Order Code IB89005
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Global Climate Change
Updated September 26, 2001
John R. Justus and Susan R. Fletcher
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Global Climate Change: Science and Policy
Greenhouse Gases: Sources and Trends
The Policy Context
Clinton Administration Policies
Bush Administration Policies
International Action
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC)
COP-1, The Berlin Mandate
COP-2 and a Ministerial Declaration
COP-3, The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change
COP-4, Buenos Aires
COP-5, Bonn, Germany
COP-6, The Hague, Netherlands
Congressional Interest and Activities
LEGISLATION
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Global Climate Change
SUMMARY
There is concern that human activities are
“greenhouse” gases. Because the U.S. econ-
affecting the heat/energy-exchange balance be-
omy is so dependent upon energy, and so
tween Earth, the atmosphere, and space, and
much of U.S. energy is derived from fossil
inducing global climate change, often termed
fuels, reducing these emissions poses major
“global warming.” Human activities, particu-
challenges and controversy.
larly the burning of fossil fuels, have increased
atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO ) and other
Congress has extensively reviewed
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trace greenhouse gases. If these gases con-
scientific information about climate change,
tinue to accumulate in the atmosphere at
and because of the global implications of this
current rates, most scientists believe global
problem, it has also been addressed
warming would occur through intensification
internationally through negotiations and ex-
of Earth’s natural heat-trapping “greenhouse
changes of views and information with interna-
effect.” Possible impacts might be seen as
tional organizations within and outside the
both positive and negative.
United Nations system.
A warmer climate would probably have
The 1992 U.N. Framework Convention
far reaching effects on agriculture and forestry,
on Climate Change (UNFCCC) called for a
managed and un-managed ecosystems, includ-
“non-binding” voluntary aim for industrialized
ing natural habitats, human health, water
countries to control atmospheric concentra-
resources, and sea level depending on climate
tions 0f green-house gases by stabilizing their
responses.
emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000.
The 1997 U.N. Kyoto Protocol to the
Although causal relationships between
UNFCCC goes further and, if it were to enter
projected long-range global climate trends and
into force, would commit the 38 major indus-
record-setting warmth and severe weather
trialized nations to legally binding emissions
events of the past two decades have not been
reductions.
firmly established, attention has been focused
on possible extremes of climate change and
International negotiations continued in
the need for better understanding of climate
July 2001 to reconcile differing positions of
processes to improve climate model forecasts.
nations and to continue to spell out key details
on how the Kyoto Protocol would operate.
The basic policy question is: Given
Following the Bush Administration’s rejection
scientific uncertainties about the magnitude,
of the Kyoto Protocol in March, the United
timing, rate, and regional consequences of
States declined to participate in these negotia-
potential climatic change, what are the appro-
tions, which ended with agreement among the
priate responses for U.S. and world
parties to proceed without the United States.
decisionmakers?
The United States has indicated it would seek
new approaches based on voluntary measures
Fossil-fuel combustion is the primary
and market mechanisms, but has declined to
source of CO emissions, and also emits other
proclaim a timeframe for a new proposal.
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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
At the November 2000 conference of parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on
Climate Change (COP-6), held in the Hague, Netherlands, international climate change
negotiations on implementing the Kyoto Protocol collapsed due to major differences among
the developed country parties, especially the European Union and the United States. A
major focus of disagreement concerned carbon sink issues. In late March, the Bush
Administration declared the Kyoto Protocol a failed effort and indicated that the United
States would not continue to participate in negotiations related to the Kyoto Protocol. This
caused widespread concern among environmental organizations and in certain diplomatic
circles expressed primarily by European Union (EU) nations and others, but high-level
efforts by EU officials to re-engage the United States were reportedly rebuffed. The COP-6
negotiations were resumed Bonn, Germany, in July 2001. The United States attended but
for the most part did not participate in discussions related to key issues of the Protocol.
At the ministerial segment of the Bonn meeting, the UNFCCC parties reached agreement on
the political elements of the Protocol without the United States, including the key issues such
as carbon sequestration and determinations to proceed with emissions trading and
compliance. As details continued to be negotiated at Bonn, it became apparent that future
disagreements would be possible, but that discussions to resolve the remaining details would
be continued with the expectation they could be resolved at the next meeting, COP-7, to be
held in Marrakech, Morocco, October 29 - November 9, 2001.
On June 6, 2001, the U.S. National Research Council (NRC) released a report
requested by the White House stating that global warming could well have serious societal
and ecological impacts by the end of this century. President Bush made a policy statement
on June 11, 2001, following release of the NRC report and completion of a cabinet-level
review of climate change options. In that statement, the President acknowledged that the
world has warmed and that greenhouse gases have increased, largely due to human activity,
but emphasized that the magnitude and rate of future warming are unknown. The President
then outlined the U.S. approach as rejecting the Kyoto Protocol and favoring voluntary
actions, increased scientific research, better technology, and market mechanisms. This
preceded his trip to Europe for meetings with European heads of state, which ended with
statements that Europe and the United States “agree to disagree” on climate change
approaches.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Global Climate Change: Science and Policy
A large number of scientists believe that human activities, which have increased
atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO ) by one-third over the past 100 years,
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may be leading to an increase in global average temperatures. However, this “global
warming” theory is not without challengers, who argue that scientific proof is incomplete or
contradictory, and that there remain many uncertainties about the nature and direction of
Earth’s climate. Nevertheless, concern is growing that human activities, such as the burning
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of fossil fuels, industrial production, deforestation, and certain land-use practices are
increasing atmospheric concentrations of carbon dioxide (CO ) that, along with increasing
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concentrations of other trace gases such as chlorofluorocarbons-CFCs, methane (CH ),
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nitrous oxide (N O), hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs) and sulfur
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hexafluoride (SF ), may be leading to changes in the chemical composition and physical
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dynamics of Earth’s atmosphere, including how heat/energy is distributed between the land,
ocean, atmosphere and space.
