Order Code RL30692
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Global Climate Change: The Kyoto Protocol
Updated December 17, 2001
Susan R. Fletcher
Senior Analyst in International Environmental Policy
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Global Climate Change: The Kyoto Protocol
Summary
Negotiations on the Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC) were completed December 11, 1997,
committing the industrialized nations to specified, legally binding reductions in
emissions of six “greenhouse gases.” The United States signed the Protocol on
November 12, 1998.
This treaty would commit the United States to a target of reducing greenhouse
gases by 7% below 1990 levels during a “commitment period” between 2008-2012.
Because of the fact that “sinks,” which remove and store carbon from the
atmosphere, are counted and because of other provisions discussed in this report, the
actual reduction of emissions within the United States required to meet the target is
estimated to be lower than 7%. The Clinton Administration did not submit the
protocol to the Senate for advice and consent, acknowledging that one condition
outlined by S.Res. 98, passed in mid-1997–meaningful participation by developing
countries in binding commitments limiting greenhouse gases–had not been met.
Major decisions on finalizing the operational rules of the Kyoto Protocol were
expected at the sixth Conference of the Parties (COP-6) in The Hague, Netherlands,
November 13-24, 2000. When COP-6 began, little progress had been made on the
more difficult political issues, such as how much of a nation’s commitment could be
met through emissions trading systems, consequences for non-compliance, and the
extent to which nations could take credit for carbon absorbed in “sinks” such as
forests and soils. The COP-6 negotiations collapsed November 25, when the United
States and the European Union failed to reach agreement on these key issues, with
particular controversy centering on how much credit a nation could be allowed for
carbon uptake – sequestration– by forests. Talks were suspended until a resumed
COP-6 meeting termed “COP-6 bis,” in Bonn, Germany, the last two weeks of July
2001.
In late March, the Bush Administration indicated it considered the Kyoto
Protocol “dead” in terms of U.S. policy, and announced a cabinet-level review of
climate policy. This initiated a high-level effort by the European nations to re-engage
the United States in the Kyoto process. This effort was reported as having been
“rebuffed” by the United States, and in mid-June, President Bush outlined his
preferred approach and confirmed U.S. rejection of the Kyoto Protocol. He indicated
the United States would remain engaged in the international negotiation process, with
positions favoring strengthened scientific research and voluntary measures and market
mechanisms. At COP-6 bis in July 2001, the United States remained on the sidelines,
following the Bush Administration’s decision not to engage in negotiations on the
Kyoto Protocol. To the surprise of many, negotiators at this meeting reached
agreement on most of the outstanding political issues, with compromises allowing
significant credit for carbon sinks, and at the following COP-7 meeting in Marrakech,
Morocco, in October-November, most remaining operational decisions were
completed. The other parties announced their intention to seek ratifications enough
to bring the Protocol into force by a self-imposed “deadline” of the World Summit on
Sustainable Development (WSSD) scheduled for August-September 2002 in
Johannesburg, South Africa.

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Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Major Provisions of the Kyoto Protocol . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Emissions Reductions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Developing Country Responsibilities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Emissions Trading and Joint Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Buenos Aires Action Plan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
COP-6 Negotiations, The Hague . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Bush Administration Policy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
COP-6 Resumed, Bonn, Germany . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
COP-7, Marrakech, Morocco . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Ratification . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Oversight . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

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Global Climate Change: The Kyoto Protocol
Background
Responding to concerns that human activities are increasing concentrations of
“greenhouse gases” (such as carbon dioxide and methane) in the atmosphere, most
nations of the world joined together in 1992 to sign the United Nations Framework
Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC). The United States was one of the first
nations to ratify this treaty. It included a legally non-binding, voluntary pledge that
the major industrialized/developed nations would reduce their greenhouse gas
emissions to 1990 levels by the year 2000, and that all nations would undertake
voluntary actions to measure, report, and limit greenhouse gas emissions.
