Order Code IB94029
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Chemical Weapons Convention:
Issues for Congress
Updated November 13, 2001
Steven R. Bowman
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
CWC Ratification and Implementation
Ratifying Legislation in 105th Congress (S.Res. 75)
Implementing Legislation in the 105th Congress (H.R. 1590, H.R. 2709, S. 610)
U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Agreements
U.S.-Soviet Memorandum of Understanding (Wyoming MOU), September 1989
U.S.-/Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Agreement, June 1990
Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention of 1993
CWC Issues for Ratification and Implementation
Universality
Verification
Impact on U.S. Industry
Loss of Proprietary Information (Trade Secrets)
Export Controls
Enforcement/Sanctions
Chemical Weapons and Facilities Destruction
The United States Destruction Program
Russian CW Destruction Program
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
Selected World Wide Web Sites

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Chemical Weapons Convention:
Issues for Congress
SUMMARY
More than 100 years of international
procedures for seizure, forfeiture, and destruc-
efforts to ban chemical weapons culminated
tion of contraband chemical weapons; 2)
January 13, 1993, in the signing of the Chemi-
statutory authority for record-keeping and
cal Weapons Convention (CWC). The Con-
reporting requirements relevant to the CWC;
vention entered into force April 29, 1997.
3) various restrictions on certain chemicals,
One hundred forty-three of the 171 signatories
depending on their likelihood of being used to
have ratified the Convention. On April 24,
produce chemical weapons; and 4) a protective
1997, the Senate passed the CWC resolution
regime for confidential business information
of ratification (S.Res. 75) by a vote of 74-26.
gathered from private corporations. The
President Clinton signed the resolution and the
legislation also provides detailed procedures to
United States became the 75th nation to ratify
be used for on-site inspections by the OPCW,
the Convention. Russia and Iran were the most
including limitations on access and search
recent nations to have ratified the CWC. The
warrant procedures, should they be required.
CWC bans the development, production,
Though supporting passage, CWC advocates
stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons by
expressed concerns over several sections of
members signatories. It also requires the
the legislation which were added in Judiciary
destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles
Committee mark-up, and intended to work for
and production facilities. The Convention
their revision before final enactment. Of partic-
provides the most extensive and intrusive
ular concern are provisions that allow the
verification regime of any arms control treaty,
President to block challenge inspections and
extending its coverage to not only governmen-
that prohibit the OPCW from sending chemical
tal but also civilian facilities. The Convention
samples outside the United States for analysis.
also requires export controls and reporting
These provisions are intended to protect U.S.
requirements on chemicals that can be used as
national security interests and proprietary
warfare agents and their precursors. The
commercial information. CWC supporters,
CWC establishes the Organization for the
however, believe that blocking a challenge
Prohibition of Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to
inspection would violate a basic premise of the
oversee the Convention’s implementation.
convention, and that if other nations adopt
Chemical Weapons Convention implementing
similar provisions it will weaken the conven-
legislation, as S. 610, passed the Senate unani-
tion's effectiveness. The opportunity to address
mously on May 23, 1997. This legislation,
concerns in a House-Senate conference did not
which was an amendment in the nature of a
arise, when S. 610 was incorporated without
substitute reported from the Judiciary Commit-
amendment as Division I of the FY1999 Omni-
tee, provides the statutory authority for do-
bus Appropriations Act (H.R. 4328, P.L. 105-
mestic compliance with the Convention’s
277). Some suggested that these issues be
provisions. It sets criminal and civil penalties
dealt with new legislation in the 106th Con-
for the development, production, acquisition,
gress, though none was introduced.
stockpiling, transfer, possession, or use of
chemical weapons. It also establishes: 1)
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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
For FY2002, DOD has requested $1.153 billion for the CW demilitarization program,
including $200.4 for R&D, $164.2 million for procurement, and $789 million for operations
and maintenance. The Senate Armed Services Committee recommended authorization of the
full request, while the House Armed Services Committee recommended a reduction of $75
million overall, based upon concerns of affordability.
Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld has assigned “milestone decision authority” for the
chemical demilitarization program to the Undersecretary for Acquisitions, Technology, and
Logistics to more closely oversee Army management of the program. All aspects of the
program are undergoing detailed review, and the first recommendations are expected in
September. These may lead changes in program structure and cost estimates
Construction of the incineration destruction facility at the Umatilla CW depot in
Hermiston, OR has been completed, and operational testing will begin shortly.
The head of the Russian Munitions Agency, in Russia’s continuing effort to gain
increased foreign assistance, has stated that at current funding levels it will take “100
years” to destroy Russia’s CW stockpile. The Russian Foreign Minister, Igor Ivanov,
reaffirmed a commitment to destroy the Stockpile, but also emphasized the lack of resources
to maintain compliance with the CWC destruction schedule. The Defense Department has
urged Congress to lift the ban on U.S. aid for Russian CW destruction. House and Senate
Armed Services conferees denied FY2001 funding, and conditioned any future funding on
a series of conditions unlikely to be met by Russia in the foreseeable future.(See below,
Russian CW Destruction Program)
The Department of Defense submitted an FY2001 budget request for $1 billion for the
CW stockpile demilitarization program, including: $607 million for operations and
maintenance; $121.9 million for procurement, and $274 for research and development. The
DOD FY2001 Appropriations Acts (P.L. 106-259) provided $980 million, with the reductions
owing to program delays and terminating some contract services.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
CWC Ratification and Implementation
The United States signed the Chemical Weapons Convention in the last days of the Bush
Administration (1/13/93), and the Convention was submitted to the Senate for its advice and
consent in the midst of the 103rd Congress (11/23/93). In the 103rd, 104th, and 105th
Congresses, an extensive series of 13 hearings were held by the Foreign Relations, Armed
Services, Intelligence, and Judiciary Committees, complemented with classified briefings from
the intelligence community. (See For Additional Reading) Under a unanimous consent
agreement, the CWC ratification resolution was to have been brought to the Senate floor in
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mid-September 1996. However, uncertain of sufficient votes to ensure passage, it supporters
postponed its consideration.
