Order Code IB98030
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Nuclear Arms Control:
The U.S.-Russian Agenda
Updated October 15, 2001
Amy F. Woolf
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
START I
Treaty Provisions
Ratification and Implementation
Ratification
Weapons Deactivation
Monitoring and Verification
Compliance
START II
Treaty Provisions
Ratification
START III
Proposed Provisions
Alternative Proposals
The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
Treaty Provisions
The Demarcation and Succession Agreements
Agreed Statements on Demarcation
Memorandum of Understanding on Succession
The ABM Treaty and National Missile Defenses
LEGISLATION
CONGRESSIONAL HEARINGS, REPORTS, AND DOCUMENTS
FOR ADDITIONAL READING

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Nuclear Arms Control: The U.S.-Russian Agenda
SUMMARY
Although arms control negotiations are
but the treaty has not yet entered into force.
not as important to the U.S.-Russian relation-
ship as they were to the U.S.-Soviet relation-
During a summit meeting in March 1997,
ship during the Cold War, the United States
Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed that the
and Russia have continued to implement
United States and Russia would begin negotia-
existing nuclear arms control agreements and
tions on a START III Treaty as soon as
to pursue negotiations on further reductions in
START II enters into force. They agreed the
their strategic offensive weapons and
new treaty would reduce their forces to be-
modifications to limits on ballistic missile
tween 2,000 and 2,500 warheads. They also
defenses. This issue brief summarizes the
agreed to address measures related to non-
contents of these agreements and tracks prog-
strategic nuclear weapons and the warheads
ress in their ratification and implementation.
removed from weapons eliminated under the
treaty. Negotiations to turn this framework
The 1991 START I Treaty entered into
into a formal agreement have proven difficult,
force in December 1994. It limits the United
and the Bush Administration has not indicated
States and four successors to the Soviet Union
whether they will continue.
— Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan
— to 6,000 accountable warheads on 1,600
The United States and Russia continue to
strategic offensive delivery vehicles. The
abide by the 1972 ABM Treaty, which limits
parties are well ahead of the elimination sche-
each side to one anti-ballistic missile deploy-
dules outlined in the treaty and all the nuclear
ment area with no more than 100 interceptor
warheads have been removed from the 3 non-
missiles. In September 1997, the parties
Russian republics. The parties also continue to
signed several documents that established a
implement the on-site inspections that are a
demarcation line between ABM systems and
part of the Treaty’s complex verification regi-
theater missile defense systems, which are not
men.
limited by the Treaty. They also signed a
Memorandum that named Russia, Ukraine,
The United States and Russia signed
Belarus, and Kazakhstan as the successors to
START II in January 1993. This agreement
the Soviet Union for the ABM Treaty. The
would reduce U.S. and Russian strategic
Clinton Administration never submitted these
offensive forces to 3,500 warheads. In Sep-
to the Senate for advice and consent. It did
tember 1997, the United States and Russia
however, pursue negotiations on modifications
signed a Protocol to START II that would
to the Treaty that would permit the deploy-
extend the elimination period in the treaty to
ment of national missile defenses. The Bush
the end of the year 2007. This is designed to
Administration has indicated that it believes
ease the economic burdens of treaty implemen-
the Treaty is out of date, and has suggested
tation for Russia. The U.S. Senate approved
that the United States and Russia agree to set
the Treaty’s ratification in January 1996 and
the Treaty aside.
the Russian legislature did so in April 2000,
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The United States and Russia continued consultations on missile defense through mid-
September 2001. The two sides continued to disagree about whether they should seek
amendments to the ABM Treaty (the Russian view) or an alternative security framework to
replace the Treaty (the U.S. view). Administration officials have indicated that the attacks
on the World Trade Center and Pentagon had not undermined support for missile defenses,
even though those attackers used aircraft, not missiles. In a press conference in October,
President Bush repeated the U.S. view that the ABM Treaty was out-of-date and that the
United States would seek to convince Russia to withdraw from it with the United States.
Some analysts believe that the new cooperative framework between the countries with respect
to terrorism will spill over into cooperation on missile defenses; others argue that Russia
may believe its cooperation on terrorism provides it with leverage to press for changes in
U.S. policy on missile defense and the ABM Treaty.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
During the Cold War, arms control negotiations were a central feature of U.S.-Soviet
relations. Observers disagreed about whether these would enhance U.S. security by limiting
Soviet weapons and providing information about Soviet capabilities or undermine U.S.
security by limiting U.S. weapons while the Soviet Union continued to pursue more capable
systems. Many noted, however, that arms control negotiations were sometimes the only place
where the two nations could communicate and pursue cooperative efforts — even if they did
little to control arms or reduce the dangers posed by nuclear weapons.
In the late 1980s and early 1990s, the United States and Soviet Union/Russia signed
several agreements that reduced nuclear weapons. The 1987 Intermediate-Range Nuclear
Forces Treaty (INF) eliminated all land-based ballistic and cruise missiles with ranges between
300 and 3,400 miles. The 1991 Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START I, mandated
reductions in numbers of warheads deployed on long-range land-based and submarine-based
missiles and on heavy bombers. In January 1993, the United States and Russia signed the
second Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty, START II, which would further reduce the number
of warheads on their strategic offensive forces. The United States and Russia also held
discussions on a START III treaty that would reduce their forces further.
The Bush Administration has argued that arms control negotiations, leading to formal
treaties, should no longer be a central feature of the U.S-Russian relationship. Administration
officials contend that the relationship codified by these treaty regimes reflects old-style “Cold
War” thinking, and that the two sides should, instead, reduce their offensive forces
unilaterally, to the levels that each finds necessary, and eliminate the ABM Treaty’s
restrictions on the deployment of missile defenses. The United States and Russia continue
to implement START I, but START II may never enter into force and that the two sides mayl
not pursue a START III Treaty. This issue brief reviews developments in these earlier efforts
and summarizes proposals for further arms control agreements. It also tracks discussions on
arms control issues that have occurred since the start of the Bush Administration.
