Order Code RL30967
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
National Missile Defense: Russia’s Reaction
Updated August 10, 2001
Amy F. Woolf
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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National Missile Defense: Russia’s Reaction
Summary
In the late 1990s, the United States began to focus on the possible deployment of
defenses against long-range ballistic missiles. The planned National Missile Defense
(NMD) system would have exceeded the terms of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty.
Recognizing this, the Clinton Administration sought to convince Russia to modify the terms
of the Treaty. But Russia was unwilling to accept any changes to the Treaty. It also
decried the U.S plan to deploy NMD, insisting that it would upset strategic stability and
start a new arms race.
Russia has claimed that the ABM Treaty is the “cornerstone of strategic stability” and
that, without its limits on missile defense, the entire framework of offensive arms control
agreements could collapse. Furthermore, Russia argues that a U.S. NMD system would
undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent and upset stability by allowing the United States to
initiate an attack and protect itself from retaliatory strike. The Clinton Administration
claimed that the U.S. NMD system would be directed against rogue nations and would be
too limited to intercept a Russian attack. But Russian officials question this argument.
They doubt that rogue nations will have the capability to attack U.S. territory for some
time, and they believe that the United States could expand its NMD system easily.
Furthermore, they argue that, when combined with the entirety of U.S. conventional and
nuclear weapons, an NMD system would place the United States in a position of strategic
superiority.
Russian officials have stated that, if the United States withdraws from the ABM
Treaty and deploys an NMD, Russia would withdraw from a range of offensive arms
control agreements. Furthermore, Russia could deploy multiple warheads on its ICBMs
to overcome a U.S. NMD, or deploy new intermediate-range missiles or shorter-range
nuclear systems to enhance its military capabilities.
Russia has also outlined diplomatic and cooperative military initiatives as alternatives
to the deployment of a U.S. NMD. Russia has proposed that the international community
negotiate a Global Missile and Missile Technology Non-Proliferation regime as a means
to discourage nations from acquiring ballistic missiles. It has also suggested that it would
cooperate with nations in Europe to develop and deploy defenses against theater-range
ballistic missiles. Many analysts believe this proposal was designed to win support among
U.S. allies for Russia’s opposition to the U.S. NMD program. U.S. officials expressed
an interest in the idea but said it could not substitute for defenses against longer-range
missiles.
The Clinton Administration sought to address Russia’s concerns by offering continued
support to the fundamental principles of the ABM Treaty and by seeking to convince
Russia that the U.S. NMD system would remain too limited to threaten Russia’s nuclear
deterrent. The Bush Administration, in contrast, has supported more robust missile
defenses, but it also has stated that they will not be directed against Russia’s offensive
forces. The President has indicated that the United States will need to move beyond the
limits in the ABM Treaty, but he suggested that Russia join the United States in developing
a new strategic framework.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
The ABM Treaty . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
National Missile Defense Plans . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Clinton Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Bush Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
The Russian Response . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Concerns about Strategic Stability and Arms Control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Concerns about the Scope and Intent of NMD . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Differing Threat Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Skepticism about “Limited NMD” . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
The Threat to Russia’s Deterrent . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Possible Military Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Deploy Multiple Warheads on New ICBMs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Deploy new intermediate range missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Redeploy shorter-range nuclear delivery systems . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Russian Alternatives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
The Global Missile and Missile Technology Non-Proliferation Control System (GCS)
. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Cooperation on Theater Ballistic Missile Defenses in Europe . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
The Russian Proposal . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
The U.S. and European Reactions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
U.S. Response to the Russian Reaction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Clinton Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Bush Administration . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Issues for Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Will Russia continue to cooperate on offensive arms reductions? . . . . . . . 19
Will Russia continue to cooperate in non-proliferation and threat reduction
activities? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Will Russia convince other nations to support its objections to U.S. missile
defense policies? . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21

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National Missile Defense: Russia’s
Reaction
Introduction
During the latter years of the Clinton presidency, the United States began to focus on
the possible deployment of defenses against long-range ballistic missiles. The
Administration, and many missile defense supporters, claimed that the United States
needed to pursue National Missile Defenses (NMD) because “rogue” nations such as
North Korea, Iran, and Iraq might soon acquire longer range missiles that could strike U.S.
territory, and the United States could not be certain that the threat of offensive retaliation
would deter these unpredictable actors. The Clinton Administration realized that its plans
for NMD would exceed the limits imposed by the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty
between the United States and Soviet Union. Consequently, the Administration opened
discussions with Russia in an effort to negotiate amendments to the Treaty that would
permit the deployment of a limited NMD system.
Russian officials have consistently and repeatedly insisted that the 1972 ABM Treaty
is the cornerstone of strategic stability (this is defined on page 4). They have argued that
any changes to the Treaty that permitted the deployment of defenses against long-range
ballistic missiles would undermine international strategic stability, upset the nuclear balance
established by the Treaty, and interfere with Russia’s nuclear deterrent capabilities. Russia
has, thus far, refused to accept any modifications to the ABM Treaty that would permit
national missile defenses and has campaigned against the U.S. policy at meetings with other
nations and international organizations. Russia has also offered alternatives, suggesting that
the United States, Russia, and the international community address emerging missile threats
with diplomacy and arms control measures that would seek to stop the proliferation of new
threats and with cooperation on theater-range ballistic missile defenses to address those
threats that did emerge.
This report provides a detailed review of Russia’s reaction to U.S. policy on NMD
and U.S. proposals for modifications to the ABM Treaty. It begins with a brief
background section that describes the central limits in the ABM Treaty and U.S. policy on
the deployment of NMD. It then describes, in more detail, Russia’s objections to the U.S.
proposals. The report also provides a summary of possible military responses that Russia
might take if the United States were to abrogate the ABM Treaty and begin deployment
of missile defenses and contains a discussion of Russia’s proposals for diplomatic and
military alternatives to the U.S. plans to deploy missile defenses. The report concludes
with a brief discussion of the U.S. response to Russia’s objections and a few issues for
Congress.

