Order Code RL30892
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Drug Certification Requirements and
Proposed Congressional Modifications in 2001
Updated November 6, 2001
K. Larry Storrs
Specialist in Latin American Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
Drug Certification Requirements and
Proposed Congressional Modifications in 2001
Summary
Since the mid-1980s, Congress has required the President to certify that specified
drug producing and drug-transit countries are cooperating fully with the United States
in counter-narcotics efforts in order to avoid a series of sanctions, including
suspension of U.S. foreign assistance and financing, and opposition to loans in the
multilateral development banks. The sanctions would also apply if the Congress,
within 30 calendar days, passes a joint resolution of disapproval to overturn the
presidential certification, however, any resolution would be subject to veto.
Over the years, spokesmen from many countries have complained about the
unilateral and non-cooperative nature of the drug certification requirements, and have
urged the United States to end the process and to rely upon various multilateral
methods of evaluation that have been developed. Mexico, often the focus of
congressional debate, particularly expressed dissatisfaction with the process, even
though it was regularly certified as being a fully cooperative country. Following the
July 2000 election of opposition candidate Vicente Fox as President of Mexico,
legislative measures were introduced to modify the drug certification requirements,
and these initiatives were mentioned when President Bush met with President Fox in
Mexico in mid-February 2001, and in the United States in early September 2001.
Major legislative options initially considered were (1) retain the existing drug
certification procedures; (2) suspend the certification process for two years and urge
a high level multinational conference to develop a more effective multilateral strategy;
(3) exempt Mexico from the certification process for one year and require a
comprehensive bilateral U.S.-Mexico counter-narcotics plan within a short period; (4)
modify the drug certification requirements in FY2002-FY2004 to require the
President to identify only those countries which are failing to cooperate adequately
and are subject to sanctions; and (5) provide that drug certification requirements not
apply to countries which have concluded and made progress on bilateral counter-
narcotics agreements with the United States.
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved and reported out a substitute
version of S. 219 on April 5, 2001, with elements from the various proposed
modifications, and on September 4, 2001, it reported out S. 1401, the Foreign
Relations Authorization for FY2002-FY2003, with Sections 741-745 containing
similar provisions. These provisions would modify the existing drug certification
procedures for FY2002-FY2004, require the President to designate only the worst
offending countries subject to sanctions, and encourage the convening of a high-level
conference to develop an effective multilateral strategy.
On October 24, 2001, the Senate passed the Foreign Operations Appropriations
for FY2002 (H.R. 2506), with an amendment by Senators Dodd and Hutchison
(S.Amdt. 1959), that generally incorporated the provisions of S. 219 and S. 1401 as
reported, except that the modifications would apply only to FY2002 and would apply
only to countries in the Western Hemisphere.
Contents
Existing Drug Certification Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Past Experience and Reform Efforts . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Early Legislative Options,
with Possible Advantages and Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Retain the Current Drug Certification Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Possible Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Possible Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Suspend the Certification Process for All Countries for Two Years
and Encourage the Early Convening of a High-Level
Conference to Develop an Effective Multilateral Strategy . . . . . . . . . . 6
Possible Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Possible Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Exempt Mexico from Certification Requirements for a Year, and
Require a Comprehensive Plan for Enhanced Bilateral
Cooperation within a Short Period . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Possible Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Possible Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Modify Drug Certification Requirements in FY2002-FY2004 to
Require the President to Identify Only Those Countries
That Are Subject to Sanctions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Possible Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Possible Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Provide that Drug Certification Requirements Not Apply to
Countries with Which the United States Has Bilateral
Counter-Narcotics Agreements and Other Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Possible Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Possible Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Later Options with Major Legislative Activity . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Modify Certification Requirements for FY2002-FY2004, Require
President to Designate Countries Subject to Sanctions,
Encourage Development of Multilateral Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Possible Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Possible Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Modify Certification Process for FY2002 for Western Hemisphere
Countries; President to Designate Countries Subject to Sanctions,
Convene Multilateral Conference . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Possible Advantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Possible Disadvantages . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Active Legislative Measures in 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
S. 219 in Nature of Substitute – Modify Certification Process in
FY2002-FY2004, Require President to Designate Countries
Subject to Sanctions, Develop Multilateral Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
S. 1401, Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2002-FY2003,
Sections 741-745 – Modify Certification Process in
FY2002-FY2004, Require President to Designate Countries
Subject to Sanctions, Develop Multilateral Strategy . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
H.R. 2506, Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2002 –
Modify Certification Process for FY2002 for Western
Hemisphere Countries; President to Designate Countries
Subject to Sanctions, Convene Multilateral Conference . . . . . . . . . . 13
Drug Certification Requirements and
Proposed Congressional Modifications
in 2001
This report provides (1) a brief summary of the existing drug certification
requirements for drug producing and drug-transit countries; (2) background on the
experience, criticisms, and reform efforts under these provisions; (3) a summary of
early congressional options and proposals advanced in 2001, with possible advantages
and disadvantages; (4) a summary of later initiatives with legislative activity; and (5)
a tracking of legislative action on the major initiatives.1 Similar material is presented
in a different way under the main headings.
