Order Code RS21125
January 28, 2002
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Homeland Security: Coast Guard Operations–
Background and Issues for Congress
Ronald O’Rourke
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
In response to the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard
significantly increased homeland-security operations to protect U.S. ports and waterways
from potential maritime terrorist threats. The Coast Guard accomplished this in part by
diverting resources from other missions. Increased requirements for homeland-security
operations after September 11 appear to have added to a pre-existing tension between
Coast Guard mission responsibilities and available resources. The Coast Guard’s new
homeland-security operations raise potential issues for Congress regarding the adequacy
of Coast Guard assets and funding, the Coast Guard’s legal authorities, the Coast
Guard’s location within the executive branch, and coordination between the Coast Guard
and other agencies. This report will be updated as events warrant.
Background
The Coast Guard in Brief. The Coast Guard, the federal government’s principal
maritime law-enforcement agency, is a military service and a branch of the armed forces
that normally operates within the Department of Transportation (DoT).1 It has about
36,000 active-duty uniformed personnel, 8,000 reserve personnel, about 6,000 civilian
personnel, and an annual budget of about $5 billion.2 It performs a wide variety of
missions that it groups into four major roles – maritime law enforcement, maritime safety,
marine environmental protection, and national defense. The Coast Guard and its
predecessor agencies have participated in every major U.S. conflict since the War of 1812.
Homeland-Security Operations After September 11. In response to the
terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the Coast Guard took several initial actions to
1 The Coast Guard is to operate as a service within the Navy upon declaration of war or when the
President directs, until the President by executive order transfers it back to DoT (14 USC 3).
2 U.S. Department of Transportation. 2002 Budget in Brief, U.S. Department of Transportation.
Washington, 2001. p. 35, 37.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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strengthen protection of U.S. ports and waterways from potential maritime terrorist
threats. Coast Guard cutters and aircraft were diverted from more distant operating areas,
such as the North Atlantic, the Caribbean, and the Eastern Pacific, to patrol U.S. ports and
coastal waters. The Coast Guard Captain of the Port for New York/New Jersey
temporarily closed local waterways to all traffic and coordinated the evacuation by water
of hundreds of thousands of people from Manhattan. Additional Coast Guard patrol craft
were assigned to the Potomac River and Chesapeake Bay to protect the Washington, DC,
area against potential attack. The Coast Guard also exercised its authority to establish and
enforce naval protection zones (security zones) to protect Navy ships and bases.
Following these initial responses, the Coast Guard took several follow-on actions to
create what is the largest port-security operation since World War II. The Coast Guard
activated 4 of its 6 Port Security Units (PSUs)3 and assigned them to help protect the ports
of New York, Boston, Seattle, and Los Angeles/Long Beach. Coast Guard personnel
began boarding and inspecting inbound vessels, escorting cruise ships into and out of port,
and escorting oil tankers into and out of Valdez, Alaska. The Coast Guard instituted new
regulations requiring inbound ships to provide 96-hour (as opposed to the previous 24-
hour) advance notice of arrival, to provide more time to board and inspect vessels. Coast
Guard sea marshals began boarding and riding inbound commercial ships during transits
of San Francisco Bay. And, agents from the Coast Guard Investigative Service were
assigned to commercial aircraft as sky marshals to support the Federal Aviation
Administration’s (FAA’s) immediate needs for such personnel.
To help implement these actions, the Coast Guard initially activated 2,600 of its 8,000
reservists. The Coast Guard is working to reduce this figure to about 2,000, which would
be an easier level for the Coast Guard to sustain on a rotational basis over the long run.
The expansion of Coast Guard homeland-security operations led to a major
reshuffling of the service’s mission priorities. Port-security operations, which had
accounted for less than 5% of all Coast Guard operations prior to September 11, increased
to 56% by October 9. The diversion of Coast Guard ships, aircraft and personnel to these
operations, however, significantly reduced the Coast Guard’s ability to perform other
missions. As of October 9, 2001, alien migrant interception and recreational boating safety
operations were completely eliminated, fisheries-enforcement operations were almost
completely eliminated, counter-drug operations were reduced substantially, and aids to
navigation operations were also reduced.