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START I
Treaty Provisions
START I, signed on July 31, 1991, limits the United States and successors to the Soviet
Union to 6,000 warheads attributed to 1,600 strategic offensive delivery vehicles —
land-based intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), submarine-launched ballistic missiles
(SLBMs) and heavy bombers. The treaty also limits each side to 4,900 warheads attributed
to ballistic missiles, 1,540 warheads attributed to heavy ICBMs, and 1,100 warheads
attributed to mobile ICBMs. Warheads are “attributed” to missiles and heavy bombers
through counting rules that assign each deployed missile or bomber a warhead number. The
number of warheads attributed to ICBMs and SLBMs usually equals the number actually
deployed on that type of missile, but the number attributed to heavy bombers is far fewer than
the number of bombs or cruise missiles that each type of bomber can be equipped to carry.
The Treaty allows “downloading” of warheads to reduce the number of warheads attributed
and carried on some multiple warhead (MIRVed) missiles. (For details about START I, see
CRS Report 91-575, START: Central Limits and Key Provisions.)
To monitor forces and verify compliance with START I, the parties rely on their own
national technical means (NTM) and numerous cooperative measures designed to supplement
information received through NTM. These include extensive data exchanges on the numbers
and locations of affected weapons and several types of on-site inspections (OSI), including
baseline inspections to confirm initial data, inspections of closed-out facilities or eliminated
equipment, inspection of suspect sites, and continuous monitoring of certain facilities. The
parties must also notify each other of several types of activities, such as the movement of
items limited by the treaty. The parties agreed to refrain from encrypting or denying the
telemetry (missile test data) needed to monitor many qualitative and quantitative limits. The
treaty established the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC), where the parties
meet to discuss treaty implementation issues and compliance questions.
In May 1992, the United States, Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan signed a
Protocol to START I that listed those four former Soviet republics as the successors to the
Soviet Union for the Treaty. In this agreement, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan all agreed
to join the Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) as non-nuclear weapons states and to
eliminate the strategic nuclear weapons on their territories. In separate agreements, these
three states arranged to return the nuclear warheads from those weapons to Russia.
Ratification and Implementation
Ratification. The U.S. Senate gave consent to the ratification of START I on October
1, 1992. Kazakhstan ratified START I in June 1992; it joined the NPT as a non-nuclear state
on February 14, 1994. Belarus approved START I and the NPT on February 4, 1993, and
formally joined the NPT as a non-nuclear weapon state on July 22, 1993. The Russian
parliament approved START I on November 4, 1992, but stated that it would not exchange
the instruments of ratification until all three of the other republics adhered to the NPT as
non-nuclear states. Ukraine delayed action on START I for nearly two years. On January
14, 1994, Presidents Clinton, Yeltsin, and Kravchuk of Ukraine signed a Trilateral Statement
in which Ukraine agreed to transfer all the nuclear warheads on its territory to Russia and to
eliminate the treaty-accountable delivery vehicles for these warheads in exchange for
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compensation and security assurances. The Ukrainian parliament approved the Trilateral
Statement and START I in early February 1994. It eventually approved Ukraine’s accession
to the NPT in November 1994. On December 5, 1994, the United States, Russia, and Great
Britain signed a memorandum granting security assurances to Ukraine, Belarus and
Kazakhstan. Ukraine then acceded to the NPT, the five parties to START I exchanged
instruments of ratification, and START I entered into force.
Weapons Deactivation. As of January 31, 2001, the United States had removed all
of the Minuteman II missiles from their silos and had eliminated or converted 449 of the 450
Minuteman II silos according to the provisions outlined in START. The United States has
also withdrawn from service and removed the missiles from all of its Poseidon ballistic missile
submarines. All but 1 of the 31 Poseidons have been eliminated according to the provisions
outlined in the treaty. After these reductions, the United States had 7,295 warheads
attributed to 1,344 delivery vehicles in its force.
Forces of the former Soviet Union have declined significantly during START I
implementation, from more than 10,000 warheads on 2,500 delivery vehicles in 1990 to 6,302
warheads on 1,288 delivery vehicles on January 31, 2001. All the nuclear warheads from
SS-18 missiles and weapons for bombers in Kazakhstan had been returned to Russia by May
1995. All the nuclear weapons had been removed from Ukraine’s territory by June 1, 1996
and all 81 of the SS-25 missiles based in Belarus had been returned to Russia by late
November 1996. Ukraine has eliminated all of the SS-19 ICBM silos on its territory and 29
of the 56 silos for SS-24 ICBMs. Russia has also eliminated several hundred ICBM silos,
almost 350 SLBM launchers and 50 bombers.
The number of bombers remaining in Ukraine has declined from 43 to 6; these include
5 Bear-H bombers and one Blackjack bomber. Russia and Ukraine sought unsuccessfully for
five years to negotiate a price for Russia to purchase these aircraft from Ukraine. However,
in late 1999, Russia and Ukraine reached an agreement for Ukraine to return 11 bombers –3
Bear_H bombers and 8 Blackjack bombers – to Russia in exchange for forgiveness of part of
its natural gas debts to Russia.
Monitoring and Verification. All the parties to START I have conducted on-site
inspections permitted by the treaty. In addition to conducting routine inspections called for
in the Treaty, U.S. inspectors also monitored the elimination of 20 Russian SLBMs in early
December 1997. Although not mandated by the treaty, Russia eliminated these missiles by
launching them from submarines and destroying them shortly after launch.
Compliance. The parties to START I have all noted that there have been few
significant compliance questions. In 1995, the United States raised concerns about Russian
compliance with the treaty’s provisions on the conversion of missiles to space launch vehicles
when Russia used a converted SS-25 ICBM to launch a satellite. According to published
reports, Russia did not allow the United States to inspect the missile to confirm that it was
configured as a space launch vehicle when it exited the Votkinsk missile assembly facility, and
it failed to provide the proper notifications, as specified in START I, about the location of the
missile prior to the satellite launch. Russia claimed that it was not obligated to notify the
United States about the missile or permit the United States to inspect it at the Votkinsk portal
because it was a dedicated space launch vehicle that was not limited by START. The United
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States held that the missile was subject to START I inspection and notification provisions
because it was a variant of a missile limited by the treaty.