Existing Drug Certification Requirements
Since the mid-1980s, with some modifications in procedure, Congress has
required the President to certify that certain countries are cooperating fully with the
United States in counter-narcotics efforts in order to avoid the suspension of U.S.
foreign assistance. Sections 489-490 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as
amended, require the President to designate the major illicit drug producing and drug-
transit countries by November 1st of each year. These sections further require the
President to withhold 50% of U.S. assistance for the designated countries for that
fiscal year until he certifies by March 1st of each year that the countries have
cooperated fully with the United States in drug control efforts, or have taken adequate
steps on their own to achieve the goals and objectives of the 1988 United Nations
Drug Convention.2
In the event the President is unable to certify that a country is fully cooperative,
or to determine that a less than fully cooperative country should be given a
certification in the national interest, certain sanctions apply to the countries denied
certification. Among the sanctions applied to decertified countries are the following:
(1) most foreign assistance and financing of sales for the decertified country are
suspended, with the exception of counter-narcotics and humanitarian aid; (2) U.S.
representatives are required to vote against loans for the country in the multilateral
1 The initial version of this report drew from a CRS memorandum prepared for the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee and was used with the permission of the Committee.
2 For more detail, see U.S. Department of State, Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs, Fact Sheet: Majors List and the Certification Process, March 1, 2001,
available on internet at [http://www.state.gov/g/inl/rls/fs/index.cfm?docide=1130]; and CRS
Report 98-159, Narcotics Certification of Drug Producing and Trafficking Nations: Questions
and Answers, by Raphael F. Perl.
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development banks; and (3) certain trade sanctions, including increased tariffs and
denial of preferential trade benefits, may be applied at the President’s discretion. The
imposed sanctions remain in force until the country is certified.
The sanctions would also apply if the Congress, within 30 calendar days, passes
a joint resolution of disapproval to overturn the presidential certification, thereby
decertifying a country. However, any such congressional resolution would be subject
to a presidential veto, and would require a two-thirds vote of both houses to override.
On March 1, 2001, in the most recent presidential certifications under these
provisions, President Bush certified 20 of the 24 designated drug producing or transit
countries as fully cooperative in counter-narcotics efforts, and he granted vital
national interest certifications to Cambodia and Haiti. Only two countries –
Afghanistan and Burma – were decertified and subject to the sanctions. President
Bush’s determinations were very similar to the determinations of President Clinton in
the previous year, except that Nigeria and Paraguay were elevated from national
interest waiver status to fully cooperative status. By the end of the 30-day period for
congressional review of presidential drug certifications, no resolutions of disapproval
had been introduced to disapprove President Bush’s certification of Mexico or any
other country.
Past Experience and Reform Efforts
Over the years, as U.S. presidential certification decisions were prepared and
announced, spokesmen from many countries (particularly Mexico, which has often
been the focus of congressional debate) have complained about the unilateral and non-
cooperative nature of the drug certification requirements, and have urged the United
States to end the process and to adopt more multilateral methods of evaluation.
Particularly in the context of Latin America and the Caribbean, the most commonly
mentioned multilateral forum for counter-narcotics evaluation is the Multilateral
Evaluation Mechanism (MEM) developed by the Inter-American Drug Abuse Control
Commission (CICAD) of the Organization of American States (OAS) 3
While Mexico has been fully certified each year by a series of U.S. presidents,
congressional resolutions to disapprove Mexico’s certification were introduced in
3 Following up on the Hemispheric Anti-Drug Strategy of 1996 and the Plan of Action of
Summit of the Americas II (1998) in Santiago, Chile, the CICAD agreed upon the Multilateral
Evaluation Mechanism (MEM) in 1999, and a CICAD working group developed a
questionnaire with 61 indicators to which governments responded for the first time in 2000.
A Governmental Experts Group, made up of one representative from each country, assessed
achievements in 1999-2000 for all countries except their own country. The resulting overview
Hemispheric Report and the individual National Reports make assessments and
recommendations for future action. Critics argue that the reports are preliminary, bland, and
without any sanctions. Proponents argue that the reports make important recommendations,
that the MEM process will advance beyond this first effort, and that countries care about their
performance under the agreed upon criteria. For more detail on the CICAD and the MEM,
see CICAD’s internet site at [http://www.cicad.oas.org/en/mem/Main.htm].
