Order Code IB96019
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Haiti:
Issues for Congress
Updated November 21, 2001
Maureen Taft-Morales
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
From Aristide to Preval and Back Again
Congressional Concerns
Cost of Peacekeeping Efforts
Holding of Democratic Elections
Cost and Effectiveness of U.S. Assistance
Economic Policy and Role for U.S. Business
Security and Human Rights Concerns
Narcotics Trafficking
Legislation in the 106th Congress
LEGISLATION
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
CHRONOLOGY
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Reports

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Haiti: Issues for Congress
SUMMARY
In the last few years, Congress has been
Because of this controversy, the opposi-
concerned about a number of developments in
tion boycotted the November 26, 2000
Haiti, with attention shifting from concern with
presidential and legislative elections, and
the flow of refugees to concern for the cost
international donors, including the United
and safety of U.S. troops in Haiti and to the
States, withheld election aid. Aristide won the
stalled democratic process there.
elections and was inaugurated on February 7,
2001.
Since the virtual withdrawal of U.S.
troops and the inauguration of Rene Preval as
International organizations have been
President in February 1996, Congress has been
increasingly concerned about Haiti’s inability
concerned that U.S. assistance to Haiti be
to resolve its impasse. The U.N.’s secretary
effective, that Haitian leaders pursue demo-
General withdrew the U.N. mission in Haiti in
cratic reforms, including the holding of free
February and issued reports expressing con-
and fair elections, adopt sound economic
cerns about the Haitians’ failure to find a
policies, improve security conditions in Haiti,
compromise and the current lawlessness and
and fully investigate reported human rights
fear of political violence.
abuses.

President Aristide has pledged to enact
Concern over political stability increased
political, judicial, and economic reforms.
with President Preval’s controversial dissolu-
Negotiations between Lavalas and the
tion of the Haitian Parliament in January 1999,
opposition alliance Convergence, mediated by
and his rule by decree after that. This fol-
the Organization of American States, have
lowed an election dispute that had remained
stalled. The two sides agreed to hold new
unresolved since April 1997, and the lack of a
elections for local and most parliamentary
fully functioning government since the resigna-
seats, but dates for those elections remain to
tion of Prime Minister Rosny Smarth on June
be set.
9, 1997. This political paralysis has also con-
tributed to economic stagnation, preventing
The Foreign Operations Appropriations
major reforms from being finalized, and imped-
bill for FY2002 would prohibit assistance to
ing access to over $500 million in international
Haiti except through regular notification
assistance.
procedures; no other conditions on aid to Haiti
are in the current bill. It would also allow Haiti
In July, 1999, President Preval signed a
to purchase defense articles and services for
new electoral law which effectively annulled
the Haitian Coast Guard. FY2000 assistance
the disputed April 1997 elections, and called
to Haiti was $82 million; the estimate for
for new legislative and local elections. After
FY2001 is $76 million; the request for FY2002
three postponements and international expres-
is $55 million.
sions of concern about Haiti’s failure to set a
date, elections were held on May 21, 2000.
But the tabulation of election results was
tainted with charges of electoral irregularities
by domestic and international observers. The
electoral council affirmed those results, which
favored former President Aristide’s Lavalas
party.

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
President Aristide has pledged to make several political, judicial, and economic
reforms, including correcting the problems of the May 2000 elections, in which Aristide
supporters were awarded ten disputed Senate seats. The dispute remains unresolved and the
international community frustrated. The OAS has been mediating on-again off-again talks
between the Aristide government and the opposition alliance Convergence; the latest effort
collapsed in mid-October. Although both sides have said they are willing to resume talks,
negotiations remain stymied.
On September 27, 2001, Amnesty International released a report that outlined
important achievements made in respect for human rights in Haiti during the last 10 years,
as well as the continuing human rights problems that threaten to undermine that progress.
The report describes “a human rights situation that is more serious today than at any point
since the return of Aristide [in 1994].” The Haitian government rejected the report’s
claims, saying that human rights conditions were improving.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Congress has followed events in Haiti closely during this decade, but especially since
September 19, 1994, when about 20,000 U.S. military forces, under code name Operation
Uphold Democracy, entered Haiti as the lead force in a multi-national force to restore
Jean-Bertrand Aristide to power. Aristide had been elected President in December 1990 in
elections that were considered democratic, and he took office in February 1991. He was
overthrown by a military coup on September 30, 1991, and lived in exile until the United
States negotiated his return three years later. During President Aristide’s second period in
office, Rene Preval was elected as his replacement in December 1995 elections, and was
inaugurated as the new President of Haiti on February 7, 1996. In January 1999 he dissolved
the legislature and ruled by decree for the rest of his term. Having won questionable elections
in November 2000, Aristide was inaugurated for his second term as President on February
7, 2001.
From Aristide to Preval and Back Again
The Haitian military regime agreed to relinquish power after 3 years of diplomatic
pressure and economic sanctions by the United States, and members of the Organization of
American States (OAS) and the United Nations (U.N.). Faced with the imminent threat of
a U.S. invasion, they signed an agreement calling for the immediate, unopposed entry of U.S.
troops, a legislatively approved amnesty for the military, the resignation of the military
leadership, and the return of President Aristide. Shortly after the initial entry of the
multinational forces, President Aristide returned to Haiti on October 15, 1994, and within a
few months, on March 31, 1995, the U.S.-led operation gave way to the U.N. peacekeeping
operation, called the U.N. Mission in Haiti or UNMIH.
