Order Code IB98046
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Nigeria in Political Transition
Updated November 8, 2001
Theodros Dagne
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Current Issues
Historical and Political Background
Transition to Civilian Rule
Elections
Current Economic and Social Conditions
Issues in U.S.-Nigerian Relations
Background
The United States and the Obasanjo Government
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Reports


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Nigeria in Political Transition
SUMMARY
On June 8, 1998, General Sani Abacha,
and other senior officials in Washington.
the military leader who took power in Nigeria
President Clinton pledged substantial increase
in 1993, died of a reported heart attack and
in U.S. assistance to Nigeria. In August 2000,
was replaced by General Abdulsalam
President Clinton paid a state visit to Nigeria.
Abubakar. On July 7, 1998, Moshood Abiola,
He met with President Obasanjo in Abuja and
the believed winner of the 1993 presidential
addressed the Nigerian parliament. Several
election, also died of a heart attack during a
new U.S. initiatives were announced, including
meeting with U.S. officials. General Abubakar
increased support for AIDS prevention and
released political prisoners and initiated politi-
treatment programs in Nigeria and enhanced
cal, economic, and social reforms. He also
trade and commercial development.
established a new independent electoral com-
mission and outlined a schedule for elections
In May 2001, President Obasanjo met
and transition to civilian rule, pledging to hand
with President Bush and other senior officials
over power to an elected civilian government
in Washington. The two presidents discussed
by May 1999.
a wide range of issues, including trade, peace-
keeping, and the HIV/AIDS crisis in Africa.
In late February 1999, former military
President Bush pledged $200 million into a
leader General Olusegun Obasanjo was elected
new global fund for HIV/AIDS. In early
president and was sworn in on May 29, 1999.
November 2001, President Obasanjo paid a
Obasanjo won 62.8% of the votes (18.7 mil-
visit to Washington to express his govern-
lion), while his challenger, Chief Olu Falae
ment’s support for the U.S.-led anti-terrorism
received 37.2% of the votes (11.1 million). In
campaign.
the Senate elections, the People’s Democratic
Party (PDP) won 58% of the votes, the All
Nigeria continues to make progress in
People’s Party (APP) 23%, and the Alliance
strengthening its fragile democracy but faces
for Democracy (AD) 19%. In the elections for
serious economic challenges. With a populat-
the House of Representatives, PDP received
ion of over 126 million, Nigeria remains rela-
59% of the votes, AD 22%, and APP 20%.
tively stable, although ethnic and religious
clashes in some parts of the country have led
The international community welcomed
to massive displacement of civilian popula-
the election of Obasanjo as president. The
tions. Thousands of civilians have been killed
European Union restored full cooperation with
over the past several years and many more
Nigeria and lifted sanctions that were imposed
wounded in religious clashes.
to punish the Abacha government. The Com-
monwealth moved swiftly and readmitted
Economic conditions remain poor, de-
Nigeria as a member, after 3 years of suspen-
spite serious efforts by the Obasanjo govern-
sion.
ment. Revenues from oil account for more
than 90% of foreign exchange earnings and
Relations between the United States and
65% of budget revenues. Meanwhile, high
Nigeria improved with the transfer of power
unemployment rate continues to pose serious
to a civilian government. In late October 1999,
challenge to the government.
President Obasanjo met with President Clinton
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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
In early November 2001, President Obasanjo met with President Bush in Washington
express his government’s support for the U.S.-led anti-terrorism campaign. At a press
conference, Presidents Bush and Obasanjo pledged to work together. President Bush said
that Obasanjo “has been a steadfast friend of the United States government and the United
States people, before and after September 11th, and for that we are most grateful.” In
response, President Obasanjo stated that he came to the United States “to express solidarity,
to express support, to express condolences for the terrorist attack on this country, on
innocent people of all faiths and of all races on the 11th of September.”

BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Current Issues
In late May 1999, General Obasanjo was sworn in as president of a new civilian
government. In his inaugural address, President Obasanjo said he is prepared to restore
confidence in government, deal with the growing economic crisis, and tackle corruption. In
late June, the Nigerian Senate approved 42 of the 49 cabinet members submitted for
confirmation by President Obasanjo.
In early June 1999, the Commonwealth readmitted Nigeria as member, after 3 years of
suspension. The European Union also restored full economic cooperation with Nigeria. In
July, a court in Abuja convicted the Speaker of the House of Representatives after he pleaded
guilty to perjury and forgery. The Speaker was forced to resign from Nigeria’s 469-member
national assembly after admitting that he lied about his age and educational qualifications.
In mid-August 1999, Energy Secretary Bill Richardson visited Nigeria and met with
senior government officials. In late September, the Associate Administrator of the Federal
Airports Administration (FAA), Admiral Cathal Flynn, visited Nigeria to discuss the status
of the Murtala Mohammed International Airport in Lagos. The United States suspended
flights to Lagos because of security concerns. On December 22, 1999, the Department of
Transportation removed the suspension after Nigeria met all safety requirements.
In mid-October 1999, Secretary of State Albright visited Nigeria and met with senior
government officials and civil society groups. At a press briefing following her Africa tour,
Secretary Albright stated that the government and people of Nigeria are “engaged in a
dramatic and high-stakes struggle to establish a viable democratic system.” She said President
Obasanjo “appears truly committed to jump-starting the economy, fighting corruption and
resolving regional problems that remain a source of unrest within Nigeria.”
