Order Code IB10070
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Mexico-U.S. Relations:
Issues for the 107th Congress
Updated December 4, 2001
K. Larry Storrs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
U.S.-Mexico Relationship
Major Bilateral Linkages
Fox Administration
Economic and Social Challenges
Political and Security Challenges
Foreign Policy Challenges
Bilateral Issues for Congress
Trade Issues
Functioning of NAFTA Institutions
Recent Trade Disputes
Immigration Issues
Nature of the Immigration Problem
Clinton Administration and Congressional Initiatives to Curb Immigration
Bush Administration Initiatives
Drug Trafficking Issues
Nature of the Problem
Presidential Certifications and Congressional Reactions
Political and Human Rights Issues
Concerns over Elections and Political Rights
Allegations of Human Rights Abuses
LEGISLATION
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Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for the 107th Congress
SUMMARY
The United States and Mexico have a
the September terrorist attacks, some Mem-
special relationship under the North American
bers are urging tighter border controls.
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), which
removes trade and investment barriers between
Drug Trafficking. After the escape from
the countries. The friendly relationship has
prison of major drug lord Joaquin “El Chapo”
been strengthened by President Bush’s meet-
Guzman on January 19, 2001, President Fox
ings with President Fox in Mexico, Canada,
announced a national crusade against drug
and the United States. Major issues of con-
trafficking and corruption. During the
cern to Congress are trade, immigration, drug
February and September 2001 Bush-Fox
trafficking, and political rights.
meetings, the leaders agreed to strengthen law
enforcement cooperation, including the sharing
Trade. NAFTA institutions have been
of seized assets, and to find more effective
functioning, trade between the countries has
mechanisms for multilateral cooperation. With
tripled since 1994, and allegations of violations
several Members pressing proposals to modify
of labor and environmental laws have been
U.S. drug certification requirements, the
considered. While the Clinton and Bush
Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved
Administrations have argued that NAFTA has
measures in April and August 2001 that would
had modest positive impacts on all three mem-
modify the existing process for three years,
ber countries, public and congressional criti-
and the Senate passed the FY2002 Foreign
cisms of NAFTA have been factors in the
Operations Appropriations bill (H.R. 2506),
delay of legislation to give the president fast
which would modify the process for one year
track trade negotiation authority. Recent trade
for Western Hemisphere countries.
disputes with Mexico have involved trucking,
sugar, telecommunications, and tuna. Presi-
Political and Human Rights. Mexico
dent Fox has been urging an expanded Euro-
held historic nationwide elections on July 2,
pean Union-like conception of NAFTA.
2000, in which Vicente Fox of the Alliance for
Change (PAN/PVEM) won the presidency.
Immigration. Following major immigra-
Recent human rights concerns have focused on
tion reforms in 1996, Congress acted to en-
the killing of human rights lawyer Digna
large the Border Patrol and to strengthen
Ochoa on October 19, 2001, and the killing of
immigration controls along the border. De-
two judges in Sinaloa on November 11, 2001,
spite Mexican complaints about these efforts,
prompting criticisms and calls for action. In
the two countries issued a Binational Study on
related action, on November 8, 2001,
Migration in November 1997, and since the
President Fox freed two well known anti-
mid-1990s, have been consulting regularly on
logging activists, and on November 27, 2001,
border safety and consular issues. Presidents
he welcomed a report by the National Human
Fox and Bush in early September 2001
Rights Commission on human rights abuses in
meetings praised the work of the high level
the 1970s and early 1980s, and promised to
working group on migration begun in February
designate a special prosecutor to prosecute
2001, and instructed it to reach agreements as
those responsible for the abuses and to
soon as possible on border safety, a temporary
consider compensation for the families of the
worker program, and the status of undocu-
disappeared persons.
mented Mexicans in the United States. Since
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On November 16-18, Senate Majority Leader Thomas Daschle and House Minority
Leader Richard Gephardt visited Mexico to continue a dialogue on migration and security
issues. On November 19, 2001, Mexican National Security Adviser Adolfo Aguilar met with
U.S. Homeland Security Director Tom Ridge to discuss cooperative border and security
arrangements. On November 20, 2001, Mexican and U.S. foreign affairs officials met to
discuss migration issues, with the press reporting that agreements were deferred because of
terrorism concerns. On November 27, President Fox received a report from the National
Human Rights Commission documenting abuses and disappearances in the 1970s and early
1980s, and he promised the appointment of a Special Prosecutor to prosecute those
responsible for the abuses. Around December 1, 2001, the one-year anniversary of his
inauguration, President Fox recognized that the economy was struggling because of the
global slowdown but argued that respect for law and human rights had advanced and that
the basis for economic progress had been established.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS1
U.S.-Mexico Relationship
Major Bilateral Linkages
Mexico surpassed Japan in 1998 to became the United States’ second most important
trading partner following Canada. It is also one of the leading countries in Latin America in
terms of U.S. investment, with total stock of investment of about $34 billion in 1999. In
addition, cooperation with Mexico is vital in dealing with illegal immigration, the flow of illicit
drugs to the United States, and a host of border issues.
The United States is Mexico’s most important customer by far, receiving about 87% of
Mexico’s exports — including petroleum, automobiles, auto parts, and winter vegetables —
and providing about 77% of Mexico’s imports. The United States is the source of over 60%
of foreign investment in Mexico, and the primary source of important tourism earnings.
Until the early 1980s, Mexico had a closed and statist economy and its independent
foreign policy was often at odds with the United States. Beginning under President Miguel
de la Madrid (1982-1988), and continuing more dramatically under President Carlos Salinas
de Gortari (1988-1994) and President Ernesto Zedillo (1994-2000), Mexico adopted a series
of economic, political, and foreign policy reforms. It opened its economy to trade and
investment, adopted electoral reforms that leveled the playing field, and increased cooperation
with the United States on drug control, border issues, and trade matters. Cooperation under
1 This issue brief draws from CRS Issue Brief IB10047, Mexico-U.S. Relations: Issues for the 106th
Congress, which contains more information on the Zedillo Administration in Mexico. It is out of print,
but may be requested through the author, Larry Storrs, at (202) 707-5050.
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NAFTA and the annual cabinet-level meetings of the Binational Commission are the clearest
indications of the growing ties between the countries.
Fox Administration
Vicente Fox of the conservative Alliance for Change was inaugurated as President on
December 1, 2000, for a 6-year term, promising to promote free market policies, to
strengthen democracy and the rule of law, to fight corruption and crime, and to end the
conflictive situation in the state of Chiapas. Fox’s inauguration ended 71 years of presidential
control by the long dominant party.
