Order Code RL30790
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The Andean Trade Preference Act: Background
and Issues for Reauthorization
Updated February 21, 2002
J. F. Hornbeck
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
The Andean Trade Preference Act: Background and
Issues for Reauthorization
Summary
Following passage by the 102nd Congress, President George Bush signed into
law the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) on December 4, 1991(P.L. 102-182,
title II), making it part of a multifaceted strategy to counter illicit drug production and
trade in Latin America. For ten years, it has provided preferential, mostly duty-free,
treatment of selected U.S. imports from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.
ATPA’s goal has been to encourage growth of a more diversified Andean export
base, thereby promoting development and providing an incentive for Andean farmers
and other workers to pursue economic alternatives to the drug trade. ATPA expired
on December 4, 2001 and U.S. tariffs were reimposed, but on February 15, 2002,
President Bush acted to defer collection of these tariffs for 90 days. In the meantime,
reauthorizing legislation (H.R. 3009) has been passed by the full House and by the
Senate Finance Committee and is part of the broader 2002 trade agenda.
In considering the merits of ATPA, it is important to understand that its benefits
have been shown to be quantitatively small. Because many imports are not eligible
by law for preferential treatment or enter the United States under other preferential
trade arrangements, only 10% of imports from ATPA countries enter the United
States exclusively under the ATPA provisions. This has not changed in recent years,
suggesting that ATPA’s trade effects are unlikely to increase, unless the program’s
parameters are modified. Because the trade response is small, so too are ATPA’s
likely effects on the Andean economies.
Although the trade effects of ATPA have been relatively small, there is some
indication that the composition of trade has changed and that, with a few products,
a case can be made that ATPA has supported this change. It is possible that the
slightly altered composition of U.S. imports from ATPA countries reflects broader
change in what Andean countries are producing and that this in turn points to some
indirect evidence that resources once used for drug-related activity are being
redirected toward ATPA-eligible products. Isolating ATPA’s role from other
counternarcotics and economic diversification programs, however, has been a difficult
challenge, producing imprecise estimates. Supporters of ATPA argue that its effects
are evident and have proposed that it be reauthorized to reinforce the U.S.
commitment to the alternative development counternarcotics strategy and that
preferential treatment be extended to other Andean exports to broaden the program
effects. Both the House and Senate versions of H.R. 3009 express the findings of
Congress that extending and expanding trade preferences to ATPA countries is part
of an effective U.S. foreign policy to counter illicit drug trafficking from the Andean
region. To enhance the effects of ATPA, both bills provide for an extension of trade
preferences into 2006 and cover exports previously excluded, including certain textile
and apparel articles, canned tuna, watches and parts, petroleum, footwear, and
selected leather bags and goods. Although ATPA may be only a small part of a large
and long-term counternarcotics effort, expanding duty-free provisions of ATPA to
include more exports in growth industries may have a marginal effect on the
program’s effectiveness.
Contents
An Overview of ATPA’s Scope and Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
U.S.-ATPA Country Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Imports from ATPA Countries by Duty Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Imports from ATPA Countries by Product Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
ATPA Program Effects: Andean and U.S. Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
ATPA’s Economic Effects on the Andean Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Bolivia and Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Colombia and Ecuador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Coca Eradication and Crop Substitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
ATPA’s Economic Effects on the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Changes in Trade Composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Consumer Welfare and Tariff Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Producer Welfare Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Outlook and Legislation in the 107th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Legislation in the 107th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
House-Passed Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Senate Finance Committee-Passed Version . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Discussion of Proposed Legislative Changes . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Appendix 1. ATPA Program Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Appendix 2. U.S.-ATPA Country Merchandise Trade, 1990-2000 . . . . . . . . . 18
List of Figures
Figure 1. U.S. Imports from ATPA Countries by Product Category . . . . . . . . . 3
List of Tables
Table 1. Duty Status of U.S. Imports from ATPA Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Table 2. Major U.S. Imports Entering Under ATPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Andean Trade Preference Act:
Background and Issues for Reauthorization
Following passage by the 102nd Congress, President George Bush signed into
law the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) on December 4, 1991(P.L. 102-182,
title II), making it part of a multifaceted strategy to counter illicit drug production and
trade in Latin America. For ten years, it has provided preferential, mostly duty-free,
treatment of selected U.S. imports from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.
ATPA’s goal has been to encourage growth of a more diversified Andean export
base, thereby promoting development and providing an incentive for Andean farmers
and other workers to pursue economic alternatives to the drug trade.
ATPA expired on December 4, 2001 and U.S. tariffs were reimposed on affected
Andean exports. On February 15, 2002, the Bush Administration acted to defer
collection of these tariffs for 90 days, in expectation that Congress would either
reauthorize ATPA or temporarily extend the tariff provisions, presumably
retroactively. In the meantime, reauthorizing legislation has been passed in the House
and by the Senate Finance Committee and is part of a broader trade legislative agenda,
including Trade Promotion Authority (TPA), under consideration in 2002.
An Overview of ATPA’s Scope and Impact
ATPA was created as part of a broader Andean initiative to address the growing
drug trade from Latin America. It provides zero or reduced tariffs on certain U.S.
imports from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru (see Appendix 1 for program
details) to complement crop eradication, interdiction, military training, and other
counternarcotics efforts. In 1992, when the program was implemented, supporters
expected that ATPA-induced export diversification and growth would encourage
economic alternatives to coca production and other drug-related activity, with one
estimate projecting as much as a three-fold increase in U.S. imports from ATPA
countries over a decade.1
Trade data alone, however, do not provide adequate measures of success, which
should link a decline in drug activity with the expansion of ATPA supported
industries. Indeed, there has been some movement on the drug front. For example,
total coca cultivation has fallen by 13% from 1992 to 2000. This represents
significant declines in Bolivia (68%) and Peru (74%), but an offsetting large increase
1 For more on early expectations, see: CRS Report 92-172 F, The Andean Drug Initiative:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Raphael F. Perl. February 13, 1992, p. 3.
CRS-2
in Colombia (267%). Little coca is grown in Ecuador.2 Determining the role of
ATPA tariff preferences in this trend, however, presents a difficult challenge because
their effects must be isolated from other counternarcotics and economic development
efforts.