Greenhouse Gases: Sources and Trends
Scientists have found that the four most important variable greenhouse gases, whose
atmospheric concentrations can be influenced by human activities, are carbon dioxide (CO ),
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methane (CH ), nitrous oxide (N O), and chlorofluorocarbons (CFCs). Historically, CO has
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been the most important, but over the past several decades other gases have assumed
increasing significance and, collectively, are projected to contribute about as much to
potential global warming over the next 60 years as CO . The 1997 U.N. Kyoto Protocol on
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Climate Change, if it were to become a treaty in force, would also regulate three other trace
gases: hydrofluorocarbons (HFCs), perfluorocarbons (PFCs), and sulfur hexafluoride (SF ),
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whose limited concentrations in the atmosphere are anticipated to grow over the long-term.
Sulfate aerosols, a byproduct of air pollution, and other natural phenomena, are also viewed
as important for their transient and regional “climate cooling” effects in Earth’s atmosphere.
The amount of carbon cycling from naturally occurring processes each year through the
biosphere as CO is enormous — some 800 billion tons. Ice cores and other proxy climate
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data, which also indicate CO concentrations in the atmosphere, have shown, in general, a
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relatively stable global climate, at least over the past 10,000 years. As such, many scientists
suggest that the amount of CO generated by natural processes is about equal to the amounts
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absorbed and sequestered by natural processes. However, human activity since the Industrial
Revolution (c.a. 1850), and primarily in the form of burning fossil fuels, is now generating
some additional 24 billion tons of CO per year. Available evidence shows that about half this
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amount is absorbed by natural processes on land and in the ocean, and that atmospheric
concentrations of CO are now about 32% higher than they were some 150 years ago. Some
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scientists suggest that a large amount of CO may be stored in northern latitude soils and in
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temperate and tropical forests, suggesting a greater importance of the role of natural
resources management and land-use practices in these regions, including burning of biomass
and deforestation. Scientists estimate that anthropogenic emissions of CO alone may
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account for as much as a 60% increase in global mean temperatures of 0.9oF, since 1850. For
more information on the science of global climate change, visit the CRS Electronic Briefing
Book: Global Climate Change web site. [http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebgcc1.html].
The most recent projections of state-of-the-art computer models of the Earth’s climate
(GCMs) have projected a globally averaged warming ranging from almost 3 to 10.7degrees
F over the next 100 years, if greenhouse gases continue to accumulate in the atmosphere at
the current rate. Climate scientists believe that such a warming could shift temperature zones,
rainfall patterns, and agricultural belts and, under certain scenarios, and cause sea level to rise.
They further predict that global warming could have far-reaching effects — some positive,
some negative depending how it may be experienced in a given region — on natural
resources; ecosystems; food and fiber production; energy supply, use, and distribution;
transportation; land use; water supply and control; and human health.
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Some skeptics of the global warming theory have called into question the reliability of
the computer climate models and their output used to make projections of future warming
that supported Kyoto Protocol negotiations. They also challenge some scientists’ assertions
that, although recent episodic weather events may seem more extreme in nature, this is
indicative of long-term climate change. The Clinton Administration received criticism about
attributing seemingly more frequent weather anomalies to a warming of the climate. And so
the scientific questions remains: Can scientists now confirm that humans are indeed, at least
in part, the cause of recent climate changes? Also, as a result of this, is the Earth committed
to some degree of future global warming? If so, then what might be the consequences, and
what if any of those might be prevented?
Evidence of natural variability of climate is large enough that even the record-setting
warmth at the end of the 20th century does not allow a vast majority of knowledgeable
scientists to state beyond a reasonable doubt that weather extremes experienced over the past
two decades are attributable to “global warming,” at least at the present time. However, the
warming trend at the surface appears to continue. In some cases, causal relationships
between seasonal and inter annual climate changes and present-day severe weather events are
beginning to be recognized and even predicted, because of an improved ability to observe the
El Nino and La Nina phenomena. This notwithstanding, singular extreme weather events
have focused public attention on possible outcomes of potential long-term climate change and
a need for a better understanding of regional climates on decadal to century time scales.
National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration’s (NOAA) researchers reported that
the 12 warmest years (globally averaged) since historical records have been kept occurred in
the past two decades, with 1990 and 1998 among the warmest. At least some of this
warming, they concluded, is human-induced. On the other hand, satellite instruments —
which, through indirect methods, measure the average temperature of the atmosphere in a
deep column above the surface — for the past 20 years are hard pressed to demonstrate any
positive trends. A report issued in January 2000 by the U.S. National Research Council’s
Board on Atmospheric Sciences and Climate, Reconciling Observations of Global
Temperature Change, attempted to resolve apparent disparities between temperature data
measured at the surface and those from satellites. Skeptics claim that disparate trends
invalidate the output of general circulation models (GCMs), many of which demonstrate
homogenous warming throughout all the levels of the Earth’s atmosphere. Panel scientists
concluded that there may be a systematic disconnect between the upper and near surface
atmosphere and cited physical processes which may have an unique impact on the upper
atmosphere that are not currently accounted for in GCMs. In addition, they acknowledged
that only long-term, systematic monitoring of the upper atmosphere could resolve the
differences in temperature trends.
The Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC), jointly established in 1988 by
the United Nations World Meteorological Organization (WMO) and the United Nations
Environment Program (UNEP), reported in its Second Assessment (1996) that “. . . [such]
a change is unlikely to be entirely natural in origin . . . [and that] the balance of evidence, from
changes in global mean surface air temperature and from changes in geographical, seasonal,
and vertical patterns of atmospheric temperature, suggests a discernible human influence on
global climate.” And now, the latest report (January 2001), the Intergovernmental Panel’s
Third Assessment, concluded that a firmer association between human activities and climate
seems to have emerged. That is news, because reservations about the source of the past
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century’s warming and whether it bore a human fingerprint are often cited in policy debates,
usually in support of deferring actions aimed at mitigating possible global warming. In
addition, the IPCC reported a higher range of potential warming – roughly between 2.7 and
just under 11 degrees Fahrenheit over the next 100 years. Also, on June 6, 2001, a
Committee on the Science of Climate Change of the U.S. National Research Council (NRC)
released a report, Climate Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions, stating that
global warming could well have serious societal and ecological impacts by the end of this
century. Commissioned by the Bush White House and prepared by 11 of the nation’s leading
climate scientists, the report summarized the current state of knowledge on climate change
and confirmed that the climatic changes observed during the past several decades were most
likely due to human activities. The committee members warned, however, that they could
not rule out the possibility that the climate’s natural variability could be responsible for a
significant portion of that trend. The authors agreed that human-induced warming and sea
level rise were expected to continue through the 21st century and beyond, but they
emphasized that current predictions of the magnitude and rate of future warming “should be
regarded as tentative and subject to future adjustments (either upward or downward).” The
NRC report generally concurred with the latest conclusions of the Intergovernmental Panel
on Climate Change, which found that the Earth warmed by about 1 degree Fahrenheit during
the 20th century, and that most of the warming of the past 50 years was probably due to
increases in greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere. The full report, Climate
Change Science: An Analysis of Some Key Questions, is available online at
[http://books.nap.edu/html/climatechange/] or may be downloaded as a PDF file at
[http://books.nap.edu/html/climatechange/climatechange.pdf]
President Bush made a speech on global climate change from the Rose Garden on June
11, 2001, following release of the NRC report and completion of a cabinet-level review of
climate change options. In that speech, timed just before his trip to Europe to meet with
leaders there, the President acknowledged that the world has warmed and that greenhouse
gases have increased, largely due to human activity, but emphasized that the magnitude and
rate of future warming are unknown. In a policy statement, he then outlined the U.S.
approach to potential climate change as rejecting the Kyoto Protocol and favoring voluntary
actions, increased scientific research, better technology, and market mechanisms as solutions.
(For more information, see later section, COP-6, The Hague, Netherlands)
A November 2000 national assessment report, Climate Change Impacts on the United
States: The Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and Change, released under the
auspices of the U.S. Global Research Program received criticism from many of those who
were involved in its early review. Critics claimed that many of the model-projected impacts
of possible future climate changes were overstated and unsubstantiated. The National
Assessment Synthesis Team (NAST), with overall authority for the report, countered that
much of the criticism it had received did not take into account the time scales upon which the
report was based; the report targeted the effects of climate toward the middle of this century
to the end of the next. Also, seemingly contradictory outcomes were produced by the two
climate models selected for making the climate projections, casting some lingering doubt on
the overall value and utility of the results for decision makers at the local, regional, and
national levels. Various regional and resource-focused assessments are now available at the
USGCRP website [http://www.nacc.usgcrp.gov]. A final synthesis report by the NAST, of
the same title and consisting of an overview of all of the regional and sectoral studies, was
released in December 2000.
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In August 2000, NASA scientist James Hansen suggested that climate change benefits
could be achieved through near-term regulation of non-CO greenhouse gases. He proposed
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that reducing emissions of halocarbons (refrigerants), methane, nitrogen oxides, and carbon-
black aerosols (soot) could have the effect of reducing ozone (smog), in the troposphere,
which itself is a greenhouse gas. Non-CO greenhouse gases have relatively short
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atmospheric lifetimes compared with CO ; however, most have a much larger global warming
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potential (gwp). This would suggest that controlling emissions of these greenhouse gases
could reduce the rate and overall amount of climate warming from greenhouse gases, leaving
only that expected from long-term CO emissions whose full effects would not be realized for
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another 75-100 years hence. Nevertheless, Hansen emphasized that any actions to reduce
emissions of these gases would need to be taken concomitantly with long-term strategies to
reduce CO . Hansen also noted that modest gains from reducing CO and non-CO emissions
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in the near-term could be achieved primarily through cleaner energy production.
The Policy Context
The prospect of global warming from an increase in greenhouse gases has become a
major science policy issue during the past 15 years. Seeking answers to a number of
questions — How much warming?...How soon?...Should we worry? — a growing number
of policymakers continue to debate the advantages and disadvantages of an active
governmental role in forging policies to address prospective climate change. How real is the
human-induced global warming threat? Another 10-15 years of continued warming might
validate the scientific projections, but many scientists caution that waiting for this added
assurance might put society at risk for a larger dose of climate change than if actions to curb
or slow the buildup of greenhouse gases were implemented now. But actions on what scale?
Policymakers, here and abroad, are counseling cautious courses of action to address the
prospect of climate change that many believe is still theoretical and cannot be foreseen with
confidence. Given uncertainties about the timing, pace, and magnitude of global warming
projections and the imprecise nature of the regional distribution of possible climate changes,
and recognizing the complex feedback mechanisms within the climate system that could mask,
mimic, moderate, amplify, or even reverse a greenhouse-gas-induced warming, the question
is posed: What policy responses, if any, are indicated, now, or in the future?
