Order Code IB94040
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S.
Military Involvement
Updated February 4, 2002
Nina M. Serafino
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Context for the Debate
The Definitional Problem
Current U.S. Military Participation in Peacekeeping
PDD 25 and Clinton Administration Policy
The Bush Administration Seeks Reductions in Peacekeeping Deployments; QDR
Promises to Address Issues Created by Peacekeeping
Issues of U.S. Military Involvement
Executive Consultation and Congressional Approval
Funding Issues: Costs and Reimbursements
Costs
The Bush Administration FY2002 Appropriations Request
U.N. Reimbursements
Suitability and Desirability as a U.S. Military Mission
The Readiness Controversy and Related Concerns
Training Effects
Deployment Strains
Debate Over Force Size and Structure
Greater Use of the Reserves
Bosnia and Kosovo Debates
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Issue Briefs
CRS Reports

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Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement
SUMMARY
For almost a decade, Congress has
missions. As the number of troops under U.N.
expressed reservations about many complex
control declined steeply, the first concern
and intertwined peacekeeping issues. The Bush
became less pressing. Regarding the second,
Administration’s desire to reduce the commit-
Congress is currently informed through regular
ment of U.S. troops to international peace-
monthly consultation between the armed
keeping stems largely from the major concerns
services and foreign affairs committees
of recent Congresses: that peacekeeping duties
(usually at the staff level) and executive branch
are detrimental to military “readiness,” i.e., the
officers. Other important concerns have been
ability of U.S. troops to defend the nations.
the high cost of and the appropriate method
Critics, however, are concerned that
for funding DOD peacekeeping activities, and
withdrawals of U.S. troops from peacekeeping
how much of U.S. contributions to U.N.
commitments will undermine U.S. leadership.
peacekeeping should be reimbursed.
Thousands of U.S. military personnel
Currently, the most salient Congressional
currently serve in or support peacekeeping
peacekeeping concern is the military
operations, performing tasks ranging from
“readiness” issue. Members and military
providing humanitarian relief to monitoring
analysts worry that costs drain funds that DOD
and enforcing cease-fires or other agreements
uses to prepare its forces to defend against a
designed to separate parties in conflict. Of
threat to U.S. vital interests, and that troops
these, 43 were serving in seven operations
deployed for peacekeeping lose their facility
under U.N. control (as of October 31, 2001).
for performing combat tasks. A related issue is
Others are serving full-time in operations run
the suitability and desirability of U.S. military
unilaterally by the Department of Defense
participation in peacekeeping operations.
(DOD) or together with U.S. allies in support
of these operations, particularly the NATO
The Bush Administration has sought to
Stabilization Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and the
negotiate with allies concerning reductions in
NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR). About 37,000
U.S. military involvement in international
more serve in or support peacekeeping opera-
peacekeeping operations, but it hasn’t rejected
tions in South Korea. These “peacekeeping”
the use of such operations as a foreign policy
operations are undertaken to promote, main-
tool. With U.S. troops and those of other
tain, enforce, or enhance the possibilities for
NATO nations deployed in seemingly indefi-
peace, and can sometimes be dangerous.
nite peacekeeping commitments in Bosnia and
Kosovo, a key issue facing the 107th Congress
For Congress, two initial issues were (1)
is what, if any, adjustments should be made in
whether U.S. troops should be placed under
order to perform peacekeeping missions with
U.N. control and (2) when the President shou-
less strain on the force, or whether the United
ld consult with and seek congressional ap-
States should continue to participate in these
proval to deploy U.S. troops on peacekeeping
missions at all.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The Bush Administration submitted its budget for FY2003 to Congress on February 4.
Documents available as of that date do not include a breakdown for the Overseas
Contingency Operations Transfer Fund, the account from which peacekeeping operations
are funded.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Many questions have been raised in debate over U.S. involvement in international
peacekeeping. These have ranged from the basic question of definition — what is
peacekeeping? — to the broad strategic question — how and when does it serve U.S.
interests? Some issues directly concern U.S. military involvement and are discussed here, or
in other CRS reports. For several Congresses, two primary issues were (1) when should the
President consult Congress and seek its approval to send U.S. troops on peacekeeping
missions; and (2) whether Congress should restrict the placement of U.S. troops under U.N.
control. The first issue is covered briefly below, and more completely in other CRS Reports.
The second is covered in CRS Report RL31120, Peacekeeping: Military Command and
Control Issues. Currently, Congressional attention focuses on three issues: (1) the costs of
peacekeeping, (2) peacekeeping operations’ effects on the U.S. military’s warfighting capacity
(“readiness”), and (3) the suitability and desirability of deploying U.S. troops on peacekeeping
missions. (See CRS Issue Brief IB90103, United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for
Congress, for information on the costs of U.N. operations and its capability to handle them.)
Debate over peacekeeping has been complicated by the difficult context in which the
demand for U.S. troops and funds for such operations takes place. At home, this has
included the downsizing of U.S. forces, and the press of U.S. domestic programs for funds
spent on the military and on foreign aid. Internationally, complicating factors have included
the sometimes fractious relationship between the United States as a world leader and its
allies, and the nature of current ethnic and regional conflicts.
Context for the Debate
The Definitional Problem
“Peacekeeping” is a broad, generic, and often imprecise term to describe the many
activities that the United Nations and other international organizations undertake to promote,
maintain, enforce, or enhance the possibilities for peace. These activities range from
providing observers to monitor elections, recreating police or civil defense forces for the new
governments of those countries, organizing humanitarian relief efforts, and monitoring and
enforcing cease- fires and other arrangements designed to separate parties recently in conflict.
The use of the term “peacekeeping” gained currency in the late 1950s, when United Nations
peacekeeping efforts mostly fit a narrower definition: providing an “interpositional” force to
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separate parties that had been in conflict and to supervise the keeping of a peace accord they
had signed. In 1992, the United Nations began to use a broader terminology to describe the
different types of peacekeeping activities. In particular, it created the term “peace
enforcement” to describe operations where peacekeepers are allowed to use force because
of a greater possibility of conflict or a threat to their safety. Subsequently, the Administration
and executive branch agencies replaced the term “peacekeeping” with “peace operations.”