However, as scientific consensus grew that human activities are having a
discernible impact on global climate systems, possibly causing a warming of the Earth
that could result in significant impacts such as sea level rise, changes in weather
patterns and health effects—and as it became apparent that major nations such as the
United States and Japan would not meet the voluntary stabilization target by
2000—Parties to the treaty decided in 1995, at the first conference of the parties
(COP-1) in Berlin, Germany, to enter into negotiations on a protocol to establish
legally binding limitations or reductions in greenhouse gas emissions. It was decided
by the Parties that this round of negotiations would establish limitations only for the
developed countries (the 38 nations listed in Annex I to the UNFCCC, including the
former Communist countries, and referred to as “Annex I countries.” Developing
countries are referred to as “non-Annex I countries”).1 This was referred to as the
“Berlin Mandate,” which reflected the acceptance in the UNFCCC that parties bore
“common but differentiated responsibilities” in dealing with climate change issues, and
that first steps in reducing greenhouse gas emissions should be taken by the Annex I
countries.
During negotiations that preceded the December 1-11, 1997, meeting in Kyoto,
Japan (COP-3), little progress was made, and the most difficult issues were not
resolved until the final days—and hours—of the Conference. There was wide
disparity among key players especially on three items: (1) the amount of binding
reductions in greenhouse gases to be required, and the gases to be included in these
requirements; (2) whether developing countries should be part of the requirements for
greenhouse gas limitations; and (3) whether to include emissions trading and joint
implementation, (which allow credit to be given for emissions reductions to a country
that provides funding or investments in other countries that bring about the actual
reductions in those other countries or locations where they may be cheaper to attain).

1 For additional information on the negotiations in Kyoto and related background, see CRS
Report 97-1000, Global Climate Change Treaty: Negotiations and Related Issues; and CRS
Issue Brief IB89005, Global Climate Change.

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CRS-2
Following completion of the Protocol in December of 1997, decisions and
details regarding a number of the more difficult issues remained to be negotiated and
resolved (see below). At the fourth Conference of the Parties (COP-4) held
November 2-13, 1998, in Buenos Aires, Argentina, it was apparent that these issues
could not be resolved at this meeting as had been expected. Instead, parties
established a two-year “Buenos Aires Plan of Action” (BAPA) to deal with these
issues, with a deadline for completion at the COP-6 meeting in The Hague,
Netherlands, November 13-24, 2000.
The difficulty in resolving these issues was underlined by the collapse of
discussions at COP-6 in The Hague, without agreement. As discussed below, COP-6
resumed in the latter half of July 2001, following U.S. President Bush’s announcement
that the United States would not continue participating in negotiations on the Kyoto
Protocol, and would develop an alternative approach. The U.S. delegation remained
on the sidelines, declining to negotiate the key remaining issues related to the
Protocol. During the July meeting, the other parties reached final agreement on most
outstanding issues, with details remaining to be finalized at the next meeting, COP-7,
in Marrakech, Morocco, October 29-November 9, 2001. (See discussion below)
Major Provisions of the Kyoto Protocol
The Kyoto Protocol was opened for signature March 16, 1998, and would
enter into force–become legally binding for countries that have ratified–when 55
nations have ratified it, provided that these ratifications include Annex I Parties that
account for at least 55% of total Annex I carbon dioxide emissions in 1990. This
provision would likely be hard to meet in the absence of U.S. ratification, since the
United States accounts for some 25 percent of such emissions. On November 12,
1998, the United States signed the Protocol, in part because the Clinton
Administration wanted to revitalize what was seen as some loss of momentum during
COP-4.
As of December 11, 2001, 84 countries had signed the Kyoto Protocol,
including the European Union and most of its members, Canada, Japan, China, and
a range of developing countries. Some 46 countries were reported by the UNFCCC
Secretariat to have ratified the treaty, but only one Annex B/developed
nation–Romania–has ratified the Protocol. Nations are not subject to its
commitments unless they have ratified it and it enters into force.
The major commitments in the treaty on the most controversial issues are as
follows:
Emissions Reductions. The United States would be obligated under the
Protocol to a cumulative reduction in its greenhouse gas emissions of 7% below 1990
levels for three major greenhouse gases, including carbon dioxide, (and below 1995
levels for the three other, man-made gases), averaged over the commitment period
2008 to 2012. The Protocol states that Annex I Parties are committed—individually
or jointly—to ensuring that their aggregate anthropogenic carbon dioxide equivalent
emissions of greenhouse gases do not exceed amounts assigned to each country in
Annex B to the Protocol, “with a view to reducing their overall emissions of such

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gases by at least 5% below 1990 levels in the commitment period 2008 to 2012.”