In his State of the Union address, President Clinton pledged he would make the CWC
a high priority in 1997, pressing for Senate consent early in the 105th Congress. On January
29, SFRC chairman Senator Helms, in a letter to Senate Majority Leader Senator Lott,
indicated that he continued to oppose the CWC as submitted, and believed that a number of
other issues should take precedence on the legislative agenda. Specifically, Senator Helms
noted: 1) restructuring foreign policy agencies; 2) United Nations reforms; and assured
submission of modifications to other arms control treaties currently in force to the Senate for
its advice and consent. Secretary of State Albright objected to linking these issues with the
CWC, arguing they should be considered independently. Nevertheless, talks between the
White House and Senate Leadership resulted in the Administration’s acknowledgment of the
Senate’s unique role in treaty consideration, and an announcement of foreign policy agency
consolidation coincided with Senator Helms agreeing to bring the CWC ratification resolution
to the floor. (Washington Post, 4/18/97. p. 10)
Ratifying Legislation in 105th Congress (S.Res. 75)
After extensive negotiations between the White House and key Senators, and within the
Senate itself, a unanimous consent agreement was reached to bring the Chemical Weapons
Convention ratification resolution (S.Res. 75) to the Senate floor on April 23, 1997. The
resolution contained 33 conditions, 28 of which were agreed to by the White House and
within the Senate. Under the unanimous consent agreement, these were not subject to further
amendment or motions. Five conditions were not agreed to, and each was struck by roll-call
vote during floor debate, prior to passage of the resolution. The summary of the conditions
below provides only the general intent of each; the ratification resolution itself should be
consulted for a full understanding of the requirements each condition establishes.
The CWC ratification resolution, including agreed upon conditions:
! Asserts the Senate’s right under the Constitution to add reservations to the
Convention.Assures congressional oversight of all funds provided under the
CWC.
! Requires Presidential certification that the OPCW has an Inspector-General
and specifies report requirements.Requires cost-sharing for R&D
expenditures for verification.
! Establishes standards for U.S. intelligence sharing and reports to Congress.
! Requires submission of any CWC amendments to the Senate.
! Requires the President to obtain assurances from Australia Group members
that Article XI is consistent with continued export controls.Requires a report
on the assurances offered to countries that forswear the use of nuclear
weapons.
! Requires Presidential certification that restrictions on Schedule 1 chemicals
do not adversely affect the chemical, biotechnology, and pharmaceutical
industries.Requires annual country reports of CW activities, compliance, and
intelligence monitoring.
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! Requires the Secretary of Defense to ensure the Armed Forces are effectively
equipped, organized, trained, and exercised for operations in CBW
environments.Asserts the primacy of the U.S. Constitution.
! Requires the President to use the full range of his authority to enforce
compliance.
! Requires the United States to reject any Russian effort to make its
ratification contingent on U.S. financial assistance.Requires the United States
to limit its CW defensive assistance under Article X, to countries of concern,
to medical antidotes and treatments.
! Prescribes U.S. responses to unauthorized release of confidential business
information by the OPCW or other parties.States the sense of the Senate that
U.S. negotiators should not agree to treaties that bar reservations.
! Prohibits transfer of inspection samples collected in the United States to
laboratories outside the United States.States the Senate finding that chemical
weapons terrorism is still a threat.
! States the Senate declaration that the United States should not be denied its
vote in the CWC organization.Sense of the Senate that the U.S. On-Site
Inspection Agency should provide assistance to facilities subject to routine
inspection under the CWC.
! Limits U.S. assessment for OPCW to $25 million; ties increases to the
Consumer Price Index; provides for certain exceptions, e.g., verification
costs. Reaffirms the Senate’s role in treaty interpretation.
! Reaffirms the Senate’s role regarding arms control treaties.
! Requires Presidential certification that the CWC does not restrict U.S. use
of riot control agents in certain specified circumstances. Requires notification
and consultation when a chemical is added to CWC Schedules.
! Requires the President to explore alternative technologies for the destruction
of the U.S. chemical weapons stockpile. Requires criminal search warrant for
challenge inspections and administrative search warrant for routine
inspections, if not permitted voluntarily.
Implementing Legislation in the 105th Congress (H.R. 1590, H.R.
2709, S. 610)
On May 23, 1997 the Senate unanimously passed S. 610. This legislation, as reported
by the Judiciary Committee, was an amendment in the nature of a substitute for the
Administration bill.. CWC supporters with objections to provisions of S. 610 as reported
hoped they could be resolved before final enactment, perhaps in House-Senate conference.
(Congressional Record, May 23, p. S5078). However, S. 610's language was incorporated,
without amendment, by the House International Relations Committee as Title II of the Iran
Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997 (H.R. 2709), which passed the House by voice
vote , Nov. 12, 1997. The Senate passed H.R. 2709 on May 22, 1998 with no amendment
to the CWC-related element of the legislation. On June 9, 1998 the House concurred with
a Senate amendment to the Title I missile sanctions regime, permitting submission of the
legislation to the President, who vetoed the legislation on June 23. The veto stemmed from
the Administration's disapproval of the Iran sanction elements of the legislation, not the
CWC-related elements. In October 1998, the House incorporated S. 610's language, without
amendment, into the FY1999 Omnibus Appropriations Act. This passed the House and
Senate, and was signed into law October 20th, 1998 (P.L. 105-277)
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The Administration sought implementing legislation’s timely passage to permit U.S.
compliance with CWC reporting and inspection requirements within established time limits.
