Order Code IB92115
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Tactical Aircraft Modernization:
Issues for Congress
Updated January 14, 2002
Christopher Bolkcom
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Background
Tactical Aircraft in the U.S. Military
Major Tactical Aircraft Programs
Implications of Near-Term Decisions
Analysis: Key Issues to Consider
Affordability
Capability Required
Force Structure
Service Roles and Missions
Industrial Base
Modernization vs. Transformation
Congressional Action
FY2001

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Tactical Aircraft Modernization: Issues for Congress
SUMMARY
The Defense Department plans to buy the
next century.
F-22 fighter for the Air Force, the F/A-18E/F
fighter/attack plane for the Navy, and the V-22
Congress has questioned these tactical
tilt-rotor aircraft for the Marines, as well as a
aircraft modernization plans on grounds of
joint-service program to develop a multirole
affordability and requirements. Because of the
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) aircraft in three
lack of consensus about future threats and
variants, some of which might be operational
defense requirements, there has been increas-
around 2010.
ing skepticism about the need for some of
these aircraft programs on grounds of cost and
Decisions in Congress and the Defense
affordability, military requirements and force
Department regarding these aircraft programs
levels, and effects on the defense industrial
may have important long-range implications.
base. Debate has also emerged on the need to
The V-22, the F/A-18E/F, and the F-22 are
balance modernization needs with military
now in transition from research-development
transformation goals.
(R&D) to procurement and could remain in
production for decades. The next-generation
The FY2002 authorization markups
combat aircraft that are expected to result
continued the trend of congressional support
from joint-service efforts now getting under-
for tactical aviation modernization. Both
way through the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF)
Senate and House authorizors exercised over-
program might be in production through the
sight by recommending modifications to tacti-
2020s. Decisions about the funding of these
cal aviation development and procurement
programs will influence which U.S. aircraft
funding and schedules, and to the total number
manufacturers survive in the aviation industry
of aircraft procured.
and may well affect the division of combat
roles and missions among the services in the
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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The Bush Administration’s amended FY2002 defense budget, submitted in July 2001,
included the following requests for tactical aircraft programs: F-22 — $3.9 billion ($3.03
billion in procurement, $881.4 million in RDT&E); JSF — $1.5 billion in RDT&E ($769.5
million USAF, $767.2 million USN); V-22 — $1.6 billion ($110.1 million in USAF
procurement, $1.05 billion in USN procurement, $10 million in USAF RDT&E, $546.7
million in USN RDT&E); F/A-18E/F - $3.4 billion ($3.1 billion in procurement, $253.2
million in RDT&E).
On August 14, 2001, a Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) announced its decision to
allow the F-22 program to graduate from its EMD phase and begin low-rate initial
production. The DAB also reduced the total number of F-22s to be produced from 331 to
295 aircraft.
On October 26, 2001, the Department of Defense (DoD) announced its decision that
the team lead by Lockheed Martin had won the JSF competition against a Boeing-led team.
The Lockheed Martin team will manufacture this aircraft.
In a December 21, 2001 memo to the Secretaries of the Air Force and the Navy, and
the Commander-in-Chief, Special Operations Command, Undersecretary of Defense Edward
“Pete”Aldridge gave his authorization for the V-22 to resume flight testing in the April 2002
time frame.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Background
Tactical Aircraft in the U.S. Military
Tactical or theater aircraft — fighters, fighter/attack planes, attack planes, and combat
support aircraft — constitute a major component of U.S. military capability. They played a
prominent role in the 1991 Gulf War, and are expected to play a leading role in contemporary
and future military operations, particularly in situations where U.S. leaders hope to limit or
avoid the commitment of U.S. ground forces. Operation Allied Force, the 1999 war in
Kosovo, may fuel these expectations. During this 78-day war, hundreds of coalition aircraft
attacked Serbian targets, losing only two aircraft in the process.
Tactical aviation accounts for a significant part of the defense budget, counting the costs
of developing, procuring, and operating aircraft, engines, avionics, and weapon systems, and
personnel, training, and administrative costs. The U.S. Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps
had a total inventory of some 2,800 fixed-wing tactical combat aircraft in 1999. Of these, the
Air Force operated about 60% and the Navy and the Marine Corps about 40%. In addition
to these fixed-wing combat aircraft, the Army operated about 1,500 combat helicopters. This
issue brief focuses on fixed-wing aircraft programs, such as the Air Force F-22, the Navy
F/A-18E/F, the Marine Corps V-22, and the Joint Strike Fighter.
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These aircraft have been traditionally referred to as “tactical”aircraft to distinguish them
from the Air Force’s B-52, B-1, and B-2 “strategic” bombers. When applied to aircraft,
“tactical” generally refers to smaller and shorter-ranged planes, while “strategic” generally
refers to larger and longer-ranged aircraft. Both tactical and strategic types are operated by
USAF’s Air Combat Command, which in 1992 replaced Strategic Air Command (SAC) and
Tactical Air Command (TAC). Reflecting the post-Cold War demise of SAC and TAC,
tactical types are sometimes referred to as “theater aircraft.”