(DOD categorizes peace operations among its “operations other than war” [OOTW].)
Congress has tended to use the term “peacekeeping,” as does this Issue Brief. The
definitional problem stems from a semantic dilemma: no single term currently in use can
accurately capture the broad and ambiguous nature of all these types of operations. Use of
any term with the word “peace” conveys the misleading impression that they are without risk,
when, in fact, “peace” operations can place soldiers in hostile situations resembling war.
Current U.S. Military Participation in Peacekeeping
Thousands of U.S. military personnel participate full-time in a wide variety of activities
that fall under the rubric of peacekeeping operations, most sponsored or otherwise endorsed
by the United Nations. As of October 31, 2001, 43 U.S. troops were serving in seven U.N.
peacekeeping operations. These were located in the Middle East (14 in two operations), the
Western Sahara (15), Georgia (2), Kosovo (2), East Timor (3), and Ethiopia/Eritrea (7).
Other U.S. forces are deployed in operations that the United States undertakes by itself or in
cooperation with other nations under U.N. authority. As of November 1, 2001, some 3,132
U.S. troops were participating in the NATO Bosnia Stabilization Force (SFOR), and 6,515
in the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR), with another 1,309 in Macedonia providing support to
KFOR. (Numbers fluctuate with troop rotations.) Over 37,000 U.S. troops serve in South
Korea under bilateral U.S.-Republic of Korea agreements and U.N. authority. Another 865
serve in the coalition Multilateral Force (MFO) in the Sinai, which has no U.N. affiliation.
There is no sign of any reduction in these numbers due to the Afghanistan operation.
Approximately 20,000 (the numbers have fluctuated somewhat) U.S. troops — mostly
sailors and marines — usually have been involved in Southwest Asia around Iraq for the past
several years, enforcing maritime sanctions in the Arabian Sea and two no-fly zones over
northern and southern Iraq. (The Bush Administration had budgeted for 18,000 during
FY2002.) These tasks are among those involved in “peace enforcement” efforts, i.e., the
upper end of the peacekeeping spectrum where unstable situations require the threat or
application of military force, although the Bush Administration has decided to budget them
as ongoing peacetime U.S. activities. The air operations — Northern Watch and Southern
Watch — are performed in coalition with the United Kingdom. (See CRS Report 98-120,
Iraq Crisis: U.S. and Allied Forces, for information on U.S. activities around Iraq.) Several
other nations contribute to operations in the Arabian Sea.
PDD 25 and Clinton Administration Policy
On May 3, 1994, President Clinton signed a classified presidential decision directive
(PDD 25) that defined the scope and conditions of future U.S. participation in, and
contributions to, multilateral (mostly United Nations) peacekeeping efforts. (References in
this Issue Brief are to a 15-page unclassified summary, “The Clinton Administration’s Policy
on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,” Department of State Publication 10161, May
1994.) As the Clinton Administration’s statement of peacekeeping policy, which remains in
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effect for the Bush Administration unless revoked or superseded by a subsequent directive,
it defined guidelines for U.S. support of and U.S. military participation in multilateral
peacekeeping operations that narrowed the broad, “assertive” multilateralist vision the
Administration expounded during its first year which had cast the United Nations, with U.S.
support, as a central player in ensuring world stability. PDD 25 delineated the more
restrained role for peacekeeping that Administration officials articulated after the deaths of
U.S. special operations forces in Somalia in 1993 made peacekeeping operations highly
controversial. (See CRS Report 94-260, Peacekeeping in Future U.S. Foreign Policy, for
a discussion of PDD 25 and a copy of the unclassified summary.)
Under PDD 25 guidelines, a primary consideration for U.S. support of multilateral
peacekeeping operations was to be whether “there is a threat to or breach of international
peace and security.” Basic considerations for political and financial support were whether
U.N. or other peacekeeping operations advanced U.S. interests and whether other countries
would commit adequate resources. In deciding whether to send U.S. troops, other factors
to consider were: whether the U.S. presence is essential to an operation’s success, the risks
to U.S. troops are acceptable, resources are available, and domestic and congressional
support “exists or can be marshaled.” Where U.S. troops might encounter combat, other
factors included whether there are: “a determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve
clearly defined objectives;” “a plan to achieve those objectives decisively;” and “a
commitment to reassess and adjust” as necessary the size, composition, and use of forces.
Despite PDD 25 and its guidelines, or perhaps because of it, the debate over
peacekeeping intensified. Some critics judged it as “significant revolution” in U.S. security
policy that could result in “increased subordination of American Military forces and U.S.
foreign policy prerogatives to the U.N.” (S.Rept. 103-282) Others found the guidelines either
too vague or too restrictive. Some doubted that they could prevent the U.S. military from
becoming entangled in missions that initially appeared manageable, but eventually would cost
more lives and money than U.S. interests would merit. In addition, the Clinton
Administration may not have adhered to PDD 25 guidelines in decisionmaking on subsequent
peacekeeping operations. GAO attempts to investigate this have been thwarted by a lack of
cooperation from executive agencies. (See GAO testimony of Nov. 1, 2000, GAO-01-180T,
U.N. Peacekeeping: Access to Records Concerning the U.S. Decision-making Process.)