In late October 1999, President Obasanjo met with President Clinton and other senior
government officials in Washington. At a White House press briefing, President Clinton said
that “it is very much in America’s interests that Nigeria succeed, and therefore we should
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assist them in their success. We intend to increase our assistance to Nigeria to expand law-
enforcement cooperation and to work toward an agreement to stimulate trade and investment
between us. We intend to do what we can to help Nigeria recover assets plundered by the
previous regime.” President Clinton stated that the United States will support “generous debt
rescheduling through the Paris Club and encourage other countries to take further steps.”
In late October, Nigeria’s Zamfara state introduced Islamic Sharia law. The introduction
of Sharia law has triggered sharp reaction from non-Muslims in other parts of Nigeria. In
early November, the Cross River state passed a non-binding resolution declaring the area a
Christian state in protest of Zamfara state’s action.
Between February and May 2000, more than 500 were killed in Kaduna in northern
Nigeria in violence triggered by the proposal to introduce Sharia by Muslims. The violence
was triggered in reaction to a proposal to introduce Sharia by Moslems. Following Zamfara
State which began implementing Sharia in January 2000, the states of Niger and Sokoto
adopted Sharia in February. As of August 2000, several more states, including Kano, Katsina,
Jigawa, Yobe, and Borno have adopted Sharia. (Details available on the BBC News Web
site at [http://news.bbc.co.uk/low/english/world/africa/newsid_924000/924573.stm].) Despite
assurances by authorities in these states that Sharia would not apply on non-Moslems,
Christian groups complain about restrictions as a result of the new law. President Obasanjo
vowed to punish the perpetrators of the violence and assured Nigerians that the security
services would restore law and order. President Obasanjo stated in late August 2000 that
the best way to respond to Sharia was to ignore it: “I think Sharia will fizzle out. To
confront it is to keep it alive.”
In late June, Nigeria and the United States established a new organization to promote
trade and investment. The U.S. and Nigeria Trade and Investment Council was inaugurated
in late June in the Nigerian capital, Abuja. According to U.S. Deputy Trade Representative
Susan Esserman, “the Council shall focus on removing impediments to trade, developing and
implementing concrete strategies to strengthen reforms and achieve economic diversification
and growth.” In February 2000, Nigeria and the United States signed a trade and investment
agreement in Washington.
In mid-May, the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) decided to
send an estimated 3,000 troops to the war-torn west African country of Sierra Leone. Nigeria
was expected to contribute the majority of the 3,000 troops and take command of the West
African force in Sierra Leone.
Swiss officials said that about 120 accounts in Zurich and Geneva have been frozen. In
early April 2000, Swiss officials charged a businessman for falsifying documents to open a
bank account in Geneva for the Abacha family. According to the New York Times, the
unidentified businessman is Dharam Vir of New Delhi, India. In mid-May, 2000, President
Obasanjo announced that his government has recovered $200 million public funds looted by
former Nigerian dictator Abacha and his associates. In July, Nigerian authorities announced
that Swiss officials have transferred $64.36 million of the looted money to the Central Bank
of Nigeria.
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In early April, Secretary of Defense William Cohen met with President Obasanjo in
Abuja and reportedly pledged $10 million to Nigeria in military aid, including an increase in
the International Military Education Training (IMET) program.
In a meeting with President Obasanjo in Abuja on August 26, 2000, President Clinton
stated that the U.S. is “committed to working with the people of Nigeria to help build
stronger institutions, improve education, fight disease, crime and corruption, ease the burden
of debt and promote trade and investment in a way that brings more of the benefits of
prosperity to people who have embraced democracy.” President Clinton also made an
unprecedented address before the Nigerian parliament in which he underscored the major
issues facing the country today. Among them were democratization and ethnic and religious
strife.
In late February 2001, direct flight from Lagos, Nigeria, to New York resumed after
several delays. The direct flight to New York is a joint venture between Nigeria Airways and
South African Airways. According to Nigerian officials, flight resumption “signifies the
further strengthening of relationship between Nigeria, the United States, and South Africa and
these relationship have positive political, social, and economic implications.”
In its Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2000, issued in late February, the
State Department stated that Nigeria’s “human rights record was poor; although there were
some improvements in several areas during the year, serious problems remain. The national
police, army, and security forces continued to commit extrajudicial killings and used excessive
force to quell civil unrest and ethnic violence, although they did so less frequently than under
previous military governments.”
On February 27, 2001, President Obasanjo stated that he would remove all subsidies
from petroleum products, as part of an overhaul of the energy sector and would increase
subsidies for education, health and water services. President Obasanjo gave a major televised
address to the nation in late December 2000, marking the first anniversary of his government.
Obasanjo gave an overview of his government’s achievements of the past 12 months and
outlined his agenda for the future. The president acknowledged that serious challenges face
the country, including growing ethnic and religious clashes. He stated that Nigeria will
continue its peacekeeping role in West Africa.
In late April 2001, 47 African leaders met in Abuja, the capital, to discuss the AIDS
crisis in Africa. U.N. Secretary General Kofi Annan called on donor governments to provide
at least $7 billion to combat AIDS in Africa. Former President Bill Clinton, who attended the
summit, also urged donor countries to assist in combating AIDS. Secretary of State Colin
Powell, who was expected to attend the summit, did not go due to conflict in his schedule,
according to the State Department.