After further discussions in the Joint Compliance and Inspection Commission (JCIC),
the two sides agreed that a limited number these launch vehicles could leave the Votkinsk
facility without being subject to imaging inspections. They would still have to be measured
and opened to confirm that they were not treaty-limited missiles. By 1997, Russia had
produced all the launch vehicles permitted by this interim agreement. In November 1997, the
two sides reached a final agreement that would cover any additional space-launch vehicles
assembled at Votkinsk. Russia agreed to notify the United States when such vehicles left
Votkinsk and to provide the unique identifier number for the launch vehicles. The two sides
agreed on the data they would use in the inspection process to confirm that the canister
contained a space launch vehicle, rather than a treaty-limited missile.
In mid-June 1998, the Russian press reported that Russian officials were concerns about
several areas of U.S. compliance with START I. For example, tests of the British Trident
missiles may have released 10-12 warheads, rather than the 8 permitted on U.S. Trident
missiles. The United States believes this is consistent with START I because the Treaty does
not limit British missiles, but some in Russia argue that the United States could gain valuable
information that would permit it to deploy its own missiles with 10-12 warheads. Some in
Russia also contend that the United States has altered the B-1 bombers to make it easier for
them to carry cruise missiles. These changes are not banned by the START I Treaty, and the
United States could equip B-1 bombers without violating its obligations, but this would
change the accounting for the bombers under START I. Most of these issues have been
addressed during meetings of the JCIC. Some observers speculated that the Russian reports
were designed to deflect criticism about Russia’s failure to ratify START II. Officials in the
Russian Defense Ministry repeated the accusations of U.S. non-compliance with START I
in late January 1999. The timing of Russia’s complaint appeared to derive from the recent
U.S. announcements regarding funding for a national ballistic missile defense system and its
intentions to negotiate amendments in the 1972 ABM Treaty (see below).
START II
Treaty Provisions
The United States and Russia signed START II on January 3, 1993. It limits each side
to 3,000-3,500 accountable warheads on strategic offensive delivery vehicles, with no more
than 1,750 warheads permitted on submarine-launched ballistic missiles (SLBMs). The Treaty
also bans all multiple warhead ICBMS (MIRVed ICBMs). As under START I, the parties can
reduce their deployed warheads and eliminate MIRVed ICBMs by downloading missiles —
that is, by removing warheads from deployed missiles. However, the treaty specifies that the
parties can remove, at most, 4 warheads from each missile, so ICBMs with 10 warheads must
be eliminated, rather than downloaded. The treaty makes an exception for the Russian SS-19
missile, which carries 6 warheads. Russia can remove 5 warheads from 105 of these missiles
so that they will remain as single-warhead missiles. The treaty requires the complete
elimination of Russia’s SS-18 heavy ICBMs, a long-standing U.S. arms control objective, as
well as the elimination of Russia’s SS-24 ICBMs and the U.S. Peacekeeper (MX) missile.
For the most part, START II will rely on the same verification regime as START I, and there
are few new verification provisions in the second treaty. (For details see CRS Report 93-35,
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START II: Central Limits and Force Structure Implications and CRS Report 93-617, The
START and START II Arms Control Treaties: Background and Issues.)
Ratification
The Senate Foreign Relations Committee held hearings on START II in March 1993,
but delayed further debate until START I entered into force. Hearings resumed in early
1995, but a dispute over plans to reorganize the State Department and eliminate the Arms
Control and Disarmament Agency delayed further action. After the Senate leadership reached
agreement on those issues, the Foreign Relations Committee approved the START II
resolution of ratification for START II by a unanimous vote on December 12, 1995. The full
Senate voted 87-4, offering its advice and consent to ratification, on January 26, 1996.
The lower house of Russia’s parliament, the Duma, began considering START II in July
1995. In early 1998, leaders in the Duma stated that they would probably debate the treaty
and vote on its ratification before the end of the session in June 1998. The leadership agreed
to hold closed meetings with Defense Minister Sergeyev and Foreign Minister Primakov. A
meeting with representatives from all Duma factions occurred on June 5 and a meeting for
all Duma members was scheduled for June 16, but did not take place.
The Duma resumed work on START II during its fall session, and it had drafted a law
on ratification for the treaty by the end of November, 1998. It planned to begin debate on the
Treaty in December, but the Communist party delayed that debate because the Duma did not
yet have a draft law on financing for the nation’s strategic nuclear forces. Nevertheless,
officials in the Yeltsin government continued to press for START II approval, and many
began to believe the Duma would act by the end of December. However, it again delayed its
consideration of the treaty after the U.S. and British air strikes on Iraq in mid-December. The
Treaty’s future clouded again after the United States announced its plans in January 1999 to
negotiate amendments to the 1972 ABM Treaty. However, the Duma leadership sent the
draft law on ratification to President Yeltsin in late March 1999. On March 19, the Duma’s
leadership announced that it had scheduled a debate for April 2, 1999. However, this debate
was canceled after NATO forces began their air campaign in Yugoslavia.
After he took office at the end of 1999, President Vladimir Putin expressed his support
for START II and pressed the Duma to approve its ratification. The Duma Foreign Affairs
committee recommended START II ratification in early April, and the Duma voted to
approve ratification on April 14, 2000. The upper chamber of the Parliament, the Federation
council, did the same on April 19, 2000.
Some Duma members objected to START II because they generally opposed President
Yeltsin and his policies. Others argued that Russia should not reduce its offensive forces as
NATO expanded into central Europe because NATO could then move its nuclear weapons
closer to Russia’s borders. And some argued that Russia should not approve START II until
it is certain that the United States will continue to abide by the 1972 ABM Treaty — they fear
that the United States could undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent if it deployed extensive
missile defenses while Russia reduced its offensive forces.
The debate over START II also revealed concerns about the substance of the Treaty.
Some argued the treaty would undermine Russia’s security by eliminating the core of Russia’s
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strategic forces — the MIRVed ICBMs. In addition, Russia would need hundreds of new
single-warhead ICBMs to retain 3,500 warheads as it eliminates MIRVed ICBMs. As a
result, some in the Duma suggested that the United States and Russia skip START II and
negotiate further reductions so that the United States would have to reduce to levels that
Russia might end up at anyway. (For details, see CRS Report 97-359, START II Debate in
the Russian Duma: Issues and Prospects.)
