Order Code IB88093
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Drug Control:
International Policy and Options
Updated January 31, 2002
Rensselaer Lee
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Problem
Current International Narcotics Control Policy
Eradication of Narcotic Crops
Interdiction and Law Enforcement
International Cooperation
Sanctions/Economic Assistance
Institution Development
Policy Options
Overview
Expansion of Efforts to Reduce Production at the Source
Political and Economic Tradeoffs
Use of Sanctions or Positive Incentives
Expansion of Interdiction and Enforcement Activities to Disrupt Supply
Lines/Expanding the Role of the Military
Expansion of Efforts to Reduce Worldwide Demand
Expansion of Economic Disincentives for Illicit Drug Trafficking
Initiatives by the Clinton Administration
Bush Administration Anti-Drug Strategy
Certification Issues
Plan Colombia
Andean Counterdrug Initiative
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Reports

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Drug Control: International Policy and Options
SUMMARY
Efforts to reduce the flow of illicit drugs
ment Congress waived the drug certification
from abroad into the United States greatly
requirements for 2002 in December 2001,
have so far not succeeded. Moreover, over
while requiring the President, with certain
the past decade, worldwide production of
exceptions, to designate and withhold assis-
illicit drugs has risen dramatically: opium and
tance from countries that had failed demon-
marijuana production has roughly doubled and
strably to meet their counternarcotics obliga-
coca production tripled. Also, street prices of
tions.
cocaine and heroin have fallen significantly in
the past 20 years, reflecting increased avail-
P.L.106-246, “Plan Colombia,” a $1.3
ability. A major area of ongoing concern is:
billion military assistance-focused initiative to
how effective can international narcotics
provide emergency supplemental narcotics
control programs be in helping to reduce
assistance to Colombia, was signed into law
consumption?
July 13, 2000. On April 9, 2001, President
Bush unveiled an Andean Counterdrug
Despite national political resolve to deal
Initiative (ACI) to succeed Plan Colombia, and
with the drug problem, inherent contradictions
requested $731 million in FY2002 funds for
regularly appear between U.S. anti-drug policy
the program. On December 20, Congress
and other policy goals and concerns. Pursuit of
appropriated $625 million for the program,
these goals can sometimes affect foreign policy
$106 million below the President’s request.
interests and bring political instability and
economic dislocation to countries where
Policy options addressed in this brief include:
narcotics production has become entrenched
—Expansion of efforts to reduce foreign
economically and socially. Drug supply inter-
production at the source.
diction programs and U.S. systems to facilitate
—Expansion of interdiction and enforcement
the international movement of goods, people,
activities to disrupt supply lines.
and wealth are often at odds. U.S. interna-
—Expansion of efforts to reduce worldwide
tional narcotics policy requires cooperative
demand.
efforts by many nations which may have do-
—Expansion of economic disincentives for
mestic and foreign policy goals that compete
international drug trafficking.
with the requirements of drug control.
For CRS products relevant to this sub-
The mix of competing domestic and
ject, see CRS Issue Brief IB95025, Drug
international pressures and priorities has
Supply Control: Current Legislation; CRS
produced an ongoing series of disputes within
Report 98-159, Narcotics Certification of
and between the legislative and executive
Drug Producing and Trafficking Nations:
branches concerning U.S. international drug
Questions and Answers; CRS Report
policy. One contentious issue has been the
RL30541, Colombia: U.S. Assistance and
Congressionally-mandated certification pro-
Current Legislation; and CRS Report
cess, an instrument designed to induce
RL31016, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI):
specified drug-exporting countries to prioritize
FY2002 Assistance for Colombia and Neigh-
or pay more attention to the fight against
bors.
narcotics businesses. In a significant develop-
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
An ongoing series of United States and Northern Alliance military victories against
Taliban and al Qaeda forces in Afghanistan raise questions regarding the future of
Afghanistan’s lucrative illicit opium trade and the role of drug eradication and drug
income-substitution programs in a post-Taliban Afghanistan. Also at issue, is the degree
to which – if at all – counter-terrorism policy and programs should be linked efforts to curb
illicit drug trafficking in regions such as Afghanistan, the Balkans, the Bekaa Valley, and
Colombia. (See also CRS Report RS21041, Taliban and the Drug Trade).
In Colombia, the Government and the country’s largest guerrilla group, the
Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) agreed to establish a specific timetable
for peace talks on January 20, 2002. The sides set a target date of April 7 for a truce
accord. The FARC and other armed groups are important players in the Colombian drug
trade, earning hundreds of millions of dollars annually from the business. An important
issue is whether the peace process in Colombia can be linked to tangible steps by insurgent
factions to curb their participation in illicit drug trafficking.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Problem
More than13 million Americans buy illicit drugs and use them more than once per month,
spending by most conservative estimates over $60 billion annually in a diverse and fragmented
criminal market. Such drugs are to varying degrees injurious to the health, judgment,
productivity and general well-being of their users. Economic costs associated with drug
abuse are estimated at $110 billion. The addictive nature of many of these drugs, their high
price, and their illegality play a role in more than half the street crime in the United States.
The U.S. illicit drug market generates enormous profits that enable the growth of diversified
international criminal organizations, and extend their reach into local neighborhoods,
legitimate business, and even national governments. Such profits provide drug trafficking
organizations with the resources to effectively evade and compete with law enforcement
agencies, to penetrate legitimate economic structures, and, in some instances, to challenge the
authority of national governments.