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Following President Aristide’s return, Haiti took steps to hold democratic elections, with
substantial assistance from the United States and the international community. Most
first-round parliamentary and municipal elections were held on June 25, 1995. Although
deadly violence, which marred past Haitian elections, did not occur, election observers alleged
that there were numerous irregularities, including ballot burning in some places. Several rerun
or runoff elections were held subsequently, from July to October, 1995. Pro-Aristide
candidates won a large share of the parliamentary and local government seats. Presidential
elections were held December 17, 1995. The Haitian constitution prevented Aristide from
running for a second consecutive term. Rene Preval, an Aristide supporter, won, with 89%
of votes cast, but with a low voter turnout of only 28%, and with many parties boycotting the
election.
Rene Preval was inaugurated as President of Haiti on February 7, 1996. Preval was
trained as an agronomist in Belgium in the late 1960s, and he lived and worked in the United
States in the early 1970s. He returned to Haiti in the mid-1970s and worked for several
businesses, after which he opened a bakery in 1983. With the fall of the Duvalier dictatorship
in 1986, Preval was active in several civic groups, particularly Respect for the Constitution,
and he also worked with Father Aristide’s Family Is Life orphanage. In 1991, he served as
Prime Minister and Defense Minister of Aristide’s government, until Aristide was overthrown.
In March 1993, he joined Aristide in Washington, D.C. Preval returned to Haiti in October
1994, and served as the director of the internationally-funded Economic and Social Assistance
Fund from March 1995 until he was elected President of the country.
As President, Preval launched his “Democratization by Capitalization” program to
privatize government enterprise through joint ventures with private capital. Despite public
protests against the economic reforms, the Haitian Senate passed privatization and
administrative reform laws on September 25 and 26, 1996 allowing the release of $226
million in foreign aid through the International Monetary Fund. Protests against the
associated austerity measures continued, however. One of the most vocal critics of the
proposed economic austerity program was Aristide. In January 1997 he formed a new party,
Lavalas Family, as a vehicle for his presidential bid in the year 2000. Prime Minister Rosny
Smarth barely won a parliamentary no-confidence vote on March 26, but bowed to pressure
from opponents of the government’s unpopular economic reform and resigned on June 9.
He cited the Electoral Council’s mishandling of the April elections as a reason for his
resignation, saying he did not want to be associated with fraud.
By the end of 1997, Haiti’s failure to form a new government had already cost the nation
$162 million in assistance from the Inter-American Development Bank, and tens of millions
from other sources. On July 15, 1998, then President Preval nominated Jacques-Edouard
Alexis, his education minister at the time, to be prime minister. The nomination process was
stalled for months, however, by bureaucratic procedures. On January 11, 1999, Preval
declared that most of Parliament’s term had expired, even though elections had not been held
to replace them. He then installed Alexis as Prime Minister, members of his Cabinet, and an
electoral council by decree, and began ruling by decree. He continued to do so through the
end of his term in February 2001.
In elections boycotted by most of the opposition, Aristide was elected president again
in November 2000. He signed an agreement with outgoing President William J. Clinton,
promising to make several political, judicial, and economic reforms. According to the White
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House, no new promises were made by the United States. Aristide took office again on
February 7, 2001.
Congressional Concerns
In the last few years Congress has been concerned about a number of developments in
Haiti, with attention shifting from one area to another as the situation changed. From 1991
to 1994, Congress expressed concern over the flow of Haitian refugees and ways to restore
the democratic process to Haiti during the period of the military regime. Later, following the
military action in September 1994, Congress was concerned with the cost and safety of U.S.
troops in Haiti, and the holding of democratic elections to select a new parliament and a
replacement for Aristide. Following the inauguration of President Preval in 1996, Congress
was concerned that U.S. assistance to Haiti be effective. Congress also expressed concern
that Haiti’s political stalemate stymied reform and economic development, and that various
election disputes be resolved in a transparent manner. Other ongoing concerns include the
improvement of security and human rights conditions in Haiti, and the reduction of illegal
trafficking of narcotics through Haiti. Congress has prohibited assistance to the government
of Haiti until some of those concerns are addressed.
Cost of Peacekeeping Efforts
Congress was concerned about the cost of U.S. military operations related to Haiti and
the danger for U.S. troops involved in those operations. Some believed that such involvement
was too costly and too risky for U.S. personnel in a country of marginal importance to the
United States and with a very weak democratic tradition. Others were concerned about the
implications and precedent of U.S. troops operating under U.N. command. Still others
believed that such peacekeeping efforts can and should support and strengthen democracy in
fragile societies. This concern began with the launching of Operation Uphold Democracy in
September 1994 when about 20,000 U.S. troops led the military intervention that restored
Aristide to power. It culminated in Congress mandating the withdrawal of U.S. troops from
Haiti by May 31, 2000.
The costs for the United States of these operations can be divided into different
categories, with the costs for the Department of Defense being expressed in terms of
incremental costs (i.e., the costs over normal peacetime operating expenses). DOD
incremental costs for U.S. efforts to restore democracy in Haiti, including support for
UNMIH, totaled $790.4 million from FY1994-FY1996. Additional peacekeeping costs for
international organizations funded through the International Affairs (Function 150) account
are estimated at $148.7 million for FY1994-FY1996.