Studies by the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) of ATPA’s trade
effects suggest that overall, the program has had a positive, but small influence on the
volume and composition of U.S. imports from ATPA countries. For example,
although total U.S. imports from ATPA countries on a dollar-value basis have grown
85% through the decade 1990-99, this is much less than some had hoped for and
represents no growth of ATPA imports relative to U.S. import growth worldwide.
Further, the composition of U.S. imports from Andean countries has changed only
slightly in favor of products that are ATPA eligible. This suggests that there has been
no major change in the production structure of ATPA economies, particularly in the
biggest ATPA beneficiary, Colombia, which has actually experienced a large increase
in coca production in the 1990s.
One of the most telling indicators of ATPA’s limited influence is that U.S.
imports given preferential treatment exclusively under ATPA represent only 10% of
total imports from the four eligible countries.3 This represents a small percentage of
trade and has not grown thus far in the life of the program. Without legislative
change to the ATPA program, a larger response may be limited in the short run by the
Andean export sector’s dependence on a limited number of natural-resource based
products and simple manufactures, ATPA’s program exclusion of many major Andean
products (e.g. petroleum products, textiles, certain leather goods), and the fact that
many products are already eligible for duty-free or preferential treatment under other
trade arrangements.
In short, as discussed below, although there may have been a positive response
to the ATPA preferential tariff provisions, the overall impact has been small and
operates at the margin of Andean trade. Similarly, the tariff preferences have little
effect on the United States economy, suggesting the cost of these preferences is low.
U.S.-ATPA Country Trade
Colombia and Bolivia qualified as ATPA beneficiaries in mid-1992, with Ecuador
and Peru following one year later. Since then, aggregate U.S. trade with ATPA
countries has remained small and has grown in line, more or less, with the average for
U.S. trade worldwide. For the decade 1990 to 2000, U.S. exports to ATPA countries
rose by 84%, less than total export growth (see Appendix 2 for aggregate trade
data.) Relative to the rest of the world, U.S. exports to ATPA countries have
2 United States Department of State. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). March
2001. pp. II-11 and II-21.
3 U.S. International Trade Commission. Andean Trade Preference Act: Impact on U.S.
Industries and Consumers and on Drug Crop Eradication and Crop Substitution. Seventh
Report 1999. Publication No. 3358, September 2000. p. 34.
CRS-3
declined slightly to less than 1% of total exports, although there was an upward trend
in the mid-1990s. U.S. imports from ATPA countries, although rising by 105% in
dollar terms from 1990 to 2000, also declined slightly on a relative basis to less than
1% of total U.S. world imports.
In addition to trade volume, another indicator of ATPA’s possible effects is
change in the composition of ATPA imports. Figure 1 contrasts the composition of
U.S. imports from ATPA countries between 1994 and 2000. Because 1994 is the first
full year all four countries participated, it provides a base for comparison since it is
unlikely to reflect large changes in the trade composition due to ATPA given that
insufficient time had passed for industries to have responded fully.4
Figure 1. U.S. Imports from ATPA Countries by Product Category
For 2000, the major U.S. imports (approximately 80% of the ATPA countries
total), by harmonized tariff schedule (HTS) chapter were: HTS 27, mineral fuels (81%
of which is crude oil); HTS 71, precious stones and metals (43% gold); HTS 09,
spices, coffee, and tea (99% coffee); HTS 08, edible fruit and nuts (91% bananas);
HTS 03, fish and seafood (69% crustaceans or shrimp); HTS 61 and 62, knit and
woven apparel (73% sweaters, shirts, and suits); HTS 06, live plants and trees (99%
cut flowers); and HTS 74, copper articles (94% unwrought refined and alloy.)
4 1994 data from the U.S. International Trade Commission. Andean Trade Preference Act:
Impact on U.S. Industries and Consumers and on Drug Crop Eradication and Crop
Substitution. Seventh Report 1999, Publication 2995. September 1996, p. 8. Data for 2000
originated from the U.S. Department of Commerce as reported in World Trade Atlas.
CRS-4
A comparison of the two years suggests that on a broad product category basis,
the composition of U.S. imports from eligible countries has changed only marginally
since the ATPA program began. Most notable has been the addition of Peru’s refined
copper cathode imports, which began in 1995 and are ATPA eligible. Petroleum
products, which are not eligible for ATPA tariff preferences, remain a large portion
of imports, but come predominantly from Colombia. There has been a contrasting
relative decline in seafood and coffee imports.
In general, the minimal change in U.S. import composition reflects three factors.
First, most U.S. imports from ATPA countries are natural-resource based products
(petroleum, gold, fish, coffee, bananas, cut flowers) or simple manufactures (knit
apparel, sweaters, shirts, suits, copper cathodes), many of which are not ATPA
eligible. This trend is likely to continue regardless of ATPA reauthorization. Second,
the continuing large portion of oil imports on a dollar-value basis in 2000 continues
to skew import figures, reflecting in part the worldwide surge in oil prices. Third,
Colombia stands out as the dominant ATPA trade partner, accounting for 62% of
total U.S. imports from the group in 2000, followed by Peru and Ecuador, both with
18%, and Bolivia trailing with only 2%.5
Given that the relative size and composition of ATPA imports, variables
expected to reflect the program’s effects, have not changed much during the course
of the program, little trade effect seems attributable to the ATPA provisions. A closer
look at the trade data at the sectoral level supports this conclusion until the data are
further disaggregated by duty treatment and product type. These trends are in
keeping with economic reasoning that would suggest a program such as ATPA would
not affect the overall structure of trade, but might alter the composition of ATPA
imports at the margin and within very specific product categories.