Measured in dollar value, at least four-fifths of all the illicit drugs consumed in the U.S.
are of foreign origin, including virtually all the cocaine and heroin. Of the marijuana
consumed in the United States, 25% to 35% is domestically produced and most of the
hallucinogens and illegally marketed psychotherapeutic drugs and “designer” drugs are of
domestic origin.
Drugs are a lucrative business and a mainspring of global criminal activity. The State
Department estimates that 768 tons of cocaine potentially could have been produced from
coca leaf grown in South America in 2000. If sold internationally at an average U.S. street
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price per gram of $100, the drug would yield a gross value of almost $77 billion, a figure
exceeding the gross domestic product of many nations. Little is known about the distribution
of revenues from illicit drug sales, but foreign supply cartels exercise considerable control
over wholesale distribution in the United States and illicit proceeds are often laundered and
invested through foreign banks and financial institutions.
The federal anti-drug initiative has two major elements: (1) reduction of demand and (2)
reduction of supply. Reduction of demand is sought through education to prevent
dependence, through treatment to cure addiction and through measures to increase prices and
risk of apprehension at the consumer level. Reduction of supply (which generally accounts
for about 66% of the federal anti-drug control budget) is sought by programs aimed at
destabilizing the operations of illicit drug cartels at all levels and severing their links to
political power, and by seizing their products, businesses, and financial assets. As most illicit
drugs are imported, a major interdiction campaign is being conducted on the U.S. borders,
at ports of entry, on the high seas, and along major foreign transshipment routes and at
production sites. An international program of source crop eradication is also being pursued.
Federal policies for the reduction of illicit supply have major international components. These
are discussed below.
Current International Narcotics Control Policy
The primary goal of U.S. international narcotics policy is to reduce the supply of illicit
narcotics flowing into the United States. A second and supporting goal is to reduce the
amount of illicit narcotics cultivated, processed, and consumed worldwide. U.S. international
narcotics control policy is implemented by a multifaceted strategy that includes the following
elements: (1) eradication of narcotic crops, (2) interdiction and law enforcement activities
in drug-producing and drug-transiting countries, (3) international cooperation, (4)
sanctions/economic assistance, and (5) institution development. The U.S. State Department’s
Bureau of International Narcotics and Law Enforcement (INL) has the lead role coordinating
U.S. international drug intervention and suppression activities.
On April 9, 2000, the President requested $731 million in economic and counternarcotics
assistance for Colombia and regional neighbors as part of an Andean Counterdrug Initiative
(ACI). The proposal differed from the Plan Colombia program in two key areas: (1)
spending on economic and social programs would be roughly equal to the drug control and
interdiction components that had been the primary focus of Plan Colombia; and (2) more than
half of the assistance was targeted to neighboring countries experiencing spillover effects from
Colombia’s civil conflict and from narcotrafficking activities in that country. The enacted
appropriations bill (P.L. 107-115) cleared by Congress on December 20, 2001, provided $625
million for the Initiative, a cut of $106 million from the President’s request, although House
and Senate conferees authorized the transfer of an additional $35 million to the ACI, subject
to Congressional notification. The enacted bill included conditions on the use of funds for
purchase of chemicals for the aerial spraying program in Colombia, limited the number of U.S.
civilian and military personnel involved in Colombia to 800, and blocked funding for
restoration of flights in support of the Peruvian air interdiction program until a system of
enhanced safeguards is in place.
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Eradication of Narcotic Crops
A long-standing U.S. official policy for international narcotics control strategy is to
reduce cultivation and production of illicit narcotics through eradication. In 2001, the United
States supported programs to eradicate coca, opium, and marijuana in a number of countries.
These efforts are conducted by a number of government agencies administering several types
of programs. The United States supports eradication by providing producer countries with
chemical herbicides, technical assistance and specialized equipment, and spray aircraft. The
U.S. Agency for International Development (AID) funds programs designed to promote
economic growth and to provide alternative sources of employment for the people currently
growing, producing, or processing illicit drugs. AID also provides balance of payments
support (especially to the Andean countries) to help offset the loss of foreign exchange (from
diminished drug exports) occurring as a result of U.S.-supported anti-drug programs. U.S.
eradication policy receives informational support from the State Department’s Office of
Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs (formerly the U.S. Information Agency (USIA)) which
publicizes the dangers of drug abuse and trafficker violence. In addition, AID sponsors drug
education and awareness programs in 33 Latin American, Asian, and East European
countries. Requested FY2002 expenditures for eradication and alternative development
globally total $332.9 million, compared to $76.0 million dispensed in 2001.
The eradication program in the Andes resulted in the elimination of an estimated 115,000
hectares of coca in Peru and Bolivia between 1995 and 2000, or 70% of the combined
cultivated area in those countries. Nevertheless, cultivation increased by 85,000 hectares or
168% over the same period. The shift in cultivation has had implications for Colombia’s civil
conflict. The State Department’s International Strategy report for 2001 notes that “The
Colombian syndicates, witnessing the vulnerability of Peruvian and Bolivian coca supply to
joint interdiction operations in the late 1990s, decided to move most of the cultivation to
Colombia’s southwest corner, an area controlled by the FARC, the country’s oldest insurgent
group.”