Annex A lists the 6 major greenhouse gases covered by the treaty2.
Annex B to the Kyoto Protocol lists 39 nations, including the United States, the
European Union plus the individual EU nations, Japan, and many of the former
Communist nations (the same countries as Annex I to the UNFCCC). The amounts
for each country are listed as percentages of the base year, 1990 (except for some
former Communist countries), and range from 92% (a reduction of 8%) for most
European countries—to 110% (an increase of 10%) for Iceland. The United States
agreed to a commitment on this list to 93%, or a reduction of 7%below 1990 levels,
to be achieved as an average over the 5 year commitment period, 2008-2012.
Based on projections of the growth of emissions using current technologies and
processes, the reduction in greenhouse gas emissions required of the United States
would likely be between 20% and 30% below where it would be otherwise by the
2008-2012 budget period.3 However, inclusion of greenhouse gas sinks4 — which
the Protocol adopted as urged by the United States — and emissions trading, means
that the domestic U.S. emission reductions from fossil fuels needed to meet a 7%
target would be substantially less. However, two of the most difficult issues
unresolved at Kyoto, and responsible in large part for the breakdown of the COP-6
negotiations in November 2000, are related to (1) emissions trading–specifically, how
much of a country’s obligation to reduce emissions can be met through purchasing
credits from outside, vs. taking domestic action; and (2) the extent to which carbon
sequestration by forests, soils and agricultural practices can be counted toward a
country’s emission reductions.
Developing Country Responsibilities. The United States had consistently
taken a firm position that “meaningful participation” of developing countries in
commitments made in the Protocol is critical both to achieving the goals of the treaty
and to its approval by the U.S. Senate. This reflects the requirement articulated in
S.Res. 98, passed in mid-1997, that the United States should not become a party to
the Kyoto Protocol until developing countries are subject to binding emissions targets.
The U.S. government also argued that success in dealing with the issue of climate
change and global warming would require such participation. The developing country
bloc argued that the Berlin Mandate—the terms of reference of the Kyoto
negotiations established at COP-1 in 1995—clearly excluded them from new
commitments in this Protocol, and they continued to oppose emissions limitation
commitments by non-Annex I countries.
The Kyoto Protocol was concluded without such commitments, and the Clinton
Administration indicated that it would not submit the Protocol for Senate
consideration until meaningful commitments were made by developing countries. At
COP-4 in Buenos Aires, Argentina–host country of the meeting– became the first
2 The six gases covered by the Protocol are carbon dioxide (CO ), methane (CH ), nitrous
2
4
oxide (N O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulphur hexafluoride
2
(SF ). The most prominent of these, and the most pervasive in human economic activity is
6
carbon dioxide, produced when wood or fossil fuels such as oil, coal, and gas are burned.
3 See CRS Report 98-235 ENR, Reducing Greenhouse Gases: How Much from What
Baseline?
4 Greenhouse gases, especially CO , are absorbed by a number of processes in forests, soils,
2
and other ecosystems. These are called "sinks."

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CRS-4
nation to indicate that it will make a commitment to take on a binding emissions target
for the period 2008-2012. Kazakhstan also announced its intention to take similar
action. At this meeting, the United States announced it would sign the Kyoto
Protocol, which it did on November 12, 1998. To date, none of the largest
developing countries, such as China, India or Brazil, have shown a willingness to
make commitments to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. The United States has
continued to attempt raising this issue at COP meetings, generally under the agenda
item “adequacy of commitments.” However, developing country resistance continues.
The Protocol does call on all Parties—developed and developing—to take a
number of steps to formulate national and regional programs to improve “local
emission factors,” activity data, models, and national inventories of greenhouse gas
emissions and sinks that remove these gases from the atmosphere. All Parties are also
committed to formulate, publish, and update climate change mitigation and adaptation
measures, and to cooperate in promotion and transfer of environmentally sound
technologies and in scientific and technical research on the climate system.
