Order Code IB98038
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Nuclear Weapons in Russia:
Safety, Security, and Control Issues
Updated November 5, 2001
Amy F. Woolf
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Nuclear Weapons After the Demise of the Soviet Union
Location of Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union
Continuing Concerns about Command, Control, Safety, and Security
Russia’s Nuclear Command and Control System
Safety and Security of Stored Nuclear Warheads
Former Soviet Nuclear Facilities and Materials
Cooperative Programs For Nuclear Threat Reduction
The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program
Program Objectives and Funding
Implementing the Programs
International Science and Technology Centers
Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Programs
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention
Nuclear Cities Initiative
Bilateral Meetings
The U.S.-Russian Commission on Economic and Technological Cooperation
(The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission)
The Strategic Stability Working Group (SSWG)
Safeguards, Transparency, and Irreversibility Talks
Arms Control Proposals
Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons
Agreement on the Disposition of Weapons-grade Plutonium
Sharing Early Warning Data
Alert Rates for Strategic Nuclear Weapons
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
FOR ADDITIONAL READING

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Nuclear Weapons in Russia:
Safety, Security, and Control Issues
SUMMARY
When the Soviet Union collapsed in late
Reports of Russian nuclear materials for
1991, it reportedly possessed more than
sale on the black market, when combined with
27,000 nuclear weapons, and these weapons
evidence of weaknesses in the security systems
were deployed on the territories of several of
have raised concerns about the possible theft
the former Soviet republics. All of the nuclear
or diversion of nuclear materials from these
warheads have now been moved to Russia, but
facilities.
Russia still has around 6,000 strategic nuclear
weapons and perhaps as many as 12,000
The United States and Russia are cooper-
warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
ating in many fora to improve the safety,
security, and control over Russia’s nuclear
Many analysts in the United States and
weapons and materials. Through the Nunn-
Russia have expressed concerns about the
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,
safety, security, and control over these wea-
the U.S. Department of Defense has provided
pons. Some of these concerns focus on Rus-
assistance worth nearly $2 billion to help
sia’s nuclear command and control structure.
Russia, Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus
Financial constraints have slowed the moderni-
safely transport and store weapons and elimi-
zation and replacement of many aging satellites
nate launchers under the START Treaties.
and communications links, raising the possibil-
The Department of Energy’s Materials Protec-
ity that Russia might not be able to identify a
tion, Control and Accounting Program is
potential attack or communicate with troops in
helping Russia and other former Soviet repub-
the field if an attack were underway. Some
lics secure nuclear materials at research and
fear that the misinterpretation of an ambiguous
other facilities in the former Soviet Union.
event might lead to the launch of nuclear
The nations have also held bilateral meetings
weapons. Some also expressed concern that
to identify ways in which they might cooperate
the year 2000 computer bug could affect Rus-
to improve security and resolve concerns.
sia’s command and control system, but it did
not.
Some have proposed that the United
States and Russia negotiate arms control
Some concerns are also focused on the
agreements to reduce their stockpiles of
safety and security of nuclear warheads in
nonstrategic nuclear weapons and to improve
storage facilities in Russia. Press reports and
transparency and confidence in the elimination
statements by Russian officials about possible
of those weapons. Others have proposed that
missing warheads have added to these
the two sides agree to “de-alert” their strategic
concerns. However, General Eugene Habiger,
nuclear weapons to reduce the pressures and
former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Stra-
relieve concerns about Russia’s nuclear com-
tegic Command, stated that he had no major
mand and control system.
concerns about security at Russian nuclear
storage facilities after he visited several stor-
age sites in October 1997 and June 1998.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The Bush Administration has requested $403 million for the DOD Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program in FY2002. This is reduction of $40 million from the $443 million
authorized in FY2001. The House and Senate both approved this request in their versions
of the FY2002 Defense Authorization bill. The Senate rejected the Administration’s
proposal to eliminate the Nuclear Cities Initiative, although it did legislate limits on the
numbers of cities that could receive funding under this program.
The terrorist attacks of September 11, and the subsequent anthrax attacks, have
renewed concerns about the vulnerability of Russia’s nuclear, chemical, and biological
weapons. The Bush Administration’s budget had reduced the Department of Energy’s
nonproliferation programs in Russia by around $100 million. In the Energy and Water
Appropriations Bill for FY2002, Congress restored much of the eliminated funding, but, in
spite of wide-spread support for increased efforts, it did not add funding to these programs
beyond their FY2001 spending levels.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Nuclear Weapons After the Demise of the Soviet Union
After the demise of the Soviet Union in 1991many analysts expressed concerns about
the possibility that nuclear weapons might be lost or stolen, or that some might be launched
by accident or without authorization by responsible officials. Many of these weapons were
located outside Russia. Both the first Bush and Clinton Administrations received assurances
that the weapons remained under secure, central control. The United States has also offered
these nations assistance, through efforts such as the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat
Reduction Program, to encourage the return of all nuclear warheads to Russia and to enhance
safety and security at nuclear facilities in Russia.
By the late 1990s, many of the early concerns about the potential for loss of control have
eased, but concerns about the long-term effects of economic hardship and the increasing age
of Soviet-era systems continue to prompt questions about the disposition of Russia’s nuclear
weapons. This issue brief highlights the continuing concerns that many have about the safety
and security of these weapons and ongoing U.S. assistance programs.
Location of Nuclear Weapons in the Former Soviet Union
When the Soviet Union collapsed in late 1991, it possessed, according to most estimates,
more than 27,000 nuclear weapons. These included more than 11,000 strategic nuclear
weapons — warheads on land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs),
submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs), and in bombers with the range needed to
attack the continental United States — and over 15,000 warheads for nonstrategic tactical
nuclear weapons (such as artillery shells, short-range missiles, nuclear air-defense and ballistic
missile defense interceptors, nuclear torpedoes and sea-launched cruise missiles, and nuclear
weapons for shorter-range aircraft). In early 1998, Russia reportedly retained approximately
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6,000 warheads on its strategic nuclear weapons and, according to some reports, between
7,000 and 12,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons.