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Background
The ABM Treaty
The United States and Soviet Union signed the Treaty on the Limitation of Anti-
Ballistic Missile Systems (ABM Treaty) in May 1972. This Treaty prohibits the
deployment of ABM systems for the defense of the nations’ territory, or an individual
region, or defenses that can provide the base for such a defense. It permits each side to
deploy limited ABM systems at two locations, one centered on the nation’s capital and one
at a location containing ICBM silo launchers. A 1974 Protocol further limited each nation
to one ABM site, located either at the nation’s capital or around an ICBM deployment
area. Each ABM site can contain no more than 100 ABM launchers and 100 ABM
interceptor missiles. The Treaty also specifies that, in the future, any radars that provide
early warning of strategic ballistic missile attack must be located on the periphery of the
national territory and oriented outward.
The Treaty bans the development, testing, and deployment of sea-based, air-based,
space-based, or mobile land-based ABM systems and ABM system components (these
include interceptor missiles, launchers, and radars or other sensors that can substitute for
radars). Each party can propose amendments, and, in the Standing Consultative
Commission established by the Treaty, they can consider possible proposals for further
increasing the viability of the Treaty. Each party can also withdraw from the Treaty, after
giving 6 months notice, if “extraordinary events related to the subject matter of this Treaty
have jeopardized its supreme interests.”1
In September 1997, the Clinton Administration signed a Memorandum of
Understanding on Succession that named Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan as the
successors to the Soviet Union for the Treaty. This agreement has never entered into force
because Congress insisted that the Clinton Administration submit it to the Senate for advice
and consent, as an amendment to the Treaty. The Clinton Administration never did so, in
part because it feared that the Senate might reject the agreement in an effort to abolish the
Treaty. Some Members of Congress have argued that the ABM Treaty is no longer in
force because the Soviet Union has ceased to exist. The Clinton Administration, however,
determined that, in the absence of alternative arrangements, Russia would serve as the
successor to the Soviet Union for the Treaty.
The Bush Administration has not explicitly accepted the argument that the ABM
Treaty is no longer in force and Deputy Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz has said the
United States would withdraw before violating the Treaty. However, during their
nomination hearings, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld referred to the Treaty as “ancient
history” and Secretary of State Powell stated that the Treaty is no longer relevant to our
strategic framework. The President Bush has also said that the ABM Treaty is outdated,
1For the full text of the Treaty and a description of the process leading to its negotiation see
Arms Control and Disarmament Agreements. Texts and Histories of the Negotiations.
United States Arms Control and Disarmament Agency. Washington, D.C. 1990.

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and that the United States must move beyond the limits in the Treaty to deploy effective
missile defenses.
National Missile Defense Plans
Clinton Administration. The Clinton Administration’s plan for NMD, which it
outlined in 1999, called for the deployment of 100 interceptor missiles at a single site in
Alaska.2 This system would have been designed to defend against a relatively limited
threat of perhaps 20 missiles. Eventually the system might have expanded to 200-250
interceptors at one or more sites to defend against a larger and more sophisticated threat.
It might also have included space-based sensors and components currently banned by the
ABM Treaty. The Administration recognized that this site, and some of the technologies
under consideration, would not have been consistent with the limits in the ABM Treaty.
As a result, it participated in discussions with Russia in an effort to modify the ABM Treaty
to permit a limited deployment. It would, however, have retained many of the central
features of the Treaty that limit the capabilities of ABM systems.
President Clinton announced on September 1, 2000 that he had decided not to
authorize deployment of an NMD system because he did not have “enough confidence in
the technology, and the operational effectiveness of the entire NMD system.” In two of
three tests, the defensive missile had failed to intercept its target. The Administration
announced that it planned to continue with research and development on its NMD
technologies, and that it would continue discussions with the Russians about the ABM
Treaty. But the final decision on whether to begin NMD deployment would be left to
Clinton’s successor.
Bush Administration. President Bush has emphasized that he places a high
priority on defenses that could protect the United States, its forces, and its allies from
ballistic missile attack. He outlined his Administration’s approach in a speech on May 1,
2001,3 when he indicated that “we can draw on already established technologies that might
involve land-based and sea-based capabilities to intercept missiles in mid-course or after
they re-enter the atmosphere.”4 During hearings before Congress in July 2001, Deputy
Secretary of Defense Wolfowitz provided more details on the Administration’s missile
defense program. He stated that the Pentagon would pursue a robust research and
development program into a wide range of technologies that could be based on land, at
sea, or in space. He stated that the Administration had not yet identified a specific
architecture for its system because it would make use of the most promising technologies
2For a detailed discussion of the U.S. NMD program and policy towards the ABM Treaty,
see U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service, National Missile Defense:
Issues for Congress, CRS Issue Brief IB10034. By Steven A. Hildreth and Amy F. Woolf.
3The Bush Administration does uses the phrase “missile defense” rather than the Clinton-era
“national missile defense” to describe the systems currently under consideration. This is a
broader concept for missile defense that could combine defenses against both shorter,
medium, and longer-range missiles in an integrated defense architecture.
4George W. Bush Delivers Remarks on Missile Defense. Transcript. Federal Document
Clearing House. May 1, 2001.

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CRS-4
as soon as they were ready. Ultimately, though, the Administration is seeking to develop
and deploy an integrated, layered system that can defend the United States, its forces, and
allies from missiles of all ranges at all phased of their flight trajectories.
Administration officials acknowledge that its many parts of its missile defense program
systems would not be consistent with the terms of the ABM Treaty. They have argued that
it should be replaced by a new framework for deterrence that combines both offensive and
defensive capabilities. The Administration has not yet announced U.S. withdrawal from
the ABM Treaty, but the President and others have stated that they would do so if
consultations with Russia on a new strategic framework do not soon produce an agreement
to “set aside” the Treaty.
The Russian Response
Concerns about Strategic Stability and Arms Control
The dominant theme in Russia’s response to the U.S. approach to NMD and the
ABM Treaty is the idea that the ABM Treaty is the “cornerstone of strategic stability” and
that the U.S. deployment of NMD would undermine stability and upset arms control.5
According to this view, the Treaty, with its ban on widespread ballistic missile defenses,
underscores the Cold War model of deterrence, where neither the United States nor
Soviet Union could threaten an attack on the other without facing an overwhelming
retaliatory strike. The assured destruction promised by this retaliatory strike meant that the
strategic balance was stable, that neither side would risk an attack no matter how grave
a crisis. Accordingly, the deployment of ballistic missile defenses that could protect all
U.S. territory (as opposed to the limited defenses permitted by the Treaty) would
undermine this concept of stability. If a nation could intercept missiles launched in
retaliation, particularly if it had diminished their numbers in its initial strike, it might believe
it could launch a first strike without fearing retaliation. Knowing this, the nation without the
defensive system might conclude that it had to launch preemptively, before losing any of
its forces in an initial attack. Under these circumstances, stability would be lost because
a nation might have an incentive to launch first in a crisis.
Furthermore, Russian officials argue that the ABM Treaty is the cornerstone of the
entire network of agreements that reduce offensive nuclear weapons.6 The Treaty’s limits
5 Russia’s former defense minister, Igor Sergeyev, has said “the [1972] ABM Treaty, is the
cornerstone for strategic stability and the basis for the system of international agreements
in the sphere of the monitoring and control of weapons. Now it has been threatened due to
the fact that the USA has decided upon the deployment of a national ABM system, which
is prohibited by the [ABM] Treaty... If such a system is deployed in the USA, it [the treaty]
will become meaningless. See Russian Defense Minister Sergeyev on Military Reform,
Chechnya, ABM Defense. Vek. February 23, 20001. Translated in FBIS Document
CEP20010301000351.
6Russia’s President Putin has said, “People must realize that the mutual reduction of strategic
attack weapons -- the most dangerous of all nuclear weapons -- is possible only when the
(continued...)