Emissions Trading and Joint Implementation. Emissions trading, in
which a Party included in Annex I “may transfer to, or acquire from, any other such
Party emission reduction units resulting from projects aimed at reducing
anthropogenic emissions by sources or enhancing anthropogenic removals by sinks
of greenhouse gases” for the purpose of meeting its commitments under the treaty,
is allowed and outlined in Article 6, with several provisos. Among the provisos is the
requirement that such trading “shall be supplemental to domestic actions.” The
purpose of this proviso is to make it clear that a nation cannot entirely fulfill its
responsibility to reduce domestic emissions by relying primarily on emissions trading
or joint implementation to meet its targets. Joint implementation is project-based
activity in which one country can receive emission reduction credits when it funds a
project in another country where the emissions are actually reduced. One of the more
contentious issues in the negotiations concerning how the Kyoto Protocol would
work has been this issue of “supplementarity”–finding agreement on what proportion
of a nation’s obligations could be met through these mechanisms versus domestic
actions to reduce emissions within a nation’s own borders. At the negotiations in
Bonn, Germany, in mid-2001 (COP-6 “bis” discussed below), this issue was resolved
with language that indicated there would be no quantitative limit on the credit a
country could claim from use of these mechanisms, but that domestic action must
constitute a significant element of the efforts of each Annex B country to meet their
targets.
A number of specific issues related to the rules on how joint implementation and
emissions trading would work were left at Kyoto to be negotiated and resolved in
subsequent meetings; in the years since the Protocol was completed, it became
increasingly clear that this is an extremely complex issue, and an emissions trading
system is not likely to be designed and implemented quickly.
Another major “mechanism” for meeting obligations in the Protocol is provided
by the establishment of a “clean development mechanism” (CDM), through which a
modified form of joint implementation between developed and developing countries
would occur. The United States had pushed hard for joint implementation, and early
proposals were formulated with the expectation that “JI” projects would be primarily
bilateral. Instead, negotiations resulted in agreement to establish the clean
development mechanism to which developed Annex I countries could contribute
financially, and developing/non-Annex I countries could benefit from financing for

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approved project activities; Annex I countries could then use certified emission
reductions from such projects to contribute to their compliance with part of their
emission limitation commitment. Emissions reductions achieved through this
mechanism could begin in the year 2000 to count toward compliance in the first
commitment period (2008-2012). Like emissions trading, making the CDM
operational appears likely to be a difficult and complex process.
Buenos Aires Action Plan
Although it had been expected just after the 1997 Kyoto conference that the
November 1998 COP-4 meeting in Buenos Aires, Argentina, would resolve some of
the more difficult issues left unresolved in Kyoto, it became clear during the year
leading up to COP-4 that parties were far from agreement on all of these issues.
Additional time for parties to analyze, negotiate, and work on these issues would be
required. Therefore, the parties arrived in Buenos Aires with an agenda focused on
formulating an “action plan” that would allow for the needed additional work to be
done. It was decided that the work plan would be completed by the end of 2000, and
would focus on the key issues, including the following:
--
Rules and guidelines for the “market-based mechanisms” that allow
flexibility to parties in meeting their obligations. These include emissions
trading, joint implementation, and the Clean Development Mechanism
(CDM). The list of critical issues to be considered include whether there
should be quantified limits on how much of a country’s emission reduction
requirement could be met through these mechanisms, as argued by the
European Union, or no quantified limit, as argued by the United States;
“transparency” in making it possible to effectively track emission units;
allocating risk in emissions trades--including the question of assigning
liability, or responsibility, when emissions trading involves “false” credits;
and key measurement, reporting and verification issues.
--
Rules and procedures that would govern compliance, including provisions
covering non-compliance with the treaty’s commitments. This issue was
left entirely open at Kyoto and remained one of the major challenges facing
negotiators.
--
Issues concerning development and transfer of cleaner, lower-emitting
technologies, particularly to developing countries.
--
Consideration of the adverse impacts of climate change and also the
impacts of measures taken to respond to it, an issue of particular
importance to developing countries, who argue the need for financial
assistance in order to help them cope with these impacts.
Carbon sinks. Another issue under active negotiation and consideration by the
parties, but outside the action plan itself, is defining application of the concept of
carbon sinks, including how to measure and verify the categories of carbon sinks. The
scientific panel that provides analysis to the parties, the Intergovernmental Panel on
Climate Change (IPCC), conducted a comprehensive study on land use, land-use
change, and forestry activities to identify their roles as carbon sinks and deal with the
measurement and verification issues related to them.