In May 2001, President Obasanjo met with President Bush and other senior officials in
Washington. President Bush stated that the United States is “in the process of helping
provide technical assistance to Nigerian troops so that they are better able to keep those
peace missions.” At a joint White House press conference, President Bush pledged $200
million into a new global fund for HIV/AIDS. President Obasanjo said he discussed a number
of issues of mutual interest, including the conflicts in Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo,
and Sierra Leone.
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In late July 2001, the government of Nigeria announced a major AIDS treatment
program. President Obasanjo declared that his government would provide cheap generic
drugs to AIDS patients beginning September 1, 2001. Patients are expected to pay about $7
a month. Nigeria’s Health Minister negotiated a $350,000 deal with Cipla, an Indian
pharmaceutical company.
In early September 2001, clashes broke out between Muslims and Christians in the city
of Jos in northern Nigeria. An estimated 500 people were killed in the clashes and thousands
more were injured. Meanwhile, tens of thousands of civilians have reportedly fled their homes
for other locations. President Obasanjo sent the army to restore order.
In mid-September 2001, President Obasanjo strongly condemned the terrorist attacks
on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon and expressed his support in combating
terrorism. Obasanjo described the attacks as “callous and dastardly.” The Nigerian House
of Representatives also condemned the attacks, calling the terrorist action “an act of terrorism
against humanity.”
Historical and Political Background
Nigeria, the most populous nation in Africa with an estimated 107 million people, has
been in political turmoil and economic crisis intermittently since independence in October
1960. The current borders were demarcated by British colonial rulers in 1914, on the eve of
World War I, by merging the British dependencies of Northern and Southern Nigeria into a
single territory with promising economic prospects. The new Nigeria, as defined by the
British, placed over 250 distinct ethnic groups under a single administrative system. Of this
large number of groups, ten account for nearly 80% of the total population, and the northern
Hausa-Fulani, the southwestern Yoruba, and the southeastern Ibo, have traditionally been the
most politically active and dominant. Since gaining independence from Britain in 1960,
Nigerian political life has been scarred by conflict along both ethnic and geographic lines,
marked most notably by largely northern and Hausa domination of the military and the
Biafran secession movement and civil war fought by the Ibo from 1967 to 1970. Questions
persist as to whether or not Nigeria and its multitude of ethnic groups can be held together
as one nation, particularly in light of the degree to which misrule has undermined the authority
and legitimacy of the state apparatus; but many Nigerians feel a significant degree of national
pride and belief in Nigeria as a state.
Nigeria’s political life has been dominated by military coups and long military-imposed
transition programs to civilian rule. The military has ruled Nigeria for approximately 28 of
its 41 years since independence. In August 1985, General Ibrahim Babangida ousted another
military ruler, General Muhammadu Buhari, and imposed a transition program that lasted until
June 1993, when Nigeria held its first election in almost a decade, believed to be won by Chief
Moshood K. O. Abiola, a Yoruba businessman from the south. In the same month, General
Babangida annulled the presidential election because of what he called “irregularities in the
voting” and ordered a new election with conditions that Abiola and his challenger be excluded
from participating. Amid confusion and growing political unrest Babangida handed over
power to a caretaker government in August 1993, then ousted the caretaker the following
November.
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General Sani Abacha took power in November 1993. Abacha had been an active
participant in several Nigerian military coups and was an authoritarian figure who seemed
unmoved by international opinion. Since 1995, Abacha had imprisoned hundreds of critics,
including former military leader Olusegun Obasanjo, the only Nigerian military leader to have
handed over power voluntarily to an elected civilian government, and Moshood Abiola, who
was charged with treason after declaring himself president following the annulled election.
The senior wife of Abiola, Kudirat Abiola, was assassinated in June 1996 by unidentified men.
Her daughter blamed the military junta.
In October 1995, under pressure to implement political reforms, Abacha announced a
3-year transition program to civilian rule, which he tightly controlled until his death on June
8, 1998. Abacha established the National Electoral Commission of Nigeria (NECON), which
published guidelines for party registration, recognized five political parties in September 1996
and officially dissolved opposition groups after refusing to recognize them. The military
professed its support for Abacha should he seek reelection as a civilian, and by April 20,
1998, all five parties had nominated Abacha as the single presidential candidate despite
pressure by the international community and dissident groups. Major opposition figures,
especially those in exile, dismissed the transition program and called for boycotts of the
parliamentary and presidential elections. Only candidates from among the five state-
sanctioned political parties participated in state assembly elections held in December 1997 and
parliamentary elections held on April 25, 1998. The United Nigeria Congress Party (UNCP),
considered by many government opponents to be the army’s proxy, won widespread victories.
Transition to Civilian Rule
Abacha died, reportedly of a heart attack, on June 8, 1998. The Provisional Ruling
Council quickly nominated Major General Abdulsalam Abubakar to assume the presidency.
General Abubakar, a career serviceman from the Northern Hausa-speaking elite, was regarded
as a military intellectual. He served as chief of military intelligence under General Ibrahim
Babangida and was Abacha’s chief of staff. He led the investigations of reported coup
attempts by former President Olusegun Obasanjo and Lt. General Oladipo Diya, charges that,
critics argue, were fabricated by the government. Following Abacha’s death, General
Abubakar addressed the nation and expressed his commitment to uphold the October 1998
hand-over date to civilian government established by Abacha. In an effort to prove his
commitment, Abubakar released several prominent political prisoners, including General
Olusegun Obasanjo.