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on ballistic missile defenses allowed the United States and Soviet Union to accept limits
and reductions in their offensive forces because they knew they could maintain an effective
deterrent at lower levels when the offensive forces could not be blunted by defensive
systems. Accordingly, if the United States were to abrogate the ABM Treaty to deploy
ballistic missile defenses, Russia might feel compelled to abrogate agreements on offensive
forces so that it could retain an arsenal of sufficient size to ensure that it could penetrate the
U.S. ballistic missile defenses.
Finally, Russian critics note that the U.S. approach to missile defenses and the ABM
Treaty would upset not only strategic stability between the United States and Russia, but
also international strategic stability. They argue that other nations, such as China, might
believe that their offensive forces would be undermined by U.S. defenses, and might feel
compelled to expand their arsenals to ensure an effective retaliatiory attack. But, if one
nation, such as China, were to react this way, other nations might feel threatened and might
react, themselves, by increasing their offensive military capabilities. Hence, the deployment
of a U.S. NMD and U.S. abrogation of the ABM Treaty could set off a new, threatening
international arms race. Russian critics, and many critics of missile defense in the United
States argue that, in the long run, the United States could become less secure with NMD
than it is in its current more “vulnerable” condition.
The Clinton Administration sought to reassure Russia about its concerns for strategic
stability. On several occasions, when President Clinton met with President Yeltsin or
President Putin, he signed statements and declarations acknowledging that the ABM
Treaty remained the cornerstone of strategic stability. At their summit meeting in June
2000, Presidents Clinton and Putin signed a Joint Statement On Principles of Strategic
Stability. In this document, the Presidents declared that “They agree on the essential
contribution of the ABM Treaty to reductions in offensive forces, and reaffirm their
commitment to that Treaty as the cornerstone of strategic stability.”7 At the same time, the
United States sought to convince Russia that the Treaty could serve this purpose even if
it were modified or amended to allow the deployment of a limited NMD.8 In addition, the
6(...continued)
ABM Treaty continues to hold. Scrapping it would make a further reduction of strategic
attack weapons according to START-I impossible. START-II would not come into force
either, as it would be impossible to conclude START-III, aimed at talking about the radical
reduction of nuclear arsenals. This blow would also affect other agreements that are of
fundamental, global importance: the NPT, and the Nuclear Test Ban Treaty... Russia will be
forced to look for an alternative to end its commitments not only regarding START, but also
the agreement on intermediate-range and short-range missiles, the conclusion of which is
linked to the legal and military framework of the START-II-ABM process.” See Gafron,
Georg and Kai Diekmann. Russia is Still a World Power. Interview with Russian President
Vladimir Putin Hamburg Welt am Sonntag. June 11, 2000. Translated in FBIS Document
EUP20000611000121.
7Joint Statement By the Presidents of the United States of America and The Russian
Federation on Principles of Strategic Stability. The White House. Office of the Press
Secretary. June 4, 2000.
8 Secretary of Defense Cohen noted that, although the Presidents agreed that the Treaty
(continued...)

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Clinton Administration argued that the changes it sought in the ABM Treaty would permit
only a limited NMD system that would address the emerging threat from “rogue” nations
and that the system would not be capable enough to intercept the larger numbers of
missiles that Russia would possess, even as its forces declined in the coming decade.
Concerns about the Scope and Intent of NMD
Differing Threat Assessments. Russian officials have agreed with the U.S.
view that ballistic missile proliferation could pose a problem and introduce new missile
threats to both nations. The Joint Statement on Principles of Strategic Stability, signed
after the June 2000 summit, stated that the Presidents agreed “that the international
community faces a dangerous and growing threat of proliferation of weapons of mass
destruction and their means of delivery, including missiles and missile technologies...”
Furthermore, the Presidents agreed that “this new threat represents a potentially significant
change in the strategic situation and international security environment.”9 In an interview
held shortly before the summit, President Putin proposed that the United States and Russia
cooperate on the development of a “boost-phase” theater missile defense system that
could be based near “rogue” nations to address this emerging threat.10
However, Russian officials disagree with the U.S. view that missile proliferation and
the potential missile capabilities of “rogue”nations pose a significant or immediate threat to
the United States. In an interview with the Russian press, President Putin acknowledged
that “such threats, theoretically, in principle, [could] emerge one day.” But he went on to
state that “we do not believe that there are such threats now nor that they are coming from
any specific states.”11 Consequently, President Putin did not agree with the U.S. view that
these emerging threats justified the U.S. proposals for changes to the ABM Treaty and the
deployment of an NMD system.12 Moreover, Russian officials claim that, even if “rogue”
nations could threaten the United States with long-range missiles, the overwhelming power
of U.S. offensive forces would deter such an attack. Russia’s former Defense Minister,
Igor Sergeyev, outlined this view when he stated:
8(...continued)
remained a cornerstone of strategic stability, it was not a static document. He pointed out
that “the treaty allows amendments to fit new strategic realities, such as the emerging new
threats we face.” DOD New Briefing, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Presenter.
June 9, 2000.
9Joint Statement By the Presidents. Op cit.
10Grier, Peter. Putin’s “Star Wars” Lite: Could it Fly? Christian Science Monitor. June 8,
2000. p. 2.
11Shchedrov, Oleg. Putin sees U.S. missile concerns, but no threat now. Reuters. July 12,
2000.
12 “The situation indeed has changed, but not enough to break down the system of strategic
stability that has formed by emasculating the ABM Treaty. It is possible to take steps to
counter the proliferation of missiles and missile technologies without going beyond the
framework of the ABM Treaty and by acting above all by means of political and diplomatic
methods.” See Putin’s Nuclear Weapons Reduction Proposals. Moscow, Krasnaya Zvezda,
November 14, 2000.

