Order Code IB98030
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Nuclear Arms Control:
The U.S.-Russian Agenda
Updated November 16, 2001
Amy F. Woolf
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
START I
Treaty Provisions
Ratification and Implementation
Ratification
Weapons Deactivation
Monitoring and Verification
Compliance
START II
Treaty Provisions
Ratification
START III
Proposed Provisions
Alternative Proposals
The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
Treaty Provisions
The Demarcation and Succession Agreements
Agreed Statements on Demarcation
Memorandum of Understanding on Succession
The ABM Treaty and National Missile Defenses
LEGISLATION
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
FOR ADDITIONAL READING

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Nuclear Arms Control: The U.S.-Russian Agenda
SUMMARY
Although arms control negotiations are
2,000 and 2,500 warheads. They also agreed
not as important to the U.S.-Russian relation-
to address measures related to non-strategic
ship as they were to the U.S.-Soviet relation-
nuclear weapons and the warheads removed
ship during the Cold War, the United States
from weapons eliminated under the treaty.
and Russia have continued to implement
Negotiations to turn this framework into a
existing nuclear arms control agreements and
formal agreement proved difficult. The Bush
to pursue negotiations on further reductions in
Administration has not continued negotiations
their strategic offensive weapons and
towards START III, but it has pledged to
modifications to limits on ballistic missile
reduce U.S. nuclear forces below START II
defenses. This issue brief summarizes the
levels unilaterally. President Bush plans in-
contents of these agreements and tracks prog-
formed President Putin of planned reductions
ress in their ratification and implementation.
to 1,700-2,200 warheads in November,
2001.The United States and Russia continue to
The 1991 START I Treaty entered into
abide by the 1972 ABM Treaty, which limits
force in December 1994. It limits the United
each side to one anti-ballistic missile deploy-
States and four successors to the Soviet Union
ment area with no more than 100 interceptor
— Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan
missiles. In September 1997, the parties
— to 6,000 accountable warheads on 1,600
signed several documents that established a
strategic offensive delivery vehicles. The
demarcation line between ABM systems and
parties are well along in the elimination sche-
theater missile defense systems, which are not
dules outlined in the treaty and will complete
limited by the Treaty. They also signed a
the process by December 4, 2001. The parties
Memorandum that named Russia, Ukraine,
also continue to implement the on-site inspec-
Belarus, and Kazakhstan as the successors to
tions that are a part of the Treaty’s complex
the Soviet Union for the ABM Treaty. The
verification regimen. The United States and
Clinton Administration never submitted these
Russia signed START II in January 1993.
to the Senate for advice and consent. It did
This agreement would reduce U.S. and Rus-
however, pursue negotiations on modifications
sian strategic offensive forces to 3,500 war-
to the Treaty that would permit the deploy-
heads. In September 1997, the United States
ment of national missile defenses. The Bush
and Russia signed a Protocol to START II to
Administration has indicated that it believes
extend the elimination period in the treaty to
the Treaty is out of date, and that the United
the end of the year 2007. The U.S. Senate
States must withdraw to pursue missile de-
approved the Treaty’s ratification in January
fense. It has suggested that the United States
1996 and the Russian legislature did so in
and Russia agree to set the Treaty aside.
April 2000, but the treaty has not yet entered
Russia has not accepted this proposal, but it
into force. In March 1997, Presidents Clinton
may accept more robust testing of missile
and Yeltsin agreed that the United States and
defenses as long as the United States does not
Russia would negotiate a START III Treaty
withdraw from the Treaty. The United States
after START II entered into force. The new
might accept this alternative, and address the
treaty would reduce their forces to between
Treaty’s deployment restrictions in the future.
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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
On November 13, President Bush informed Russia’s President Putin that the United States
would reduce the number of operationally deployed warheads on its strategic offensive nuclear
weapon to between 1,700 and 2,200 during the next ten years. The United States does not plan to
negotiate an agreement that codifies these reductions. President Putin reiterated that Russia also
intended to reduce its forces, but he insisted that these reductions be included in a formal treaty that
would allow for monitoring and verification.
Prior to the November meetings, press reports indicated that the two nations were nearing
agreements on ABM Treaty issues. Many expected that the United States would agree not to
withdraw from the ABM Treaty in the near term if Russia would agree that the United States could
conduct a testing program that would otherwise conflict with the Treaty limits. However, the
Presidents did not announce such an agreement. Because the United States still plans to conduct
tests that raise Treaty questions, it may need to announce its withdrawal from the ABM Treaty in
the near-term.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
During the Cold War, arms control negotiations were a central feature of U.S.-Soviet relations.
Observers disagreed about whether these would enhance U.S. security by limiting Soviet weapons
and providing information about Soviet capabilities or undermine U.S. security by limiting U.S.
weapons while the Soviet Union continued to pursue more capable systems. Many noted, however,
that arms control negotiations were sometimes the only place where the two nations could
communicate and pursue cooperative efforts — even if they did little to control arms or reduce the
dangers posed by nuclear weapons.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the United States and Soviet Union/Russia signed several
agreements that reduced nuclear weapons. The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear Forces Treaty
(INF) eliminated all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between 300 and 3,400 miles.
The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START I, mandated reductions in numbers of warheads
deployed on long-range land-based and submarine-based missiles and on heavy bombers. In January
1993, the United States and Russia signed the second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START II,
which would further reduce the number of warheads on their strategic offensive forces. The United
States and Russia also held discussions on a START III treaty that would reduce their forces further.
The Bush Administration has argued that arms control negotiations, leading to formal treaties,
should no longer be a central feature of the U.S-Russian relationship. Administration officials
contend that the relationship codified by these treaty regimes reflects old-style “Cold War” thinking,
and that the two sides should, instead, reduce their offensive forces unilaterally, to the levels that each
finds necessary, and eliminate the ABM Treaty’s restrictions on the deployment of missile defenses.
The United States and Russia continue to implement START I, but START II may never enter into
force and that the two sides may not pursue a START III Treaty. This issue brief reviews
developments in these earlier efforts and summarizes proposals for further arms control agreements.
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It also tracks discussions on arms control issues that have occurred since the start of the Bush
Administration.