In March 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin agreed to extend the elimination timelines
in START II and established guidelines for a START III Treaty that would reduce both sides’
forces to 2,000-2,500 warheads. On September 26, 1997, Secretary of State Albright and
Russia’s Foreign Minister Primakov signed a protocol to START II that formalized the
extension of START II deadlines. They also exchanged letters repeating the Presidents’
agreement that the two sides would deactivate all the weapons to be eliminated under START
II by the end of 2003. The two sides agreed to work out methods for deactivation as soon
as the treaty entered into force. Russia added another provision to its letter, noting that it
expected a START III treaty to enter into force before the deactivation deadline for START
II. The United States acknowledged this statement but did not agree.
Both Yeltsin and Putin governments reportedly told the Duma committees that Russia
could not afford to retain strategic offensive forces at START I levels. Ratification of
START II would not only ensure that the United States reduces its forces along with Russia,
but would also permit the two nations to move on to deeper reductions in START III. These
arguments apparently swayed enough members of the Duma to win approval for the Treaty.
The Duma attached several conditions to its Federal Law on Ratification. The Law
indicates that U.S. withdrawal from the 1972 ABM Treaty would be considered to be an
extraordinary event that would give Russia the right to withdraw from START II. President
Putin appeared to endorse this view when he stated that Russia would pull out of the entire
system of arms control agreements on strategic nuclear forces if the United States dismantled
the ABM Treaty. Furthermore, the Federal Law on Ratification states that Russia will not
exchange the instruments of ratification on START II until the United States approves the
ratification of the 1997 Agreed Statements on Demarcation and Memorandum of
Understanding on Succession to the ABM Treaty. The Clinton Administration never
submitted these agreements to the U.S. Senate.
The Bush Administration has thus far been silent on its intentions with regard to START
II, although most analysts believe it will not attempt to complete the ratification process. The
President has stated that he would support further reductions in U.S. offensive nuclear forces,
but he has said that these reductions could be taken unilaterally, without Treaty provisions
to govern final numbers or monitoring and verification. It revealed a possible first step in this
process in its budget for the Defense Department for FY2002 when it requested $17 million
to being to dismantle the 50 Peacekeeper ICBMs. These missiles would have been eliminated
under the START II Treaty, but Congress has prevented any expenditures to begin their
retirement prior to START II’s entry into force. According to Secretary of Defense
Rumsfeld, the United States no longer needs these missiles and the Air Force had not
provided any funds to maintain or operate them. The Administration also included funding
in the budget to begin converting two Trident submarines to carry cruise missiles, instead of
nuclear-armed ballistic missiles. It has not, however, announced a more comprehensive
strategy for reducing U.S. offensive nuclear weapons.
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If it wanted START II to enter into force, the Administration would have to ask the
Senate for its advice and consent to ratification for the Protocol extending the elimination
time lines for the Treaty and the agreements clarifying the ABM Treaty, as required by the
Russian Law on Ratification. But it appears unlikely that President Bush would seek approval
for clarifications to the ABM Treaty when officials in his Administration have argued (as is
noted below) that the treaty is outdated and no longer serves U.S. interests. During his
nomination hearings, John Bolton, who has been nominated as Undersecretary of State for
Arms Control, stated that he would support an effort to gain ratification of the START II
Protocol, if it were separated from the clarifications to the ABM Treaty.
START III
Proposed Provisions
During their summit in Helsinki on March 20-21, 1997, Presidents Clinton and Yeltsin
agreed that the United States and Russia would begin negotiations on a START III treaty as
soon as START II entered into force. This treaty would limit each side to between
2,000-2,500 strategic nuclear warheads by December 31, 2007. The warhead reductions
would address Russia’s concerns about the need to build hundreds of new single-warhead
missiles to meet START II force levels. And, by reiterating that formal START III
negotiations would not begin until START II entered into force, the agreement sought to
reassure those in the United States who feared that START III might replace START II.
The Presidents also agreed that START III should contain measures to promote the
irreversibility of the weapons elimination process, including transparency measures and the
destruction of strategic nuclear warheads removed from delivery vehicles. This responds to
a condition that the Senate added to the START I resolution of ratification and it could
address concerns about the possible theft or sale of warheads to nations seeking their own
nuclear weapons. The two sides have been attempted, with little progress, to implement
warhead data exchanges for several years.
Finally, the Presidents agreed the two sides would explore possible measures for
long-range, nuclear-armed, sea-launched cruise missiles and other tactical nuclear weapons.
These could include transparency and confidence-building measures. Russia has long sought
restrictions on U.S. sea-launched cruise missiles. The United States unilaterally withdrew
these missiles from deployment in 1991, but Russia fears that the these missiles could threaten
targets in Russia if the United States redeployed them. The United States would like further
restrictions on Russian tactical nuclear weapons because these may pose a proliferation risk;
Russia would like restrictions on U.S. tactical nuclear weapons to ensure that they are not
deployed on the territory of new NATO members.
During discussions on START III, both sides introduced numerous provisions that
would address all the issues outlined in the Helsinki framework, but they could not resolve
their differences. For example, the Russians proposed that the treaty reduce strategic nuclear
forces to 1,500 or fewer warheads on each side. The United States has resisted such deep
reductions in the past, and when it tabled a new proposal in January 2000, it reportedly
continued to insist that START III reduce forces to 2,000 or 2,500 warheads.
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Press reports indicate that the Clinton Administration had asked DOD to assess the
implications of lower levels again, in early May 2000, in preparation for President Clinton’s
summit with President Putin scheduled for early June 2000. Military leaders reportedly
rejected lower levels again. At the time, many analysts expected the Clinton Administration
to negotiate a “Grand Bargain,” where the United States would accept lower limits for
START II if Russia accepted modifications to the ABM Treaty that would permit the
deployment of a U.S. NMD. However, the summit did not produce any arms control
agreements. Presidents Clinton and Putin did, however, agree to intensify their negotiations
on START III. Furthermore, during a press conference after their meetings, President
Clinton said that the United States would have to alter its strategic plans to reduce its forces
to 1,500 warheads. And he indicated that such a change in plans would be more complete
if the United States knew what role missile defenses would play in the U.S. plan.
In November 2000, President Putin outlined a new proposal for reductions in offensive
forces, stating that Russia would be willing to reduce to 1,500 warheads or lower if the
United States remained committed to the ABM Treaty. President Clinton did not respond
directly to this proposal. Many analysts doubt that the United States would accept such a
proposal because U.S. officials have indicated that the United States would only be willing
to cut its forces that deeply if Russia agreed to modify the ABM Treaty.