However, the deadline for initial declarations has passed, the United States is technically in
violation of the Convention. While able to submit declarations concerning government
facilities (e.g. CW stockpile depots, former production facilities, and CW destruction
facilities), the Administration maintains that without the implementing legislation the
government cannot gather the information needed for complete declarations regarding civilian
facilities capable of producing or using controlled chemicals. The United States is not alone
in this situation; 28 other CWC State Parties have also failed to submit full declarations owing
to bureaucratic difficulties or lack of implementing legislation Some of the implementing
legislation's provisions might be carried out through executive orders, but criminalization of
prohibited activities and the search warrant procedures required by the ratification resolution
must be statutory.
The implementing legislation sets criminal and civil penalties for the development,
production, acquisition, stockpiling, transfer, possession, or use of chemical weapons. These
penalties would also apply to anyone who assists, encourages, induces, attempts, or conspires
to carry out these proscribed activities. It also establishes: 1) procedures for seizure,
forfeiture, and destruction of contraband chemical weapons; 2) statutory authority for
record-keeping and reporting requirements relevant to the CWC; 3) various restrictions on
certain chemicals, depending on their likelihood of being used to produce chemical weapons;
and 4) a protective regime for confidential business information gathered from private
corporations. S. 610 also provides detailed procedures to be used for on-site inspections by
the OPCW, including limitations on access and search warrant procedures, should they be
required.
The provisions, now enacted into law, which raise concerns from CWC supporters and
the OPCW include:
! Section 213 — sets procedures for U.S. firms to seek compensation from the
U.S. government, should they suffer the loss of proprietary information
through the actions of OPCW employees. Critics, however, maintain that,
as worded, this section does not place a high enough burden of proof on the
claimants, and consequently could lead to excessive and unfounded claims
against the government. Sections 237 — grants the President the right to
deny a request for inspection if it “may cause a threat to U.S. national
security interests.” The CWC contains no provision permitting denial of an
inspection, and critics note that doing so could place the United States in
non-compliance. They maintain that even if never exercised, this section’s
existence will encourage other nations to enact similar exemptions, thereby
weakening the CWC verification regime.
! Section 253 — exempts discrete organic chemicals not on the CWC control
lists and incidental chemical by-products or waste-streams from reporting
and inspection requirements. This is intended to ease the potential burdens,
particularly on paper manufacturers, but critics believe the exemption is too
broadly worded and would rule out an effective non-intrusive sampling
technique for inspectors. Sections 212 & 238 prohibit requiring that
government contractors waive any constitutional rights for any purpose
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related to the CWC. Some believe that this could hinder the CWC routine
inspection regime.
U.S.-Soviet Bilateral Agreements
U.S.-Soviet Memorandum of Understanding (Wyoming MOU), September
1989. In 1989, as the multilateral negotiations slowed, the U.S.-Soviet bilateral talks took
on greater importance and assumed a much higher public profile. On September 23, 1989,
the United States and the Soviet Union signed a bilateral Memorandum of Understanding
(MOU) agreeing to data declarations on CW stockpiles and trial inspections. U.S.
intelligence officials believe that Russian declarations have been incomplete, particularly in
the area of binary chemical weapons and novel chemical agents. High level consultations
continue to try to resolve these discrepancies.
U.S.-/Russian Chemical Weapons Destruction Agreement, June 1990. On
June 1, 1990, the United States and Russia signed an agreement covering the production of
chemical weapons and the destruction of current CW stockpiles. This agreement, as yet not
implemented, would permit bilateral routine monitoring and challenge inspections of the CW
destruction process conducted in accordance with the provisions of the Chemical Weapons
Convention. Russia has communicated to the Administration that the Bilateral Destruction
Agreement (BDA) described below has “outlived its usefulness”, and should be superseded
by the Chemical Weapons Convention. U.S. officials, however, still support the BDA and
are continuing talks on the issue. Russian cost estimates have concluded that the BDA
verification regime would be more expensive than OPCW monitoring and inspections. If,
however, Russia fails to ratify the CWC, the BDA would be the only international agreement
requiring destruction of the Russian CW stockpile.
Provisions of the Chemical Weapons Convention of
1993
More than 100 years of international efforts to ban chemical weapons culminated
January 13, 1993, in the signing of the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC). The United
States was one of the original signatories of the Convention and has been joined by 170 other
nations. The Clinton Administration submitted the Convention to the Senate on November
23, 1993. The United States ratified the convention May 25, 1997. The Convention came
into force on April 29, 1997, 180 days after the 65th ratification was received. One hundred
forty-three nations have ratified the Convention: Albania, Algeria, Argentina, Armenia,
Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Belarus, Belgium, Benin, Bolivia,
Bosnia-Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon,
Canada, Chile, China, Cook Islands, Costa Rica, Cote d’Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech
Republic, Denmark, Dominica, Ecuador, El Salvador, Equatorial Guinea, Eritrea, Estonia,
Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Former Republic of Yugoslavia, Former Yugoslav Republic of
Macedonia, France, Gabon, Gambia, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Guinea, Guyana,
Holy See, Hungary, Iceland, India, Indonesia, Iran, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan,
Kenya, Kiribati, Kuwait, Laos, Latvia, Lesotho, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malawi, Malaysia,
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Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia, Moldova, Monaco,
Mongolia, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Nepal, Netherlands, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria,
Mauritania, New Zealand, Niger, Norway, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea,
Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Romania, Russian Federation, San
Marino, Santa Lucia, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Seychelles, Singapore, Slovak Republic,
Slovenia, South Korea, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland,
Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Tanzania, Togo, Trinidad-Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey,
Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, the United Kingdom, the United States,
Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela, Vietnam, Yemen, Zambia and Zimbabwe.
The CWC bans the development, production, stockpiling, and use of chemical weapons
(CW) by its signatories. It also requires the destruction of all chemical weapons and
production facilities. The Convention provides the most extensive and intrusive verification
regime of any arms control treaty, extending its coverage to not only governmental but also
civilian facilities. The verification package includes instrument-monitoring, both routine and
random onsite inspections, and challenge inspections for sites suspected of CW storage or
production. The Convention also requires export controls and reporting requirements on
chemicals that can be used as warfare agents and their precursors.
