Order Code IB94049
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Iraq-U.S. Confrontation
Updated February 20, 2002
Alfred B. Prados and Kenneth Katzman
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Events of the Crisis
Forerunner Episodes
December 1998 Air Strikes
Further Actions
The February 2001 Strikes
Additional Strikes and Provocations
Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks
Force Deployments and Costs
The 1998 Build-Up
After Desert Fox
Costs
U.S. and International Reactions
Administration Position on Use of Force
Congressional Reactions
International Reactions
Plans and Alternatives
FOR ADDITIONAL READING

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Iraq-U.S. Confrontation
SUMMARY
Efforts by Iraq to impede U.N. weapons
continued to conduct periodic strikes against
inspections since late 1997 and to challenge
Iraqi air defense installations, amid reports that
the allied-imposed no-fly zones over northern
Iraq has been upgrading its air defense capabil-
and southern Iraq have resulted in further
ities. On October 7, 2001, following the
confrontations with the United States and its
September 11 terrorist attacks on the United
allies. In early 1998, U.S.-led retaliatory
States, the U.S. Ambassador to the United
strikes against Iraq were averted by an agree-
Nations warned Iraq not to move against Iraqi
ment negotiated by the U.N. Secretary General
opposition groups or attack its neighbors while
on February 23, under which Iraq promised
the United States was involved in its campaign
“immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted”
against terrorism.
access by U.N. inspectors throughout Iraq.
According to the U.S. Defense Depart-
On March 3, the U.N. Security Council passed
ment as of late November 1998, expanded
Resolution 1154, which warned Iraq of the
military operations and crisis build-ups in the
“severest consequences” for violating the
Gulf since the 1991 war had cost a total of
agreement.
$6.9 billion. Incremental costs of these opera-
tions amounted to approximately $1.6 billion
A decision by Iraq to ban almost all U.N.
in FY1998, 1.3 billion in FY1999, $1.1 billion
inspections on October 31, 1998, precipitated
in FY2000, and $1.1 billion estimated in
a new phase of the confrontation. The Clinton
FY2001. These figures do not include costs
Administration decided to abort air and missile
resulting from operations in Afghanistan.
strikes planned for November 14-15 after Iraq
agreed at the last minute to resume coopera-
Erosion of the former allied coalition and
tion with U.N. inspections. But, following a
U.S. force constraints limit some military
report on December 15 by the chief weapons
options. Although some Arab states, notably
inspector that Iraq was withholding coopera-
Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, host U.S. aircraft
tion, the United States and Britain conducted
enforcing no-fly zones, no Arab states with the
a 4-day operation against Iraq (Operation
exception of Kuwait have publicly supported
Desert Fox) including approximately 410
allied air strikes against Iraq.
missiles and 600 bombs.
Some officials and analysts have called
Since the December 1998 operation, the
for expansion of no-fly zones over Iraq.
United States and Britain have carried out air
Others support covert operations to inflict
strikes against Iraqi air defense units and
damage on key Iraqi facilities and build a
installations on a frequent basis, in response to
viable opposition to the regime. According to
Iraqi attempts to target allied aircraft enforcing
a press article in mid-November, some U.S.
no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq.
officials favor more strikes against Iraq even in
On February 16, 2001, allied aircraft con-
the absence of evidence linking it to the Sep-
ducted strikes against five Iraqi air defense
tember attacks, in view of its efforts to acquire
installations north of the 33rd parallel (the
mass destruction weapons, refusal to readmit
northern limit of the southern no-fly zone) in
U.N. weapons inspectors, and long-standing
response to increasing challenges by Iraqi air
support for terrorism.
defense units. Since then, allied aircraft have
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On December 20, 2001, the U.S. House of Representatives passed H.J.Res. 75, which
stated, among other things, that Iraq’s refusal to allow U.N. weapons inspectors
“immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access” to Iraqi facilities “presents a mounting
threat to the United States, its friends and allies, and international peace and security.”
On January 29, 2002, in his State of the Union address, President Bush described Iraq,
Iran, and North Korea as constituting “an axis of evil.” Secretary of State Colin Powell told
a Senate committee on February 5 that Iraq “remains a significant threat to the [Middle
East] region’s stability.” He added that “we have not ruled out other options” with respect
to Iraq and went on to say that “we believe strongly in regime change in Iraq.” On
February 19, National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice was quoted by the press as saying
that “[w]e’re pursuing a range of policy options, including, for instance, trying to change
the nature of the sanctions with Iraq.”
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
This issue brief covers the most recent U.S.-Iraqi confrontations, which began in the fall
of 1998. It summarizes events that led to the crisis, the allied military build-up, military
strikes against Iraq, international reactions, costs, and options for U.S. policy makers. It does
not cover developments in the war in Afghanistan, except insofar as they may relate to the
U.S.-Iraqi confrontation. For further information on previous U.S.-Iraqi confrontations, see
CRS Report 98-386, Iraq: Post-War Challenges and U.S. Responses, 1991-1998.
Since the cease-fire of March 3, 1991, that ended the Persian Gulf war (Operation
Desert Storm), the United States has resorted on several occasions to the use or threat of
force against Iraq. Some of these incidents resulted from Iraqi challenges to U.N. cease-fire
terms that followed the war. Others resulted from bilateral issues between Iraq and the
United States and its allies.
A principal factor in the most recent confrontation was Iraq’s failure to cooperate fully
with U.N. weapons inspectors. The inspection regime, established by U.N. Security Council
Resolution 687 adopted on April 3, 1991, is designed to identify and dismantle Iraq’s
programs to develop weapons of mass destruction, including chemical, biological, and nuclear
warfare systems as well as missiles capable of delivering them. Two agencies are charged
with conducting these inspections: the U.N. Special Commission on Iraq (UNSCOM), which
deals with chemical, biological, and missile systems; and the International Atomic Energy
Agency (IAEA), which deals with Iraqi nuclear weapons programs. Since the inception of
the inspection regime, Iraq has obstructed its work in various ways:
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! False, misleading, or incomplete responses to questions posed by inspectors;
! Interference by Iraqi escorts with the conduct of inspections;
! Denial of access to “sensitive” sites on grounds of national security;
! Removal of or tampering with material evidence of weapons programs; and
! Attempts to exclude U.S. personnel from inspection teams.