Imports from ATPA Countries by Duty Status6
To determine which products are benefitting from ATPA, it is necessary to
ascertain what portion would have entered duty-free exclusively because of their
ATPA eligibility. Many imports qualify unconditionally as duty-free under general
tariff rates (e.g. coffee) or through other favorable tariff arrangements such as the
Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) or production sharing provisions and can
enter under more than one of these arrangements. For example, some products
eligible to enter under GSP come in under ATPA. As shown in table 1, when these
products are subtracted, it turns out that imports eligible exclusively for ATPA
preferences represented only 10% of total imports from the ATPA countries.7 The
table contrasts selected Andean country import data in 1995 and 1999 to reflect
5 U.S. International Trade Commission, Andean Trade Preference Act, September 2000, p.
14.
6 For this section, it was necessary to rely on specialized data produced by the International
Trade Commission, which has not been updated for 2000.
7 Estimates by USITC, ibid, p. 34. It should be noted that the 10% figure was higher during
the mid-1990s when the GSP program lapsed on a few occasions, causing greater reliance on
the ATPA provisions.
CRS-5
changes that may have occurred during a time when the ATPA program was in full
force. Duty-free imports rose from 59% of total imports in 1995 to 66% in 1999, but
because the ATPA-only category is unchanged, the increase appears due entirely to
non-ATPA trade arrangements (general rates, GSP, production-sharing arrangements,
or other smaller programs).
Table 1. Duty Status of U.S. Imports from ATPA Countries
(1995 and 1999 in $ millions)
Duty Status
Bolivia
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Total
% of
Total
1995 Total
256.8
3,807.4
1,929.2
965.4
6,958.7
100%
Imports:
Dutiable
19.0
1,717.0
756.6
360.5
2,853.1
41%
Duty-Free
237.8
2,090.4
1,172.7
604.7
4,105.6
59%
(ATPA only)*
na
na
na
na
699.0
10%
(Other Duty-
na
na
na
na
3,406.6
49%
Free)**
1999 Total
216.8
5,476.2
1,798.6
1,781.8
9,273.6
100%
Imports:
Dutiable
40.1
2,059.3
587.8
450.6
3,137.8
34%
Duty-Free
176.7
3,417.1
1,210.8
1,331.2
6,135.8
66%
(ATPA only)*
na
na
na
na
939.0
10%
(Other Duty-
na
na
na
na
5,196.8
56%
Free)**
na = not available, per discussion with USITC.
* Includes value of both duty-free and reduced-duty ATPA imports. Reduced-duty imports
amounted to only 0.3% of total imports from ATPA countries in both years and so are not shown
separately.
** Includes all other imports that entered the United States duty-free: 1) under general rates; 2)
under non-ATPA programs (e.g. Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) or production sharing
provisions) and/or; 3) under ATPA, but eligible to enter duty free under another program.
Data source: U.S. International Trade Commission. Andean Trade Preference Act: Impact on
U.S. Industries and Consumers and on Drug Crop Eradication and Crop Substitution.
Publication No. 3358, September 2000. pp. 17 and 34.
The 10% figure is important because it shows first that the amount of imports
entering duty-free exclusively under ATPA is a small portion of trade and second that,
over the life of the program, ATPA-eligible imports as a group have not grown any
faster than U.S. imports from the four Andean countries as a whole. This is unlikely
to change in the short run without legislative action given that many imports already
enter the United States duty free, other big items, such as petroleum and textile
products, are not eligible for duty-free treatment, and economic diversification into
new (ATPA-eligible) areas is a slow process.
Imports from ATPA Countries by Product Level
The major products entering the United States under ATPA appear in table 2
in descending order of importance. Between 1995 and 1999, cut flowers, most of
CRS-6
which come from Colombia, were the largest import item. Copper cathodes from
Peru grew to become the second largest ATPA import, rising in 1999 to nearly 19%
of the total on a dollar-value basis. Precious metals, mostly jewelry and gold products
from Peru, are the third largest import group, comprising some 11% of the total.
Colombian pigments (9%), Ecuadoran non-canned tuna (5%), and Peruvian zinc (5%)
round out the major ATPA imports.
Table 2. Major U.S. Imports Entering Under ATPA
(1995 and 1999, in percent)
HTS*
Article
% 1995
% 1999
Beneficiary Country
06
Live Plants (cut flowers)
39.6
25.0
Colombia - 80%
Ecuador - 20%
74
Copper articles (cathodes)
2.9
18.9
Peru - 100%
71
Precious metals
18.9
10.7
Peru - 70%
(jewelry/gold products)
Bolivia - 30%
32
Pigments
0.3
9.3
Colombia - 100%
16
Tuna (non-canned)
4.2
5.0
Ecuador - 99%
Colombia - 1%
79
Zinc
0.8
4.8
Peru - 100%
Other
33.3
26.3
Total
100.0
100.0
* HTS = harmonized tariff schedule chapter.
Data source: USITC, Andean Trade Preference Act, September 2000, pp. 16-24, D-3.
The composition of ATPA imports has changed some over the life of the
program, but not in clearly predictable ways. Cut flowers, for example, which remain
the largest U.S. import item on a dollar basis, have actually fallen from nearly 40% to
25% of total ATPA imports, reflecting falling demand in the United States for cut
flowers and growth in other ATPA imports such as copper cathodes and pigments,
which represent new U.S. imports since the ATPA the program began. Although
there has been a large increase in zinc products coming in under ATPA, this growth
is partially due to a shift in duty treatment of zinc products, which previously entered
the United States duty-free under the GSP provisions.8
The benefits of ATPA fall in line with the overall trade importance of the
countries. In 1999, Colombia and Peru benefitted most and had 45% and 36% of the
dollar value of ATPA imports, respectively. Colombia’s percentage has fallen slightly
since 1995, reflecting a decline in cut flower imports, offset some by an increase in
U.S. pigment imports. Peru is the fastest growing exporter under ATPA, reflecting
its new copper cathode manufacturing industry. Ecuador accounted for 15% of
ATPA imports in 1999, followed by Bolivia with only 4%. Ecuador accounts for
most of the tuna imports and a small portion of cut flowers. Bolivia exports mostly
gold jewelry items, which is the only major ATPA item it produces.9
8 Ibid., pp. 23-24.
9 Ibid., pp. 24-26, D-3. Bolivia also exports small amounts of wood products under ATPA.
CRS-7
Overall, the ATPA trade effects appear to be relatively small. Nonetheless, at
the product level there has been some indication of a change in trade composition
with new products coming on line, at least in part to take advantage of ATPA’s duty-
free provisions. This reflects some level of Andean economic diversification, but not
a net growth in the amount of Andean exports eligible under ATPA on a relative
basis. Given that total imports eligible exclusively under ATPA have remained at
10% of total U.S. imports from these countries, it appears that gains in some
industries or products have been offset by declines in others.