Many proponents for early actions to address potential climate change have suggested
adopting a “precautionary principle” comprised of a number of anticipatory, yet flexible policy
responses that might be likened to the purchase of an insurance policy to hedge against some
risks of potential climate change in the future. Broader national responses might range from
engineering countermeasures, to passive adaptation, to prevention, and pursuit of an
international law of the atmosphere. One policy widely advocated by President Bush in the
early 1990s, and to some degree implemented to date, is the so-called “no regrets” approach,
which in theory would not only reduce emissions of greenhouse gases but provide other
benefits to society as well. Such policy options stress energy efficiency and conservation,
increased renewable energy use, planting trees to enhance CO sequestration from the
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atmosphere, and substitution of lesser or non-CO producing fuels. Many scientists suggest
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that early actions might buy time to gain a better understanding of global climate change and
perhaps reduce possible negative impacts attributable to human-induced climate change,
should they occur.
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Clinton Administration Policies. On October 19, 1993, President Clinton released
his Climate Change Action Plan (CCAP), which proposed voluntary domestic measures to
attain greenhouse gas emissions stabilization as outlined under the terms of the U.N. FCCC
(see International Action). The CCAP reflected the President’s own goals to stabilize U.S.
emissions at 1990 levels by the year 2000, and called for a comprehensive suite of voluntary
measures by industry, utilities and other large-scale energy users. CCAP stressed
energy-efficiency upgrades through new building codes in residential and commercial sectors,
and other improvements in energy generating or using technologies. Large-scale tree planting
and forest reserves were encouraged to enhance sequestration of carbon dioxide and to
conserve energy. Other aspects of the plan addressed mitigation of greenhouse gases other
than CO . By avoiding mandatory command and control measures, CCAP, in one sense,
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appeared to be moving aggressively to implement “no-regrets” policies endorsed by former
President Bush.
However, periodically, the Clinton Administration hinted at stronger regulatory actions;
and some economists have suggested implementation of some form of carbon (or other
energy use) tax to deter fossil fuel consumption. However, national energy taxes have
historically proven to be controversial with U.S. energy producers and consumers alike. In
deliberations over U.S. policy in international negotiations on global climate change, some
trade groups and labor unions representing America’s heavy industry, utility, and agricultural
sectors have been some of the strongest vocal opponents of regulation of CO emissions,
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claiming their members would bear the greatest economic burden of regulating fossil fuel
emissions. These organizations project the loss of many American jobs to countries which
would not be required to impose as strong environmental regulations, and have expressed
opposition to any effort by the President to commit to greenhouse gas reductions that are not
supported by sound scientific and economic analysis. Such interest groups, and some
Members of Congress, have continued to challenge greenhouse gas control proposals under
the 1997 U.N. Kyoto Protocol that would not apply to developing countries in kind, and,
consequently, many of the same are opposed to U.S. ratification of the Protocol.
Not all business/industry-related organizations, are of the same opinion, however. Some
industries see an opportunity to develop and market environmental “friendly” technologies
to be marketed internationally, or to switch to less CO -intensive fossil fuels, expand
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renewable and alternative energy resources for power generation, and expand use of nuclear
power. Also, In efforts to garner support for or against Kyoto Protocol ratification, petitions
have been circulated to thousands of scientists by major interest groups with differing views
on the treaty.
Clinton Administration climate change policy encouraged voluntary efforts by
government, industry and citizens alike which emphasize flexibility in achieving U.S.
greenhouse gas emissions goals, taking into account where global emissions occur and when
such reductions would be the most economically feasible. This policy addressed the life cycle
and potential market of new capital equipment, e.g., energy generating technologies, that
might portend savings in energy costs while enabling concomitant emissions reductions. In
concert with the when and where policy, is joint implementation that would allow
industrialized countries to share credits for emissions reduction with developing host
countries. The latest dimension of the “flexible” policy response was the what factor, which
U.S. representatives characterize as, choosing what off-the-shelf mitigation technologies, or
what adaptation strategies may make the most sense to develop and utilize it now where and
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when feasible. While some economists have suggested that stronger climate protection
measures could actually benefit the U.S. economy, by providing economic growth and
employment, others such as WEFA (formerly, Wharton Economic Forecast Associates) have
projected dire economic consequences, including major loss of GDP, and often conflicting
results supporting both sides of the issue have depended upon what assumptions underlay
their respective economic models.
On November 12, 1998, President Clinton instructed a representative to sign the Kyoto
Protocol to “lock-in” U.S. interests achieved during negotiations. This act drew protest by
some in Congress. Some Members claimed Clinton action was in violation of the June 1997
Byrd/Hagel Resolution (S.Res. 98) that required an economic analysis of legally binding
emission reductions on the United States, as well as participation of all FCCC parties,
including developing countries. The President announced he would continue to
pursue”meaningful” commitments from key developing countries before he would send the
treaty to the Senate.
The Clinton Administration did release an economic analysis (July 1998), prepared by
the Council of Economic Advisors, that concluded that with emissions trading among the
Annex B-countries, and participation of key developing countries in the “Clean Development
Mechanism” — which grants the latter business-as-usual emissions rates through 2012 —
the costs of implementing the Kyoto Protocol could be reduced as much as 60% from many
estimates. Other economic analyses, however, prepared by the Congressional Budget Office
and the DOE Energy Information Administration (EIA), and others, demonstrated a
potentially large loss of GDP from implementing the Protocol. Some have questioned the
“hot air issue” surrounding proposed emission trading credits from joint implementation (JI)
and whether these would actually be available for trade, especially in light of Eastern and
Central Europe’s and some countries of former Soviet Union’s desire to resume rapid
economic development. Furthermore, at the Ministerial session at COP-5, the EU demanded
that industrialized nations’ greenhouse gas emissions be reduced domestically first, in effect
imposing a cap on emissions credits granted for developing county projects under JI. This
continues to be a contentious topic of debate during Kyoto Protocol negotiations.