Fox was elected with 42.52% of the vote in the July 2, 2000 elections, with support from
the conservative National Action Party (PAN) and the Green Ecological Party of Mexico
(PVEM), which formed the Alliance for Change. Francisco Labastida from the long-ruling
and centrist Institutional Revolutionary Party (PRI) came in second with 36.10% of the vote.
Cuauhtemoc Cardenas from the leftist Alliance for Mexico came in third with 16.64% of the
vote, with support from the center-left Party of the Democratic Revolution (PRD) and four
minor leftist parties.
Results from the July 2000 legislative elections produced a pluralistic legislature, with
no party or coalition having a majority in either chamber of Congress. In the 128-member
Senate, the PRI has 60 senators, the PAN has 46 and the PVEM has 5 (giving the Alliance
for Change a total of 51), while the PRD has 15, the Labor Party (PT) has one and the
Democratic Convergence (CD) has one (giving the Alliance for Mexico a total of 17). In the
500-seat Chamber of Deputies, the PAN has 206 seats and the PVEM has 17 seats (giving
the Alliance for Change 223 seats), while the PRI has 211 deputies. The Alliance for Mexico
has a total of 66 seats, with 50 for the PRD, 7 for the PT, 3 for the CD, 3 for the Party of the
Nationalist Society (PSN), and 2 for the Social Alliance Party (PAS). (For more detail on the
2000 elections, see CRS Report RS20611, Mexico’s Presidential, Legislative, and Local
Elections of July 2, 2000, by K. Larry Storrs.)
Economic and Social Challenges. After four years of economic growth rates
averaging over 5% per year in 1996-1999, and estimated growth of 7% in 2000, with help
from high oil prices, President Fox inherited a fairly robust economy, but with many social
challenges. He named widely respected Francisco Gil Diaz as Secretary of the Treasury, and
Luis Ernesto Derbez as Secretary of the newly formed Economic Development Ministry, and
promised to follow sound macro-economic policies to control inflation. In early April 2001,
the Fox Administration finally proposed a long-discussed fiscal reform that will increase tax
revenues so that the government can reduce poverty and regional inequality, while increasing
investment in health, security, and education One element of the reform is the termination of
the exemption from the value-added tax for food and medicine, although opposition parties
have criticized that proposal, and the Administration has indicated some willingness to make
adjustments. President Fox promised in his inaugural address not to privatize the Mexican
oil monopoly (Pemex) and the Federal Electricity Commission (CFE), but he called for
greater operational efficiency in Pemex, and expanding private investment in the power
sector. He proposed an austere budget for 2001, but was forced to increase social and local
expenditures to obtain congressional approval by the end of 2000. In the face of the
economic slowdown in the United States, declining oil prices, and the fallout from the
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September 2001 terrorist attacks, he has had to lower economic growth projections for the
year from 4.5% to 2.5% and then to zero or slightly negative.
Political and Security Challenges. President Fox has promised to end corruption
and to operate a more transparent and open government, with examination of some of the
more notorious past cases. He has promised to end government surveillance of opposition
politicians, and to strengthen the government’s commitment to human rights. He has
proposed the professionalization of the police under a new public security ministry to deal
with widespread public concerns with security and police corruption, and he has promised
vigorous efforts against illicit drug traffickers.
President Fox has offered to reinitiate peace talks with the Zapatista rebels in the state
of Chiapas, and has taken a number of initiatives to facilitate the talks, including introduction
of indigenous rights legislation, withdrawal of the military from some areas, and release of
over 30 Zapatista prisoners. On February 9, 2001, President Fox visited Chiapas for the third
time, launched a railroad modernization project, and invited the Zapatista rebels to meet with
him when they arrived in Mexico City after their announced march to the capital. The
Zapatistas declined the offer to meet with Fox, but later agreed to meet with the congressional
commission in Mexico City. Unarmed but masked Zapatista leaders marched from Chiapas
to Mexico City from February 24 to March 9, 2001, and remained in the city to generate
support for indigenous rights legislation. They spoke to the Chamber of Deputies on March
28, and while refusing to speak to President Fox until he complies with all of their stated pre-
conditions, they agreed to enter into dialogue with the government. After the Mexican
Congress passed a modified version of the indigenous rights legislation, the Zapatistas
denounced the legislation as inadequate and withdrew from any dialogue with the
government. On July 13, 2001, with the approval of the 17th state, Mexico approved the new
indigenous rights legislation, although eight states with heavy indigenous populations voted
against the legislation.
Foreign Policy Challenges. President Fox and Foreign Minister Castaneda have
indicated that Mexico will pursue a more activist and diversified foreign policy, with greater
involvement in UN activities, and stronger ties to Latin America and Europe. President Fox
has promoted the so-called Puebla-Panama Plan, which would provide for cooperative
development efforts among the Central American countries and the southeastern states of
Mexico. He is reviving the G-3 group (Colombia, Venezuela, and Mexico), seeking better
ties with the Southern Common Market (Mercosur) countries, and he has sought to expand
trade with the European Union under the EU-Mexico Free Trade Agreement that went into
effect in July 2000. The Fox Administration has indicated that it will be more aggressive in
defending the interests of Mexicans living in foreign countries, particularly those in the United
States, and it established a Special Office for Mexicans Abroad. On various occasions,
including his post-election visit to the United States, President Fox indicated that he expects
to have warm and friendly relations with the United States, and he has called for greater
cooperation under NAFTA and for a more open border between the countries over time. In
2001, Presidents Fox and Bush have met in mid-February in Mexico, in mid-April in Canada,
in early May in the United States, in early September in the United States on an official state
visit, and in early October in the United States for Mexico to express solidarity with the
United States following the terrorist attacks. The leaders set in motion procedures to advance
progress on trade, migration, drug trafficking, and other issues.
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Bilateral Issues for Congress
Trade Issues
Trade between Mexico and the United States has grown dramatically in recent years,
encouraged by the adoption of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) between
the United States, Mexico, and Canada. Total U.S. trade with Mexico has increased from
$81.5 billion in 1993 (exports of $41.6 billion; imports of $39.9 billion) to $247.2 billion in
2000 (exports of $111.3 billion; imports of $135.9 billion). However, the U.S. trade balance
with Mexico has shifted from a surplus of $1.3 billion in 1994 to a generally growing deficit
of $24.6 billion in 2000, in part because of the late 1994 devaluation of the peso which made
Mexican products cheaper. This change in the trade balance has caused some Members of
Congress to question the benefits of NAFTA. Despite the deficit, Mexico is one of the fastest
growing export markets for the United States in recent years, and it became the second most
important trading partner after Canada in 1998.