ATPA Program Effects:
Andean and U.S. Responses
An evaluation of ATPA should indicate how any changes in trade patterns are
affecting the economies of the Andean countries and the United States. Two studies
required by the ATPA legislation tackle these questions. First, the U.S. International
Trade Commission ATPA report evaluates both the Andean and U.S. responses to
ATPA. The U.S. Department of Labor produces a separate targeted evaluation of
ATPA’s effects on U.S. workers. Both point to the marginal effects of ATPA on the
economies of participating countries and the United States.
ATPA’s Economic Effects on the Andean Countries
Although the trade effects of ATPA have been relatively small, there is some
indication that the composition of trade has changed and that, with a few products,
a case can be made that ATPA has contributed to this change. It is possible that the
altered composition of U.S. imports from ATPA countries reflects broader change in
what Andean countries are producing and that this in turn points to some indirect
evidence that ATPA-eligible products are being substituted for illicit coca.10
It is difficult to gauge the effects of ATPA on national economies because the
program has a small effect relative to other variables. National macroeconomic
policies, particularly in countries undergoing long-term economic reform, have a
much larger effect on economic trends. Domestic Andean government policies also
support crop substitution, the effects of which are not easily distinguishable from
those of ATPA. In effect, they work together. External shocks to the region’s
economies, such as repeated El Ninos and other natural phenomena, have devastating
effects on the agricultural sector that easily overshadow incremental policy shifts like
ATPA. Isolating the marginal effects of ATPA, therefore, is an imprecise exercise.11
Bolivia and Peru. In its 2000 report, the USITC used Bolivia and Peru as
case studies to explore the possibility of a link between ATPA program effects and
10 The USITC also points out that the benefits of ATPA to eligible countries is declining as
the “margin of preference” declines for various reasons, such as the continuing phase-in of
other trade agreement tariff rate cuts from the Uruguay Round, as well as sectoral and
regional agreements. For details, see: ibid., pp. 33.
11 Ibid., pp. 53 and 55.
CRS-8
changes in economic production. Bolivia showed some diversification in exports to
the United States that coincided with ATPA. In the mid-1990s, there was a marked
expansion of jewelry and, to a lesser extent, leather and wood product exports that
may be related to ATPA, but other domestic policy changes (e.g. the tax code) also
affected production incentives for these goods. After 1996, however, this export
growth trend slowed. In Peru, a broader array of export growth was discernible over
the past decade, with a noticeable increase in copper cathodes and agricultural
products, especially asparagus, all of which benefit from ATPA. Asparagus also
stands out because it is grown near traditional coca cultivation areas and is presumed
to be an alternative cash crop, at least in part encouraged by ATPA provisions.12
Colombia and Ecuador. In its 1999 report, the USITC evaluated ATPA’s
impact on Colombia and Ecuador. Of the ATPA-eligible products from Colombia
over the past decade, cut flowers have increased the most as a proportion of U.S.
imports, but overall, the composition of Colombia’s exports to the United States has
not changed dramatically since ATPA began, in part because of the dominance of
petroleum. Other nontraditional products, such as asparagus, do present some
potential for increased benefits from ATPA, but overall its benefits are considered
small. Ecuador has a similar profile, with little change in the composition of exports
to the United States, but some credit significant increases in the production of cut
flowers and seafood, both of which benefit from ATPA, with encouraging export
diversification. The overall effect is still small given the myriad variables that affect
production capabilities and decisions.13
Coca Eradication and Crop Substitution. Alternative crop production
is a critical component of the coca eradication effort underway in the Andes.
Although there is some indirect evidence to suggest that crop substitution is
occurring, it is small overall and the effect of ATPA on this process is marginal at
best. Whereas larger substitution effects may be linked to the cut flower industry in
Colombia, there are many factors that allowed such alternatives to exist before ATPA
was even conceived. All the evidence points to ATPA’s supportive, but relatively
small effect, particularly given the magnitude of the problem and the comprehensive
effort needed to address the drug trade. For example, numerous obstacles impede the
alternative development strategy including the high profitability of coca production,
lack of physical infrastructure required to support alternative cash crops, and overt,
often violent, guerrilla pressure to reject the program.14
ATPA’s Economic Effects on the United States
Although ATPA was created to influence the economic landscape of the Andean
region, Congress also requested analysis of how changes in trade patterns related to
12 Ibid., pp. 55 and 62.
13 U.S. International Trade Commission. Andean Trade Preference Act: Sixth Report 1998.
USITC publication 3234, September 1999, pp. 106, 111-14, 118, 120-22.
14 Wilson, Scott. Colombia’s Anti-Drug Plan Fuels Fight in Coca Country. The Washington
Post, October 14, 2000, p. A14 and DeYoung, Karen. Colombia Plan Faces ‘Crunch Time.’
The Washington Post, December 22, 2000, p. A35.
CRS-9
ATPA might affect the United States. The USITC looks at three basic issues: 1)
consumer welfare gains from lower-priced imports; 2) the offsetting tariff revenue
losses; and 3) producer welfare losses (production displacement). The U.S.
Department of Labor produces a separate report dealing solely with ATPA’s effects
on the domestic labor force.