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CRS-7
“the development of ICBMs entailed a colossal strain on the economy even for
giants like the USSR and the United States. So assertions that ICBMs will
appear in the near future in the possession of Third World states that do not
possess a sound economy or the relevant technologies appear very lightweight
and unfounded. Indeed, even if we imagine the purely theoretical situation
where such missiles will become part of the armory, the nuclear deterrence
factor that demonstrated its effectiveness back in the Cold War years will still
apply to those countries.”13
Thus, Minister Sergeyev, and others in Russia have concluded that, if the emerging
missile threats in “rogue” nations do not really threaten U.S. territory, then a U.S. NMD
system cannot really be directed against those threats. Instead, the United States must be
seeking to develop a missile defense system that can contribute to its global drive for
domination and undermine Russia’s nuclear deterrent.
“The results of our military-technical analysis indicate that the threat of the
carrying out of a strike against the USA by intercontinental ballistic missiles
launched by so-called "problem" states, which the USA sets forth as the
primary reason for the development of its national ABM system, is, in realty, not
being considered [i.e., it is not the real reason for the development of the
national ABM system]. We do not see any [real] motives for the deployment
of this national ABM system other than the striving of the USA to acquire
strategic domination in the world. We are deeply convinced that such a
deployment would be primarily directed against Russia.”14
Skepticism about “Limited NMD”. Many Russian officials and analysts do
not believe that the United States plans to limit its NMD system. Some argue that the
United States would not spend more than $100 billion dollars to develop and deploy a
missile defense system, then limit it to a capability to intercept only 10-20 missiles.15 The
Clinton Administration contributed to this disbelief when it stated that it would seek
modifications to the ABM Treaty in two phases; the first would simply allow the
deployment of a single NMD site in Alaska and the upgrades to some early warning
radars. In the second phase, the Clinton Administration planned to request an increase in
the permitted number of interceptor missiles and the addition of space-based sensors.
Some Russians suspected that additional phases, with additional “minor modifications”
would have followed, and that, eventually, the U.S. approach would have loosened the
Treaty enough to permit the deployment of more extensive defenses. The Bush
Administration also insists that its missile program would be limited to address only the
threat from rogue nations. But the Administration has outlined plans to develop and deploy
13 Tretyakov, Vitaliy. The United States is Destroying Strategic Stability. Interview with
Russian Federation Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. June
22, 2000. Translated in FBIS Document CEP20000622000242
14 Russian Defense Minister Sergeyev on Military Reform, Chechnya, ABM Defense. Vek.
February 23, 20001. Translated in FBIS Document CEP20010301000351.
15 Russian military chief says NMD will destroy strategic stability. Itar-Tass. February 16,
2001. Translated in FBIS Document CEP20010216000210.

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CRS-8
a robust, layered system, as opposed to the limited land-based system considered by the
Clinton Administration, which could provide a more capable defense against Russian
missiles.
Russian analysts calculated that, even with the Clinton Administration’s limited
defensive system, the United States could expand its missile defense capabilities by
upgrading its early warning and command and control structures, then quickly adding to
the number of deployed interceptors. Former Defense Minister Sergeyev outlined this
concern in an interview with the Russian press. He noted that “It is not the quantity of
interceptor missiles that determines the combat potential of any antimissile defense system.
First and foremost, it depends on the system's information components which ensure the
acquisition and tracking of targets, the ability to distinguish real warheads from dummy
targets.”16 A Russian analyst, Alexander Pikayev, also noted that the United States could
easily expand its NMD capabilities once it had developed the space-based sensors that
would improve targeting and tracking capabilities. He stated that, once it had developed
and deployed these capabilities, “it would be easy for the U.S. to produce and deploy
large numbers of interceptors.”17
In April 2000, Pentagon officials presented Russia’s Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov
with a detailed briefing about the capabilities of the radars planned for the U.S. NMD
system in an effort to convince him that the system would not pose a threat to Russia’s
strategic deterrent forces.18 But Russian officials were not convinced.19 The Bush
Administration also provided Russian officials with detailed briefings on the new U.S.
missile defense program in early August 2001.
Consequently, with their doubts about the U.S. assessments of emerging ballistic
missile threats and their doubts about the limited nature of a prospective U.S. NMD
system, many Russian officials and analysts concluded that “the so-called limited nature of
the U.S. NMD sytem is based on the desire to obscure the very essence of the system.
The NMD is only a stage in the development and deployment of a full-scale ABM
system.”20 Former Defense Minister Sergeyev stated that the Clinton Administration’s
limited NMD would be the “first step toward the future emergence of a multifunctional
16 Tretyakov, Vitaliy. The United States is Destroying Strategic Stability. Interview with
Russian Federation Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. June
22, 2000. Translated in FBIS Document CEP20000622000242
17Pikayav, Alexander. ABM Treaty Revision: A Challenge to Russian Security.
Disarmament Diplomacy. Issue No. 44.
18Myers, Steven Lee. Russians Get Briefing on U.S. Defense Plan. New York Times.
April 29, 2000.
19“The argument that the US NMD system will be "limited" in nature and therefore
r epresents no danger to the Russian strategic deterrent forces does not convince us” See,
Tretyakov, Vitaliy. The United States is Destroying Strategic Stability. Interview with
Russian Federation Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. June
22, 2000. Translated in FBIS Document CEP20000622000242.
20 Russian military chief says NMD will destroy strategic stability. Itar-Tass. February 16,
2001. Translated in FBIS Document CEP20010216000210.