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1987, 1988, 1997, 1998, and 1999, and congressional criticisms of Mexico’s
certifications were voiced in many years.4 Resolutions of disapproval failed to reach
floor action in most years, but both houses passed separate versions of weakened
resolutions of disapproval in 1997, and a Senate resolution of disapproval reached the
floor but was defeated in 1998.5
Responding to domestic and international criticisms, measures to modify the
drug certification requirements were introduced but not enacted in 1997. In the lower
house, the House International Relations Committee reported out H.R. 1486, the
Foreign Policy Reform Act, with Section 403, proposed by Representative Hamilton,
which would have eliminated the presidential certification, congressional review, and
sanctions against countries under the certification process. Instead, it would have
required the President to continue to report yearly, and to consult regularly with
Congress on drug control issues. It would have given the President the authority to
withhold bilateral assistance and to oppose multilateral bank financing for countries
that are not fully cooperative if he found those measures to be helpful. In the upper
house, an amendment by Senators Dodd and McCain to the Foreign Operations
Appropriations Bill (S. 955) was defeated, which would have suspended the drug
certification requirements for two years, and called upon relevant country leaders to
develop a multilateral framework for improving international cooperation in
counter-narcotics efforts.
Following the July 2000 election of opposition candidate Vicente Fox as
President of Mexico, bills were introduced but not enacted to exempt Mexico from
the drug certification requirement in FY2001. However, the Senate did pass S. Res.
366 in October 2000, expressing the sense of the Senate that a one-year waiver was
warranted for Mexico so that the new presidents in Mexico and the United States
could develop more effective and cooperative counter-narcotics programs.
In late January 2001, Senator Dodd introduced S. 219 to suspend the existing
drug certification process for two years and encourage a high-level conference to
develop an effective multilateral strategy. In mid-February 2001, Senator Kay Bailey
Hutchison introduced S. 353 to exempt Mexico from the drug certification
requirement in FY2001 but require enhanced bilateral counter-narcotics cooperation.
About the same time, Senator Grassley and Senator DeWine introduced S. 376 to
modify the certification process for FY2002-FY2004 to require the President to
identify only those countries that are failing to cooperate fully with the United States
in drug control efforts.
In mid-February 2001, on the eve of President Bush’s visit with President Fox
in Mexico, the Senate passed S.Con.Res. 13 expressing the sense of the Congress that
the President should work with the President of Mexico to advance bilateral
cooperation. The measure urged the President to seek, among other things, “to
4 For details on the certification process and an illustration of the possible consequences of
decertification of Mexico, see CRS Report RL30080, Mexico and Drug Certification in
1999: Consequences of Decertification, March 4, 1999, by K. Larry Storrs.
5 For more detail, see CRS Report 98-174, Mexican Drug Certification Issues: U.S.
Congressional Action, 1986-2001, by K. Larry Storrs.
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review the current illicit drug certification process, and should seek to be open to
consideration of other evaluation mechanisms that would promote increased
cooperation and effectiveness in combating the illicit drug trade.” During the joint
press conference following the meeting in Mexico, President Bush indicated that there
was a movement in Congress to review the drug certification requirements, and he
expressed confidence in President Fox’s efforts to combat drug trafficking.
In late February and early March, additional measures were introduced to modify
the existing drug certification procedures. On February 27, 2001, Representative
Kolbe introduced H.R. 753 to exempt Mexico from the drug certification
requirements in FY2001. On March 1, 2001, Senators Boxer and Gramm introduced
S. 435 to provide that the drug certification procedures would not apply to countries
with which the United States has bilateral counter-narcotics agreements; and
Representative Reyes introduced H.R. 841 to suspend the certification procedures for
two years and encourage development of an effective multilateral strategy.
On March 1, 2001, the same day that the President certified that Mexico was
cooperating fully with the United States in counter-narcotics areas, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee held a hearing in which several of the proposed modifications
to the drug certification requirements were discussed. Assistant Secretary of State
for International Law Enforcement Affairs Rand Beers testified that the certification
process had been “an effective, if blunt, policy instrument” but he recognized a
growing sense in Congress that there may be more effective approaches. He added:
“Any regime that might modify or replace certification should have an enforcement
mechanism to ensure continued international counternarcotics cooperation. If there
were efforts to suspend the certification procedure, we believe the President must
retain in the interim the power to decertify or sanction individual countries using the
standards of the current process. We do not believe that there should be exemptions
for individual countries or regions at this time. Future carve-outs may be appropriate,
however, for regions where there is a mutually acceptable and credible multilateral
evaluative mechanism in place.”