The Bush Administration Seeks Reductions in Peacekeeping
Deployments; QDR Promises to Address Issues Created by
Peacekeeping
During his presidential campaign, President Bush expressed a dislike for open-ended
“nation-building” missions involving U.S. ground forces, but did not promise any specific
actions regarding peacekeeping operations. However, Condeleeza Rice, then his foreign
policy advisor and currently National Security Advisor, stated during the campaign that if
elected Bush would end U.S. participation in Balkans peacekeeping operations. Since the
election, Secretary of Defense Donald H. Rumsfeld urged a withdrawal of U.S. troops from
peacekeeping duties, with specific references to the Balkans and the Sinai, and from the
training of African troops for peacekeeping, although in early June he acknowledged that U.S.
troops must be present in Kosovo. Secretary of State Colin Powell (who as an active-duty
army general was known for deep reservations regarding peacekeeping) has emphasized that
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the United States must respect its commitments abroad. Critics of reducing or withdrawing
U.S. commitments have argued, however, that relatively few U.S. troops are involved in
peacekeeping operations compared to the large forward presence of the U.S. elsewhere,
including some 37,000 troops (technically involved in peacekeeping) in Korea and some
40,000 in Japan.
Bush Administration actions are consistent with President-elect Bush’s remarks in early
2001 that he was “in consultation with our allies” concerning his desire to reduce the U.S.
peacekeeping presence in the Balkans. Denying that he intended to precipitously withdraw
U.S. troops, the President-elect nonetheless stated that “we’d like for them [the allies] to be
the peacekeepers....And it’s going to take a while.” (New York Times, January 14, 2001) After
that, the de facto Bush Administration policy, at least towards Bosnia, appeared to be to
quietly seek to minimize forces through negotiations with U.S. allies. For Bosnia, the Bush
administration sought to reduce the U.S. presence through established NATO procedures.
Despite news reports that an announcement would be made at the June 7-8 NATO defense
ministers meeting cutting SFOR strength from some 21,000 to 18,000 military personnel, with
the U.S. contingent cut by about 500 from some 3,600 to 3,100, no such announcement was
made. However, DOD documentation for the amended budget cited U.S. troop strength in
Bosnia at that point in late summer at 3,250, to be maintained through FY2002. (For more
on Bush Administration statements and policy regarding U.S. troops in Bosnia, see CRS
Report RL30906, Bosnia-Hercegovina and U.S. Policy. For U.S. military commitments
abroad, see [http://web1.whs.osd.mil/mmid/military/miltop.htm].)
No new U.S. troops participated in NATO’s 30-day Macedonia arms collection
operation which commenced in mid-August 2001 under the leadership of the British. U.S.
troops already in Macedonia attached to the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) provided
transport and logistics support, but did not participate in the collection of weapons. Nor are
U.S. troops participating in the British-led Afghanistan peacekeeping force.
The September 30, 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) suggested, however, that
the Bush Administration was willing to maintain peacekeeping in its military tool kit to help
deter aggression in selected circumstances and areas. The QDR stated that the United States
must, together with its allies and friends, “maintain and prepare” its forces for peacetime
“smaller-scale contingency operations;” smaller-scale contingency operations is a category
which includes support for humanitarian operations and disaster relief, peace accord
implementation and other forms of peacekeeping, maritime sanction and “no fly” zone
enforcement, shows of force, counterdrug operations, noncombatant evacuation operations,
and strikes and other limited intervention. The document (available through the Department
of Defense website) also stated that “DoD will explicitly plan to provide a rotational base –
a larger base of forces from which to provide forward deployed forces – to support long-
standing contingency commitments in the critical areas of interest....Moreover, DoD will
ensure that it has sufficient numbers of specialized forces and capabilities to ensure that it
does not overstress elements of the force when it is involved in smaller-scale contingency
operations.”
In short, the document promises that DOD will address the stresses created by current
policies for deploying forces to contingency operations such as peacekeeping (see sections
on the readiness controversy, below) and by the current mix of U.S. forces that many view
as inappropriate to handle the current range of operations. The document also states that the
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new planning construct to be employed by DOD “explicitly calls for the force to be sized for
defending the homeland, forward deterrence, warfighting missions, and the conduct of
smaller-scale contingency operations.” It does not, however, specify any increase in the total
size of the force.
Issues of U.S. Military Involvement
Executive Consultation and Congressional Approval
A primary concern of Congress is that it be consulted about the commitment of U.S.
forces in peacekeeping operations; many Members also want Congress’ approval sought if
and when U.S. forces are to be placed at risk. Debate over the type of consultation and
approval that the executive branch must seek is a continuation of the ongoing dispute
regarding powers under the Constitution to deploy U.S. troops abroad into hostilities. The
War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148), a 1973 legislative attempt to clarify that dispute,
requires the President to consult with and report to Congress any introduction of U.S. forces
into hostilities or imminent hostilities. The War Powers Resolution also requires that troops
usually be withdrawn after 60 days if Congress does not approve a continued stay. It does
not provide a mechanism for Congress to disapprove the initial deployment of troops.
Congress’ primary power to exercise control over peacekeeping deployments and
expenditures is the power of the purse, but many consider this insufficient. Not all Members
wish to change this situation, preferring not to take a position on uses of force abroad.
The first session of the 104th Congress rejected attempts to repeal the War Powers Act
and substitute another mechanism. Since then, several Congress’ have debated placing
conditions on peacekeeping deployments, although most such efforts have been defeated.
The Bush Administration is continuing the practice, adopted during the Clinton years, of
informing Congress of ongoing and/or planned operations through monthly meetings with
staff of the armed services and foreign affairs committees.
Funding Issues: Costs and Reimbursements
As U.S. spending on U.S. and U.N. peacekeeping activities soared in the early to mid-
1990s, Congress became increasingly concerned about the costs of those operations. Because
the “incremental” costs of peacekeeping and other military contingency operations generally
have been funded through supplemental appropriations, DOD has had to postpone and cancel
training and maintenance and to rescind funds from weapons modernizations and other
accounts. Supplemental appropriations designated as “emergency” funding do not disrupt
DOD activities and plans, but they can be controversial as they can raise overall spending
above the budget caps set by Congress. During the second session of the 104th Congress,
Members sought to resolve the problem by budgeting funding for ongoing missions in an
“Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund,” (OCOTF) in the annual DOD measures.
This mechanism was included in legislation of the 105th and 106th Congresses, but the
President still sought supplemental funding for Bosnia, and then Kosovo, in subsequent years.