President Bush has stated that he believes the United States and Russia could move away
from the formal arms control process and reduce their forces unilaterally or in parallel to
whatever level each side decided was appropriate. He has stated that he would reduce U.S.
forces unilaterally, to the lowest possible level, after military leaders conducted a thorough
review of U.S. defense plans. In mid-February 2001, he issued a directive for DOD to begin
this review of the U.S. nuclear force posture. At their meeting following the G-8 summit in
Genoa, Italy, Presidents Bush and Putin agreed that the two nations would begin
consultations on offensive and defensive weapons. The Russians apparently expect these
consultations to produce agreed limits on offensive forces and minor modifications of the
ABM Treaty. The Bush Administration, however, has stated that the United States is not
expecting lengthy negotiations or the completion of a formal arms control treaty. Instead, the
Administration expects to use these consultations as a forum to inform Russia of U.S. plans
with respect to offensive and defensive forces and to convince Russia to set aside the ABM
Treaty with the United States.
Alternative Proposals
Many analysts in the arms control community believe the United States and Russia
should move beyond the START framework by either reducing the alert rates of their
deployed weapons or seeking deeper reductions, leading towards the eventual elimination of
all nuclear weapons. Supporters argue that these measures would not only make the United
States and Russia safer, they would also demonstrate that the United States and Russia are
reducing the role of nuclear weapons in their defense policies. Others argue that the United
States and Russia should stop negotiating and implementing formal arms control
arrangements. Some contend that this locks the two parties into an adversarial relationship,
where a more cooperative approach, with each side setting its own force structure
requirements, would be more appropriate. Others contend that formal agreements that
mandate U.S. reductions are not needed because economic conditions in Russia will assure
that reductions occur there with or without U.S. participation.
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The Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty
Treaty Provisions
The 1972 U.S.-Soviet Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty prohibits the deployment of
ABM systems for the defense of the nations’ entire territory. It permits each side to deploy
limited ABM systems at two locations, one centered on the nation’s capital and one at a
location containing ICBM silo launchers. A 1974 Protocol further limited each nation to one
ABM site, located at the nation’s capital or around an ICBM deployment area. Each ABM
site can contain no more than 100 ABM launchers and 100 ABM interceptor missiles.
(Russia deployed its ABM site around Moscow; the United States deployed its site around
ICBM silos near Grand Forks, North Dakota. The United States ceased operations at its
ABM site in 1975, but the facilities continue to count under the ABM Treaty.) The Treaty
also specifies that, in the future, any radars that provide early warning of strategic ballistic
missile attack must be located on the periphery of the national territory and oriented outward.
The Treaty bans the development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based, space-
based, or mobile land-based ABM systems and ABM system components (these include
interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars or other sensors that can substitute for radars).
The numerical limits and deployment restrictions in the ABM Treaty do not apply to
other types of defensive systems — such as defenses against shorter-range battlefield or
theater ballistic missiles. However, the Treaty does state that the parties cannot give these
other types of defenses the capabilities to counter strategic ballistic missiles or their elements
in flight trajectory. The parties also cannot test these other types of defenses “in an ABM
mode.” But the ABM Treaty does not define the capabilities of a “strategic” ballistic missile
or the characteristics of a test that would be “in an ABM mode.”
The Demarcation and Succession Agreements
Questions about the difference between ABM systems and theater missile defense
(TMD) systems grew in importance after the 1991 Persian Gulf War. Iraq’s scud missile
attacks on Israel and allied forces alerted many in the United States to the growing threat
from ballistic missiles in regional conflicts and generated new interest in the ongoing
development of advanced theater missile defenses (TMD). By 1993, some analysts and
officials in the Clinton Administration had begun to ask whether advanced TMD systems
would be limited by the ABM Treaty. To avoid possible compliance questions, the Clinton
Administration sought to reach an agreement with Russia on a “demarcation line” to
distinguish between ABM systems and TMD systems. (For details on U.S. TMD programs,
see CRS Issue Brief IB98028, Theater Air and Missile Defense: Issues for Congress.)
Questions about the future of the ABM Treaty and its relationship to U.S. National
Missile Defenses were further complicated by the fact that the Soviet Union no longer existed.
Many critics of the ABM Treaty and supporters of U.S. missile defense deployments found
the situation to be advantageous; they believed the Treaty could lapse and the United States
could deploy missile defenses without limits. But the Clinton Administration believed that the
ABM Treaty remained in the U.S. national security interest and it began negotiations in late
1993 on an agreement that would identify the treaty successors to the Soviet Union.
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Agreed Statements on Demarcation. When the ABM/TMD demarcation
negotiations began, the United States sought to maintain the flexibility to develop advanced
theater missile defense (TMD) systems without having those systems fall under the limits in
the ABM Treaty. It a simple rule that defining an ABM interceptor as one that demonstrated
the capability to destroy a target ballistic missile with a velocity greater than 5 kilometers per
second (this would essentially define a “strategic” ballistic missile). Any missile defense
interceptor tested against a less capable target missile would not be considered to have been
tested “in an ABM mode” and would not be covered by the limits in the ABM Treaty.
Russia feared that the United States might deploy advanced TMD systems that would
allow it to intercept Russia’s strategic ballistic missiles, and, therefore, undermine Russia’s
nuclear deterrent. Hence, Russia proposed a more restrictive formula to define an ABM
interceptor as one with the capability to intercept targets with a velocity of 3 kilometers per
second, rather than 5 kilometers per second, and a range of 3,500 kilometers. And, it sought
to limit the velocity of TMD interceptor missiles to 3 kilometers per second. Any interceptor
tested with a greater velocity, even if tested against a shorter range or slower target missile,
would be considered to be subject to the limits in the Treaty. Russia also suggested that the
parties link the number and location of deployed TMD systems to size and scope of threat and
that they restrict the power of TMD radars. (For a more detailed discussion see CRS Report
98-496, Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Demarcation and Succession Agreements: Background
and Issues.)