Changes in Trade Composition. Given that only a very small share of U.S.
imports are involved in the ATPA program, its effects on the aggregate U.S. economy
are negligible. Therefore, measuring the gains and losses to the U.S. economy must
be done at the product/industry level. In 1999, copper cathodes, cut flowers (roses
and chrysanthemums), tuna, and gold compounds together accounted for 83% of total
imports that benefitted exclusively from the ATPA provisions. Copper cathodes and
cut flowers each contributed to approximately one-third of the ATPA-exclusive
imports. Hence, an analysis of the benefits and displacement costs related to these
products covers most of the effects ATPA has on the U.S. economy.15
Consumer Welfare and Tariff Effects. USITC market share data showed
that ATPA-imported copper cathodes, although growing briskly, still accounted for
only 7.4% of the U.S. market in 1999 and imported gold compounds claimed only
6.7%. Cut flowers, by contrast, accounted for up to 75% of the U.S. market. Based
on an partial equilibrium analysis, the USITC estimated that the consumer welfare
effects in all three cases were, nonetheless, small. In the first two, market penetration
was simply too small, but even in the case of Colombia’s dominance of the U.S. cut
flower market, the USITC suggests that U.S. consumers would have paid only 5.5%
more for flowers than they would have in the absence of ATPA. In addition, the
consumer benefits were offset, in many cases, by reduced tariff revenues. The net
welfare effects for the United States as a whole, therefore, were considered small.16
Producer Welfare Effects. Of greater concern to many are ATPA’s effects
on U.S. producers. To the extent that ATPA encourages a marginal increase in
imports, those industries in the United States that produce competing products are
potentially “displaced” from the market. Given market share figures, the USITC
found that only cut flowers and asparagus caused “displacement” of over 5% of the
market. Asparagus imports are small and enter during the late summer and fall
months when domestic crop production is low and so have a clear benefit to U.S.
consumers. Because they do not directly compete with the U.S. growing season,
however, they are not a primary target for concern over displacement.17
Cut flower imports have been a greater concern, but as the USITC points out,
Colombia, the major flower exporter, had established its market dominance before
ATPA, and the U.S. growers had already responded by differentiating their products.
The overall impact of ATPA flower imports is deemed small given domestic industry
adjustment. One indication that U.S. flower growers are no longer seriously
15 U.S. International Trade Commission, Andean Trade Preference Act, September 2000, pp.
36-37.
16 Ibid., pp. 38 and 45.
17 Ibid., p. 38.
CRS-10
concerned with competition from Andean imports is their decision to discontinue
pursuing antidumping and countervailing duty remedies as of May and October 1999,
respectively. In short, should ATPA tariff preferences be eliminated, it appears there
would be little effect on the domestic cut flower industry.18
The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) report targets ATPA’s impact on the
domestic work force. It concluded that the overall effects of ATPA in 1998 were
negligible given the strong U.S. economy and employment picture, and the fact that
ATPA-eligible imports were so small that their effect on aggregate U.S. employment
was virtually unmeasurable.19 Based on an analysis of products that entered the
United States duty free exclusively from ATPA provisions, the Department of Labor
argued that only the cut flower industry was likely to have presented any adjustment
problem. U.S. cut flower production had fallen by 11% in 1998 as ATPA imports
rose, perhaps suggesting that ATPA may have had some effect on the industry’s
contraction, but the Department of Labor report is quick to note that other factors
may have affected cost competitiveness of the U.S. cut flower industry, such as
complying with worker protection standards, and that in any case, their estimates
were not precise.20
Of the workers potentially affected by layoffs in the flower industry, the DOL
noted that all were seasonal agricultural workers who experience periods of
unemployment, have a very low wage level, and live predominantly in poverty. Some
43% were estimated to be of “illegal, temporary, or unknown legal status.” DOL did
not estimate the “degree of adjustment difficulty,” but noted that the strong U.S.
economy should be able to minimize any employment dislocation that might occur.
Adjustment costs faced by other industries from increased import competition from
ATPA were considered insignificant.21
Outlook and Legislation in the 107th Congress
ATPA is only a small part of the larger Andean counternarcotics effort. Coca
production is the primary target of these efforts and because it is a highly profitable
undertaking and particularly enticing for poor areas of the world, a key element of the
strategy is supporting the cultivation of alternative cash crops.22 ATPA’s supporters
18 Ibid., p. 43.
19 U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of International Labor Affairs. Trade and Employment
Effects of the Andean Trade Preference Act. Sixth Annual Report to Congress, by Robert
C. Shelburne. 1999. p 14.
20 Ibid., p. 10. The DOL report covers 1998 and so does not reflect the fact that in 1999 the
cut flower industry representatives dropped interest in antidumping and countervailing duty
investigations, suggesting doubt in their ability to make a strong case that the industry is being
materially harmed by ATPA-eligible imports.
21 Ibid., pp. 11-14.
22 U.S. Department of State, 2001 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report
(continued...)
CRS-11
argue that reduced tariffs conceivably play a part of the “alternative development”
strategy by providing an additional financial incentive to substitute legal crops for
coca cultivation. The increase in non-agricultural exports (e.g. copper cathodes), it
could be argued, may also reflect, in part, ATPA’s preferential tariff treatment.
Testimony before congressional committees has expressed the desire by groups
in the United States and the Andean countries to reauthorize ATPA and consider
expanding the tariff preferences to more products and countries. These views have
been summarized before Congress by the Bush Administration as well, which has
represented ATPA as achieving its goal of promoting “export diversification and
broad-based economic development that provides sustainable economic alternatives
to drug-crop production in the Andean region.”23
In considering the merits of ATPA, it is important to understand that the benefits
it provides are quantitatively small. ATPA’s influence should be visible in the
changing composition of U.S. imports, which has so far been marginal. Because
many imports are not eligible by law for duty-free treatment or enter the United States
under other preferential trade arrangements, only 10% of ATPA country imports
enter the United States exclusively under the ATPA provisions. This has not changed
in recent years, suggesting that ATPA’s effect on trade is unlikely to increase, unless
the program’s parameters are modified.
Because the trade response is small, so too are ATPA’s likely effects on the
Andean economies. Still, indirect evidence suggests that it may have supported
economic diversification into products such as copper cathodes and asparagus.
Asparagus, for example, is being cultivated in larger quantities near traditional coca
producing regions. Although an encouraging sign, given the high profitability of coca
and active resistence by both armed guerrilla groups and peasants, there are limits to
what ATPA may be expected to accomplish and it is not clear that there is a strong
direct link between increased ATPA-eligible exports and any verifiable diminished
drug-related activity.