(For more information on the concept of incremental costs, and on legislative and executive
attempts to create more efficient methods of funding contingency operations see CRS Report
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98-823, Military Contingency Funding for Bosnia, Southwest Asia, and Other Operations:
Questions and Answers.)
Costs. Until the 1990s, DOD did not keep a central accounting of figures on
peacekeeping because these “incremental” costs (i.e., the amount spent on peacekeeping over
that which would have been normally spent on regular salaries, and on routine training,
equipment repairs and replacements) were minimal. At the end of this report, there is a
detailed chart of DOD incremental costs (actuals) of peacekeeping and related security
operations from FY1991-FY2000, and part-year FY2001 incremental costs, all in current
dollars. Incremental costs in constant FY2002 dollars though FY2000 are available in CRS
Report RS21013, Costs of Major U.S. Wars and Recent U.S. Overseas Military Operations.
The Bush Administration FY2002 Appropriations Request.
On June 27,
2001, the Bush Administration submitted a revised FY2002 defense budget, calling for $2.8
billion ($2,844,226,000) in FY2002 funding for the OCOTF, slightly lower than the
preliminary FY2002 request (submitted in February 2001) of $2.993 billion. The $2.8 billion
is intended to cover incremental costs in Bosnia and Kosovo. As of FY2002, the Bush
Administration decided to fund operations in Southwest Asia directly through each of the
services’ accounts, rather than through the OCOTF. (In documents for the amended budget
made public in late summer 2001, DOD projected FY2002 Southwest Asia (SWA) at a
rounded figure of $1.2 billion.) A July 2001 GAO defense budget report (GAO-01-829)
warned that this change could have both positive and negative effects: while this funding
method “could provide an incentive to better control costs,” it could also mean that Congress
will no longer be able to track the expenditure of those funds and know of their possible
diversion to other uses. The GAO suggested that Congress could require (1) written
notification if funds intended for SWA were obligated for other purposes and (2) that DOD
continue to report monthly on the costs of SWA operations.
Congressional Action. The conference version of the FY2002 DOD authorization
bill, filed December 12 (S. 1438, H.Rept. 107-333), contained the full $2.8 million Bush
Administration request for Balkans funding in the OCOTF accounts, and a House restriction.
The restriction limits obligations for DOD incremental costs for Bosnia peacekeeping to
$1,315.6 million and for Kosovo peacekeeping to $1,528.6 million, unless the President
should waive the limit by certifying to Congress that increased funding would serve U.S.
national security interests and submits a supplemental appropriations request for the additional
DOD funding. Following the Administration’s lead, the bill incorporates funding for
Southwest Asia (SWA) operations in the services’ regular budget accounts rather than the
OCOTF, without specifying the amount. It was approved by the House and Senate on
December 13, and signed into law (P.L. 107-107) on December 28, 2001.
The conference version of the DOD appropriations bill, H.R. 3338, placed both the
Balkans and SWA funds in the services’ accounts, providing some $50 million in the OCOTF
as a “central response fund from which the Secretary of Defense can address unknown and
unexpected overseas continency costs,” according to the bill’s statement of the managers
(H.Rept. 107-350). (Both the House and Senate versions of the bill had followed the
Administration’s lead, placing funding for the Balkans in the OCOTF for the Balkans (with
slightly less than the Administration’s request) and an unspecified amount for SWA
operations in the service’s regular budget accounts.) The statement broke down the total
amount for Balkans operations – some $2.144 billion or about $650 million less than the
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President’s request – among the services in the operations and maintenance, and the military
personnel accounts, but did not specify the amounts for SWA operations. The conference
report was approved by the House and Senate on December 20, 2001, and signed into law
(P.L. 107-117) on January 10, 2002.
Congress took steps, however, to ensure that information would be public on the
amounts requested for contingency operations. Section 8097 of H.R. 3338/P.L. 107-117
requires the FY2003 and all future budget requests to “include separate budget justification
documents for costs of United States Armed Forces’ participation in contingency operations
for the Military Personnel accounts, the Overseas Continency Operations Transfer Fund, the
Operation and Maintenance accounts, and the Procurement accounts.”
U.N. Reimbursements. Some Members argue that the costs of U.S. direct or
indirect support for U.N. and U.N.-sanctioned operations, including DOD incremental costs,
should be credited towards the payment of U.S. assessments for U.N. peacekeeping
operations and other payments to the U.N. (See CRS Issue Brief IB90103 for more on U.N.
assessments.) (In the 104th Congress, provisions to credit such support towards U.S.
assessments for U.N. peacekeeping were included in “Contract with America” legislation –
S. 5 and H.R. 7 – but did not become law.) Currently, the United States is reimbursed only
for the troops which it contributes to actual U.N. operations, and for assistance provided
under Letters of Assist where the U.N. specifically pledges reimbursement. A little under
one-third of U.N. reimbursements for troop contributions is credited to DOD to cover DOD’s
incremental costs in deploying troops; the remainder is credited to the State Department.
Policymakers who object to provisions requiring reimbursement for all costs to the
United States of supporting U.N. operations note that such assistance is voluntary and would
not be provided if it were not in the U.S. interest. Also, many other countries provide
voluntary support that is not reimbursed or credited to their assessments by the United
Nations. A State Department compilation of the 1995 voluntary contributions of the United
States and 13 other countries to support U.N. peacekeeping operations (excluding economic
and humanitarian aid), shows that the United States provided 57%, 11 NATO countries and
Australia some 42%, and Japan slightly under one percent. (The contributions are
incremental costs for either FY1995 or calendar year 1995.) Subsequently, the State
Department questioned whether these figures, because of the different methods used to
compile them, presented a valid comparison, and did not update them. (An exhaustive CRS
attempt in 1999 to gather information on NATO contributions to Kosovo found no single,
definitive source of consistent data on military and non-military contributions, and at best
could provide an approximate idea of relative costs. See CRS Report RL30398, NATO
Burdensharing and Kosovo, A Preliminary Report.)