Fighter planes primarily engage in air-to-air combat, either at close/visual range or at
ranges requiring radar-guided missiles and stand-off munitions (including “precision-guided
munitions”/PGMs). Attack planes focus on air-to-surface combat operations such as close
air support (CAS) for friendly ground forces engaged in battle, battlefield air interdiction
(BAI) against enemy forces behind the lines, and deep interdiction (also known as “deep
strike”) against the enemy’s military, political, and industrial infrastructure. Fighter/attack
planes (also known as fighter-bombers, strike fighters, or multirole fighters) perform both
air-to-air and air-to-surface missions. Long-range bombers and cruise missiles can also be
used in BAI and deep strike operations. Different air-to-air and air-to-surface missions and
different basing modes (sea- vs. land-based) give rise to different performance requirements
for combat aircraft, making use of a common aircraft for different missions and services
difficult, if not impossible, without major modifications.
Major Tactical Aircraft Programs
In response to an emerging congressional consensus and recommendations by the
Defense Department’s 1993 Bottom-Up Review (BUR) of force structure requirements, the
Administration decided in late 1993 to continue two major aircraft programs then underway
— the F-22, a low-observable-to-radar (stealthy) fighter for the Air Force; and the F/A-18E/F
version of the F/A-18 fighter/attack plane for the Navy — while also pursuing new aviation
technology initiatives through the Joint Advanced Strike Technology (JAST) program, which
later evolved into the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program. The Clinton Administration also
supported procurement of the Marine Corps’s V-22 tilt-rotor aircraft, which had been
opposed by the first Bush Administration on grounds of affordability.
The George H. Bush Administration’s plan for modernizing U.S. tactical aircraft had
focused on four key aircraft programs: (1) the F-22, (2) the F/A-18E/F, (3) the AFX, a
stealthy attack/fighter aircraft to be developed for the Navy and Air Force, and (4) the Multi-
Role Fighter (MRF), either a new aircraft or an upgraded version of the F-16 fighter/attack
plane for the Air Force. Since there was no funding for the MRF and only minimal funding
for the AFX, their rejection by the BUR in 1993 was more a recognition of their demise than
the termination of viable programs.
The Defense Department’s Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR), released in May of
1997, recommended buying fewer tactical aircraft than was then projected, with reduced
annual procurements of the F-22 and the F/A-18E/F and accelerated procurement of the V-22
tilt-rotor aircraft. Major tactical aircraft programs since the early 1990s are noted below.
F-22 Raptor, built by Lockheed Martin and Boeing, features a stealthy design (difficult
to detect by radar), advanced engines by Pratt and Whitney, and new avionics by Hughes and
other subcontractors. It will replace the F-15 as the Air Force’s air superiority fighter. The
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program was in competitive prototyping from 1986 to 1991 and then entered engineering and
manufacturing development (EMD), with prototype flights beginning in 1997. On August 14,
the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) announced its much-awaited decision that the F-22
program had successfully completed EMD and was ready to move on to low-rate initial
production. Because of uncertainties in projecting the actual production costs, the DAB also
reduced the total number of Raptors produced to 295 aircraft. Like the F-15E, the F-22 will
also have air-to-surface attack capabilities, although it was primarily designed for air-to-air
operations. Procurement of 331 production F-22s was projected to cost some $61.9 billion
then-year dollars, including actual past expenditures and projected future costs. (See CRS
Issue Brief IB87111, F-22 Raptor Aircraft Program.)
The F/A-18E/F Super Hornet, built by Boeing (since its acquisition of McDonnell
Douglas in 1997) and Northrop Grumman, is a larger and more expensive version of the
current F/A-18C/D fighter/attack plane. With more range/payload than that of existing
F/A-18s and more potential for future modernization, it also provides some degree of stealth
(reduced radar-detection). The E/F version will replace the Navy’s older F/A-18s in
fighter/attack missions and will eventually assume some missions now performed by F-14
fighters and formerly by A-6 attack planes. In May 1992, the program entered engineering
and manufacturing development (EMD), with prototypes beginning flight-tests in late 1995
and procurement funding beginning in FY1997. Procurement of 548 F/A-18E/Fs is currently
projected, at a cost of some $47 billion then-year dollars (actual past expenditures and
projected future costs) as estimated in June 30, 2000. (See CRS Report RL30624, F/A-18E/F
Aircraft Program.)
F-22 Raptor
F/A-18F Super Hornet
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) began in FY1994 as the Joint Advanced Strike
Technology (JAST) program, which emerged after cancellations of the AFX and MRF. The
JSF program is a long-term effort to design, develop, and produce a family of affordable
joint-service fighter/attack planes, with conventional take-off and landing (CTOL) aircraft for
the Air Force and Navy and short take-off vertical landing (STOVL) aircraft for the U.S.
Marine Corps and the U.K. Royal Navy. Britain is a “collaborative development partner” in
the JSF program; other countries involved in the program are Denmark, Netherlands, and
Norway (associate partners); Canada and Italy (informed partners); and Singapore and
Turkey (major participants). Participation is related to the financial contributions to the
program by these governments, the British government being the major non-U.S. contributor
of development funds. From1997-2001, the program was in a competitive design phase
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involving prototypes built by Boeing and Lockheed Martin. On October 26, 2001 the DoD
announced that Lockheed Martin won the competition, and would move on to the production
phase. As now projected, some 2,900 JSFs would be procured for U.S. and British forces,
with production starting around 2005 and operational service to begin around 2010. Since
the JSF is a long-term program now in its early stages, currently projected quantities and
schedules as well as the performance characteristics and acquisition costs of these aircraft are
more subject to change than in the case of aircraft already in some stage of production. In
March 1999, the Congressional Budget Office estimated the total acquisition cost of these
aircraft over a 27-year period at some $223 billion (FY2000$). (See CRS Report RL30563,
Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) Program: Background, Status, and Issues; for recent legislative
action on JSF, see Congressional Action, below.)