START I
Treaty Provisions
START I, signed on July 31, 1991, limits the United States and successors to the Soviet Union
to 6,000 warheads attributed to 1,600 strategic offensive delivery vehicles — land-based
intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs) and heavy
bombers. The treaty also limits each side to 4,900 warheads attributed to ballistic missiles, 1,540
warheads attributed to heavy ICBMs, and 1,100 warheads attributed to mobile ICBMs. Warheads
are “attributed” to missiles and heavy bombers through counting rules that assign each deployed
missile or bomber a warhead number. The number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs
usually equals the number actually deployed on that type of missile, but the number attributed to
heavy bombers is far fewer than the number of bombs or cruise missiles that each type of bomber can
be equipped to carry. The Treaty allows “downloading” of warheads to reduce the number of
warheads attributed and carried on some multiple warhead (MIRVed) missiles. (For details about
START I, see CRS Report 91-575, START: Central Limits and Key Provisions.)
To monitor forces and verify compliance with START I, the parties rely on their own national
technical means (NTM) and numerous cooperative measures designed to supplement information
received through NTM. These include extensive data exchanges on the numbers and locations of
affected weapons and several types of on-site inspections (OSI), including baseline inspections to
confirm initial data, inspections of closed-out facilities or eliminated equipment, inspection of suspect
sites, and continuous monitoring of certain facilities. The parties must also notify each other of
several types of activities, such as the movement of items limited by the treaty. The parties agreed
to refrain from encrypting or denying the telemetry (missile test data) needed to monitor many
qualitative and quantitative limits. The treaty established the Joint Compliance and Inspection
Commission (JCIC), where the parties meet to discuss treaty implementation issues and compliance
questions.
In May 1992, the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan signed a Protocol
to START I that listed those four former Soviet republics as the successors to the Soviet Union for
the Treaty. In this agreement, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan all agreed to join the Nuclear
Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states and to eliminate the strategic nuclear
weapons on their territories. In separate agreements, these three states arranged to return the nuclear
warheads from those weapons to Russia.
Ratification and Implementation
Ratification. The U.S. Senate gave consent to the ratification of START I on October 1,
1992. Kazakhstan ratified START I in June 1992; it joined the NPT as a non-nuclear state on
February 14, 1994. Belarus approved START I and the NPT on February 4, 1993, and formally
joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state on July 22, 1993. The Russian parliament approved
START I on November 4, 1992, but stated that it would not exchange the instruments of ratification
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until all three of the other republics adhered to the NPT as non-nuclear states. Ukraine delayed
action on START I for nearly two years. On January 14, 1994, Presidents Clinton, Yeltsin, and
Kravchuk of Ukraine signed a Trilateral Statement in which Ukraine agreed to transfer all the nuclear
warheads on its territory to Russia and to eliminate the treaty-accountable delivery vehicles for these
warheads in exchange for compensation and security assurances. The Ukrainian parliament approved
the Trilateral Statement and START I in early February 1994. It eventually approved Ukraine’s
accession to the NPT in November 1994. On December 5, 1994, the United States, Russia, and
Great Britain signed a memorandum granting security assurances to Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakhstan. Ukraine then acceded to the NPT, the five parties to START I exchanged instruments
of ratification, and START I entered into force.
Weapons Deactivation. As of July 31, 2001, the United States had removed all of the
Minuteman II missiles from their silos and had eliminated or converted 449 of the 450 Minuteman
II silos according to the provisions outlined in START. The United States has also withdrawn from
service and removed the missiles from all of its Poseidon ballistic missile submarines. All but 1 of the
31 Poseidons have been eliminated according to the provisions outlined in the treaty. After these
reductions, the United States had 7,013 warheads attributed to 1,299 delivery vehicles in its force.
Forces of the former Soviet Union have declined significantly during START I implementation,
from more than 10,000 warheads on 2,500 delivery vehicles in 1990 to 5,988 warheads on 1,211
delivery vehicles on July 31, 2001. All the nuclear warheads from SS-18 missiles and weapons for
bombers in Kazakhstan had been returned to Russia by May 1995. All the nuclear weapons had been
removed from Ukraine’s territory by June 1, 1996 and all 81 of the SS-25 missiles based in Belarus
had been returned to Russia by late November 1996. Ukraine has eliminated all of the SS-19 and SS-
24 ICBM silos on its territory. Ukraine has also eliminated all 43 heavy bombers that were left on
its territory. Russia and Ukraine sought unsuccessfully for five years to negotiate a price for Russia
to purchase these aircraft from Ukraine. However, in late 1999, Russia and Ukraine reached an
agreement for Ukraine to return 11 bombers –3 Bear_H bombers and 8 Blackjack bombers – to
Russia in exchange for forgiveness of part of its natural gas debts to Russia.
Monitoring and Verification. All the parties to START I have conducted on-site
inspections permitted by the treaty. In addition to conducting routine inspections called for in the
Treaty, U.S. inspectors also monitored the elimination of 20 Russian SLBMs in early December 1997.
Although not mandated by the treaty, Russia eliminated these missiles by launching them from
submarines and destroying them shortly after launch.
Compliance. The parties to START I have all noted that there have been few significant
compliance questions. In 1995, the United States raised concerns about Russian compliance with the
treaty’s provisions on the conversion of missiles to space launch vehicles when Russia used a
converted SS-25 ICBM to launch a satellite. According to published reports, Russia did not allow
the United States to inspect the missile to confirm that it was configured as a space launch vehicle
when it exited the Votkinsk missile assembly facility, and it failed to provide the proper notifications,
as specified in START I, about the location of the missile prior to the satellite launch. Russia claimed
that it was not obligated to notify the United States about the missile or permit the United States to
inspect it at the Votkinsk portal because it was a dedicated space launch vehicle that was not limited
by START. The United States held that the missile was subject to START I inspection and
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notification provisions because it was a variant of a missile limited by the treaty. After discussions
in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), the two sides agreed that a limited
number these launch vehicles could leave the Votkinsk facility without being subject to imaging
inspections. They would still have to be measured and opened to confirm that they were not treaty-
limited missiles. In November 1997, the two sides reached a final agreement that would cover any
additional space-launch vehicles assembled at Votkinsk.