Immediately following Abacha’s death, pro-democracy leaders demanded that Abiola
be released from prison and be declared the legitimate ruler of Nigeria. To mark the fifth
anniversary of the annulled elections, many dissidents protested and demanded the release of
Abiola in spite of a ban on demonstrations by the government. Reports of secret talks
between top government officials and Abiola led many observers to believe that the
government intended to release Abiola on the condition that he renounce his claim to the
presidency. Government officials granted U.N. Secretary-General Kofi Annan an audience
with Abiola in which Annan reportedly attempted to persuade Abiola to give up his title in
order to earn immediate release. Annan reported that Abiola had agreed to renounce his title
and cooperate with the transition program, and the government promised to release all
political prisoners, including Abiola. However, a letter reportedly written by Abiola and
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published after his death called into question the accuracy of Annan’s report. According to
Abiola, Annan behaved like a “Nigerian diplomat” who wanted him to relinquish the title for
which he and his supporters had fought over the past 5 years.
During a meeting with a U.S. delegation
Nigeria At A Glance
led by Undersecretary of State Thomas
Pickering on July 7, 1998, Abiola suffered a
Population: 126.6 million
heart attack and died soon after. Pro-
Independence: October 1960
Comparative Area: Slightly more than twice the
democracy leaders immediately claimed that
size of California
Abiola was murdered. The autopsy report,
Religions: 50% Muslim, 40% Christian, 10%
monitored by an independent team of Canadian,
Indigenous beliefs
Languages: English (official)
American, and British doctors, confirmed that
GDP: $117 billion (2000)
Abiola died of natural causes due to a long-
GDP Per Capita: $950 (2000)
standing heart condition and that death as a
Unemployment rate: 28% (1992)
Exports: $22.2 billion (1999)
result of poisoning was highly unlikely. Many
Imports: $10.7 billion (1999)
observers said, however, that Abiola’s care was
External Debt: $32 billion (1999)
deliberately neglected, resulting in his early
Source: The World Fact book, 2001
demise. His death crushed the hopes of many
democracy supporters and spurred riots for
several days.
Abubakar replaced several of Abacha’s top advisors in the military hierarchy with men
of his own choosing, and began to establish a framework for the transition to civilian rule.
On July 20, 1998, General Abubakar admitted that the October 1998 hand-over date
established by Abacha was unrealistic in light of the disruption caused by his death. He
announced in a public speech a series of political and economic reforms that his government
would implement before handing over power to an elected civilian government on the new
official date of May 29, 1999. In an early effort to demonstrate his government’s
commitment to reconciliation, General Abubakar announced the release of all political
detainees and decided to “withdraw all charges against political offenders.”
Although politicians and leading opposition figures have generally welcomed the
transition program, many were disappointed that Abubakar rejected their call for a national
unity government. The leader of the National Democratic Coalition of Nigeria (NADECO),
a leading opposition group, proposed a sovereign conference to decide how the different
ethnic groups should be represented to draft a constitution for the nation as a whole, at which
point elections would be held. Abubakar rejected this suggestion, saying that it replaces one
unelected government with another, that the process would take too long, and that “such an
arrangement is full of pitfalls and dangers, which this administration cannot accept.”
In August and September, Abubakar undertook rapid and dramatic reforms to the
Nigerian political system and economy. He replaced Abacha’s top security staff and cabinet
and dissolved the five political parties that Abacha had established. He abolished major
decrees banning trade union activity, which had been used by Abacha to put down the
political strikes that followed the nullification of the 1993 election results and ended treason
charges against Nobel Prize-winning writer Wole Soyinka and 14 others. Abubakar has also
made a concerted effort to appeal to Nigerians in exile to return home and assist in the
transition process, and many have done so, most notably Nobel Prize-winning author Wole
Soyinka in mid-October. Journalists reported that freedom of the press improved during
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Abubakar’s tenure. On September 7, Abubakar released the draft constitution for the next
civilian government, which Abacha had kept secret, but announced on October 1 that he was
setting up a committee to organize and collate views from various sections of the country,
after which he would finalize changes to the draft document in order to make it “more
representative and acceptable.” In early May 1999, the government approved an updated
version of the 1979 Nigerian constitution instead of the constitution drafted by the Abacha
regime.
Abubakar outlined a specific timetable for the transition to civilian rule, with local polls
on December 5, 1998, gubernatorial and state polls on January 9, followed by national
assembly polls on February 20, 1999, and presidential polls on February 27. The official
hand-over date was set for May 29, 1999. He also nullified all of the previous state and
gubernatorial elections because they were held under the Abacha system, and dismissed the
National Electoral Commission established by Abacha, replacing it with one of his own, the
Independent National Electoral Commission (INEC), in early August. Political party
registration for elections ended after an extension on October 12, and the INEC released the
names of the nine registered parties on October 19. The three major parties are the People’s
Democratic Party (PDP), the All People’s Party (APP), and the Alliance for Democracy
(AD). In order to be registered, a party must be considered “national,” defined as having
offices in at least two-thirds of the 36 states that make up Nigeria, and furthermore must win
at least 10% of votes in two-thirds of the states in the local elections in December in order
to qualify a candidate for the national elections in February. Abubakar warned of the dangers
of a “proliferation of political parties with parochial orientation, that may lead to disunity and
instability,” while urging political leadership to represent the will of people of all tribes and
ethnicities.