Boeing (L) and Lockheed Martin (R) JSF Prototypes
The V-22 Osprey is a tilt-rotor aircraft built by Bell Helicopter Textron and Boeing
Helicopters primarily for the U.S. Marine Corps to replace their aging helicopters that
transport troops and equipment into combat zones. The Air Force also wants the V-22 for
its special forces and the Navy is considering the Osprey for search and rescue missions. The
V-22's distinguishing characteristic is its ability to take off, land, and hover like a helicopter,
but also rotate its rotors 90 degrees and fly like a conventional airplane.
Although not part of the tactical aircraft modernization program of the early 1990s, the
V-22 is in funding competition with these programs. The first production aircraft were
procured in FY1997. In June 2000, the V-22 program was estimated by the Defense
Department to cost some $38.1 billion then-year dollars for development and production of
458 aircraft. While proponents focus on the Osprey’s unique operational capabilities (i.e.
long range, high speed, large payload coupled with vertical take off and landing capability)
some opponents say that the aircraft’s tilt-rotor technology is not mature and has contributed
to a number of V-22 crashes over the last several years. Investigations into the V-22 program,
its crashes, and allegations of malfeasance came to a head in the spring of 2001.
On May 1, 2001, a Blue Ribbon panel formed by then-Secretary of Defense William
Cohen to review all aspects of the V-22 program reported its findings and recommendations
during congressional testimony. The panel recommended cutting production to the “bare
minimum” while an array of tests are carried out to fix a long list of problems they identified
with hardware, software and performance. On July 5, 2001, it was reported that the DoD
Inspector General (IG) found evidence that the V-22 squadron at New River, NC, falsified
maintenance and readiness records, and in September 2001, three Marines were disciplined.
(See CRS Issue Brief IB86103, V-22 Osprey Tilt-Rotor Aircraft.)
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V-22 Osprey
Implications of Near-Term Decisions
Decisions in Congress and the Defense Department in regard to these aircraft programs
may have important long-range implications. The V-22, the F/A-18E/F, and the F-22 are now
in transition from research-development (R&D) to procurement and could remain in
production for decades. The next-generation combat aircraft that are expected to result from
joint- service efforts now getting underway through the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program
might be in production through the 2020s. Decisions about the funding of these programs
will influence which U.S. aircraft manufacturers survive in the aviation industry and may well
affect the division of combat roles and missions among the services in the next century.
Congressional debate on tactical aviation has often reflected desires by the defense
committees to assess these programs from a joint and interservice perspective rather than on
a program-by-program or service-by-service basis. The JSF program is a prime example of
this concern for joint-service development and procurement of weapon systems and
equipment. In 1994, the Senate Armed Services Committee concluded that “the only
affordable long-term modernization plan must maximize commonality, where the Air Force
and the Navy procure and operate the same aircraft,” adding that “both the Air Force and the
Navy could face the same threats and operate side by side, necessitating a common
technological approach” (S.Rept. 103-282, p. 82).
Some in Congress have expressed doubts about the affordability of tactical aircraft
modernization programs as currently projected, and some question the need for as many of
these aircraft as currently planned by the services. These concerns were also reflected in the
recommendations of the 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review, which resulted in reductions
in the projected numbers of tactical aircraft to be procured.
Analysis: Key Issues to Consider
Affordability
Given probable constraints on defense spending in future years, can we afford tactical
aircraft modernization programs as currently projected?
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Tactical aviation accounts for a significant share of the U.S. defense budget, although
estimates vary widely, depending on what is included and how costs are allocated. In 1996,
some Defense Department analysts estimated that over 40% of the projected cost of
developing and producing the 20 most expensive weapon systems during the FY1996-
FY2013 period would go to three tactical aviation programs: JSF (16.5 %), F-22 (14.5%),
and F/A-18E/F (11%). These analyses did not assess the relative military value of such
aircraft in comparison with other weapon systems, however, nor did they compare the cost
of aircraft with that of other weapon systems on an historical basis. In FY1996, tactical
aircraft programs accounted for about 10% of acquisition in the FY1997-FY2001 Five Year
Defense Plan (FYDP).
Since the early 1990s, Administration officials have argued that their tactical aircraft
modernization plans are designed to be affordable within the smaller defense budgets
projected for future years. In efforts to reduce tactical aviation costs, the Bush
Administration terminated several aircraft programs in 1990-92, including continued
procurement of Navy F-14D fighter/attack planes, development of a naval variant of the Air
Force F-22 stealth fighter, and development of the Navy’s A-12 attack plane. In a hearing
on tactical aircraft before the House Armed Services Committee on April 29, 1992,
Congressional Budget Office (CBO) analysts testified that the procurement costs of the four
tactical aircraft then in the Administration’s plan would be affordable “only under optimistic
assumptions about trends in costs and available funds.” CBO concluded that these aircraft
would probably be procured in smaller numbers than originally planned and without some of
the technological features and performance capabilities that earlier were regarded as military
requirements.
In a hearing on the same subject before the House National Security Committee’s R&D
and Procurement Subcommittees on June 27, 1996, CBO analysts expressed similar doubts
about the JSF, F-22, and F/A-18E/F programs, concluding that DOD is understating the costs
of these aircraft, which “may not be affordable and will probably need to be scaled back....”