In June 1998, the Russian press reported that Russian officials were concerned about U.S.
compliance with START I. For example, tests of the British Trident missiles may have released 10-
12 warheads, rather than the 8 permitted on U.S. Trident missiles. The United States believes this
is consistent with START I because the Treaty does not limit British missiles, but some in Russia
argue that the United States could gain valuable information that would permit it to deploy its own
missiles with 10-12 warheads. Some in Russia also contend that the United States has altered the B-1
bombers to make it easier for them to carry cruise missiles. These changes are not banned by the
START I Treaty, and the United States could equip B-1 bombers without violating its obligations,
but this would change the accounting for the bombers under START I. Most of these issues were
addressed in the JCIC. Some observers speculated that the Russian reports were designed to deflect
criticism about Russia’s failure to ratify START II. Officials in the Russian Defense Ministry
repeated the accusations of U.S. non-compliance with START I in late January 1999. The timing of
Russia’s complaint appeared to derive from U.S. funding and support for a national ballistic missile
defense system and its intentions to negotiate amendments in the 1972 ABM Treaty.
START II
Treaty Provisions
The United States and Russia signed START II on January 3, 1993. It limits each side to 3,000-
3,500 accountable warheads on strategic offensive delivery vehicles, with no more than 1,750
warheads on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The Treaty also bans all multiple
warhead ICBMS (MIRVed ICBMs). As under START I, the parties can reduce their deployed
warheads and eliminate MIRVed ICBMs by downloading, or removing, warheads from deployed
missiles. Because the parties can remove, at most, 4 warheads from each missile, ICBMs with 10
warheads must be eliminated, rather than downloaded. The treaty makes an exception for the Russian
SS-19 missile, which carries 6 warheads. Russia can remove 5 warheads from 105 of these missiles
so that they will remain as single-warhead missiles. For the most part, START II would use rely on
the same verification regime as START I. (For details see CRS Report 93-35, START II: Central
Limits and Force Structure Implications and CRS Report 93-617, The START and START II Arms
Control Treaties: Background and Issues.)
Ratification
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on START II in March 1993, but
delayed further debate until START I entered into force. Hearings resumed in early 1995, but a
dispute over plans to reorganize the State Department and eliminate the Arms Control and
Disarmament Agency delayed further action. After the Senate leadership reached agreement on those
issues, the Foreign Relations Committee approved the START II resolution of ratification for START
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II by a unanimous vote on December 12, 1995. The full Senate voted 87-4, offering its advice and
consent to ratification, on January 26, 1996.
The lower house of Russia’s parliament, the Duma, began considering START II in July 1995
but the debate did not proceed well. In early 1998, leaders in the Duma stated that they would
probably debate the treaty and vote on its ratification by June 1998, but this date passed without
action. The Duma resumed work on START II during its fall session, and it had drafted a law on
ratification for the treaty by the end of November, 1998. It again planned to begin the debate in
December, but this was delayed because the Duma did not yet have a draft law on financing for the
nation’s strategic nuclear forces. Nevertheless, officials in the Yeltsin government continued to press
for START II approval, and many began to believe the Duma would act by the end of December.
However, it again delayed consideration after U.S. and British air strikes on Iraq in mid-December.
The Treaty’s future clouded again after the United States announced its plans in January 1999 to
negotiate amendments to the 1972 ABM Treaty. However, the Duma leadership sent the draft law
on ratification to President Yeltsin in late March 1999. On March 19, the Duma’s leadership
announced that it had scheduled a debate for April 2, 1999. This debate was canceled after NATO
forces began their air campaign in Yugoslavia.
After he took office at the end of 1999, President Vladimir Putin expressed his support for
START II and pressed the Duma to approve its ratification. The Duma Foreign Affairs committee
recommended START II ratification in early April, and the Duma voted to approve ratification on
April 14, 2000. The upper chamber of the Parliament, the Federation council, did the same on April
19, 2000.
Some Duma members objected to START II because they generally opposed President Yeltsin
and his policies. Others argued that Russia should not reduce its offensive forces as NATO expanded
into central Europe because NATO could then move its nuclear weapons closer to Russia’s borders.
And some argued that Russia should not approve START II until it is certain that the United States
will continue to abide by the 1972 ABM Treaty — they feared that the United States could undermine
Russia’s nuclear deterrent if it deployed extensive missile defenses while Russia reduced its offensive
forces.
The debate over START II also revealed concerns about the substance of the Treaty. Some
argued the treaty would undermine Russia’s security by eliminating the core of Russia’s strategic
forces — the MIRVed ICBMs. In addition, Russia would need hundreds of new single-warhead
ICBMs to retain 3,500 warheads as it eliminates MIRVed ICBMs. As a result, some in the Duma
suggested that the United States and Russia skip START II and negotiate further reductions so that
the United States would have to reduce to levels that Russia might end up at anyway. (For details,
see CRS Report 97-359, START II Debate in the Russian Duma: Issues and Prospects.)
In March 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to extend the elimination timelines in
START II and established guidelines for a START III Treaty that would reduce both sides’ forces
to 2,000-2,500 warheads. On September 26, 1997, Secretary of State Albright and Russia’s Foreign
Minister Primakov signed a protocol to START II that formalized the extension of START II
deadlines. They also exchanged letters repeating the Presidents’ agreement that the two sides would
deactivate all the weapons to be eliminated under START II by the end of 2003. The two sides
agreed to work out methods for deactivation as soon as the treaty entered into force. Russia added
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another provision to its letter, noting that it expected a START III treaty to enter into force before
the deactivation deadline for START II. The United States acknowledged this statement but did not
agree.
Both Yeltsin and Putin reportedly told the Duma committees that Russia could not afford to
retain strategic offensive forces at START I levels. Ratification of START II would not only ensure
that the United States reduces its forces along with Russia, but would also permit the two nations to
move on to deeper reductions in START III. These arguments apparently swayed enough members
of the Duma to win approval for the Treaty.