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Following the release of this report, which indicated that a large amount of
carbon could be stored in a variety of carbon sinks, including not only forests, but in
soils, vegetation, grazing lands, etc., the United States made a comprehensive
proposal for the COP-6 negotiations to broaden the scope of acceptable carbon sinks.
The Kyoto Protocol accepts in principle that a nation’s forests–management practices,
reforestation or afforestation–may be included in the accounting of net greenhouse
gas emissions and their reduction. This would be important to the United States, as
its large land area and extensive potential for greater absorption of carbon due to land
management changes could greatly reduce the amount of emissions reductions needed
from energy production. In a submission to the Secretariat of the UNFCCC, the
United States proposed in late summer 2000 that elaboration at COP-6 of land use
changes acceptable under the Protocol should also include soil carbon sequestration
and vegetation.
Few decisions were reached, nor were they expected, on the more difficult issues
outlined in the Buenos Aires Plan of Action at the COP-5 meeting in Bonn, Germany,
held October 25-November 24, 1999.
COP-6 Negotiations, The Hague
There were two intersessional negotiation sessions of the UNFCCC Subsidiary
Bodies (the key mechanisms for considering Kyoto issues between COP meetings) in
2000, June 12-16 and September 11-15, dealing with the issues of the Buenos Aires
workplan and attempting to fashion a negotiating text for final consideration at the
November 13-24 COP-6 meeting. At the conclusion of the meeting in Lyon, it was
reported that language on aspects of some issues had been agreed upon, but that the
negotiating text had been expanded to some 200 pages, much of it “bracketed.”
[Brackets indicate that no agreement has been found on the language in brackets, and
often several alternative possibilities are reflected within brackets.] Thus, though there
was negotiating text on most issues, disagreements remained on most key issues.
Observers reported that political positions remained entrenched and little movement
toward compromise appeared evident in Lyon. The end result was that many
participants felt doubtful that many of the key issues could be completely resolved in
November, 2000, at COP-6.
As talks began at COP-6 in The Hague, Netherlands, on November 13, they
centered initially on the "Buenos Aires Plan of Action" (BAPA), but evolved into a
high-level negotiation over the major political issues. These included major
controversy over the United States' proposal to allow credit for carbon "sinks" in
forests and agricultural lands, satisfying a major proportion of the U.S. emissions
reductions in this way (between half and one-quarter, according to various versions
of the U.S. proposal); disagreements over consequences for non-compliance by
countries that did not meet their emission reduction targets; and difficulties in
resolving how developing countries could obtain financial assistance to deal with
adverse effects of climate change and meet their obligations to plan for measuring and
possibly reducing greenhouse gas emissions.
In the final hours of COP-6, despite some compromises agreed between the
United States and some EU countries, the EU countries as a whole, reportedly led by
Denmark and Germany, rejected the compromise positions, and the talks in The
Hague collapsed. Jan Pronk, the President of the COP, suspended COP-6 without
agreement. Discussions between the EU and the “Umbrella group” that includes the
United States, Canada, Japan and Australia, were held in Ottawa, Canada, during the

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week of December 4, 2000, in order to try and salvage some of the agreement
reached at the end of the talks in The Hague. However, the U.S. negotiators reported
that these talks were “inconclusive” and the differences were still in place, or even
exacerbated, after this meeting.
At the end of 2000, based on discussions at The Hague and in Ottawa, the issues
particularly in contention were as follows:
Mechanisms, especially emissions trading: The main issue here was
“supplementarity”-- the position of the United States was that there should not
be quantitative limits to the amount of emissions reductions that are allowed
toward a country’s obligations through emissions trading or joint
implementation. The EU and others argue there should be such limitations, in
order to force nations to take more extensive domestic action to reduce
emissions. This issue is related to the commitment outlined in the Kyoto
Protocol that emissions trading should be “supplemental” to domestic action.
The United States was supported by the “umbrella group” in which it is joined
by New Zealand, Japan, Canada, Australia, Russia, Ukraine, Norway and
Iceland. Another related issue was whether carbon sinks can be included in the
Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) in which a contributing developed
country can claim credit for actions to reduce emissions in developing countries.