The FY2001 and FY2002 DOD appropriations acts did not repeat provisions of the
DOD appropriations acts for FY1998-FY2000 regarding reimbursement, which required
quarterly reports from the Defense Secretary on all DOD costs in support of the U.N.
peacekeeping and U.N. Security Council resolutions, a detailing “all efforts” made to seek
credit against past U.N. expenditures and to seek compensation from the U.N. for DOD costs
incurred in implementing and supporting U.N. activities. They did, however, repeat
provisions from those acts requiring DOD to notify specified committees 15 days before
obligating or spending money to transfer defense articles or services (other than intelligence)
to another nation or an international organization for use in any U.N. or other international
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peacekeeping, peace-enforcement or humanitarian operation. (Section 8072 in the FY2002
version.)
Suitability and Desirability as a U.S. Military Mission
Some analysts question whether military forces in general and U.S. military forces in
particular are, by character, doctrine, and training, suited to carry out peacekeeping
operations. One reason given is that military forces cultivate the instincts and skills to be
fighters, while the skills and instincts needed for peacekeeping are those inculcated by law
enforcement training. (In some peacekeeping operations, however, the military’s training to
work in units and employ higher levels of force are seen as necessary.) Another reason is that
peacekeeping requires a different approach than combat operations. Many senior U.S.
military planners hold that successful military action requires “overwhelming” force. U.S.
troops are taught to apply “decisive” force to defeat an enemy. Most peacekeeping tasks,
however, require restraint, not an “overwhelming” or “decisive” use of force.
As the military has gained more experience with peacekeeping missions and analyzed
their requirements, and as some officers and analysts have begun to look more favorably on
peacekeeping as a mission, many assert that to be a good peacekeeper, one must first be a
good soldier. (“Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it,” states the
Army field manual outlining doctrine on Peace Operations, FM 100-23, in a quote attributed
to former U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold.) In part this argument is based on the
growing recognition that troops in peacekeeping operations need military and combat skills
to respond to unanticipated risks, in part it is based on the judgment that part of the task of
a peacekeeping operation is to provide a deterrent to the continued use of force and that the
most credible deterrent is a soldier well-trained for combat. U.S. military participation in
peacekeeping has become regarded more favorably by some military officers who argue that
although combat skills deteriorate (“degrade”) during peace operations, many other skills
necessary for military operations are enhanced. (See section on Training Effects, below.)
Questions also arise as to whether peacekeeping is a desirable mission for U.S. forces.
On the one hand, some point out that as representatives of the sole world “superpower,”
U.S. troops are particularly vulnerable to attempts to sabotage peacekeeping operations by
those who want to convince potential followers of their power by successfully engaging U.S.
forces. On the other, analysts note that other countries are often reluctant to commit forces
if the United States does not, and that U.S. participation in peacekeeping is an important part
of “shaping” the world environment to decrease the possibilities of future conflict and war.
In recent years, the military services made several changes to adjust for peacekeeping
missions. In particular, the U.S. military has been increasing special training for peacekeeping
functions. Most of the training is for units who are deployed, or expect to be deployed, for
peace operations: the Army norm is that units should receive four to six weeks of special
training. The unified commands have developed exercise programs involving staff planning,
command and control, simulated deployments, and training with non-governmental
organizations and foreign militaries. Units that are drawn upon for peacekeeping operations
have also incorporated training for peace operations in their normal training routines.
Some analysts argue that U.S. combat forces should not be used for peacekeeping.
Instead, they suggest two options: establish a separate peacekeeping force, distinct from the
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current military service branches, or create special units dedicated solely to peacekeeping
within the current services. (In PDD 25, the Administration stated that it did not support the
concept of a standing U.N. army, nor would it earmark military units for participation in U.N.
peacekeeping operations.) The military has resisted the concept of dedicated units.
On June 12, 2001, DOD sponsored a briefing on an Institute of Defense Analysis
defense transformation study commissioned by the Secretary of Defense that recommended
the creation of a standing humanitarian joint task force, “with a joint command and control
capability similar to our war-fighting capability...with some immediately [sic] airlift and
security capabilities” to respond to humanitarian crises. According to the briefing transcript
([http://www.defenselink.mil/news/Jun2001/t06122001_t612tran.html]), the task force would
precede civilian contractors to the field as a stop-gap measure in a benign environment and
for a limited time in a more troubled environment where “the circumstances required a
military response.” These do not appear to be the type of dedicated peacekeeping units
envisioned by some, but questions might be raised as to whether they eventually engage in
humanitarian interventions that could require a longer than anticipated military presence.
The Readiness Controversy and Related Concerns
“Readiness” issues have been a driving force in congressional debate over the extent to
which the U.S. military should engage in peacekeeping. Readiness is a subjective and
ambiguous concept referring to the degree to which the armed forces are “prepared” — i.e.,
currently in training and well-equipped — to defend the nation. As the U.S. military has been
increasingly called upon to perform peacekeeping and other non-combat missions — at the
same time as it has downsized significantly — Members have questioned whether U.S.
military forces can perform their “core” mission, i.e., national defense where U.S. vital
interests are threatened, if they engage extensively in other activities. Readiness, as related
to peacekeeping, depends on several factors: the size of the force, the numbers of troops
devoted to specific tasks (force structure), the size, length, and frequency of deployments
(operational tempo), and opportunities for training in combat skills during a peace operation.
There is some difference of opinion concerning the importance of the readiness issue.
Peacekeeping (and all other operations other than war) is directly related to the readiness
problem, if one is looking strictly at the results of the readiness ratings that are calculated
periodically. That is because all the standards – all the factors and tests – that are used to
measure “readiness” only measure the military’s combat preparedness, that is, its ability to
fight and win wars. These standards measure the availability of a unit’s personnel, the state
of a unit’s equipment, and the performance of a unit’s members on tests of their wartime
skills. When the military deploys large numbers of personnel to peacekeeping operations,
scores on these measures can decline, and they have declined in some cases.