From the end of March 1995 to mid-April 1996, about 2,000 U.S. troops served as part
of the United Nations Mission in Haiti (UNMIH). In early 1996, President Rene Preval asked
U.N. peacekeeping troops to remain six months beyond the scheduled departure date at the
end of February 1996. Under pressure from China, the U.N. Security Council reduced the
size of the force and cut back the term to four months, with Canada contributing additional
troops on their own when the United States indicated that its troops would depart on
schedule. On June 28, 1996, a 5-month extension was approved, with the mission scaled
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down to 600 troops and 300 policemen, with another 700 troops provided by Canada. In
mid- November, President Preval requested an 8-month extension of the U.N. peacekeeping
mandate, which he said was necessary while the Haitian National Police gain enough
experience to maintain order in Haiti. On December 5, the U.N. granted the extension for a
maximum of 8 months.
The mission was extended until May 31, 1997, with a renewal allowed until July 31. The
U.N. resolution also reduced the number of troops by 100. On July 30, the U.N. voted to
extend the U.N. presence in Haiti until November 30. A U.N. Transition Mission replaced the
300 police and 500 troops of the U.N. Support Mission. The new mission had 250 civilian
police and a 50-member military headquarters staff. Canada previously had about 750 troops
in Haiti; 1,000 troops from Canada and Pakistan supplemented the Transition Mission and
were paid for by Canada and the United States. The last of the U.N. peacekeeping troops
were withdrawn on November 30, 1997. Three hundred members of the U.N. police-
monitoring force were to be replaced by a smaller mission in March 2000.
On February 29, 1996, the U.S. Commander of the UNMIH was replaced and U.S.
forces ceased to conduct security operations in Haiti, except for self defense. According to
the Clinton Administration, the majority of the 1,907 U.S. military personnel in Haiti were
withdrawn by mid-March 1996, and the remainder, who stayed to arrange the dismantlement
and repatriation of equipment, were withdrawn in mid-April 1996. After that, a U.S. support
unit of 300 to 500 troops, made up primarily of engineers, remained in Haiti carrying out
public works such as building bridges, repairing schools, and digging wells. In December
1997, President Clinton ordered the Dept. of Defense to maintain hundreds of U.S. troops
in Haiti indefinitely. In September 1999, however, the 106th Congress passed the FY2000
DOD authorization bill (P.L. 106-65) that prohibited DOD funding to maintain a continuous
U.S. military presence in Haiti beyond May 31, 2000. (See “Legislation” below.) The troops
were withdrawn by the end of January 2000. According to the conference report (H.Rept.
106-301), the provision does not prohibit periodic theater engagement activities in Haiti.
Holding of Democratic Elections
After Aristide was restored to power in 1994, Congress was concerned that Haiti
continue to strengthen its transition to democracy, and in particular that it hold democratic
elections in 1995 in accordance with Haiti’s 1987 Constitution. In keeping with the
arrangements for President Aristide’s return to power, Haiti pledged to hold democratic
elections, even though some of Aristide’s supporters argued that he was entitled to another
3 years because he was denied office for 3 years by the military coup.
The Clinton Administration spent $1.3 million in technical aid for the presidential
election, which was held on December 17, 1995. Although deemed to be generally free and
fair by international observers, the turnout was only about 28% and many of the parties
boycotted the elections. Rene Preval, President Aristide’s Prime Minister in 1991, received
89% of the vote, with Leon Jeune coming in a very distant second with 2.5%. Preval was
inaugurated as the new President of Haiti on February 7, 1996.
The low turnout and the lack of competition has raised questions about the adequacy of
the elections. The official U.S. Presidential Delegation to the Haitian elections found the
election to be “another important achievement in establishing a fully functioning democracy.”
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The report on the election by the International Republican Institute (IRI) observation group,
however, while praising the fact that it was an election without violence, expressed
reservations about the election because it lacked adequate participation or competition, key
elements of a fully satisfactory democratic election.
Elections for one-third of the Senate and for territorial assemblies were held on April 6,
1997. An assembly was elected in each of Haiti’s 565 communal sections — roughly
equivalent to U.S. towns or districts. These are the smallest administrative unit in Haiti’s
governmental structure. Communal sections are part of 133 communes, similar to U.S.
counties, which belong to nine departments, similar to U.S. states. Each communal section
assembly will choose one member to represent them at the communal level on a municipal
assembly, which will in turn select a representative to serve on a departmental assembly.
Although these assemblies — collectively referred to as territorial assemblies — are mandated
in the 1987 constitution, this was the first time Haitians were able to vote for officials at this
local level.
Many observers expressed the same concerns they had during the presidential elections:
low turnout — estimated to be 5% — and numerous irregularities. The United States decreed
the first round elections free and fair, but the Organization of American States disagreed. IRI
called the elections “another lost opportunity in Haiti’s democratic development,” citing the
extremely low turnout and the continued “breakdown in the ballot and result collection and
consolidation process.” Partial Senate results were announced in early May: two of the nine
Senate seats open were won by candidates of Famille Lavalas, former President Aristide’s
new party. The top two candidates in the other seven races were to face each other in a
runoff election.
These runoff elections were indefinitely postponed by the Electoral Council on June 12,
amid widespread charges that it had manipulated the elections in favor of Aristide’s party.
Most political parties had planned to boycott the runoff elections. The postponement
reportedly came after U.S. Ambassador William Swing told President Preval that the United
States would not recognize the runoff elections unless the Electoral Council reheld elections
in areas where the boycotting parties claimed fraud had been committed in the April elections.