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global system for combating all types of ballistic, aerodynamic, and space targets and
subsequently also surface and land targets. This comprehensive defense system will be
directed first and foremost against the deterrent potential of the Russian Federation and the
People's Republic of China.”21
The Threat to Russia’s Deterrent. Russian analysts have argued that the
United States could undermine Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent, and possibly acquire
a disarming first strike capability, with even a relatively limited NMD capability. First, they
note that Russia’s arsenal of strategic offensive nuclear weapons is likely to decline sharply
over the next decade, to perhaps fewer than 1,500 warheads, as older weapons are
retired and financial constraints preclude the acquisition of newer weapons. But the United
States could maintain a much larger offensive nuclear force of several thousand nuclear
weapons, even under the terms of the START I and START II Treaties. In addition,
NATO enlargement, the U.S. advantage in anti-submarine warfare, and the U.S.
advantage in precision-guided conventional weapons, such as the sea-launched Tomahawk
cruise missile, provide the United States and its allies with the ability to conduct
conventional attacks on strategic targets in Russia in a comprehensive first strike. If the
United States launched an attack against Russia with its conventional and nuclear forces,
and destroyed a large percentage of Russia’s diminished nuclear forces, a few hundred
missile defense interceptors could be sufficient to intercept Russia’s retaliatory strike.
Hence, according to this argument, even a limited NMD system could “undermine strategic
stability” and contribute to U.S. efforts to “achieve radical changes in the military
balance.”22
Russian analysts also note that China is likely to react to the deployment of a U.S.
NMD system by expanding its military capabilities and its offensive missile forces. One
Russian analyst, Alexander Pikayev, has stated that China has already adopted a $10
billion package for a new nuclear buildup in reaction to U.S. plans to deploy an NMD
system together with a TMD system in the Western Pacific, and that China would have to
significantly increase the size of its missile force to maintain the credibility of its deterrent
in the face of a U.S. NMD. But, according to Pikayev and other Russian analyts, these
weapons could pose as much of a threat to Russia as they could to the United States:
“Currently, the predominance of Chinese conventional weapons vis-a-vis the vast but
sparsely populated Russian Far East is balanced by Moscow’s superiority in nuclear
weapons. China’s nuclear build-up might considerably erode this superiority, further
weakening Russia’s position in the Far East.”23 According to Pikayev, this imbalance with
21 Tretyakov, Vitaliy. The United States is Destroying Strategic Stability. Interview with
Russian Federation Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. June
22, 2000. Translated in FBIS Document CEP20000622000242
2 2 Rogov, Sergey Mikhaylovich. Reliance on the Nuclear Shield: Not Unilateral Reduction,
but a Search for Compromise Solutions With the United States Will Ensure Russia's National
Security. August 4, 2000. Translated in FBIS Document CEP20000810000216. See also,
Pikayav, Alexander. ABM Treaty Revision: A Challenge to Russian Security. Disarmament
Diplomacy. Issue No. 44.
2 3 Pikayav, Alexander. ABM Treaty Revision: A Challenge to Russian Security.
Disarmament Diplomacy. Issue No. 44.

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CRS-10
Chinese forces might compel Russia to withdraw from the 1987 Intermediate Forces
Treaty.
Possible Military Responses
Hence, in spite of U.S. claims to the contrary, many Russian officials and analysts
appear to believe that U.S. withdrawal from the ABM Treaty and deployment of an NMD
system would undermine the existing framework of arms control agreements, upset
international strategic stability, incite new arms races, and threaten the credibility of
Russia’s strategic nuclear deterrent. Several Russian officials have declared that, if the
United States were to follow this path, Russia would feel compelled to withdraw from a
range of arms control agreements so that it could deploy the military forces that it would
need to offset the U.S. threat to its nuclear deterrent. These military responses could
include changes in the deployment of several different types of nuclear weapons.
Deploy Multiple Warheads on New ICBMs. The 1993 START II Treaty,
which has not yet entered into force, would have banned the deployment of land-based
strategic ballistic missiles with multiple warheads (MIRVed ICBMs). Under this
agreement, Russia would have had to eliminate its 10-warhead SS-18 ICBMs and 10-
warhead SS-24 ICBMs. It also would have to reduce, from 6 to one, the number of
warheads deployed on its SS-19 ICBMs. This would leave Russia with an ICBM force
that consisted of single warhead SS-25 and SS-27 missiles and around 100 aging SS-19
missiles..
Even without Treaty implementation, Russia is likely to eliminate many of the older
multiple warhead missiles. The SS-18s, which have long been considered the backbone
of Russia’s strategic nuclear force, are likely to reach the end of their service-lives by the
end of the decade. Russia would find it hard to maintain these forces because the missiles
were produced at a plant in Ukraine, which is no longer making ICBMs for Russia, and
Russia lacks the economic resources needed to build a new plant to support these missiles
in Russia. However, if it were not bound by the START II ban on MIRVed ICBMs,
Russia could deploy its older single-warhead SS-25 ICBM and new single-warhead SS-
27 ICBM with 3 warheads.24 Alternatively, Russia could develop new types of decoys
and penetration aids for these missiles, to complicate U.S. efforts to intercept them with
its missile defense system.
Russia currently has 360 SS-25 missiles and 26 operational SS-27 missiles. The SS-
27 missiles were expected to replace the SS-25 missiles in Russia’s force. Russia is
currently producing fewer than 10 of these missiles per year, but had hoped to produce up
to 30 missiles per year later this decade. Many experts believed Russia would eventually
produce 300 SS-27 missiles, but with the low production rates currently in place, this
number is likely to be lower. Even if each of these missiles were to carry 3 warheads,
Russia’s ICBM force would likely include fewer than 1000 warheads by the end of the
24 Dolinin, Aleksandr. Russia's Security Is Reliably Guaranteed. Interview with Strategic
Missile Troops Commander-in-Chief, General of the Army Vladimir Yakovlev. Krasnaya
Zvezda, July 5, 2000. Translated in FBIS CEP20000705000396.