Interdiction and Law Enforcement
A second element of U.S. international narcotics control strategy is to help host
governments seize illicit narcotics before they reach America’s borders. A related imperative
is to attack and disrupt large aggregates of criminal power, to immobilize their top leaders and
to sever drug traffickers’ ties to the economy and to the political hierarchy. Training of
foreign law enforcement personnel constitutes a major part of such endeavors. The
Department of State funds anti-narcotics law enforcement training programs for foreign
personnel from more than 70 countries. In addition, the Department of State provides host
country anti-narcotics personnel with a wide range of equipment to perform effectively, and
U.S. Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents regularly assist foreign police forces
in their efforts to destabilize trafficking networks. U.S. efforts to promote effective law
enforcement against narcotics traffickers also include suggestions to nations on means to
strengthen their legal and judicial systems.
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International Cooperation
Essentially all elements of U.S. international narcotics control strategy require
international cooperation. By use of diplomatic initiatives, both bilateral and multilateral, the
Department of State encourages and assists nations to reduce cultivation, production, and
trafficking in illicit drugs. These bilateral agreements and international conventions have thus
far been largely ineffective in reversing the growth of international narcotics trafficking, in
part because they lack strong enforcement mechanisms and are not uniformly interpreted by
member nations.
U.S. international narcotics control strategy also requires cooperation among
governments to coordinate their border operations to interdict traffickers. To this end, the
U.S. government has provided technical assistance for anti-drug programs in other countries.
For FY2002, the State Department’s international narcotics control budget request totaled
$893 million to assist programs globally, including $101 million for Bolivia, $156 million for
Peru, and $399 million for Colombia. Also requested was $60 million for interregional
aviation support, to provide aircraft for anti-drug programs in other countries. The United
States also participates in multilateral assistance programs through the U.N. International
Drug Control Program and actively enlists the aid and support of other governments for
narcotics control projects. The U.N. currently assists 67 developing countries through
development, law enforcement, education, treatment, and rehabilitation programs. For
FY2002, the Bush Administration requested $18 million for narcotics control-related
contributions to international organizations, the majority of which constitutes the U.S.
voluntary contribution to the U.N. drug control program.
Sanctions/Economic Assistance
A fourth element of U.S. international narcotics control strategy involves the threat of,
or application of, sanctions against drug producer or trafficker nations. These range from
suspension of U.S. foreign assistance to curtailment of air transportation. Current law
requires the President to submit to Congress by March 1 each year a list of major illicit drug-
producing and transit countries that he has certified as eligible to receive U.S. foreign aid and
other economic and trade benefits. This sets in motion a 30-calendar-day review process in
which Congress can override the President’s certification and stop U.S. foreign aid from
going to specific countries.
Certification may be granted because a major illicit drug-producing or transit country has
“cooperated fully” with U.S. narcotics reduction goals or has taken “adequate steps on its
own” to achieve full compliance with the goals and objectives established by the 1988 U.N.
anti-drug trafficking convention. A country not qualifying on this basis may escape
imposition of sanctions if the President certifies U.S. “vital national interests” preclude
implementation of sanctions on that country. (See “Certification Issues,” below.)
U.S. sanctions policy has been augmented with programs of economic assistance to
major coca producing countries (see “Use of Sanctions or Positive Incentives” and “Bush
Administration Anti-Drug Strategy,” below). For FY2002 the State Department requested
for drug related alternative development: approximately $92 million for Colombia; $81.5
million for Peru; approximately $40 million for Bolivia, and $50,000 for Mexico.
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Institution Development
A fifth element of U.S. international narcotics control strategy increasingly involves
institution development, i.e. strengthening judicial and law enforcement institutions, boosting
governing capacity, and assisting in developing host nation administrative infrastructures
conducive to combatting the illicit drug trade. Institution development includes such
programs as corruption prevention, training to support the administration of justice, and
financial crimes enforcement assistance.
Policy Options
Overview
The primary goal of U.S. international narcotics control policy is to stem the flow of
foreign drugs into the United States. A number of options have been proposed to reshape
U.S. international narcotics control policy and implement it more effectively. Whatever
options are selected will likely require funding on a scale sufficient to affect the drug problem.
It is estimated that the illicit drug trade generates as much as $400 billion annually in retail
sales worldwide. Policymakers face the challenge of deciding the appropriate level of funding
required for the nation’s international narcotics control efforts within the context of
competing budgetary priorities.
Another challenge facing the U.S. international narcotics control efforts concerns how
to implement policy most effectively. Some observers argue that current U.S. policy is
fragmented and overly bilateral in nature. These analysts suggest that to achieve success,
policy options must be pursued within the context of a comprehensive plan with a multilateral
emphasis on implementation. For example, they point out that some studies indicate that
interdiction can actually increase the economic rewards to drug traffickers by raising prices
for the products they sell. They agree, however, that interdiction as part of a coordinated
plan can have a strong disrupting and destabilizing effect on trafficker operations. Some
analysts suggest that bilateral or unilateral U.S. policies are ill-suited for solving what is in
effect a multilateral problem. They cite the need for enhancing the United Nations’ ability to
deal effectively with the narcotics problem and for more international and regional
cooperation and consultation on international narcotics issues. Proponents of bilateral policy
do not necessarily reject a more multilateral approach. They point out, however, that such
multinational endeavors are intrinsically difficult to arrange, coordinate, and implement
effectively.
Some analysts believe that current efforts to reduce the flow of illicit drugs into the
United States have essentially failed and that other objectives, policies, programs, and
priorities are needed. Four major options which have been suggested, in various
combinations, as part of an overall effort are set out below.
