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# Peacekeeping: Military Command and Control Issues

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### Peacekeeping: Military Command and Control Issues

#### Summary

Coalition warfare and the leadership of foreign commanders has played a part in U.S. history since the War for Independence, when the commander of the troops of the predecessor colonies, George Washington, entrusted a key mission and command of 2,000 Continental soldiers to a French Major General, the Marquis de Lafayette. Since 1900, there have been at least seventeen military operations in which the United States has placed U.S. troops under a foreign commander.

As of November 1, 2001, some 6,515 U.S. troops serve under a French general in the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR). Some 865 troops also serve in the Multinational Force in the Sinai (MFO), an ad hoc coalition, under a Canadian commander. As of August 31, 2001, the United States had 43 U.S. troops serving under commanders from various nations in seven U.N. operations.

During the last decade, some Members of Congress have expressed concern about the placement of U.S. troops under a foreign commander; in general, this concern has centered on such placement in U.N. operations. Until the end of the Cold War, U.S. support for U.N. operations had been generally limited to air lift, even though Congress in 1949 had granted the President the authority to detail up to 1,000 personnel in a non-combatant capacity for U.N. peacekeeping activities. But controversy arose in the early 1990s, when the United States began to place U.S. troops under U.N. commanders. Since then, Members of Congress have made various legislative attempts to restrict the placement of U.S. troops under U.N. command. The first, in 1995, was included in the Contract for America legislation, which passed the House (H.R. 7), but not the Senate. The second was contained in the FY1996 DOD authorization bill vetoed by President Clinton (H.R. 1530), in part due to this provision. Congress deleted the provision from the version that became law, and since then has not passed such a restriction.

Although troops from other nations have served under U.S. commanders, some Members of Congress are troubled by several issues raised by ceding even some level of control over U.S. troops to foreign commanders. These revolve around questions about whether placing U.S. soldiers under a foreign commander in any way impinges on U.S. sovereignty, and whether U.S. troops face greater danger under a foreign commander. Those who favor such placement put forth various procedures and arrangements that are taken to avoid such problems, for instance, U.S. troops are placed under a foreign commander only for a specified time and a specific mission. The foreign commander's authority over U.S. troops is limited to the authority necessary to organize, coordinate, and direct the mission-related tasks of those units provided to him, in order to accomplish the assigned mission. In addition a variety of safeguards are recognized as needed to protect U.S. troops, many of which were spelled out in former President William Clinton's Presidential Decision Directive (PDD) 25 of May 1994. In particular, the United States participates actively in the policymaking bodies that oversee the military operation, seeks the clear delineation of operational missions in governing agreements, and limits the authority of foreign commanders.

### Contents

Introduction
President's Constitutional and Statutory Authorities
Historical Precedents and Issues in Ceding Control to Foreign Commanders 3 The Michael New Challenge
Lessons for Collective Security Actions
Appendix A: Examples of International Command
Appendix B: U.S. Troops Currently Serving Under Foreign Commanders 11

## Peacekeeping: Military Command and Control Issues

#### Introduction

Military forces are a unique symbol of national sovereignty and pride. For various reasons, however, nations often combine their forces in common effort. The national military strategy of the United States has long recognized the value of allies and coalition warfare. Success on the battlefield may depend on a unified command and control system with one senior officer in charge. The United States has often been in a leadership position and provided the senior commander; Desert Storm is a recent example. Sometimes, however, other countries have led coalitions and U.S. forces have been placed temporarily under foreign commanders.

Congressional concerns have centered primarily around the United Nations' role in command of U.S. forces. Concerns are less evident with NATO officers, with whom the United States has longstanding ties and training experience, more so with those outside this longstanding alliance. Until the United States began to place U.S. troops under U.N. commanders with the expansion of U.N. peacekeeping operations in the early 1990s, there were few complaints that the United States had suffered a loss of control over its forces or a compromise of its sovereign will.

Since 1995, with House passage of the "Contract for America" legislation (H.R. 7), Members have made a number of attempts to prohibit or limit the placement of U.S. troops under U.N. command. [H.R. 7 was referred to the Senate, but not reported out of committee.] Also in 1995, Congress included restrictions on such placement in a FY1996 DOD authorization bill (H.R. 1530). This bill was vetoed by President Clinton for a variety of reasons, among them this provision, which was cited as an infringement on the President's constitutional authority as Commander in Chief. Congress deleted the provisions from its subsequent version of the FY1996 DOD authorization bill, which was signed by the President. Since then, Congress has not approved any restrictions on DOD funding regarding the participation of U.S. troops in U.N. peacekeeping operations.