In addition to the economic analysis, the debate over ATPA will likely consider
more intangible policy benefits. For example, supporters argue that ATPA is an
expression of direct U.S. support for the regional counternarcotics efforts with
potentially positive side benefits in the area of economic development. They also note
that it is a less expensive and invasive counter-drug option compared to the large
financial and military commitment of Plan Colombia.
Supporters of ATPA have proposed at least three program initiatives. First,
reauthorize ATPA for an extended period of time to reinforce the U.S. commitment
to the alternative development counternarcotics strategy. Second, extend duty-free
treatment to other Andean exports, such as textile and apparel products, to broaden
22(...continued)
(INCSR),pp. IV-6, 18, 27, 37.
23 Testimony of Ambassador Peter Allgeier, Deputy United States Trade Representative,
before the Senate Committee on Finance, Subcommittee on International Trade. August 3,
2001. p. 1.
CRS-12
the program effects, particularly in Colombia, which remains the most problematic
country. Third, include Venezuela as a beneficiary country, which although not
currently a major coca producer, is part of the larger drug trafficking problem.
Legislation in the 107th Congress
On December 4, 2001, ATPA expired and U.S. tariffs were reimposed on
affected Andean exports. On February 15, 2002, the Bush Administration acted to
defer the collection of these tariffs for 90 days in expectation that the 107th Congress
would either reauthorize ATPA or provide a short-term extension of its trade
preferences, presumably retroactively. In the meantime, ATPA reauthorizing
legislation has moved in both the House and the Senate.
In the House, H.R. 3009, the Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication
Act was introduced on October 3, 2001 by Representative Crane (for himself and
Ways and Means Chairman Thomas). Hearings were held by the House Ways and
Means Committee on October 5, 2001. Chairman Thomas offered an amendment in
the nature of a substitute and the committee ordered the bill favorably reported, as
amended, by voice vote. On November 14, 2001, the bill was reported to the House
(H. Rept. 107-290). On November 16, 2001, the House Rules Committee reported
(H. Rept. 107-293) the rule (H. Res. 289) for consideration of H.R. 3009 by a vote
of 225 to 191. H.R. 3009 was passed by the House the same day by voice vote.
In the Senate, S. 525, the Andean Trade Preference Expansion Act (ATPEA)
was introduced by Senator Graham on March 13, 2001 and referred to the Committee
on Finance. The Subcommittee on International Trade held hearings on August 3,
2001. The amended House-passed version of H.R. 3009 was also sent to the Senate
on November 16, 2001, where it was referred to the Committee on Finance. Full
committee consideration and mark up occurred on November 29, 2001, and by voice
vote, the language of S. 525, with some modifications, was offered in the nature of
a substitute for H.R. 3009, which was adopted, along with three amendments, and
reported to the full Senate (S. Rept. 107-126). The Senate is not expected to act on
the bill before March 2002.
Both the House and Senate versions of H.R. 3009 express the findings of
Congress that extending and expanding trade preferences to ATPA countries is part
of an effective U.S. foreign policy to counter illicit drug trafficking from the Andean
region. To enhance the effects of ATPA, both bills provide for an extension of trade
preferences into 2006 and cover exports previously excluded, including certain textile
and apparel articles, canned tuna, watches and parts, petroleum, footwear, and
selected leather bags and goods (see discussion below). These provisions provide
treatment similar to that received by Caribbean countries under the Caribbean Basin
Trade Promotion Act (CBTPA). There is a new emphasis on giving preferential
treatment to articles made from regional fabrics, an important provision for Peru,
which produces much of its yarn locally from alpaca, llama, and vicuna. Both bills
include a longer list of country eligibility requirements and expanded transshipment
and safeguard provisions to address concerns of U.S. apparel manufacturers.
House-Passed Version. The House-passed version of H.R. 3009 would
extend preferential treatment to articles from ATPA beneficiary countries through
December 31, 2006. Duty-free treatment would be expanded to cover five of eight
CRS-13
categories of articles previously excluded, provided the countries meet new enhanced
eligibility standards and the President of the United States does not declare any of the
products “import sensitive” for purposes of this act. New non-apparel articles to be
made eligible include: 1) certain footwear not eligible under the Generalized System
of Preferences (GSP); 2) petroleum products; 3) watches and watch parts; 4) selected
leather goods (including certain handbags, gloves, flat goods, luggage); and 5) tuna
preserved in any airtight container (canned). Three categories of articles will remain
ineligible for preferential treatment: 1) textiles subject to textile agreements and
apparel products not specifically mentioned below; 2) sugar and related products; and
3) rum and tafia.24
The number of apparel articles that would receive duty-free treatment would be
expanded based on various product categories differentiated by origin of fabric, yarn,
and components used. Specifically, this section includes articles sewn or otherwise
assembled from materials from one or more beneficiary countries that fall into the
following categories:25
1)
fabric or fabric components formed, or components knit-to-shape, in the
United States from yarns formed in the United States or one or more
beneficiary countries;
2)
fabrics or fabric components formed, or components knit-to-shape, in one
or more beneficiary countries, from yarns formed in one or more
beneficiary countries, if such fabrics are formed chief in weight of llama or
alpaca;
3)
fabrics or yarn not produced in the United States or a beneficiary country,
but are eligible for preferential treatment under the North American Free
Trade Agreement (NAFTA) short-supply provisions (Annex 401);
4)
apparel articles sewn or otherwise assembled in one or more beneficiary
countries from fabrics or fabric components formed or components knit-to-
shape, in a beneficiary country from yarns formed in the United States or
in one or more beneficiary countries, whether or not the apparel articles are
also made from any of the fabrics, fabric components formed, or
components knit-to-shape in the United States defined in paragraph 1
above. Imports of apparel made from regional fabric and yarn would be
capped at 3% of U.S. imports, growing to 6% of U.S. imports in 2006.
24The bill would also amend the Caribbean Basin Trade Promotion Act and the African
Growth and Opportunity Act to clarify congressional intent regarding various draft Customs
regulations addressing duty-free and quota-free treatment of, among other products, knit-to-
shape articles and apparel articles that are cut both in the United States and the beneficiary
countries. These provisions are not included in the Senate bill. See: U.S. Congress. House
of Representatives. Andean Trade Promotion and Drug Eradication Act. Report 107-290
to accompany H.R. 3009. November 14, 2001. pp. 6-8 and 18-21.