General Accounting Office (GAO) analysts also testified that attempting to pay for DOD’s
tactical aviation programs as planned “appears to be unrealistic” in light of probable levels of
defense spending in the 2000s.
On March 5, 1997, these programs were discussed in a Senate Armed Services
Committee hearing and later in a joint hearing of the House National Security Committee’s
R&D and procurement subcommittees, where GAO and CBO analysts and DOD officials (Air
Force General Joseph Ralston, Vice Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, and Dr. Paul
Kaminsky, Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition and Technology) testified. Options
noted by General Ralston ranged from canceling the F- 22, F/A-18E/F, or JSF program, or
buying 25-50% fewer planes than projected, to increasing funding for these three tactical
aircraft programs — which as then projected accounted for about 10% of projected spending
for development and procurement of all weapons through FY2003 and would rise to 16%
through FY2009 and 18% through FY2015.
Representative Weldon stated that since procurement of tactical aircraft in the
Administration’s FY1998 budget accounted for only about 6% of total procurement funding,
the currently projected funding levels and production schedules for these three programs —
estimated by CBO to cost over $350 billion through the 2020s — were unrealistic. Several
other Members also expressed doubts about the affordability of these programs, given current
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budgetary concerns, uncertainties about future threats, and competing funding requirements
of other programs. CBO and GAO analysts expressed considerable skepticism about the
affordability and schedules of these programs as currently planned. (See Tacair
Modernization on Hill: Questions, but No Decisions Yet. Aerospace Daily, March 12, 1997:
377-378; and Capaccio, Tony. GOP Defense Staff: Tac Air Problem ‘Out Of Control.’
Defense Week, March 10, 1997: 1, 15.)
These programs were also the subject of the Senate Armed Services Committee’s
Air-Land Subcommittee hearing on April 16, 1997, which focused mainly on differing
estimates of the F-22's production cost by Defense Department and Air Force officials. (See
Foote, Sheila. Senators Raise Questions about Affordability of TACAIR. Defense Daily.
April 17, 1997: 101-102.) On July 11, 1997, during Senate debate on the FY1998 defense
authorizations bill (S. 936), an amendment by Sen. Russell Feingold requiring DOD to
recommend which of three programs (JSF, F-22, or F/A- 18E/F) should be terminated if
funding were available for only two programs was defeated 79-19. (Congressional Record,
July 11, 1997: S7227-S7234.)
Similar concerns about the rising costs of these aircraft programs were voiced in 1999
during hearings by the House Armed Services Committee (March 3, 1999) and the Senate
Armed Services Committee’s Airland Subcommittee (March 10 and 17, 1999), when
projected increases in the development cost of the F-22 and the JSF were discussed at length.
CBO and GAO analysts expressed many of the same concerns about these programs that they
have noted in recent years. (HASC Tactical Air Hearing Raises Cost Questions Across the
Board. Aerospace Daily, March 9, 1999: 349-350; DOD Cost Estimates for Tacair
Unrealistic, CBO Says. Aerospace Daily, March 11, 1999: 365, 368.) Concerns about the
affordability of these programs played a major role in congressional opposition to
procurement funding for the F-22 program in the FY2000 defense budget.
In the spring of 2000, it was reported that a joint study by Boeing and the Air Force
Research Laboratory — 21st Century Affordable Aircraft Thrust — found that fighter aircraft
production costs could be cut in half by aggressively incorporating commercially proven
technologies and processes throughout a fighter aircraft’s development and production phase.
Furthermore, operations and maintenance costs over an aircraft’s 20-30 year lifetime could
similarly be reduced by 50 percent.1 In light of DoD’s desire to acquire more than 3,800
tactical fighter over the next 25 years, reported savings such as these may merit additional
investigation.
Capability Required
Given the demise of the Soviet Union and the changed international security environment,
what capabilities are required in U.S. tactical aircraft?
The F-22 program was started in the mid-1980s, when the Soviet Union was expected
to continue producing high-performance aircraft and air-defense missiles that could pose
serious threats in the 1990s and beyond. The F-22 was then justified as an advanced, stealthy
1 Dine, Philip. Talent Seeks Spending for Cheaper F-15 Test Models. St. Louis Post-Dispatch. May
9, 2000. And Rep. James Talent. Building the Affordable Fighter. Defense News. July 24, 2000:37-38.
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aircraft capable of performing combat missions in a high-threat environment. With the
dissolution of the Soviet Union and a much changed international environment, some question
the need to procure large quantities of such expensive, high-capability aircraft. Alternatives
would be to produce only limited numbers of these aircraft, while upgrading and extending
the service lives of existing aircraft such as Air Force F-15Es and F-16Cs and Navy F-14Ds
and F/A-18C/Ds.
Others argue that large numbers of high-capability aircraft are still necessary because
Russian aircraft and surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) are available to potential adversaries of
the United States and its allies, and some European and Asian companies may soon be able
to market advanced aircraft and missiles to potential enemies. In this view, the demise of the
Soviet Union does not mean the end of potential high-threat areas requiring advanced aircraft.
For example, Iraq’s Air Force included some advanced, Soviet-designed fighters that are
aerodynamically equivalent to the F-15, and its air-defense system included advanced
equipment of both Soviet and European design. Against this force, the F-117 stealth attack
plane played a crucial role in destroying targets in high-threat areas. Having large numbers
of such advanced aircraft, it is argued, will help ensure operational success in future conflicts
with well-armed adversaries.