Some Members of Congress remain concerned about this issue. In the 107<sup>th</sup> Congress, the American Sovereignty Restoration Act of 2001, H.R. 1146, introduced by Rep. Paul, would, among other actions, withdraw the United States from the United Nations, and prohibit the use of funds for the participation of any member of the U.S. armed forces in a U.N. peacekeeping operation or force.

#### **Definition of Command and Control**

The term command has several applications. The power of command usually given to the leader of a multinational force is called operational control or operational command (in NATO).<sup>1</sup> For a specified time and specified mission, the designated leader has authority to organize, coordinate, and direct the mission-related tasks of those units provided to him, in order to accomplish a given mission. This leader cannot interfere with their internal activities or many other command functions normally retained within national military structures. Thus, he cannot separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change their internal organization. Typically, this type of command arrangement has raised limited concern about loss of national control or compromise of sovereignty.

The broadest command includes the total range of responsibilities exercised by the National Command Authority [the President and the Secretary of Defense] over its units and soldiers. Besides operational activities, full command includes logistics, training, and all aspects of personnel discipline, morale, and welfare. In the U.S. case, this command ultimately resides with the President as Commander-in-Chief and much is non-transferable from the highest echelons of DOD. Although some logistics and training responsibilities could be shared by agreement, another nation would be reluctant to assume responsibility for pay, promotions, courts martial, individual assignments, replacements, and long-term medical care even if they could. U.S. soldiers serving in multinational commands always retain their ultimate allegiance to the United States of America: they wear their national uniforms and insignia; and, no oaths are given to other powers or organizations. They may, however, also wear other mission-specific insignia and headgear. For instance, in U.N. operations, U.S. troops may wear a U.N. patch and blue beret in order to identify clearly their role and status in a possibly ambiguous situation.

#### **President's Constitutional and Statutory Authorities**

Article 2 of the U.S. Constitution designates the President as Commander in Chief. Although specific duties are not delineated, it is traditionally assumed that the President may organize for military operations – to include approving command arrangements – as he sees fit. Congress has, however, made two laws to govern some recurring, noncombat uses of U.S. military forces within international entities as noted below.

Since 1949, the President has held standing authority under Section 7 of the U.N. Participation Act (P.L. 79-264) to detail up to 1,000 personnel, in a non-combatant capacity, at one time for U.N. peacekeeping activities. Besides outlining fiscal and logistical arrangements, the law states "That while so detailed, such personnel shall be considered for all purposes as acting in the line of duty, including

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup>U.S. Department of Defense. Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms. JCS Pub 1-02, 1 December 1989. Washington, pp. 77 and 262-263. Also see JCS Pub 0-2 and Title 10, USC, Chapter 6, Section 164.

the receipt of pay and allowances as personnel of the armed forces of the United States...."<sup>2</sup>

The Administration also can and has detailed specialized military personnel to international units under the authority of Section 628 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195), as amended. Section 628 provides that whenever the President determines that it serves U.S. foreign policy interests, any officer or employee of any U.S. government agency can be made available to any international organization "to serve with, or as a member of, the international staff of such organization, or to render any technical, scientific, or professional advice or service to, or in cooperation with, such organization."<sup>3</sup>

# Historical Precedents and Issues in Ceding Control to Foreign Commanders

U.S. military history provides many precedents for placing troops temporarily under foreign commanders. The precedents date back to the United States' colonial history, when General George Washington entrusted a key mission to French Major General, the Marquis de Lafayette, and appointed him as commander over 2,000 Continental soldiers rebelling against the British Crown. During World War I, some 2 million U.S. soldiers served under the coordination of the French Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France. During World War II, U.S. units served under British commanders in several areas. During the Cold War period, there were a few instances of U.S. military personnel serving under foreign commanders in multinational operations, mostly in ad hoc coalitions as the United States usually provided only air lift and supplies to U.N. operations. During the 1991 Desert Storm campaign in the Persian Gulf, a U.S. brigade was placed under operational control of a French commander. [For more information on these and other instances of such placements, see Appendix A, which details such instances from 1900 till the present.]