On seven occasions between 1991 and 1993, the U.N. Security Council found Iraq in
“material breach of cease-fire terms”; however, the Council has not issued a finding of
“material breach” since June 17, 1993, despite subsequent Iraqi provocations. According to
news reports, some Council members are reluctant to agree to another such finding, which
they think might provide the basis for an attack on Iraq.
Another factor contributing to the recent confrontation was Iraqi violation of the no-fly
zones imposed by the United States and its allies over portions of northern and southern Iraq.
U.S. and British aircraft (and formerly French aircraft) have conducted overflights of
northern and southern Iraq since 1991 and 1992, respectively, to enforce the bans on Iraqi
aircraft in these zones. The allied overflights are known as Operation Northern Watch and
Operation Southern Watch and are designed to exclude Iraqi aircraft from flying north of the
36th parallel and south of the 33rd parallel, respectively. The southern zone, covering 227,277
square kilometers (87,729 square miles) is larger than the northern zone, which covers 43,707
square kilometers (16,871 square miles), but Iraqi air defenses reportedly are thicker in the
northern zone. Together, these zones cover 270,985 square kilometers (104,600 square
miles), or 62% of Iraqi territory.
U.S. officials base the no-fly zones primarily on U.N. Security Council Resolution 688
of April 5, 1991, which demands that Iraq end repression of its population (notably Kurds in
the north and Shi’ite Muslims in the south), and on the military cease-fire agreements after
the Gulf war (the Safwan Accords), which forbid Iraq to interfere with allied air operations
over Iraq. Some countries question this interpretation, arguing that Resolution 688 was not
passed under Chapter VII provisions (peace and security) and does not by itself permit
military action to enforce its terms. Iraq maintains that the no-fly zones constitute an illegal
infringement on its sovereignty and has occasionally fired on allied planes conducting
overflights to enforce these zones.
Events of the Crisis
Forerunner Episodes
Between mid-1993 and 1996, UNSCOM personnel were able to carry out their
inspections of Iraqi weapons programs with relatively little interference by the government
of Iraq. Increasing attempts by Iraq in 1997 to impede U.N. weapons inspections and to
exclude U.S. personnel from UNSCOM teams prompted demands by the U.N. Security
Council that Iraq cease its interference or face further sanctions. A Russian undertaking in
November 1997 to seek “balanced representation” in UNSCOM membership temporarily
averted a crisis; however, tensions mounted again in January 1998, as Iraq once more barred
U.S.-led teams from conducting inspections and declared several “sensitive sites” off limits
to U.N. inspectors. After a month of intensive diplomacy and a continuing build-up of U.S.
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forces in the Persian Gulf region, the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister and the U.N. Secretary
General signed an agreement with the following provisions:
! Reconfirmation by Iraq that it accepts relevant U.N. resolutions
! Commitment of U.N. member states to “respect the sovereignty and
territorial integrity of Iraq”
! “Immediate, unconditional, and unrestricted access” by UNSCOM and IAEA
within Iraq, with respect for Iraqi concerns relating to “national security,
sovereignty, and dignity”
! Special procedures to apply to inspections at eight “presidential sites”
defined in an annex to the agreement
! Efforts to accelerate the inspection process, and an undertaking by the
Secretary General to bring to U.N. Security Council members the concerns
of Iraq over economic sanctions.
On March 3, the U.N. Security Council unanimously passed Resolution 1154, co-
sponsored by Britain and Japan, which commended the initiative of the Secretary General in
security these commitments from Iraq, stressed that Iraq must comply with its obligations,
and warned that any violation of these terms or other Security Council resolutions “would
have the severest consequences for Iraq.” Although inspections during the spring of 1998
proceeded relatively smoothly, many questions concerning Iraq’s weapons programs remained
unresolved. Also, Iraqi spokesmen continued periodically to warn of a new crisis if economic
sanctions were not quickly removed.
December 1998 Air Strikes
After a lull of several months, tensions mounted in August 1998, as Iraq began to
challenge U.N. operations once more. On August 5, Iraq announced that it would no longer
allow UNSCOM to inspect new facilities, and followed with a ban on all remaining UNSCOM
activities on October 31. U.S. officials described Iraq’s actions as unacceptable, as did some
other members of the Security Council. Resolution 1205 of November 5, which demanded
that Iraq rescind its bans on U.N. weapons inspection activities and resume full cooperation
with UNSCOM, did not specifically mentioned use of force; however, U.S. officials
emphasized again that all options are open including military force to compel Iraqi
compliance. On November 11, the United Nations evacuated more than 230 staff personnel
from Baghdad, including all weapons inspectors, as the United States warned of possible
retaliatory strikes against Iraq.
As U.S. forces were on the verge of conducting air and missile strikes against Iraq on
November 14, the Clinton Administration delayed them for 24 hours upon learning that Iraq
had agreed to resume cooperation with UNSCOM. After further negotiations, Iraq agreed
in a letter to the Security Council on November 15 to provide unconditional cooperation to
UNSCOM and rescind its ban on UNSCOM activities. The Administration then canceled the
planned strikes; however, the President warned that Iraq must fulfill its obligations.
Specifically, in a news conference on November 15, he listed five conditions Iraq must fulfill
to meet the criteria of unconditional cooperation:
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! Resolution of all outstanding issues raised by UNSCOM and the IAEA.
! Unfettered access for inspectors with no restrictions, consistent with the
February 23 memorandum signed by Iraq.
! Turnover by Iraq of all relevant documents.
! Acceptance by Iraq of all U.N. resolutions related to mass destructions
weapons.
! No interference with the independence or professional expertise of weapons
inspectors.