Abubakar announced in a public speech on October 1 that the election commission had
already met delegates from the United Nations and the Commonwealth to discuss ways of
ensuring free and fair elections in February. Registration of an expected 60 million voters
began in early October and lasted until October 19. Despite television advertisements taken
out by the INEC and assurances that the lists of voters were checked and cross-checked in
order to prevent any faults or double registration, the process was reportedly marked by fraud
and controversy. INEC members cited unconfirmed reports that their officials were being
bribed to hand over piles of cards to representatives from political parties, in order to improve
their chances in the upcoming elections (BBC, October 14, 1998). These accounts were in
addition to complaints of shortages of cards in certain areas and that the registration offices
were not open at regular hours in certain states. Although the INEC had denied
responsibility, political parties and leaders accused the commission of poor preparation and
ineptitude.
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The international community
Highlights of Abubakar’s Transition Program
cautiously welcomed the transition
program. Donor governments in Europe
Rejected:
expressed support and urged transparency.
National Conference
National Unity Government
French, British, and German delegations
met with the Nigerian leadership in Abuja,
Accomplished:
the capital, in late July, and Abubakar has
Debt relief talks with World Bank and IMF
made numerous trips abroad in an effort to
Release of all political prisoners
improve relations with African and world
Dissolution of old electoral commission and
establishment of new Independent National Electoral
leaders. The European Union announced
Commission
in late October 1998 that, effective
Dissolution of old political parties and registration
November 1, some sanctions would be
of new parties
relaxed. The visa ban was officially
Voter registration
removed and some officials indicated that
Annulment of elections under Abacha
even the military measures might be lifted
Most political prisoners freed
Greater freedom of press, human rights better
after the official hand-over date in May. On
Publicized and amended 1995 constitution
May 31, 1999, the European Union
Dismissed Abacha officials and began investigation
restored full economic cooperation with
into misappropriated funds
Nigeria. In late May, the Commonwealth
Exiled dissidents returned home
also readmitted Nigeria as a member, after
Better-paid civil servants to combat corruption
Repairs started on refineries, more oil imported,
3 years of suspension.
privatization program started
Hand-over May 29, 1999
Elections
Presidential elections February 27, 1999
National assembly elections February 20, 1999
State/Gubernatorial elections January 9, 1999
In early December 1998, the PDP
Local elections December 5, 1998 Partial lifting of
won in 389 out of 774 municipalities in
international sanctions
local elections, while the All People’s Party
(APP) came a distant second with 182,
followed by Alliance for Democracy. In the governorship elections in early January, the PDP
won 21 states out of 36, the APP won in nine states, and the AD won in six states. Shortly
after the elections in January, the APP and AD began talks to merge the two political parties.
However, the Independent Electoral Commission rejected a merger but agreed that the two
parties “can present common candidates” for the presidential elections.
In mid-February, the People Democratic Party nominated General Olusegun Obasanjo
as its presidential candidate. Obasanjo won the support of more than two-thirds of the 2,500
delegates and a northerner, Abubakar Atiku, who was elected governor in the January
elections, was chosen as his running mate. The APP and AD nominated Chief Olu Falae, a
Yoruba, as their joint candidate for president. A former Nigerian security chief and a
northerner, Chief Umaru Shinakfi, was chosen as Falae’s running mate.
In late February 1999, General Obasanjo was elected president by a wide margin.
Obasanjo won 62.8% of the votes (18.7 million), while his challenger, Chief Olu Falae
received 37.2% of the votes (11.1 million). In the Senate elections, the PDP won 58% of
the votes, APP 23%, and AD 19%. In the elections for the House of Representatives, PDP
received 59% of the votes, AD 22%, and APP 20%.
On May 29, 1999, Obasanjo was sworn in president and the Nigerian Senate approved
42 of 49 members of his cabinet. In his inaugural address, President Obasanjo said that “the
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entire Nigerian scene is very bleak indeed. So bleak people ask me where do we begin? I
know what great things you expect of me at this New Dawn. As I have said many times in
my extensive travels in the country, I am not a miracle worker. It will be foolish to underrate
the task ahead. Alone, I can do little.”
Current Economic and Social Conditions
Western officials believe that Sani Abacha may have stolen over $3.5 billion over the
course of his 5 years in power. Abacha’s former national security adviser, Ismaila Gwarzo,
has been connected to the disappearance of $2.45 billion from the Nigerian Central Bank.
Due in large part to large-scale theft from the now almost bankrupt Nigerian treasury, the
education system is collapsing, industry has idled, refineries are no longer operating because
of the dire need for repairs, and the sixth-largest oil-producing country in the world now
imports most of its oil for consumption and suffers from severe fuel shortages (The New York
Times
, August 23, 1998). The Nigerian economy depends heavily on oil revenues; about half
of Nigeria’s GDP comes from petroleum and petroleum products, which also represent 95%
of its exports and 80% of its budgetary revenues (CIA World Factbook, 1997). The
European Union is a major trading partner, and the United States imports more oil from sub-
Saharan Africa, primarily Nigeria, than from the Middle East. Oil prices are currently low and
expected to drop further, which could lead to even more severe consequences for the
Nigerian economy.
The state of the economy has most affected the poorest segments of the population, and
has sparked violence around the country, particularly in the oil-producing regions. Hundreds
have been killed in pipeline explosions in southeast Nigeria since July, though the largest
single toll from an explosion was approximately 1,000 in October of 1999. These explosions
result from the siphoning off of oil from holes punched in the above-ground pipeline. Ethnic
clashes over rights to a promising oil prospect in the southwest also killed hundreds of people
in September and October 1999. In the Niger Delta, youths from the ethnic Ijaw tribe have
stopped the flow of one-third of Nigeria’s oil exports of more than two million barrels per day
in order to protest sub-standard living conditions in the country’s richest oil-producing region.