On June 3, 1999, President Clinton issued Executive Order (E.O.) No. 13123, that called
for a “Greening the Government Through Efficient Energy Use.” The Department of Energy
has since announced that efforts under this E.O., along with other voluntary climate change
initiatives undertaken to date, have helped the United States reduce its overall greenhouse
emissions by as much as 19% below 1990 levels, well ahead of the timetable proposed by the
Kyoto Protocol.
On November 11, 2000, President Clinton issued a statement on “Meeting the Challenge
of Global Warming” in response to the results of the report: Climate Change Impacts on the
United States: The Potential Consequences of Climate Variability and Change (see
[http://www.gcrio.org/National Assessment/]). In his statement, President Clinton said he
would promulgate new regulations for U.S. electric power plants, imposing emissions caps
on sulphur, nitrogen oxides, mercury, and CO . He also called for establishment of a
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domestic emissions trading program and promised a continued U.S. leadership role in climate
change to set an example for other industrialized countries. Clinton announced he would take
such steps as necessary to keep the United States on target for meeting Kyoto Protocol goals,
if certain concessions were made regarding international adoption of flexible mechanisms such
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as emissions trading, the clean development mechanism (CDM), credit for carbon sinks, and
accountable, legally-binding, compliance mechanisms.
Bush Administration Policies. Soon after taking office, the Bush Administration
had asked for a delay in resumption of COP-6 negotiations to allow time for consideration
of its approach and policies. Talks were accordingly scheduled for the second half of July.
However, in late March, the Bush Administration indicated its opposition to the Kyoto
Protocol, and created widespread concern among the EU nations by essentially rejecting it,
citing lack of developing country participation and possible harm to the U.S. economy,
especially in light of current energy problems. This followed extensive press attention to,
first, statements by the EPA Administrator that–pursuant to campaign statements by then-
candidate George W. Bush–carbon dioxide would be included in a multi-pollutant regulatory
effort; and then a repudiation of that position and clarification by President Bush and
Administration spokespersons that carbon dioxide would not be regulated.
President Bush made a policy statement in mid-June, following a cabinet-level review
of climate change options, in which he outlined the U.S. approach as rejecting the Kyoto
Protocol and favoring voluntary actions, increased scientific research, and market
mechanisms. This preceded his trip to Europe for meetings with European heads of state,
which ended with statements that Europe and the United States “agree to disagree” on
climate change approaches.
The Europeans then announced their intentions to proceed with ratification of the Kyoto
Protocol, while President Bush indicated the United States will continue to participate in
negotiations of the UNFCCC parties in order to pursue its objectives. When talks resumed
among UNFCCC parties at “COP-6 bis” in mid-July in Bonn, Germany, the United States
delegation did not make new proposals and declined to participate in discussions about the
Kyoto Protocol; it stayed on the sidelines as observers. The other COP-6 parties surprised
many observers by engaging in high-level negotiations in overnight sessions that resulted in
agreement on nearly all of the most contentious issues, including significant use of carbon
sinks, establishing a compliance mechanism, and disallowing credit for nuclear facilities.
When the UNFCCC parties meet again at COP-7 in Marrakech, Morocco, October 29-
November 9, 2001, the remaining details making the COP-6 decisions operational will need
to be finalized; various U.S. officials have made somewhat contradictory statements as to
whether or not the United States will bring to that meeting a proposal for an alternative or
revisions to the Kyoto Protocol. It remains to be seen how successful the Kyoto signatories
will be in ratifying the Kyoto Protocol and reaching the threshold for it to enter into force
without the United States. At the very least, even if all the other Annex I countries were to
ratify the Protocol, and it entered into force, the collective 5% reduction in emissions that is
the Protocol’s goal would not be possible without the United States, which emits some 25%
of greenhouse gases.
International Action
The United States was involved in negotiations and international scientific research on
climate change prior to ratifying the 1992 U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change
(FCCC). This included passage of a National Climate Program Act of 1978 (P.L. 95-367).
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These activities are discussed in CRS Report RL30522, Global Climate Change: A Survey
of Scientific Research and Policy Reports, also in which early aspects of the scientific debate
and a chronology of U.S. government involvement in climate change policy are featured.
U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC)
The U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change (FCCC) was opened for signature
at the 1992 UNCED conference in Rio de Janeiro (“The Earth Summit”). On June 12, 1992,
the United States, along with 153 other nations, signed the FCCC, that contained a legal
framework that upon ratification committed signatories’ governments to a voluntary “non-
binding aim” to reduce atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases with the goal of
“preventing dangerous anthropogenic interference with Earth’s climate system.” These
actions were aimed primarily at industrialized countries, with the intention of stabilizing their
emissions of greenhouse gases at 1990 levels by the year 2000; and other responsibilities
would be incumbent upon all FCCC parties. On September 8, 1992, President Bush
transmitted the FCCC for advice and consent of the U.S. Senate to ratification. The Foreign
Relations Committee endorsed the treaty and reported it (Senate Exec. Rept. 102-55)
October 1, 1992. The Senate consented to ratification on October 7, 1992, with a two-thirds
majority vote. President Bush signed the instrument of ratification October 13, 1992, and
deposited it with the U.N. Secretary General. According to terms of the FCCC, having
received over 50 countries’ instruments of ratification, it entered into force March 24, 1994.
COP-1, The Berlin Mandate
Seeking grounds for a uniform approach toward climate protection, the Conference of
Parties (COP) to FCCC met for the first time in Berlin, Germany in the spring of 1995, and
voiced concerns about the adequacy of countries’ abilities to meet commitments under the
Convention. These were expressed in a U.N. ministerial declaration known as the “Berlin
Mandate,” which established a 2-year Analytical and Assessment Phase (AAP), to negotiate
a “comprehensive menu of actions” for countries to pick from and choose future options to
address climate change which for them, individually, made the best economic and
environmental sense. Criticism was leveled by many industrialized countries, including the
United States, at newly industrializing countries, such as Brazil, India, and China. These
would continue to be classified as non-Annex I countries and enjoy exemption from any
future, legally binding emissions reduction agreements even though, collectively, these would
be the world’s largest emitters of greenhouse gas emissions 15 years hence. (See, CRS
Report 96-699, Global Climate Change: Adequacy of Commitments Under the U.N.