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CRS-11
decade. This contrasts with more than 3,500 warheads on Russia’s ICBM force now.
So, even if Russia were to abrogate START I and set aside START II, it would probably
institute sharp reductions in the size of its ICBM force.
Deploy new intermediate range missiles. Several Russian officials have
also suggested that Russia might abrogate the 1987 INF Treaty and deploy new shorter-
range and intermediate-range missiles.25 As was noted above, Russia could pursue this
option in an effort to offset any advantages that China might acquire if it expanded its
nuclear forces in response to a U.S. NMD. But the threat to deploy new missiles in this
range can also be seen as a part of Russia’s attempt to convince U.S. allies in Europe to
join it in opposing U.S. NMD plans.26 In discussing this option, Vladimir Yakovlev, the
former Commander of Russia’s Strategic Rocket Forces noted that “in the event of the
repudiation of the INF Treaty, Europe once again falls hostage to a clash between the
nuclear superpowers. The United States is planning to [maintain] a 100,000-strong
grouping on the continent of Europe with command and control posts and the relevant
infrastructure and all this is an extremely worthy target for Russian missiles.27
Russia could reportedly produce new intermediate range missiles in a relatively short
amount of time. According to one official, the Moscow Institute of Heat and Engineering,
Russia’s leading design bureau for ballistic missiles, has already prepared blueprints and
technical documents for the system and could transfer them to the Votkinsk missile
assembly facility as a soon as a decision was made to begin producing missiles.28
Nevertheless, it is unlikely that it could produce large numbers of these missiles in a short
period of time. The Votkinsk Missile Assembly facility is the same location where Russia
produced the SS-25 missiles and is currently producing the SS-27 missile, at a rate of
fewer than 10 per year. Economic constraints would make it very difficult for Russia to
expand production at this facility. Hence, any increase in the production of intermediate-
range missiles could come at the expense of the already-low production rate for SS-27
missiles.
Redeploy shorter-range nuclear delivery systems. During the early
1990s, the United States and Soviet Union both withdrew from deployment many of their
shorter-range nuclear delivery systems. They did this unilaterally, without any negotiated
agreements and without any formal monitoring or verification provisions. For Russia, these
weapons came out of deployment areas in the other former Soviet republics and near
Russia’s borders. Many were consolidated at storage areas within Russia. Some analysts
in the United States have expressed concerns that Russia might return some of these
2 5 Dolinin, Aleksandr. Russia's Security Is Reliably Guaranteed. Krasnaya Zvezda, July 5,
2000. Translated in FBIS CEP20000705000396.
26Saradzhyan, Simon. U.S. NMD Effort Fueling Russia’s New Missile Plan. Defense
News. July 10, 2000. p. 1.
27 Odnokolenko, Oleg. Wait For a Response. Asymmetrical Response. Russia Could Be
Embroiled in Ruinous Arms Race. Segodnya, June 22, 2000. Translated in FBIS Document
CEP20000622000085
28Saradzhyan, Simon. U.S. NMD Effort Fueling Russia’s New Missile Plan. Defense
News. July 10, 2000. p. 1.

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CRS-12
weapons to deployment or to storage areas closer to Russia’s western borders. The
Commander of Russia’s Strategic Rocket forces indicated that this was a possibility when
he stated that Russia could also institute “changes to the principles of employment and
deployment of operational-tactical nuclear weapons” as a part of its response to U.S.
deployment of NMD.29
This type of response would not give Russia any new capabilities to threaten the
United States or to penetrate U.S. missile defenses. However, it would be consistent with
Russia’s new national security strategy, which allows for the possible use of non-strategic
nuclear weapons in response to conventional military attacks on Russia. Most experts
believe that this change in Russia’s strategy is a response to the degradation in Russia’s
conventional military capabilities, and its growing concern about the military implications
of NATO enlargement. In addition, the threat of new nuclear deployments near Europe
could be a part of Russia’s efforts to draw support from the United States’ allies in Europe
for Russia’s opposition to missile defense. According to this school of thought, the more
threatened the Europeans feel by Russia’s potential responses, the more likely they are to
pressure the United States to alter its policy on missile defense.
Most experts agree that Russia will not be able to win the support of U.S. allies in
Europe, even if it threatens to redeploy shorter-range or intermediate-range nuclear forces
near its western borders. However, if Russia intends to make these changes anyway, in
response to its diminished conventional capabilities, then the collapse of arms control in
response to U.S. missile defense policy could provide a convenient excuse.
Russian Alternatives
Russian officials have stated that, instead of relying on missile defenses that could
upset stability and undermine arms control, the two sides should rely on “an umbrella based
on diplomacy”30 and has offered proposals for measures that the international community
might adopt to address the threat posed by missile proliferation. The Clinton
Administration did not dismiss the Russian approach, but also did not accept it as an
alternative to the U.S. approach. Then-Secretary of Defense Cohen noted, after the June
2000 summit between Presidents Clinton and Putin, that the response to missile
proliferation should include both diplomatic efforts to stop proliferation and defensive
systems to protect the nations from possible attack.31
29 Dolinin, Aleksandr. Russia's Security Is Reliably Guaranteed. Interview with Strategic
Missile Troops Commander-in-Chief, General of the Army Vladimir Yakovlev. Krasnaya
Zvezda, July 5, 2000. Translated in FBIS CEP20000705000396.
30Williams, Daniel. Russia Wants Political Shield; Moscow Says Diplomacy, Not Technology,
Key to Missile Defense. Washington Post. June 14, 2000. p. A34
31DOD News Briefing, Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Presenter. June 9, 2000.

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The Global Missile and Missile Technology Non-
Proliferation Control System (GCS)
In June 1999, Russia proposed that the international community establish a Global
Missile and Missile Technology Non-proliferation Control System (GCS). Russia
advocated this regime as “component part of the global regime of the non-proliferation of
missiles and missile technologies.”32 It would, in part, complement the Missile Technology
Control Regime – which regulates the supply side of missile technologies – by regulating
the behavior of nations that might seek to acquire ballistic missile technologies; and, would
operate under U.N. auspices. It would also provide incentives to nations so that they
would forgo their own missile arsenals. Russian officials said the goal was to present an
alternative to NMD that maximizes “peaceful” diplomatic and political efforts to address
concerns about missile proliferation.33
Specifically, Russia proposed that the international community create a pre-launch
and post-launch notification launch-monitoring regime to build transparency into ballistic
missile developments. Nations that participated in this regime would gain an understanding
of missile developments in neighboring countries and might feel less threatened, and
therefore, less compelled to develop their own missiles. The regime would also include a
global monitoring system to provide a “mechanism for detection of missile launches for any
purpose.” This monitoring system, which could build on the system under development by
the United States and Russia, might also ease tensions and uncertainties about ballistic
missile developments. For nations who agreed to forgo the development of their own
ballistic missiles, the Russian proposal offered security guarantees, with the international
community coming to a nation’s assistance if it were attacked by ballistic missiles. Finally,
the proposal contained incentives for countries to forgo the development of ballistic
missiles.34
The Clinton Administration responded cautiously to the Russian proposal. It
reportedly saw some positive elements, but also had concerns that the discussions might
be used as a forum to criticize U.S. NMD plans and undermine U.S. efforts to win support
for missile defenses.35 Furthermore, although the United States supported the principle of
a multilateral launch notification regime, it preferred to focus its attention on the bilateral
U.S.-Russian effort. It believed it would be easier to make the Joint Data Exchange
Center available to other countries once it was operational than to conduct multilateral
negotiations to establish the center.
32Ivanov Comments on START-3 Negotiations, Moscow Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the
Russian Federation, September 2, 2000. Translated in FBIS Document
CEP20000905000219.
33U.S. Adopting “Wait and See” Approach to Russian Missile Initiative. Inside the
Pentagon, April 16, 2000. p. 1.
34U.S. Adopting “Wait and See” Approach to Russian Missile Initiative. Inside the
Pentagon, April 16, 2000. p. 1.
35U.S. Adopting “Wait and See” Approach to Russian Missile Initiative. Inside the
Pentagon, April 16, 2000. p. 1.