Thus far, the army has not used force to reopen the oil facilities, but has sought a peaceful
resolution by engaging in dialogue with tribal elders and encouraging the oil companies to
invest in the socioeconomic and educational development of their operational areas. The
government has also established a national task force on surveillance of petroleum pipelines
in order to prevent a recurrence of the pipeline explosion tragedy.
Riots have also followed the June 1 , 2000 fuel price hike of 50% on petroleum products
by the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation (NNPC). Violence stemming from the fuel
crisis has seen 40 dead, hundreds injured, and more than 1,000 arrested. The situation is
further exacerbated by a strike (2 weeks to date) of the National Union of Petroleum and
Natural Gas Workers and the Natural Gas Senior Association of Nigeria for increased wages.
As a result of the strike, most gas stations in and around Lagos are running out of fuel, and
black-market oil is thriving with prices inflated by 100-200%.
As part of his reforms, Abubakar launched a long-promised privatization program, which
he promised will include large sections of the oil industry, and he also implemented measures
to ease the fuel shortage, increasing the number of firms importing oil and beginning repairs
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on state-owned refineries. Money owed to oil companies has been paid under Abubakar, and
he has given the contracts for the new oil imports to established firms, not presidential
acquaintances. The pay for civil servants was also increased in an effort to lower the high
level of corruption present in all levels of government, and Abubakar ordered open bidding
for all government contracts.
Abubakar also recovered money stolen and misappropriated during the Abacha regime.
Although the Abacha family had reportedly surrendered $750 million to the government and
former national security adviser Ismaila Gwarzo has turned over more than $250 million, no
one has been arrested and charged. To recover funds, the military junta used quiet pressure
rather than the threat of imprisonment. Observers reported that Abubakar was concerned
about initiating too broad an inquiry, since an investigation could implicate almost the entire
army hierarchy and spark another coup (Associated Press, November 1, 1998). Abubakar
instructed the governor of the Central Bank of Nigeria to take inventory of the remaining
funds in the treasury and launched an extensive investigation into the finances of the Abacha
family and an “administrative auditing” of the office of the National Security Adviser.
Allegations include payments on contracts that were not executed, payments on contracts
with inflated prices, and funds withdrawn for purposes other than the former two but
misapplied.
Abubakar told reporters: “All those that have been questioned have cooperated and
voluntarily refunded some monies, which are being kept in special account in the Central
Bank of Nigeria ... At the end of the exercise, [the] government will fully examine all the
findings and take appropriate decisions.” Analysts believe that most of the money is overseas
and likely untraceable and unrecoverable (Africa News Service, October 28, 1998). In late
March 1999, the Central Bank of Nigeria devalued the naira, the Nigerian currency, from 86
naira to 90 naira to the U.S. dollar. The devaluation took place after a visit to Nigeria by a
team from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). The Director of IMF, Michel Camdessus,
said at a conference during his visit to Nigeria that “hopes are high that Nigeria will recover
the momentum of development and assume once again its leadership in Africa and among
developing countries worldwide.”
Issues in U.S.-Nigerian Relations
Background
Relations between the United States and Nigeria began to deteriorate with the annulment
of the 1993 elections by the military junta. Three issues dominated U.S.-Nigerian relations:
the absence of democracy, human rights abuses, and drug trafficking. Washington took a
series of measures against the military junta shortly after the 1993 election results were
annulled. These included suspending development assistance, terminating joint military
training with Nigeria, and imposing visa restrictions of Nigeria’s military leaders and their
family members, but did not affect trade between U.S. companies and Nigeria. Washington
was also engaged in diplomatic efforts, albeit unsuccessful, to break the political impasse in
the West African nation. The Clinton Administration sent civil rights leader Jesse Jackson,
then-U.N. Ambassador Bill Richardson, and former Ambassador Donald McHenry as envoys
to convince Abacha to implement reforms.
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In response to the execution of nine Ogoni activists in 1995, the Clinton Administration
recalled its ambassador and pushed a resolution at the U.N. General Assembly that
condemned Nigeria’s action. The imprisonment of Moshood Abiola and many others was a
contentious issue in U.S.-Nigerian relations. In its Country Report on Human Rights
Practices for 1997, the Department of State wrote: “The human rights record remained
dismal. Throughout the year, Abacha’s Government relied regularly on arbitrary detention
and harassment to silence its most outspoken critics.” The report further stated that security
forces “continued to commit extrajudicial killings and use excessive force to quell anti-
government protests as well as to combat crime, resulting in the death or injury of many
individuals, including innocent civilians.” Human rights groups reported the torture of
prisoners and constant harassment of journalists under the Abacha regime.
Washington’s concern was not limited to human rights abuse allegations. Drug
trafficking by Nigeria has emerged as a major issue in U.S.-Nigerian relations since the mid-
1980s. Although Nigeria is not a drug-producing country, it has become a major transit
point. An estimated 35-40% of all the heroin coming into the United States is brought by
Nigerian couriers. In 1989, the United States and Nigeria established a joint Counter-
Narcotics Task Force. Lack of cooperation by Nigerian authorities in combating the drug
trafficking problem led to a decision by the Clinton Administration in March 1998, as in 1994
and 1996, to put Nigeria on the State Department’s list of non-cooperative drug trafficking
nations, which includes Burma and Iran. As a consequence, the U.S. had to vote “no” on all
loans to Nigeria being considered by the World Bank and the African Development Bank, and
Nigeria was ineligible for any Export-Import Bank financing of U.S. exports.