Prime Minister Smarth said his resignation was due in part to the fraud he believes was
committed by the electoral council, to which he did not want to be party. “I cannot justify
that abuse of power,” Smarth reportedly said. “In our country, power is a sickness.” The
country was without a prime minister for a year and a half, with four failed attempts to name
a new one, and no resolution to the 1997 elections controversy.
Preval named a new electoral council by decree in early 1999. After criticizing the
council’s new electoral law, Preval signed it on July 16, effectively annulling the April 1997
elections and seeming to pave the way for a resolution to the country’s 2-year old crisis.
The United States allotted $16 million over two fiscal years for elections assistance.
The provisional electoral council’s tasks included the registration of almost 4 million eligible
voters, issuing voter identification cards for the first time, and organizing legislative and
municipal elections for some 10,000 posts on May 21. Every elected position in the country
except for president and eight Senate seats, were on the ballot. Contested in those elections
were the entire 83-seat lower house, 19 of the 27 seats in the upper house — including the
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two seats won , but never occupied, by Famille Lavalas — 133 mayoral posts, and hundreds
of local consultative assemblies.
Many observers hoped these elections would mean that, after two years of a deadlocked
government, and more than a year of President Preval ruling by decree, a new Parliament
could be installed and international aid released. Instead, the elections brought Haiti into
another crisis. Both opposition parties and international observers have said the process used
to tabulate winning percentages were erroneous and gave Lavalas ten more first-round
victories than they should have had. Increased political violence surrounded the vote,
including the arrests or murders of many opposition activists. Elections council president
Leon Manus fled Haiti in fear of his life, reportedly saying he refused to give in to pressure
from President Preval to approve incorrect results giving Lavalas candidates 18 Senate seats;
Manus said Lavalas candidates won only eight seats and that the others should have faced
second-round runoffs. Two other council members resigned. The remaining council
members announced the disputed results as final. Despite domestic and international
objections, the remaining run-off elections were held July 30.
In September, thousands of protesters shouting anti-Aristide and anti-Lavalas slogans
called for the resignation of the Lavalas-controlled legislature. The OAS tried to broker an
agreement between Lavalas and the opposition, to no avail. Presidential elections were held
on November 26, 2000. Because the Haitian government refused to address the contested
election results, the United States and other international donors withheld election assistance
and refused to send observers to the election, and opposition parties boycotted them. Aristide
won the election and took office on February 7. His inauguration was attended by few, if any,
heads of state. The United States was represented only by its ambassador.
President Aristide has pledged to make several political, judicial, and economic reforms,
including correcting the problems of the May 2000 elections. The dispute remains unresolved
and the international community frustrated. At the third Summit of the Americas in April
2001, hemispheric leaders singled out Haiti as a country whose democratic practices were in
trouble and asked the Organization of American States (OAS) to try again to help negotiate
a solution to the crisis. In mid-July, in talks mediated by the OAS, the Aristide government
and the opposition alliance Convergence agreed to hold new elections for local and most
parliamentary seats. Progress was interrupted, however, by violence. On July 28, armed men
dressed in military uniforms attacked two police installations, killing four police officers and
injuring 10. The Aristide administration denounced the attacks as an attempted coup. The
opposition denied that it is conspiring with former army members to plot a coup. Although
both sides have said they are willing to resume talks, negotiations remain stymied. Still left
to be negotiated is a schedule for the agreed-upon new elections.
Cost and Effectiveness of U.S. Assistance
Congress has been concerned about the cost and effectiveness of U.S. assistance to
Haiti, despite recognition of the great needs of the poorest country in the hemisphere,
exacerbated by 3 years of international sanctions under the military regime. The Clinton
Administration provided approximately $100 million in foreign assistance to Haiti each year
from FY1996 - FY1999, with a similar request for FY2000 (see Table 1).
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Critics argue that the amount of aid is excessive and has permitted the government to
avoid the hard economic reforms that are necessary to revive the economy, such as
privatization of inefficient government enterprises. They argue that not much progress has
been made in Haiti, despite the massive assistance, and they express disappointment that
President Aristide resumed diplomatic relations with Cuba as one of his government’s last
acts.
Supporters argue that the aid is necessary to support the fragile democracy in a time of
severe need, and to prevent instability and massive migration from the island. They stress that
Haiti is the poorest country in the Western Hemisphere with annual per capita income of only
$225, that the economy was badly damaged by U.S. and international sanctions, and that
much of the assistance goes for basic programs in health, education, food security, and
environmental projects.
Congress has monitored aid to Haiti closely, and has established a number of conditions
on this assistance. It has conditioned aid upon the holding of democratic elections and upon
the investigation and prosecution of those responsible for human rights abuses. It also has
required that all assistance be approved under special notification requirements. Acting under
this provision, the House International Relations Committee has placed holds on some police
assistance, and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee has placed similar holds on aid
because of human rights concerns. Current conditions prohibit any assistance to the Haitian
government until Haiti has held free and fair parliamentary elections, and is fully cooperating
in narcotics interdiction efforts.
Table 1. U.S. Aid to Haiti, FY1996-2000
(dollars in millions)
FY1999
FY2000
Program
FY1996
FY1997
FY1998
(est.)
(req.)