In 1991, more than 80% of Soviet strategic nuclear weapons, including all ballistic
missile submarines, were deployed at bases in Russia. The remaining strategic nuclear
weapons were deployed in Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan. By the end of 1996, these
states had all returned their nuclear warheads to Russia and each had begun to eliminate the
launchers for strategic nuclear weapons under the terms of the START I Treaty. By the end
of 1998, only Ukraine still had Soviet-era strategic missiles in silos on its territory, and it
continued its efforts to eliminate these missiles and their silos. The last SS-19 ICBM was
eliminated at the end of February 1999, and all SS-24 silos were eliminated by October, 2001.
After lengthy and unsuccessful negotiations with Russia, Ukraine began to dismantle the
Soviet-era bombers that remained on its territory. However, in August 1999, Ukraine and
Russia announced that Russia would take 8 of these aircraft as partial payment for Ukraine’s
debt for natural gas deliveries from Russia. In October, the two nations completed the details
of the transaction and noted that Russia would buy 11 of the strategic bombers from Ukraine.
Table 1 depicts the number of nuclear weapons deployed in these states in late 1991 and their
status today.
Table 1. Strategic Nuclear Weapons in the Non-Russian Republics
Strategic Nuclear Weapons in
Strategic Nuclear Weapons
State
1991
Today
Belarus
81 SS-25 single-warhead mobile
All SS-25 single-warhead mobile
ICBMs
ICBMs, with warheads and
launchers, were removed in
November 1996
Kazakhstan
104 SS-18 10-warhead silo-based
All SS-18s removed from silos; all
ICBMs (1,040 warheads)
silos destroyed; all warheads
40 Bear H bombers
returned to Russia.
All bombers and cruise missiles
returned to Russia
Ukraine
130 SS-19 6-warhead silo-based
All SS-19 silos and SS-24 silos
ICBMs
have been destroyed. Ukraine has
46 SS-24 10-warhead silo-based
completed dismantling of
ICBMs
bombers, after transferring 11 to
About 40 strategic bombers
Russia, and transferred or
More than 500 air-launched cruise
dismantled all cruise missiles.
missiles
Source: U.S. Department of Defense.
Many of the Soviet Union’s tactical nuclear weapons were also stationed outside Russia,
in Eastern Europe or in republics that were closer to prospective theaters of operation. The
weapons in Eastern Europe had reportedly been returned to Russia by 1989. In late 1991,
the majority of weapons outside Russia reportedly were in Belarus, Ukraine, and Kazakhstan,
with perhaps less than 5% in Georgia and the Central Asian states (Kirghizia, Tajikistan,
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan.) According to officials in Russia and these other states, all
the weapons had been moved to storage areas in Russia by the end of 1992.
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According to American and Russian sources, the command and control system for all
Soviet strategic and tactical nuclear weapons is centered in Moscow. This central command
would have to authorize the use of any nuclear weapons. As the Soviet Union dissolved in
December 1991, Russian President Boris Yeltsin replaced Soviet President Gorbachev at the
top of the command authority, but the rest of the system remained the same.

Continuing Concerns about Command, Control, Safety, and
Security
Many in the United States and Russia remain concerned about safety, security, and
control over nuclear weapons in Russia. These concerns center on three general areas —
concerns about the possibility for an accidental or unintended launch of nuclear weapons due
to weaknesses in Russia’s command and control system; concerns about the possible theft or
loss of nuclear warheads due to lax security or accounting at nuclear weapons facilities; and
concerns that nuclear materials from the former Soviet Union’s nuclear weapons facilities
might be lost or sold to nations seeking their own nuclear weapons.
Russia’s Nuclear Command and Control System
Russia’s nuclear command and control system consists, generally speaking, of early
warning satellites and sensors that would warn of an imminent attack on Russian territory; the
senior political and military leaders who would assess the nature of the attack and, if
necessary, authorize a response using Russia’s nuclear weapons; and the communications
links that these commanders would use to consult with each other and to transmit messages
authorizing the use of nuclear weapons to commanders in the field. These messages would
contain the authorizing and enabling codes needed to “unlock” the permissive action links
(PALs) and other technologies used to make sure that nuclear weapons could not be armed
and launched without authorization from the central command authority. (For a more detailed
description of this command and control system, see CRS Report 97-586, Russia’s Nuclear
Forces: Doctrine and Force Structure Issues.)
Analysts in the United States and Russia have pointed to the degradation of Russia’s
early warning network of satellites and radars to note that Russia may soon lack the ability
to monitor and react to strategic threats to its own territory. In early 1997, Russia’s Defense
Minister Rodionov stated that he feared a loss of control over Russian strategic nuclear forces
in the future if additional funding were not available to maintain and modernize the
communications links in the nuclear command and control structure. Furthermore, in June
and July 1998, both of Russia’s geostationary early warning satellites failed; this leaves Russia
relying on its older satellites and ground radar stations for early warning of ballistic missile
attacks. These systems cannot provide continuous coverage of U.S. missile launch sites. At
the end of August, Russia lost another early warning asset when Latvia shut down the
Skrunda radar, which provided Russia with early warning of ballistic missile attacks. Russia
had hoped that Latvia would allow this radar to continue operating until a new radar in
Belarus was completed.
The U.S. Defense Department has downplayed concerns about a loss of control over
Russia’s nuclear weapons, noting that the central command structure remains in place. But
some analysts fear that Russia could respond to the degradation of the system by
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disseminating codes needed to launch nuclear weapons to commanders in the field to make
sure that these commanders had the ability to launch missiles in a conflict. This might raise
the possibility of an accidental or unauthorized use of these weapons.
Reports in the Russian press have also noted that some strategic rocket forces personnel
have faced serious financial hardship. Reports of inadequate funding for training and
maintenance, along with low morale among the troops, have raised concerns about an
eventual breakdown of authority among strategic rocket troops. Recent reports of shooting
incidents at facilities that house nuclear weapons or materials and onboard a nuclear-powered
attack submarines have raised further concerns about the reliability of Russia’s military
personnel. Although problems with the troops probably would not lead to the unauthorized
use of nuclear weapons, they could make it difficult for Russia to remain confident in the
reliability and effectiveness of its nuclear deterrent.