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CRS-14
Russia has held two organizational meetings on its proposal for a GCS. At the first
conference, in March 2000, Russia outlined its plan for the regime. At the second, in
February 2001, the participants talked about an international code of conduct on missile
technology transfers that had been proposed at the MTCR meetings last year. This code
would affect the demand side, placing limits on nations seeking to advance their missile
capabilities. The United States has not participated actively in the GCS forum. The U.S.
embassy sent an observer to the first meeting but no U.S. official attended the second.
The Clinton Administration agreed to try to integrate the GCS proposal into the existing
MTCR framework, but it did not support the creation of a separate regime outside of the
MTCR framework.36
Cooperation on Theater Ballistic Missile Defenses in
Europe
The Russian Proposal. Russia’s President Vladimir Putin first proposed that
Russia cooperate with nations in Europe in developing defenses against theater ballistic
missiles in June 2000, shortly after his summit meeting with President Clinton. He referred
to this concept as “a regionally-based missile defense system” that would not require any
changes in the ABM Treaty.”37 Putin’s initial, general proposal was followed by meetings
between NATO officials and Russia’s Minister of Defense, Igor Sergeyev, later in June.
At that time, General Sergeyev reportedly outlined the framework for cooperation that
Russia had in mind. He said that possible areas of cooperation could include:
-- joint assessment of the nature and scale of missile proliferation and possible missile
threats;
-- joint development of a concept for a pan-European nonstrategic missile defense
system and of a procedure for its creation and deployment;
-- joint creation of a pan-European multilateral missile launch warning center;
-- the holding of joint command and staff exercises;
-- the conducting of joint research and experiments;
-- joint development of nonstrategic missile defense systems;
-- creation of nonstrategic missile defense formations for joint or coordinated actions to
protect peacekeeping forces or the civilian population.38
36Russia holds Second GCS Conference. Arms Control Today. March 2001. p. 34.
37Europe Urged by Putin to reject U.S. Missile Plan. London Times, June 12, 2000.
38 Tretyakov, Vitaliy. The United States is Destroying Strategic Stability. Interview with
Russian Federation Defense Minister Marshal Igor Sergeyev. Nezavisimaya Gazeta. June
22, 2000. Translated in FBIS Document CEP20000622000242

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Russia’s second proposal was included in a nine-page paper entitled “Phases of
European Missile Defense” that was presented to NATO’s Secretary General Lord
George Robertson in Moscow in February 2001. This paper reportedly added details to
the general outline that Russia had first presented in June 2000. One key difference was
that, instead of hinting at the use of boost-phase defenses, as Russia had done in June
2000, the new paper indicated that the defensive system would rely on more conventional
terminal defenses in transportable units that could be moved to counter specific threats
during a crisis.39 But the rest of the proposal remained essentially the same. Russia and
the European nations would first cooperate in a forum that would review and assess
emerging ballistic missile threats. They could then establish a joint early warning center to
process data and share information on missile launches. These nations could also jointly
develop, build and deploy a non-strategic anti-ballistic missile system that could be ready
for rapid deployment to any area in Europe where the threat of missile attack might arise.40
According to some reports, the plan was “long on generalities and short on specifics.” It
provided “little technical evaluation and no cost estimates, development timetables, or
organizational structures.” It simply represented a “theoretical basis for how a mobile
European-based system might be developed using Russian technology.”41
Russian officials emphasized that Russia had the technology, industrial base, and
testing facilities needed to develop and produce a mobile non-strategic ballistic missile
defense system. They also noted that Russia had the early warning network needed to
monitor and respond to ballistic missile threats that might emerge from nations to the south
of Europe.42 The paper presented to Lord Robertson did not identify the technologies that
could be used in the system, but it did contain a diagram, and analysts who reviewed the
material concluded that Russia intended to use its S-300 and S-400 air-defense systems.43
The S-300 reportedly includes a sophisticated set of tracking devices and rockets that can
reportedly intercept up to six missiles or aircraft at one time.44 These systems are
reportedly based on the SA-10 air-defense system that the Soviet Union first deployed in
the late 1960s. The system accomplished some successful intercepts of theater-range
ballistic missiles in the mid-1990s. Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems attributes this
system with capabilities similar to the U.S. Patriot system, which can intercept shorter-
range ballistic missiles.45 But Russian sources claim the S-400 version will be able to
3 9 Baker, Peter and Susan B. Glasser. Russia Details Anti-Missile Alternative. Washington
Post. February 21, 2001. p 16.
40Russia Sees Rapid Anti-Missile Force. New York Times on the Web. April 10, 2001.
41Baker, Peter. Russia’s Skeletal Missile Plan. Outline of European Shield Brings Little
Response from the West. Washington Post. April 3, 2001.
42 Sorokina, Svetlana. Interview with Vladimir Yakovlev, Commander in Chief of the
Russian Strategic Missile Troops. From the "Hero of the Day" program, June 22, 2000.
Translated in FBIS Document CEP20000622000323.
43Baker, Peter. Russia’s Skeletal Missile Plan. Outline of European Shield Brings Little
Response from the West. Washington Post. April 3, 2001.
44Hoagland, Jim. Putin’s Rocket Challenge. Washington Post. March 18, 2001. p. B7
45Lennox, Duncan, editor. Jane’s Strategic Weapons Systems. Issue 33. August 2000. pp.
(continued...)