Resources vs. Missions Prior to September 11. Even before September 11,
the Coast Guard appeared hard-pressed to perform all its various missions at desired levels
with available assets and resources. Many of the Coast Guard’s cutters are old, expensive
to operate and maintain, and not well suited for some of the missions they undertake.
Some Coast Guard units have very high operational tempos. The Coast Guard has
experienced difficulties in recent years in retaining sufficient numbers of experienced
personnel and maintaining some of its aircraft at desired levels of readiness.
3 The PSUs are staffed mostly by Coast Guard reservists and have been used in recent years to
protect U.S. Navy ships overseas. At the time that the 4 PSUs were activated to protect U.S. ports,
a fifth PSU was guarding U.S. Navy ships overseas, and the sixth had recently returned from such
a deployment.

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Prior to September 11, insufficient funding to operate Coast Guard assets to their full
potential was a recurrent issue – the Coast Guard has received seven emergency
supplemental appropriations in the past 10 years. Operations of some ships and aircraft
had to be reduced by 10% for part of FY2001 due to lack of sufficient funding for
operations. Some observers have expressed concerns or doubts about the Coast Guard’s
ability to finance key equipment modernization programs, such as its Deepwater
acquisition project for replacing aging cutters and aircraft.4 Inefficient use of available
resources by the Coast Guard does not appear to be a significant contributor to the
problem – the Coast Guard in March 2000 received an excellent review for financial
management and stewardship of resources by the Government Performance Project of
Government Executive magazine.5
Prior to September 11, Coast Guard leaders and others, through speeches and
articles, attempted repeatedly to draw attention to this missions-vs.-resources situation.
They noted, among other points, that, the Coast Guard today is smaller than it was several
years ago, even though Coast Guard responsibilities have expanded considerably over the
last quarter-century as a result of substantial growth in mission areas such as counter-drug
operations, alien interception, pollution prevention, and fisheries enforcement.
Port Security. Following the September 11 terrorist attacks, policymakers have
expressed strong concern for the security of the nation’s 361 ports, for which only modest
security procedures were in place prior to September 11. They have noted, for example,
that of the 6 million loaded commercial cargo containers that enter the United States each
year (an average of about 16,400 per day), less than 2% are currently inspected to verify
their contents – and even this figure includes some containers that aren’t inspected until
after they are loaded onto trucks and are transported on the nation’s highways to
destinations on the other side of the country. Several congressional hearings dedicated
partly or entirely to the issue of port security have been held since September 11.
The Coast Guard is a key player in maintaining port security, particularly in terms of
boarding and inspecting incoming commercial ships. Other federal and local agencies,
however, also have important roles to play in port security. The Customs Service, for
example, is the agency that inspects cargo containers, and local port authorities participate
in maintaining security perimeters around port facilities. Thus, while Coast Guard
homeland-security operations focus to a large degree on port security, the issue of port
security encompasses more than the Coast Guard. Conversely, some Coast Guard
homeland-security operations, such as those directed to maintain security of the nation’s
shore areas and inland waterways, go beyond the issue of port security, strictly defined.
Issues for Congress
Missions vs. Resources. The terrorist attacks of September 11 have increased
Coast Guard requirements for the homeland-security mission without obviously reducing
4 See CRS Report RS21019, Coast Guard Deepwater program: background and issues for
Congress, by Ronald O’Rourke. Washington, 2001. (Updated periodically) 6 p.
5 Laurent, Anne. Measuring Up. Government Executive, March 2000: 10-15, and The Curse of
Can-Do. op cit, p. 41-42, 44, 46-49. See also Lunney, Kellie. Making the Case. Government
Executive, April 2001: 105-106.

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requirements for other, pre-September11 missions. (Some observers go further, arguing
that September 11 has, if anything, strengthened requirements for Coast Guard counter-
drug and alien migrant interception operations, since terrorists can use drug profits to
finance their activities and might try to enter the United States illegally by ship.) Coast
Guard leaders and others since September 11 have argued that the Coast Guard’s budget
needs to be increased at least to the point where it can make full use of its existing ships
and aircraft, and perhaps further, so as to finance an increase in size.