On April 3, 2001, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee reported out S. 219
with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, with elements from the various
proposals, that would suspend the existing drug certification procedures for three
years, require the President to designate only the worst offenders subject to sanctions,
and encourage a high-level conference to develop effective multilateral drug reduction
and prevention strategies. On August 1, 2001, the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee approved S. 1401, the Foreign Relations Authorizations Act for FY2002-
FY2003, with the provisions of the previously reported S. 219 incorporated as
Sections 741-745 in Title VII, Subtitle D, Reform of Certification Procedures
Applicable to Certain Drug Producing or Trafficking Countries. The Committee
reported out S. 1401(S.Rept. 107-60) on September 4, 2001, and the measure was
placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar.
During President Fox’s official state visit to the United States on September 5-7,
2001, the Mexican President, in addressing a joint session of Congress, called upon
Congress to pass legislation to suspend the drug certification requirements as a
gesture of trust and faith in the new government, arguing that “trust requires that one
partner not be judged unilaterally by the other.” Following the Bush-Fox talks, the
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joint communique praised the growing law enforcement cooperation between the
countries, expressed support for the OAS’ multilateral evaluation of counter-narcotics
efforts, and noted President Bush’s commitment “to work with the U.S. Congress, on
a priority basis, to replace the annual counter-narcotics certification regime with new
measures designed to enhance international cooperation in this area.”
On October 24, 2001, the Senate passed the Foreign Operations Appropriations
for FY2002 (H.R. 2506), with an amendment by Senators Dodd and Hutchison
(Senate Amendment 1959), that generally incorporated the provisions of S. 219 as
reported, except that the modifications would apply only to FY2002 and would apply
only to countries in the Western Hemisphere.
Early Legislative Options,
with Possible Advantages and Disadvantages
Retain the Current Drug Certification Process
Congress could leave the present drug certification process in place, and make
no changes to existing legislation.
Possible Advantages. It is argued that leaving the system intact would
provide continuity with a process that has been in place for many years, and, which,
arguably, has produced results. According to this view, the certification process has
encouraged the executive branch to place a high priority on foreign drug trafficking
activities, and it has forced the countries to take appropriate actions throughout the
year.6 It is viewed by many as a legitimate exercise in accountability that requires
recipients of U.S. foreign assistance to cooperate with the United States in important
matters. Although countries may express opposition to the certification process,
nearly all drug producing or transit countries have been given full certification, or a
national interest certification, and have had little fear of sanctions.
Among Latin American and Caribbean countries, only Colombia and Panama
have ever been decertified. Despite Mexico’s argument that the certification process
is harmful to bilateral cooperation, the United States and Mexico have cooperated
extensively in recent years through the yearly cabinet-level Binational Commission,
the twice yearly High-Level Contact Group on Narcotics Abuse, and the quarterly
Plenary Group on Law Enforcement. Acting through these groups, the countries
agreed upon an Anti-Drug Alliance in 1997, a joint anti-drug strategy in 1998, law
enforcement coordination in 1999, and anti-money laundering initiatives in 2000. The
United States has also been heavily involved in training Mexican military and law
enforcement officials in recent years. Proponents of the existing process would argue
that the procedure has encouraged bilateral discussion and agreement on counter-drug
policies for all countries.
6 See the statements of Representative Benjamin Gilman and Senator Charles Grassley before
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, March 1, 2001, for defense of the certification
process.
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Possible Disadvantages. It is argued that the existing system is unilateral,
punitive, arbitrary, and counter-productive. It places blame upon the drug producing
and transit countries while neglecting the large responsibility posed by the demand for
drugs in the United States. It is viewed as harmful to the absolutely essential
cooperation needed with neighbors and allies, not only in counter-narcotics efforts,
but in other areas as well.7 In the context of U.S.-Mexico relations, it is argued that
retaining the system might harm the spirit of the Fox-Bush meetings, and miss the
opportunity to establish exceptionally friendly relations with the new Fox
Administration in Mexico. President Fox has stated that the certification process is
unilateral and counterproductive, even if Mexico is fully certified. Despite the pattern
of accomplishments in the past, it might be argued that the achievements might have
been greater without the certification process. Moreover, in a more cooperative
environment, Mexico may be more willing and able to address politically difficult
issues like corruption and extradition.
Suspend the Certification Process for All Countries for Two
Years and Encourage the Early Convening of a High-Level
Conference to Develop an Effective Multilateral Strategy
On January 30, 2001, Senators Dodd, McCain, Hollings, and Hagel introduced
S. 219 in the Senate, to suspend the existing drug certification process for all
countries for the two fiscal years following enactment, unless the President
determined that the certification of one or more countries would advance U.S. drug
control goals. Finding that the annual certification process does not foster effective
bilateral or multilateral cooperation with the United States, the bill expresses the sense
of Congress that the President should take advantage of the period of suspension to
convene a conference of drug producing, transit, and consuming countries at the
earliest feasible date in 2001 to develop an effective multilateral strategy, and to
transmit to Congress no later than one year after enactment the necessary legislation
to implement a new strategy. On March 1, 2001, Representative Reyes introduced
H.R. 841 in the House with similar provisions.