The Duma attached several conditions to its Federal Law on Ratification. The Law indicates
that U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty would be considered an extraordinary event that
would give Russia the right to withdraw from START II. President Putin appeared to endorse this
view when he stated that Russia would pull out of the entire system of arms control agreements on
strategic nuclear forces if the United States dismantled the ABM Treaty. Furthermore, the Federal
Law on Ratification states that Russia will not exchange the instruments of ratification on START
II until the United States approves the ratification of the 1997 Agreed Statements on Demarcation
and Memorandum of Understanding on Succession to the ABM Treaty. The Clinton Administration
never submitted these agreements to the U.S. Senate.
The Bush Administration has thus far been silent on its intentions with regard to START II,
although most analysts believe it will not attempt to complete the ratification process. As a result,
the Russians will not be required to eliminate their large MIRVed ICBMs, which has long been a goal
of U.S. arms control policy, even though many experts believe Russia will retire the SS-18s by the
end of the decade. Furthermore, in its package of unilateral reductions, the Bush Administration has
included steps that DOD would have taken if START II had entered into force. In its budget for the
Defense Department for FY2002, it requested $17 million to being to dismantle the 50 Peacekeeper
ICBMs. Congress had prevented any expenditures to begin this retirement prior to START II’s entry
into force, but it is likely to lift the restriction in FY2002. According to Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld, the United States no longer needs these missiles and the Air Force had not provided any
funds to maintain or operate them. The Administration also included funding in the budget to begin
converting two Trident submarines to carry cruise missiles, instead of nuclear-armed ballistic missiles.
START III
Proposed Provisions
In March 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that the United States and Russia would
negotiate a START III treaty as soon as START II entered into force. This treaty would limit each
side to between 2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads by December 31, 2007. The Presidents also
agreed that START III should contain measures to promote the irreversibility of the weapons
elimination process, including transparency measures and the destruction of strategic nuclear
warheads removed from delivery vehicles. This responds to a condition that the Senate added to the
START I resolution of ratification and it could address concerns about the possible theft or sale of
warheads to nations seeking their own nuclear weapons. The two sides have attempted, with little
progress, to implement warhead data exchanges for several years.
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Finally, the Presidents agreed the two sides would explore possible measures for long-range,
nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missiles and other tactical nuclear weapons. These could include
transparency and confidence-building measures. Russia has long sought restrictions on U.S.
sea-launched cruise missiles. The United States unilaterally withdrew these missiles from deployment
in 1991, but Russia fears that the these missiles could threaten targets in Russia if the United States
redeployed them. The United States would like further restrictions on Russian tactical nuclear
weapons because these may pose a proliferation risk; Russia would like restrictions on U.S. tactical
nuclear weapons to ensure that they are not deployed on the territory of new NATO members.
During discussions on START III, both sides introduced numerous provisions that would
address all the issues outlined in the Helsinki framework, but they could not resolve their differences.
For example, the Russians proposed that the treaty reduce strategic nuclear forces to 1,500 or fewer
warheads on each side. The United States has resisted such deep reductions in the past, and when
it tabled a new proposal in January 2000, it reportedly continued to insist that START III reduce
forces to 2,000 or 2,500 warheads.
Press reports indicate that the Clinton Administration had asked DOD to assess the implications
of lower levels again, in early May 2000, in preparation for President Clinton’s summit with President
Putin scheduled for early June 2000. Military leaders reportedly rejected lower levels again. At the
time, many analysts expected the Clinton Administration to negotiate a “Grand Bargain,” where the
United States would accept lower limits for START II if Russia accepted ABM Treaty modifications
that would permit the deployment of a U.S. NMD. However, the summit did not produce any arms
control agreements. Presidents Clinton and Putin did, however, agree to intensify their negotiations
on START III. Furthermore, during a press conference after their meetings, President Clinton said
that the United States would have to alter its strategic plans to reduce its forces to 1,500 warheads.
And he indicated that such a change in plans would be more complete if the United States knew what
role missile defenses would play in the U.S. plan.
In November 2000, President Putin outlined a new proposal for reductions in offensive forces,
stating that Russia would be willing to reduce to 1,500 warheads or lower if the United States
remained committed to the ABM Treaty. President Clinton did not respond directly to this proposal.
Many analysts doubt that the United States would accept such a proposal because U.S. officials have
indicated that the United States would only be willing to cut its forces that deeply if Russia agreed
to modify the ABM Treaty.
President Bush has stated that he believes the United States and Russia could move away from
formal arms control treaties and reduce forces unilaterally or in parallel to whatever level each side
decided was appropriate. He stated that he would reduce U.S. forces to the lowest possible level
after military leaders conducted a thorough review of U.S. defense plans. At their meeting following
the G-8 summit in Genoa, Italy, Presidents Bush and Putin agreed that the two nations would begin
consultations on offensive and defensive weapons. The Russians apparently expect these
consultations to produce agreed limits on offensive forces and minor modifications of the ABM
Treaty. The Bush Administration, however, has stated that the United States is not expecting lengthy
negotiations or the completion of a formal arms control treaty. Instead, the Administration expects
to use these consultations as a forum to inform Russia of U.S. plans with respect to offensive and
defensive forces and to convince Russia to set aside the ABM Treaty with the United States.
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The consultations made little progress for several months, with Russia complaining that the
United States had not outlined its proposals for deep reductions in offensive nuclear weapons. The
Bush Administration responded that it was not yet ready to make these proposals because DOD had
not completed its review of U.S. nuclear forces. However, on November 13, 2001, during meetings
with President Putin in Washington, President Bush announced that he would reduce the number of
operationally deployed warheads on U.S. strategic offensive nuclear weapons to between 1,700 and
2,200 over 10 years. The reference to “operationally deployed” warheads indicates that the United
States would not include warheads on submarines or bombers undergoing overhauls in this total. As
a result, it might not count several hundred warheads that would be included in a tally using START
treaty counting rules. A tally that included these warheads would be closer to the level of 2,500
warheads proposed for START III. Furthermore, the Bush Administration indicated that it did not
intend to negotiate a formal treaty; but would reduce U.S. forces unilaterally, regardless of Russian
reciprocity. President Putin reiterated Russian intentions to reduce its forces to much lower levels.