Development Assistance
14.116
24.346
0.900
—
—
Econ. Support Funds (ESF)
45.263
53.547
65.052
73.500
70.000
P.L. 480 Food Assistance
Title I (loans)
—
—
—
—
—
Title II (grants for emergency/
29.275
12.535
34.908
25.579
26.432
humanitarian purposes)
Title III (grants)
10.000
10.000
10.000
10.000
—
Interntl. Narcotics Control
—
—
—
—
—
Peace Corps
0.671
1.032
1.118
1.236
1.380
For. Military Financing Grants
—
—
—
—
—
Interntl. Milit. Ed. Train. (IMET)
0.169
0.275
0.290
0.300
0.300
TOTAL
99.494
101.735
112.268
110.615
98.112
Once the Haitian parliament passed legislation guiding economic policy reform, including
privatization of the many inefficient state-run enterprises (see below), the Agency for
International Development (AID) and the international financial institutions were able to
release most of the non-project assistance that had been on hold. Funds moved more slowly
than originally intended, however, because the lack of expertise in the Haitian government
made the negotiating and carrying out of programs more difficult. Prime Minister Smarth’s
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resignation, the failure to replace him for a year and a half, and Preval’s dissolution of
parliament caused further delays in both the execution of economic reforms and the delivery
of international aid.
Representatives of the former Clinton Administration, the International Monetary Fund,
and the World Bank have criticized Haiti’s failure to resolve the impasse. Because of the
questioned legitimacy of the spring and fall 2000 elections, the international community
withheld about $600 million in aid. Much of this international aid has expired or been
redirected elsewhere. Most funding will have to be negotiated if the Haitian government
resolves the election dispute and carries out other promised reforms.
Economic Policy and Role for U.S. Business
Haiti is the poorest nation in the hemisphere; Haitian unemployment is as high as 80%.
Haiti’s per capita income is $250 — much less than one-tenth of the Latin American average,
according to an August 1998 World Bank report, Haiti: The Challenges of Poverty
Reduction. “The overwhelming majority of the Haitian population are living in deplorable
conditions of extreme poverty,” says the report, pointing to a long history of political
instability, corruption, misuse of public funds, and lack of governance as a key factor in that
poverty.
Congress has been concerned that Haiti follow sound economic practices and that U.S.
business play a role in Haiti’s economic recovery and development. U.S. and international
lending institutions have urged Haiti to enact reforms to reduce the role of government and
to encourage domestic and foreign investment. Privatization of nine government-operated
parastatal enterprises (electricity, telephone, seaports, airports, two financial institutions, and
cement, flour and vegetable oil factories) has been seen as a key reform to reduce government
expenditures and stimulate investment. Other proposed reforms funded by AID or other
institutions were measures to strengthen budget and monetary policy, to modernize the
investment and commercial codes, and to improve banking practices. During his first term,
President Aristide agreed to privatize some of the government enterprises, but backed off
when political opposition arose. This decision prompted the resignation in October 1995 of
his Prime Minister, Smarck Michel, and the suspension of assistance by the international
financial institutions.
Former President Preval’s privatization of government enterprises drew public protests
against that and other aspects of economic reform. Preval’s “Democratization by
Capitalization” program called for increasing agricultural production through the partial sale
of four state-run businesses — Electricity of Haiti (EDH), the Telecommunications Service
(TELECO), the Minoteri (a flour mill), and the Haitian Cement Co. The Haitian Parliament
passed President Preval’s privatization and administrative reform proposals on September 25
and 26, 1996, paving the way for the release of some $226 million in foreign aid through the
International Monetary Fund. Smarth’s resignation in June 1997 and the lack of a fully
functioning government since then caused further delays in the economic reform program.
The stalemate also stymied the passage of important legislation.
With regard to the role of U.S. trade and businesses in Haiti, before the 1991
international embargo against Haiti, U.S. trade accounted for about 61% of Haitian imports
and 87% of the country’s exports, but by 1994 had dropped almost by half. U.S. assembly
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operations were also a major source of new employment. With the return of Aristide, several
U.S. companies expressed an interest in Haiti, and the former Clinton Administration
encouraged U.S. investment. Many companies are worried that the lack of infrastructure in
Haiti, its political problems, rising insecurity, and extreme poverty make for a poor investment
climate. Haiti’s political stalemate has inhibited both public and private investment
Nonetheless, according to an Economist Intelligence Unit report in June 1999, many
companies are returning to Haiti, attracted to advantages such as its deep-water port, low-
cost labor force, and proximity to the United States. During the first quarter of 1999, exports
of Haitian textile and apparel to the United States reportedly increased by nearly 20%, to
$52.9 million, over the same period the year before.
Security and Human Rights Concerns
Congress has been concerned with the security and human rights conditions within the
country. To break with the pattern where a military-dominated police force was associated
with human rights abuses, Haiti under President Aristide’s first term, with U.S. assistance,
demobilized the old military, established an interim police force of selected ex-military
personnel, and began to train a professional, civilian Haitian National Police (HNP) force.
The level of reported violence, flight of refugees, and alleged assassinations dropped markedly
from very high levels during the de facto military regime. Since the return to civilian rule in
1994, Haiti has made progress in the protection of human rights, but the gains made are
fragile and threatened by political tensions and problems with impunity.