There appear to be few observers who oppose the general notion that the Coast
Guard’s resources will need to be increased to bring them into better alignment with the
service’s post-September 11 mission requirements. The issue appears to center more on
the question of the size of the increase that will be needed. Coast Guard officials estimate
that the service’s FY2003 budget request will be $900 million to $1 billion higher than the
FY2002 budget and plan to seek congressional approval to add 5,000 to 6,000 active-duty
personnel and 4,000 reservists to the force over a three-year period starting in FY2003.6
Legal Authorities. Coast Guard officials state that their legal authorities are quite
broad and are generally sufficient for conducting post-September 11 homeland-security
responsibilities. One change that the Coast Guard is seeking would expand its authority
to enforce rules and regulations for controlling vessels in U.S. territorial waters so that the
authority extends to U.S. waters up to 12 miles from shore (the current definition of U.S.
territorial waters, adopted in 1988), rather than its current statutory authority, which
extends out only to 3 miles from shore (the pre-1988 definition of U.S. territorial waters).
This change would be made by Section 119 of S. 1214/H.R. 3437, the Port and Maritime
Security Act of 2001, which passed the Senate on December 20, 2001.
Location Within Executive Branch. A third potential issue for Congress that
existed prior to September 11, but which may have taken on greater prominence since
then, is whether the Coast Guard should remain in DoT or be transferred to another
federal department or agency, such as the Department of Defense (DoD) or a new,
Cabinet-level homeland security agency. Some Coast Guard supporters, noting the Coast
Guard’s national defense mission and that Coast Guard programs currently must compete
for limited DoT funding against highly popular highway and transit projects, have
proposed transferring the service to DoD. Other observers, noting the Coast Guard’s
homeland-security operations, have proposed incorporating the Coast Guard into a new
Cabinet-level homeland security agency.
Prior to September 11, Coast Guard leaders argued that since the Coast Guard’s
operations are part transportation-related, part law-enforcement-related, and part defense-
related, the Coast Guard will not fit perfectly into any parent department, whether that be
DoT, DoD, the Department of Justice, or a new homeland security agency, and that
consequently there was no overwhelming case for transferring the Coast Guard from DoT
to some other parent department. Since September 11, Coast Guard officials have argued
that given the Coast Guard’s current focus on conducting operations in response to
September 11, now would not be a good time to transfer the Coast Guard to another
parent department.
6 Frank, Thomas. Coast Guard Windfall. Long Island Newsday, January 22, 2002.

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Coordination With Other Agencies. A fourth potential issue for Congress is
coordination between the Coast Guard and other government agencies.
Coordination With Navy. On September 21, 1998, the Coast Guard and Navy
issued a joint policy statement on a new “national fleet” concept under which the Coast
Guard and Navy will seek to coordinate more closely in various areas, including ship
acquisition, research and development, concepts of operations, logistics, training,
exercises, and deployments. An updated version of this document is now being prepared.
Some supporters of the national fleet concept – particularly those who believe the
two services have taken only modest steps since 1998 to implement it – believe that the
post-September 11 expansion of the Coast Guard’s homeland security mission will provide
an important new opportunity for the two services to begin implementing the national fleet
concept more fully. DoD’s 2001 Quadrennial Defense Review, issued 19 days after the
September 11 terrorist attacks, states: “Preparing forces for homeland security may require
changes in force structure and organization.... It is clear that U.S. forces, including the
United States Coast Guard, require more effective means, methods, and organizations to
perform these missions. As part of this examination, DoD will review the establishment
of a new unified combatant commander [for homeland security] to help address complex
inter-agency issues and provide a single military commander to focus military support.”7
The emerging homeland security concepts of operations of the Coast Guard and Navy
both view the Coast Guard as the primary service for maritime homeland-security
operations, with the Navy supporting the Coast Guard, if needed, in specific areas where
Coast Guard capabilities are very limited, such as air defense or antisubmarine warfare.