Another congressional concern will be how to fund the new international initiative within
existing budgetary constraints, and how other domestic, military, or foreign aid programs may
be affected because of increased anti-drug expenditures.
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Expansion of Efforts to Reduce Production at the Source
This option involves expanding efforts to reduce the growth of narcotic plants and crops
in foreign countries before conversion into processed drugs. Illicit crops may either be
eradicated or purchased (and then destroyed). Eradication of illicit crops may be
accomplished by physically uprooting the plants, or by chemical or biological control agents.
Development of alternative sources of income to replace peasant income lost by
nonproduction of narcotic crops may be an important element of this option.
Proponents of expanded efforts to stop the production of narcotic crops and substances
at the source believe that reduction of the foreign supply of drugs available is an effective
means to lower levels of drug use in the United States. They argue that reduction of the
supply of cocaine — the nation’s top narcotics control priority — is a realistically achievable
option.
Proponents of vastly expanded supply reduction options, and specifically of herbicidal
crop eradication, argue that this method is the most cost-effective and efficient means of
eliminating narcotic crops. They maintain that, coupled with intensified law enforcement,
such programs will succeed since it is easier to locate and destroy crops in the field than to
locate subsequently processed drugs on smuggling routes or on the streets of U.S. cities.
Also, because crops constitute the cheapest link in the narcotics chain, producers will devote
fewer economic resources to prevent their detection than to concealing more expensive and
refined forms of the product.
Opponents of expanded supply reduction policy generally question whether reduction
of the foreign supply of narcotic drugs is achievable and whether it would have a meaningful
impact on levels of illicit drug use in the United States. They suggest that even if the supply
of foreign drugs destined for the U.S. market could be dramatically reduced, U.S. consumers
would simply switch to consumption of synthetic drug substitutes. Thus, they maintain, the
ultimate solution to the U.S. drug problem is wiping out the domestic market for illicit drugs,
not trying to eliminate the supply in source countries.
Some also fear that environmental damage will result from herbicides. As an alternative,
they urge development, research, and funding of programs designed to develop and employ
biological control agents such as coca-destroying insects and fungi that do not harm other
plants. Others argue that intensified eradication will push the drug crop frontier and the
attendant polluting affects of narcotics industries farther into ecologically sensitive jungle
areas, with little or no decrease in net cultivation.
Others question whether a global policy of simultaneous crop control is politically
feasible since many areas in the world will always be beyond U.S. control and influence. Such
critics refer to continuously shifting sources of supply, or the so-called “balloon syndrome”:
when squeezed in one place, it pops up in another. Nevertheless, many point out that the
number of large suitable growth areas is finite, and by focusing simultaneously at major
production areas, substantial reductions can be achieved if adequate funding is provided.
Some also question the value of supply reduction measures since world production and
supply of illicit drugs vastly exceeds world demand, making it unlikely that the supply surplus
could be reduced sufficiently to affect the ready availability of illicit narcotics in the U.S.
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market. Such analysts also suggest that even if worldwide supply were reduced dramatically,
the effects would be felt primarily in other nation’s drug markets. The U.S. market, they
argue, would be the last to experience supply shortfalls, because U.S. consumers pay higher
prices and because U.S. dollars are a preferred narco-currency.
Political and Economic Tradeoffs. Many suggest that expanded and effective
efforts to reduce production of illicit narcotics at the source will be met by active and violent
opposition from a combination of trafficker, political, and economic groups. In some nations,
such as Colombia, traffickers have achieved a status comparable to “a state within a state.”
In others, allegations of drug-related corruption have focused on high-level officials in the
military and federal police, as well as heads of state. In addition, some traffickers have
aligned themselves with terrorist and insurgent groups, and have reportedly funded political
candidates and parties, pro-narcotic peasant workers and trade union groups, and high
visibility popular public works projects to cultivate public support through a “Robin Hood”
image. Because many groups that benefit economically from coca are so well armed, if the
United States were successful in urging foreign governments to institute widespread use of
chemical/biological control agents, cooperating host governments could well face strong
domestic political challenge and violent opposition from trafficking groups. Heavy military
protection, at a minimum, would be required for those spraying or otherwise eradicating. It
is possible that U.S. officials, businessmen, and real assets might not be immune to
terrorist-style attacks by traffickers worldwide.
Some critics have argued, with respect to Colombia, that eradication campaigns can have
the unintended effect of aggravating the country’s ongoing civil conflict. Since Colombia’s
guerrilla groups pose as advocates of growers, spraying may broaden support for guerrilla
groups, thereby contradicting the objectives of the government’s counterinsurgency efforts
in the affected zones. Such observers believe that Colombia’s enforcement priorities should
shift to targeting critical nodes in transportation and refining and to the extent possible
sealing off traffic routes to and from the main coca producing zones. The argument is made
that interdiction can disrupt internal markets for coca derivatives and that, compared to
eradication, it imposes fewer direct costs on peasant producers and generates less political
unrest.
For some countries, production of illicit narcotics and the narcotics trade has become
an economic way of life that provides a subsistence level of income to large numbers of
people from whom those who rule draw their legitimacy. “Successful” crop reduction
campaigns seek to displace such income and those workers engaged in its production. In this
regard, these campaigns may threaten real economic and political dangers for the
governments of nations with marginal economic growth. Consequently, many analysts argue
that the governments of such low-income countries cannot be expected to launch major crop
reduction programs without the substitute income to sustain those whose income depends on
drug production.