Most of those questioning the modernization plan acknowledge that proliferation of
advanced aircraft and air-defense equipment in the Third World will require the United States
to field some new-generation high-capability aircraft. They argue, however, that the Gulf
War showed the United States has a formidable advantage in air-to-air combat, which can be
maintained by procuring a limited number of F-22s for use against those adversaries who may
be able to make effective use of modern Soviet or European aircraft. They note that the
F-117s used in the Gulf War constituted a tiny percentage of all tactical aircraft employed
against Iraq, and yet only a few of the non-stealthy planes were shot down, even in the early
days of the war. Moreover, they argue that cruise missiles and stealthy B-2 bombers and
non-stealthy B-1s equipped with adequate standoff munitions could be used against heavily
defended targets. In this view, the F-22 would be procured in some smaller quantity than the
339 production planes as currently projected and could be operated as special “silver bullet”
forces.
Others take issue with the need for any F-22s, arguing that the Air Force and Navy will
face generally the same adversary aircraft in the future, and these services now have roughly
equal capability in air-to-air combat as well as considerable air-to- surface attack capabilities
with F-15Es and F-14Ds. Others point out that the Navy will eventually conduct its air-to-air
combat mission primarily with the F/A-18E/F — a major modification of a 1970s-era
strike-fighter. If the Navy does not need a new- generation stealth fighter for the post-Cold
War era, they ask, why is such an aircraft required for the Air Force? Some also argue that
the improved attack capability of the F/A-18E/F will be sufficient for carrier-based attack
missions against the most likely adversaries in regional conflicts. Furthermore, it can be
argued that the successful development of longer-range and more accurate and lethal standoff
munitions would significantly increase the combat effectiveness of current-generation tactical
aircraft. (See CRS Report RL30552, Missiles for Standoff Attack: Air-Launched
Air-to-Surface Munition Programs, by Christopher Bolkcom and Bert Cooper, May 9, 2000.)
The need for the V-22's capabilities are also debated. Those in favor of the program say
the V-22 is needed to replace aging military helicopters in all the services, which are costly
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to maintain and operate safely and effectively. This tilt-rotor aircraft will provide the
operational flexibility of a helicopter without the helicopter’s inherent limitations of speed,
range, and altitude. When landing on hostile shores in a third-world conflict, the V-22 would
be critical for the transport of Marines from ship to shore. In sum, it is the Marine Corps’
most important program and a key pillar supporting emerging Marine Corps warfighting
concepts such as Operational Maneuver from the Sea. Those who question the need for the
V-22's capabilities say that ship-to-shore logistical operations can be performed by less
expensive helicopters for the kinds of landing operations in which the Marines are likely to
be involved, where the V-22's greater speed and range would not be needed. Moreover,
Marine assault missions in an opposed landing would involve ship-to-shore movement of
troops and equipment, which would require coordination with aircraft having less speed and
range than the V-22.
Force Structure
How many wings of tactical aircraft does the United States need?
The Bush Administration’s proposed base force for the mid-1990s and beyond reduced
force structure to 26.5 Air Force fighter and attack wings, 13 Navy carrier air wings, and four
Marine Corps air wings (compared to 35, 15, and four air wings respectively in FY1990).
Budgetary considerations and radically altered international conditions led to these reductions,
which some argued were appropriate for the post-Cold War era, while others viewed this
force structure as excessive. Secretary of Defense Les Aspin announced in September 1993
that the Clinton Administration projected a base force of 20 Air Force fighter/attack wings
(13 active, 7 reserve), 11 Navy carrier air wings, and four Marine Corps air wings. The
Quadrennial Defense Review released by Defense Secretary William Cohen in May 1997
recommended no major changes in this force structure, although the 20 Air Force tactical
wings would comprise 12 active and 8 reserve wings.
The question of how many wings of tactical aircraft the United States needs for the
post-Cold War era, and how this number should be determined, is part of an on- going debate
in the Defense Department and Congress over the proper overall size of U.S. military forces
for the early 2000s and beyond. Decisions on this issue can affect views on the affordability
and focus of plans for modernizing tactical aircraft. A reduction in the number of air wings
would lead to a corresponding reduction in the number of aircraft to be procured. On the
other hand, a reduction in the number of air wings may lead to a decision to increase the
proportions of F-22s and F/A-18E/Fs in the force, on grounds that reduced forces need more
capable equipment.
Service Roles and Missions
How should views on service roles and missions be factored into decisions on tactical
aircraft modernization?
The high cost of tactical aircraft programs has renewed interest in the division of tactical
aviation roles and missions among the services. The apparent redundancy in tactical aviation
among the services — the Air Force plus air components of the Navy, Marine Corps, and
Army — has often been criticized as a duplication of efforts. In May 1995, the Commission
on Roles and Missions advocated the continuation of air components in every service, but
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suggested that the overall force structure as well as the mix of capabilities and support
infrastructure should be reviewed. GAO analysts concluded in 1996 that DOD’s current
plans for tactical aviation have not taken adequate account of overall capabilities and
requirements from a joint-service perspective.
The main roles-and-missions issue affecting current modernization plans concerns the
respective roles of the Air Force and Navy/Marine Corps in projecting U.S. air power
overseas. Most defense analysts view this as not an either-or question but a question of the
appropriate balance between these services in a shared and joint mission. Some would give
the Air Force primary responsibility for power projection overseas; others argue that
geo-political factors would require naval assets for sustained air operations in many situations.