Despite its pledges on November 14-15, Iraq began to impede the work of U.N.
weapons inspectors once more, according to statements by UNSCOM Chief Butler on
December 8. On December 15, Butler submitted a report in which he concluded that “Iraq
did not provide the full cooperation it promised on 14 November 1998" and “initiated new
forms of restrictions upon the Commission’s work.” On December 15, Butler withdrew
remaining UNSCOM inspectors from Iraq, saying that they could no longer perform their
mission. On the following day, then President Clinton directed U.S. forces to strike military
and security targets in Iraq. He described the mission as “to attack Iraq’s nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons programs and its military capacity to threaten its neighbors.”
Attacks began on December 16, 1998, at 5:06 p.m. EST (December 17 at 1:06 a.m.
Baghdad time) in an operation known as Desert Fox, as U.S. forces launched over 200 cruise
missiles (officials declined to give an exact number) at over 50 targets in Iraq, from the
aircraft carrier U.S.S. Enterprise, other Navy ships in the region, and some 70 Navy and
Marine Corps aircraft. According to some media reports, B-52 bombers based in the Indian
Ocean island of Diego Garcia took part as well. British forces also joined in the attacks. A
second wave of attacks took place on the evening of December 17-18, involving
approximately 100 cruise missiles (but with larger warheads than those used in the first wave
of attacks) and B-52 bombers, again with British participation. B-1 bombers joined the attack
during the third wave (evening of December 18-19), marking the first combat operations for
this aircraft. After the fourth wave of attacks (evening of December 19-20), President Clinton
halted the 72-hour operation (code named Operation Desert Fox) on December 20. Senior
U.S. officials warned that the United States would repeat its attacks as often as necessary to
prevent Iraq from continuing programs to develop mass destruction weapons.
During Operation Desert Fox, U.S. and British forces launched approximately 415 cruise
missiles (325 Tomahawks fired by Navy ships and 90 air launched cruise missiles mainly by
B-52s) and dropped more than 600 bombs. According to reports by the U.S. Department of
Defense, the 97 targets of allied attacks included lethal weapons production or storage
facilities (11), security facilities for weapons (18), Iraqi Republican Guards and other military
facilities (9), government command, control, and communications facilities (20), air defense
systems (32), airfields (6), and one oil refinery. According to preliminary Defense
Department assessments on December 20, 10 targets were destroyed, 18 severely damaged,
18 moderately damaged, 18 lightly damaged, and 23 not yet assessed. A second assessment
on December 21 cited a total of 98 targets, of which 43 were severely damaged or destroyed,
30 moderately damaged, 12 lightly damaged, and 13 not damaged. The U.S. theater
commander described the estimates as conservative, pointing out that even lightly damaged
facilities can be rendered unusable. There were no U.S. or British casualties. According to
the Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister, the allied action killed 62 Iraqi military personnel (including
38 Republican Guards) and wounded 180; there have been no estimates of Iraqi civilian
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casualties. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff General Harry Shelton told the Senate on
January 5, 1999, however, that allied strikes killed or wounded an estimated 1,400 members
of Iraq’s elite military and security forces (600 from the Special Republican Guard and 800
from the Republican Guard).
Further Actions
A series of follow-on military actions have occurred since December 28, 1998, as Iraqi
air defenses have tried to target U.S. and British aircraft patrolling the no-fly zones and Iraqi
aircraft have made brief intrusions into the zones. U.S. Air Force and Navy aircraft, as well
as British aircraft, have responded to Iraqi challenges with anti-radiation missile strikes
directed against Iraq air defense and command and control installations and have fired at
intruding Iraqi aircraft. Before Operation Desert Fox, U.S. responses to Iraqi violations of
the no-fly zones were usually confined to the immediate source of the violation, i.e., an air
defense battery or an intruding Iraqi aircraft. On January 27, 1999, authorities expanded rules
of engagement to allow U.S. aircraft to target a wider range of Iraqi air defense systems and
related installations in response to Iraqi violations of the no-fly zones. In congressional
testimony on March 23, 2000, a Defense Department official said operational commanders
have been given additional flexibility in responding to Iraqi provocations; under the current
rules of engagement, pilots may respond not only by defending themselves but also by acting
to reduce the overall Iraqi air defense threat to coalition aircraft.
Official Iraqi media reported on January 3, 1999 that President Saddam Hussein
condemned the no-fly zones as illegal and said his people would resist them with “bravery and
courage.” The Iraqi President followed up by offering a $14,000 bounty to any unit that
succeeded in shooting down an allied plane and an additional $2,800 reward for capturing an
allied pilot. In an NBC interview carried on June 17, 2001, the Iraqi Ambassador to the
United Nations said Iraq would do “anything possible to down American planes” and
confirmed that the government had offered a reward to Iraqi military personnel who
succeeded in doing so.
In a May 8, 2000 interview, the U.S. commander of Operation Northern Watch said
Iraqi air defense weapons, which can reach altitudes of 40,000 feet, have the capability to hit
U.S. aircraft. According to a July 24 press report, however, the newly designated commander
responsible for the Southern Watch operation told the Senate Armed Services Committee that
Iraqi air defense missiles are largely ineffective because they do not use their radar systems
(which allied pilots can target) and because they must move frequently (approximately every
12 hours). On June 15, the commander of Iraqi air defense forces asserted that Iraq had
succeeded in shooting down or intercepting 100 U.S. high-speed anti-radar missiles (HARM)
used by allies to target Iraqi radar; however, allied sources dismissed the Iraqi claim.
Similarly, allied officials state that no U.S. or British planes have been lost, despite Iraqi
claims to the contrary. (On September 13, 2000, an Iraqi air defense spokesman asserted that
Iraqi air defense units had shot down 10 allied aircraft since December 17, 1998.)
Iraq has claimed that allied air strikes have killed a number of Iraqi civilians. In a note
to the U.N. Human Rights Commission released by U.N. officials on March 26, 2001, the
Iraqi government protested that allied air strikes had killed 315 and wounded 965 Iraqis, all
civilians; the note described the allied overflights as a violation of international law.
Subsequently, the Iraqi Government claimed that a U.S.-British air strike on June 20, 2001
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killed 23 Iraqis and injured 11 others participating in a soccer game near the city of Mosul in
northern Iraqi.