Use of Sanctions or Positive Incentives. Those promoting expansion of efforts
to reduce production at the source face the challenge of instituting programs that effectively
reduce production of narcotic crops and production of refined narcotics without creating
unmanageable economic and political crises for target countries. A major area of concern of
such policymakers is to achieve an effective balance between the “carrot” and the “stick”
approach in U.S. relations with major illicit narcotics-producing and transit countries.
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Proponents of a sanctions policy linking foreign aid and trade benefits to U.S.
international narcotics objectives argue against “business as usual” with countries that permit
illicit drug trafficking, production, or laundering of drug profits. They assert that this policy
includes a moral dimension and that drug production and trafficking is wrong, and that the
United States should not associate with countries involved in it. Such analysts maintain that
U.S. aid and trade sanctions can provide the needed leverage for nations to reduce production
of illicit crops and their involvement in other drug related activities. They argue that both the
moral stigma of being branded as uncooperative and the threat of economic sanctions prod
many otherwise uncooperative nations into action. They further stress that trade sanctions
would be likely to provide a highly effective lever as most developing countries depend on
access to U.S. markets.
Opponents of a sanctions policy linking aid and trade to U.S. international narcotics
objectives argue that sanctions may have an undesirable effect on the political and economic
stability of target countries, making them all the more dependent on the drug trade for
income; that sanctions have little impact because many countries are not dependant on U.S.
aid; that sanctions historically have little effect unless they are multilaterally imposed; and that
sanctions are arbitrary in nature, hurt national pride in the foreign country, and are seen in
many countries as an ugly manifestation of “Yankee imperialism.” Finally, an increasing
number of analysts suggest that if sanctions are to be fully effective, they should be used in
conjunction with additional positive incentives (subject perhaps to a congressional
certification/approval process) to foster anti-drug cooperation.
Alternatively, some suggest positive incentives instead of sanctions. They believe that
narcotics-producing countries must be motivated either to refrain from growing illicit crops,
or to permit the purchase or destruction of these crops by government authorities. Many
argue that since short term economic stability of nations supplying illegal drugs may depend
upon the production and sale of illicit narcotics, it is unrealistic to expect such nations to limit
their drug-related activities meaningfully without an alternative source of income. The House
Appropriations Committee report on the 1993 foreign operations appropriations bill
suggested that when it comes to narcotics related economic development “there is too little
emphasis in either actual funding or policy.”
It has been suggested by some analysts that a massive foreign aid effort — a so-called
“mini-Marshall Plan” — is the only feasible method of persuading developing nations to curb
their production of narcotic crops. Such a plan would involve a multilateral effort with the
participation of the United States, Europe, Japan, Australia, other industrialized nations
susceptible to the drug problem, and the rich oil producing nations. The thrust of such a plan
would be to promote economic development, replacing illicit cash crops with other
marketable alternatives. Within the framework of such a plan, crops could be purchased or
else destroyed by herbicidal spraying or biological control agents while substitute crops and
markets are developed and assured. Any such program would be coupled with rigid domestic
law enforcement and penalties for non-compliance. Thus, it would require a U.S.
commitment of substantially increased enforcement assets to be used against both growers
and traffickers, and some observers assert it might require direct U.S. military involvement
at the request of the host country.
Critics find much to be concerned about in these positive incentive concepts. They warn
of the precedent of appearing to pay “protection” compensation — i.e., providing an incentive
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for economically disadvantaged countries to go into the drug export business. They also warn
of the open-ended cost of agricultural development programs and of extraterritorial police
intervention. Finding markets for viable alternative crops is yet another major constraint.
Some experts argue that typical conditions of drug crop zones–geographical remoteness,
marginal soils and, in certain countries, extreme insecurity–tend to limit prospects for legal
commercial agriculture. Such observer believe that a more promising strategy is to foster
development of legal economy in other locales, including urban areas in order to attract
people away from areas that have a comparative advantage in coca or opium production.
Expansion of Interdiction and Enforcement Activities to Disrupt
Supply Lines/Expanding the Role of the Military
Drug supply line interdiction is both a foreign and domestic issue. Many argue that the
United States should intensify law enforcement activities designed to disrupt the transit of
illicit narcotics as early in the production/transit chain as possible — well before the drugs
reach the streets of the United States. This task is conceded to be very difficult because the
United States is the world’s greatest trading nation with vast volumes of imports daily flowing
in through hundreds of sea, air, and land entry facilities, and its systems have been designed
to facilitate human and materials exchange. This has led some analysts to suggest that the
military should assume a more active role in anti-drug activities.
Congress, in the late 1980s and prior to appropriations for FY1994, had urged an
expanded role for the military in the “war on drugs.” The idea of using the military is not
novel. Outside the United States, military personnel have been involved in training and
transporting foreign anti-narcotics personnel since 1983. Periodically, there have also been
calls for multilateral military strikes against trafficking operations, as well as increased use of
U.S. elite forces in preemptive strikes against drug fields and trafficker enclaves overseas.
The military’s role in narcotics interdiction was expanded by the FY1990-1991 National
Defense Authorization Act. The conference report (H.Rept. 100-989) concluded that the
Department of Defense (DOD) can and should play a major role in narcotics interdiction.