The United States briefly considered accepting limits on the velocity of TMD interceptor
missiles, but by 1995 it returned to its initial position that the demarcation line should be
based on the characteristics of the target ballistic missile used during tests of TMD interceptor
missiles. Russia eventually accepted this standard for TMD systems with slower velocity
interceptors, i.e. those with interceptors with velocities below 3 km/second, but it wanted
added restrictions on TMD systems with faster velocity interceptors because these were the
systems that might threaten Russia’s strategic offensive forces.
In March 1997. Secretary of State Albright and Russia’s Foreign Minister Primakov
signed Agreed Statements on Demarcation on September 26, 1997. In the First Agreed
Statement, the two sides agreed that TMD systems with interceptors tested at speeds at or
below 3 km/sec that were tested against a target with a speed at or below of 5 km/sec and a
range of less than 3,500 km would be exempt from the limits in the ABM Treaty. The
Second Agreed Statement outlined parameters for higher speed systems, those with
interceptor velocities above 3 km/second. These systems could not be tested against a target
missile with a velocity greater than 5 km/sec and a range greater than 3,500 km. In addition,
the agreement banned TMD systems with space-based interceptors. However, the agreement
did not state whether these more capable TMD systems would be covered by the limits in the
ABM Treaty. Each nation would decide whether its systems had been “tested in an ABM
mode.” (For more details on the substance of the agreements see CRS Report 98-496, Anti-
Ballistic Missile Treaty Demarcation and Succession Agreements: Background and Issues.)
The demarcation agreements would not limit the speed of U.S. TMD systems. They use
the interceptors’ speed as a dividing line between those systems that are not limited by the
ABM Treaty and those that would need further analysis to determine whether they are exempt
from the Treaty limits. Many in Congress believe the TMD demarcation provisions will
restrict U.S. TMD capabilities, even though the Administration has stated that they are
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consistent with all current programs, because they believe the United States will “dumb
down” its systems to avoid compliance debates with Russia. Some in the arms control
community believe that the demarcation agreements permit too much TMD capability, and
that the deployment of more advanced TMD systems could undermine the ABM Treaty.
Memorandum of Understanding on Succession. The 1997 Memorandum of
Understanding on Succession names Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan as successors
to the Soviet Union in the ABM Treaty. Together, these states are limited to a single ABM
deployment area with no more than 100 launchers and interceptors. The MOU also states
that the geographic area covered by the provisions in the treaty would be the combined
territories of these successor states. These provisions permit Russia to continue to operate
Soviet ABM facilities and radars in Ukraine and Kazakhstan and to construct a new early
warning radar in Belarus. The MOU also states that the Successor States may continue to use
any facility covered by the Treaty that is “currently located on the territory of any State that
is not Party to the Treaty, with the consent of such State....” Consequently, Russia can
continue to operate the early warning radar in Azerbaijan (it closed the radar in Latvia in
September 1998) even though it is outside the periphery of the participating nations.
The Clinton Administration and supporters of the ABM Treaty argued that this
agreement will allow the ABM Treaty to remain in place as the cornerstone of the strategic
relationship between the United States and Russia. They contend that, without limits on the
deployment of strategic ballistic missile defenses, Russia would be unwilling to reduce its
strategic offensive forces. Some in Congress, however, believe that the United States should
have allowed the ABM Treaty to lapse. They believe that, by adding parties to the ABM
Treaty, it will be more difficult for the United States to negotiate amendments that would
permit deployment of effective national missile defenses.
The Clinton Administration agreed to submit the demarcation and succession agreements
for Senate advice and consent as amendments to the ABM Treaty, but never did so for fear
that the Senate would defeat them. The Clinton Administration declared in May 1998 that
the United States and Russia “clearly are parties” to the ABM Treaty. This declaration would
make it possible for the treaty to remain in force if the Senate rejected the MOU on
succession. Many in Congress objected to this declaration. On August 5, 1998, the House
passed an amendment to the FY1999 Commerce, Justice, and State Department
Appropriations Bill (H.R. 4276, H.Amdt. 859) stating that the U.S. delegates to the Standing
Consultative Commission (SCC), could not use any of the funds to implement the MOU on
succession. Representative Weldon argued that this would force the Administration to
submit the MOU to the Senate for its advice and consent to ratification. Others argued that
the United States should cease its participation in the ABM Treaty so that it could build
nationwide defenses. Critics of the amendment argued that it would preclude any U.S.
participation in the SCC, and therefore, undermine continued implementation of the treaty.
The ABM Treaty and National Missile Defenses
In the mid-1990s, concerns about the possibility of an unintended missile launch from
Russia and the growing ballistic missile threat from other nations stimulated interest in
national missile defenses (NMD). Some members of Congress argued that the United States
should deploy limited defenses to protect against unintended and rogue missile launches.
Others, like Senators Jon Kyl and Jesse Helms, have argued that the United States should
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abandon the ABM Treaty and deploy whatever defenses it needed to protect its territory from
missile attacks. Still others, like Representative Curt Weldon, supported an approach where
the United States would cooperate with Russia both to modify the ABM Treaty and deploy
ballistic missile defenses. Others, however, argued that the United States should not rush to
deploy an NMD system. They noted that rogue nations are years away from deploying
missiles that could threaten U.S. soil. And, they argued that U.S. plans to deploy an NMD
system could interfere with offensive force reductions if Russia reacts by withdrawing from
the START I and START II treaties.
In January 1999, the Clinton Administration added $6.6 billion to the Defense budget
for FY1999-2005 to support the deployment of an NMD system. It still planned to decide
in June 2000 whether to deploy the system, but these funds in the out-years of the budget
would preserve that option. The Administration announced that the growing missile threat
from North Korea would support a decision to deploy in 2000, if the technology were
sufficiently mature. The Administration also moved the projected deployment date from 2003
to 2005, to reduce the amount of risk in the program.
Some in Congress argued that the Administration should accelerate, not delay the
schedule for NMD because the threat from uncertainties in Russia and missiles in rogue
nations exists now. Some also argued that the United States may have too little warning
when new threats emerge. They point to the 1998 “Rumsfeld Report,” which notes that
nations may acquire long-range ballistic missiles without pursuing long development and
testing programs. Some Members praised the Administration for adding deployment funds
to the budget. But they continued to question the Administration’s commitment to
deployment. Others, including Senator Helms, criticized the Administration’s intention to
negotiate ABM Treaty amendments with Russia. He argued that the Treaty was no longer
in force due to the demise of the Soviet Union, and, by negotiating amendments, the
Administration would only give Russia a chance to veto U.S. NMD plans.