U.S. and British officials have denied some Iraqi reports of civilian casualties and have
attributed others to the Iraqi practice of placing air defense weapons in close proximity to
populated areas, thus using nearby residents as human shields. For example, on August 18,
1999, U.S. Defense Department officials said reconnaissance photographs showed two Iraqi
missile launchers located 115 feet from homes in the northern city of Mosul. On at least one
occasion, in May 1999, U.S. authorities reportedly acknowledged the likelihood that allied
units had erroneously identified a civilian target as an air defense installation. Allied officials
have dismissed some Iraqi complaints as distortions or fabrications; with regard to the alleged
soccer casualties, for example, allied spokesmen said their aircraft had not carried out any air
strikes on June 20 and suggested that any casualties or injuries that occurred may have been
caused by misdirected Iraqi ground fire.
The year 2001 has seen what appears to be a more aggressive effort by Iraq to bring
down an allied aircraft by upgrading its air defense capabilities and mounting more challenges
against allied overflights. Iraq reportedly has succeeded in extending the range of some of
its older model air defense missiles and has made its communications less vulnerable by
installing fiber optic cable, reportedly with Chinese assistance. On July 31, 2001, U.S.
Defense Department spokesman Rear Admiral Quigley told reporters that Iraq has shown “a
considerably more aggressive stance in trying to bring down a coalition aircraft.” He noted
continuing provocations by Iraq against allied aircraft over the two no-fly zones, especially
in the southern zone, and allied retaliations (number of days on which allied aircraft have
struck Iraqi targets in response):
! Southern Watch: 221 provocations in 2000 (18.4 per month); 370 in the first
seven months of 2001 (30.8 per month).
! Northern Watch: 145 provocations in 2000 (12.1 per month); 62 in the first
seven months of 2001 (8.9 per month).
In response, allied forces conducted strikes on Iraqi targets in the Southern Watch area on
32 days in 2000 and 19 days during the first 7 months of 2001; in the Northern Watch area,
on 48 days in 2000 and 7 days during the first 7 months of 2001.
U.S. officials have acknowledged increased risks to allied pilots posed by Iraqi
challenges and have made further efforts to counteract them. On June 4, 2001, U.S.
Secretary of Defense Donald Rumsfeld told reporters that “there is a risk to pilots that fly in
areas that are dangerous and defended.” He added that “[t]he risk grows to the extent that
other nations assist Iraq in strengthening its military capability, its air defense capability and
its ability to proceed with its clear and unambiguous desire to have increasingly powerful
weapons and military capabilities.” On August 3, he said: “[i]t does appear that Iraq has been
successful in quantitatively and qualitatively improving their air defenses.” According to news
reports, allied strikes have been increasingly designed to set back recent improvements in Iraqi
air defense capabilities.
The February 2001 Strikes. On February 16, between the hours of 11:20 a.m. and
1:40 p.m. Washington, D.C. time, 24 U.S. and British combat aircraft struck five Iraqi air
defense command-and-control installations, using precision guided munitions. According to
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a U.S. Defense Department spokesman, four of the five installations struck by the allied
aircraft were located north of the 33rd parallel (the northern limit of the southern no-fly zone),
but the aircraft themselves did not go north of the 33rd parallel. The spokesman noted that
this was the first time since Operation Desert Fox that allied aircraft had hit targets outside
the southern no-fly zone, although targets outside the northern zone had been struck during
the fall of 1999.
According to press reports, one goal of the allied strikes was to destroy a fiber optic
cable network that Chinese are reportedly installing to upgrade the effectiveness of Iraqi air
defense radars. On March 6, China’s foreign minister said relevant agencies had investigated
these allegations and found no evidence that Chinese companies had assisted Iraq in installing
fiber optic cables for Iraqi air defenses. A March 17 Washington Post article, citing U.N.
documents and unidentified diplomats, reported that a Chinese company, Huawei
Technologies, has been seeking U.N. approval to sell Iraq telecommunications equipment and
switching systems.
Subsequent press reports indicated that many of the munitions fired by allied units had
missed their targets; according to these reports, a majority of the AGM-154A Joint Stand-Off
Weapons (JSOWs) dropped by U.S. aircraft went astray, although two other types of “smart
weapons” (AGM-130 guided missiles and Stand-Off Land Attack missiles) achieved
somewhat more success. These alleged problems have been attributed by press sources to
several possible factors: human error in programming, heavy wind, software defects,
mechanical failure, or jamming of signals by Iraqis; officials reportedly believe the first two
explanations are the most likely. Defense spokesmen have declined to identify the munitions
used in the strikes.
Additional Strikes and Provocations. Since February, allied forces have carried
out several significant strikes against Iraqi air defense installations, including an Iraqi mobile
early warning radar in southern Iraq on April 19, an air defense site in northern Iraq on April
20, an air defense installation 180 miles southeast of Baghdad on May 18, and an air defense
site in northern Iraq on August 7. On August 10, in the largest air strike since February, U.S.
and British aircraft hit three installations: a surface-to-air missile battery 170 miles southeast
of Baghdad, an associated long-range mobile radar system, and a fiber optic communications
station 70 miles southeast of Baghdad. Before this strike, on July 29, U.S. National Security
Advisor Condoleeza Rice told CNN that the Administration is contemplating the use of
“military force in a more resolute manner” and said that “Saddam Hussein is on the radar
screen for the Administration.”