In early 1999, officials in the Russian government acknowledged that the Y2K bug could
pose problems for Russia’s military systems and some stated it could cost Russia $2-3 billion
to solve the problems. A team from the U.S. Defense Department that traveled to Moscow
in mid-February 1999 to assess the problem and proposed that the two nations man a joint
early warning center in Colorado Springs at the end of December 1999 and early January
2000. In mid-September, Secretary of Defense Cohen and Russia’s Defense Minister
Sergeyev established the Y2K Center for Strategic Stability. This facility, which was based
at Peterson Air Force Base in Colorado, monitored ballistic missile launches world-wide from
December 30, 1999 through January 15, 2000. Russian officers manned the center and had
access to data from U.S. early warning assets. The New Year passed with no apparent or
reported missile warning problems.
Safety and Security of Stored Nuclear Warheads
In October 1991 and January 1992, Soviet President Gorbachev and Russian President
Yeltsin pledged to withdraw most nonstrategic nuclear weapons from deployment and to
place them in secure storage areas. All the warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons based
outside Russia had been moved to storage facilities in Russia by the middle of 1992 and
Russia has consolidated the remaining weapons, reducing the number of storage facilities
from several hundred to, perhaps, less than one hundred. Russian officials also contend that
they have begun to dismantle these warheads at a rate of around 2,000 per year. The United
States does not have independent confirmation of this number, and some analysts suspect that
Russia could still have 12,000 warheads for nonstrategic nuclear weapons in its storage
facilities. Many in the United States remain concerned about the level of security at these
storage facilities and some fear that, as a result of poor security and inadequate record-
keeping, Russia may not be able to keep track of all the warheads in these facilities.
In March 1992, reports suggested that a few nuclear warheads from Kazakhstan might
have been sold to Iran. These reports stated that Iran did not have codes needed to detonate
the weapons but that it might use them to gain design information it needs for its own nuclear
weapons programs. At the time, Russian and Kazakh officials denied that nuclear weapons
were missing, and U.S. officials stated that the United States has no evidence of such a
transfer. Nevertheless, these reports resurfaced in April 1998 — the Jerusalem Post
newspaper reported that an Israeli politician had received Iranian documents showing that
Iran had received these weapons. Russia repeated its denials and U.S. officials repeated that
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the United States had no evidence that any nuclear warheads were missing from Russia. The
1998 reports surfaced amidst concerns about Russia construction of nuclear power reactor
in Iran and reports that Russian firms were assisting Iran’s missile development program.
Some believe the timing was intended to apply added pressure on Russia to cease its
cooperation with Iran and on the U.S. Congress to impose sanctions on Russia.
In September 1997, former Russian Security Council head and national security advisor
Alexander Lebed alleged that Russian authorities were uncertain of the whereabouts of 100
out of 250 small portable nuclear demolition munitions. The Russian Defense Ministry
responded by noting that “the Russian system of nuclear weapons safety keeps nuclear
weapons under full control and makes any unauthorized transport of them impossible.” It
also stressed that all nuclear weapons had been withdrawn to Russia from the former Soviet
republics. Other Russian observers also discounted Lebed’s allegations. In early October
1997, Lebed appeared to withdraw his allegation, stating that he had investigated the matter
and had found no evidence of missing nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, the debate in Russia
continued, with some alleging that Russia never had such small munitions and others
confirming that the munitions existed but denying that any are unaccounted for. The White
House stressed that the United States had “no credible information that any [Russian] nuclear
weapon ... has ever been available on the black market.”
In late 1997, George Tenet, the Director of Central Intelligence reportedly stated that
the United States remained concerned about the possible loss or theft of nuclear weapons and
materials in Russia due to declining social and economic conditions. He did not, however,
offer any evidence that such losses had already occurred. But conditions have continued to
deteriorate, and some wages have gone unpaid for several months during the financial crisis
that began in mid-1998. As a result, many analysts have continued to express concerns about
the “human factor” and the possibility that low morale and poor living conditions may
combine to weaken security and controls over nuclear weapons.
In contrast, General Eugene Habiger, the former Commander-in-Chief of the U.S.
Strategic Command, expressed confidence in Russia’s ability to safeguard its weapons. He
visited nuclear weapons storage facilities in Russia to observe safety and security procedures
on two occasions. In October 1997, he reportedly came away impressed with what he saw,
although he acknowledged that his tour only focused on strategic nuclear weapons and
provided no information or insights into the security procedures at storage facilities for
nonstrategic nuclear weapons. He also noted that Russia lacked many of the high-tech
devices the United States used to maintain security at nuclear bases and that it seemed to rely
more heavily on added manpower to protect its weapons. In June 1998, he visited five major
nuclear sites, including bases with operational missiles and storage areas for nuclear weapons.
He viewed security procedures around the silos and at the launch control center; visited a
national nuclear weapons storage site where U.S. assistance has provided fencing and sensors,
and viewed the weapons storage facility at Engels Air Force Base, where Russian heavy
bombers are deployed. He also visited an ICBM weapons storage site and a naval nuclear
weapons storage facility. In a press briefing after this trip, General Habiger again noted that
Russia used more manpower and less technology than the United States to safeguard its
nuclear weapons. But he stated that he did not have any serious concerns about the security
of Russia’s nuclear weapons.
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Some in Congress remain concerned about Russia’s stockpile of nonstrategic nuclear
weapons. The Senate added an amendment to the FY1999 Defense Authorization Act (P.L.
105-261) and the FY2000 Defense Authorization Bill (S. 1059) calling on the President to
press Russia to reduce these weapons in accordance with its pledges from 1991 and 1992.
The amendment also requires that the Secretary of Defense submit a report detailing the
numbers, types, strategic implications, and proliferation risks associated with Russia’s
nonstrategic nuclear weapons. A request for this report remains in the House and Senate
versions of the FY2001 Defense Authorization Bill
Former Soviet Nuclear Facilities and Materials
There have been numerous reports of nuclear materials from facilities in the former
Soviet Union appearing on the black market in Europe. In most cases, the materials lacked
the purity to be used to manufacture nuclear weapons. However, in approximately 6-8 of the
reported cases, the materials could have been useful to a nation seeking to develop nuclear
weapons. In May 1999, the National Research Council, an arm of the U.S. National Academy
of Sciences, issued a report stating that security at Russia’s nuclear materials facilities was
worse than previously reported. The report argued for sustained cooperation between the
United States and Russia to improve security and prevent the diversion of these materials.