In the past, he has called for reductions to 1,500 warheads or less. But he stated that these reductions
should be codified in a formal treaty that including control and verification measures.
Some analysts have doubted that this informal arrangement would appeal to President Putin.
It would not reduce U.S. forces as far as he would like and it would leave the United States with the
ability to increase its forces with little warning. Others, however, expected Putin to accede to the
U.S. proposal. Pressing for a formal treaty would not change the Bush Administration’s approach.
Furthermore, it would be difficult to criticize the U.S. reductions when Russia had proposed numbers
close to the U.S. offer for years. Some analysts expected that Putin would accept the U.S. offer and
approach as the best outcome he could hope for.
Alternative Proposals
Many analysts in the arms control community believe the United States and Russia should move
beyond the START framework by either reducing the alert rates of their deployed weapons or
seeking deeper reductions, leading towards the eventual elimination of all nuclear weapons.
Supporters argue that these measures would not only make the United States and Russia safer, they
would also demonstrate that the United States and Russia are reducing the role of nuclear weapons
in their defense policies. Others argue that the United States and Russia should stop negotiating and
implementing formal arms control arrangements. Some contend that this locks the two parties into
an adversarial relationship, where a more cooperative approach, with each side setting its own force
structure requirements, would be more appropriate. Others contend that formal agreements that
mandate U.S. reductions are not needed because economic conditions in Russia will assure that
reductions occur there with or without U.S. participation.
The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
Treaty Provisions
The 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty prohibits the deployment of ABM
systems for the defense of the nations’ entire territory. It permits each side to deploy limited ABM
systems at two locations, one centered on the nation’s capital and one at a location containing ICBM
silo launchers. A 1974 Protocol further limited each nation to one ABM site, located at the nation’s
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capital or around an ICBM deployment area. Each ABM site can contain no more than 100 ABM
launchers and 100 ABM interceptor missiles. (Russia deployed its ABM site around Moscow; the
United States deployed its site around ICBM silos near Grand Forks, North Dakota. The United
States ceased operations at its ABM site in 1975, but the facilities continue to count under the ABM
Treaty.) The Treaty also specifies that, in the future, any radars that provide early warning of
strategic ballistic missile attack must be located on the periphery of the national territory and oriented
outward. The Treaty bans the development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-
based, or mobile land-based ABM systems and ABM system components (these include interceptor
missiles, launchers, and radars or other sensors that can substitute for radars).
The numerical limits and deployment restrictions in the ABM Treaty do not apply to other types
of defensive systems — such as defenses against shorter-range battlefield or theater ballistic missiles.
However, the Treaty does state that the parties cannot give these other types of defenses the
capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements in flight trajectory. The parties also
cannot test these other types of defenses “in an ABM mode.” But the ABM Treaty does not define
the capabilities of a “strategic” ballistic missile or the characteristics of a test that would be “in an
ABM mode.”
The Demarcation and Succession Agreements
Questions about the difference between ABM systems and theater missile defense (TMD)
systems grew in importance after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Iraq’s scud missile attacks on Israel and
allied forces alerted many in the United States to the growing threat from ballistic missiles in regional
conflicts and generated new interest in the ongoing development of advanced theater missile defenses
(TMD). By 1993, some analysts and officials in the Clinton Administration had begun to ask whether
advanced TMD systems would be limited by the ABM Treaty. To avoid possible compliance
questions, the Clinton Administration sought to reach an agreement with Russia on a “demarcation
line” to distinguish between ABM systems and TMD systems. (For details on U.S. TMD programs,
see CRS Issue Brief IB98028, Theater Air and Missile Defense: Issues for Congress.)
Questions about the future of the ABM Treaty and its relationship to U.S. National Missile
Defenses were further complicated by the fact that the Soviet Union no longer existed. Many critics
of the ABM Treaty and supporters of U.S. missile defense deployments found the situation to be
advantageous; they believed the Treaty could lapse and the United States could deploy missile
defenses without limits. But the Clinton Administration believed that the ABM Treaty remained in
the U.S. national security interest and it began negotiations in late 1993 on an agreement that would
identify the treaty successors to the Soviet Union.
Agreed Statements on Demarcation. When the ABM/TMD demarcation negotiations
began, the United States sought to maintain the flexibility to develop advanced theater missile defense
(TMD) systems without having those systems fall under the limits in the ABM Treaty. It sought a
simple rule that defining an ABM interceptor as one that demonstrated the capability to destroy a
target ballistic missile with a velocity greater than 5 kilometers per second (this would essentially
define a “strategic” ballistic missile). Russia, on the other hand, feared that the United States might
deploy advanced TMD systems that would allow it to intercept Russia’s strategic ballistic missiles,
and, therefore, undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent. Hence, Russia proposed a more restrictive
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formula to define an ABM interceptor as one with the capability to intercept targets with a velocity
of 3 kilometers per second, rather than 5 kilometers per second, and a range of 3,500 kilometers.
And, it sought to limit the velocity of TMD interceptor missiles to 3 kilometers per second. Russia
also suggested that the parties link the number and location of deployed TMD systems to size and
scope of threat and that they restrict the power of TMD radars. (For a more detailed discussion see
CRS Report 98-496, Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Demarcation and Succession Agreements:
Background and Issues.)
The United States briefly considered accepting limits on the velocity of TMD interceptor
missiles, but by 1995 it returned to its initial position that the demarcation line should be based on the
characteristics of the target ballistic missile used during tests of TMD interceptor missiles. Russia
eventually accepted this standard for TMD systems with slower velocity interceptors, i.e. those with
interceptors with velocities below 3 km/second, but it wanted added restrictions on TMD systems
with faster velocity interceptors because these were the systems that might threaten Russia’s strategic
offensive forces.
In March 1997. Secretary of State Albright and Russia’s Foreign Minister Primakov signed
Agreed Statements on Demarcation on September 26, 1997. In the First Agreed Statement, the two
sides agreed that TMD systems with interceptors tested at speeds at or below 3 km/sec that were
tested against a target with a speed at or below of 5 km/sec and a range of less than 3,500 km would
be exempt from the limits in the ABM Treaty. The Second Agreed Statement outlined parameters
for higher speed systems, those with interceptor velocities above 3 km/second. These systems could
not be tested against a target missile with a velocity greater than 5 km/sec and a range greater than
3,500 km. In addition, the agreement banned TMD systems with space-based interceptors.