25 In paragraphs 1, 3, and 4 below, fabrics eligible for duty-free treatment include fabrics not
from yarns if classified under HTS 5602 and 5603, referring to felt. This provision does not
appear in the Senate Version. Ibid., pp. 3 and 12-13.
CRS-14
In addition, this act allows for duty-free importation of handloomed, handmade,
and folklore articles, clarifies and enhances penalties for transshipment of apparel
goods through the Andean countries, and provides for NAFTA-equivalent safeguard
protections related to apparel imports. It also expands requirements for becoming
eligible as a beneficiary country to include, in addition to previously defined
requirements: undertaking obligations set out in the World Trade Organization
(WTO); participating in negotiations to complete the Free Trade Area of the Americas
(FTAA); providing protection of intellectual property rights; adhering to
internationally recognized worker rights; committing to eliminating the worst forms
of child labor; meeting counternarcotics certification criteria; becoming party to the
Inter-American Convention Against Corruption; and applying transparent, non-
discriminatory, and competitive procedures to government procurement.
Senate Finance Committee-Passed Version. The Senate Finance
Committee-passed version (the Andean Trade Preference Expansion Act - ATPEA)
agrees in principal with much of the House-passed version, but is slightly more
restrictive in some product categories. It would extend the program through February
28, 2006 or until the FTAA is enacted, whichever comes first, and would expand
coverage to most of the same products identified in the House bill.
Non-apparel provisions vary slightly or are worded differently from the House
version. Of the eight categories of goods not eligible for preferential treatment under
current expired law, five would receive tariff treatment equal to that under NAFTA,
or a zero tariff if the products are so treated under different trade laws (e.g. the GSP
or CBTPA): 1) selected footwear; 2) petroleum products; 3) watches and watch
parts; 4) selected leather goods; and 5) rum and tafia products. Except for rum
products this is similar to the House provisions. One category, sugars, syrups, and
molasses, remains ineligible for trade preferences as in the House version. A second
category, tuna prepared in airtight containers, is given duty-free treatment like the
House version, but the Senate places a cap on this type of tuna import equal to 20%
of U.S. production in the previous year and requires tuna to be harvested by U.S. or
ATPEA beneficiary country vessels.26
Finally, textile and apparel articles are treated separately and in detail, allowing
certain goods into the United States duty-free based on the origin of fabric, yarn, or
components used. Apparel provisions are similar to those in the House bill, with a
few exceptions. There are six categories of apparel products that would qualify for
duty-free treatment. The first is similar to the House version and includes articles
sewn or otherwise assembled from one or more beneficiary countries if so done with
materials that fall into any of the following categories:
1)
U.S. fabric, or fabric components, or components knit-to-shape, from yarns
wholly formed in the United States;
26 This is one of three amendments made to the bill. The other two do not relate directly to
ATPA. They include waiving restrictions on duty-free imports on fans from Thailand through
July 30, 2002 and suspending from January 1, 2002 through December 31, 2006 duties
imposed on selected steam or other vapor generating boilers used in nuclear facilities. See:
U.S. Congress. Senate. Andean Trade Preference Expansion Act. Report 107-126 to
Accompany H.R. 3009. December 14, 2001. pp. 6, 12, and 20.
CRS-15
2)
a combination of both U.S. and ATPEA beneficiary country components
knit-to-shape from yarns wholly formed in the United States;
3)
ATPEA beneficiary country fabric, fabric components, or knit-to-shape
components, made from yarns wholly formed in one or more ATPEA
beneficiary countries, if the constituent fibers are primarily llama, alpaca,
or vicuna hair; and
4)
fabrics or yarns, regardless of origin, if such fabrics or yearns have been
deemed, under NAFTA, not to be widely available in commercial quantities
in the United States (short supply provisions).
The second duty-free category includes apparel articles knit-to-shape (except
socks) in an ATPEA country from yarns wholly formed in the United States. The
third category includes apparel articles wholly assembled in an ATPEA country from
fabric or fabric components knit, or components knit-to-shape in an ATPEA country
from yarns wholly formed in the United States, with an annual cap set on quantity
imported and increased each year. The fourth category includes brassieres that are
cut or sewn, or otherwise assembled, in the United States and/or one or more ATPEA
country. The fifth category captures “handloomed, handmade, and folklore”articles,
to be defined jointly by the United States and the beneficiary countries. The sixth
category includes textile luggage assembled in an ATPEA country from fabric and
yarns formed in the United States.
Like the House version, the Senate language also includes stronger
transshipment penalties for infractions related to apparel products, and adopts
safeguard provisions on apparel goods similar to those found in NAFTA, both of
which also are found in the CBTPA. Country eligibility requirements are also
lengthened in similar fashion to those found in the House bill (see Appendix 1 for
current program requirements).
Discussion of Proposed Legislative Changes. Supporters of the
apparel provisions would argue that they serve multiple purposes, they: 1) provide
similar tariff treatment to ATPA, NAFTA, and CBTPA countries, thereby eliminating
the relative competitive disadvantage of ATPA countries; 2) deepen coverage of the
ATPA tariff program to include products that compose a larger portion of Andean
exports and hence improve the chances for greater impact on their trade
diversification, economic development, and counterdrug activity; 3) encourage
increased U.S. investment in ATPA countries; and, 4) take into account possible
negative repercussions to domestic apparel manufacturers.27
Although it is possible that the ATPA countries will respond to these additional
incentives, countries will not benefit equally. In dollar terms, Colombia may benefit
the most because it has the largest share of U.S. apparel imports from ATPA
countries (49% in 2000). Peru, which constituted 46% of U.S. apparel imports from
these countries, uses mostly non-U.S. materials and so has lobbied for removing
27 For more details, see: U.S. International Trade Commission. Apparel: Andean Countries
Seek Parity with Caribbean Basin Countries to Remain Competitive in U.S. Market. Industry
Trade and Technology Review, March 2001. pp. 9-13.