Officials from the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry disputed these reports and argued that
some safeguards are Russian facilities were more stringent than those at U.S. facilities.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) estimates that there may be enough weapons-
usable nuclear materials to produce 40,000 nuclear weapons at facilities in 8 countries that
were once a part of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union secured most of these facilities by
placing them in closed cities or by using with gates and armed guards. But, according to
DOE, budget cuts and political upheavals have undercut this system. Many facilities lacked
fences, monitors, alarms, and comprehensive accounting systems to keep track of materials.
Reports indicate that even those facilities with security and monitoring systems often
disconnected them to save money on electric bills and to reduce false alarms. They also have
been unable to pay the guards and officers charged with maintaining security at the facilities.
Deterioration of economic conditions and the decline in military spending has also
displaced many scientists and engineers who worked in Soviet nuclear programs. Although
reports of scientists moving to other countries have waned, the economic problems continue.
For example, on July 23, 1998, several thousand staff members at Arzamas-16, one of
Russia’s premier nuclear research facilities, stopped work during a three-hour strike. They
sought back payment for wages and budget allocations for 1997 and a pay increase for 1998.
Nuclear workers from several of the closed cities participated in a strike in mid-September
1998, with many traveling to Moscow for protests at the Atomic Ministry (MINATOM).
Cooperative Programs For Nuclear Threat Reduction
The Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program
Program Objectives and Funding. In November 1991, Congress allocated $400
million in Department of Defense funds to help the former Soviet republics secure their
nuclear weapons. The funds were to provide Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan
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assistance in 1) the transportation, storage, safeguarding and destruction of nuclear, chemical
and biological weapons and the dismantlement of missiles and launchers; 2) the prevention
of the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction; and, 3) the prevention of diversion of
weapons-related scientific expertise. (For details on the CTR program, see CRS Report 97-
1027, Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs: Issues For Congress.)
Although some Members have questioned the benefits and administration of the Nunn-
Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR) Program, Congress has consistently supported
the central objectives of the program, allocating $400 million each year in FY1993, 1994, and
1995 and an additional $300 million in FY1996. In FY1997, the Senate passed a new
amendment sponsored by Senators Nunn, Lugar and Domenici that added $94 million to
DOD and DOE budgets to expand U.S. efforts to contain and control nuclear, chemical and
biological weapons in the former Soviet Union. These funds were included in the
House-Senate Conference Report, which provided $364.9 million to DOD for CTR, in
addition to the funds for DOE, in the FY1997 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 104-201).
Congress also approved $382.2 million for CTR in FY1998 (P.L. 105-85, H.Rept. 105-340),
and $440.4 million in FY1999 (P.L. 105-261, H.Rept. 105-736). In FY1999, the House
sought to eliminate funding for chemical weapons destruction, but the Senate restored the
funding and prevailed in conference.
The Clinton Administration requested $475.5 million for CTR in FY2000. The Senate
(S. 1059) approved the full request, but it expressed concerns about Russia’s financial
commitment to the CTR programs and about other areas of Russia’s nuclear weapons
programs. As a result, it required that the Administration re-submit certifications that had
been required by earlier versions of the legislation. The House approved $444.1 million for
CTR and again eliminated funding for the construction of a chemical weapons destruction
facility. The House Armed Services Committee expressed concerns with U.S. funding for this
program and cited a GAO study that questioned the nonproliferation benefits of the facility.
It mandated, instead, that U.S. assistance seek to improve security at existing chemical
weapons storage facilities. The Conference Committee on the FY2000 Defense
Authorization Bill (H.Rept 106-301) approved the Administration’s request for $475.5
million for CTR programs, but it also approved House position precluding funding for the
construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility.
The Clinton Administration requested $458.4 million for CTR in FY2001. The Senate
Armed Services Committee approved the full amount, but limited the use of funds for the
construction of the chemical weapons destruction facility until the Secretary of Defense could
certify that Russia was committed to providing at least $25 million per year to help construct
and operate the facility; that Russia was committed to destroying all its remaining nerve agent;
that other nations were committed to providing funding for the social infrastructure around
this facility; and that Russia was committed to destroying its chemical weapons production
facilities. The House, in contrast, again eliminated all funding for the chemical weapons
destruction facility. In its version of the Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 4205), it provided
only $433.4 million for CTR. The House prevailed in the Conference Committee, and the
Conference Report (H.Rept. 106-945) authorizes the appropriation of only $433.4 million for
CTR and precludes any expenditures on the construction of a chemical weapons destruction
facility in Russia. Instead, it expresses the sense of Congress that the international community
should do more to help Russia eliminate its chemical weapons in accordance with its
obligations under the Chemical Weapons convention.
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The Bush Administration requested $403 million for CTR programs, a reduction of $40
million from the amount authorized in FY2001. This reduction results primarily from the
absence of funding for the Mayak plutonium storage facility. The Administration has stated
that Russia does not require any additional assistance with this project. The Administration
has, however, requested $50 million to resume construction at the chemical weapons
destruction facility in Russia. Congress had denied funding for this project in FY2000 and
FY2001, but both the House Armed Services Committee and Senate Armed Services
Committee approved the request for FY2002. The Administration has reportedly completed
its review of the CTR program, and has concluded that it should continue with most of the
programs currently underway. It concluded that these programs were “effectively managed”
and did serve U.S. interests. The Administration will, however, expect Russia to make a
greater contribution to the efforts itself, and it may expect Russia to alter its behavior in other
areas, such as nuclear cooperation with Iran. The House and Senate both approved the
Administration’s request for CTR funding in their versions of the FY2002 Defense
Authorizaiton bills (H.R. 2586 and S. 1438).
Implementing the Programs. The United States government signed Memoranda
of Understanding, known as “umbrella agreements” with each of the nations receiving
assistance under the CTR program. These agreements, which form the legal framework for
CTR and lay out the rights and responsibilities of each of the parties. The original agreement
between the United States and Russia was set to expire in mid-June 1999, and many observers
expected that it would not be renewed in time to continue implementing CTR programs
because the two nations had held few high-level meetings on the issue. Russia had been
reluctant to hold these meetings after NATO forces began their attacks against Serbian forces
in Kosovo and Serbia. However, the United States and Russia concluded and signed a 7-year
extension for the U.S.-Russian umbrella agreement on June 17, 1999.