There were significant divisions on this issue not among developed countries, but
among developing countries, as well.
Compliance issues: Decisions on how non-compliance with Protocol (and
UNFCCC) obligations should be handled was a very controversial issue. The
United States position was that there should be binding consequences, but these
should be in the form of additional obligations in subsequent commitment
periods, and not in the form of financial penalties. There was considerable
disagreement at The Hague over whether financial penalties should be allowed.
Agreement on binding consequences would probably require an amendment to
the Protocol, which would be separately agreed to, and separately ratified.
Opponents to binding consequences include Japan, Russia, and Australia, who
were concerned, among other things, about opening the Protocol to an
amendment process. On the structure of a compliance regime, there was
substantial agreement on a likely outcome: a single compliance body with two
functions or branches–(1) to facilitate and assist compliance (mainly for
developing countries), and (2) an enforcement function where decisions would
be made on whether compliance violations have occurred and what
consequences should be applied. Consequences under consideration, in addition
to financial penalties, included losing access to mechanisms like emissions
trading and/or subtracting from future allocations of allowable carbon emissions.
Land use and land use change and forestry (LULUCF): As noted above, the
Kyoto Protocol accepts in principle that a nation’s forests–management
practices, reforestation or afforestation–may be included in the accounting of net
greenhouse gas emissions and their reduction. The United States proposed at
COP-6 that land use changes acceptable under the Protocol should also include
soil carbon sequestration and vegetation. Major issues were how to attain
precision in measuring absorption and release of carbon from land-based
sources, how permanent such land use mechanisms would be, and the extent to
which land use absorption counted by a nation is “additional” to business as
usual.

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The United States made a series of controversial proposals on how to count
carbon sequestration, beginning with basically counting most of the carbon
sequestration in its extensive forest cover toward its obligations. It subsequently
revised this proposal and put forward a formula that included three parts: a first
“interval” allowing up to 20 million tons of carbon to be counted at 100% for
any country with forests absorbing that much; a second interval of a certain
amount in which credit for a certain percentage would be allowed up to a certain
threshold; then full credit for tons absorbed beyond the threshold (which would
be historically determined in relation to baseline absorption amounts). The EU
opposed the U.S. proposal, mainly on the issue of forests, and the extent to
which a country like the United States would receive credits for a “business as
usual” scenario that did not involve the harder emissions reductions from fuel
sources and technological measures. When the United States put numbers to
this proposal, the U.S. credits from carbon sinks appeared to represent about
125 million tons of carbon, against a likely need to reduce emissions by about
600 million tons of carbon to meet its commitment in 2008-2012. This was
strongly opposed by the EU and other countries, and a stalemate over this issue,
despite several revisions downward of the U.S. position and tentative acceptance
of a much smaller amount by the EU, was thought to be a major factor in the
collapse of the November COP-6 negotiations at The Hague.
Developing country participation: The United States had been seeking
additional commitments from developing countries in a series of informal
discussions and consultations during the period since the Kyoto Protocol was
completed in late 1997, but only Argentina and Kazakhstan have shown a
willingness to make such commitments. Little willingness to do so has been
shown by other developing countries. The possibility that it would be discussed
under an agenda item dealing with “adequacy of commitments” did not occur at
The Hague.
Bush Administration Policy
Just over 2 months after the COP-6 talks collapsed, President George W. Bush
took office and announced his Administration would carry out a cabinet-level review
of climate policy. The Bush Administration announced in late March 2001 that it
would not be interested in continuing discussion on the Kyoto Protocol, which was
characterized as “dead” in terms of U.S. policy. The cabinet-level review of U.S.
climate policy was on-going, and the Administration indicated that it would be
interested in pursuing alternative approaches or cooperative efforts such as market-
based incentives and voluntary measures, to address climate change concerns.
The EU nations and others, such as Japan, expressed deep concern and dismay
at this new U.S. position, and a high-level delegation of EU officials visited the United
States to attempt to re-engage the United States in the Kyoto Protocol process. This
effort was reported as having been “rebuffed.” Some observers began considering the
implications of the new U.S. position for the Protocol, and whether the EU and other
nations would ratify the Protocol, and try to bring it into force without the United
States.