In addition, Navy officials are aware that if the Coast Guard’s funding requirements for
homeland security are insufficient, Navy assets could be diverted to fill the gap, which
would detract from the Navy’s primary focus of maintaining forward deployments of naval
forces in overseas operating areas.
Coordination with Other Agencies. The Coast Guard has established working
relationships with other federal, state, and local agencies (including port authorities), and
with Canadian agencies, that can contribute to maritime homeland security, including the
Customs Service, the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS), and U.S. intelligence
agencies. Coast Guard officials state, however, that after September 11, this coordination
will need to be improved, particularly in terms of preparing port-security plans and sharing
information about potential maritime homeland security threats. For example, Coast
Guard officials would like the INS database on foreign individuals of concern to be
computerized (much of it currently is in paper form only), so that Coast Guard officers can
access it electronically when inspecting crew manifests of ships they have boarded.
More broadly, the Coast Guard supports the creation of a fully networked
information environment among interested agencies to help achieve and maintain what the
Coast Guard calls “maritime domain awareness” (MDA). In essence, MDA refers to
having a continuous understanding of commercial shipping on a global basis, so that
commercial ships of potential concern can be identified at their foreign ports of origin, long
7 U.S. Department of Defense. Quadrennial Defense Review Report. Washington, 2001.
(September 30, 2001) p. 19.

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before they begin to approach the United States. Maritime homeland security, Coast
Guard officials argue, can be significantly increased if MDA can be implemented to
establish a de facto forward line of defense in overseas ports of origin.
Legislation in the 107th Congress
Numerous bills recently, currently, or soon to be before the 107th Congress relate to
the Coast Guard’s homeland-security operations. Among these are the following:
! bills authorizing Coast Guard programs, including H.R. 1699/S. 951,
the Coast Guard Authorization Act for FY2002; and H.R. 1099, the
Coast Guard Personnel and Maritime Safety Act of 2001;
! bills appropriating funds for Coast Guard programs, including the
FY2003 DoT and related agencies appropriations bill, which makes
regular appropriations for Coast Guard programs for FY2003 (to be
submitted to Congress in early 2002); and P.L. 107-117 (H.R. 3338), the
FY2002 defense appropriations bill, which contains a section (Division B)
appropriating FY2002 funds for emergency expenses to respond to the
September 11 terrorist attacks (including funds for the Coast Guard);
! bills relating to port security and terrorism, including S. 1214/H.R.
3437, the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001, which passed the
Senate on December 20, 2001; H.R. 3432, a bill to require that the Coast
Guard Sea Marshal program be carried out in 20 U.S. ports most
vulnerable to terrorist attack by a commercial vessel, and to authorize
additional personnel and funds for such program; S. 1429, the Airport and
Seaport Terrorism Prevention Act; S. 1559; the Transparent Sea Act of
2001; S. 1587, the Port Threat and Security Act; S. 1678; the Maritime
Security Advancement Act; and P.L. 107-108 (H.R. 2883), the FY2002
Intelligence Authorization Act;
! bills relating to homeland security generally, including H.R. 1158, a
bill to establish the National Homeland Security Agency; H.R. 2960, a bill
to require inspection of all cargo on commercial trucks and vessels
entering the United States; H.R. 3026, a bill to establish the Office of
Homeland Security; H.R. 3078/S. 1449, a bill to establish the National
Office for Combating Terrorism; S. 1462, a bill to establish the Federal
Emergency Transportation Administration; and S. 1534, a bill to establish
a Department of National Homeland Security; and
! bills affecting policies for Coast Guard personnel, including the
FY2003 defense authorization act to be submitted to Congress in
February 2002.
Coast Guard officials, in their discussions of homeland-security operations,
sometimes mention S. 1214/H.R. 3437, the Port and Maritime Security Act of 2001, as
a bill that would, in their view, specifically address a variety of homeland-security issues
of direct or indirect interest to the Coast Guard.

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