Canceling the AFX in 1993 and relying mainly on the attack capabilities of the F/A-18E/F has
been viewed by some as reducing the Navy’s role in overseas projection of air power, which
to some would call into question the value of aircraft carriers. Others would argue that
carrier-based aircraft are needed for missions other than deep-strike operations, such as
shorter-range land attack, air superiority, airborne early warning, reconnaissance, electronic
warfare, and anti-submarine warfare.
Industrial Base
How should industrial-base considerations be factored into decisions on tactical aircraft
modernization?
The health of the U.S. industrial base has been an issue of growing concern. A report by
the Defense Science Board published in the Spring of 2000 noted that the defense industry
is in the midst of a painful transition that is complicated by the “new economy,” which is
draining human and financial resources. Unless steps are taken now, the study concluded, the
U.S. defense industry will likely be less competitive and financially viable in five to 10 years
than it is today. A July 2000 study by Booz-Allen Hamilton reported that the U.S. defense
industrial base is in a state of decline and national security will be affected if current trends
go unchecked.2
Congressional decisions on tactical aviation programs have serious implications for the
aerospace sector of the U.S. industrial base, which is a major source of technological
innovations as well as export earnings. Aerospace is the nation’s leading net exporter of
manufactured goods, with exports exceeding imports in1998 by $41 billion (including $12
billion in military exports), according to the Aerospace Industries Association. There is
general agreement that there were more aircraft manufacturers and subcontractors than recent
levels of defense spending could sustain. Consequently, the aerospace industry, like other
industries heavily dependent on Pentagon spending, has been undergoing a shakeout, with
some companies leaving the military aircraft business and others merging with financially
stronger competitors and downsizing production lines.
During 1994, Lockheed bought General Dynamics’ aircraft production facilities in Ft.
Worth, Texas; Grumman merged with Northrop; and Martin Marietta merged with Lockheed.
2 Velocci, Anthony. Industry Prognosis Flags Ominous Trends. Aviation Week & Space Technology.
July 17, 2000:28
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Similar buy-outs and mergers have continued, with Boeing buying McDonnell Douglas in
December 1996, and Lockheed Martin seeking to acquire Northrop Grumman in 1998.
Thus, the F-22 will be built by Lockheed Martin with Boeing as a major partner; the
F/A-18E/F is now built by Boeing (as owner of McDonnell Douglas) with Northrop
Grumman as the major airframe subcontractor; and the proposed Joint Strike Fighter would
be built by Boeing or Lockheed Martin in a competition to be decided in 2001, as currently
planned.
Congressional decisions on which military aircraft programs to support may influence
which aircraft manufacturers and subcontractors remain in business. While the U.S. economy
as a whole regularly absorbs declines equal in magnitude to that projected for defense
aerospace, in the short- and medium-term, thousands of skilled engineering and manufacturing
jobs as well the health of local and regional economies are at stake. Some argue that
preservation of critical components of U.S. defense industry is now as important as military
requirements, which have always been matters of judgment based on threat assumptions that
are subject to change. There is no apparent consensus, however, about what is most critical
to future U.S. military requirements or how excess military industrial capabilities can be
converted to civilian production that might enhance international competitiveness in export
trade.
Several questions arise out of the industrial base issue: How many aircraft
manufacturers are needed to support U.S. military needs? To what extent should the
survivability of these firms be taken into account in deciding which aircraft programs to
pursue? Which aspects of the aerospace industry are really unique and vital to production of
tactical aircraft? How can competitiveness among U.S. defense contractors be maintained
with fewer firms, particularly regarding different design concepts and cost-reduction
innovations in the development and production of planes? Should foreign sales of U.S.
military aircraft be factored into decisions on which tactical aircraft programs to pursue?
How might decisions on tactical aircraft programs affect U.S. export earnings and
international competitiveness of the U.S. aerospace industry? There are no easy answers to
such questions and no consensus on these industrial base issues, which confront all industrial
nations in the early 2000s.
Modernization vs. Transformation3
How can or should tactical aircraft modernization needs be balanced with transformation
goals?
Over the past several years, defense analysts and decision makers have increasingly
discussed the need for the Department of Defense (DoD) to transform itself in light of rapidly
changing geo-military circumstances.4 Unlike modernization, transformation is generally
viewed as discontinuous change, or a “leap ahead” in capabilities. Transformation is thought
3 For a more detailed discussion of transformation, see CRS Report RS20859, Air Force
Transformation: Background and Issues for Congress.
4 For instance: The 1997 Quadrennial Defense Review; The National Security Strategy of the United
States; The Secretary of Defense’s Annual Report to the President and Congress; The 1998 National
Defense Panel; P.L. 105-261, Title IX, Subtitle A, Sec. 903.
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to be fueled by a combination of new technologies, innovative operational concepts, and
codified by new organizational schema. Modernization and transformation objectives may not
be compatible. This potential incompatibility raises several questions: What emphasis should
DoD place on tactical aviation modernization vs. transformation goals? To what degree do
DoD’s current tactical aviation modernization programs facilitate transformation? To what
degree do they conflict with transformation?
Many proponents of transformation argue that instead of pursuing the tactical aviation
programs described in this report, DoD should upgrade the F-16, F-15 and F/A-18C/Ds.