President Bush made a policy statement in mid-June, resulting from the
continuing cabinet-level review of climate change options, in which he confirmed the

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U.S. approach as rejecting the Kyoto Protocol and favoring voluntary actions,
increased scientific research, and market mechanisms. President Bush also outlined
a U.S. Climate Change Research Initiative, and the National Climate Change
technology Initiative. (See CRS Report RL30452, Climate Change: Federal
Research, Technology, and Related Programs.) During his mid-June trip to Europe,
President Bush discussed climate policy with European heads of state and met strong
opposition to the U.S. position. The outcome was that Europe and the United States
would “agree to disagree” on climate. The Europeans announced they would proceed
with ratification of the Kyoto Protocol.
President Bush indicated that the United States would continue to participate in
international negotiations on climate change, but would not negotiate on Kyoto
Protocol issues. When the COP-6 meeting resumed in Bonn, Germany, in July 2001,
the U.S. delegation followed this approach, declining to participate in negotiations on
most Kyoto Protocol issues, and remaining on the sidelines. The other parties
reached agreement on the key political issues and announced that the developed
countries would move toward ratification of the Kyoto Protocol without the United
States, with the goal of attaining the number of ratifications necessary to bring the
protocol into force by the time of the World Summit on Sustainable Development
(WSSD) to be held August 26-September 4, 2002, in Johannesburg, South Africa.
The United States has indicated it will have a new approach to be proposed at some
point in the future, but following the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in New
York and Washington, climate issues–along with many others–have been eclipsed by
U.S. security concerns and the war on terrorism. It remains unclear when the United
States may elucidate further its approach to dealing with climate change.
COP-6 Resumed, Bonn, Germany
When the COP-6 negotiations resumed July 16-27, 2001, in Bonn, Germany,
little progress had been made on resolving the differences that had produced an
impasse in The Hague. However, this meeting took place after President George
Bush had become the U.S. President, and had rejected the Kyoto Protocol in March;
as a result, the United States delegation to this meeting declined to participate in the
negotiations related to the Protocol and chose to act as observers at that meeting. As
the other parties negotiated the key issues, agreement was reached on most of the
major political issues, to the surprise of most observers given the low level of
expectations that preceded the meeting. The agreements included:
(1) Mechanisms – the “flexibility” mechanisms which the United States had strongly
favored as the Protocol was initially put together, including emissions trading;
joint implementation; and the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), which
provides funding from developed countries for emissions reduction activities in
developing countries, with credit for the donor countries. One of the key
elements of this agreement was that there would be no quantitative limit on the
credit a country could claim from use of these mechanisms, but that domestic
action must constitute a significant element of the efforts of each Annex B
country to meet its targets.
(2) Carbon sinks – credit was agreed to for broad activities that absorb carbon from
the atmosphere or store it, including forest and cropland management, and
revegetation, with no over-all cap on the amount of credit that a country could

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claim for sinks activities. In the case of forest management, an Appendix Z
establishes country-specific caps for each Annex I country; for example, a cap
of 13 million tons could be credited to Japan (which represents about 4% of its
base-year emissions). For cropland management, countries could receive credit
only for carbon sequestration increases above 1990 levels.
(3) Compliance – final action on compliance procedures and mechanisms that would
address non-compliance with Protocol provisions was deferred to COP-7, but
included broad outlines of consequences for failing to meet emissions targets that
would include a requirement to “make up” shortfalls at 1.3 tons to 1, suspension
of the right to sell credits for surplus emissions reductions; and a required
compliance action plan for those not meeting their targets.
(4) Financing – three new funds were agreed upon to provide assistance for needs
associated with climate change; a least-developed-country fund to support
National Adaptation Programs of Action; and a Kyoto Protocol adaptation fund
supported by a CDM levy and voluntary contributions.
A number of operational details attendant upon these decisions remained to be
negotiated and agreed upon, and these were the major issues of the COP-7 meeting
that followed.
COP-7, Marrakech, Morocco
At the COP-7 meeting in Marrakech, Morocco October 29-November 10, 2001,
negotiators in effect completed the work of the Buenos Aires Plan of Action,
finalizing most of the operational details and setting the stage for nations to ratify the
Protocol. The United States delegation continued to act as observers, declining to
participate in active negotiations. Other parties continued to express their hope that
the United States would re-engage in the process at some point, but indicated their
intention to seek ratification of the requisite number of countries to bring the Protocol
into force (55 countries representing 55% of developed country emissions of carbon
dioxide in 1990). A target date for bringing the Protocol into force was put
forward–the August-September 2002 World Summit on Sustainable Development
(WSSD) to be held in Johannesburg, South Africa.