In March 2000, however, President Clinton provided a waiver, a Vital National Interests
Certification, for Nigeria in order to allow support for the democratic transition program.
According to the U.S. Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA), Nigeria’s anti narcotic efforts
remain “unfocused and lacking in material support.” According to the DEA (Lagos), despite
the new government’s efforts in dealing with the problem, “Nigerian law enforcement
agencies did not significantly improve their counter-drug performance in 1999”
[http://www.usembassy.state.gov/nigeria/]. Nigerian authorities point to the government’s
active cooperation with U.S. officials and increased funds appropriated by the Nigerian
government to fight drug trafficking. In March 2001, however, the Bush Administration
certified that Nigeria was fully cooperating with U.S. officials. According to a U.S. embassy
(Lagos) press release, “in spite of continued problems with corruption and a weak judicial
system, the Nigerian government has shown a commitment to improving its efforts in fighting
organized crime and drug trafficking [http://usembassy.state.gov/nigeria].”
Through legislative action, Members of Congress were active concerning Nigeria. In
1994, the House of Representatives passed H.Con.Res. 151, which called for additional
measures against the military junta by the Clinton Administration. A bill calling for the
imposition of sanctions and freezing of assets was introduced in 1996 by then-Senator Nancy
Kassebaum and Representative Donald Payne. Although the bill enjoyed significant bipartisan
support, it did not move out of committees, in part because of opposition by Members of
Congress who favor dialogue with the Nigerian government. Pro-Nigerian groups and some
American business interests actively opposed the bill (The Washington Post, November 24,
1996). The Nigerian Democracy Act, introduced by Representative Donald Payne and
Representative Amo Houghton in 1997 (to be discussed below), contained similar provisions,
including a ban on new U.S. corporate investment in Nigeria. In May 1998 House
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International Relations Committee Chairman Benjamin A. Gilman and Representative Donald
M. Payne introduced the Nigerian Democracy and Civil Society Empowerment Act (H.R.
3890), calling for additional sanctions and increased U.S. aid to democratic opposition
groups. The bill was also introduced in the Senate in May 1998 by Senators Feingold,
Jeffords, Leahy, and Wellstone. The bill was sent to committees in both houses, but the 105th
Congress did not act further on either piece of legislation.
Conflicts within the Clinton Administration regarding the appropriate strategy toward
Nigeria while under the control of Abacha surfaced in speeches given by senior
Administration officials and President Clinton in early 1998. Assistant Secretary of State for
African Affairs Dr. Susan Rice stated in a speech on March 17, 1998, that the United States
would hold “General Abacha to his 3-year-old promise to undertake a genuine transition to
civilian rule this year and to establish a level playing field by allowing free political activity,
providing for an open press, and ending political detention. Let me state clearly and
unequivocally to you today that an election victory by any military candidate in the
forthcoming presidential elections would be unacceptable.” In late March, President Clinton
stated that U.S. policy toward Nigeria was “to do all that we can to persuade General Abacha
to move toward general democracy and respect for human rights, release of political
prisoners, and the holding of elections.” Referring to General Abacha’s rumored candidacy,
however, President Clinton seemed to contradict Rice by suggesting that “if [Abacha] stands
for election we hope he will stand as a civilian.” President Clinton’s March statement led
some critics to question the Administration’s policy toward Abacha and the military junta.
The Administration came to a final decision on May 28, saying that the proposed
transition was clearly “unacceptable” as long as Abacha remained the single candidate and
that current sanctions would remain (The Washington Post, May 29, 1998). Following
Abacha’s death, State Department spokesman James P. Rubin stated that Abubakar had “a
historic opportunity to open the political process and institute a swift and credible transition
to civilian democratic rule.” Rubin said that Washington would “accept” only a transition that
included “three things: first, freeing political prisoners; second, ensuring respect for the basic
freedoms of speech, press, and assembly; and third, returning the Nigerian army to its rightful
position as a professional armed force committed to defending the constitution and civilian
rule.” U.S. officials had anticipated that Abubakar would be more cooperative with the
United States because he received military training here. On June 14, 1998, President Clinton
called Abubakar and “underscored our desire for improved bilateral relations in the context
of Nigeria taking swift and significant steps toward a successful transition to a democratically-
elected government” (Associated Press, June 14, 1998).
The U.S. officials who met with Abubakar in July 1998 reported that he appeared very
receptive to implementing the transition to democracy, although he would continue
consultations before releasing the final details of the transition. Critics asserted that the
United States should have pushed harder for Abiola’s unconditional release in order for him
to consult with advisers rather than consent to renouncing his title under political pressure.
Critics also warned that a hands-off policy could enable the regime to proceed slowly with
reforms that may escalate civil conflict to the point of war in which ethnic rivalries could erupt
on a massive scale. The Clinton Administration, nonetheless, welcomed Abubakar’s
transition program, and on October 30, 1998, the U.S. State Department announced that the
Secretary, after consulting with Members of Congress, has terminated a Presidential
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Proclamation that restricted entry into the United States by high-ranking Nigerian officials and
their family members.