Framework Convention and the Berlin Mandate.)
COP-2 and a Ministerial Declaration
The Second Conference of Parties to the FCCC (COP-2) met in July 1996 in Geneva,
Switzerland. Its Ministerial Declaration was adopted July 18, 1996, and reflected a U.S.
position statement presented by Timothy Wirth, former Under Secretary for Global Affairs
for the U.S. State Department at that meeting, which 1) accepted outright the scientific
findings on climate change proffered by the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change
(IPCC) in its second assessment (1995); 2) rejected uniform “harmonized policies” in favor
of flexibility; and 3) called for “legally binding mid-term targets.” Legally, the Declaration
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represented a consensus that parties to the FCCC would not object to a “future decision
which would be binding on all parties,” opening the door for a possible international
regulatory protocol. Individual party’s objections were recorded.
COP-3, The Kyoto Protocol on Climate Change
The Kyoto Protocol to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
was adopted by the COP, in December 1997 in Kyoto, Japan, one day after the official
session ended. Most industrialized nations and some central European economies in
transition (all defined as Annex B countries) agreed to legally binding reductions in
greenhouse gas emissions of an average of 6%-8% below 1990 levels between the years
2008-2012, defined as the first emissions budget period. The United States would be required
to reduce its total emissions an average of 7% below 1990 levels. (For more details, see CRS
Report RL30692: Global Climate Change: The Kyoto Protocol.)
The Clinton Administration initiated funding efforts to address climate change, and in
the FY2001 budget requested funding for a Climate Change Technology Initiative (CCTI)
first introduced in his FY1999 budget. Somewhat reduced funding for the climate technology
initiatives was received in previous years. (See CRS Report RL30452. Climate Change
Technology Initiative (CCTI): R&D and Related Programs.)
COP-4, Buenos Aires
COP-4 took place in Buenos Aires in November 1998. Here, FCCC parties adopted a
2-year “Plan of Action” to advance efforts and to devise mechanisms for implementing the
Kyoto Protocol. FCCC parties also addressed compliance and financial response mechanisms
to encourage more developing countries to sign on to the protocol. Talks on compliance
stressed a front end “qualifying” approach rather than “sanctions and punitive measures,” as
the European Union (EU), and the U.S. had originally, supported. (That is, parties must be
in compliance with existing commitments to take part in emissions trading and joint
implementation. This meant being accepted for Annex-B status and committed to terms of
the Kyoto Protocol. On the other hand, few restrictions would apply for developing countries
wishing to participate in the “clean development mechanism.” Work continued at COP-4 to
determine how to calculate emissions reductions from strengthening “carbon sinks,” and
devising technical definitions for sink capacity of current forest, vegetation, and land-use
practices.
COP-5, Bonn, Germany
The 5th Conference of Parties to the U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change
met in Bonn, Germany, between October 25 and November 4, 1998. COP-5 included
sessions of the Subsidiary Bodies on Implementation and Science and Technology and a two-
day ministerial session. Major themes of negotiations included devising the technical and
political mechanisms, such as the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM), Joint
Implementation (JI), and developing criterial for project eligibility, all processes that would
allow both developed and developing countries to meet their respective responsibilities under
the FCCC, and 1997 Kyoto Protocol, with optimum flexibility. Also under consideration
were legally-binding consequences for non-compliance of parties under the voluntary FCCC.
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This action, in and of itself, would require an amendment to the Kyoto Protocol, as well as
establishment of a COP-certified national inventorying systems to track international
greenhouse gas emissions and their reduction. Parties adopted a decision for a second round
of national communications and emissions reporting (for Annex I countries); so that updated
data and information could be used to inform upcoming negotiations at COP-6.
COP-6, The Hague, Netherlands
The Sixth Conference of Parties to the United Nations Framework Convention on
Climate Change (COP-6) convened November 13-25, 2000. Despite a major impasse reached
at this session for final implementation of the Kyoto Protocol, a number of FCCC parties
expressed confidence that progress was made in resolving a number of technical issues
associated with the Kyoto Protocol. Throughout the session, however, the United States and
European Union (EU) parties remained at odds over a number of issues, particularly credit
for carbon absorbed by forests and agricultural lands. Talks continued in Ottawa, Canada
during the first week of December 2000, but no further agreements were reached.
Throughout COP-6 many parties discussed the development of mechanisms by which
Annex B countries under the Kyoto Protocol might trade emissions credits and pursue flexible
response strategies such as international joint implementation among industrialized (Annex
1) countries; and also develop a clean development mechanisms (CDM) funded by
industrialized countries, to facilitate economic development that would be less greenhouse-
gas intensive or to bring about greenhouse gas reductions.
However, negotiations faltered when the EU charged that the United States stood to
enjoy a “number of loopholes” under the agreement negotiated thus far and would lessen the
former’s respective burden of domestic emissions reductions. Instead, the EU sought to
impose certain limits on the use of these flexibility mechanisms. Otherwise, the EU claimed
that little would be accomplished in terms of environmental improvement if the United States
failed to rein-in its contributions of greenhouse gas emissions (24% of the total). U.S.
negotiators countered that U.S. emissions growth had been stemmed significantly over the
past 10 years, growth was occurring elsewhere, and that emissions reductions should be
counted no matter where in the world they occur or how they are achieved. Also under
debate was whether some U.S. proposals would achieve any real emissions reductions. For
example, the EU consistently criticized the United States for its proposal to pay Russia and
Central European countries for their rights for emissions, if surplus credits were eventually
granted to the latter, under Annex B of the Kyoto Protocol.