This happens for several reasons. For one, people are transferred from units that are not
deployed to peace operations to take part in peacekeeping. Second, funds for training and
equipment have been diverted in the past to fund peacekeeping operations. Third, military
personnel cannot continue to practice all their combat skills when participating in peace
operations; and fourth, the U.S. military has been deployed for peacekeeping operations at
the same time that the size of the force, particularly the army, has been reduced substantially.
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Whether a potential or actual “degradation” of readiness ratings is important depends
on one’s perspective on the utility of readiness measures. The standard of readiness ratings
is based on the concept that the U.S. military must be prepared to fight two nearly
simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs). Those who believe that in holding the military
to that standard when there are many other necessary military missions see the measures as
flawed. They believe that peacekeeping is a significant mission and argue that readiness
standards should also measure, or otherwise account for, performance of peacekeeping tasks.

If one looks at the larger “readiness” problem, that is the perception that U.S. military
personnel are in general overworked and underpaid, that military equipment is in poor shape,
that there are rampant shortages of spare parts, and that the military forces cannot recruit and
retain needed personnel, the relationship of peacekeeping to readiness is less pronounced.
Peacekeeping is responsible to some extent for this larger readiness problem, but there are
many other contributing factors. The strong economy is frequently cited as impairing the
military’s ability to recruit and retain personnel. Equipment is deteriorating and spare parts
are increasingly in demand not only because of peacekeeping deployments, but also in many
cases because the equipment was old and deteriorating. The area in which peacekeeping most
affects readiness is the stress that frequent deployments have placed on certain troops – the
so-called increase in Operational tempo (optempo) and personnel tempo (perstempo).
Training Effects. The effects of peace operations on a soldier’s ability to maintain
military and combat skills through training has been a source of concern; military analysts and
personnel have noticed mixed effects on soldiers’ skills, and thus on readiness. For some
types of military activities and skills, participation in peacekeeping operations is considered
to be a good substitute for normal training activities. This is true for many activities short of
high-intensity combat skills, e.g., support functions, such as intelligence, medical, logistics,
transportation and engineering, where units deployed in peacekeeping perform tasks that are
quite similar to their wartime tasks, and in an environment that approaches a wartime
environment. Many military officers and analysts state that peacekeeping operations provide
far superior opportunities for small unit commanders to develop leadership skills than do
normal training exercises. Nevertheless, for combat personnel, it is indisputable that some
combat skills may deteriorate and the “warrior” spirit may be taxed by the mundane tasks
performed and the restraint required by peacekeeping. All acknowledge that participation in
peacekeeping operations significantly “degrades” crucial combat skills such as shooting (“live
firepower”) skills, coordination of the use of weapons and equipment (combined arms skills),
and large unit maneuver ability, which cannot be practiced in a peace operation. (The longer
the deployment, the greater the deterioration of skills, according to some analysts.) To
reduce such deterioration, efforts are made for troops to continue some level of combat
training during peacekeeping deployments. For instance, the Army provides opportunities
for those deployed to Bosnia and Kosovo to practice wartime skills while on duty.
Deployment Strains. The increased “optempo” demanded by peacekeeping takes
time from necessary maintenance, repairs, and combat training, and can shorten the useful life
of equipment. The “perstempo” problem is regarded as particularly severe for the Army. For
several years, the Army was deploying the same units over and over to peacekeeping
operations, and the pace of deployment was viewed as too demanding, affecting morale by
keeping personnel away from families for too long, and, some argue, affecting recruitment.
In one of the first publicly-available studies of the stresses caused by peacekeeping, a March
1995 GAO report (GAO/NSIAD-95-51) found that the increasing “op tempo,” deployments
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due to peacekeeping, and reduced force structure taxed certain Navy and Marine Corps units,
and “heavily” stressed certain Army support forces, such as quartermaster and transportation
units, and specialized Air Force aircraft critical to the early stages of a MRC, to an extent that
could endanger DOD’s ability to respond quickly to MRCs. DOD disagreed at the time, but
the pace of operations subsequently became a source of concern throughout the services and
DOD, as well as in Congress. A July 2000 GAO report (GAO/NSIAD-00-164) found several
shortages in forces needed for contingency operations, including an inadequate number of
active-duty civil affairs personnel, Navy/Marine Corps land-based EA-6B squadrons, fully
trained and available Air Force AWACs aircraft crews, and fully-trained U-2 pilots.
The Army has also taken steps to deal with some of its problems by the realignment and
better management of its resources, as has the Air Force. In recent years, the army has
addressed perstempo strains by limiting deployments to 6 months, and including national
guard and reserve units among those on the roster to serve in Bosnia, thus attempting to
reduce the optempo of combat duty units. The Air Force, since 1999, has established Air
Expeditionary Units that deploy under a predictable rotation system in an attempt to reduce
the stresses of deployment to enforce no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq and to
meet other disaster and humanitarian assistance demands as they arise. Nevertheless, in July
2000, the GAO issued a report noting that the Air Force was unable to meet the demand for
aerial surveillance with AWAC aircraft because of a shortage of AWAC crews. In some cases,
however, these solutions may generate other problems. For instance, the Army’s attempts
to relieve the stresses of frequent deployments on its active forces by instead deploying
reservists may, some analysts worry, affect guard and reserve personnel recruitment and
retention. Some analysts suggest, however, that continued improvements in resource
management could ease stresses. Others prefer changes to the force size or force structure.
Debate Over Force Size and Structure. Many defense analysts and military
officers have questioned whether the military is appropriately sized and structured to fight
two MRCs and also take on peacekeeping and other so-called “non-combat” missions. For
several years, many Members have expressed concern that the U.S. military is too small and
too stretched to take on peacekeeping operations. Since the mid-1990s, several policymakers
and military experts have suggested that 540,000 would be an appropriate size for the army
to prepare for two MRCs while undertaking peacekeeping missions, i.e., considerably more
than the current 480,000 troop army end strength.