Administratively, the Convention establishes the Organization for the Prohibition of
Chemical Weapons (OPCW) to oversee the Convention’s implementation. It will be a
permanent international organization charged with ensuring compliance with the Convention,
and monitoring the chemical industry worldwide. The OPCW will have three components:
1) the Conference of States Parties, comprising all signatories; 2) the Executive Council,
composed of 41 signatories chosen in a rotation based upon geographic region and
significance of commercial chemical production; and 3) the Technical Secretariat, which will
conduct day-to-day administration of the Convention. Currently the CWC Preparatory
Commission in the Hague is working out the details of OPCW organization and procedural
details of CWC implementation. Each signatory will also designate a National Authority that
will be the liaison with the OPCW, and will administer the implementation of the CWC
domestically. On June 25, 1999 the President issued an Executive Order designating the State
Department as the National Authority for the implementation of the CWC, and establishing
an interagency group comprising the Secretaries of State, Defense, Commerce, and Energy,
and the Attorney-General to coordinate the implementation. The Department of Commerce
is authorized to begin the process for regulations(e.g. reporting requirements, export
controls), and to obtain and execute warrants if necessary for facilities inspections.
Declarations required from each state party by the CWC include:
! Location and detailed inventory of all chemical weapons storage sites.
! Location and capacities of all chemical weapons production and research
facilities.
! All transfers of chemical weapons and CW production equipment since
1946.A detailed plan and schedule for the destruction of chemical weapons
and CW production facilities.Location and activities of any facilities using or
producing controlled chemicals.
Destruction of chemical weapons agents, munitions, and production facilities must be
completed within 10 years of the Convention’s entry into force or a State Party’s ratification
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date, whichever is earlier. In extraordinary circumstances, this deadline can be extended for
up to 5 years, with the approval of two-thirds of the states parties.
The Convention establishes three lists (Schedules) of chemical warfare agents and their
precursor chemicals arranged in order of their importance to CW production and range of
legitimate peaceful uses. These chemical Schedules will be updated as needed by the OPCW
Technical Secretariat. Above certain quantitative thresholds, these chemicals’ production,
use, or transfer must be projected and subsequently reported annually to the OPCW. All
facilities capable of producing, or that use scheduled chemicals must be registered. In
addition, all facilities that produce over 30 metric tons of a discrete chemical containing
phosphorous, sulphur, or fluorine must be registered.
The OPCW inspection regimes will vary, depending on the type of facility:
! Declared CW production, storage, or destruction sites: systematic on-site
inspection and continuous instrument monitoring.Declared non-CW chemical
facilities: routine or random inspections, depending on the Schedule and
amounts of chemicals produced or used.
! All other facilities: on-site challenge inspections upon request of a state
party.
Signatories also agree not to export Schedule 1 chemicals to any non-signatory.
Schedule 2 chemicals may be traded with non-signatories for only 3 years after the
Convention enters into force. Schedule 3 chemicals may be freely traded, with end-use
certification, for 5 years after the Convention comes into force, at which time additional
controls will be considered. If the United States does not ratify the CWC, this provision
could present difficulties for the U.S. chemical and pharmaceutical industries, which have
extensive overseas trade.
CWC Issues for Ratification and Implementation
The CWC raises a variety of issues for congressional consideration. Although the vast
majority of the world’s nations have signed the CWC, some nations suspected of having
chemical weapons have not — Egypt, Iraq, Libya, North Korea, Syria. What effect does this
lack of universality have upon the value of the Convention? The CWC’s verification
provisions are extensive, but they have not stilled the debate over whether they will be
effective enough to deter violations. And, if violations are detected, are enforcement
procedures and sanctions sufficiently stringent? Because the CWC extends its provisions to
the civilian sector, the impact of inspections, reporting requirements, and export controls on
commercial enterprise raises concerns unique to arms control treaties. Furthermore
inspection procedures and U.S. constitutional protections must be reconciled through
implementing legislation. The destruction of chemical weapon stockpiles, though
congressionally-mandated independently of the CWC, presents technical, environmental, and
financial challenges at home and abroad. Issues deserving attention in consideration of the
CWC and its implementing legislation can be grouped in six general areas: 1) universality;
2) verification; 3) impact on U.S. industry; 4) enforcement; 5) technology transfer; 6)
destruction of chemical weapons; and 7) cost.
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Universality
How many nations are willing to ratify the CWC and, more importantly, which nations
are not? As noted, 171 have signed, and 140 have ratified the Convention. Examining the
signatory list, most are heartened to see China, Iran, and Israel — nations believed to have,
or be developing, significant CW capability. On the other hand, some particularly
troublesome nations, such as Iraq, Libya, North Korea, and Syria have not signed. In
addition, a number of middle eastern states, notably Egypt and Jordan, have refused to sign,
linking their participation to the removal of Israel’s suspected nuclear capability.
Indicative of the difficulties that lack of universality brings is the continued concern
about Iraq’s intentions. In an effort to have the United Nations maintain economic sanctions
on Iraq, the United States has shown Security Council members satellite photographic
evidence that Iraq has rebuilt a plant formerly used to produce chemical weapons. U.S.
analysts believe that Iraq could resume CW production almost immediately if monitoring
ceased. U.S. officials also provided evidence that Iraq continues to try to import ballistic
missile fuel and guidance system components. It is assumed that a resurgence of Iraq’s
missile program will see a continuance of its previous efforts to develop CW warheads.