The United States and the Obasanjo Government
Relations between Washington and Abuja began to improve shortly after General
Abubakar assumed power. In September 1998, Abubakar visited the United States for the
U.N. General Assembly meeting, and also came to Washington to meet with President Clinton
at the White House. After the meeting, Abubakar said President Clinton told him that if
Nigeria stayed on its democratic course, the United States was prepared to help win some
debt relief from international lending institutions and might also allow the resumption of direct
air links between the U.S. and Nigeria. U.S. Secretary of State Madeleine Albright also
praised Abubakar for “taking steps to bring Nigeria back into the world community.”1 U.S.
officials applauded Abubakar’s transition program and warmly welcomed the transfer of
power to an elected civilian government and promised to work closely with the Obasanjo
government.
In mid-October 1999, then Secretary of State Albright visited Nigeria and met with
senior government officials and civil society groups. At a press briefing following her Africa
tour, Secretary Albright stated that the government and people of Nigeria are “engaged in a
dramatic and high-stakes struggle to establish a viable democratic system.” She said President
Obasanjo “appears truly committed to jump-starting the economy, fighting corruption and
resolving regional problems that remain a source of unrest within Nigeria.”In late October
1999, President Obasanjo met with President Clinton and other senior government officials
in Washington. At a White House press briefing, President Clinton said that “it is very much
in America’s interests that Nigeria succeed, and therefore we should assist them in their
success. We intend to increase our assistance to Nigeria to expand law-enforcement
cooperation and to work toward an agreement to stimulate trade and investment between us.
We intend to do what we can to help Nigeria recover assets plundered by the previous
regime.” President Clinton stated that the United States will support “generous debt
rescheduling through the Paris Club and encourage other countries to take further steps.”
In a meeting with President Obasanjo in Abuja on August 26, 2000, President Clinton
stated that the United States is “committed to working with the people of Nigeria to help
build stronger institutions, improve education, fight disease, crime and corruption, ease the
burden of debt and promote trade and investment in a way that brings more of the benefits
of prosperity to people who have embraced democracy.” Clinton also made an
unprecedented address before the Nigerian parliament in which he underscored the major
issues facing Nigeria today, including democratization and ethnic and religious strife.
President Clinton announced a number of new initiatives during his Nigeria visit. He pledged
$60 million for AIDS vaccine research and more than $20 million for Obasanjo’s campaigns
against malaria, polio, and HIV/AIDS. He also praised Nigeria’s regional leadership and
promised continued U.S. support for the West African peacekeeping mission in Sierra Leone.
He pledged continued U.S. support for education, including the provision of Internet access
through the work of NGOs and universities.
1 The New York Times, September 25, 1998.
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In May 2001, President Obasanjo met with President Bush and other senior officials in
Washington. President Bush stated that the United States is “in the process of helping
provide technical assistance to Nigerian troops so that they are better able to keep those
peace missions.” At a joint White House press conference, President Bush pledged $200
million into a new global fund for HIV/AIDS. President Obasanjo said he discussed a number
of issues of mutual interest, including the conflicts in Angola, Democratic Republic of Congo,
and Sierra Leone.
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Nigeria
($ millions, fiscal years)
Program
1992
1993
1994
1995
1996
1997
1998
1999
2000
2001
DA
4.300
22.80
5.893
6.520
1.670
4.100
3.500
10
10.500
32.833
CSD
--
--
--
--
--
--
3.500
6.8
17.000
22.167
ESF
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
6.9
20.000
25.000
FMF
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
--
10.000
--
Grants
P. Corps
.742
.872
1.047
.429
--
--
--
--
--
--
IMET
.401
.450
--
--
--
--
--
.090
.600
.650
Total
5.443
24.12
6.940
6.949
1.670
4.100
7.000
23.80
58.100
80.650
DA=Development Assistance
CSD=Child Survival and Disease Programs Fund
ESF=Economic Support Fund
P. Corps=Peace Corps
IMET=International Military Education and Training
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
Testimony by Assistant Secretary of State for African Affairs Susan Rice before the House
Committee on International Relations. “Prospects for Democracy in Nigeria.” June 25,
1998.
U.S. Congress. House. Committee on International Relations. Subcommittee on Africa.
United States Policy Toward Nigeria. Hearing, 105th Congress, 1st session. September
18, 1997. Washington, U.S. Government Printing Office, 1997. 35 pp.
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FOR ADDITIONAL READING
For an extensive list of Internet resources on Nigeria, including news on politics, the
economy, and the culture, see [http://www-sul.stanford.edu/depts/ssrg/africa/nigeria.html].
Boustany, Nora. “Quiet Confidence in Nigeria’s Future.” The Washington Post. November
11, 1998. A30 p.
Onishi, Norimitsu. “Hopeful but Skeptical, Nigerians Await Democracy.” The New York
Times. November 9, 1998. A3 p.
Rupert, James. “Denied Wealth, Nigeria’s Poor Take Dire Steps.” The Washington Post.
November 6, 1998. A17 p.
U.S. Department of State Press Statement. “End to Special Visa Restrictions on Certain
Nigerian Nationals.” October 30, 1998.
CRS Reports
CRS Report 98-484. Nigeria: A Chronology, June 1996 - March 1998, by Theodros Dagne.
CRS Report 98-651. Nigeria in Political Transition and U.S. Policy, by Theodros Dagne,
with the assistance of Jaimie Morse.
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