Already, a number of industrialized countries, including the U.S. and the "Umbrella
Group" consisting of Japan, U.S., Canada, Australia, New Zealand, Russia, the Ukraine and
Norway, and their major industries, are proposing domestic systems for emissions trading,
which might at some point, negotiators claim, serve as a model for an international trading
regime under an international agreement sanctioned by UNFCCC parties. The EU has its
own proposal for such a scheme, known as the “EU Bubble.”
Major environmental interests continue to oppose any agreement that would not take
strong international legally binding regulatory action to reduce greenhouse gas emissions. On
the other hand, many reputable scientists feel that the scientific evidence about climate change
has been compelling enough for world leaders to accept the likelihood of climate change. To
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reduce the apparent human contribution, they believe, can only be done by reducing
atmospheric emissions of greenhouse gases under an international regulatory regime.
However, there remain skeptics of global warming who continue to question whether any
action is necessary based upon their interpretation of the scientific data.
The Kyoto Protocol has been signed but not ratified by the United States and is still a
long way from meeting the criteria established by the COP necessary for its entry into force,
and there are a number of details, especially related to the flexibility mechanisms that are
under discussion. Some of these include: 1) deciding terms under which parties will be able
to participate in flexibility mechanisms; 2) determining the adequacy of current commitments
of parties under the FCCC; 3) establishing rules for the consequences, if any, for non-
compliance under a prospective protocol; 4) determining how limits can be applied to the
amount of emissions credits earned by any one country should be capped, if resulting in
nothing more than a zero-sum gain for global emissions reductions; 5) where and when
carbon sink credits might be taken; and 6) whether activities primarily taken in a host country
should be credited in the absence of any domestic efforts (the so-called “additionality”
argument) – and the crux of the EU’s resistance to U.S. flexibility mechanisms.
Congressional Interest and Activities
For a review of legislative activities in the 100th - 102nd Congresses, see CRS Report
93-445 SPR: Global Climate Change Legislation: A Review of the 102nd Congress.
Recent legislation and other related information on global climate change may also be found
in the CRS Electronic Briefing Book, Global Climate Change at
[http://www.congress.gov/brbk/html/ebgcc1.html].
New scientific findings concerning the human contribution to climate change emerged
during expert review of the third IPCC assessment on climate change; recently the overall
projections of temperature and sea-level rise made in the 1995 IPCC Assessment were
estimated to be higher than previously reported, and mostly on the high end of predictions.
The IPCC has also suggested that it may be prudent to consider other potential greenhouse
gases not slated to be regulated by the Kyoto Protocol, and also to account for potential
indirect climatic change effects that may be attributable to other atmospheric emissions (e.g.,
replacements for ozone depleting substances).
On January 13, 2000, the National Research Council released a report which attempted
to reconcile different surface and atmospheric temperature trends and the implication for
global climate change models (GCMs), and confirmed a positive temperature trend at the
surface since 1970. On November 10, 2000, the USGCRP released its assessment of the
potential consequences of climate change impacts on the United States; the results, the
National Assessment Synthesis team called for action to address potential significant regional
climate changes in the United States resulting from global climate change. Also, the
Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change has this year released its Third Assessment
Report on Climate Change. These three reports, and many other issues stated above, have
succeeded in drawing the interest of House and Senate Members and the attention of
committees of relevant jurisdiction in the 107th Congress.
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LEGISLATION
Note: As in the previous two Congresses, language has been included in several
appropriations bills, to prohibit activities that would have the effect of implementing the
Kyoto Protocol. However, legislative language has been added to both House and Senate
State Department authorization bills to encourage the United States to take leadership
internationally and domestically in reducing greenhouse gas emissions, and to continue
participating in negotiations to deal with climate change (see below). A number of other
proposals, including coordination mechanisms in the federal government for climate change,
and a number of energy-related bills that include an emphasis on sources of energy that
produce fewer emissions, are under active consideration and have been considered or
reported by several committees. Also, a number of bills on energy, especially those with
provisions encouraging or authorizing energy efficiency and alternative energy sources, are
relevant to climate change and in some cases directly reference reductions in greenhouse
gases as benefits or goals. For additional information on climate-relevant energy legislation,
not included in the list below, see the Legislation section of CRS Issue Brief IB10041,
Renewable Energy: Tax Credit, Budget and Electricity Production Issues; CRS Issue Brief
IB10020, Energy Efficiency: Budget, Oil Conservation, and Electricity Conservation Issues;
and CRS Report RL31044, Renewable Energy Legislation in the 107th Congress. The
legislation listed below is included because these bills have a strong or primary focus on
greenhouse gases or climate change.
H.R. 1335 (Allen)
Reduces emissions of mercury, carbon dioxide, nitrogen oxides, and sulfur dioxide from
fossil fuel-fired electric utility generating units operating in the United States, and for other
purposes. Introduced April 3, 2001.