The NAFTA agreement was negotiated in 1991 and 1992; side agreements on labor and
environmental matters were completed in 1993; the agreements were approved by the
respective legislatures in late 1993 and went into force on Jan. 1, 1994. Under the
agreements, trade and investment restrictions are being eliminated over a 15 year period, with
most restrictions eliminated in the early years of the agreement. On July 11, 1997, the Clinton
Administration released a required report on the first 3 years of operations under NAFTA that
argued that NAFTA had had a modest positive impact on U.S. jobs and income, and had
facilitated Mexico’s economic recovery following the peso crisis of 1994-1995. In
subsequent statements, Clinton and Bush Administration spokesmen argued that NAFTA has
been successful in increasing U.S. exports to Mexico, particularly heavily protected areas such
as agricultural products, and in creating jobs and strengthening the economy.
At the Miami Summit of the Americas, in December 1994, the NAFTA partners
announced that they would begin negotiations with Chile on accession to NAFTA, and the
hemispheric presidents pledged to create a Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA) by the
year 2005. These negotiations have been hampered by the inability of the legislative and
executive branches in the United States to agree on conditions for granting the President fast
track negotiation authority for new free trade agreements. Hemispheric negotiations leading
toward the FTAA have continued and the goal was reaffirmed at the Summit of the Americas
in Quebec City, Canada in April 2001, despite the executive branch’s lack of free trade
negotiating authority. In November 2000, the Clinton Administration began strictly bilateral
free trade talks with Chile, and the Bush Administration is continuing these talks.
Functioning of NAFTA Institutions. Since 1994, the NAFTA institutions
mandated by the agreements have been functioning. The tripartite Commission on
Environmental Cooperation (CEC) was established in Montreal, Canada; and the Commission
for Labor Cooperation (CLC) was established in Dallas, Texas. In addition, the bilateral
Border Environment Cooperation Commission (BECC), located in Ciudad Juarez, Mexico;
and the North American Development Bank (NADBank), headquartered in San Antonio,
Texas, were created to promote and finance border environment projects along the
U.S.-Mexico border. During the Bush-Fox talks in Washington, D.C. in early September
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2001, the two presidents pledged to take steps to strengthen the North American
Development Bank and the Border Environmental Cooperation Commission.
These NAFTA institutions have operated to encourage cooperation on trade,
environmental and labor issues, and to consider non- governmental petitions under the labor
and environmental side agreements. Under the labor side agreement, 23 petitions have been
submitted alleging non-compliance by one of the NAFTA countries with existing labor
legislation, and 14 of these have been against Mexico: five submissions were advanced to the
next stage of ministerial consultations, although negotiations are ongoing in two cases; two
submissions were essentially dropped on grounds that the workers who were fired in Mexico
accepted severance pay; two submissions were withdrawn, in one case when Mexico
recognized a union just before a scheduled hearing; one submission was rejected on
procedural grounds, although a study on reconciliation of the right to strike and national
interests was initiated; and one submission is pending.
In one case advanced to ministerial consultation, involving the dismissal of workers for
union organizing activities at a SONY electronics plant in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico, the labor
ministers agreed to a plan of action including meetings with the affected workers, public
seminars, and studies of union registration procedures. In the case of alleged discrimination
against pregnant Mexican workers in border assembly (maquiladora) plants, ministerial
consultations led to an implementation agreement and a conference on the rights of working
women. With regard to the union association and health and safety issues in the Han Young
maquiladora plant in Tijuana and the Itapsa maquiladora plant in the state of Mexico,
ministerial consultations were held and negotiations are continuing.
Under the trilateral CLC, the countries are cooperating in many areas, especially
occupational safety and rights of working women and children. Some argue that the
provisions have encouraged Mexico to enforce its own labor legislation. Others argue that
the provisions have been extremely weak and that numerous abuses persist. (For more
information on the functioning of this institution, see CRS Report 97-861, NAFTA Labor Side
Agreement: Lessons for the Worker Rights and Fast-Track Debate, by Mary Jane Bolle.)
Under the environmental side agreement, 26 petitions have been submitted alleging
non-compliance with environmental legislation, but only 9 of these have involved Mexico:
in the major case involving the environmental impact of the construction of a cruise boat port
in Cozumel, Mexico, the Council requested a response from the Mexican government and
after evaluation directed the CEC Secretariat to prepare a full factual record on the case to
highlight deficiencies; in two cases involving pollution of the Magdalena River and Lake
Chapala the Council is reviewing the response from the Mexican government; in three recent
cases the Council has requested responses from the Mexican government; in another case the
complaint is still being reviewed; and another case was rejected on grounds that it did not
allege a violation of environmental law. The CEC is cooperating on many environmental
projects, including the North American Bird Conservation Initiative to protect birds and
conserve bird habitats; the Upper San Pedro River Initiative to protect this Sonora-Arizona
eco-system that is an important corridor for millions of migratory birds; and the Sound
Management of Chemicals Project to dramatically reduce the use of PCBs, DDT, chlordane,
mercury, and other pollutants. (For more information, see CRS Report 97-291, NAFTA:
Related Environmental Issues and Initiatives, by Mary Tiemann.)
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Recent Trade Disputes. The major trade disputes between the countries involve the
access of Mexican trucks to the United States, opening the Mexican telecommunications
sector to international long distance competition, the access of Mexican sugar and tuna to the
U.S. market, and the access of U.S. sweeteners to the Mexican market.