Critics of the CWC believe that its value is significantly reduced if all nations with the
capability to develop and use chemical weapons are not parties, particularly in a region as
volatile as the Middle East. The rationale is that even one nation having chemical weapons
will create an incentive for its neighbors to follow suit. Some have suggested that the United
States should condition its own CWC ratification upon ratification by these “nations of
concern.” They believe that it is unwise for the United States to relinquish its chemical
weapons capability while other nations retain theirs. They also generally maintain that
retaliation in kind, i.e. with chemical weapons, is an important component of CW deterrence.
CWC supporters, while agreeing to the importance of persuading all CW-capable nations
to join, believe that a small number of hold-outs does not pose a sufficient threat to justify not
ratifying the Convention. They note that in the Persian Gulf War, the United States forswore
retaliation with chemical weapons, even if Iraq used them against coalition forces. This
decision was based on the assessment that the U.S. arsenal was adequate for both limited or
massive retaliation without the use of chemical weapons. CWC supporters further argue that
without the Convention there would be even greater incentive to acquire chemical weapons,
and it would be easier to accomplish. The CWC would provide an international regime of
export controls and a widely accepted international norm, to which all nations — signatories
or not — could be held.
Verification
Verification is undoubtedly the thorniest issue. Devising an acceptable verification
regime was the most difficult task for CWC negotiators and will be the most challenging for
those implementing the Convention. The CWC provides for the most intrusive and extensive
verification regime of any arms control agreement to date. The regime, for the first time in
arms control, provides for routine monitoring and inspection not only of military facilities but
also of certain civilian chemical facilities . In addition, challenge inspection provisions expand
compliance verification to suspect facilities of any sort. The Organization for the Prohibition
of Chemical Weapons will oversee the Convention’s compliance verification. Two of the
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most salient verification concerns are its effectiveness and its impact on the rights and
property of the U.S. chemical industry.
The most serious question is whether the OPCW will be able to detect all clandestine
production or stockpiling of chemical weapons. Ironically, the CWC’s supporters and
detractors generally agree: the answer is no. Acknowledging that the verification regime will
not be absolute carries differing significance for the Convention’s critics and advocates.
Those who question the Convention’s value believe that if compliance verification cannot be
guaranteed, and undetected CW possession may be possible, the Convention is not worth the
cost and effort. Worse, perhaps, they are concerned that the Convention would engender
a false sense of security. They point out that in certain circumstances, the selective use of
relatively small amounts of chemical weapons could be significant militarily, particularly
against unprotected personnel. Consequently, would-be violators need not produce or
stockpile vast amounts.
Advocates argue that, though CWC is imperfect, it provides the most intrusive and
extensive verification regime in the history of disarmament and represents a notable
improvement over current CW non-proliferation regimes. For signatories, this fact could
change the cost/benefit analysis of CW production or stockpiling enough to deter violations.
Provision for challenge inspections creates the likelihood that violations would become public
breaches of the international norm, something not possible without the CWC.
The most difficult challenge would be to detect existing chemical weapons that a nation
does not declare and continues to store clandestinely. Detecting illicit transfers of controlled
chemicals may also prove a challenging task. Covert production of chemical warfare agents
and the subsequent manufacture of chemical munitions are higher-profile activities and
consequently more vulnerable to detection. This assessment assumes that the OPCW and
signatories’ national intelligence resources will seek to uncover Convention violators. The
extent of intelligence sharing will have a significant impact on the CWC’s effectiveness. It
can be anticipated that those nations with highly developed intelligence collection capabilities,
the United States particularly, will be depended upon to cooperate with the OPCW.
Congress may wish to encourage the U.S. intelligence community explicitly to maintain
close liaison with the OPCW. Congress could also require that the intelligence community
provide periodic independent evaluations of the verification regime or that the President
certify to Congress that the regime is performing effectively. This could be made part of the
President’s annual report to Congress on proliferation currently required under the Chemical
and Biological Weapons Control and Warfare Elimination Act of 1991 (P.L. 102-182) or the
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency’s annual report, Adherence to and Compliance with
Arms Control Agreements.
Another factor that will affect the OPCW’s verification capabilities will be the amount
and reliability of its funding by the Convention’s signatories. Without adequate funding to
maintain the technological and personnel resources necessary to monitor the international
chemical industry and government activities, the rigor of the verification regime will
undoubtedly suffer.
Concerns over verification have been heightened by press reports that U.S. officials
believe that Russia has withheld information on its chemical weapons research programs (New
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York Times, June 23, 1994, p. 1). In a data exchange called for under a 1989 U.S.-Russian
agreement, Russia acknowledged no binary chemical research program. (Binary chemical
weapons use two non-lethal chemicals that combine to form a lethal agent after launching.)
The United States worked on developing binary weapons sporadically from the 1950s, ending
the effort in 1992, when the signing of the CWC became imminent. U.S. intelligence has long
believed that Russia was undertaking a similar program. In 1992, a Russian scientist, Vil
Mirzayanov, publicly claimed that Russia had developed a binary agent significantly more
effective than current nerve agents. He also asserted that the Russian military leadership
continued the program after President Gorbachev declared Russia’s chemical weapons
development at an end. Concern over this Russian program has rekindled with the leaking
of a classified DOD report to the press. Written at the U.S. Ground Intelligence Center, the
article reportedly maintains that the new agent can be manufactured in significant amounts in
modified pesticide plants from chemicals not covered by the CWC. (Washington Times,
February 4, 1997, p.1) CWC opponents believe this latest information highlights the
difficulties of verification and the lack of Russian trustworthiness. CWC supporters have
responded that without the CWC such a program is legal, but with the CWC and accession
to it, it would be illegal and suspect facilities would be subject to inspection.
The United States, having specifically requested an accounting of the Russian binary
program and received inadequate responses, is continuing discussions to resolve these
discrepancies. Although the current data exchange is independent of the CWC, Russian
recalcitrance on this issue could adversely affect support for the Convention. If Russia is
unwilling to be forthright in what is generally judged to be an “open secret,” it raises the
question of how seriously it considers the prohibitions of the CWC and consequently places
greater emphasis on effective verification.