Possible Advantages. Suspension of the certification process for two years
would eliminate the unilateral procedure for all countries, and would provide time for
the development of a more effective multilateral strategy, with necessary legislation
to be transmitted to Congress. In comparison to another proposed approach, this
option would not single out Mexico for preferential treatment, and would establish
a basis for a broad-based multilateral strategy. Since it gives the President the option
to make certifications and impose sanctions if considered useful, it would seem to
meet the criteria specified by the Bush Administration in the March 1st hearing.
7 See the statements by Senators Christopher Dodd, Barbara Boxer, Charles Grassley, Kay
Bailey Hutchison, and by Representative Silvestre Reyes in the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee hearing, March 1, 2001, for some criticisms of the certification process. For other
critical views, see the information and linkages on U.S. Drug Certification on the home page
[http://www.wola.org] of the Washington Office on Latin America (WOLA), and on the
Internet site [http://www.lawg.org/drugcontrol.htm] of the Latin America Working Group
(LAWG).
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Possible Disadvantages. Suspending the process for all countries may be
unwise if the main target is Mexico, and developing a broad-based multilateral
strategy may be unmanageable and unachievable. At the urging of then President
Zedillo of Mexico, the U.N. Special Session on Drug Control was held in June 1998,
but the results were fairly limited. For those who favor the existing certification
requirements, a disadvantage of suspension for two years would be the danger that
it could lead to permanent suspension of the requirements. The proposed legislation
to suspend the process for two years was not passed in time to prevent any harm to
relations with Mexico from the March 2001 certification decision, but discussion of
the modification may have softened the action, and passage this year would set a new
pattern for the future. Since the State Department’s annual International Narcotics
Control Strategy Report (INCSR) would still be made under this proposed
legislation, Mexico and other countries might still take offense at this unilateral and
often somewhat critical evaluation of drug control efforts.
Exempt Mexico from Certification Requirements for a Year,
and Require a Comprehensive Plan for Enhanced Bilateral
Cooperation within a Short Period
On February 15, 2001, Senator Kay Bailey Hutchison with 6 cosponsors
introduced S. 353 in the Senate, that would exempt Mexico from the drug
certification requirements in FY2001, and would require development of a
comprehensive plan of proposals by June 30, 2001 for enhanced counter-narcotics
cooperation between the United States and Mexico. On February 27, 2001,
Representative Kolbe introduced H.R. 753 in the House with similar provisions.
Possible Advantages. Exempting Mexico from the certification
requirements for a year would avoid the possible harmful effects of a certification
decision on relations between the two countries in an early period of the Fox-Bush
relationship. While not in time to avoid any negative effects caused by the March
2001 certification, discussion of exemption may have acted to soften the damage, and
it would prevent any harmful effects next year if the legislation were modified to cover
FY2002. Requiring the President to provide a comprehensive plan for bilateral
Mexico-U.S. counter-narcotics cooperation within a short period of time would place
the issue in a more manageable bilateral context with two of the most important
actors, and it would require President Bush and President Fox to make this a priority
issue.
Possible Disadvantages. This option singles out Mexico for very special
treatment, and may result in criticisms from other countries. It would seem to lack
presidential support since the Administration has expressed opposition to exemptions
for individual countries or regions. The fact that it leaves the drug certification
procedure in place may also bring criticism from various countries, including Mexico.
Moreover, as indicated above, the continued issuance of the INCSR may be viewed
in a negative light by Mexico, even if it is exempted from certification. As written,
S. 353 and H.R. 753 would be unable to prevent any negative effects from the March
2001 certification for FY2001 already issued, but similar legislation could be
proposed to cover FY2002.
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Modify Drug Certification Requirements in FY2002-FY2004 to
Require the President to Identify Only Those Countries That
Are Subject to Sanctions
On February 15, 2001, Senators Grassley and DeWine introduced S. 376, that
would modify the certification process for FY2002-FY2004 to require the President
to identify only those countries that are to be subject to sanctions (i.e. those countries
found not to be cooperating fully with the United States in drug control efforts), with
provision for exclusion of countries from sanctions on national security grounds.
Under this proposal, for a 3-year trial period, beginning in the coming fiscal year, all
countries would be assumed to be fully cooperating with the United States in counter-
narcotics efforts, and the President would be required only to identify those
presumably few countries that are not fully cooperative and consequently subject to
the sanctions. It also requires the identification and description of major drug
trafficking organizations in the INCSR as well as the traditional material.