With respect to trucking issues, the Mexican government has criticized U.S.
postponement on safety grounds of implementation of NAFTA provisions that would give
Mexican trucks access to U.S. highways, and Mexico has been seeking settlement through
NAFTA dispute settlement procedures. On February 6, 2001, the dispute resolution panel
ruled that the United States was in violation of NAFTA for failure to allow Mexican trucks
access to U.S. roads, although non-discriminatory safety procedures were permitted. The
Bush Administration indicated a willingness to abide by the decision, and Presidents Bush
and Fox announced after their mid-February 2001 meeting in Mexico that the two countries
would begin immediate discussions to implement the NAFTA panel decision on trucking. The
U.S. Department of Transportation announced a plan in March 2001 under which Mexican
trucks will have full access to the United States in January 2002, but they will be required to
comply over a period of time with U.S. safety regulations and to have insurance with U.S.-
registered agents. Proposed rules were announced on May 1, 2001, and restrictions on
Mexican investment in this sector were eased on June 6, 2001. Congressional opposition on
safety grounds was demonstrated in the FY2002 Department of Transportation
Appropriations (H.R. 2299). The House version, passed on June 26, 2001, contains an
outright prohibition on the processing of applications of Mexican truckers to operate in the
United States beyond the border commercial zones, and President Bush has threatened to
veto the measure if this provision survives. The Senate version, passed on August 1, 2001,
was subject to parliamentary delay for several days by Senators Gramm and McCain, who
argued that the Murray-Shelby provisions requiring prior safety inspection of Mexican trucks
were contrary to the NAFTA pact and were discriminatory toward Mexico. On November
29, 2001, House and Senate conferees agreed to basically retain the safety provisions but
grant the Administration greater flexibility in implementation, and these provisions were
approved by the House and the Senate in early December 2001.
Regarding telecommunications issues, the United States filed a complaint with the WTO
in August 2000, following previous warnings, over Mexico’s failure to reduce Telmex’s
continuing dominant position in the telecommunications industry. While Mexico’s issuance
of new regulations in mid-September 2000 was considered unsatisfactory, a late December
2000 agreement between Telmex and rival carriers Alestra and Avantel under which Telmex
agreed to lower interconnection fees was said to reduce the likelihood that the United States
will pursue the complaint with the WTO. However, the USTR’s April 2001 report on
telecommunication trade barriers cited Mexico for continued failure to open its long-distance
market to competition, and it gave the country until June 1, 2001, to remove the barriers or
the United States would pursue the WTO dispute resolution process.
With regard to sugar and sweetener issues, Mexico argues that it is entitled to ship its
net sugar surplus to the United States duty free under NAFTA, while the United States argues
that a sugar side letter negotiated along with NAFTA limits Mexican shipments of sugar.
Efforts to resolve the issue have been unsuccessful, and Mexico has threatened to resort to
NAFTA dispute resolution procedures. On a related matter, Mexico complains that imports
of high fructose corn syrup (HFCS) sweeteners from the United States constitute dumping,
and it has imposed anti-dumping duties, while the United States has invoked WTO and
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NAFTA dispute resolution mechanisms, claiming that the Mexican government has colluded
with the Mexican sugar and sweetener industries to restrict HFCS imports from the United
States. In February 2000, the WTO upheld the U.S. claim, but Mexico has retained the anti-
dumping duties and announced in November 2001 that it will submit new injury studies soon.
On tuna issues, the United States lifted the embargo on Mexican tuna in April 2000, after
procedures were worked out to permit the unharmed release from nets of dolphins, but a
federal judge in San Francisco blocked the Clinton Administration’s plan to loosen the
standards of a 1990 law for a dolphin-safe label, saying that the standards of the law had not
been met. In mid-May 2000, the U.S. delegation to the Binational Commission meetings
announced that the government was appealing the decision. The Federal Appeals Court in
San Francisco reviewed the case in December 2000 but ruled unfavorably on July 23, 2001,
prompting criticism from Mexican fishers who had hoped to be rewarded for their efforts.
With respect to other issues, both countries have alleged dumping of beef and cattle;
Mexico has alleged U.S. dumping of apples, cotton, and sorghum; and the United States has
alleged Mexican dumping of tomatoes and steel, although many of these complaints have been
resolved to some extent. The United States has also claimed that Mexican sanitary standards
have posed barriers to U.S. exports, and that Mexico’s lax enforcement has permitted
widespread piracy of recording and software products. Mexico has objected to U.S.
sanctions against third countries with investments in Cuba under the Cuban Liberty and
Democratic Solidarity Act of 1996, commonly called the Helms-Burton legislation.
Immigration Issues
Nature of the Immigration Problem. The Immigration and Naturalization Service
(INS) has estimated that there were about 2.7 million undocumented Mexican migrants
residing in the United States in late 1996, accounting for 54% of the total estimated illegal
alien population of 5.1 million, but preliminary data from the 2000 Census suggest
considerably higher numbers. Mexico regularly expresses concern about alleged abuses
suffered by Mexican workers in the United States, and takes the view that the migrants are
“undocumented workers,” not illegal immigrants, making the point that since the U.S. market
attracts and provides employment for the migrants, it bears some responsibility. Mexico also
regularly voices concern for the loss of life and other maladies suffered by Mexican migrants
as they are forced by increasing border controls to utilize increasingly dangerous routes and
methods to enter the United States without proper documentation.
Mexico benefits from illegal migration in at least two ways: (1) it is a “safety valve” that
dissipates the political discontent that could arise from higher unemployment in Mexico; and
(2) it is a source of remittances by workers in the United States to families in Mexico,
ranging, according to widely varying estimates, from $1 billion to $10 billion.
The main U.S. mechanism for controlling illegal immigration in the past was the
Immigration Reform and Control Act of 1986 (P.L. 99-603), which was passed by Congress
in late 1986. Main provisions of the Act include civil and criminal penalties for U.S.
employers who knowingly hire undocumented workers; increased border control and
enforcement measures; anti-discrimination safeguards; provision for amnesty or legalization
for illegal aliens who resided continuously in the United States before 1982; and a special
legalization for farm workers previously employed on American farms.
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In the face of criticisms that illegal aliens deprive American citizens of jobs and are a
growing burden on the educational, health, and welfare resources of certain states, recent
Administrations sought to control illegal immigration to protect U.S. borders and to preserve
the program of legal immigration. Suits by the most affected states (California, Florida,
Texas, and Arizona) against the federal government, and the passage in California in late 1994
of Proposition 187, which sought to deny health and educational benefits to illegal aliens,
stimulated additional state and federal legislative proposals. Mexican authorities strongly
criticized passage of Proposition 187, even though it was blocked by court action, and other
restrictive immigration legislation as racist and discriminatory.
Clinton Administration and Congressional Initiatives to Curb Immigration.