Meanwhile, some observers believe Iraqi air defense forces may be improving their
ability to target allied aircraft. On July 24, Iraqi forces fired a surface-to-air missile at a U.S.
high altitude U-2 reconnaissance aircraft, and Defense Department sources reportedly said
the missile came close to hitting the plane. On August 27, according to the U.S. Defense
Department, a U.S. Air Force RQ-1B Predator – an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV or
“drone”) – was reported missing over southern Iraq while on a routine mission in support of
Operation Southern Watch. A Defense Department statement described the Predator as “one
of many systems used for reconnaissance and surveillance to monitor Iraqi compliance with
United Nations Security Council Resolutions.” Iraqi media claimed that Iraq's air defense
units successfully hit the UAV, while the U.S. Defense Department statement said the aircraft
may have crashed or may have been shot down. According to the U.S. Defense Department,
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no sensitive technology was compromised by the loss of the aircraft. Press reports have
noted, however, that if the Iraqi claim is correct, it would be the first time that a U.S. aircraft
involved in enforcing the Northern or Southern Watch Operations has been brought down by
enemy fire. A second RQ-1B was lost over southern Iraq on September 11 and a third on
October 10. Again, Iraqi media claimed responsibility for both losses but U.S. military
spokesmen said they had not confirmed the cause. According to a U.S. military spokesman
commenting on the first incident, U.S. officials are aware of efforts by Iraq to bring down a
manned allied aircraft.
Aftermath of the Terrorist Attacks. The Iraqi government was the only Middle
East regime that did not send condolences to the United States after the September 11
attacks, although Iraq officials did express sympathy to several U.S. non-government
organizations known to oppose U.S. containment policies toward Iraq. According to
numerous press reports, U.S. officials have found no hard evidence of an Iraqi hand in the
attacks or subsequent cases of anthrax, although some U.S. officials suspect Iraqi
involvement. Some commentators have pointed to several alleged meetings in recent years
between Iraqi intelligence officials and members of Osama bin Laden’s Al Qaeda organization
and speculated that Iraq could provide Al Qaeda with money and expertise on chemical and
biological warfare. Other commentators counter that Saddam and bin Laden have different
views and ideologies and note that Iraq has been trying recently to cultivate better relations
with western countries in an effort to gain support for terminating economic sanctions
imposed after Iraq invaded Kuwait in 1990.
On October 7, 2001, U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations John D. Negroponte
delivered a warning to his Iraqi counterpart stating that the United States would launch
military strikes against Iraq if it tried to attack its neighbors, aid anti-U.S. forces in
Afghanistan, or move against domestic opposition groups such as the Kurds in northern Iraq
while the United States is involved in its counter-terrorism campaign. Iraqi Ambassador
Muhammad al-Douri rejected the warning on the following day as “stupid” and said “What
you have warned about is not on Iraq’s agenda.” On October 11, U.S. Defense Department
spokesmen were quoted as saying that there had been no significant increase in skirmishes
between allied forces and Iraqi forces since the September 11 attacks. According to a
November 19 press article, even in the absence of evidence linking Iraq to the attacks, some
U.S. officials are in favor of more strikes against Iraq because of its efforts to acquire mass
destruction weapons, its refusal to readmit U.N. weapons inspectors, and its long-standing
support for terrorism. In a press interview on October 28, Iraqi Deputy Prime Minister Tariq
Aziz accused the United States and Britain of trying to overthrow the Iraq regime under the
guise of fighting terrorism and charged that the two governments had plans to strike 300
targets in Iraq with 1,000 missiles. According to a February 15, 2002 press report, Aziz said
Iraq would consider readmitting U.N. weapons inspectors, but only if other countries in the
region were subject to the same inspection process.
On January 29, 2002, in his State of the Union address, President Bush described Iraq,
Iran, and North Korea as constituting “an axis of evil.” Secretary of State Colin Powell told
a Senate committee on February 5 that Iraq “remains a significant threat to the [Middle East]
region’s stability.” He added that “we have not ruled out other options” with respect to Iraq
and went on to say that “we believe strongly in regime change in Iraq.” On February 19,
National Security Adviser Condoleezza Rice was quoted by the press as saying that “[w]e’re
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pursuing a range of policy options, including, for instance, trying to change the nature of the
sanctions with Iraq.”
Force Deployments and Costs
The 1998 Build-Up
U.S. force levels have fluctuated somewhat since the latest series of confrontations that
began in the fall of 1997. During the mid-1990s, U.S. forces in the Persian Gulf region on
an average comprised 15,000 to 20,000 personnel (many of them Navy and Marine Corps
personnel embarked on ships), together with up to 200 aircraft and 20 ships, usually but not
always including an aircraft carrier. The first phase of the crisis saw U.S. force levels increase
to more than 40,000 personnel in late February and March, reinforced with British and other
allied contingents. As the crisis receded later in the spring, forces were briefly drawn back
down to their pre-1997 levels.
As the crisis worsened again in the fall of 1998, U.S. force levels in the Gulf began to
climb once more. Additional deployments begun on November 11 were briefly halted after
November 16, following cancellation of planned allied strikes in response to a last-minute
understanding reached with Iraq. As Iraq failed to honor its November commitments,
Secretary Cohen announced “a sharp increase in our forces in the Gulf” (approximately
24,100 personnel as of December 15). Cohen and General Shelton announced the
deployment of a “crisis response force” consisting of nearly 60 additional Air Force and
Marine jet fighters (including 10 F-117A radar-evading stealth fighters), additional Patriot
missiles, elements of an Army brigade (some 2,700 troops), and a second aircraft carrier, the
U.S.S. Carl Vinson with up to 60 Navy jet fighters, to the Gulf region. According to
subsequent reports, up to 15,000 additional military personnel were deployed or ordered to
the region. During Operation Desert Fox, Defense Department officials said U.S. force
strength in the Gulf reached 29,900 on December 19, together with 37 ships and 348 aircraft.
After Desert Fox
These forces were once more reduced after Operation Desert Fox was over, even though
smaller scale military action continued. U.S. commanders pointed out that the lack of an
effective Iraqi response to Desert Fox made the reinforcements unnecessary at this time, and
said the United States would return to a normal continuous presence in the Gulf. Most U.S.
personnel in the region, including those conducting Operation Southern Watch, are assigned
to the U.S. Central Command (CENTCOM), whose area of responsibility covers large parts
of the Middle East and portions of nearby northeastern Africa. U.S. forces conducting
Operation Northern Watch are based in Turkey and assigned to U.S. European Command
(EUCOM). The task forces responsible for enforcing the two no-fly zones are linked by a hot
line and coordinate many of their operations. On September 12, 2000, a Defense Department
official said that at any given time the United States has between 20,000 and 25,000 personnel
in the region, most of them afloat. The total number of U.S. military aircraft (Navy and Air
Force) in the Gulf region has generally averaged about 200 in recent years. Ship totals vary;
as of June 2001, the U.S. Navy had 20 ships (including one aircraft carrier and eight other
combatants) in the Gulf region. Table 1 provides figures on U.S. troop strength in the Gulf
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region as of March 31, 2001, but these figures represent the situation before the September
11 attacks.