Possible Advantages. This option retains major elements of the certification
process but places emphasis upon the countries that are not cooperating fully with the
United States. Following the pattern of the provisions for imposing sanctions on
countries engaging in state-supported terrorism or a pattern of human rights abuse,
it would give most countries the benefit of the doubt and single out only those
countries engaging in non-cooperative behavior. It also requires the Administration
to provide additional information on major drug trafficking organizations in the
INCSR in addition to the standard coverage. Since this option retains sanctions for
non-cooperating countries, it would seem to meet the criteria specified by the Bush
Administration.
Possible Disadvantages. Since this measure retains the unilateral evaluation
of the certification process with the threat of sanctions, it would be subject to many
of the criticisms voiced about the existing process, and it is only in effect for a three
year trial period. While focusing on the countries subject to sanctions, the proposed
procedures might continue to generate the type of congressional debate that was
considered to be harmful by many countries as questions are raised about the initial
identification of non-cooperative countries, the final determination of countries
subject to sanctions, the omission of countries subject to sanctions for national
security reasons, and Congress’ power to identify a country subject to sanctions.
Provide that Drug Certification Requirements Not Apply to
Countries with Which the United States Has Bilateral Counter-
Narcotics Agreements and Other Plans
On March 1, 2001, Senators Boxer and Gramm introduced S. 435 to provide
that the drug certification procedures and sanctions would not apply to countries with
which the United States has bilateral agreements and other plans related to counter-
narcotics efforts. Under this proposal the certification procedures would not apply
if the President determined by December 31 of that fiscal year, after consultation with
relevant agencies, that a country had a bilateral counter-narcotics agreement with the
United States and had made progress in accordance with the agreement. The
agreement and other plans with the United States would have to be consistent with
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major international agreements, address specified major issues, and include timetables
and objective and measurable standards. The President would be required to report
by the end of December and June on the progress of such countries.
Possible Advantages. By exempting from the certification process
countries that concluded and made progress on bilateral counter-narcotics
agreements, this option would encourage regular and sustained bilateral consultation
regarding goals and progress in counter-drug efforts with all countries while avoiding
any harmful effects from certification decisions. It would place emphasis upon more
manageable bilateral discussions and give all countries the opportunity to be exempted
from the certification process if they met the required conditions, rather than
legislatively singling out any country or region for special consideration. The
requirement for twice yearly reports, at the end of December and June, would make
it likely that counter-narcotics issues would be given a high priority. Since this
proposal leaves the certification procedure in place and requires a presidential
determination for exemption, it would seem to meet the criteria of the Bush
Administration.
Possible Disadvantages. While exempting a country with a bilateral
agreement from the certification process, this proposal requires the President to make
a determination that a county has concluded an adequate counter-narcotics agreement
with the United States under specified criteria and that progress is being made in
accordance with the agreement. These presidential determinations are fairly similar
to presidential decisions about certification, and countries may object to them nearly
as much as certification decisions because they are unilateral U.S. decisions, even if
accompanied with bilateral consultations. It could also be argued that the proposal
sets up a two-stage procedure that might be burdensome and irritating – first a
decision to determine whether a country has an adequate bilateral plan and has made
sufficient progress for exemption, and then, in the event of inadequate progress, a
determination on certification. Moreover, by requiring twice yearly reports, the
provision could be seen as even more burdensome than the certification procedure.
The fact that Congress appears to have no role in reviewing the presidential decisions
under this proposal would be seen as advantageous by some, but would be seen as
strongly disadvantageous by others.
Later Options with Major Legislative Activity
Modify Certification Requirements for FY2002-FY2004, Require
President to Designate Countries Subject to Sanctions,
Encourage Development of Multilateral Strategy
On April 3, 2001, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee marked up and
reported out S. 219 with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, with elements
from several of the previously mentioned proposals. On August 1, 2001, the Senate
Foreign Relations Committee approved S. 1401, the Foreign Relations Authorizations
Act for FY2002-FY2003, with the provisions of the previously reported S. 219
incorporated as Sections 741-745 in Title VII, Subtitle D, Reform of Certification
Procedures Applicable to Certain Drug Producing or Trafficking Countries. The
CRS-10
Committee reported out S. 1401 (S.Rept. 107-60) on September 4, 2001, and the
measure was placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar.
As reported, S. 219 and Sections 741-745 of S. 1401 would modify the existing
drug certification procedures for FY2002 to FY2004. In place of the existing
requirements, the bill would require the President to identify by October 1 of each
year major drug-transit or major illicit drug-producing countries and to designate each
of such countries that has failed demonstrably, during the previous 12 months, to
make substantial efforts to adhere to its obligations under international
counternarcotics agreements (multilateral and bilateral) and other standards. U.S.
assistance would be withheld from any designated countries unless the President
determined that the provision of assistance was vital to the national interest of the
United States or until the country made substantial counter-narcotics efforts.