The Clinton Administration sought to control illegal entry into the United States with
improved technology and additional Border Patrol agents and INS inspectors, using a strategy
known as “prevention through deterrence,” modeled upon two border initiatives, Operation
Hold the Line in the El Paso area and Operation Gatekeeper in the San Diego area. With
regard to bilateral cooperation with Mexico under Clinton, the countries formalized
consultations through the Border Liaison Mechanisms, issued a Binational Study on
Migration in 1997 that found that unauthorized migration carries costs for both countries, and
pursued a Border Safety Campaign in recent years to reduce violence on the border through
public information campaigns, search and rescue programs, and cooperation between U.S.
and Mexican officials. In mid-May 2000, following expressions of concern over private
ranchers detaining Mexican migrants in Arizona, the governments announced at the Binational
Commission meetings that they would prosecute any unlawful behavior by private citizens,
combat migrant smugglers, and expand regular consultation mechanisms.
Congress passed two major immigration reform measures in 1996 to control illegal
immigration and to limit the eligibility of aliens for federal programs. One was the Illegal
Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996, Division C of the Omnibus
Consolidated Appropriations Act for FY1997 (H.R. 3610/P.L. 104-208). The other was the
1996 welfare law entitled the Personal Responsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation
Act of 1996 (H.R. 3734/P.L. 104-193). The first measure sought to control illegal
immigration by adding 1,000 Border Patrol agents per year for 5 years (FY1997-FY2001),
along with additional personnel, equipment, and procedures. Both measures reduce the
attractiveness of immigration by restricting the eligibility of aliens for federal programs. (See
CRS Report 95-881, Immigration Legislation in the 104th Congress, by Joyce Vialet, et al.)
Congress also increased funding for the Immigration and Naturalization Service,
including the Border Patrol, through the regular Commerce, Justice, State, and Judiciary
Appropriations Acts, nearly tripling INS’s budget from $1.5 billion in FY1993 to $4.3 billion
in FY2000. (For more details, see CRS Report RS20618, Immigration and Naturalization
Service’s FY2001 Budget.) With various groups, including the AFL-CIO in February 2000,
calling for amnesty for illegal immigrants in the United States and a more lenient immigration
policy, legislation was enacted in 2000 to increase the number of temporary H-1B
professional workers, and Congress considered measures to increase the number of H-2A
agricultural workers and to legalize the status of undocumented aliens through registry and
various forms of amnesty. (See the following CRS reports by Ruth Ellen Wasem: CRS
Report RS20836, Immigration Legislation in the 106th Congress, CRS Report RL30780,
Immigration Legalization and Status Adjustment Legislation, and CRS Report RL30852,
Immigration of Agricultural Guest Workers: Policy, Trends, and Legislative Issues.)
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Bush Administration Initiatives. When President Bush met with President Fox in
mid-February 2001, migration issues were among the main topics, with Mexican officials
expressing concern about the number of migrants who die each year while seeking entry into
the United States. President Fox has been pressing proposals for legalizing undocumented
Mexican workers in the United States through amnesty or guest worker arrangements as a
way of protecting their human rights. Senator Gramm, after meeting with President Fox in
early January 2001, has been proposing the development of a guest worker program that
would bring Mexican workers legally to the United States on a temporary basis with various
protections and benefits. A binational panel sponsored by the Carnegie Endowment for
International Peace and the Autonomous Technological Institute of Mexico (ITAM) issued
a report in mid-February 2001 called “Mexico-U.S. Migration: A Shared Responsibility” that
called for improved treatment of Mexican migrants by making visas and legal status more
widely available.
In the Joint Communique following the Bush-Fox meeting in mid-February 2001, the
two presidents agreed to begin at the earliest opportunity cabinet-level negotiations aimed at
achieving short- and long-term agreements to constructively address migration and labor
issues between the countries. When President Bush released his FY2002 budget request on
April 9, 2001, he proposed $75 million for 570 new Border Patrol agents per year in FY2002
and FY2003, $20 million for intrusion detection technology, and $7 million for intelligence
units along the Northern and Southwest borders. On May 25, 2001, President Bush
telephoned President Fox to express condolences for the recent deaths of 14 Mexican
migrants in the Arizona desert, and both leaders reaffirmed their commitment to enhance
safety along the border and to continue to make progress on migration issues. Press reports
suggested that proposals to regularize the status of Mexican workers in the United States
were being considered by the Administration and by Congress, but President Bush has
indicated that blanket amnesty will not be proposed.
During the opening day of President Fox’s official visit to Washington, D.C., in early
September 2001, he called for the two governments to reach agreement on migration
proposals by the end of the year. The Joint Communique at the end of the meeting called for
the countries to reach agreement as soon as possible on a range of issues, including border
safety, a temporary worker program, and the status of undocumented Mexicans in the United
States. However, following the September 2001 terrorist attacks, some policy makers called
for tighter border controls. On October 29, 2001, President Bush issued a presidential
directive calling for measures to improve the tracking of terrorists, to review student visa
policies, and to better coordinate the sharing of immigration and customs information with
Mexico and Canada. On November 20, 2001, country representatives met on migration
issues and essentially deferred decisions because of concerns over terrorism.
Drug Trafficking Issues
Nature of the Problem. Mexico is a major source of production of heroin and
marijuana for the U.S. market and has become the major transit point in the flow of cocaine
from South America. According to the State Department, it was the source of about 20-30%
of the heroin, up to 70% of the foreign grown marijuana, and the transit point for 55-60% of
the cocaine shipped to the United States. Although U.S.-Mexico efforts in this area have
been marked by distrust at various times, particularly because of the killing of U.S. Drug
Enforcement Administration (DEA) agents in the mid-1980s and the kidnaping of Mexican
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officials in 1990, relations have been improving in recent years. In response to U.S. criticisms
of widespread corruption, Mexican officials point to the numerous Mexican policemen and
soldiers killed in confrontations with narcotics traffickers as evidence of their commitment to
controlling the problem. They also criticize U.S. officials for failing to do more to control the
demand for drugs in the United States, noting that the problem is one of supply and demand.
Presidential Certifications and Congressional Reactions. In general, the
Clinton Administration’s drug control policy in the domestic area stressed drug treatment and
prevention, and in the international area it devoted more attention to eradication and source
country institution building, particularly law enforcement and judicial institutions. Under
recent pressure from Congress, through mechanisms like the Western Hemisphere Drug
Elimination Act and the Supplemental FY1998 Appropriations Act, which were included in
the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations Act of 1998 (H.R.
4328/P.L. 105-277), additional funding was provided to strengthen the Border Patrol and
international interdiction efforts, including $90 million in Southwest Border enhancements.
In other actions to encourage greater counter-narcotics efforts in Mexico, congressional
resolutions to disapprove President Clinton’s certification of Mexico as fully cooperative in
drug control efforts were introduced in 1997, 1998, and 1999, in both houses but never fully
enacted. (For details, see CRS Report 98-174, Mexican Drug Certification Issues: U.S.
