Order Code RS21035
October 3, 2001
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Emergency Spending: Statutory and
Congressional Rules
James V. Saturno
Specialist on the Congress
Government and Finance Division
Summary
Under the Budget Enforcement Act (BEA), there are statutory limits (caps) on the
level of federal discretionary spending, enforced by across-the-board spending cuts,
known as a sequester. If, however, spending is designated as emergency by both the
President and Congress, it will not trigger a sequester, because the caps are adjusted
automatically by an amount equal to the emergency spending. Since the BEA was first
enacted in 1990, both the House and Senate have supplemented its provisions with
additional limitations in their respective rules concerning the use of emergency
designations. This report will be updated to reflect any changes in the rules concerning
the use of emergency designations.
Control of the process for initiating, considering, and enacting appropriations for
unanticipated or emergency purposes has been a longstanding concern within the federal
budget process. For example, the Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act
of 1974 included a requirement that the budget resolution include an allowance for
“contingencies”1; similarly, the President’s budget was required to include:
an allowance for additional estimated expenditures and proposed appropriations for the
ensuing fiscal year, and an allowance for unanticipated uncontrollable expenditures for
the ensuing fiscal year.2
No explicit limitations, however, were placed on either branch with regard to their
prerogative to request or enact spending for any purpose, including supplemental
appropriations. As part of presidential-congressional budget summit agreements in 1987
and 1989, appropriations caps were enacted, and the two branches agreed not to initiate
supplemental spending above these amounts “except in the case of a dire emergency.” In
1 P.L. 93-344, Section 301(a)(2), 88 Stat. 306.
2 P.L. 93-344, Section 604, 88 Stat. 324.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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neither agreement was there a definition for a dire emergency, or a requirement that any
supplemental spending be offset.3
The Budget Enforcement Act
With the Budget Enforcement Act of 1990,4 the process for enacting emergency
spending became more formalized. The Act generally shifted the focus of budgetary
control mechanisms from the projected deficit to the spending or revenue effect of current
legislation, by providing for the direct enforcement of statutory discretionary spending
limits and a limitation on changes to entitlement spending and revenues known as “pay-as-
you-go” or PAYGO.5 In addition to specifying the spending limit, the Act also provided
for several required adjustments, including emergency appropriations. The Act provides
that:
If, for any fiscal year, appropriations for discretionary accounts are enacted that the
President designates as emergency requirements and that the Congress so designates in
statute, the adjustment shall be the total of such appropriations in discretionary
accounts designated as emergency requirements and outlays flowing in all fiscal years
from such appropriations.6
Enforcement of the spending caps for discretionary spending currently is provided
through FY2002. A separate spending cap for highway and mass transit spending remains
in place for FY2003, and spending caps for conservation programs in six subcategories
remain in effect through FY2006, but there is no mechanism in law at this time to enforce
them.
A similar provision specifies that enforcement of PAYGO exclude emergency
provisions.7 However, almost all of the spending designated as emergency since 1991 has
been for discretionary accounts.8 Enforcement of the PAYGO process currently applies
to legislation enacted prior to October 1, 2002.
Either the President or Congress may initiate the emergency spending designation.
The President may initiate emergency spending by designating the spending as emergency
in his request, which would then have to be similarly designated by Congress in statutory
3 William G. Dauster, “Budget Emergencies,” Journal of Legislation, Vol. 18, no. 2, 1992, pp.
249-315.
4 Title XIII of P.L. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388-573-1388-630. This act amended the Balanced
Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act of 1985, P.L. 100-119.
5 For more on the federal budget process, see CRS Report 98-721, Introduction to the Federal
Budget Process
, by Robert Keith and Allen Schick.
6 Section 251(b)(2)(A). The current language was enacted in 1997 in Title X of P.L. 105-33 and
appears at 111 Stat. 699.
7 Section 252(d)(4)(B) excludes from the PAYGO process estimates of amounts for emergency
provisions, as designated under Section 252(e). The current language was enacted in 1997 in Title
X of P.L. 105-33 and appears at 111 Stat. 703.
8 To date, only two emergencies have been designated under the PAYGO process, Section 6 of P.L.
103-6, and Section 3309(c) of P.L. 105-206.

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language. Congress may also initiate emergency spending by making the designation in
statutory language. When it does so, it usually makes the availability of those funds for
obligation contingent on the President designating them as well.
The Act does not define or place limits on the use of the emergency designation,
other than the requirement that it be so designated by both the President and Congress.
This has provided a maximum degree of flexibility, but has also led to criticism from some
Members of Congress that the emergency designation could be applied to non-emergency
spending, and thus be used as a means for circumventing budgetary discipline. This has
resulted in additional rules concerning the consideration of emergency spending legislation
in both the House and the Senate.
House Rules
In January 1995, the House added a new provision to its rules, House Rule XXI,
Clause 2(e), to prevent non-emergency spending from being added to an appropriations
bill designated as providing emergency spending.9 The rule provides that:
A provision other than an appropriation designated as an emergency under section
251(b)(2) or section 252(e) of the Balanced Budget and Emergency Deficit Control Act,
a rescission of budget authority, or a reduction in direct spending an amount for a
designated emergency may not be reported in an appropriation bill or joint resolution
containing an emergency designation under section 252(b)(2) or section 252(e) of such
Act and may not be in order as an amendment thereto.
Senate Rules
The Senate has taken a different approach to limiting the use of emergency
designations. In 1999, the Senate first adopted a point of order to prohibit consideration
of legislation containing an emergency designation.10 This mechanism was designed so
that a point of order could be raised against any emergency designation in a measure,
which would then be stricken from the measure without further action. The point of order
could be waived, however, by a vote of three-fifths of the Senate. The result of this was
effectively to require that any emergency designation be supported by three-fifths of the
Senate, in order to insure that it would remain as part of the measure. If a waiver was not
granted, the emergency designation would be stricken, but the spending could remain in
the measure subject to any other applicable budgetary limits. This provision also included
language providing guidelines for justifying an emergency designation, but these guidelines
were not binding. This provision was readopted in modified form in 2000, and currently
provides that:
When the Senate is considering a bill, resolution, amendment, motion, or conference
report, a point of order may be made by a Senator against an emergency designation in
that measure and if the Presiding Officer sustains that point of order, that provision
9 Representative Gerald Solomon, remarks in the House, Congressional Record, Vol. 141, January
4, 1995, p. 475.
10 Section 206(b) of H.Con.Res. 68 (106th Congress).

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making such a designation shall be stricken from that measure and may not be offered
as an amendment from the floor.11
In 2000, the Senate also adopted a provision establishing that the point of order does
not apply against an emergency designation for a provision making discretionary
appropriations for defense spending.12
11 Section 205(b) of H.Con.Res. 290 (106th Congress).
12 Section 205(g) of H.Con.Res. 290 (106th Congress).