In the Balkans, U.S. troops serve under commanders from NATO nations, who rotate every six months. As of November 1, 2001, some 6,515 U.S. troops are serving under a French general in the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR). (In Bosnia, some 3,132 U.S. troops in NATO's Stabilization Force (SFOR) are serving under the American general who commands that operation, Lt. General John B. Sylvester.) Some 865 U.S. troops also serve in the Multinational Force in the Sinai (MFO), an ad hoc coalition, under a commander from Canada. As of August 31, 2001, the United States had 43 U.S. troops serving under commanders from various nations in seven U.N. operations.

The placement of U.S. troops under foreign commanders only became controversial in the 1990s, when the U.S. involvement in multilateral peacekeeping

 $<sup>^2</sup>$  P.L. 79-264, 59 Stat. 619, approved December 20, 1945, as amended by P.L. 81-341, approved October 10, 1949.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>3</sup> Section 628 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961 (P.L. 87-195) as amended. 22 U.S.C. 2388.

operations became more frequent. Of particular concern was the placement of troops in two U.N. peacekeeping operations, under commanders from countries other than longstanding U.S. military allies. Another concern has been the cumulative effect of such placements with the commitment of a significant number of troops to NATO operations.

Since that time, the issue of placing U.S. troops under foreign "command" often has been posed as a symbolic one, reflecting larger issues about U.S. leadership in the world and concerns about whether the United States cedes any degree of sovereignty when it participates in collective security mechanisms. The pragmatic question also persists: whether the United States should trust its citizens' lives to the judgment of foreign officers, particularly in those from countries whose military standards may be questioned.

To most officials and analysts, no substantial injury to the sovereignty of the United States, control over, or long-term effectiveness of the U.S. armed forces appear evident. Most such arrangements have balanced the military advantages of a clear chain of command and greater mass on the battlefield with the political need to recognize the national pride and competence of sovereign allies. Some, however, were not particularly successful, and all had difficulties that provide future cautions.

Still, some Members and military officers are reluctant to relinquish any authority to foreign officers, whose judgment may differ from that of a U.S. officer. Military analysts note that training and cultural differences may create differences in approach and style; thus, foreign officers might put U.S. troops at risk where U.S. officers would not. Some also note that cultural and language difficulties can make combined operations too cumbersome for the quick responses needed in the more difficult "peace enforcement" operations.

Some analysts also point out that decisions on the use of U.S. soldiers in peacekeeping missions involve different criteria than the use of soldiers of other countries. When U.S. soldiers are involved, the prestige of the world's sole superpower is on the line. Although in some circumstances this could confer greater authority, in others it might make U.S. soldiers more tempting targets, particularly in conflictive peacekeeping missions. It also may complicate the response of U.S. soldiers: for instance, where a soldier from another country would be praised for negotiating his unit's way through a roadblock, a U.S. soldier must consider whether that would make it appear that the U.S. could be intimidated and was backing down.

Practical considerations and standard arrangements are cited to counter these objections. Most importantly, the United States takes precautions that U.S. troops serve under respected foreign officers and that U.S. officers are positioned to look after U.S. troops. U.S. officials have a virtual veto power over the selection of top commanders for U.N. operations in which U.S. troops participate. In addition, commanders of U.S. military units participating in multilateral operations will monitor the actions and orders of foreign commanders, and question them if necessary.<sup>4</sup> The

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> Responding to questions whether U.S. troops are able to refuse to obey or question what they (continued...)

United States also reserves the right to take any action necessary to protect U.S. forces. In addition, military analysts note that under U.S. and international law, soldiers are obliged to refuse illegal orders.

The temporary nature of operational command and control arrangements ensures that participating subunits retain national characteristics and allegiances. Even in relatively permanent multinational formations – such as the MFO in the Sinai and NATO's Standing Naval Force Atlantic – U.S. units rotate every six to 12 months. Although U.S. brigades and divisions are assigned to NATO multinational corps for exercises and operations, the bulk of their time is spent within their permanent U.S. chains of command.

#### The Michael New Challenge

No challenge was raised to the constitutional authority of the President, as Commander-in-Chief, to enter into multinational command arrangements and to the practice of placing U.S. troops under foreign commanders, until 1996. That year, **U.S. Army Specialist Michael G. New** challenged his January 1996 court-martial and bad-conduct discharge, which was upheld by his commanding general in June 1996. New, who refused to obey an order to wear the designated U.N. patch and blue beret when his unit was assigned to the U.N. Preventive Deployment Force in Macedonia, argued that he owes allegiance to the United States, not to the U.N., that the insignia are not authorized, that the chain of command was not constitutional, and that the operation was not legal.