However, the agreement did not state whether these more capable TMD systems would be covered
by the limits in the ABM Treaty. Each nation would decide whether its systems had been “tested in
an ABM mode.” (See CRS Report 98-496, Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Demarcation and
Succession Agreements: Background and Issues.)
The demarcation agreements would not limit the speed of U.S. TMD systems. They use the
interceptors’ speed as a dividing line between those systems that are not limited by the ABM Treaty
and those that would need further analysis to determine whether they are exempt from the Treaty
limits. Many in Congress believe the TMD demarcation provisions will restrict U.S. TMD capabilities,
even though the Clinton Administration stated that they were consistent with all current programs,
because they believe the United States will “dumb down” its systems to avoid compliance debates
with Russia. Some in the arms control community believe that the demarcation agreements permit
too much TMD capability, and that the deployment of more advanced TMD systems could undermine
the ABM Treaty.
Memorandum of Understanding on Succession. The 1997 Memorandum of
Understanding on Succession names Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan as successors to the
Soviet Union in the ABM Treaty. Together, these states are limited to a single ABM deployment
area with no more than 100 launchers and interceptors. The MOU also states that the geographic
area covered by the provisions in the treaty would be the combined territories of these successor
states. Russia could continue to operate Soviet ABM facilities and radars in Ukraine and Kazakhstan
and construct a new early warning radar in Belarus. The MOU also states that the Successor States
may continue to use any facility covered by the Treaty that is “currently located on the territory of
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any State that is not Party to the Treaty, with the consent of such State....” Consequently, Russia can
continue to operate the early warning radar in Azerbaijan (it closed the radar in Latvia in September
1998) even though it is outside the periphery of the participating nations.
The Clinton Administration and supporters of the ABM Treaty argued that this agreement would
allow the ABM Treaty to remain in place. They argued that, without limits on the deployment of
strategic ballistic missile defenses, Russia would be unwilling to reduce its strategic offensive forces.
Some in Congress, however, believe that the United States should have allowed the ABM Treaty to
lapse. They believe that, by adding parties to the ABM Treaty, it will be more difficult for the United
States to negotiate amendments that would permit deployment of effective national missile defenses.
The Clinton Administration agreed to submit the demarcation and succession agreements for
Senate advice and consent as amendments to the ABM Treaty, but never did so for fear that the
Senate would defeat them. Instead, it declared in May 1998 that the United States and Russia
“clearly are parties” to the ABM Treaty. Many in Congress objected to this declaration. On August
5, 1998, the House passed an amendment to the FY1999 Commerce, Justice, and State Department
Appropriations Bill (H.R. 4276, H.Amdt. 859) stating that the U.S. delegates to the Standing
Consultative Commission (SCC), could not use any of the funds to implement the MOU on
succession. Representative Weldon argued that this would force the Administration to submit the
MOU to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. Others argued that the United States
should cease its participation in the ABM Treaty so that it could build nationwide defenses. Critics
of the amendment argued that it would preclude any U.S. participation in the SCC, and therefore,
undermine continued implementation of the treaty.
The ABM Treaty and National Missile Defenses
In the mid-1990s, concerns about the possibility of an unintended missile launch from Russia and
the growing ballistic missile threat from other nations stimulated interest in national missile defenses
(NMD). Some members of Congress argued that the United States should deploy limited defenses
to protect against unintended and rogue missile launches. Others, like Senators Jon Kyl and Jesse
Helms, have argued that the United States should abandon the ABM Treaty and deploy whatever
defenses it needed to protect its territory from missile attacks. Still others, like Representative Curt
Weldon, supported an approach where the United States would cooperate with Russia both to modify
the ABM Treaty and deploy ballistic missile defenses. Others, however, argued that the United States
should not rush to deploy an NMD system. They noted that rogue nations are years away from
deploying missiles that could threaten U.S. soil. And, they argued that U.S. plans to deploy an NMD
system could interfere with offensive force reductions if Russia reacts by withdrawing from the
START I and START II treaties.
In January 1999, the Clinton Administration added $6.6 billion to the Defense budget for
FY1999-2005 to support the deployment of an NMD system. It still planned to decide in June 2000
whether to deploy the system, but these funds in the out-years of the budget would preserve that
option. The Administration announced that the growing missile threat from North Korea would
support a decision to deploy in 2000, if the technology were sufficiently mature. The Administration
also moved the projected deployment date from 2003 to 2005, to reduce the amount of risk in the
program.
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Some in Congress argued that the Administration should accelerate, not delay the schedule for
NMD because the threat from uncertainties in Russia and missiles in rogue nations exists now. Some
also argued that the United States may have too little warning when new threats emerge. They point
to the 1998 “Rumsfeld Report,” which notes that nations may acquire long-range ballistic missiles
without pursuing long development and testing programs. Some Members praised the Administration
for adding deployment funds to the budget. But they continued to question the Administration’s
commitment to deployment. Others, including Senator Helms, criticized the Administration’s
intention to negotiate ABM Treaty amendments with Russia. He argued that the Treaty was no
longer in force due to the demise of the Soviet Union, and, by negotiating amendments, the
Administration would only give Russia a chance to veto U.S. NMD plans.
In 1998 and 1999, Congress sought to pass legislation that would mandate the deployment of
nationwide ballistic missile defenses. On April 21, 1998, the Senate Armed Services Committee
approved the American Missile Protection Act of 1998 (S. 1873, S.Rept. 105-175), which called for
the deployment of a national missile defense system to protect all U.S. territory as soon as the
technology is ready. When the Senate bill came to the floor on May 13, 1998, Democrats succeeded
with a filibuster. The effort to invoke cloture failed by one vote, 59 to 41, with only 4 Democrats
joining all 55 Republicans in support of the legislation. The Senate failed, again, to invoke cloture,
in a vote on September 9, 1998. Once again, the vote was 59-41. Senator Cochran introduced this
bill again in January 1999 (S. 257). The Administration threatened a veto because it bill would used
only the state of technology as the measure for deployment, ignoring considerations about cost,
threat, and treaty-compliance. The Senate approved the bill, by a vote of 97-3, on March 17, 1999.