By February 2001, the Department of Defense had obligated over $2.6 billion for CTR
projects and had spent nearly than $2 billion implementing those efforts. Early CTR projects
focused on transportation of nuclear warheads; the United States provided secure rail cars,
storage containers, and kevlar blankets to protect nuclear warheads moving to storage areas
inside Russia. The United States is also helping Russia with nuclear weapons control and
accounting systems at storage facilities. CTR projects have also helped Belarus, Ukraine, and
Kazakhstan eliminate Soviet-era strategic nuclear weapons and facilities on their territories.
Russia will also receive CTR funds to help it dismantle nuclear weapons slated for elimination
under START II. In addition, in FY1999, DOD requested funds to begin helping Russia with
a warhead dismantling project. The two sides are also building a storage facility at Mayak
for plutonium removed from Russia’s nuclear weapons. The facility’s design has been
completed and construction is underway. However delays have occurred because Russia has
been unable to fund its portion of the project and the two sides have been unable to agree on
transparency measures that will ensure that materials stored in the facility are not removed
and returned to nuclear weapons uses.
The CTR program also funded projects that addressed a particular proliferation concern.
In November 1997, the United States purchased 21 nuclear-capable MIG-29 aircraft from the
Republic of Moldova. The United States feared that Moldova might sell these aircraft to a
nation seeking nuclear delivery capabilities. In April 1998, the United States and Great
Britain moved 8.8 pounds of highly enriched uranium and 17.6 pounds of highly radioactive
spent fuel from a nuclear reactor outside Tbilisi, Georgia to Dounreay, Scotland. According
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to officials in the U.S. State Department, Georgia had first requested assistance in securing
these materials in 1996. The U.S. Department of Energy worked to improve security at the
facility, with both physical improvements and changes in security procedures. But the U.S.,
U.K. and Georgia eventually agreed that the only way to be sure the materials were safe was
to remove them from the country. In September 1998, the government of Kazakhstan
announced that it planned to move 3 tons of weapons-useable nuclear materials from a facility
near the Iranian border to Semipalatinsk, on the other side of the nation, over the next several
years. Funds from the CTR program would help secure this material, as well.
International Science and Technology Centers
The United States, several European countries, and Japan have all provided funding to
International Science and Technology Centers (ISTC) in Moscow and Kiev. These centers
— which were originally funded through the CTR program, but are now funded by the State
Department — are designed to provide research and peaceful employment opportunities for
nuclear scientists and engineers. The United States has contributed just over $75 million to
the centers. The Centers began operations in 1992 and have, thus far, funded around 450
projects at a cost of $145 million. More than 17,000 scientists and engineers have
participated in ISTC projects. Many continue to work at their primary jobs in Russia’s
research facilities. But, because most have not received their full salaries at their primary
jobs, the grants from the ISTC permit them to support their families without contemplating
selling their knowledge to nations seeking nuclear weapons.
Material Protection, Control, and Accounting Programs
As was noted above, many in the United States have expressed concerns about the safety
and security of nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union. Although some of the materials
believed to be at risk are located at nuclear weapons facilities, many others are located at
civilian nuclear research facilities. Although the Nunn-Lugar CTR program focused on
securing nuclear weapons, not materials, it did include some funding for materials control and
protection. But government-to-government negotiations with Russia and the other republics
proceeded slowly, so projects at facilities with these materials did not begin until 1994. In a
parallel effort that sought to reduce these delays, experts from the U.S. nuclear laboratories
also began, in 1994, less formal contacts with their counterparts in Russia to identify and
solve safety and security problems at Russian facilities. Together, the government-to-
government and lab-to-lab projects constitute the Material Protection, Control and
Accounting (MPC&A) program, which is funded through the U.S. Department of Energy;
these merged into a single program in 1997.
The MPC&A program began with less than $3 million in the FY1993 Nunn-Lugar
budget and $11 million in FY1994. This amount grew to $73 million in FY1995. In FY1996,
Congress expanded these programs through the Nunn-Lugar-Domenici Amendment, and
provided $99 million in the DOE budget for MPC&A. The program received an additional
$115 million in FY1997 and $137 million in FY1998. The Administration requested and the
Congress approved $152 million for MPC&A activities in FY1999. The Clinton
Administration requested $145 million for MPC&A activities for FY2000 and nearly $145
million in FY2001; Congress approved both these requests.
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According to GAO, the Department of Energy has identified 332 buildings that require
nuclear security systems. By late 1999, DOE had helped upgrade security systems at 113
buildings that contained about 50 metric tons of nuclear materials, or 7% of the 650 metric
tons that DOE believed were at risk of theft. These upgrades include the installation of
improved security systems that use modern technology and strict material control and
accounting systems. The program has also provided security training for Russian nuclear
specialists. DOE officials have noted that the program had has experienced some problems
and results have been limited because most of the materials are in Russia’s closed nuclear
cities and nuclear weapons complex. MINATOM, which is responsible for these facilities,
has been slow to provide DOE with information about and access to these facilities because
of the sensitive nature of the nuclear weapons complex.
In August 2000, the Russian American Nuclear Security Advisory Council, a private
organization, issued a report that praised the past efforts of the MPC&A program, but
criticized DOE and the Administration for moving too slowly and with too little priority to
secure nuclear materials in the Former Soviet Union. The report outlined a number of steps
that it believed the next Administration should take to accelerate and strengthen the program.
It repeated many of these suggestions in a paper released in October, 2001, noting that the
September 11 attacks had renewed and strengthened concerns about the safety and security
of Russia’s nuclear materials.
The Clinton Administration requested $145 million for MPC&A activities for FY2001.
It also requested an additional $100 million for a new initiative, the Long Term
Nonproliferation Program for Russia. DOE planned to use $70 million of this amount to help
Russia strengthen security and accounting for existing civil plutonium stockpiles and to
prevent the further accumulation of separated plutonium from spent fuel produced by civil
nuclear power programs. The remaining $30 million would support a number of
nonproliferation programs related to Russia’s nuclear infrastructure, including new initiatives
for securing weapons-usable materials in Russia and to accelerate the closure of Russian
nuclear weapons assembly facilities. Congress approved the Administration’s request for the
MPC&A program, but did not fund the new Long Term initiative, noting that funding for this
program was premature.