Congressional Action, 1986-2001.) In 1999, Congress passed the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Designation Act, Title VIII of the Intelligence Authorization Act for FY2000 (H.R. 1555/P.L.
106-120), which strengthened the President’s authority under the International Emergency
Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to block the assets in the United States of designated
international drug traffickers, and six well known Mexican drug lords were designated in June
2000. In early 2000, while some Members of Congress criticized Mexico’s counter-drug
efforts, no resolutions of disapproval were introduced in either house to overturn President
Clinton’s certification of Mexico during the 30-day congressional review period.
Following the election of Vicente Fox as President of Mexico in the July 2, 2000
election, bills were introduced by Senator Hutchison (S. 3021) and Representative Kolbe
(H.R. 5155) to exempt Mexico from the drug certification requirement in FY2001, but neither
bill was enacted. On October 11, 2000, the Senate agreed to S.Res. 366, introduced by
Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison, that welcomed the constitutional transition in Mexico, and
expressed the sense of the Senate that a one-year waiver of the drug certification requirement
is warranted in order for incoming new governments in both countries to develop more
effective and cooperative counter-narcotics programs.
In early 2001, a number of Members introduced measures in an effort to avoid a
confrontation with the new Fox Administration over the certification process. Senator Dodd
introduced S. 219 and Representative Reyes introduced H.R. 841 that would suspend the
existing drug certification process for all countries for two years in order to develop a more
effective multilateral counter-narcotics strategy. Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison introduced
S. 353 and Representative Kolbe introduced H.R. 753 that would exempt Mexico from the
drug certification requirements in FY2001 and establish some other conditions. Senator
Grassley introduced S. 376 that would modify the certification process for FY2002-FY2004
to require the President to identify only those countries subject to sanctions. Senator Boxer
introduced S. 435 to provide that the drug certification procedures would not apply to
countries with which the United States has bilateral agreements and other plans. At a Senate
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Foreign Relations Committee hearing on the certification process in early March 2001, the
Administration spokesman argued that the certification had been “an effective, if blunt, policy
instrument” but recognized a growing sense in Congress that there may be more effective
approaches. (For details on this and previous years’ actions, see CRS Report 98-174,
Mexican Drug Certification Issues: U.S. Congressional Action, 1986-2001. For details on
the various proposals, see CRS Report RL30892, Drug Certification Requirements and
Proposed Congressional Modifications in 2001.)
President Bush certified, on March 1, 2001, as previous presidents had done, that
Mexico had been a fully cooperative country in efforts to control drug trafficking. He cited
the arrest of two key members of the Tijuana-based Arellano Felix Organization, aggressive
eradication programs, and continuing cooperation with the United States in a number of
areas. Although noting the daunting challenges Mexico faces to control corruption, the State
Department report stated that President Fox’s commitments to fight crime, drug trafficking,
and corruption offered “unprecedented opportunities for greater cooperation and mutual
assistance with the United States.” Among recent troubling developments for the Fox
Administration that indicate the persistence of corruption was the escape from a high security
prison in the state of Jalisco, of reputed Mexican drug lord Joaquin “El Chapo” Guzman, on
January 19, 2001. This prompted the detention of prison officials for questioning and
renewed commitments against drug trafficking and corruption. On January 24, 2001,
President Fox announced a national crusade against drug trafficking, promising to eliminate
corruption in the prison system and to enhance law enforcement efforts against drug
traffickers. On February 1 and 2, 2001, in continuing efforts to reduce corruption, 43 of 47
regional directors of the Mexican Customs Service and 80 anti-drug agents in the state of
Chihuahua were removed from office. In another troubling development, Mexican Brigadier
General Ricardo Martinez and aides Captain Pedro Maya and Lieutenant Javier Quevedo
were arrested on April 5, 2001, on charges of protecting members of the Gulf Drug Cartel.
Following up on previous hearings, on April 5, 2001, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee reported out a substitute version of S. 219, which would modify the existing drug
certification procedures for a 3-year trial period, would require the President to sanction non-
cooperative countries only, and would encourage efforts to develop a multilateral counter-
narcotics approach. On August 1, 2001, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved
the Foreign Relations Authorizations for FY2002-FY2003 (S. 1401) with similar language,
and on October 24, 2001, the Senate passed the FY2002 Foreign Operations Appropriations
bill (H.R. 2506, with an amendment by Senators Dodd and Hutchison with similar language
that would modify the existing procedures for one year for Western Hemisphere countries).
(For more details see the Legislation section of this brief and CRS Report RL30949, Drug
Certification Procedures: Side-by-side Comparison of Existing Procedures and S. 219 as
Reported, and CRS Report RL30950, Drug Certification Procedures: A Comparison of
Current Law to S. 219 and S. 1401 as Reported, by K. Larry Storrs.)
President Bush’s FY2002 budget request, released April 9, 2001, called, in the area of
combating crime and drug abuse, for expanding the range of community groups and parents
engaged in local drug prevention efforts, increasing drug treatment, taking steps to improve
the safety of schools, and enhancing the security of our borders. It called for fully funding the
Western Hemisphere Drug Elimination Act and proposed $278 million to upgrade drug
interdiction efforts of the U.S. Coast Guard and Customs Service, $731 million for the
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Andean Counterdrug Initiative for Colombia and other South American countries, and $31
million for other Western Hemisphere countries, including $12 million for Mexico.
On May 5, 2001, Mexico extradited to the United States for prosecution an alleged top
lieutenant of the Arellano Felix or Tijuana Drug Cartel, Mexican citizen Arturo “Kitty” Paez
Martinez, an action praised by U.S. Attorney General John Ashcroft. On June 20, 2001, the
Drug Enforcement Administration, citing laudable cooperation from Mexican authorities,
announced the culmination of an 18-month investigation, known as Operation Marquis, which
netted more than 261 arrests against the multi-million dollar cocaine and marijuana smuggling
Marquis Organization based in Nuevo Laredo, Mexico. In his speech to a joint session of
Congress during the early September 2001 official visit, President Fox called for modification
of the U.S. drug certification process.
Political and Human Rights Issues
Concerns over Elections and Political Rights. Over the years, major attention
has focused on the fairness of elections in Mexico since the Institutional Revolutionary Party
or PRI controlled the presidency until 2000, all gubernatorial posts until the 1990s, and had
solid control of the two chambers of the Mexican Congress until 1997, although the PAN had
made progress in capturing control of major cities for several decades.