Then, DoD would have sufficient resources to pursue more aggressive aviation technologies
such as unmanned combat aerial vehicles (UCAVs) and next generation bombers, which,
transformation advocates argue, would more likely generate a “leap ahead” in aviation
capabilities. Advocates of the F-22, JSF and Super Hornet argue that these aircraft have
capabilities that could contribute to transformation. Furthermore, they argue, DoD has
already skipped a generation of tactical aircraft modernization and can’t wait for more
aggressive technologies that may or may not emerge in the distant future. Today’s combat
aircraft are losing ground to Russian and other combat aircraft, and need to be replaced
sooner rather than later.
Congressional Action
In July 2001, the Bush Administration submitted its amended budget request for
FY2002. The request for F-22, JSF, V-22 and F/A-18E/F is summarized in Table 1, below.
In H.Rept. 107-194 (H.R. 2586), the HASC matched the Administrations’s request for
F-22 procurement and EMD funding, but reduced operational system development funding
by $15 million. Similarly, it matched F/A-18E/F procurement funding, but cut systems
development funding by $39 million. The HASC also matched the request for JSF funding,
and added $10 million for the Alternative Engine Program. House authorizors also matched
the request for MV-22 procurement funding and CV-22 R&D. It eliminated all CV-22
procurement funding except for $295 million for spare and repair parts, and cut $100 million
from the MV-22 RDT&E request.
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Table 1. FY 2002 Amended Budget Request
(in millions)
Program
USAF Procure
USN Procure
USAF RDT&E
USN RDT&E
Total
FY02 $
$
#
$
#
EMD
CD
EMD
CD
F-22
3,053.4
13
–
–
865.4
16
–
–
3,918.8
Less AP
-395.3
Sub Tot.
2,658.2
+ AP CY
379.2
Net Req.
3,037.4
JSF
–
–
–
–
769.5
–
767.2
–
1,536.7
V-22
117.8
–
1,080.8
12
10
–
546.7
–
Less AP
-22.7
-70.9
Sub Tot.
95.1
1,009.9
+AP CY
15.0
48.4
Net Req.
110.1
1,058.3
1,615.0
F/A-18E/F
–
–
3,180.1
48
–
–
–
253.2a
3,409.6
Less AP
-112.6
Sub Tot.
3,067.5
+AP CY
88.9
Net Req.
3,156.4
a $55.8 million will fund R&D on projects, such as ATFLIR and the Helmet Mounted Cuing System, that are
applicable to all F/A-18 models, not just the Super Hornet.
In S.Rept. 107-62 (S. 1416), the SASC also matched the Administration’s request for
all F-22 funding. It also increased F/A-18E/F procurement funding by $15 million to
accelerate IDECM procurement, and also increased systems development funding by $27
million to support the Joint Helmet Mounted Cuing System. The SASC reduced JSF EMD
funding by $307 million, expressing their expectation that DoD would not be prepared for
EMD down select this October. Senate authorizors increased the DemVal account by $60
million. SASC oversight of the V-22 program was very similar to that of the HASC, except
for MV-22 procurement funding, which the HASC cut to $783 million to procure nine
aircraft, in line with the Blue Ribbon Panel’s recommendation for maintaining the minimum
sustainable procurement rate.
In their report to accompany S. 1438 (H.Rept. 107-333), FY2002 authorization
conferees cut $50 million from the Navy’s MV-22 procurement request, providing enough
funding for 11 airframes vs the 12 requested. Conferees rejected the Administration’s request
for Air Force CV-22 procurement funding, reduced the Navy’s request for R&D funding by
$100 million, and matched the Air Force’s request for $10 million in R&D funding.
Authorization conferees also required DoD (Sec. 124, p.514) to provide a report 30 days
prior to any resumption of V-22 flight testing. Authorization conferees supported the
Administration’s request for F-22 funding, and adopted a Senate provision to remove the
$20.4 billion legislative cost cap on F-22 Engineering, Manufacturing and Development.
Authorization conferees increased the F/A-18EF procurement request by $13 million to
accelerate IDECM purchases. Conferees authorized the Administration’s request for JSF
funding, but expressed concern regarding industrial base issues and directed DoD to provide
a report on the subject.
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The House Appropriations Committee took the following action on the Administration’s
FY2002 budget request: MV-22 - reduced purchase by three aircraft, and funding by $226
million; CV-22 - increased funding by $85 million to facilitate procurement of two airframes;
F-22: approved Administrations’s plan to purchase 13 aircraft, but reduced funding by $2.5
million due to delayed procurement plan; JSF - matched the Administration’s request; F/A-
18E/F - matched the Administration’s request.
In their report to accompany H.R. 3338 (S.Rept. 107-109), Senate appropriators
matched the Air Force’s procurement request for current and advance year procurement to
build 13 F-22 Raptors, and the Air Force’s request for RDT&E funding The Senate
Appropriations Committee cut $226.7 million and three aircraft from the Navy’s FY02
procurement request and zeroed-out the Air Force’s procurement request of $95.1 million.
Senate appropriators matched the Navy’s RDT&E request, but denied the Air Force’s $10
million R&D request. Similar to Senate authorizors, Senate appropriators reduced JSF EMD
and increased JSF concept development funds in anticipation of a delay in the down select.
The net reduction was $247 million divided equally between the Navy and Air force. Senate
appropriators supported the Navy’s request to procure 48F/A-18E/F aircraft, but at a reduced
(-$35 million) level.