There are also proposals to restructure U.S. forces. These include proposals to increase
the total number of personnel most heavily taxed by peacekeeping, and to establish special
dedicated units for peacekeeping. Some military analysts suggest that the overall force might
be restructured to include more of the types of specialities needed for peacekeeping, and in
units sized appropriately for peace operations. For instance, civil affairs, psychological
operations (PSYOPS), and military police units are specialties that are particularly needed in
peace operations, but are in short supply in the active military. This could entail increasing
the number of such specialties in the active force and reserve, or altering the current
requirement that the military be prepared to engage in two nearly simultaneous MRCs. Some
analysts have suggested that structuring the forces to engage in one MRC and a few small-
scale contingencies such as peace operations might be more appropriate to current world
conditions; others argue that this would leave the United States too vulnerable to military
challenges from states such as Iraq and North Korea.
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Greater Use of the Reserves. Increasing use of Army reservists and National
Guardsmen in peacekeeping operations culminated in the Texas Army National Guard’s 49th
Armored Division’s assumption of command of the U.S. Bosnia SFOR contingent on March
7, 2000. Some 1,200 Texas guardsmen were in charge until October 2000, when they were
replaced by the active duty Third Infantry Division. Reportedly, it was the first time since
World War II that a National Guard General had commanded active duty Army troops, of
which there were some 3,000. For the near future, Army National Guard divisions will
alternate with active duty divisions in commanding the U.S. SFOR contingent; after October
2002 through 2005, the Army plans for it to be commanded by National Guardsmen.
Two areas of concern have been the cost of their use and the effect on recruitment and
retention. The costs of increasing the use of the Reserves and Guard for peacekeeping could
vary substantially, depending on the size of the active duty force and on the “tempo” of
operations, i.e., the size, length, and frequency of deployments, according to defense experts.
While Reservists and Guardsmen are less expensive to maintain on a daily basis than active
duty soldiers, who are paid year round, once deployed they temporarily increase the number
of active duty personnel and thus the overall cost of the force. They also add more to the
incremental cost of an operation than do active duty soldiers. GAO/NSIAD-00-162 states
that the “integration of Guard forces in peacekeeping missions such as Bosnia significantly
increases the cost of these missions...” Many defense experts fear that repeated call-ups for
reservists and guards are affecting their recruitment and retention, thus depleting the pool
available for such operations and for deployment to a major regional conflict. To mitigate
that prospect, the Army announced on March 6, 2000, that future deployments of active and
reserve components for operations other than war would be limited to 179 days. This has
displeased some reservists who desire longer tours for promotion and other career reasons.
Bosnia and Kosovo Debates
Since 1993, the Balkans debates have reflected many of the above issues. On the issue
of presidential authority to deploy troops on a NATO peacekeeping mission to Bosnia,
Congress in effect deferred to President Clinton, leaving unchallenged his initial decision to
seek congressional support, but not authorization, for the deployment. Despite continuing
reservations about the Bosnia mission, Congress has continued to fund U.S. military actions
there. Even Members who have opposed the deployment have stated that they did not wish
to deprive U.S. troops of the means to perform their mission. In 1998 and 1999,
Congressional reactions to the possibility of U.S. military action under NATO in Kosovo, a
region of the Former Republic of Yugoslavia (i.e., Serbia and Montenegro), indicated that
Members remained reluctant to restrict the President’s ability to act. Congressional action on
FY2000 and FY2001 supplemental and FY2001 regular appropriations for Kosovo indicated
continuing reluctance to restrict the President, although some Members feel strongly that it
is within the Congress’ prerogatives to do so. For information on Kosovo, Macedonia, and
Bosnia, and other provisions and legislation related to U.S. deployments there, see CRS Issue
Brief IB98041, Kosovo and U.S. Policy; CRS Issue Brief IB10027, Kosovo and Macedonia:
U.S. and Allied Military Operations; CRS Issue Brief IB93056, Bosnia: U.S. Military
Operations, and CRS Report RL30906, Bosnia-Hercegovina and U.S. Policy.
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DOD Incremental Costs of U.S. International Peace and Security Commitments, FY1991-FY2001
(Budget authority in millions of current year dollars)
FY2001 to
FY2001
FY2002
Operation
FY1991 FY1992 FY1993 FY1994 FY1995 FY1996 FY1997 FY1998 FY1999 FY2000
06/30/01
TOTALS Estimates Request
AREAS OF ONGOING OPERATIONS
Southwest Asia/Iraq
Provide Comfort/Northern Watch
325.0
101.5
116.6
91.8
138.2
88.9
93.1
136.0
156.4
143.7
11.3
1,502.5
Southern Watch/Air Expeditionary Force
–
–
715.9
333.0
468.4
576.3
597.3
1,497.2
954.8
755.4
673.5
6,571.8
Vigilant Warrior
–
--
–
–
257.7
–
–
–
–
–
–
257.7
Desert Strike/Intrinsic Action/Desert Spring
--
--
--
--
–
--
102.7
5.6
13.8
239.8
207.2
569.1
Desert Thunder (Force Buildup, 11/98)
--
--
--
--
--
--
–
–
43.5
–
–
43.5
Desert Fox (Air Strikes, 12/98)
--
--
--
--
--
--
–
–
92.9
–
–
92.9
UNIKOM (UN/Iraq Observer Group)