New has appealed his case to several appeals for which either have refused to reconsider the case or have upheld the initial decision. In March 1996, the U.S. District Court of the District of Columbia rejected New's civil suit of Habeas Corpus challenging the court-martial's finding and sentence; in November 1997, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the District Court's dismissal on the grounds that civilian courts must await the final outcome of military court proceedings on a court martial before considering an action brought by a service member. The U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals heard the case on May 28, 1998, and affirmed the court martial in April 1999. On February 4, 2000, New appealed the decision before the final military appeals venue, the Court of Appeals of the Armed Forces, which affirmed the U.S. Army Court of Criminal Appeals decision on June 13, 2001.

On September 10, 2001, New's attorneys petitioned the U.S. Supreme Court to review and overturn the military courts' decisions. On October 5, 2001, the Supreme Court declined to hear the case. According to New's website [http://www.mikenew.com/], New is considering whether to take further action.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>4</sup> (...continued)

may regard as illegal or unwise orders from foreign commanders, the Clinton Administration's Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25) states that commanders of U.S. military units participating in U.N. operations can "report separately to higher U.S. military authorities" and "will refer to higher U.S. authorities orders that are illegal under U.S. or international law, or outside the mandate of the mission to which the U.S. agreed with the U.N."

#### Lessons for Collective Security Actions

Occasional placements of U.S. forces under foreign commanders within multinational commands for agreed purposes appear likely to continue in the future. World War I established a *de facto* guideline for U.S. forces that coalition integration only extends so far; in fact, during that war the United States attempted to retain total command at the highest, or army, level. Exigencies, however, often required U.S. divisions to be under the tactical command of French and British corps commanders. Since then, the United States has relinquished partial command at much lower echelons. As noted above, full command is never relinquished at the individual soldier level, and all soldiers placed within a multinational structure are commanded by a U.S. officer. One duty of the U.S. commander is to ensure his troops are linked to the U.S. chain of command, particularly for such essential responsibilities as pay and discipline.

The proper echelon, i.e., the level of military organization, for integrating U.S. forces into a multinational formation will probably continue to be a major point of negotiation. For combat, larger national units are more self-sufficient and can be integrated more quickly and with fewer logistical problems than smaller units. For conventional ground warfare, the corps is currently the most comprehensive or independent element. Corps frequently take tactical command or control of divisions from allied nations; multinational corps are rapidly becoming the norm for NATO. Since corps and divisions are large, expensive formations, future multinational operations may well, depending on the mission, integrate at lower levels, particularly for specialized and supporting units.

Potential safeguards to acknowledge and protect the sovereign control of those forces are suggested by precedent, practice, and law – many now are spelled out in the Clinton Administration's Presidential Decision Directive 25 (PDD-25). These include:

- Participating actively in the policy making bodies that oversee the military operation, e.g., U.N. Security Council;
- Clearly delineating operational mission in governing agreements;
- Limiting foreign command authority to operational command, operational control, tactical control, or similar formulation;
- Ensuring the temporary nature of personal involvement by rotation of U.S. units or individuals, even though the national commitment may be to long-term support of a standing multinational force;
- Providing active support and oversight through a permanent command chain for those U.S. units and individuals committed to multinational operations, to usually include the regional U.S. Commander-in-Chief (CINC);

- Placing U.S. officers on multinational unit staffs; if appropriate, the foreign commander could be provided a U.S. deputy, e.g., UNOSOM II;
- Maintaining U.S. unit integrity at the highest practical echelon.
- Reserving the President's right to terminate participation at any time and to protect endangered U.S. forces with whatever actions are deemed necessary.

#### **Appendix A: Examples of International Command**

Since 1776, military units from the United States or the predecessor colonies have engaged in numerous conflicts, many in concert with allied nations. France, for example, contributed to winning the final battle of the American War for Independence at Yorktown. During that campaign, General George Washington entrusted a key mission and command of 2,000 Continental soldiers to a French Major General, the Marquis de Lafayette. The list below reflects a survey of U.S. military activities from 1900 to the present, looking for distinct instances when U.S. forces were placed under temporary command of a foreign officer.<sup>5</sup>

**1900.** International Relief Force in China, Boxer Rebellion. An eight-nation force, led by a British general and later a German, included U.S. units comprised of 2,000 soldiers and marines. Loose coordination of operations was achieved through meetings of a Council of Generals.