Congress, in FY1989 and FY1990-1991 authorization acts, required DOD to promptly
provide civilian law enforcement agencies with relevant drug-related intelligence; charged the
President to direct that command, control, communications, and intelligence networks
dedicated to drug control be integrated by DOD into an effective network; restricted direct
participation by military personnel in civilian law enforcement activities to those authorized
by law; permitted the military to transport civilian law enforcement personnel outside U.S.
land area; expanded the National Guard’s role in drug interdiction activities; and authorized
additional $300 million for DOD and National Guard drug interdiction activities.
DOD’s total drug budget for 1999 was $974.9 million. It was $1,142.0 million for 2000
and $1,091.4 million for 2001.
Despite the military’s obvious ability to support drug law enforcement organizations,
questions remain as to the overall effectiveness of a major military role in narcotics
interdiction. Proponents of substantially increasing the military’s role in supporting civilian
law enforcement narcotics interdiction activity argue that narcotics trafficking poses a national
security threat to the United States; that only the military is equipped and has the resources
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to counter powerful trafficking organizations; and that counter drug support provides the
military with beneficial, realistic training.
In contrast, opponents argue that drug interdiction is a law enforcement mission, it is not
a military mission; that drug enforcement is an unconventional war which the military is
ill-equipped to fight; that a drug enforcement role detracts from readiness; that a drug
enforcement role exposes the military to corruption; that it is unwise public policy to require
the U.S. military to operate against U.S. citizens; and that the use of the military may have
serious political and diplomatic repercussions overseas. Moreover, some in the military remain
concerned about an expanded role, seeing themselves as possible scapegoats for policies that
have failed, or are likely to fail.
Expansion of Efforts to Reduce Worldwide Demand
Another commonly proposed option is to increase policy emphasis on development and
implementation of programs worldwide that aim at increasing public intolerance for illicit drug
use. Such programs, through information, technical assistance, and training in prevention and
treatment, would emphasize the health dangers of drug use, as well as the danger to regional
and national stability. The State Department’s Office of Public Diplomacy and Public Affairs
and AID currently support modest efforts in this area. Some believe these programs should
be increased and call for a more active role for the United Nations and other international
agencies in development and implementation of such demand reduction programs.
Expansion of Economic Disincentives for Illicit Drug Trafficking
Proponents of this option say that the major factor in the international drug market is not
the product, but the profit. Thus, they stress, international efforts to reduce the flow of drugs
into the United States must identify means to seize and otherwise reduce assets and profits
generated by the drug trade. Some critics point out the challenges of tracking, separating out
and confiscating criminal assets. These include the huge volume of all international electronic
transfers – some $2 trillion each day – and the movement of much illegal money outside of
formal banking channels (through hawala-type chains of money brokers).
Policymakers pursuing this option must decide whether laws in countries where they
exert influence are too lenient on financial institutions, such as banks and brokerage houses,
which knowingly facilitate financial transactions of traffickers. If the answer is “yes,” national
leaders would then take concerted action to promote harsher criminal sanctions penalizing the
movement of money generated by drug sales, including revocation of licenses of institutions
regularly engaging in such practices. Finally, those supporting this option favor increased
efforts to secure greater international cooperation on financial investigations related to money
laundering of narcotics profits, including negotiation of mutual legal assistance treaties
(MLATs).
Initiatives by the Clinton Administration
On February 7, 1994, the Clinton Administration released its National Drug Control
Strategy. Both domestically and internationally, the strategy sought to downplay the drug
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issue as a single policy driving priority. Domestically, drug policy is seen as linked with other
policy-driving goals, and is envisioned as a component element of efforts to spur economic
growth, reform health care, curb youth violence, and “empower” communities.
Internationally, the policy further integrated the priority of drug trade destruction with other
foreign policy goals such as democracy, market-based economic growth, and human rights.
Overall, the strategy represented a shift in emphasis from international programs to domestic
programs — particularly those aimed at prevention, treatment, and rehabilitation.
The Administration’s FY1998 budget request proposed $16 billion in national drug
control funding, a 5.4% increase over the estimated $15.2 billion in FY1997 budget authority.
The February 25, 1997 national strategy proposed an 8.4% increase for FY1998 over enacted
FY1997 levels for international programs and a 1.8% reduction in interdiction funding. The
FY1998 State Department request for international narcotics control and crime totaled $230
million ($214 million for narcotics and $16 million for anti-crime) – an approximate 10%
increase for international narcotics programs. For FY1998, Congress appropriated $210
million for international narcotics control and $20 million for crime – an approximate 8%
increase over FY1997 appropriations levels for narcotics. For FY1999 Congress
appropriated $236 million for international narcotics control and $20 million for international
crime; an emergency supplemental provided another $232.6 million for international narcotics
control. FY2000 appropriations were $273.8 million for narcotics and $30 million for
international crime control. The FY2001 request was $279 million for narcotics and $45
million for crime. The FY2002 request was $893 million for narcotics and $55 million for
crime.
In September 21, 1999 congressional testimony, SOUTHCOM Commander General
Charles Wilhelm stated that the United States wanted to use an airfield in Costa Rica as a base
to provide increased monitoring of heavily used Eastern Pacific drug trafficking routes. The
U.S. currently has Forward Operating Locations (FOLs) at Curacao and Aruba in the
Netherlands Antilles, and at Manta, Ecuador. Upgrades and expanded capabilities for FOLs
in the Americas are expected to require a total of $122.5 million in military construction
funding in FY2000 and FY2001, according to DOD estimates.