The Bush Administration sharply reduced the planned funding for MPC&A programs
in FY2002. DOD had planned to request more than $200 million, but the Administration’s
budget reduced the program to 138.8 million. The Senate Armed Services Committee added
$5 million to this request and expressed its concern about that the reduced level of funding
would be inadequate to meet current and future needs. The Senate and House Appropriations
Committees, in the Energy and Water Appropriations bills for FY2002, also sought to
increase funding for the DOE programs. In the final version of the bill, which was passed in
early November 2001, Congress restored funding for the MPC&A program to its FY2001
level. But, in spite of wide-spread concerns about the vulnerability of Russia’s nuclear
materials after the September 11 attacks, it did not increase funding beyond that level.
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention
The Department of Energy’s Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program,
which began in 1994, funds projects with non-military applications that have commercial
value for both the United States and the former Soviet republics. This effort is designed to
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discourage scientists and engineers in Russia’s nuclear complex from seeking employment in
other nations seeking nuclear weapons. The program has coordinated lab-to-lab contacts
that sought to identify technologies at former Soviet weapons facilities that might have
commercial applications. It also matches U.S. government funds with funds provided by U.S.
companies in projects that seek to commercialize these technologies.
The IPP program received $35 million in the FY1994 Foreign Operations Appropriations
Act, and funded 193 projects in 1995. In FY1996, Congress provided $10 million in the DOE
budget and the program received another $20 million from the Nunn-Lugar CTR budget.
IPP received $30 million in the DOE budget each year in FY1997 and FY1998. Through
FY1998, the IPP program had obligated $115 million to 435 projects throughout the former
Soviet republics. In FY1999, DOE requested only $15 million, noting that it had sufficient
unexpended funds from previous years to continue ongoing projects with this funding level.
The Senate, however, in its version of the FY1999 Defense Authorization Bill (S. 2057)
provided $30 million for the IPP program. The Conference Report on the Defense
Authorization Bill (H.Rept. 105-736) provided $20 million for the IPP Program. It also
required that the Secretary of Defense submit a study on the number of former Soviet nuclear
weapons scientists and engineers who are likely to be unemployed or unpaid and the extent
to which commercialization projects, such as those sponsored by IPP, might employ these
people and discourage them from selling their knowledge to other nations. The Clinton
Administration requested $30 million for the IPP program for FY2000 and $22.5 million for
FY2001. The Bush Administration requested $22.1 million for FY2002, and this was
supported by the House and Senate Armed Services Committees.
In February 1999, the General Accounting Office issued a report that reviewed and
criticized the IPP program. The report noted that Russian institutes had received only
around one-third of the funds allocated to IPP projects — around 50% of the funds had gone
to the DOE labs for oversight and implementation and around 12% had gone to U.S.
companies that were participating in the program — and that taxes, fees, and other charges
had further reduced the amount of money available to Russian scientists. The report also
questioned DOE’s oversight of the programs, noting that program officials do not always
know how many scientists are receiving funds through the IPP program. Finally, the report
questioned whether the program was contributing to U.S. nonproliferation objectives because
none of the projects was yet a commercial success and because some scientists who received
IPP funding might still be working in Russia’s WMD programs. DOE agreed that the IPP
program needed improved oversight, but it questioned the conclusions about its contributions
to U.S. nonproliferation objectives. DOE noted that IPP has temporarily employed thousands
of scientists in around 170 institutes. DOE also stated that the program did not subsidize
scientists who were performing weapons-related work.
In response to the GAO report, the House and Senate both reduced the Administration’s
request for funding for the IPP program in FY2000 and limited the proportion of the funding
that can be allocated to the U.S. national labs. In the Conference Report on the FY2000
Defense Authorization Bill, Congress approved $25 million for IPP and specified that no
more than 35% of the funds be spent at the U.S. labs. It also mandated that the United States
seek to negotiate agreements with Russia to ensure that funds provided under this program
are not subject to taxes in Russia. Furthermore, it requested that the Secretary of Energy
review IPP programs for their commercialization potential.
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Nuclear Cities Initiative
In August 1998, Vice President Gore and then-Prime Minister Kiriyenko signed an
agreement establishing the Nuclear Cities Initiative. This program is designed to bring
commercial enterprises to Russia’s closed nuclear cities, so that scientists and engineers will
not be tempted to sell their knowledge to nations seeking nuclear weapons. In September
1998, Secretary of Energy Richardson and Russia’s Minister of Atomic Energy signed an
implementing agreement for this program. It is designed to promote nonproliferation goals
by helping to redirect the work of nuclear weapons scientists, engineers, and technicians and
to develop commercial opportunities in those cities. For example, it helped finance a
computing center in Sarov, formerly known as Arzamas-16, that will produce software for
sale around the world.
The Clinton Administration requested $30 million for the NCI program in FY2000. In
its February 1999 report, the GAO recommended that DOE move slowly with this initiative
to ensure that it met its stated goals and objectives. As a result, Congress reduced funding
for this program to $7.5 million in FY2000, limiting U.S. assistance to only one of three
nuclear cities that were included in the Administration’s initiative. The Clinton Administration
has requested $17.5 million for this program in FY2001. Although most members of Congress
have questioned the value of this program, in April 2000, Senator Domenici announced that
he was considering introducing legislation that would expand funding for the NCI program.
He stated that his goal would be to expand U.S. efforts to help Russia downsize its nuclear
complex. This legislation became S.Amdt. 3760 to the Senate version of the Defense
Authorization Bill. It authorized $30 million for the NCI program for FY2001, and passed
the Senate on July 13, 2000. The Conference Committee accepted this level of funding for
NCI in FY2001 but limited the amount that could be expended until the Secretary of Energy
implemented a review process for the program.
The Bush Administration has reportedly cut funding for the NCI program sharply,
requesting $6.6 million for FY2002. With this low level of funding, the program would have
to withdraw from two of the three nuclear cities that participate. The Administration has also
indicated that it might eliminate the NCI program completely and merge its remaining projects
into the IPP program. The Senate Armed Services supported the Administration’s funding
request for NCI, but did not support the Administration’s plan to merge the NCI program
with the IPP program.