The measures also express the sense of Congress that the United States should,
at the earliest feasible date in 2001, convene a multilateral conference of relevant
countries to develop multilateral drug reduction and prevention strategies, and they
urge the President to request legislative changes to implement the strategies no later
than one year after enactment. They continue the requirement for the yearly
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) detailing the performance
of individual countries, and they add the requirement to report on major drug
trafficking organizations. They also amend the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Designation Act to allow judicial review of executive branch decisions to freeze the
assets of suspected drug kingpins.8
Possible Advantages. One major advantage of the substitute version of S.
219 as reported, and largely duplicated in S. 1401, is that it is a combination of the
other approaches and that it was reported out by the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee with support from the majority and the minority. It would modify the
certification requirements for three years (FY2002-FY2004) and would require the
President to designate only the worst offending countries subject to sanctions, thereby
reducing the diplomatic frictions mentioned above. It would make the grounds for
designation and sanctions more precise, namely that a country has failed
demonstrably, during the previous 12 months, to make substantial efforts to adhere
to its obligations under international counternarcotics agreements (multilateral and
bilateral) and other standards, which are spelled out in detail. At the same time, it
calls upon the President to convene a multilateral conference of relevant countries to
develop multilateral drug reduction and prevention strategies for the future. It retains
the requirement for the annual INCSR report and additionally requires that
information on major drug trafficking organizations be included. It also permits
judicial review of executive branch decisions under the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin
Designation Act.
8 For more detailed comparisons of the existing drug certification procedures and those in
S. 219 and S. 1401 as reported out by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, see CRS
Report RL30949, Drug Certification Procedures: Side-by-side Comparison of Existing
Procedures and S. 219 as Reported, and CRS Report RL30950, Drug Certification
Procedures: A Comparison of Current Law to S. 219 and S. 1401 as Reported, both by K.
Larry Storrs.
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Possible Disadvantages. This approach retains elements of the certification
process, with some of the stated disadvantages, and, on the other hand, it modifies the
certification requirements for three years only, raising the possibility of reinstatement,
with other stated disadvantages. It urges the convening of a multilateral conference
to develop future strategies, with uncertainty about the results from such a multilateral
effort. Since the U.S. determinations would be unilateral, and since the State
Department’s annual International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) would
still be made, Mexico and other countries might still take offense at these often critical
evaluations. Since Congress seems to have no role in reversing the presidential
designations, this could be viewed as advantageous by some and disadvantageous by
others.
Modify Certification Process for FY2002 for Western
Hemisphere Countries; President to Designate Countries
Subject to Sanctions, Convene Multilateral Conference
On October 24, 2001, the Senate passed the Foreign Operations Appropriations
for FY2002 (H.R. 2506), with an amendment by Senators Dodd and Hutchison
(S.Amdt. 1959) that generally incorporated the provisions of S. 219 as reported,
except that the modifications would apply only to FY2002 and would apply only to
countries in the Western Hemisphere. As passed by the Senate, the bill would require
the President to identify by November 30, 2001, the major drug-transit or major illicit
drug-producing countries in the Western Hemisphere and to designate each such
country that has failed demonstrably, during the previous 12 months, to make
substantial efforts to adhere to its obligations under international counter-narcotics
agreements (multilateral and bilateral) and other standards. U.S. assistance would be
withheld from any designated countries unless the President determined that the
provision of assistance was vital to the national interest of the United States or until
the country made substantial counter-narcotics efforts.
Consistent with the provisions of previously reported S. 219, the Senate-passed
Foreign Operations Appropriations bill expresses the sense of Congress that the
United States should at the earliest feasible date convene a multilateral conference of
relevant countries to develop multilateral drug reduction and prevention strategies,
and it urges the President to request legislative changes to implement the strategies
no later than one year after enactment. It continues the requirement for the yearly
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) detailing the performance
of individual countries, and it adds the requirement to report on major drug trafficking
organizations. It also amends the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act to
allow judicial review of executive branch decisions to freeze the assets of suspected
drug kingpins.
Possible Advantages. This approach would have the advantages of the
approach just above, although it would be for only one fiscal year and would apply
only to Western Hemisphere countries. For some this would be advantageous
because it would remove a source of friction in relations with Mexico and other
Western Hemisphere countries for a year, and would allow enough time for the
development of other multilateral strategies.
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Possible Disadvantages. This approach would also have the disadvantages
of the approach just above, but would be limited to one fiscal year. For some, the fact
that the legislation applies only to FY2002 and to Western Hemisphere countries
would be a disadvantage, leaving the process in place for other countries, and raising
the possibility of reinstatement, or a new debate, in the coming year.
Active Legislative Measures in 2001
Building upon the description of the options provided above, this section
provides brief summaries of the major measures with legislative activity in 2001,
focusing on three measures that have been reported out by committee or passed by
the Senate – S. 219, S. 1401, and H.R. 2506. The provisions in S. 219 and S. 1401
are nearly identical, and the provisions in H.R. 2506 are similar, except that they apply
only to FY2002 and to countries in the Western Hemisphere.