Democrats dropped their opposition, and the White House withdrew its threat of a veto, after the
Senate approved an amendment stating that it is U.S. policy to continue to negotiate with Russia on
reductions in offensive nuclear weapons.
Representative Curt Weldon introduced similar legislation on August 5, 1998 (H.R. 4402) and,
again, in early February 1999 (H.R. 4). This legislation simply stated that it is “the policy of the
United States to deploy a National Missile Defense.” This legislation passed the House, by a vote
of 317-105, on March 18, 1999. The House and Senate did not hold a conference to resolve the
differences in their bills. Instead, the Senate took up H.R. 4, replaced its language with the language
in S. 257, and passed the new bill. The House then approved the new H.R. 4 on May 20, 1999.
President Clinton signed the bill on July 23, 1999. However, he remained at odds with congressional
Republicans about the implications of the legislation. He contended that it was not equivalent to a
deployment decision because NMD remains subject to annual authorizations and appropriations. But
congressional supporters of NMD argued that the bill makes it clear that the United States will deploy
and NMD, no further decisions about that possibility are needed.
In February 1999, a team, led by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, met with Russian
officials in Moscow to begin discussions on possible amendments to the ABM Treaty. The United
States sought to reassure Russia that the planned NMD would not interfere with Russia’s strategic
nuclear forces and that the United States still views the ABM Treaty as central to the U.S.-Russian
strategic balance. The Russians were reportedly unconvinced; they continued to argue that the
United States has overstated the threat from rogue nations so that it can build a defense that will be
able to intercept Russian missiles.
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During their meeting at the G-8 summit in Germany in June 1999, the Presidents repeated their
support for the ABM Treaty as the “cornerstone of strategic stability.” But they also noted that the
parties are obligated, under Article XIII of the Treaty to consider possible changes in the strategic
situation that have a bearing on the Treaty and to consider proposals for further increasing the
viability of the Treaty. In November 1999, President Yeltsin warned that any U.S. move beyond the
limits in the ABM Treaty would “have extremely negative consequences” for other arms control
treaties. Russian officials also stated that Russia could deploy new multiple-warhead missiles or
retain older ones to have the forces needed to penetrate U.S. missile defenses. And many Russian
officials continued to insist that the United States had overstated the threat from rogue nations.
In January 1999, the United States reportedly tabled a proposed Protocol to the ABM Treaty
that would allow for the deployment of a U.S. NMD site in Alaska. This Protocol, which was
published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Magazine, would allow for the deployment of 100
interceptors and an ABM radar at a single site, other than the sites permitted by the ABM Treaty (i.e.
Alaska) and for the modification of several other early warning radars so that they could perform
ABM radar functions and support the NMD system. The Protocol also stated that either side could
request negotiations on further modifications after March 1, 200l. These talks would presumably
allow the United States to seek further changes in the Treaty’s limits on ABM interceptors and space-
based sensors. The United States also offered to exchange data and permit inspections so that Russia
could remain confident in the limited nature of the U.S. NMD. Russia reportedly did not table a
counter-proposal or begin discussions about the specific provisions in the U.S. proposal.
Some in Congress criticized these negotiations because, they argued, the resulting agreement
would prove too limiting for U.S. missile defenses. In mid-April 2000, 25 Republican Senators signed
a letter to President Clinton stating that they would vote against any agreement the Administration
reached with the Russians on modifications to the ABM Treaty. Furthermore, on April 26, 2000,
Senator Jesse Helms informed the Administration that the Foreign Relations Committee would not
address or vote on any arms control agreements reached by this Administration in its final months.
But the United States and Russia remained far apart on the question of modifying the ABM Treaty.
During their summit in Moscow in early June 2000, and again at the G-8 summit in late June,
Presidents Clinton and Putin failed to resolve their differences. At the Moscow summit, Putin did
agree that the threat from proliferation was increasing and that the ABM Treaty could be modified
to remain viable in the face of changing circumstances, but he did not agree that the proliferation
threat justified such modifications. After the summit, other Russian officials continued to dispute the
U.S. assessment of emerging threats and to argue that the U.S. NMD system would undermine
Russia’s nuclear deterrent. But Putin did propose that Russia work with European nations to develop
defenses against shorter-range ballistic missiles. Russia repeated this offer in February 2001.
On September 1, 2000, President Clinton announced that he had decided not to authorize
deployment of a National Missile Defense system. He stated that he could not conclude “that we
have enough confidence in the technology, and the operational effectiveness of the entire NMD
system, to move forward to deployment.” He also noted that the delay in a deployment decision
would permit the United States to continue its efforts to convince Russia to modify the ABM Treaty.
He stated that he believed it would be “far better to move forward in the context of the ABM
Treaty.” Russian officials praised the delay in the deployment decision, but some in Moscow may
mistakenly believe that Russia’s resistance to changes in the ABM Treaty caused the delay. President
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Clinton indicated that it was the technology that caused the delay, even though the Treaty remains
an issue.
The Bush Administration has taken a different approach to the ABM Treaty, arguing that the
United States would need to “leave behind the constraints” of the Treaty to pursue the development
and deployment of missile defenses. The President called on Russia to join the United States in
developing a new framework for strategic stability and international security in the post-Cold War
era. During the President’s visit to Europe in mid-June, some officials from the Administration argued
that the United States would need to abandon the Treaty soon because the Treaty would inhibit
testing of ballistic missile defense concepts.
In mid-July 2001, the Bush Administration offered Congress a more detailed description of its
missile defense plans when it submitted its amended defense budget for FY2002. The Administration
requested $8.3 billion, an increase of more $3 billion, or 57%, from the FY2001 budget. This funding
would support a robust research and development program into a wide range of missile defense
technologies, with the ultimate objective of deploying a layered defense. The Administration also
reorganized BMDO to eliminate the distinctions between theater missile defense and national missile
defense, instead dividing the programs into boost-phase, mid-course, and terminal technologies. This
change in thinking is also reflected in the Administration’s testing plans for missile defense in FY2002;
in testimony before Congress on July 13, 2001, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz stated that
the United States might soon test the ability of Aegis theater defense radars to track strategic ballistic
missiles. This type of test could be interpreted to be an effort to test non-ABM systems in an ABM
mode, which is forbidden by the ABM Treaty. Consequently, Secretary Wolfowitz noted that the
United States could bump up against the limits in the Treaty “in months” rather than in years.