As of August 1999, Britain had 1,400 military personnel, a supply ship, and 26 military
aircraft in the Gulf region, including 12 Tornado GR-1 bombers operating out of Kuwait and
6 Tornado air defense aircraft in Saudi Arabia. A more recent news report, on October 25,
2000, places British personnel strength in the Northern Watch area of operations at 162. This
figure does not include British personnel in the Southern Watch area.
Table 1. U.S. Force Levels in Persian Gulf Region
Marine
Air
Country/Area
Total
Army
Navy
Corps
Force
Bahrain
1,026
29
779
191
27
Kuwait
4,838
2,215
7
586
2,030
Oman
193
3
1
9
180
Qatar
51
36
3
0
12
Saudi Arabia
5,233
770
30
393
4,040
United Arab Emirates
418
0
7
6
405
Afloat*
20,138
0
20,138
0
0
Source: Department of Defense, as of March 31, 2001. Figures since the September 11 terrorist attacks are
not available.
*This figure includes other areas not in the immediate vicinity of the Persian Gulf.
Costs
A Defense Department spokesman told reporters on November 17, 1998 that expanded
military operations and crisis build-ups in the Gulf since the war in 1991 had cost a total of
$6.9 billion. Much of this figure represents the costs of enforcing the no-fly zones over
northern and southern Iraq. Following are costs estimates for several other crisis build-ups
and retaliatory operations undertaken by the United States between 1991 and 1997.
! Troop movements and retaliatory strikes against Iraq, December 1992-
January 1993: $400 million
! Troop deployments to counter Iraqi force movements, October 1994
(Operation Vigilant Warrior): $257 million (partially defrayed by Kuwait and
Saudi Arabia)
! Retaliatory strikes following Iraqi incursion into protected northern zone,
August-September 1996 (Operation Desert Strike): $102.7 million.
Incremental costs of U.S. operations in the Persian Gulf since FY1997 appear in Table
2, below.
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Britain, according to an August 23, 1999 London Times report, is spending
approximately 4.5 million pounds ($7.19 million at exchange rate of U.K. 1 pound=U.S.
$1.5974) per month on its deployments in the Gulf.
Table 2. Costs of Persian Gulf Operations
(in U.S. $ millions)
Operation
FY1998
FY1999
FY2000
FY2001*
Southern Watch
1,497.2
954.8
755.4
678.0
Northern Watch
136.0
156.4
143.6
138.7
Desert Spring (Kuwait training)**
5.6
13.8
239.8
241.8
Desert Thunder (Nov. 1998 build-up)
n/a
43.5
n/a
n/a
Desert Fox (Dec. 1998 air strikes)
n/a
92.9
n/a
n/a
Totals
1,638.8
1,261.4
1,138.8
1,058.5
Source: Department of Defense, Comptroller.
*Estimate.
**Known as Intrinsic Action until FY2000.
U.S. and International Reactions
Administration Position on Use of Force
U.S. administrations have taken the position that they already have sufficient authority
to use military force to compel Iraqi compliance. On February 3, 1998, during an earlier
phase of the present confrontation, Clinton Administration officials reportedly cited the joint
resolution passed by Congress on the eve of the 1991 Gulf war (P.L. 102-1) as the basis for
this authority. P.L. 102-1 has no expiration date, and some specialists in international law
agree that this law provides sufficient authority to U.S. administrations to use force against
Iraq.
In the international context, the United States believes that two previous U.N. Security
Council resolutions provide sufficient authority to use force against Iraq: Resolution 678
(November 29, 1990), which authorized military action after Iraq’s invasion of Kuwait, and
Resolution 687 (April 3, 1991), which made a cease-fire conditional on Iraqi compliance with
various specified terms, including the inspection and dismantling of Iraq’s lethal weapons
programs. U.N. Security Council Resolution 1154 of March 2, 1998 (see above) does not
specifically mention the use of force, but warns Iraq of “severest consequences” for violation.
In a news conference on March 11, President Clinton said “We believe that the resolution
gives us the authority to take whatever actions are necessary. But, of course, we would
consult [with other Security Council members].” Subsequently, U.N. Security Council
Resolution 1205 of November 5, 1998 condemned Iraq’s refusal to cooperate with UNSCOM
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as a “flagrant violation” of Resolution 687 and other relevant agreements, and expressed full
support for efforts by the Secretary General to seek full implementation of the February 23
agreement. Other members of the Security Council, however, with the notable exception of
Britain, do not believe that the wording of recent U.N. Security Council resolutions provides
an automatic trigger authorizing military force.
Congressional Reactions
Congress has been largely supportive of Administration efforts to compel Iraqi
compliance with U.N. resolutions. Some Members have argued for even stronger measures
against Iraq, although others believe the Administration should seek further congressional
authorization before engaging in any significant escalation of hostilities. Congress has also
appropriated funds to defray the cost of increased U.S. force deployments to the Gulf since
1997 (see CRS Report 98-386, Iraq: Post-War Challenges and U.S. Responses, 1991-1998,
updated March 31, 1999, for further information on costs and appropriations).
Some Republican Members of Congress questioned the timing of the Clinton
Administration’s decision to launch the strikes in December 1998, noting that the decision
coincided with the floor debates in the House on impeachment of then President Clinton. The
President denied that issue of impeachment was related to his decision to launch air strikes,
and said the timing was dictated by the need for surprise, along with his desire to avoid
starting hostilities during the month of Ramadan. On December 17, 1998, the House of
Representatives passed H.Res. 612, expressing unequivocal support for the men and women
of our Armed Forces carrying out missions in the Persian Gulf region, and supporting efforts
to remove Saddam Hussein from power, by 417 to 5, with one voting “present” (Roll No.