The Clinton Administration’s international strategy aimed to shift gradually from policies
that emphasize transit zone interdiction to cooperative programs with countries that
demonstrate the will to combat the international narcotics trade. Although not defined in the
Clinton strategy, “transit zone” may be roughly defined as that area within which U.S.
interdiction forces can operate between the South American continent and the 12-mile
contiguous zone offshore the United States. Implementation of the Clinton policy emphasized
programs that focus on source country institution building, particularly law enforcement and
judicial institutions. Public awareness and demand reduction programs in foreign countries
are given modestly enhanced emphasis.
Bush Administration Anti-Drug Strategy
The direction of drug policy under President George W. Bush is not expected to be an
immediate top administration foreign policy priority. To date issues of international terrorism
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and homeland security appear to command more attention However, growing concern by
some in Congress over the military component of Plan Colombia and Secretary of State Colin
Powell’s avowed predisposition to facilitate the exercise of power through coalitions
and alliances where practicable could well lead to a strategic review of the U.S. support role
for Plan Colombia. One possible outcome would be policy which is more regionally focused
and based on closer cooperation with international aid donor nations. Given what is generally
believed to be an Administration desire to avoid open-ended entanglements like the Vietnam
war, it is likely that the military component of the plan will be subject to review as well.

Issues of concern to the 107th Congress relating to international drug control policy
include the following:
(1) Can the Plan Colombia as currently envisioned have a meaningful impact on reducing
drug shipments to the U.S. or in reducing the current level of violence and instability in
Colombia? To what degree can a counter-drug plan which does not aim to deal a decisive
blow to insurgent operations Colombia be expected to meaningfully curb drug production and
violence there?
(2) To what degree might a more regional approach to the drug problem in Colombia
prove more effective and how might such an expanded initiative be funded?
(3) How does U.S. involvement in anti-drug efforts in the Andean nations affect other
aspects of American foreign policy in the region, and in Latin America generally? Does a
concentration on drug-related issues obscure more fundamental issues of stability,
governance, poverty , and democracy ( i.e., to what degree are drugs a major cause, or result,
of the internal problems of certain Latin American countries)? Do U.S. drug control
objectives contribute to or conflict with efforts to resolve Colombia’s ongoing civil conflict
and in what ways?
(4) In the case of Colombia and other nations where insurgents are heavily involved in
the drug trade, how can the United States ensure that U.S. military aid and equipment is in
fact used to combat drug traffickers and cartels, rather than diverted for use against domestic
political opposition or used as an instrument of human rights violations? How great is the risk
that such diversions could take place, and is the degree of risk worth the possible gains to be
made against drug production and trafficking?
(5) How extensive is drug-related corruption in the armed forces and police of the
Andean nations? What impact might such corruption have on the effectiveness of U.S.
training and assistance to these forces?
(6) Will an active role for the military in counter-narcotics support to foreign nations (i.e.
Colombia) result in U.S. casualties? If so, is there an exit strategy and at what point, if at all,
might Presidential actions fall within the scope of the War Powers Resolution; i.e., does the
dispatch of military advisers to help other governments combat drug traffickers constitute the
introduction of armed forces “into hostilities or into situations where imminent involvement
in hostilities is clearly indicated by the circumstances”? (The War Powers Resolution requires
the President to report such an introduction to Congress, and to withdraw the forces within
60 to 90 days unless authorized to remain by Congress.)
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(7) Will the evolving strategy under the Bush Administration produce better results than
previous strategies in reducing illicit drug use in the United States and in supporting U.S.
narcotics and other foreign policy goals overseas? Is a proper balance of resources being
devoted to domestic (the demand side) vs. foreign (the supply side) components of an overall
national anti-drug strategy? Are efforts to reduce the foreign supply level futile while
domestic U.S. demand remains high? Are efforts to reduce domestic demand fruitless as long
as foreign supplies can enter the country with relative impunity?
(8) To what extent will the Administration’s current priority in fighting terrorism affect
implementation of antidrug policy? Has repositioning of equipment and resources to improve
U.S. defenses against acts of terrorism lowered defenses with respect to curbing drug flows?
Certification Issues
On March 1, 2001, President Bush certified 20 of the 24 designated drug-producing or
transit countries as fully cooperative in counter-narcotics efforts, and he granted vital national
interest certifications to Cambodia and Haiti. Only two countries – Afghanistan and Burma
– were decertified and subject to sanctions. President Bush’s determinations were very
similar to the determinations of President Clinton in the previous year, except that Nigeria and
Paraguay were elevated from national interest waiver status to fully cooperative status.
In the past, determinations to certify Mexico have often been the most contentious, and
Mexico has been a focus of congressional attention and an important focus of U.S. foreign
narcopolicy. While Mexico has been fully certified each year by a series of U.S. presidents,
congressional resolutions to disapprove Mexico’s certification were introduced in 1987, 1988,
1997, 1998, and 1999, and congressional criticisms of Mexico’s certifications were voiced
in many years. Resolutions of disapproval failed to reach floor action in most years, but both
houses passed separate versions of weakened resolutions of disapproval in 1997, and a Senate
resolution of disapproval reached the floor but was defeated in 1998. (For more detail, see
CRS Report 98-174, Mexican Drug Certification Issues: Congressional Action, 1986-2001,
by K. Larry Storrs.)