In their report on H.R. 3338 (H.Rept. 107-350) appropriations conferees matched the
Administration’s request for JSF R&D funding and modestly reduced (-$30 million) the
Navy’s request for F/A-18E/F procurement funds; citing excess growth in ancillary support
equipment. Appropriations conferees matched the Air Force’s request for both procurement
and R&D funding. Conferees transferred $111 million from the F-22's Advanced Procurement
(Current Year) account to FY2002 procurement. Conferees also transferred $16 million from
the F-22 Operational Systems Development account to the EMD account. Conferees cut the
Navy’s procurement request by $226 million, a reduction of three airframes. Like authorizors,
appropriators rejected the Administration’s request for Air Force procurement funding.
However, appropriators increased Air Force R&D funding by $180 million to produce 2 CV-
22 EMD articles. $100 million was cut from the Navy’s R&D request.
FY2001
The Administration’s FY2001 defense budget, as submitted on February 7, 2000,
requested procurement and/or research-development (R&D) funding for the following major
tactical aircraft programs: the Air Force F-22 — $3,957.9 million ($2,546.1 million for
procurement of 10 low-rate production aircraft; $1,411.8 million for R&D); the Navy F/A-
18E/F — $2,938.8 million ($2,919.6 million for procurement of 42 aircraft; $19.2 million for
R&D); Marine Corps and Air Force versions of the V-22 — $1,719.6 million ($1,208.4
million for procurement of 16 Marine Corps MV-22s; $363 million for procurement of 4 Air
Force CV-22s; $148.2 million for R&D); and the Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) program —
$856.7 million in R&D funding by the Air Force ($429.1 million) and the Navy Department
($427.6 million).
The FY2001 DoD Appropriations Conference Report (H.R. 4576) recommended fully
funding the Administration’s request for the F-22 — $3,957.9 for 10 aircraft. Appropriations
for F/A-18E/F and V-22 were slight reductions from the request, while the JSF program was
reduced markedly. Appropriations conferees recommended reducing the FY2001 F/A-18E/F
funding by $42.6 million to account for production engineering support cost growth and
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premature IDECM (integrated defensive electronic countermeasures system) production
quantities. Advanced procurement of the Air Force’s version of the V-22 Osprey, the CV-22
was reduced by $4.5 million.
The Joint Strike Fighter program received the greatest attention from appropriation
conferees. Appropriators recommended $688.6 million, a reduction of $168 million from the
overall FY2001 request. The $392,952 million reduction in the Administration’s request for
EMD funding reflected the appropriators’ concern that the program was not technologically
ready for advancement to this stage of development. Reflecting that concern, conferees
directed that “...all flight testing should be completed and fully evaluated prior to the selection
of a JSF EMD design.” Furthermore, conferees directed that “...DoD conduct a complete
flight test program for the JSF prototypes and perform a full evaluation of all flight test results
as part of the EMD proposal review.” Appropriators increased the JSF’s DEMVAL account
by $225 million to account for the additional time that the program will spend in this stage
of development (estimated at three months).
A Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) meeting on F-22 low-rate initial production (LRIP)
— originally scheduled for December 21,2000 — was postponed several times. This
postponement gave the F-22 program additional time to successfully complete the 10
congressionally mandated criteria required to graduate from the Engineering, Manufacturing
and Development (EMD). Congress provided $353 million in “bridge funding” in the
Departments of Labor, Health and Human Services, and Education Appropriations
Conference Report to finance LRIP after December 31, 2000, and allowed DoD to reprogram
$674.5 million in procurement funds to sustain the EMD program.
The FY2001 Defense Authorization Conference Report recommended funding the V-22
Osprey at the Administration’s request. (An increase of $4.6 million was recommended for
the USAF Procurement account.) Additionally, authorization conferees required that “all V-
22 Osprey aircraft be equipped with a state-of-the art cockpit voice recorder and a state-of
the art flight data recorder...”(p. 35, H.Rept. 106-945, H.R. 4205). Conferees authorized
funding to match the Administration’s request for the F-22. Additionally, they recommended
an increase in the F-22's EMD cost cap by 1.5% “if the Director of Operational Test and
Evaluation, after consulting with the Under Secretary of Defense for Acquisition, Technology
and Logistics, determines that the increase is necessary in order to ensure adequate testing.”
(Sec. 219. p. 46). Authorization conferees followed appropriations conferees on JSF funding
and direction. Concerned about the JSF Program’s immaturity, authorizers reduced the
overall program by $168 million; increasing concept development, but cutting EMD by
approximately $389 million. To graduate from DEMVAL to EMD, authorization conferees
required DoD to certify that the JSF had met technical exit criteria, and that the STOVL flight
testing had logged at least 20 hours. Authorization Conferees (H.R. 4205) followed
appropriations by reducing the Administration’s request by $13 million “due to production
engineering support cost growth.” (p. 581). However, there was no corresponding $29.6
million reduction for premature IDECM RFCM production.
In H.Rept. 107-148 (H.R. 2216), Appropriations Conferees matched the
Administration’s request for $80 million in supplemental FY2001 development funds to
correct V-22 deficiencies and conduct flight tests. Conferees reduced FY2001 MV-22
procurement funds by $199 million and CV-22 procurement funds by $327.5 million. The
Administration requested a decrease of $235 million in MV-22 procurement funds. The
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appropriators’ adjustment will allow DoD to purchase 11 MV-22s with FY 2001 funds, as
per the Blue Ribbon Panel’s recommendation.
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