539).
Some Members of Congress have expressed support for expanding the campaign against
terrorism to Iraq, in the aftermath of the September 11 terrorist attacks on the United States.
On December 20, 2001, the House of Representatives passed H.J.Res. 75, entitled
“Regarding inspection and monitoring to prevent the development of weapons of mass
destruction in Iraq”, by 392 to 12, with 7 present, Roll no. 511. Among other things, this
resolution stated that Iraq “remains in material and unacceptable breach of its international
obligations” and that Iraq’s refusal to allow U.N. weapons inspectors “immediate,
unconditional, and unrestricted access ... presents a mounting threat to the United States, its
friends and allies, and international peace and security.” President Bush has also demanded
that Iraq agree to a resumption of U.N. weapons inspections.
International Reactions
International reactions to U.S. reprisals against Iraq have been mixed and have varied
according to the nature of the crisis that precipitated a U.S. military response. On the whole,
altered international conditions have caused some erosion since 1991 in international support
for the use of force against Iraq. Contributing factors include U.S.-Russian tensions, Arab
disillusionment with broader U.S. Middle East policies, diminished Arab concerns over a
potential threat from Iraq, and increasing sympathy for the sufferings of the Iraqi people.
Most European allies supported Desert Fox, as did Japan, South Korea, Australia, and
Canada. Britain, on its part, has continued to participate in U.S. military actions against Iraq
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and, along with the United States, takes the position that existing U.N. resolutions provide
the necessary legal basis for such action. France, on the other hand, regretted the air strikes
and China and Russia condemned them. France also suspended its participation in the allied
overflights of southern Iraq. The latter three countries have continued to criticize the U.S.-
British retaliatory responses to Iraqi challenges in the no-fly zones since December 1998.
Criticism increased after the February 16, 2001 allied strikes on Iraq’s air defense
installations. According to the Kremlin, Russian President Vladimir Putin described the
strikes as “counter-productive for the process of a political settlement” and the French
Foreign Minister said there was “no legal basis for this type of bombardment.” Turkey’s
Prime Minister said “[t]he U.S. Administration should have informed us beforehand” of the
strikes. In east Asia, Japan declined either to endorse or to criticize the strikes, but South
Korea’s national news agency warned that the “policy of strangling Iraq” has failed to achieve
its goals. Meanwhile, according to a U.S. official, the U.S. State Department has been in
touch with China about reports of Chinese assistance in upgrading Iraqi air defense units.
Most Arab leaders were restrained in their comments on the December 1998 strikes, but
hostile demonstrations took place in several countries including Egypt, Jordan, Yemen,
Palestinian areas, and Syria (where they briefly turned violent). The 55-member Islamic
Conference Organization appealed for a halt to the attacks on Iraq. Kuwait and Oman, alone
among the six pro-western Gulf states, allowed U.S. and British combat aircraft to launch
strikes from bases on their territory. The other four, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, Qatar, and the
United Arab Emirates (UAE), allowed support operations and including air space clearance
and take-off by refueling planes. Saudi Arabia expressed hopes that the strikes would end
quickly, and the UAE Defense Minister went so far as to say “the option of force should not
even have been considered, as the only ones who suffer are the Iraqi people.” On December
30, 1998, Saudi Defense Minister Prince Sultan reaffirmed that Saudi Arabia would not agree
to air strikes from its territory, but called on Iraq to implement U.N. Security Council
resolutions.
Arab countries have reacted ambivalently to follow-on allied military operations against
Iraq during 1999 and 2000. Gulf states have not publicly endorsed U.S. responses to Iraqi
challenges in the no-fly zones and Qatar’s foreign minister expressed concern during a joint
news conference with then Secretary of Defense Cohen on March 9, 1999, commenting that
“We do not wish to see Iraq bombed daily or these attacks which are being made in the no-fly
zones.” An Arab League foreign ministers’ meeting on March 18 called for an end to all
operations against Iraq not backed by the U.N. Security Council, but urged all countries to
abide by Security Council resolutions in “spirit and letter.” A year later, on April 9, 2000,
Saudi Minister of Defense Prince Sultan made the following statement in a news conference:
... the [U.S.] troops which have been in Saudi Arabia since the end of Desert Storm are
within the frame of United Nations assignments and directions to continue the surveillance
of southern Iraq, and also the border of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia, as well as the other
GCC countries. And these troops are doing their duties to protect peace only, and not for
aggression.
Saudi officials continue to cite provocations by Iraq. On June 4, 2001, the Saudi Ambassador
to the United Nations charged that Iraq had staged 11 raids on Saudi border outposts during
recent months.
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Arab governments, including those friendly to the United States, denounced the allied
strikes conducted against Iraqi air defense installations on February 16, 2001. The Secretary
General of the Arab League stated that the raid “has no justification, violates international
law, and has provoked anger and resentment in the Arab world.” Egypt’s Foreign Minister
called the raid “a serious negative step that we cannot accept,” while his Jordanian
counterpart said Jordan “never condones the use of military force against Iraq.” Saudi Arabia
initially withheld official comment and a senior Saudi official said his country was not
previously informed of the strikes. On February 21, however, Saudi Foreign Minister Prince
Saud al-Faysal during a visit to Damascus issued a joint statement with the Syrian Foreign
Minister that “[b]oth sides expressed feelings of denunciation and anxiety over the recent
escalation against south Baghdad.” In nearby Oman, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
commented that “[t]hose attacks will not benefit regional security or negotiations and
discussions.” Since the September 11 attacks, friendly Arab leaders have urged the United
States not to expand the current war against terrorism to target Iraq or other Arab countries.
A Washington Post article on January 18, 2002, described Saudi leaders as increasingly
uncomfortable with the U.S. military presence in their country and indicated that senior
Saudis would like to devise “other forms of less conspicuous military cooperation” once the
Afghan campaign is over. Secretary of State Colin Powell, however, told a news conference
on the same day that there had been no discussion of such an issue with Saudi officials, and
White House spokesman Ari Fleischer said President Bush “believes that the current
arrangements [with Saudi Arabia] are working and working well.”