Reflecting continuing concern over the investigation of political killings, however,
Congress passed the Foreign Operations Appropriations bills for 1996-1999 with conditions
on aid to Haiti under variations of the Dole amendment. The bills limited all foreign aid to
Haiti — except humanitarian and electoral assistance — unless there were progress in
investigations of extrajudicial and political killings, and other conditions. The FY2000 foreign
aid bill (see “Legislation” below) outlined congressional priorities for assistance to Haiti,
required the president to regularly report to Congress on the Haitian government’s progress
in areas of concern to Congress, and prohibited any funding to Haiti except through regular
notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations. The Foreign Operations
Appropriations bill for FY2001 prohibits providing assistance to Haiti except through regular
notification procedures and prohibits aid to the Haitian government until Haiti has held free
and fair elections to seat a new parliament and is fully cooperating with U.S. efforts to
interdict illicit drug traffic through Haiti. It allows the Haitian government to purchase
defense articles and services for the Haitian Coast Guard, subject to regular notification
procedures.
Shortly after taking office in 1996, President Preval asked U.N. troops and police
monitors to remain in Haiti to maintain security. The U.N. maintained a presence in Haiti for
another 5 years, shifting from peacekeeping forces to civilian forces charged with police
monitoring and some human rights monitoring duties. Under pressure from China, however,
the size of the mission, and lengths of the extensions were diminished. (China has challenged
the U.N. mission there because of Haiti’s ties with Taiwan, which China considers to be a
renegade province.) The United Nations ended its mission in February 2001. U.N. Secretary
General Kofi Annan said the mission could not function in a “climate of political turmoil.”
Annan’s report also said that Haiti’s police force is under-equipped, “demoralized and
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unmotivated” and that Lavalas had “disregarded all calls for a rectification” of the May 2000
elections. On May 18, 2001, Annan released another report expressing “concern about
lawlessness and an ever-present fear of an outbreak of major political violence ...” in Haiti.
He noted that Aristide had asked for a renewed U.N. mission. Reportedly, as of July 1, the
U.N. had not indicated whether one would be provided.
The Haitian National Police (HNP) became less dependent upon the U.N. police
monitoring force in 1997, the second full year of HNP operation, with the HNP being fully
responsible for domestic security. According to a 1998 report by the National Coalition for
Haitian Rights and the Washington Office on Latin America, the HNP made progress in
several areas, but some serious problems remained unresolved, the most significant of which
was that of excessive use of force.
Over the last several years, increases in political violence renewed concerns over security
and police effectiveness. In the February 2001 Human Rights Practices Report, the State
Department described the Haitian government’s human rights record as “generally poor” in
2000 and said its “overall effort to respect the human rights of its citizens was marred by
serious abuses and shortcomings in oversight.”
Most observers agree that extensive reform of the judicial system is necessary to further
strengthen the state’s ability to maintain law and order and to continue improving respect for
human rights. In May 1998, a judicial reform bill that had languished in parliament since late
1996 was finally passed. Haiti took major steps forward in its judicial reform process and
fighting police impunity last fall. In two major human rights cases, former Haitian soldiers
were found guilty of extrajudicial killings and given prison sentences ranging from three years
to life terms.
Narcotics Trafficking
Haiti is a major transshipment point for illegal narcotics, mostly cocaine, being
transported from South America to the United States, according to the State Department’s
March 2001 International Narcotics Control Strategy Report. The amount of cocaine
entering the United States through Haiti decreased from about 13% of all cocaine entering
the United States to 8% in 2000. The State Department presumed this was primarily due to
the difficulties traffickers experienced in moving drugs through Haiti because of poor
infrastructure or the seizure of drugs by rival traffickers. Several factors make Haiti attractive
to narcotics traffickers. Located between South America and the United States, its coasts and
border with the Dominican Republic are largely uncontrolled. Haiti’s nascent democratic
institutions and ineffectual infrastructure have been further weakened by the political impasse
that has characterized the country since 1997. Haiti’s current legal system is antiquated.
Haitian authorities charged with controlling drug trafficking are inexperienced, lack sufficient
resources, and, because of Haiti’s extreme poverty, are considered highly susceptible to
corruption. According to the State Department’s report, “High level [Government of Haiti]
officials of the Preval administration and members of the National Assembly [were] also
suspected of ties with narcotraffickers.”
Some progress was made, however: the Haitian Parliament ratified a U.S.-Haitian
bilateral maritime counter-drug agreement and an Inter-American Convention Against
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Corruption in late 2000, and passed a National Drug Control Strategy and anti-money
laundering legislation in January 2001.
On March 1, 2001, the Bush Administration said Haiti was not certified as having fully
cooperated with U.S. drug-control efforts, but it granted a vital national interest waiver and
said that aid to Haiti must continue. The Administration said that although the Haitian
government had “demonstrated cooperation in a limited number of areas, especially U.S.
maritime interdiction operations, Haiti failed to take other significant counter-narcotics
actions.” The Administration added that “Haitian poverty and hopelessness” were chief
catalysts in Haitian involvement in the drug trade and in illegal migration to the United States.
Cutting off aid to Haiti, including programs aimed at attacking those catalysts, “would
aggravate an already bad situation.”
Legislation in the 106th Congress
P.L. 106-65 (S. 1059). Congress agreed to the conference report (H.Rept. 106-301)
for the FY2000 Department of Defense Authorization Act; the House on September 15, the
Senate on September 22. Section 1232 prohibits DOD funding to maintain a continuous U.S.
military presence in Haiti beyond May 31, 2000, and requires the President to notify Congress
in writing within 96 hours of any deployment of U.S. Armed Forces to Haiti after that date.