In 1998 and 1999, Congress sought to pass legislation that would mandate the
deployment of nationwide ballistic missile defenses. On April 21, 1998, the Senate Armed
Services Committee approved the American Missile Protection Act of 1998 (S. 1873, S.Rept.
105-175), which called for the deployment of a national missile defense system to protect all
U.S. territory as soon as the technology is ready. When the Senate bill came to the floor on
May 13, 1998, Democrats succeeded with a filibuster. The effort to invoke cloture failed by
one vote, 59 to 41, with only 4 Democrats joining all 55 Republicans in support of the
legislation. The Senate failed, again, to invoke cloture, in a vote on September 9, 1998.
Once again, the vote was 59-41. Senator Cochran introduced this bill again in January 1999
(S. 257). The Administration threatened a veto because it bill would used only the state of
technology as the measure for deployment, ignoring considerations about cost, threat, and
treaty-compliance. The Senate approved the bill, by a vote of 97-3, on March 17, 1999.
Democrats dropped their opposition, and the White House withdrew its threat of a veto, after
the Senate approved an amendment stating that it is U.S. policy to continue to negotiate with
Russia on reductions in offensive nuclear weapons.
Representative Curt Weldon introduced similar legislation on August 5, 1998 (H.R.
4402) and, again, in early February 1999 (H.R. 4). This legislation simply stated that it is
“the policy of the United States to deploy a National Missile Defense.” This legislation
passed the House, by a vote of 317-105, on March 18, 1999. The House and Senate did not
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hold a conference to resolve the differences in their bills. Instead, the Senate took up H.R.
4, replaced its language with the language in S. 257, and passed the new bill. The House then
approved the new H.R. 4 on May 20, 1999. President Clinton signed the bill on July 23,
1999. However, he remained at odds with congressional Republicans about the implications
of the legislation. He contended that it was not equivalent to a deployment decision because
NMD remains subject to annual authorizations and appropriations. But congressional
supporters of NMD argued that the bill makes it clear that the United States will deploy and
NMD, no further decisions about that possibility are needed.
In February 1999, a team, led by Deputy Secretary of State Strobe Talbott, met with
Russian officials in Moscow to begin discussions on possible amendments to the ABM Treaty.
The United States sought to reassure Russia that the planned NMD would not interfere with
Russia’s strategic nuclear forces and that the United States still views the ABM Treaty as
central to the U.S.-Russian strategic balance. The Russians were reportedly unconvinced;
they continued to argue that the United States has overstated the threat from rogue nations
so that it can build a defense that will be able to intercept Russian missiles.
During their meeting at the G-8 summit in Germany in June 1999, the Presidents
repeated their support for the ABM Treaty as the “cornerstone of strategic stability.” But
they also noted that the parties are obligated, under Article XIII of the Treaty to consider
possible changes in the strategic situation that have a bearing on the Treaty and to consider
proposals for further increasing the viability of the Treaty. By signing on to this statement,
President Yeltsin acknowledged that the ABM Treaty could be amended, a position that is
contrary to the views of some in Russia who believe amendments that would permit more
extensive U.S. defenses would be inconsistent with the Treaty. But, in November 1999,
President Yeltsin warned that any U.S. attempt to move beyond the existing limits in the
ABM Treaty would “have extremely negative consequences” for other arms control treaties.
Russian officials also stated that Russia was prepared to deploy new multiple-warhead
missiles or retain older ones so that it would have the forces needed to penetrate U.S. missile
defenses. And many Russian officials continued to insist that the United States had overstated
the threat from rogue nations.
In January 1999, the United States reportedly tabled a proposed Protocol to the ABM
Treaty that would allow for the deployment of a U.S. NMD site in Alaska. This Protocol,
which was published by the Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists Magazine, would allow for the
deployment of 100 interceptors and an ABM radar at a single site, other than the sites
permitted by the ABM Treaty (i.e. Alaska) and for the modification of several other early
warning radars so that they could perform ABM radar functions and support the NMD
system. The Protocol also stated that either side could request negotiations on further
modifications after March 1, 200l. These talks would presumably allow the United States to
seek further changes in the Treaty’s limits on ABM interceptors and space-based sensors.
The United States also offered to exchange data and permit inspections so that Russia could
remain confident in the limited nature of the U.S. NMD. Russia reportedly did not table a
counter-proposal or begin discussions about the specific provisions in the U.S. proposal.
Some in Congress criticized these negotiations because, they argued, the resulting
agreement would prove too limiting for U.S. missile defenses. In mid-April 2000, 25
Republican Senators signed a letter to President Clinton stating that they would vote against
any agreement the Administration reached with the Russians on modifications to the ABM
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Treaty. Furthermore, on April 26, 2000, Senator Jesse Helms informed the Administration
that the Foreign Relations Committee would not address or vote on any arms control
agreements reached by this Administration in its final months. This warning had little
relevance because the United States and Russia remained far apart on the question of
modifying the ABM Treaty.
During their summit in Moscow in early June 2000, and again at the G-8 summit in late
June, Presidents Clinton and Putin failed to resolve their differences. At the Moscow summit,
Putin did agree that the threat from proliferation was increasing and that the ABM Treaty
could be modified to remain viable in the face of changing circumstances, but he did not agree
that the proliferation threat justified such modifications. After the summit, other Russian
officials continued to disp ute the U.S. assessment of emerging threats and to argue that the
U.S. NMD system would undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent. But Putin did propose that
Russia work with European nations to develop defenses against shorter-range ballistic
missiles. Russia repeated this offer in February 2001.
On September 1, 2000, President Clinton announced that he had decided not to
authorize deployment of a National Missile Defense system. He stated that he could not
conclude “that we have enough confidence in the technology, and the operational
effectiveness of the entire NMD system, to move forward to deployment.” He also noted that
the delay in a deployment decision would permit the United States to continue its efforts to
convince Russia to modify the ABM Treaty. He stated that he believed it would be “far better
to move forward in the context of the ABM Treaty.” Russian officials praised the delay in
the deployment decision, but some in Moscow may mistakenly believe that Russia’s resistance
to changes in the ABM Treaty caused the delay. President Clinton indicated that it was the
technology that caused the delay, even though the Treaty remains an issue.