**1918.** Allied Armies in France, World War I. Some 2,000,000 Americans served alongside and within French and British armies under the overall coordination of a Frenchman, the Commander-in-Chief of the Allied Armies in France, Marshall Ferdinand Foch. A precedent was set that U.S. soldiers should remain in large units under U.S. command. The French and British originally argued that U.S. soldiers should be placed in Allied units as individual and small-unit replacements as soon as they arrived in theater, a concept successfully vetoed by the senior U.S. commander, General Pershing.

**1918.** Allied Intervention in Russia, vicinity of Murmansk in the Far North. Some three U.S. battalions joined British, Canadian, Italian, Finnish, and Serbian units under command of a British general at the end of World War I during the Bolshevik Revolution. Similar activities in Siberia were not formally integrated with allies, due to disagreement on political goals.

**1942.** Allied operations in World War II. Due to the combined nature of Allied operations against Axis powers, U.S. and U.K. commands and staffs were often inter-layered. U.S. units were subordinated to British commanders a number of times, for example, in Italy, Normandy, Arnhem, and in the China-Burma-India Theatre. This experience, in general, made the U.S. military a proponent of coalition warfare and a world leader in its practice.

**1948.** United Nations Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO) in **Palestine.** Longest-lived UN peace observing mission. The United States has contributed various numbers of observers and support personnel through time, from

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>5</sup> Numerous sources. For small involvements see David W. Wainhouse, International Peacekeeping at the Crossroads, The Johns Hopkins University Press, Baltimore, 1973. For larger operations, see U.S. Department of the Army, United States Army in the World War; 1917-1919, Volume 1, Washington, 1948 and United States Army in World War II, The War Department, Strategic Planning for Coalition Warfare, Volume for 1941-1942 and Volume for 1943-1944, published in Washington in 1999 and 1959, respectively.

an early peak strength of 327 officers and enlisted men to 3 in 2001. Some 17 nations have participated, successive commanders coming from Sweden, the United States, Belgium, Denmark, Canada, Norway, and Finland. Many precedents, agreements, and laws have derived from this experience. The mission continues.

**1949.** United Nations Military Observer Group in India and Pakistan (UNMOGIP). One of 14 nations participating, the United States contributed up to 28 military observers and an air crew until 1954. The group has been headed successively by generals from Belgium, Canada, Australia, and Austria.

**1950.** United Nations Command (UNC), established for the Korean War and maintained. The overall UNC commander has always been an American, but subordinate command levels have changed. The ground component of the U.S.-Republic of Korea (ROK) Combined Forces Command (CFC) has today one U.S. division (-) and 22 ROK divisions. Since 1992, it has been commanded by a South Korean general with a U.S. deputy. CFC command arrangements become effective in wartime, and CFC planning and exercise activities in peacetime help deter attacks by North Korea.

**1951.** North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO). An integrated command structure was created to defend against any external aggression against the territory of member states, in particular the Warsaw Treaty Organization. The Supreme Allied Commander has always been American, but senior intermediate commanders from Germany and the United Kingdom would command major U.S. formations in wartime. Since 1967, a U.S. ship has operated in the multinational Standing Naval Force Atlantic under an annually rotating command; since 1992, a similar force patrols the Mediterranean. NATO envisions all corps being multinational. Through continuous association, planning, and exercises, members of NATO have achieved levels of military interoperability that set the standards and procedures for modern coalition warfare. U.S. personnel on NATO staffs often work under foreign officers. NATO continues military operations and conducted combat operations in the Balkans in 1999.

**1962.** United Nations Security Force (UNSF) for the UN Temporary Executive Authority (UNTEA) in West New Guinea. A U.S. Air Force Task Force of 115 men and 10 aircraft provided in-country support for operations commanded by a Pakistani general.

**1965.** Inter-American Peace Force (IAPF) in the Dominican Republic. First peacekeeping force of the Organization of American States. After the initial U.S. intervention, six Latin American nations sent small forces to join some 21,500 U.S. troops – soon reduced to 12,000 – in a multinational force commanded by a general from Brazil.

**1982.** Multinational Force in Beirut (MNF). About 1,200 U.S. troops joined contingents from France, Italy, and U.K. to assist in departures of PLO, Syrian, and Israeli troops from Beirut, Lebanon. No central command structure was established, although coordination was effected through a Liaison and Coordination Committee. A terrorist attack killed 241 U.S. Marines and 58 French soldiers on October 3, 1983; the MNF withdrew in March 1984.

**1982.** Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai (MFO). A ten-nation, independent force empowered by Egypt and Israel to supervise truce provisions in the Sinai Peninsula. The United States provides support troops and an infantry battalion rotated every six months; Congress limits participation to 1,200 personnel. The military commander is a Canadian general, and the Director General is an American operating from Rome. This mission continues.