Impact on U.S. Industry
It is not yet known exactly how many U.S. commercial enterprises will be required to
report or undergo inspections. ACDA’s Director John Holum has estimated about 140 firms
will be significantly affected, while other estimates have ranged as high as 10,000. (Reuters,
August 7, 1996; Chemical Weapons Convention, Republican Policy Committee, July 29,
1996). More reliable information will be available with the Convention’s entry into force,
when the Commerce Department distributes reporting requirement regulations and
questionnaires to enable potentially affected enterprises to determine whether their activities
fall under the CWC’s jurisdiction. Many enterprises may not meet the threshold requirements
for reporting, others may have minimal obligations (e.g. one-page reports) because of the
nature of the chemicals they handle. For the most part, the heaviest burden (annual reports
on production/consumption/transfer and at least one initial inspection) will fall upon
enterprises that deal with substantial amounts of chemicals that could be very useful in the
production of CW warfare agents.
Implementing legislation for the CWC, such as S. 610, must address some issues that
are novel for arms control agreements. The Convention grants the OPCW inspection rights
(routine, random, and challenge) over purely civilian, privately owned facilities. These
inspection rights must be harmonized with U.S. constitutional protections against
unreasonable search and seizure. If the United States Constitution were invoked to block a
CWC inspection, it is feared that it would seriously weaken the integrity of the Convention.
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Implementing legislation must seek to facilitate CWC inspections within the constraints of the
Constitution.
Loss of Proprietary Information (Trade Secrets). Potential loss of trade secrets
is of great concern to private industry. And the question arises whether forced or incidental
disclosure of such information during a CWC inspection would constitute a “seizure” under
the Fourth Amendment. It has been suggested that some current regulatory laws (e.g., the
Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act) already require such disclosures, and
Congress could study their example in designing implementing legislation. S. 610 addresses
this issue by restricting information collection, providing non-disclosure protection, and
penalties for unauthorized disclosure of Convention-related information. Chemical industries
contend that it is essential to protect proprietary information (or trade secrets) to maintain a
competitive advantage in the marketplace. And, the CWC, through its enforcement and
verification procedures, will require a greater level of openness regarding production
processes and rates, product composition, and market distribution. However, the U.S.
chemical industry represented through the Chemical Manufacturer’s Association and the
Pharmaceutical Manufacturers Association, has strongly endorsed the Convention’s
confidentiality measures and supported the CWC’s ratification. The National Federation of
Independent Business, a small businesses association, has also extended its endorsement to
the CWC, its spokesman noting that the NFIB did believe its members would be affected.
(Wall Street Journal, February 14, 1997, pp. 1,16)
Export Controls. The CWC requires restrictions on the export or transfer of
controlled chemicals to non-states parties. These restrictions vary in severity depending upon
the chemicals involved. Also, as an incentive for nations to sign the CWC, the restrictions
will tighten the years following the Convention coming into force. The United States already
has a variety of export controls on CW-related chemicals, equipment, and technology. (See
CRS Report 95-537, Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status.) The question
arises as to what extent the United States will need to review and revise its current export
controls in light of the CWC regime. U.S. industry is hoping for loosening of controls,
particularly with regard to the transfer of chemicals and technology to U.S. subsidiaries in
other countries. Others believe that the U.S. must keep tight controls in place until the CWC
has demonstrated its effectiveness and the threat of CW proliferation has demonstrably
abated. Nevertheless, continued pressure can be expected from developing countries and
domestic industry to loosen export controls.
Enforcement/Sanctions
The question of sanctions was addressed late in the CWC negotiations. The consultative
nature of the Convention’s provisions and the lack of specificity regarding sanctions to be
levied reflect the difficulty of those negotiations. It is generally anticipated that international
sanctions would consist of trade and, perhaps, arms embargoes. CWC critics believe that its
enforcement sanctions are too vague to be an effective deterrent. They question the
effectiveness of economic and arms embargoes, maintaining that 1) embargoes are almost
impossible to enforce internationally; 2) they historically have seldom achieved their foreign
policy objectives; and 3) if they are effective at all, it is only over the long term. CWC
supporters argue that the lack of specificity regarding possible sanctions heightens a potential
violator’s uncertainty about breaking the Convention. They believe that this uncertainty and
the international approbation that would be generated by the enforcement procedure will
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sufficiently affect the “cost/benefit” analysis of chemical weapons production to deter a
potential violator.
Chemical Weapons and Facilities Destruction
The CWC mandates the destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles and production
facilities within 10 years of the Convention’s coming into force. This deadline is now 2007.
With the approval of the States’ Conference, this deadline can be extended up to 5 years.
This extension clause was included specifically in anticipation of Russia’s not being able to
meet the destruction deadline, given its current political and economic instability. There is,
however, the possibility that the United States could experience legal and regulatory
difficulties in meeting a 10-year deadline.
The United States Destruction Program. The United States is by far the country
most advanced in its CW destruction program. In the early 1980s, DOD declared
approximately 90% of the U.S. chemical stockpile (28,000 agent tons) obsolete. This
decision, coupled with a 1985 congressional directive to destroy these munitions, led DOD
to begin planning a destruction program over a decade ago. Nevertheless, it is not entirely
assured that the United States will be able to meet a ten-year CWC deadline. DOD estimates
have called for completing destruction on time, but a number of factors could intervene.
Indeed, in August, 1999, an independent analysis commissioned by DOD and conducted by
the Arthur Anderson firm estimated that the program has less than a 1% chance of meeting
the 1997 deadline. This assessment is based on the assumption that incineration facility
construction would be halted while alternative technologies are examined. Opponents to
incineration do not regard the 2007 deadline as particularly significant, pointing to the CWC’s
provisions for extending it, if necessary.
