
Media accounts suggest that a sizable portion of the supplemental appropriation
passed in the wake of September 11 would be directed at additional surveillance
assets but little detailed information has yet been released. Secretary of Defense
Donald Rumsfeld who noted in his National Defense University speech on January 31,
2002, “the experience in Afghanistan showed the effectiveness of unmanned
aircraft–but it also revealed how few of them we have and what their weaknesses
are.” He stated that the Defense Department plans to add “more of what in the
Pentagon are called `Low Density/High Demand’ assets–a euphemism, in plain
English, for `our priorities were wrong and we didn’t buy enough of the things we
now find we need.’”
A significant problem in tying together the sensors with the attack platforms has
been the communications links. There were major problems in compatibility in the
35 See CRS Report RL30366, Kosovo: Implications for Military Intelligence, by Richard A.
Best, Jr. General Wesley Clark, the NATO Commander during Kosovo operations recalled,
however, that, “In Kosovo my commanders and I found that we lacked the detailed prompt
information to campaign effectively against the Serb ground forces. Most of the technologies
we had been promoting since the Gulf War were still immature, unable to deal adequately with
the vagaries of weather, vegetation, and urban areas, or the limitations of bandwidth and
airspace. The discrete service programs didn’t always fit together technically.” Waging
Modern War (New York: Public Affairs, 2001), p.459.
36 See Sharon Weinberger, “Third Predator Lost in Afghan Operations; 50 Remaining Air
Vehicles,” Aerospace Daily, January 29, 2002.
37 See CRS Report RL30727, Airborne Intelligence, Surveillance and Reconnaissance (ISR):
the U-2 Aircraft and Global Hawk UAV Programs, by Christopher Bolkcom and Richard A.
Best, Jr.
38 “Remarks at `The World Will Always Remember September 11' Ceremony,” December 11,
2001, Weekly Compilation of Presidential Documents, December 17, 2001.

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CRS-17
Persian Gulf War where some computer printouts had to be sent by air to various
commands in the area. Many of the problems were corrected by the time of Kosovo
operations and information flowed freely in the theater and back and forth to U.S.
agencies in real-time. Thus far, media reports have not reflected communications
problems in Afghan operations.
The integration of intelligence analysis directly into military operations requires
adjustments to organizational relationships among intelligence agencies. Imagery and
sigint usually undergo some degree of analysis before the product can be used. Target
identification can require input from a variety of intelligence disciplines and in some
cases must be approved by Washington-level agencies. Enabling agencies in
Washington and elsewhere to support low-level combat units (on a 24-hour basis)
involves a high degree of responsiveness and flexibility. Such support may, in
addition, come at the cost of other responsibilities. Some observers express concern
that support to military operations, including counterterrorist operations, may detract
from traditional, but still important missions of providing continuing strategic and
geopolitical analyses for national policymaking.
Congress has acknowledged the need for better displays of data, tied to
geographical reference points, on computer links that would be available to all military
echelons and civilian policymakers. The displays would incorporate information from
all intelligence disciplines, including humint and open source materials and would be
made available in real-time. The issue for Congress is the extent to which the
National Imagery and Mapping Agency (NIMA), a relatively young agency, should
have the primary responsibility for maintaining a global system intended to be used
throughout the Defense Department and Intelligence Community.
The U.S. military services are in a period of transformation that will pose many
issues for Congress.39 Requirements for capabilities to ensure information dominance
and for large numbers of precision weapons will be reviewed alongside programs to
replace aging platforms. Ensuring that data collected from a myriad of sensors is
available within essential time constraints will require coordination of programs some
of which are managed by DOD and others by CIA. The programs are overseen by
intelligence and armed services committees. The coordinative process has been
imperfect in the past and observers believe that it will continue to be difficult to ensure
that weapons platforms and intelligence systems work together effectively. Ties
between intelligence and armed services committees are historically close, but
observers may suggest new oversight structures.
39 For further background on the transformation process, see CRS Report RS20851, Naval
Transformation: Background and Issues for Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke; CRS Report
RS20859, Air Force Transformation: Background and Issues for Congress, by Christopher
Bolkcom; and CRS Report RS20787, Army Transformation and Modernization: Overview
and Issues for Congress, by Edward Bruner.

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Conclusion
Effective counterterrorism–political, diplomatic, and military–requires good
intelligence, but counterterrorism intelligence differs in many ways from the
intelligence support that was needed during the Cold War and for which the
Intelligence Community remains in large measure organized. Significant challenges
lie in the area of humint collection where practices that might produce much valuable
information could be expensive and involve the United States in activities that, if
revealed, could be highly controversial at home and abroad.
Intelligence and law enforcement are becoming increasingly intertwined. Few
doubt that valuable insights can derive from close correlation of information from
differing intelligence and law enforcement sources. Should the two communities draw
too close together, however, there are well-founded concerns that either the U.S. law
enforcement effort would become increasingly inclined to incorporate intelligence
sources and methods to the detriment of long-standing legal principles and
constitutional rights or, alternately, that intelligence gathering in this country or
abroad would increasingly be hamstrung by regulations and procedural requirements
to the detriment of the national security. There are difficult decisions that will have
to be made (some affecting organizational responsibilities) and fine lines that will have
to drawn.
Observers believe that the campaign to counter terrorism will tend to reinforce
the perceived need to transform the U.S. defense structure to take full advantage of
information technologies and precision munitions. Counterterrorist missions may not
dictate the procurement of platforms, but they are likely to have an important
influence on the intelligence collection, communications, and information links.
At the same time, observers caution that the current war on terrorism which has
accentuated the need for law enforcement and intelligence cooperation may not,
despite Administration projections, be a decades-long endeavor. They argue that even
as Al Qaeda and other terrorist organizations are being dealt with, traditional
geopolitical concerns remain. Given the nature of organizational dynamics, they
suggest, it may be difficult to maintain adequate expertise on international military and
geopolitical issues which will remain of vital concern in the future. Terrorist threats
have become a central concern for the U.S. Intelligence Community, but the rest of
the world has not disappeared from policymakers’ horizons. As Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld stated in his National Defense University speech, “we cannot and must not
make the mistake, of assuming that terrorism is the only threat. The next threat we
face may indeed be against terrorists–but it could also be a cyber-war, a traditional,
state-on-state war... or something entirely different.”

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