CRS-16
restrictions on use of local fabrics and yarns. It would benefit significantly if such
language remains in the final version of H.R. 3009. Ecuador and Bolivia have small
apparel export industries, each accounting for only 2% of the ATPA country apparel
exports to the United States.28 (Ecuador is a major tuna exporter and so would
benefit to extent that restrictions on canned tuna are reduced or eliminated.)
Some groups in the Unites States challenge the expansion of ATPA provisions,
arguing that the benefits to Andean countries may come at a cost to domestic
industries. Apparel is a high profile U.S. import commodity group from the region.
The U.S. industry is also facing an increasingly competitive environment worldwide.
Therefore, domestic U.S. producers have expressed opposition to these legislative
changes.
Overall, however, apparel products accounted for only 7% of U.S. imports from
ATPA countries in 2000, although this percentage has doubled since 1994 (see figure
1). Also, ATPA apparel imports accounted for less than 2% of the total sector’s U.S.
imports in 2000. Still, the United States is the primary market for Andean apparel,
capturing 93% of the region’s apparel exports.29 Although ATPA may still be only
a small part of a large and long-term counternarcotics effort, expanding duty-free
provisions of ATPA to a larger portion of the region’s exports, including its growth
industries, may have a marginal positive effect on the program’s effectiveness.
28 Ibid., pp. 2-7 and 9-10.
29 Ibid, p. 2.
CRS-17
Appendix 1. ATPA Program Details
The ATPA program has two major facets. First, each of the four Andean nations
must be designated a “beneficiary country” by meeting legislated standards.30
Beneficiary status can be denied if a country: 1) is a Communist country; 2) unfairly
nationalizes or expropriates U.S. property, tangible or intellectual, without due
recourse or commitment for compensation; 3) fails to act in good faith in recognizing
arbitral awards in favor of U.S. citizens or companies; 4) affords preferential
treatment to products from other developed countries that may have a significant
impact on U.S. commerce; 5) has a government entity that fails to follow copyright
agreements for broadcast materials; 6) is not a signatory to an agreement providing
for the extradition of U.S. citizens; or 7) is not taking steps to afford internationally
recognized workers rights as in the Trade Act of 1974. All conditions, except 4 and
6, may be waived by the President if conferring beneficiary status is deemed in the
economic or security interests of the United States. The President is also required to
consider other factors, among them the prospective beneficiary country’s: 1) interest
in ATPA; 2) economic conditions and development policies; 3) trade policies and
practices complying with rules defined in the World Trade Organization (WTO)
agreement; and 4) efforts to meet the narcotics cooperation certification criteria.
Second, eligible articles must be imported directly from a beneficiary country.
The content of materials and processing costs originating in CBTPA or ATPA
beneficiary countries, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and up to 15 percentage points
of U.S. origin value must sum to at least 35% of the value of the article when it enters
the United States. Many products are denied duty-free treatment, including textile
and apparel products subject to textile agreements, crude and refined petroleum
products, canned tuna, and certain footwear, watches, sugars, syrups, molasses, and
rum products. Selected import sensitive products are eligible for only a 20-percent
reduction in duties, including certain handbags, luggage, flat goods, work gloves, and
leather wearing apparel. The President may suspend duty-free treatment under title
II of the Trade Act of 1974 (safeguard actions) or the national security provision (sec.
232) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1862). Other trade
regulations apply, such as quotas and food-safety requirements.31
ATPA operates in addition to the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), a
program in place since 1976 giving duty-free treatment to certain developing country
imports to promote economic development. Where the two programs overlap, many
Andean exporters prefer to use ATPA because it covers more tariff categories, tends
30 P.L. 102-182, title II, sec. 203, as amended (19 U.S.C. 3202). Because these benefits
would violate the U.S. WTO obligation to accord all WTO members equal (most-favored-
nation) treatment, they require a temporary waiver by the WTO, which was in place, but
expired with the ATPA program on December 4, 2001. See: WTO General Council. United
States-Andean Trade Preference Act-Decision of 14 October 1996. WT/L/184.
31 Ibid., sec. 204 (19 U.S.C. 3203), including detailed provisions for “perishable products.”
CRS-18
to be more liberal and easier to qualify under, and has had a ten-year authorization
and so until recently, has not expired as has the GSP multiple times in the 1990s.32
32 See: CRS Report 97-389 E, Generalized System of Preferences, by William H. Cooper.
CRS-19
Appendix 2. U.S.-ATPA Country Merchandise
Trade, 1990-2000
($ millions)
U.S. Exports
% Change
Country
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
90-00
Bolivia
138
222
185
270
417
251
81.9%
Colombia
2,029
3,286
4,064
4,714
4,816
3,689
81.8%
Ecuador
678
999
1,195
1,259
1,683
1,037
53.0%
Peru
772
1,005
1,408
1,774
2,063
1,662
115.3%
Total ATPA
3,617
5,512
6,852
8,017
8,979
6,639
83.6%
Total World
393,592 448,164 512,627 625,075 682,138
780,419
98.3%
U.S. Imports
% Change
Country
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
90-00
Bolivia
203
162
260
275
224
191
-5.9%
Colombia
3,168
2,837
3,171
4,424
4,656
6,969
120.0%
Ecuador
1,376
1,344
1,726
1,958
1,752
2,210
60.6%
Peru
802
738
841
1,261
1,975
1,996
148.9%
Total ATPA
5,549
5,081
5,998
7,918
8,607
11,366
104.8%
Total World
495,310 532,665 663,256 795,289 911,896 1,216,888
145.7%
U.S. Balance of Trade
% Change
Country
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
2000
90-00
Bolivia
-65
60
-75
-6
193
61
Colombia
-1,139
449
893
291
160
-3,280
Ecuador
-697
-345
-532
-700
-69
-1,173
Peru
-29
266
566
513
87
-334
Total ATPA
-1,930
430
852
98
371
-4,726
Total World
-101,718
-84,501 -150,629 -170,214 -229,758 -436,469
Data Source: U.S. Department of Commerce.