The most unpredictable factor is the length of time that will be required to obtain the
necessary Federal and State permits to build and operate the destruction facilities. The
current plan calls for destruction facilities to be built at each of the eight CW storage depots.
These storage facilities are located in Aberdeen Proving Ground, MD; Anniston Army Depot,
AL; Lexington-Bluegrass Army Depot, KY; Newport Army Ammunition Plant, IN; Pine Bluff
Arsenal, AR; Pueblo Depot Activity, CO; Tooele Army Depot, UT; Umatilla Depot Activity,
OR; and Johnston Atoll Depot in the South Pacific. For each site, the U.S. Army must obtain
separate permits under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) and the Clean
Air Act Amendments of 1977. In addition, environmental impact statements are required
under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969. The General Accounting Office has
expressed doubt that current estimates allow sufficient time for fulfilling existing permit
application requirements. (See GAO reports: Chemical Stockpile Disposal Program Review
GAO/NSIAD-95-66R and Chemical Weapons Destruction: Issues Affecting Program Cost,
Schedule, and Performance. GAO/NSIAD 93-50. January 1993.)
Adding to the Federal requirements, the destruction program will face additional
obstacles at the state level. In the last few years, public concern in the regions where
destruction facilities are planned or under construction has heightened considerably. The
primary fears are of toxic emissions from the destruction process and the possibility of
catastrophic accident. The Chemical Weapons Working Group, an alliance of citizens’
groups in communities with CW stockpiles, vigorously opposes incineration as a means of
disposal. Public interest groups have persuaded some State governments to consider or enact
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highly restrictive standards for any CW destruction facility. Kentucky and Indiana have
passed legislation that could significantly delay, or even prevent, building destruction
incinerators, while Colorado and Maryland have considered such legislation. Even if Federal
and State permits are granted, public challenges, either judicially or politically, could also
bring delays. If CWC deadlines are to be met, Congress may have to address the extent to
which State legislation or the courts can impede the United States’ fulfillment of international
treaty obligations.
The Army’s chosen method (called “baseline”) is to drain the munitions and incinerate
the chemical agent and munition parts. Although the choice of this method came after
extensive study of alternatives, incineration has still raised objections from some who oppose
incineration. As a consequence, Congress directed the Army to reconsider alternative
technologies.
As part of this effort, the National Research Council of the National Academy of
Sciences has completed a review of potential alternative methods. The National Research
Council report observed that there are possible alternative technologies, but they are untested.
The Council estimates that the necessary research and development could take a minimum of
5 years before a pilot plant could be operational for evaluation. Its report also noted that
additional pollution control devices could be added to the “baseline” technology to minimize
the possibility of toxic emissions. In looking at the NRC report, no alternative technology
appears to surpass the current approach with regard to safety, environmental protection, and
cost. Costs could be particularly prohibitive given the delay that new research and
development would entail. The report specifically rejected the alternative “cryofracture”
method of incineration, citing the possibility of accidental explosions. The Army studied this
review and provided Congress a detailed report that continued to endorse the “baseline”
destruction process while adopting the NRC’s recommendations on enhanced emissions
control filters.
Alternative technologies for filled chemical munitions have been problematic. The
presence of “energetics”, i.e. explosives, and sometimes degrading and unstable chemical
agents presents additional challenges. In the FY1997 DOD Appropriations Act ( P.L. 104-
208) Congress created the Assembled Chemical Weapons Assessment program (ACWA) to
evaluate alternative approaches to incineration. Legislative provisions included:
! prohibiting obligation of funds for incinerator construction at the Pueblo, CO
and Blue Grass, KY sites pending a report to Congress on the feasibility of
alternative technologies.specifying that the ACWA program manager be
independent of the Program Manager for Chemical Demilitarization
! allocating $40 million to “identify and develop at least two possible disposal
alternatives”requiring a report to Congress no later than April 1999 on the
initial safety and environmental assessments for the alternative technologies.
ACWA initially identified six possible alternative technologies; and, in the summer 1998
selected three for demonstration and possible pilot programs. This met the statutory
requirement for at least two alternative pilots, but continuing public and congressional
pressure has led DOD to undertake demonstrations for all six alternatives. In the FY1999
DOD Appropriations Act, Congress authorized using $25 million for this purpose.
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The ACWA program was expected to report to Congress on the technology
demonstrations by September 30, 1999. In the FY 1999 Authorization Act (P.L. 105-261),
Congress directed the Undersecretary for Acquisition and Technology to decide whether to
begin pilot projects in time to award design contracts by December 1999. The
Undersecretary was also instructed to commission a non-governmental cost and schedule
assessment of ACWA technologies to be completed by September 1999. On August 24,
1999, the National Research Council submitted its own report to Congress on alternative
technologies, Review and Evaluation of Alternative Technologies for Demilitarization of
Assembled Chemical Weapons. [http://www.nap.edu/catalog/9660.html] The report does not
recommend any specific technology, but rather identifies the strengths and weaknesses, and
assesses their potential for full-scale development.
ACWA raises concerns about cost increases and destruction schedule slippages. The
Chemical Weapons Convention requires the United States to complete destruction of its CW
stockpile by 2007, though an extension of five years could be granted. Meeting the 2007
deadline — a probability some have questioned even using the established “baseline” process
— is high among DOD concerns. Alternative technology advocates maintain that public and
environmental safety are the overriding concerns, and that the United States should not shy
from requesting an extension if needed to take advantage of better destruction approaches.