Bilateral Meetings
Officials from the United States and Russia have met in several groups over the past 5
years to address specific problems in Russia’s nuclear weapons complex. Some groups have
produced numerous agreements and cooperative efforts; others have shown few results. This
section briefly reviews the objectives of some of these bilateral working groups.
The U.S.-Russian Commission on Economic and Technological
Cooperation (The Gore-Chernomyrdin Commission). In April 1993, Presidents
Clinton and Yeltsin established the U.S.-Russian Commission on Economic and
Technological Cooperation, to be chaired by Vice President Gore and Russia’s Prime Minister
Chernomyrdin. Although the Commission was created to foster cooperation on space and
energy issues, its mandate has expanded to include a number of other different policy areas.
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In addition, Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin often used their meetings
to address issues, such as arms control and missile defense cooperation, on the agenda for
upcoming Presidential summits.
The Energy Committee had a working group that addressed fissile materials (e.g.
weapons-grade uranium and plutonium) in an effort to ensure that they do not pose a
proliferation or environmental threat. This working group has agreed on numerous projects,
most of which were subsequently funded by the Nunn-Lugar CTR program. For example,
in 1994, the commission announced that the two sides would cooperate in building a storage
facility at Mayak (described above) for plutonium removed from Russia’s nuclear weapons.
In 1994, Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Chernomyrdin also signed the agreement
that established the program through which the United States will purchase 500 metric tons
of uranium removed from Russian nuclear weapons for use in nuclear power reactors.
In June 1994, the two sides signed an agreement requiring the shutdown of nuclear
reactors that produce plutonium for nuclear weapons. Russia initially balked at this
agreement because it used the same reactors to produce light and heat in the cities of Tomsk
and Krasnoyarsk, but the two sides agreed to find ways to replace these energy sources.
Although it announced that it had stopped producing plutonium for weapons in the reactors
by the end of 1994, Russia refused to proceed with the shutdown because these alternatives
were not yet available. In 1996, the two sides agreed to convert the reactors to a type that
would not produce weapons-grade materials as a byproduct of energy production. The
United States planned to contribute $80 million, through the Nunn-Lugar CTR Program, to
convert the reactors. An implementing agreement was signed at the commission’s meeting
in September 1997. However, in February 2000, the Russian government reportedly told the
Clinton Administration that it wanted to cancel the reactor conversion project because of
delays, cost overruns, and fears of a catastrophic accident. Instead, Russia suggested that it
would close the reactors altogether if the United States would help fund conventional energy
sources for the affected cities. In response, in its version of the Defense Authorization Bill
(H.R. 4205), the House prohibited the use of any CTR funds for the construction of “fossil
fuel energy plants.” And the Senate Armed Services Committee, in its version of the bill (S.
2549), limited the amount of funds that could be spent on this project until a new option was
selected for the shutdown or conversion of the reactors.
During their June 24, 1998 meeting, Vice President Gore and Prime Minister Kiriyenko
signed two agreements on nuclear issues. The United States agreed to provide Russia with
assistance in converting plutonium from nuclear weapons to fuel for nuclear reactors. In the
second agreement, the United States pledged $3.1 million for 9 projects that are designed to
help scientists in Russia’s closed nuclear cities convert their efforts to peaceful civilian
endeavors, a project known as the Nuclear Cities Initiative. The Bush Administration has
indicated that it will not continue to address U.S-Russian issues through this high-level
bilateral commission. Instead, the Administration will establish working groups to address
individual security and economic issues as the need arises.
The Strategic Stability Working Group (SSWG). In September 1993, Secretary
of Defense Aspin and Defense Minister Grachev established a working group of experts from
the U.S. DOD and the Russian MOD, to discuss ways to improve strategic stability, increase
mutual confidence, and relax the Cold War nuclear force postures. One of the first topics the
SSWG addressed was ballistic missile “detargeting.” In an agreement that took effect on May
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30, 1994, the two nations agreed that no country would be targeted by any strategic forces
on either side. Many observers praised this agreement as an overdue sign that the United
States and Russia no longer consider each other enemies. Some also saw it as a move away
from the nuclear hair-trigger and a concrete step to reduce the risk of accidental missile
launches. Others, however, argued that its benefits were strictly symbolic because both sides
could quickly retarget missiles during a crisis. Many also noted that the measure was not
verifiable, so neither side could be sure that the other’s missiles were actually detargeted.
During the mid-1990s the United States shared information with the Russians about
threats to both sides from short-range ballistic missiles, and the two sides held joint table-top
exercises their defenses against short-range ballistic missile attacks. The first phase of this
project occurred in June 1996, in Colorado Springs. At that time, the Russians deployed
SA-12 interceptors and the U.S. deployed Patriot batteries in a simulated combat scenario to
defend against a common enemy. Another joint exercise took place in 1998, and a third
occurred in early 2001. The exercises involved computer simulations, rather than actual
military operations, and focused on scenarios where the two nations might practice
coordinating and communicating in engaging targets in a theater of operations.
Safeguards, Transparency, and Irreversibility Talks. In January 1994,
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin established a working group to consider steps to ensure the
transparency and irreversibility of the process of reducing nuclear weapons. The Safeguards,
Transparency, and Irreversibility working group produced an agreement, in principle, for the
two sides to exchange data on warhead stockpiles. But they were unable to complete an
agreement that would permit the exchange of classified data on nuclear warheads. Congress
had amended U.S. law to permit this exchange in 1994, but Russia has neither passed
legislation nor issued the necessary executive decree.
Arms Control Proposals
Nonstrategic Nuclear Weapons. In 1991, the United States and Soviet Union both
announced that they were withdrawing most of their deployed nonstrategic nuclear weapons
and placing them in central storage areas. Each side adopted these measures unilaterally,
without formal negotiations and without a formal verification regime. The United States and
Russia have periodically exchanged information updating the status of the withdrawals and
assuring the other side that the remaining weapons are in safe and secure storage areas.
During their summit meeting in Helsinki in March 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed
that the two sides would explore possible arms control measures relating to tactical nuclear
weapons and warheads removed from strategic nuclear weapons during the proposed START
III negotiations (which will not begin until START II enters into force). These initiatives
could include transparency measures and confidence-building measures, along with reciprocal
inspections and monitoring at storage and dismantlement facilities.