During his speech on May 1, 2001, President Bush stated that the United States would
need to “leave behind the constraints” of the Treaty as it pursued the development and
deployment of missile defenses. He called on Russia to join the United States in developing
a new framework for strategic stability and international security in the post-Cold War era.
During the President’s visit to Europe in mid-June, some officials from the Administration
argued that the United States would need to abandon the Treaty soon because the Treaty
would inhibit testing of ballistic missile defense concepts. However, in the week following
the President’s trip some officials indicated that the United States could pursue its test
program for two or more years before Treaty limits would affect the program. Therefore,
they indicated that the United States might not need to withdraw from the ABM Treaty in the
near term. Some critics of missile defense believed this new position indicated the
Administration was “softening” its approach to missile defense and the ABM Treaty. Others
have stated that the President may have recognized the depth of opposition to his plans during
his visit to Europe and may be seeking a way to proceed without igniting the furor that might
exist if the United States were to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. Both proved wrong.
In mid-July 2001, the Bush Administration offered Congress a more detailed description
of its missile defense plans when it submitted its amended defense budget for FY2002. The
Administration has requested $8.3 billion and increase of more $3 billion, or 57%, from the
FY2001 budget. This increase would support a robust research and development program
into a wide range of missile defense technologies, with the ultimate objective of deploying a
layered defense. The Administration has also reorganized BMDO to eliminate the distinctions
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between theater missile defense and national missile defense, instead dividing the programs
into boost-phase, mid-course, and terminal technologies. This change in thinking is also
reflected in the Administration’s testing plans for missile defense in FY2002; in testimony
before Congress on July 13, 2001, Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz stated that the
United States might soon test the ability of Aegis theater defense radars to track strategic
ballistic missiles. This type of test could be interpreted to be an effort to test non-ABM
systems in an ABM mode, which is forbidden by the ABM Treaty. Consequently, Secretary
Wolfowitz noted that the United States could bump up against the limits in the Treaty “in
months” rather than in years. However, he said that the United States would not violate the
ABM Treaty. Instead, the Administration would seek Russia’s agreement and understanding
on a framework that would allow the United States to move beyond the ABM Treaty, and,
if this was not possible, the United States could withdraw.
During their meeting after the G-8 summit in Genoa, Italy, Presidents Bush and Putin
agreed that the two nations would soon begin “intensive consultations on the interrelated
subjects of offensive and defensive systems.” Many observers interpreted this statement as
an indication that two sides would begin negotiations on a new agreement limiting offensive
nuclear weapons and on possible amendments or modifications to the ABM Treaty. This may
have been the type of framework President Putin had in mind. His Defense Minister, Ivanov
indicated that he would recommend accepting modifications to the ABM Treaty if the
resulting defenses would not undermine Russia’s security; this acceptance would be in
exchange for deep cuts in U.S. and Russian offensive forces. However, officials from the
Bush Administration, and the President himself, have stated that the United States does not
intend to participate in lengthy negotiations in search of formal arms control limits. They
view these consultations as an opportunity for the United States to outline its policies and
programs for both offensive and defensive weapons, and to seek Russian agreement on a
mutual withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. The President has said that the United States
would withdraw from the treaty unilaterally if Russia did not accept the U.S. approach.
Furthermore, in testimony before the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, Undersecretary
of State John Bolton stated that the Bush Administration would not seek to negotiate
amendments to the ABM Treaty or a new formal agreement to replace it. Instead, the
Administration would seek to win Russian acquiescence with U.S. plans and to convince
Russia to jointly withdraw from the ABM Treaty with the United States.
These consultations began with several meetings in August and September 2001. In
early August, a Russian delegation visited the Department of Defense and received extensive
briefings on U.S. plans for missile defense in early August. These meetings were billed as
an “exchange of information” not an exchange of ideas. Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld
traveled to Moscow in mid-August, reportedly in an unsuccessful effort to convince Russia
that the two nations should withdraw from the ABM Treaty simultaneously. He did not
engage in discussions about possible modifications to the ABM Treaty or in negotiations on
reductions in offensive forces. He stated that the United States did not yet know how low
it would reduce its forces because it had not yet completed its strategic review. In late
August, Undersecretary of State John Bolton seemed to indicate that the United States would
withdraw from the ABM Treaty in November, if the United States and Russia had not agreed
on a plan for mutual withdrawal by the time President Bush and President Putin met in Texas.
He, and other officials, later stated that he had not intended to set a firm deadline. The
following day, however, President Bush stated that the United States would withdraw from
the ABM Treaty, but would do so on its own timetable. Press reports indicate that
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Undersecretary of State John Bolton was prepared to inform Russian officials of the U.S.
intention to move forward with withdrawal from the ABM Treaty during meetings in Moscow
on September 17, but he did not do so.
Russia, for its part, believes these talks should lead to new negotiations towards a treaty
that will limit offensive weapons to 1,500 warheads or fewer, and, possibly, minor
modifications to the ABM Treaty. Russian officials have complained that they cannot make
progress in these negotiations because they still do not know what kind of missile defense the
United States intends to build or what parts of the Treaty will cause problems for this defense.
Furthermore, in early September, Russian officials ruled out an early agreement on missile
defenses. They indicated that it could take a year or more for the two sides to reach
agreement on a framework to replace the ABM Treaty. At the same time, Russia appeared
willing to accept some minor modifications to the Treaty, although it continued to reject the
U.S. proposal for a joint withdrawal. Consequently, it appears that Russia may now be
willing to accept the kind of treaty modifications offered by the Clinton Administration, but
it is still not prepared to abandon the ABM Treaty in favor of a vague new framework offered
by the Bush Administration.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Report RL31111. Missile Defense: The Current Debate
CRS Report 98-496. Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty Demarcation and Succession
Agreements: Background and Issues.
CRS Report RL30345. U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Policy, Force Structure, and Arms Control
Issues
CRS Report 97-586. Russia’s Nuclear Forces: Doctrine and Force Structure Issues.
CRS Report 97-359. START II Debate in the Russian Duma: Issues and Prospects.
CRS Report RL30660. Arms Control after START II: Next Steps on the U.S.-Russian
Agenda
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