Following the controversial July 1988 presidential election, President Salinas proposed
and the Congress enacted three electoral reforms. In subsequent years, opposition governors
were elected in several states, and nationwide mid-term legislative elections in August 1991
were considered to be generally fair. Presidential and legislative elections were held under
peaceful conditions on August 21, 1994, with Ernesto Zedillo of the long ruling PRI winning
the presidency with 50.18% of the valid votes. In subsequent local elections, the opposition
PAN won governorships in many states, particularly in the period following the 1995-1996
period of financial crisis and austerity.
In late July 1996, the parties agreed, after on and off negotiations, on major electoral
reforms for the July 1997 legislative and local elections. These included the direct election
of the mayor of the Mexico City Federal District, access to the media, and controls on
campaign spending. On July 6, 1997, Mexico held nationwide midterm legislative elections
along with gubernatorial contests in 6 states and the first direct election of the Mayor of the
Mexico City Federal District. Although the Zedillo-supported PRI captured 39% of the valid
votes to remain the single largest party, it lost its long-held majority in the Chamber of
Deputies, it lost the two-thirds majority in the Senate, it lost two of the six governorships, and
it lost the all-important race for Mayor of Mexico City. This prompted observers to suggest
that the system was becoming more pluralistic and that passage of legislation would require
more negotiation among the parties. The PAN won 27% of the vote and two governorships,
reinforcing its image of strength in urban and northern areas. The PRD won 26% of the vote,
and performed particularly well in central Mexico, including victory by two time Presidential
candidate Cuauhtemoc Cardenas in the race for mayor of the Mexico City Federal District.
In the period leading to the July 2000 elections, the parties picked presidential
candidates. The PRI announced in mid-May 1999 that it would select the candidate of the
party by a direct and open primary in November 1999, and former Government Minister
Francisco Labastida was elected decisively over three other candidates in the November 7,
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1999 nationwide primary. Efforts by the PAN and the PRD to agree on a common candidate
for the opposition came to an impasse in late September 1999, and Vicente Fox was
designated as the presidential candidate for the PAN, and Cuauhtemoc Cardenas was
designated as the presidential candidate for the PRD. On July 2, 2000, Vicente Fox of the
Alliance for Change (PAN/PVEM) was elected President with 42.52% of the vote, marking
the first election of a president from an opposition party in 71 years and erasing many doubts
about the fairness of elections. President Clinton congratulated President Zedillo and
President-elect Fox on July 3, and the House of Representatives passed H.Res. 544 by voice
vote on July 25, 2000, commending the government on the successful completion of the
elections, and congratulating President-elect Fox on his victory.
In subsequent elections, a coalition of opposition parties (PAN, PRD, etc.) won the
governorship in the state of Chiapas in August 2000, the PRI won a majority in municipal and
state legislature elections in the state of Veracruz in September 2000, the PRI won a
governorship in disputed elections in the state of Tabasco in October 2000 (subsequently
annulled by the Federal Electoral Tribunal), and the PAN won a governorship in a close race
in the state of Jalisco in November 2000. After intervention by the Federal Electoral Tribunal
to ensure the neutrality of the State Electoral Council in Yucatan, the candidate of the PAN-
PRD coalition won the governorship of Yucatan in June 2001. The PRI won the
governorship in Tabasco in the re-run election in August 2001, ending a string of PRI defeats
in southern states. In other recent elections, on July 1, 2001, the PRI won control of the state
legislature and most municipalities in the state of Chihuahua but lost to the PAN in a disputed
mayoral election in the major border city of Ciudad Juarez. On July 8, 2001, the PAN
demonstrated continuing dominance in Baja California, winning the governorship, 4 of 5
mayoral races, and 14 of 16 seats in the state legislature. On November 11, 2001, PRD
candidate Lazaro Cardenas, the scion of a famous family, won the gubernatorial election in
Michoacan.
Allegations of Human Rights Abuses. Charges of human rights abuse in Mexico,
cited by human rights groups and the State Department’s annual reports, include allegations
of torture and harassment by law enforcement agents; threats against journalists, academics,
and human rights monitors; and killings or “disappearances” of prominent critics and
opposition politicians. Other abuses include prison deficiencies, discrimination against women
and indigenous peoples, and extensive child labor in the informal sector.
President Zedillo took a number of steps to deal with these abuses, including continuing
support for the National Human Rights Commission. He named Antonio Lozano of the
opposition PAN as Attorney General in 1994 and ordered him to carry out a major reform
of the judicial and law enforcement system to eliminate corruption and human rights abuse.
Judicial reform was approved in December 1994, increasing the independence and autonomy
of the Supreme Court and of the Attorney General’s Office. After trying several approaches
on Chiapas, including an attempt to arrest Zapatista leaders, President Zedillo sought a
negotiated settlement of the conflict but was unsuccessful despite agreement on indigenous
issues in 1996. In July 1996, the Inter-American Commission on Human Rights visited
Mexico for the first time, at the invitation of the Mexican government, and issued a report in
September 1998, that indicated awareness of the difficulties, given the struggles against
insurgencies and drug trafficking, and the various advances, but noted continuing failure to
prosecute those guilty of human rights abuses.
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Major attention has focused on the December 22, 1997 killing of 45 indigenous peasants
in the village of Acteal in the state of Chiapas by armed men said to be linked to the PRI.
President Zedillo quickly asked federal authorities to take over the case, vowed to prosecute
those responsible, and appointed a new Minister of Government and a new peace negotiator
for Chiapas. In subsequent action, the Governor of Chiapas resigned and federal authorities
arrested more than 40 people, including the mayor of nearby Chenalho. Mexican and
international human rights groups alleged that para-military groups linked to the PRI were
responsible, and they called for independent investigations, for removal of the military from
the region, and for renewed efforts to negotiate peace in Chiapas. Although some critics have
charged that U.S. military assistance to Mexico may be involved, the Attorney General’s
Office concluded that the military was not involved and that revenge for a previous killing was
the most likely cause for the incident. In July and September 1999, a Mexican court
sentenced 44 members of an armed group to 35-year sentences for their involvement in the
Acteal massacres. U.N. Special Reporter on extrajudicial killings Asthma Jahangir has made
critical comments about continuing impunity after her investigations of the cases.