In December 1999, the University of Arizona Environment, Behavior, and Risk Research
Laboratory released a study on public attitudes toward incineration among the communities
surrounding the demilitarization sites. The report’s conclusions, based upon a random survey
of over 8,000 residents, stands in contrast to some activists assertions that there wide-spread
public opposition to stockpile incineration. Among the reports conclusions:
! Incineration is more likely to be adopted by the public than neutralization
technology
! “The ACWA program seems to be directly incompatible with public
perception in the communities affected .” Public opinion in Pueblo, CO was
“significantly more disposed” to incineration than neutralization, and Blue
Grass, KY residents “showed no strong disposition toward either
technology”
The report also noted that the level of public concern over the demilitarization programs
was significantly less than anticipated. Of over 8,000 residents surveyed and offered the
Army Outreach Program phone number, about 4,000 took the number, and only 35 ever
contacted the Army office.
Cost estimates for the U.S. chemical weapons destruction program have grown steadily
since its inception. In 1985, for example, DOD estimated the total program cost would be
between $1.2 to $2.0 billion. DOD has estimated the total cost to be about $15 billion,
assuming a completion date of April 2007. This estimate does not assume the use of
alternative technologies. Given this history of rising estimates, the possibility of future
technically or politically-driven delays, cost estimates may well continue to increase. The
FY2000 Defense Appropriations Act (H.R. 2561) provided $1.029 billion for chemical
demilitarization, reducing the Administration’s request by $141 million, including a $94
million cut in military construction funding. The Department of Defense submitted an
FY2001 budget request for $1.003 billion for the CW stockpile demilitarization program,
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including: $607 million for operations and maintenance; $121.9 million for procurement, and
$274 for research and development. The DOD FY2001 Appropriations Act (P.L. 106-259)
provided $980 million, with the reductions owing to program delays and terminating some
contract services in the procurement and O&M accounts. For FY2002, DOD has requested
$1.153 billion for the CW demilitarization program, including $200.4 million for R&D,
$164.2 million for procurement, and $789 million for operations and maintenance. The Senate
Armed Services Committee recommended authorization of the full request, while the House
Armed Services Committee recommended a reduction of $75 million overall, based upon
concerns of affordability.

Russian CW Destruction Program.
Russia possesses the world’s largest
chemical weapons stockpile, estimated to be 40,000 to 50,000 tons. Its plans for a
destruction program are embryonic, and the country’s ongoing political and economic turmoil
leads most observers to believe it will not be able to meet CWC deadlines on its own. Russia
has established a commission to oversee the destruction program. Russian officials have
made it clear that Russia desires both technological and financial assistance to destroy its
chemical weapons. Russia is also seeking foreign assistance to fund infrastructure
improvements in the regions surrounding their CW depots, claiming that approval from local
authorities to build destruction facilities is dependent upon such assistance. In addition to
direct foreign assistance, Russia is considering establishing an investment bank to encourage
commercial participation and hopes to recycle some commercially valuable compounds from
the destruction process for sale.
Congress responded initially to Russia’s call for assistance, appropriating $55 million in
aid to be used for the initial planning and evaluation stages of the Russian program. In
addition, the United States agreed to share destruction technology and participate in the
exchange of technical experts. To facilitate these efforts, the United States has opened a
Chemical Weapons Destruction Support Office (CWDSO) in Moscow.
The Administration sought for two years to gain funding to assist Russia in construction
a CW demilitarization facility at Shchuch’ye. Both the House and Senate Armed Services
Committees expressed strong reservations about Russia’s ability to fund operation of the
facility if constructed, and noted the relative paucity of assistance from other nations for this
program. Consequently, the FY2000 DOD Authorization Act (P.L. 106-65, Sec. 1305)
forbids funding designing, planning, or construction a chemical weapons facility in Russia.
DOD’s efforts in the FY2001 budget considerations to have this provision repealed and $35
million appropriated for a Shchuch’ye facility met continued congressional skepticism. House
and Senate Armed Services Committee conferees accepted a Senate amendment in the DOD
FY2001 Authorization Act (H.R. 4205) which amends the existing statutory prohibition to
permit Shchuch’ye funding only after DOD certification that:
! Russia has agreed to provide $25 million annually for construction and
operation.
! Russia has agreed to use the facility to destroy it four other nerve agent
stockpiles.
! The United States has obtained multi-year commitments from the
international community to assist infrastructure improvement around
Shchuch’ye.
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! Russia has agreed to destroy it CW production facilities at Volgograd and
Novocheboksark.
These conditions were coupled with a DOD reporting requirement on Russian and
international financial contributions towards the safeguarding and destruction of Russia’s
nerve agent stockpiles. (H.Rept 106-945, Sec. 4205)
For FY2002, both the House and Senate Armed Services Committees, satisfied that
sufficient progress has been made in meeting these conditions, approved authorization of $35
million for the Shchuch’ye facility.
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
U.S. Congress. Chemical Weapons Convention: A Message from the President of the
United States. Treaty Document 103-21. 103 Congress, 1st Session.
U.S. Congress. Chemical Weapons Convention. Hearings, Senate Committee on Foreign
Relations, 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, S.Hrg. 103-869.
U.S. Congress. Iran Missile Proliferation Sanctions Act of 1997. Report, House Committee
on International Relations, 105 Congress, 2nd Session, H.Rept. 105-375
U.S. Congress. Military Implications of the Chemical Weapons Convention. Hearings,
Senate Armed Services Committee. 103rd Congress, 2nd Session, S.Hrg. 103-835.
U.S. Congress. U.S. Capability to Monitor Compliance with the Chemical Weapons
Convention. Report, Senate Select Committee on Intelligence. 103rd Congress, 2nd
Session, S.Rept. 103-390.
U.S. Congress. Convention on Chemical Weapons. Hearing, Senate Foreign Relations
Committee, 104th Congress, 2nd Session, S.Hrg. 104-668.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
Selected World Wide Web Sites
Chemical and Biological Nonproliferation Program
[http://cns.miis.edu/cns/projects/cbwnp/index.htm]
Organization for the Prohibition of Chemical Weapons
[http://www.opcw.nl/ptshome.htm]
U.S. Army Chemical Demilitarization Program
[http://www-pmcd.apgea.army.mil/]
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