Plans and Alternatives
Military options present various challenges. Ship-borne missile strikes against selected
Iraqi targets incur relatively few risks and have the added advantage of not requiring
overflight permission or logistical support from Gulf allies; however, missile strikes have had
only limited effects in the past. Supplementing missile strikes with a more massive bombing
campaign could succeed in destroying some key military organizations, weapons production
facilities, and command and logistical installations, as in the recent Desert Fox operation. A
bombing campaign, however, entails risks to U.S. pilots and aircrews, inflicts more civilian
casualties, and elicits significant opposition within the Arab world. A further limiting factor
is the unwillingness of Saudi Arabia and some other Gulf states to permit air strikes from their
territory. Operation Desert Fox, which combined missile strikes and a bombing campaign,
was more extensive than any of the previous post-1991 confrontations, but some analysts still
feel that it represented a limited operation producing limited results.
After Operation Desert Fox, the Clinton Administration seemed to adopt a policy of
limited escalation, including responses to Iraqi challenges in the no-fly zones through low-
level aerial bombardment and missile strikes. On March 1, 1999, commenting on the
expanded rules of engagement governing allied military action against Iraq, then Secretary of
Defense Cohen told reporters that U.S. pilots “have been given greater flexibility to attack
those systems which place them in jeopardy” and added that pilots can go after command,
control, and communications centers as well as simply respond to provocation from an
antiaircraft or air defense missile site. The Bush Administration appears to have continued
this policy. In describing the allied air strikes against Iraqi air defense installations on
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February 16, 2001, a Defense spokesman said such strikes on targets outside the no-fly zones
are not routine, but they do occur occasionally “as part and parcel to protecting our aircraft.”
Ground action, which would probably be necessary if the U.S. government should seek
to overturn the Iraqi regime, would not be feasible without more widespread allied support
than currently exists; neither Saudi Arabia nor any other neighboring country is likely to
permit the United States to stage a ground invasion of Iraq from its territory. A ground
invasion would be costly, particularly if the object were to unseat the incumbent regime.
Members of Congress from both parties have expressed support for military action
against Iraq, as noted above. Some have suggested that diplomatic efforts have been
exhausted and that failure to retaliate will embolden Saddam to mount more serious
challenges. At the same time, others have expressed concern over the burdens placed on U.S.
Air Force assets by continuing air operations over Iraq, as well as the risks to pilots in the
event of a mechanical failure or a successful hit by an Iraqi air defense unit. There have been
suggestions to scale back the U.S. presence in the Gulf and rely more on long-range power
projection capabilities. According to a Chicago Tribune article on March 29, 2001, U.S.
Army General Tommy R. Franks, Commander of Central Command, presented Secretary
Rumsfeld and his deputy with four options: (1) continue with current enforcement of no-fly
zones over Iraq, (2) increase combat strikes, (3) reduce combat flights while increasing
reconnaissance (possibly with the use of satellites), or (4) eliminate enforcement entirely.
General Franks reportedly told the House Armed Services Committee on March 28, however,
that “[e]nforcement of the no-fly zones will remain a dangerous but necessary business.” In
a subsequent press interview, he recommended that the no-fly zones continue in some form,
pointing out that as long as the United States has vital interests in the region and remains
concerned over the threat of mass destruction weapons, “it will be necessary to keep Saddam
[Hussein] in his box.”
U.S. officials and analysts have suggested various other options that could be used in
conjunction with or as a substitute for a conventional military attack. These options include
further curtailments on Iraqi military activity, more emphasis on unconventional warfare, or
more active support for anti-government militia or other opposition groups in their efforts to
topple the regime of Saddam Hussein. For example, the United States could consider
extending the two no-fly zones imposed by the allies over northern and southern Iraq to cover
the entire country, coupled with a ban on helicopter flights and imposition of “no-drive” zones
forbidding movement of Iraqi armored forces in designated areas. To enforce such measures,
however, the United States and its allies would have to allocate more assets, incur greater
risks, and deal with further challenges by Iraq. Another approach would involve covert action
against the Iraqi regime, combined with an expanded program to buttress the efforts of
opposition groups. (For more information, see CRS Report RS20843, Iraq: U.S. Efforts to
Change the Regime, by Kenneth Katzman.) Many analysts believe the opposition is too
fragmented and lacking in support within the Iraqi heartland to be effective, and cite the
failure of previous efforts to build a viable opposition in Iraq. Others maintain that the United
States has provided insufficient support to opposition groups and missed key opportunities
to further their efforts.
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Table 3. Comparative Military Strengths and Inventories: Gulf States
Field Artillery
Naval Units
Other
Attack
Surface
Military
Self-
Combat
Sub-
Country
Tanks Armored Towed
Heli-
Combat-
Personnel
Propelled
Aircraft
marines
Vehicles
copters
ants
Saudi
183,500
910
5,017
260
200
33
417
8
0
Arabia
United
Arab
65,000
331
1,178
93
177
49
101
2
0
Emirates
Oman
43,500
117
284
91
24
0
40
0
0
Kuwait
15,300
293
545
0
41
20
82
0
0
Qatar
12,330
44
284
12
28
19
18
0
0
Bahrain
11,000
106
411
36
62
40
34
1
0
Total:
330,630
1,801
7,719
492
532
161
692
11
0
Allies
Iraq
429,000
2,200
4,400
1,900
150
120
316
0
0
Iran
513,000
1,135
1,145
1,950
290
129
296*
3
5
Source:
International Institute for Strategic Studies, The Military Balance 2000-2001. (Note: Figures
shown here do not include materiel believed to be in storage and inoperable.)
* Includes aircraft flown from Iraq to Iran during 1991 Gulf war.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Issue Brief IB92117. Iraqi Compliance with Cease-Fire Agreements, by Kenneth
Katzman.
CRS Report 98-386. Iraq: Post-War Challenges and U.S. Responses, 1991-1998, by Alfred
B. Prados.
CRS Report RS20843. Iraq: U.S. Efforts to Change the Regime, by Kenneth Katzman.
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