21.5
4.9
6.0
–
--
–
–
–
–
–
–
32.4

Total Southwest Asia/Iraq
346.5
106.4
838.5
424.8
864.3
665.2
793.1
1,638.8
1,261.4
1,138.9
992.0
9,069.9
1,227.3 See Notes
Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia)
IFOR/SFOR/Joint Forge
–
--
--
--
--
2,231.7
2,087.5
1,792.8
1,431.2
1,381.8
919.9
9,844.9
Other Former Yugoslavia Operations*
--
5.8
138.8
292.0
347.4
288.3
195.0
169.9
155.4
101.3
61.5
1,755.4
Total Bosnia
--
5.8
138.8
292.0
347.4
2,520.0
2,282.5
1,962.7
1,586.6
1,483.1
981.4
11,600.3
1,348.5
1,315.6
Former Yugoslavia (Kosovo)
Balkan Calm (Observer Mission, Pre-Air War)
–
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
34.6
–
–
34.6
Eagle Eye (Air Verification 10/98-03/99)
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
20.3
–
–
20.3
Noble Anvil (Air War)
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
1,891.4
–
–
1,891.4
Joint Guardian (KFOR)
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
1,044.5
1,803.1
931.4
3,779.0
Sustain Hope (Refugee Assistance)
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
141.6
–
–
141.6
Total Kosovo
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
3,132.4
1,803.1
931.4
5,866.9
1,743.7
1,528.6
Korea Readiness*
–
–
–
69.7
90.9
–
–
–
–
–
–
160.6
–
–
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02-04-02
FY2001 to
FY2001
FY2002
Operation
FY1991 FY1992 FY1993 FY1994 FY1995 FY1996 FY1997 FY1998 FY1999 FY2000
06/30/01
TOTALS Estimates Request
COMPLETED OPERATIONS
Haiti*
Safe Harbor
–
9.3
–
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
9.3
Embargo/Interdiction/Sanctions Enforcement
–
–
2.8
65.8
–
--
--
--
--
--
--
68.6
Uphold Democracy
--
–
–
198.2
448.8
–
--
--
--
--
--
647.0
UNMIH
--
–
–
–
56.5
86.9
–
--
--
--
--
143.4
Total Haiti
--
9.3
2.8
264.0
505.3
86.9
–
--
--
--
--
868.3
Somalia
–
1.6
943.1
528.0
49.4
–
--
--
--
--
--
1,522.1
Rwanda
--
1.0
106.7
36.5
--
--
--
--
--
--
144.2
Angola
--
0.5
0.1
2.6
–
--
--
--
--
--
--
3.2
Cambodia
--
0.5
0.5
5.0
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
6.0
Western Sahara
--
0.9
0.3
0.1
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
1.3
East Timor (Operation Stabilize)
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
1.5
56.8
–
58.3
TOTALS
346.5
125.0
1,925.1
1,692.9
1,893.8
3,272.1
3,075.6
3,601.5
5,981.9
4,481.8
2,904.8
29,301.1
4,319.5
2,844.2
Source: Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller); FY2001 figures provided August 23, 2001.
*Notes: This chart consists of the DOD incremental costs involved in U.S. support for and participation in peacekeeping and in related humanitarian and security operations, including U.S. unilateral
operations, NATO operations, U.N. operations, and ad hoc coalition operations. Opinion as to which of them constitute “peacekeeping” or “peace operations” differ. U.N. reimbursements are not
deducted. Totals may not add due to rounding. Other Former Yugoslavia operations include Able Sentry (Macedonia), Deny Flight/Decisive Edge, UNCRO (Zagreb), Sharp Guard (Adriatic), Provide
Promise (Humanitarian Assistance), Deliberate Forge. Because Korea Readiness has long been considered an on-going peacetime function of U.S. troops, DOD only counts above-normal levels of activity
as incremental costs. The Haiti accounts do not include the DOD processing of Haitian migrants, which totaled $108.1 million in FY1994 and $63.7 million in FY1995. As of FY2002, the Bush
Administration has determined that costs for Southwest Asia will be included in the services’ budgets, therefore only a rounded figure of $1,200.0 is available in public budget documents.
For figures in constant FY2002 dollars through FY2000, see CRS Report RS21013, Costs of Major U.S. Wars and Recent U.S. Overseas Military Operations.
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FOR ADDITIONAL READING
U.S. General Accounting Office. Contingency Operations: Providing Critical Capabilities
Poses Challenges. [Washington] GAO/NSIAD-00-164. July 2000.
—— Defense Budget: Fiscal Year 2000 Contingency Operations Costs and Funding
[Washington] GAO/NSIAD-00-168. June 2000.
—— Defense Budget: Need for Continued Visibility over Use of Contingency Funds.
[Washington] GAO-01-829. July 2001.
—— Force Structure: Army Is Integrating Active and Reserve Combat Forces, but
Challenges Remain. [Washington] GAO/NSIAD-00-102. July 2000.
—— Military Operations: Impact of Operations Other Than War on the Services Varies.
[Washington] GAO/NSIAD-99-69. May 1999.
—— Military Readiness: Improvements Still Needed in Assessing Military Readiness.
[Washington] GAO/T-NSIAD-97-107. March 11, 1998.
—— Military Readiness: Observations on Personnel Readiness in Later Deploying Army
Divisions. [Washington] GAO/T-NSIAD-98-126. March 20, 1998.
—— Military Readiness: Readiness Reports Do Not Provide a Clear Assessment of Army
Equipment. [Washington] GAO/NSIAD-99-119. June 1999.
—— Quality of Life for U.S. Soldiers Deployed in the Balkans. [Washington] GAO-01-
201R. December 14, 2000.
—— Reserve Forces: Cost, Funding, and Use of Army Reserve Components in Peacekeeping
Operations. [Washington] GAO/T-NSIAD-98-126, March 20, 1998.
CRS Issue Briefs
CRS Issue Brief IB81050. War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance, by Richard
Grimmett.
CRS Reports
CRS Report RL30172. Instances of Use of United States Armed Forces Abroad, 1798-1999,
by Richard F. Grimmett.
CRS Report RL30384: Military Interventions by U.S. Forces from Vietnam to Bosnia:
Background, Outcomes, and “Lessons Learned” for Kosovo,” by Nina M. Serafino.
CRS Report 98-41. Military Readiness, Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) and Personnel
Tempo (PERSTEMPO): Are U.S. Force Doing Too Much? by Michael C. Ryan.
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