The conference report says the provision does not prohibit periodic theater engagement
activities in Haiti under the auspices of the U.S. Southern Command. Signed into law on
October 5, 1999.
P.L. 106-113 (H.R. 3194, Major Legislation). The Consolidated Appropriations Act
for FY2000 included the Foreign Operations Appropriations bill (H.R. 3422) as introduced
on November 17, 1999. Section 520 prohibits any funding to Haiti except through regular
notification procedures of the Committees on Appropriations. Section 559 (1) outlines
congressional priorities for assistance to Haiti, including “aggressive action to support the
Haitian National Police;” ensuring that elections are free and fair; developing indigenous
human rights monitoring capacity; facilitating more privatization of state-owned enterprises;
a sustainable agricultural development program; and establishing an economic development
fund to encourage U.S. investment in Haiti; (2) requires the President to submit a report to
Congress every 6 months until September 30, 2001, regarding the status of various Haitian
government efforts in areas of concern to Congress; and (3) stipulates that not more than
17% of funds appropriated by this act for Latin America and the Caribbean may be made
available to any one country in that region. Section 562 allows the Haitian government to
purchase defense articles and services for the civilian-led Haitian National Police and Coast
Guard, subject to regular notification procedures. Signed into law on November 29, 1999.
P.L. 106-429 (H.R. 4811). The Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill for FY2001
(H.R. 5526 enacted by reference.) Section 520 prohibits providing assistance to Haiti except
through regular notification procedures of the Committee on Appropriations. Section 558
prohibits aid to the Haitian government until Haiti has held free and fair elections to seat a
new parliament and is fully cooperating with U.S. efforts to interdict illicit drug traffic
through Haiti. Section 561 allows the Haitian government to purchase defense articles and
services for the Haitian Coast Guard, subject to regular notification procedures. The House
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Appropriations Committee’s report (H.Rept. 106-720) expressed full support of humanitarian
assistance and the private organizations through which it is provided. The Senate Committee
on Appropriations’ report (H.Rept. 106-291) states, “Absent significant political change, the
Committee believes American aid should be suspended, except for the most urgent
humanitarian programs.” Signed into law November 6, 2000.
LEGISLATION
H.R.2506 (Koble).
The Foreign Operations appropriations bill for FY2002. Section 520 prohibits
providing assistance to Haiti except through regular notification procedures to the
Committees on Appropriations. No other conditions on aid to Haiti are currently in the
proposed bill. Section 554 would allow the Haitian government to purchase defense articles
and services for the Haitian Coast Guard. Approved by the House on July 24, 2001.
H.R.1646 (Hyde).
The Foreign Relations Authorization act for FY2002 and FY2003. Authorizes $6,000
to the Organization of American States for each fiscal year to be appropriated only for the
investigation and dissemination of information on violations of freedom of expression by the
Government of Haiti. Passed by the House May 16, 2001. The Senate version, S. 1401,
reported by the Committee on Foreign Relations September 4, 2001, contains no such
provision.
H.R.1642 (Waters).
Urges the President to accomplish modifications in the Enhanced Heavily Indebted Poor
Countries Initiative, including requiring that the eligibility requirements of the Initiative be
revised to make Haiti eligible. Introduced April 26, 2001, referred to Houses subcommittee
May 10.
H.R.707 (Smith).
Amends the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act to provide certain
Hatiian nationals an opportunity to apply for adjustment of status under that Act. Introduced
February 14, 2001, referred to House subcommittee March 2.
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Appropriations. Subcommittee on Foreign
Operations, Export Financing, and Related Programs. Foreign Operations, Export
Financing, and Related Programs Appropriations for 1997 and Supplemental for 1996.
Hearings, 104th Congress, 2nd session. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1996. 122
p. [Part 1— Jordan arms transfers; Impact of U.S. assistance to Haiti.]
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U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Policy Toward Haiti
Following the Withdrawal of U.N. Forces. Hearing, 105th Congress, 1st session. Dec.
9, 1997. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1998. 75 p.
— Administration Actions and Political Murders in Haiti. Hearing. Washington, U.S. Govt.
Print. Off., 1996. 54 p.
— Haiti: Human Rights and Police Issues. Hearing, 104th Congress, 2nd session. January
4, 1996. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1996. 326 p.
— Subcommittee on the Western Hemisphere. Haiti: Where Has All the Money Gone?
Hearing, 104th Congress, 2nd session. June 20, 1996. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off.,
1996. 55 p.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on the Judiciary. FBI Murder Investigation in Haiti.
Hearing, 104th Congress, 2nd session. January 31, 1996. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print.
Off., 1996. 111p.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Caucus on International Narcotics Control. On-site Staff
Evaluation of U.S. Counter-narcotics Activities in the Bahamas, Jamaica, and
Haiti–November 30-December 5, 1998. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1999.
U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on International Relations. Administration Actions and
Political Murders in Haiti: Part II. Hearing, 104th Congress, 2nd session. September
27, 1996. Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1997. 87 p.
CHRONOLOGY
02/07/01 —
President Aristide is inaugurated to a second term. The Democratic
Convergence, an opposition coalition, forms an alternative government.
11/26/00 —
Former President Aristide and his party win presidential and legislative
elections boycotted by opposition.
05/21/00 —
First and second round of legislative and local elections held. Observers
07/30/00
report fraudulent counting of votes.