The main decisions at COP-7 included: operational rules for international
emissions trading among parties to the Protocol and for the CDM and joint
implementation; a compliance regime that outlines consequences for failure to meet
emissions targets but defers to the parties to the Protocol after it is in force to decide
whether these consequences are legally binding; accounting procedures for the
flexibility mechanisms; and a decision to consider at COP-8 how to achieve to a
review of the adequacy of commitments that might move toward discussions of future
developing country commitments. Other parties reiterated their hope that the United
States would re-engage with the international cooperation efforts under the Protocol,
but also their decision to seek ratification by their governments and the Protocol’s
entry into force by the WSSD in 2002, as noted above.
Extensive additional information and details on the decisions at the various
conferences of the parties are available from CRS and a variety of sources at the CRS
electronic briefing book website, available through the CRS home page, or at:

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[http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebgcc1.shtml]
Issues for Congress
Ratification. For the United States to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, the treaty
would have to be transmitted to the U.S. Senate by the President for advice and
consent. A two-thirds majority vote in the Senate is required for approval. As long
as the United States has not ratified the treaty, it is not subject to its terms and
obligations. President Clinton strongly supported the Kyoto Protocol, though
criticizing it for not including commitments for developing countries. The United
States signed the Protocol on November 12, 1998. The U.S. signature was criticized
by several Members of Congress who opposed the treaty on a number of grounds,
including questions about the scientific justification for it and about the likely
economic impacts that might occur if the United States were to attempt to meet its
emission reduction commitments in the treaty. In recognition of the opposition
expressed in the Senate by S.Res. 98, which passed 95-0 in the months before the
Kyoto meeting, to a Protocol that does not include requirements for emissions
limitations by developing countries, President Clinton did not submit the treaty to the
Senate for advice and consent, citing lack of meaningful developing country
participation. Given the position announced by the Bush Administration, opposing
the Kyoto Protocol, it continues to be unlikely that he will transmit it to the Senate.
Oversight. Both the House and Senate have sent delegations of Members to
serve as observers on the U.S. delegation to most Kyoto-related meetings.
Supporters and opponents of the Protocol have been included in these delegations.
A number of committees have held hearings on the implications of the Protocol for
the United States, its economy, energy prices, impacts on climate change, and other
related issues. While the Clinton Administration stated that it believed the treaty
could be implemented without harm to the U.S. economy, and without imposing
additional taxes, a number of questions related to how its goals can be achieved and
at what cost, continue to be of interest to Congress. Given the position announced
by the Bush Administration, it seems likely that congressional attention will shift
somewhat, to a consideration of new approaches that may be identified by the
outcome of the announced policy review, or to steps that can be initiated through
legislation, especially regarding domestic policy.
Legislation. A number of legislative proposals have been introduced related
to climate change, and in particular, U.S. domestic action on research, science, and
emissions trading or sequestration credit. (See the legislation section of CRS Issue
Brief IB89005, Global Climate Change). Recent legislation has also included an
emphasis on climate/greenhouse gas reduction benefits of several energy proposals
for increased energy efficiency and alternative energy research, development and
deployment. (See CRS Issue Brief IB10041, Renewable Energy: Tax Credit, Budget,
and Electricity Production, CRS Issue Brief IB10020, Energy Efficiency: Budget,
Oil Conservation, and Electricity Conservation, and CRS Report RL31044,
Renewable Energy Legislation in the 107th Congress.) In general, if any treaty were
to be sent to the Senate for consideration, legislation that might be required for its
implementation would also typically be sent to the Congress by the Administration.
Legislation related to the Kyoto Protocol would not be likely unless the protocol were
sent to Congress, which as noted above is not likely, given the Bush Administration’s
position on the protocol. (see also the “Legislation” Section of the CRS Global
C l i m a t e C h a n g e E l e c t r o n i c B r i e f i n g B o o k —
[http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebgcc1.shtml].

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