President Fox, even before taking office, appointed well known human rights activist
Mariclaire Acosta as a Special Ambassador for Human Rights, and Mexican spokesmen have
asserted that Mexico will be open to visits by human rights organizations and foreign visitors
and will take strong human rights positions. Immediately after his inauguration, President Fox
signed an agreement with the United Nations to provide technical assistance on human rights.
The killing of human rights lawyer Digna Ochoa y Placido on October 19, 2001, has raised
questions about the government’s human rights policies, and prompted calls for prompt action
by the government from domestic and foreign human rights organizations. On November 27,
2001, the National Commission on Human Rights presented a report to President Fox that
documents human rights abuses and disappearances of persons in the 1970s and early 1980s,
and President Fox called for the appointment of a Special Prosecutor to investigate these and
other cases.
LEGISLATION
H.R. 2299 (Rogers) / S. 1178 (Murray)
Department of Transportation Appropriations, FY2002. Reported out by the House
Appropriations Committee (H.Rept. 107-108) on June 22, 2001. Passed House on June 26,
2001, with the Sabo amendment, approved 285-143, to prohibit the use of funds to process
applications by Mexico-domiciled motor carriers for authority to operate beyond border
commercial zones. The Senate version of the bill (S. 1178) was reported out on July 13,
2001, with provisions proposed by Senators Murray and Shelby requiring various safety
inspections of Mexican trucks for access to U.S. highways. The text of S. 1178 was
subsequently offered as a substitute amendment (S.Amdt. 1025) to H.R. 2299. The Senate
considered H.R. 2299 on July 19-20 and 23-27, but action was not completed because of
various parliamentary delays by Senators Gramm and McCain, who argued that the Mexican
truck provisions were contrary to NAFTA and that President Bush was prepared to veto the
measure for that reason. A motion to invoke cloture on debate was passed 70-30 on July 26,
but another vote to invoke cloture failed 57-27 on July 27. On August 1, 2001, the Senate
reconsidered and invoked cloture 100-0, after which H.R. 2299 with the Murray-Shelby
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restrictions was passed by voice vote. On November 29, 2001, House and Senate conferees
reached agreement on a compromise in Section 350 that generally retained the Senate-passed
safety provisions but gave the Administration more flexibility in implementation. The
conference report (H.Rept. 107-308) was passed by the House on November 30, 2001, and
by the Senate on December 4, 2001.
S. 219 (Dodd) / S. 1401 (Biden)
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee acted to suspend the existing drug certification
procedures for a 3-year trial period in early April 2001 when it approved S. 219, and in early
August 2001 when it approved the Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2002-FY2003
(S. 1401) which included similar language. In place of the existing procedures, the approved
measures would require the President to identify by October 1 of each year major drug-
transit or major illicit drug producing countries, and to designate each country that has failed
demonstrably, during the previous 12 months, to make substantial efforts to adhere to its
obligations under international counternarcotics agreements (multilateral and bilateral) and
other standards. U.S. assistance would be withheld from any designated countries unless the
President determined that the provision of assistance was vital to the national interest of the
United States or until the country made substantial counter-narcotics efforts. The measures
express the sense of Congress that the United States should at the earliest feasible date in
2001 convene a multilateral conference of relevant countries to develop multilateral drug
reduction and prevention strategies, and they urge the President to request legislative changes
to implement the strategies no later than one year after enactment. They continue the
requirement for the yearly International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) detailing
the performance of individual countries, and add the requirement to report on major drug
trafficking organizations. They also amend the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act
to allow judicial review of executive branch decisions to freeze the assets of suspected drug
kingpins. S. 219 was introduced on January 30, 2001; referred to the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee, which considered it on February 7 and March 1, 2001; marked up on
April 3, and reported out on April 5, 2001, with an amendment in the nature of a substitute
and an amendment to the title. The Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2002-FY2003
(S. 1401) was approved by the Committee on August 1, 2001, and was reported out on
September 4, 2001 (S.Rept. 107-60).
H.R. 2506 (Kolbe)
Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2002. H.R. 2506 was reported in the House
by the House Appropriations Committee on July 17, 2001 (H.Rept. 107-142) and passed by
the House on July 24, 2001. It was reported in the Senate by the Senate Appropriations
Committee with an amendment in the nature of a substitute on September 4, 2001 (S.Rept.
107-58). It was passed by the Senate on October 24, 2001, with an amendment (S.Amdt.
1959) by Senators Dodd and Hutchison to modify the existing drug certification procedures.
The amendment contains provisions similar to the provisions in S. 219 and S. 1401
summarized above, except that the amendment would modify the drug certification
procedures for FY2002 only, and for Western Hemisphere countries only.
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FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Products
CRS Report RL31008. Appropriations for FY2002: Department of Transportation and
Related Agencies, by Robert S. Kirk and David Randall Peterman.
CRS Report RL30950. Drug Certification Procedures: A Comparison of Current Law to
S. 219 and S. 1401 as Reported, by K. Larry Storrs.
CRS Report RL30949. Drug Certification Procedures: Side-by-side Comparison of Existing
Procedures and S. 219 as Reported, by K. Larry Storrs.
CRS Report RL30892. Drug Certification Requirements and Proposed Congressional
Modifications in 2001, by K. Larry Storrs.
CRS Issue Brief IB88093. Drug Control: International Policy and Options, by Raphael Perl.
CRS Report RS20618. Immigration and Naturalization Service’s FY2001 Budget, by
William J. Krouse.
CRS Report RL30780. Immigration Legalization and Status Adjustment Legislation, by
Ruth Ellen Wasem.
CRS Report RL30852. Immigration of Agricultural Guest Workers Policy, Trends, and
Legislative Issues, by Ruth Ellen Wasem and Geoffrey K. Collver.
CRS Report 98-174. Mexican Drug Certification Issues: U.S. Congressional Action, 1986-
2001, by K. Larry Storrs.
CRS Report RL30886. Mexico’s Counter-Narcotics Efforts Under Zedillo and Fox,
December 1994 to March 2001, by K. Larry Storrs.
CRS Report RS20611. Mexico’s Presidential, Legislative, and Local Elections of July 2,
2000, by K. Larry Storrs.
CRS Report 97-861. NAFTA Labor Side Agreement: Lessons for the Worker Rights and
Fast-Track Debate, by Mary Jane Bolle.
CRS Report 97-291. NAFTA: Related Environmental Issues and Initiatives, by Mary
Tiemann.
CRS Report RL31028, North American Free Trade Agreement: Truck Safety
Considerations, by Paul Rothberg.
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