12/17/99 —
U.N. General Assembly creates the International Civilian Support Mission in
Haiti (MICAH) to replace U.N. peacekeeping and police-training missions on
March 15, 2000.
03/99
—
President Preval appoints new prime minister and electoral council by decree.
01/99
—
President Preval dissolves parliament and local governments and begins to
rule by decree.
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06/09/97 —
Prime Minister Smarth resigns, citing a lack of public confidence in the
government and his unwillingness to be associated with electoral fraud.
04/06/97 —
Elections for one-third of the Senate and for territorial assemblies are marred
by low turnout and allegations of fraud by the Electoral Council.
03/26/97 —
Prime Minister Rosny Smarth survives a legislative no-confidence vote.
12/05/96 —
The U.N. Security council approves extension for a maximum of 8 months,
until July 31, 1997, of the U.N. Support Mission in Haiti.
07/17/96 —
Former Army General Claude Raymond, who served during the Duvalier
dictatorship, is arrested and charged with trying to destabilize the country. In
late July 1996, two men accused of murdering Justice Minister Francois Guy
Malary in 1993 remained in prison, awaiting retrial following expressions of
outrage when they were found not guilty.
06/96
—
Emmanuel Constant, the former head of the pro-military Front for the
Advancement and Progress of Haiti (FRAPH), who claims to have worked for
the CIA and who fled murder charges in Haiti, is released from a U.S.
detention center in Baltimore, Maryland, while Haiti is seeking his extradition.
06/28/96 —
The U.N. Security Council approves the extension for 5 months of a
scaled-down U.N. force, called the U.N. Support Mission in Haiti.
06/26/96 —
At a House International Relations Committee hearing, Deputy Secretary of
State Strobe Talbott denies Republican charges that the Administration had
failed to aggressively pursue human rights abuses during the Aristide
presidency, and he indicates that the United States was working with other
nations to arrange for an extension of the U.N. force in Haiti.
06/5-15/96
President Preval visits Europe to promote international assistance, investment,
and an extension of the U.N. force in Haiti.
04/19/96 —
Senator Robert Dole criticizes the Clinton Administration’s Haiti policy on the
Senate floor, and releases a critical Republican congressional staff report.
04/17/96 —
The last contingent of U.S. soldiers serving as part of the UNMIH departs
Haiti.
03/20-22/96
President Preval visits Washington, D.C., and in meetings with President
Clinton, Congress, and international financial institutions, promises to
privatize government enterprises and to adhere to international human rights
standards.
02/29/96 —
The U.N. Security Council extends the UNMIH mandate, but with a force
limited to 1,200 soldiers and 300 civilian police for a period of only four
months. Canada offers to contribute additional personnel.
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02/16/96 —
President Preval chooses the moderate agro-economist Rosny Smarth as
Prime Minister, and he is subsequently approved by the Haitian legislature.
02/09/96 —
President Preval requests an extension of the United Nations Mission in Haiti.
02/07/96 —
President-elect Rene Preval is sworn in as President, representing the first
transition from one democratically elected president to another.
12/17/95 —
In peaceful presidential elections, Rene Preval, the pro-Aristide candidate of
the Lavalas Party, wins with 89% of the vote, but turnout was only about
28% of eligible voters, and many parties boycotted the election.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
The Challenge of Haiti’s Future. Carlisle Barracks, Pa., Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Army War College, 1997. 23 p. [conference]
Falcoff, Mark. “What ‘Operation Restore Democracy’ Restored.” Commentary, v. 101,
May 1996: 45-48.

Haiti: The Challenges of Poverty Reduction, volumes I and II. World Bank Poverty
Reduction and Economic Management Unit and Caribbean Country Management Unit,
Latin America and the Caribbean Region. August 1998. Report No. 17242-HA.
[http://www.worldbank.org/html/pic/PIC.html]

Hayes, Margaret Daly, and Gary Wheatley, eds. Interagency and Political-Military
Dimensions of Peace Operations: Haiti–A Case Study. [Washington, National Defense
University.] Washington, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1996. 65 p.
Morrell, James R., and Rachel Neild and Hugh Byrne. “Haiti and the Limits to Nation-
Building.” Current History, v. 98, March 1999: 127-132.

National Coalition for Haitian Rights. Washington Office on Latin America. Can Haiti’s
Police Reforms Be Sustained? January 1998.
Preeg, Ernest H. The Haitian Dilemma: A Case Study of Demographics, Development, and
U.S. Foreign Policy. Washington, D.C., Center for Strategic and International Studies,
1996. 133 p.
Rotberg, Robert I. Haiti Renewed: Political and Economic Prospects. Washington, D.C.,
Brookings Institution Press, 1997. 245 p.
Rotberg, Robert I. and John Sweeney. “Was Intervening in Haiti a Mistake? “Foreign Policy,
no. 102, spring 1996: 134-151.
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Schulz, Donald E. Haiti Update. Carlisle Barracks, Pa., Strategic Studies Institute, U.S.
Army War College, 1997. 28 p.
Stotzky, Irwin P. “On the Promise and Perils of Democracy in Haiti.” University of Miami
Inter-American Law Review, v. 29, fall-winter 1997-1998: 1-24.
CRS Reports
CRS Report 93-931. Haiti: Background to the Overthrow of President Aristide, by Maureen
Taft-Morales.
CRS Report 95-602. Haiti: Efforts to Restore President Aristide, 1991-1994, by Maureen
Taft - Morales.
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