**1991.** Desert Storm Coalition in the Persian Gulf War. Over 23 nations joined to eject forces of Iraq from Kuwait. U.S., U.K., and French forces were under the Commander-in-Chief (CINC), U.S. Central Command, while Arab forces were under the Saudi Commander of the Joint Forces Theater of Operations; the two entities were linked in the Coalition Coordination, Communication and Integration Center. Within that structure, a U.S. brigade from the 82d Airborne Division was placed under operational control of the French 6th Light Armored Division.

**1992.** United Nations Protection Force (UNPROFOR) in former Yugoslavia. Some 21 nations protected humanitarian relief and attempted to aid peacemaking in Croatia and Bosnia-Hercegovina. The United States sent a 342-man Mobile Army Surgical Hospital (MASH) to Zagreb, Croatia for use by UNPROFOR soldiers under French command. In 1993, some 600 U.S. soldiers were sent to patrol the Macedonian border under a Swedish commander.

**1993.** United Nations Operation in Somalia after U.S. humanitarian intervention of December 1992 – UNOSOM II. The U.N. force of 25,000 from 28 nations was commanded by a Turkish general, assisted by a U.S. deputy – 3,000 U.S. logistics forces were under their operational control. U.S. combat forces of 9,000 remained solely under a U.S. chain of command (see CRS Report 93-959). U.S. operations ended in March of 1994, and the number of U.S. troops serving in UNOSOM II was reduced to 12 members of the operation's staff.

**1995. NATO Implementation Force (IFOR) in Bosnia.** The first IFOR commander was American, but U.S. ground forces reported to the ACE Rapid Reaction Corps, commanded by a British lieutenant general. The allied force initially was 54,000 strong, of which 13,000 were American. The contingent name has been changed to Stabilization Force (SFOR). (See CRS Issue Brief IB93056 for current details). The operation continues, with commanders of various NATO nations serving six month tours.

**1999.** NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR) in Kosovo, Former Republic of Yugoslavia. Following NATO air operations, KFOR entered the Province of Kosovo to supervise peace between its Serbian and Kosovar populations. It consisted of some 50,000 soldiers from NATO and other nations, including about 6,000 from the United States. The first commander was a British lieutenant general; the command now rotates every six months. (See CRS Issue Brief IB10027 for current details). The operation continues.

#### CRS-11

## Appendix B: U.S. Troops Currently Serving Under Foreign Commanders

Operation	Auspices	Total # Troops/ Military Observers	# U.S. Troops/ Military Observers*	Force Commander's Name and Nationality
Kosovo, Joint Guardian (KFOR)	NATO	Approx. 37,000	6,515	Lieutenant General Marcel M. Valentin of France
U.N. Truce Supervision Organization (UNTSO)	United Nations	153	3	Major General Franco Ganguzza of Italy
U.N. Iraq-Kuwait Observer Mission (UNIKOM)	United Nations	1,099	11	Major General John A. Vize of Ireland
U.N. Interim Administration Mission in Kosovo (UNMIK)	United Nations	37	2	Hans Haekkerup, a Danish civilian, who is the Special Representative of the U.N. Secretary General and head of the mission.
U.N. Observer Mission in Georgia (UNOMIG)	United Nations	106	2	Major General Anis Ahmed Bajwa of Pakistan
U.N. Transitional Administration in East Timor (UNTAET)	United Nations	9,614	3	Lieutenant General Winai Phattiyakul of Thailand
U.N. Mission for the Referendum in Western Sahara (MINURSO)	United Nations	263	15	Brigadier General Claude Buze of Belgium
U.N. Mission in Ethiopia and Eritrea (UNMEE)	United Nations	3,870	7	Major General Patrick C. Cammaert of the Netherlands
Multinational Force and Observers (MFO) in the Sinai	Ad hoc coalition	1,836	865	Major General Robert Meating of Canada

**Sources:** Data on U.N. troops/observers and U.S. troops serving in those operations is current as of August 31, 2001. The name and nationalities of commanders are the latest available information from various U.N. websites, which are current within two to four months. Data on U.S. troops in NATO operations was provided by the Department of Defense, November 1, 2001. Data on the MFO was provided by the Department of State, November 1, 2001.

\* **Note** that the totals for U.N. operations and for U.S. participation in U.N. operations do not include civilian police or civilian observer components of the operations.

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