However, he said that the United States would not violate the ABM Treaty. Instead, the
Administration would seek Russia’s agreement and understanding on a framework that would allow
the United States to move beyond the ABM Treaty, and, if this was not possible, the United States
could withdraw. DOD delayed the problematic tests in October of 2001, for technical reasons. But
Secretary Rumsfeld stated that the Aegis radars would not be used in the tests when they did occur
because this would violate the Treaty. Some interpreted these comments as evidence that the United
States was seeking to reach an agreement with Russia that would not involve violations of the Treaty.
Others, however, stated that Secretary Rumsfeld hoped the cancellations would emphasize how much
the Treaty constrained U.S. missile defense programs and would highlight the need for the United
States to withdraw from the Treaty.
During their meeting after the G-8 summit in Genoa, Italy in June, Presidents Bush and Putin
agreed that the two nations would soon begin “intensive consultations on the interrelated subjects of
offensive and defensive systems.” Many observers interpreted this statement as an indication that two
sides would begin negotiations on a new agreement limiting offensive nuclear weapons and on
possible amendments or modifications to the ABM Treaty. This may have been the type of
framework President Putin had in mind. His Defense Minister, Ivanov indicated that he would
recommend accepting modifications to the ABM Treaty if the resulting defenses would not undermine
Russia’s security; this acceptance would be in exchange for deep cuts in U.S. and Russian offensive
forces. However, officials from the Bush Administration, and the President himself, have stated that
the United States does not intend to participate in lengthy negotiations in search of formal arms
control limits. They view these consultations as an opportunity for the United States to outline its
policies and programs for both offensive and defensive weapons, and to seek Russian agreement on
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a mutual withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The President has said that the United States would
withdraw from the treaty unilaterally if Russia did not accept the U.S. approach. Furthermore, in
testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Undersecretary of State John Bolton
stated that the Bush Administration would not seek to negotiate amendments to the ABM Treaty or
a new formal agreement to replace it. Instead, the Administration would seek to win Russian
acquiescence with U.S. plans and to convince Russia to jointly withdraw from the ABM Treaty with
the United States.
These consultations began with several meetings in August and September 2001. In early
August, a Russian delegation visited the Department of Defense and received extensive briefings on
U.S. plans for missile defense in early August. These meetings were billed as an “exchange of
information” not an exchange of ideas. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld traveled to Moscow in mid-
August, reportedly in an unsuccessful effort to convince Russia that the two nations should withdraw
from the ABM Treaty simultaneously. He did not engage in discussions about possible modifications
to the ABM Treaty or in negotiations on reductions in offensive forces. He stated that the United
States did not yet know how low it would reduce its forces because it had not yet completed its
strategic review. In late August, Undersecretary of State John Bolton seemed to indicate that the
United States would withdraw from the ABM Treaty in November, if the United States and Russia
had not agreed on a plan for mutual withdrawal by the time President Bush and President Putin met
in Texas. He, and other officials, later stated that he had not intended to set a firm deadline. The
following day, however, President Bush stated that the United States would withdraw from the ABM
Treaty, but would do so on its own timetable. Press reports indicate that Undersecretary of State
John Bolton was prepared to inform Russian officials of the U.S. intention to move forward with
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty during meetings in Moscow on September 17, but he did not do
so.
Russia, for its part, believes these talks should lead to new negotiations towards a treaty that will
limit offensive weapons to 1,500 warheads or fewer, and, possibly, minor modifications to the ABM
Treaty. Russian officials have complained that they cannot make progress in these negotiations
because they still do not know what kind of missile defense the United States intends to build or what
parts of the Treaty will cause problems for this defense. Furthermore, in early September, Russian
officials ruled out an early agreement on missile defenses. They indicated that it could take a year or
more for the two sides to reach agreement on a framework to replace the ABM Treaty. At the same
time, Russia appeared willing to accept some minor modifications to the Treaty, although it continued
to reject the U.S. proposal for a joint withdrawal. Consequently, it appears that Russia may now be
willing to accept the kind of treaty modifications offered by the Clinton Administration, but it is still
not prepared to abandon the ABM Treaty in favor of a vague new framework offered by the Bush
Administration.
Many analysts expected President Bush to inform Russia’s President Putin of U.S. intentions to
withdraw from the ABM Treaty when they met in Shanghai in October, 2001. He did not do this.
Instead, press reports indicated that the two nations were nearing an agreement that would allow the
United States to proceed with its missile defense testing plans without withdrawing from or violating
the ABM Treaty. The United States does not plan to negotiate formal amendments to the Treaty.
But the two sides could agree on modifications or new definitions that will allow the United States
to proceed with missile defense tests that would otherwise conflict with the Treaty limits. Russia
could agree that it would not object when the United States uses non-ABM radars to track missiles
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during ABM tests, as long as the radars do not guide the interceptors to their targets. This type of
arrangement would allow President Putin to assert that he had stopped the United States from
withdrawing from the ABM Treaty and would leave questions of deployment limits to a future time,
after the United States decided on an architecture for its missile defense program. However, the
November summit concluded without the announcement of such an agreement. Because U.S. missile
defense tests planned for Spring 2002 could still conflict with provisions in the Treaty, the United
States might still announce its withdrawal in the near-term.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Report RL31111. Missile Defense: The Current Debate
CRS Report 98-496. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Demarcation and Succession Agreements:
Background and Issues.
CRS Report RL30345. U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Policy, Force Structure, and Arms Control Issues
CRS Report 97-586. Russia’s Nuclear Forces: Doctrine and Force Structure Issues.
CRS Report 97-359. START II Debate in the Russian Duma: Issues and Prospects.
CRS Report RL30660. Arms Control after START II: Next Steps on the U.S.-Russian Agenda
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