S. 219 in Nature of Substitute – Modify Certification Process
in FY2002-FY2004, Require President to Designate Countries
Subject to Sanctions, Develop Multilateral Strategy
S. 219, a free standing bill, was introduced by Senators Dodd, McCain, Hollings,
and Hagel on January 30, 2001, and referred to the Senate Foreign Relations
Committee. Initial Committee consideration on February 7, and March 1, 2001.
On April 3, 2001, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee marked up S. 219
with an amendment in the nature of a substitute, with elements from the various
proposals. As approved, S. 219 would modify the existing drug certification
procedures for a 3-year trial period. In its place, it would require the President to
identify by October 1 of each year major drug-transit or major illicit drug producing
countries and to designate each country that has failed demonstrably, during the
previous 12 months, to make substantial efforts to adhere to its obligations under
international counternarcotics agreements (multilateral and bilateral) and other
standards. U.S. assistance would be withheld from any designated countries unless
the President determined that the provision of assistance was vital to the national
interest of the United States or until the country made substantial counter-narcotics
efforts.
S. 219 as approved also expresses the sense of Congress that the United States
should, at the earliest feasible date in 2001, convene a multilateral conference of
relevant countries to develop multilateral drug reduction and prevention strategies,
and it urges the President to request legislative changes to implement the strategies
no later than one year after enactment. It continues the requirement for the yearly
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) detailing the performance
of individual countries, and it adds the requirement to report on major drug trafficking
organizations. It also amends the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act to
allow judicial review of executive branch decisions to freeze the assets of suspected
CRS-13
drug kingpins.9 The measure was reported out without written report on April 5,
2001, and was placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar on April 5, 2001.
S. 1401, Foreign Relations Authorization Act for FY2002-
FY2003, Sections 741-745 – Modify Certification Process in
FY2002-FY2004, Require President to Designate Countries
Subject to Sanctions, Develop Multilateral Strategy
On August 1, 2001, the Senate Foreign Relations Committee approved S. 1401,
the Foreign Relations Authorizations Act for FY2002-FY2003, with the provisions
of previously reported S. 219 incorporated as Sections 741-745 in Title VII, Subtitle
D, Reform of Certification Procedures Applicable to Certain Drug Producing or
Trafficking Countries.10 The Committee reported out S. 1401 (S.Rept. 107-60) on
September 4, 2001, and the measure was placed on the Senate Legislative Calendar.
H.R. 2506, Foreign Operations Appropriations for FY2002 –
Modify Certification Process for FY2002 for Western
Hemisphere Countries; President to Designate Countries
Subject to Sanctions, Convene Multilateral Conference
On October 24, 2001, the Senate passed the Foreign Operations Appropriations
for FY2002 (H.R. 2506), with an amendment by Senators Dodd and Hutchison
(S.Amdt. 1959) that generally incorporated the provisions of S. 219 as reported,
except that the modifications would apply only to FY2002 and would apply only to
countries in the Western Hemisphere. As passed by the Senate, the bill would require
the President to identify by November 30, 2001, the major drug-transit or major illicit
drug-producing countries in the Western Hemisphere and to designate each such
country that has failed demonstrably, during the previous 12 months, to make
substantial efforts to adhere to its obligations under international counter-narcotics
agreements (multilateral and bilateral) and other standards. U.S. assistance would be
withheld from any designated countries unless the President determined that the
provision of assistance was vital to the national interest of the United States or until
the country made substantial counter-narcotics efforts.
Consistent with the provisions of previously reported S. 219, the Senate-passed
Foreign Operations Appropriations bill expresses the sense of Congress that the
United States should at the earliest feasible date convene a multilateral conference of
relevant countries to develop multilateral drug reduction and prevention strategies,
and it urges the President to request legislative changes to implement the strategies
no later than one year after enactment. It continues the requirement for the yearly
9 For more detailed comparisons of the existing drug certification procedures and those in
Senate bill S. 219 as reported out by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, see CRS
Report RL30949, Drug Certification Procedures: Side-by-side Comparison of Existing
Procedures and S. 219 as Reported, by K. Larry Storrs.
10 For comparison of existing drug certification procedures to the provisions in S. 219 and
S. 1401 as reported, see CRS Report RL30950, Drug Certification Procedures: A
Comparison of Current Law to S. 219 and S. 1401 as Reported, by K. Larry Storrs.
CRS-14
International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR) detailing the performance
of individual countries, and it adds the requirement to report on major drug trafficking
organizations. It also amends the Foreign Narcotics Kingpin Designation Act to
allow judicial review of executive branch decisions to freeze the assets of suspected
drug kingpins.