H.R. 1646 (Hyde)
Authorizes appropriations for the Department of State for fiscal years 2002 and 2003,
and for other purposes. Section 745 of this bill expresses a “Sense of Congress Relating to
Global Warming,” which includes among its findings that global climate change poses a
significant threat to national security, the American economy, public health and welfare, and
the global environment, and reviews the scientific findings of the Inter-governmental Panel
on Climate Change (IPCC) and threats to various ecological and agricultural systems, and the
U.S. participation in the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change
(UNFCCC). It states the sense of Congress that the United States should demonstrate
international leadership in mitigating global warming threats by taking responsible action to
achieve meaningful reductions in greenhouse gas emissions from all sectors, and by
“continuing to participate in international negotiations with the objective of completing the
rules and guidelines for the Kyoto Protocol in a manner that is consistent with the interests
of the United States and that ensures the environmental integrity of the protocol.” Introduced
May 27, 2001; passed the House as amended May 16, 2001, and referred to the Senate
Committee on Foreign Relations on May 17, 2001. On August 2, the Senate Foreign
Relations Committee approved a similar “Sense of the Congress” resolution as an amendment
to its State Department authorization bill (no number has yet been assigned to the Senate bill).
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H.Con.Res. 83
The Senate Budget Resolution, passed in the nature of a substitute for language in
H.Con.Res.83, included S.Amdt. 249, sponsored by Senator John Kerry, to restore funding
for programs related to global climate change to the funding level of $4.5 billion over 10
years, primarily for existing programs. Among the purposes identified by the amendment
were “addressing global climate change concerns...promoting domestic energy security....to
provide increased funding to ensure adequate U.S. participation in negotiations...pursuant to
the Senate-ratified U.N. Framework Convention on Climate Change...” and other purposes.
Passed by the Senate April 6, 2001. See Congressional Record p. S3641.
H.Res. 117 (Lee, Barbara)
Expresses the sense of Congress that the United States should develop, promote, and
implement policies to reduce emissions of fossil fuel generated carbon dioxide with the goal
of achieving stabilization of greenhouse gas emissions in the United States at the 1990 level
by the year 2010. Introduced April 4, 2001.
S. 388 and S. 389 (Murkowski)
Protects the energy and security of the United States and decreases America’s
dependency on foreign oil sources to 50% by the year 2011 by enhancing the use of
renewable energy resources conserving energy resources, improving energy efficiencies, and
increasing domestic energy supplies; improves environmental quality by reducing emissions
of air pollutants and greenhouse gases; and for other purposes. Introduced February 26, 2001;
referred to the Senate committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
S. 597 (Bingaman)
The Comprehensive and Balanced Energy Policy Act of 2001. Includes Title I:
Integration of energy policy and climate change policy, and establishes a National commission
on Energy and Climate Change; and in other titles, addresses a comprehensive program for
“reliable and diverse power generation and transmission,” including clean energy, power
transmission and generation, renewable energy, hydroelectric relicensing, coal, oil and gas
production, and other energy-related issues. Introduced March 22, 2001; markup session
held by Senate Committee on Energy and Natural Resources August 2, 2001.
S. 769 (Brownback)
Establishes a carbon sequestration program and an implementing panel within the
Department of Commerce to enhance international conservation, promotes the role of carbon
sequestration as a means of slowing the buildup of greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, and
rewards and encourage voluntary, pro-active environmental efforts on the issue of global
climate change. Introduced April 24, 2001.
S. 785 (Brownback)
Amends the Food Security Act of 1985 to require the Secretary of Agriculture to
establish a carbon sequestration program to permit owners and operators of land to enroll the
land in the program to increase the sequestration of carbon, and for other purposes.
Introduced April 26, 2001.
S. 820 (Wyden)
The “Forest Resources for the Environment and the Economy Act” amends the Energy
Policy Act of 1992 to assess opportunities to increase carbon storage on national forests
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derived from the public domain and to facilitate voluntary and accurate reporting of forest
projects that reduce atmospheric carbon dioxide concentrations, and for other purposes.
Introduced May 3, 2001. Hearings held on July 4, 2001.
S. 1008 (Byrd)
Amends the Energy Policy Act of 1992 to develop the U.S. Climate Change Response
Strategy, with the goals of stabilizing greenhouse gas concentrations in the atmosphere,
minimizing adverse short-term and long-term economic and social impacts, aligning the
Strategy with U.S. energy policy, promoting sound national environmental policy, establishing
a research and development program that focuses on bold technological breakthroughs that
contribute significantly toward greenhouse gas stabilization, establishing a National Office of
Climate change Response within the Executive Office of the President, and for other
purposes. Introduced June 8, 2001. Approved by the Senate Governmental Affairs
Committee on August 2, 2001.
S. 1255 (Wyden)
The “Carbon Sequestration and Reporting Act” would amend the Energy Policy Act to
provide for the establishment of the Carbon Advisory Council to advise on reporting
guidelines for greenhouse gas sequestration from soil carbon and forest management actions,
and their potential effects and effectiveness. The act would also amend the Global Climate
Change Prevention Act of 1990 to authorize the Secretary of Agriculture to enter into
cooperative agreements for forest carbon activities on private, State, or Indian lands. It would
direct the Secretary to provide states with assistance to establish revolving loan programs for
forest carbon activities on nonindustrial private forest land. In addition, it would authorize
Washington, Oregon, Idaho, and Montana to apply for funding from the Bonneville Power
Administration for loans for related purposes or for specified fish and wildlife purposes. The
Food Security Act of 1985 would be amended to direct the Secretary to establish a carbon
sequestration program, which could include conservation reserve and wetlands reserve lands,
and it would direct the Secretary to carry out four or more carbon monitoring pilot programs.
Introduced July 26, 2001.
S. 1293 (Craig)
Amends the Internal Revenue Code to provide incentives for the voluntary reduction,
avoidance, and sequestration of greenhouse gas emissions and to advance global climate
science and technology development and deployment. Introduced August 1, 2001.
S. 1294 (Murkowski)
Establishes a new national policy designed to manage the risk of potential climate
change, ensures long-term energy security, and strengthens provisions in the Energy Policy
Act of 1992 and the Federal Nonnuclear Energy Research and Development Act of 1974 with
respect to potential climate change. Introduced August 1, 2001.
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