Following the July 2000 election of opposition candidate Vicente Fox as President of
Mexico, a number of legislative measures were introduced to modify the drug certification
requirements, and these initiatives were mentioned when President Bush met with President
Fox in Mexico in mid-February 2001. Although President Bush certified Mexico as fully
cooperative in drug control efforts on March 1, 2001, a number of legislators continued to
press for modification of the existing certification process. In December 2001, legislation was
enacted that included elements of Senate versions. Congress waived the drug certification
requirements for FY 2002. It required the President to withhold assistance from the countries
most remiss in meeting their international drug-fighting obligations, but apparently did not
require Congressional approval of the President’s selection of what countries to put in the
“worst-offending” category. The new law also seems not to require the United States to vote
against loans to such countries by multinational banking institutions. Such changes may
reflect the fact that spokesmen from many countries have complained for years about the
unilateral and non-cooperative nature of the drug certification requirements, and have urged
the United States to end the process or at least to replace it with multilateral evaluation
mechanisms.
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A multilateral [drug performance] evaluation system (MEM) has been established under
the auspices of the Organization of American States (OAS). This mechanism is seen by many
as a vehicle to undermine and facilitate abolishment of the existing U.S. sanctions-oriented
unilateral certification process which is often viewed as an irritant to major illicit drug-
producing countries, and which, opponents argue, does little to promote anti-drug
cooperation.
Plan Colombia
On July 13, 2000, U.S. support for Plan Colombia was signed into law (P.L. 106-246).
Included was $1.3 billion in emergency supplemental appropriations in equipment, supplies,
and other counter narcotics aid primarily for the Colombian military. The plan aims to curb
trafficking activity and reduce coca cultivation in Colombia by 50% over five years. Plan
components include helping the Colombian Government control its territory; strengthening
democratic institutions; promoting economic development; protecting human rights; and
providing humanitarian assistance. Included as well is $148 million for Andean regional drug
interdiction and alternative development programs. Some observers speculate that without
enhanced U.S. aid, Colombia risks disintegration into smaller autonomous political units —
some controlled by guerilla groups that are heavily involved in drug trafficking and violent
crime for profit activity. Other observers caution that narcotics-related assistance to
Colombia can, at best, produce serious reductions in illicit drug production only within a 4-
to 6-year timeframe and warn against enhanced U.S. involvement in a conflict where clear cut
victory is elusive and to a large degree dependant on reduction of so far intractable U.S.
domestic appetite for illicit drugs. Moreover, of growing concern in the Administration and
in Congress is the so called “spillover” effect of Plan Colombia on neighboring nations such
as Ecuador where Fuerzas Armadas Revolucionarias de Colombia (Revolutionary Armed
Forces of Colombia) narco-linked insurgents increasingly operate. For additional data on
proposed aid to Colombia, see CRS Report RL30541, Colombia: Plan Colombia Legislation
and Assistance (FY2000-FY2001). See also CRS Report RS20494, Ecuador: International
Narcotics Control Issues.
Andean Counterdrug Initiative
On April 9, 2001, the Bush Administration requested $731 million in FY2002 funding
for a broader regional strategy called the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ACI), distributed
as follows: $399 million for Colombia, $156 million for Peru, $101 million for Bolivia, $39
million for Ecuador, $15 million for Brazil, $10 million for Venezuela, and $11 million for
Panama. ACI was a subset of a larger program called the Andean Regional Initiative for
which requested funding levels were $882 million, with most of the $151 million balance for
economic aid.
On July 24th, 2001, the House passed the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill (H.R.
2506), which would result in total funding for the Andean Counterdrug Initiative (ARI) at
$826 million, of which $675 million was for the ACI. On July 26th, the Senate
Appropriations Committee marked up the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill, further
reducing ARI funding to $718 million. On October 24, the Senate passed H.R. 2506
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providing $698 million for the ARI of which $547 million was for the ACI. The bill was
enacted on December 20 (P.L. 107-115), providing $625 million for the ACI. For further
information, see CRS Report RL31016, Andean Regional Initiative (ARI): FY 2002
Assistance for Colombia and Neighbors.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Reports
CRS Report RL30541. Colombia: U.S. Assistance and Current Legislation, by Nina M.
Serafino.
CRS Report RS20494. Ecuador: International Narcotics Control Issues, by Raphael Perl.
CRS Report 98-174. Mexican Drug Certification Issues: U.S. Congressional Action, 1986-
2001, by K Larry Storrs.
CRS Report 98-159. Narcotics Certification of Drug Producing and Trafficking Nations:
Questions and Answers, by Raphael Perl.
CRS Report RS20051. North Korean Drug Trafficking: Allegations and Issues for
Congress, by Raphael F. Perl.
CRS Report 96-671. International Drug Trade and its Impact on the United States, by
Raphael Perl, Jennifer Neisner, and David Teasley.
CRS Report 98-159. Narcotics Certification of Drug Producing and Trafficking Nations:
Questions and Answers, by Raphael Perl.
CRS Report RL30886. Mexico’s Counter-Narcotics Efforts under Zedillo and Fox,
December 1994 to March 2001, by K. Larry Storrs.
CRS Report RL30892. Drug Certification Requirements and Proposed Congressional
Modifications in 2001, by K. Larry Storrs.
CRS Report RL31016, Andean Regional Initiative(ARI): FY2002 Assistance for Colombia
and Neighbors, by K. Larry Storrs and Nina M. Serafino.
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