The United States would like further restrictions on Russian tactical nuclear weapons
both because it believes these might pose a proliferation risk and because Russia has a far
greater number of these weapons than does the United States. Russia has resisted formal
limits. However, in late April 1998, officials from NATO and Russia exchanged information
about their nonstrategic nuclear weapons. This effort was designed not only to ease Russia’s
concerns about NATO’s nuclear weapons, but also to provide NATO with information about
the thousands of tactical nuclear weapons still in service in Russia.
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Agreement on the Disposition of Weapons-grade Plutonium. In Sept. 1998,
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that each nation would convert 50 metric tons of
weapons-grade plutonium to a form that could not be returned to nuclear weapons. Clinton
Administration officials estimated that this amount was approximately half of the U.S.
stockpile and perhaps 25% of Russia’s stockpile. The agreement highlighted two means for
converting the plutonium — the parties could either convert it to fuel for nuclear power
reactors or mix it with other nuclear wastes and dispose of it in a way the would preclude its
use in nuclear weapons. This agreement is designed to ease concerns about the possible theft
or diversion of weapons-grade plutonium by nations or others seeking to develop their own
nuclear weapons. However, the Clinton Administration emphasized that this effort could cost
hundreds of millions of dollars, and it called on other nations to help Russia implement the
program. Congress allocated $200 million for this program in the Omnibus Appropriations
Act passed at the end of the 105th Congress. The Clinton Administration had planned to
request $400 million for this program in FY2002, but the Bush Administration has indicated
that funding would remain at around $200 billion.
Sharing Early Warning Data. In September 1998, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin
agreed that the United States and Russia would share early warning data for all space
launches and ballistic missile launches world wide. The two sides have agreed that they will
share data on a continual basis, in real time (rather than providing it annually or biannually);
they agreed that data would include information on strategic, theater, and intermediate range
missiles, and on space launches; they agreed the data would be derived from early warning
satellites and ground-based radars; and they agreed to establish a multilateral pre-launch
notification system that would be open to all nations who agreed to share data prior to missile
or space launches from their territories. The Clinton Administration emphasized that this
agreement would strengthen stability and protect against the possibility of a nuclear launch
triggered by false warning of an attack. Administration officials have also highlighted the
cooperative nature of this endeavor; this Center will provide the first opportunity for U.S. and
Russian military personnel to be permanently involved in a joint military operation.
In mid-December 2000, the United States and Russia signed an agreement outlining the
types of information that would be exchanged in the newly-formed Joint Data Exchange
Center (JDEC) near Moscow. This agreement establishes a pre-launch and post-launch
notification system for ballistic missile and space launches and designed to reduce the risk that
a test, experiment, or space launch, could be misread as a ballistic missile attack. Some critics
of the planned center argued it would hinder U.S. access to space by requiring that
notifications before launches, but the military space community reportedly reviewed all the
provisions and approved of the plan because it allows for exceptions to the notification
requirement in the interest of national security. Most experts hoped the center, which is to
be based in an old school building near Moscow, would begin operations in 2001. However,
the building’s renovations have not yet begun. Disagreements between the United States and
Russia about tax issues, along with a general cooling in the relationship between the two
countries, have been cited as reasons for the delay.
Alert Rates for Strategic Nuclear Weapons. Many analysts argue that Russia’s
aging satellite and communication systems, when combined with the high alert rates for U.S.
and Russian nuclear forces (both can launch on very short notice), increase the possibility of
a nuclear attack. Many analysts note that Russia may lack complete information about the
status of U.S. forces and, therefore, might interpret ambiguous events as a missile launch.
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The agreement on sharing early warning data seeks to address this problem by providing
Russia with information about ambiguous events. Some in the United States, such as Bruce
Blair and former Senator Sam Nunn, have proposed that the United States and Russia go
further and “de-alert” their nuclear weapons. They argue that, if U.S. weapons were not on
alert, Russia would be less likely to assume that it were under attack if it detected ambiguous
activities. In addition, if Russia took its forces off alert, it would not have to loosen controls
over them to ensure their launch in a crisis because the missiles would not be ready to be
launched in a crisis. Those who support de-alerting have outlined several different measures,
from removing warheads from missiles and storing them separately, to removing launch keys
from control centers or removing critical data from launch computers.
Those who oppose the idea of “de-alerting” argue that it will undermine, not enhance
stability. They note that warheads in a few storage depots may be far more vulnerable to a
preemptive attack than warheads deployed on hundreds of missiles in hardened silos. They
also argue that each side might feel compelled to “re-alert” its forces quickly if it suspected
that the other side had started the process, and that this could lead to a destabilizing “alert”
race, with each trying to gain an advantage over the other. Finally, some have noted that
officials in Russia have shown no interest in this proposal; instead, some Russians have argued
that “de-alerting” appears to be a U.S. attempt to disarm Russian missiles.
In late 1997, an inter-agency working group assessed possible measures to “de-alert”
U.S. nuclear forces. This effort stemmed, in part from the U.S.-Russian agreement to
deactivate weapons that would be eliminated under START II by the end of 2003, even
though they would not have to be eliminated until 2007. But it also was an effort to explore
the idea of a more comprehensive change in nuclear weapons alert status. The effort,
however, did not result in any changes in the alert status of U.S. nuclear forces. During
testimony before the Senate Armed Services Committee, General Eugene Habiger, the
Commander-in-Chief of the U.S. Strategic Command, noted that the reductions in offensive
forces mandated by the START Treaties would serve to reduce the number of alert weapons
in the U.S. force from about 2,300 today to less than 1,000 under START II and less than
700 under START III because only a portion of the U.S. force is on alert at any one time.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
Executive Branch Reports
U.S. Department of Defense. Cooperative Threat Reduction. August 1997.
U.S. Department of Energy. MPC&A Strategic Plan. January 1998.
CRS Products
CRS Issue Brief IB98030. Nuclear Arms Control: The U.S.-Russian Agenda.
CRS Report 97-1027. Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs: Issues for
Congress.
CRS Report 97-586. Russia’s Nuclear Forces: Doctrine and Force Structure Issues.
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