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CRS-16
intercept missiles with ranges up to 3,500 kilometers. This version reportedly entered
production in mid-2000 and may become operational in 2001.46
The U.S. and European Reactions. When Russia first offered its proposal
for a European missile defense system, the Clinton Administration said the idea could not
serve as a substitute for a U.S. NMD. Specifically, Secretary of Defense Cohen stated
that it would leave the United States and Europe vulnerable to attacks from long-range
rockets being developed by countries such as Iran and North Korea. Therefore, it could
not protect the United States or its allies from the full range of emerging threats.47 To be
acceptable to the United States, a missile defense sytem would have to “protect all of the
United States territory.” Therefore, the Russian suggestion for a cooperative system with
Europe “could supplement, but not substitute for the system that the U.S. is developing.”48
The European reaction to Russia’s initial proposal was also “guarded” According to
a European diplomat, “There is a lot of skepticism because this would seem to be another
attempt by Moscow to drive a wedge between Europe and the United States.”49 Many
analysts also considered the proposal to a be a “clumsy” attempt by Moscow to draw the
European nations away from the United States and to increase pressure on the Clinton
Administration to defer missile defense deployment and remain within the ABM Treaty.
The reaction to Russia’s February 2001 paper that added details to the June 2000
proposal was not as critical. Officials from the both Bush Administration and NATO
noted that Russia’s focus on theater missile defenses for Europe indicated that Russia
appeared to agree with the United States that missile proliferation posed a threat and
agreed that missile defense systems, as well as diplomacy and arms control, could play a
role in addressing the threat.50 Some analysts suggested that a change in tone that
accompanied Russia’s second proposal, and the fact that it came less than a month into the
Bush Administration, signaled that Russia realized that the new President was more
committed to the deployment of missile defenses and that Russia’s opposition could be
45(...continued)
302-305.
46Missile Troops Begin Testing of S-400 Defensive Missile System. Moscow TV. June 21,
2000.
47Drozdiak, William. U.S. Rejects Russian Plan for Joint Missile Defense. Cohen Says
Proposal Fails to Shield Against Long-Range Strikes. Washington Post. June 10, 2000, p.
17
48DOD News Briefing. Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Presenter. June 9, 2000.
49Drozdiak, William. U.S. Rejects Russian Plan for Joint Missile Defense. Cohen Says
Proposal Fails to Shield Against Long-Range Strikes. Washington Post. June 10, 2000, p.
17
50Gordon, Michael R. Moscow Signaling A Change in Tone on Missile Defense. New York
Times, February 22, 2001. P. 1.

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futile. Instead, by offering more details on the Russian alternative, Russia could be seeking
to maintain a dialogue with the United States on missile defenses.51
U.S. Response to the Russian Reaction
Clinton Administration
The Clinton Administration sought to address Russian concerns about the U.S. plans
for missile defense by convincing Russia that the ABM Treaty would remain largely in
place, that missile defenses would remain relatively limited, and that they would be directed
against possible small-scale attacks from “rogue” nations. As was noted above, the
Clinton Administration agreed with the Russian view that the ABM Treaty was the
cornerstone of strategic stability. It proposed only modest changes to the Treaty, so that
it could deploy a limited ground based site in Alaska, rather than North Dakota, and so
that it could upgrade radar capabilities. It acknowledged that the United States might seek
further modifications in the future, but it never suggested that it would deploy a robust,
layered defense that included sea-based or space-based interceptors.
Administration officials also met frequently with Russian officials to discuss U.S.
NMD plans and to seek Russian agreement on changes to the ABM Treaty. Although
these discussions proved futile, and Russia offered little more than a simple “no” in
response to U.S. initiatives, this effort appeared to indicate that the United States placed
a high priority on reaching agreement with Russia before it proceeded with its missile
defense plans. Administration officials indicated that the United States would consider
withdrawing from the ABM Treaty if Russia failed to accept modifications but Russia
apparently never believed that the Clinton Administration would take this step. This view
may have contributed to Russia’s reluctance to accept or even discuss the U.S. proposals.
Bush Administration
The Bush Administration has altered sharply the U.S. approach towards addressing
Russia’s concerns. First, the Administration does not support the view that the ABM
Treaty remains the cornerstone of strategic stability. To the contrary, Secretaries Rumsfeld
and Powell have stated that the Treaty is “ancient history” and “not relevant in the current
strategic framework.” In his speech on May 1, 2001, President Bush said the United
States must “leave behind the constraints of the ABM Treaty” and, instead, “replace this
treaty with a new framework that reflects a clear and clean break from the past...”
Second, the Bush Administration has not accepted the limited approach to missile
defenses that had been pursued by the Clinton Administration. Although the
Administration insists that its defensive systems will also be directed against “rogue” nation
threats and accidental launches, it has not pledged to keep that system limited to a few
hundred interceptors based at one or a few sites on land. Instead, the Administration has
51Gordon, Michael R. Moscow Signaling A Change in Tone on Missile Defense. New York
Times, February 22, 2001. P. 1.

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pledged to develop a “layered” defense that will include components based on land, at sea,
and in space. Unlike the Clinton Administration, and possibly because it has not yet settled
on an architecture, the Bush Administration has not yet sought to convince Russia that the
technologies included in U.S. missile defense plans could not intercept a deliberate Russian
attack and would not undermine Russia’s deterrent. Instead, the Administration has
offered verbal assurances that it does not view Russia as an adversary, and, therefore,
would not direct U.S. missile defense efforts against Russian forces.
In late July 2001, Presidents Bush and Putin agreed that the two nations would hold
discussions on their offensive nuclear weapons and missile defenses, and seek to reach
agreement on a new strategic framework. These discussions began in early August, when
Russian officials received a detailed briefing on U.S. technologies and the Bush
Administration plans for missile defenses. But the Bush Administration does not view these
discussions as the opening round in a formal negotiating process that might produce a new
treaty limiting offensive nuclear weapons or missile defenses. The President and officials
in his Administration have argued that, in the absence of an adversarial relationship
between the two nations, formal arms control agreements are no longer needed to manage
their relationship. Instead, the United States may be seeking a more informal process
where the two sides simply inform each other of their plans and programs. In addition, the
United States would like Russia to agree to set aside the ABM Treaty, or to have both
parties withdraw from it together, so that the United States can proceed with missile
defense. President Bush has also stated that, if the two sides could not soon reach an
agreement to set the Treaty aside together, the United States would withdraw and deploy
defenses. In addition, Secretary Powell has announced that the United States would no
longer participate in the Standing Consultative Commission (SCC), where the parties to
the ABM Treaty discuss implementation and compliance issues.52
Russia, on the other hand, would probably prefer to keep some form of Treaty
regime in place. It acknowledges that the world has changed and that the relationship with
the United States has changed, but it continues to place a value on the predictability and
formality offered by arms control agreements. Reports indicate that it may be willing to
permit more extensive testing of missile defense systems, and to relax the definitions in the
Agreed Statements on Demarcation so that the United States can test TMD systems
against a wider range of targets. But, even if it may now be willing to modify the ABM
Treaty so that the United States can conduct these tests, it does not favor an environment
in which the United States can deploy defenses without limits.
Many experts believe that Russia is willing to engage in discussions with the Bush
Administration because Russian officials believe that the Administration is so committed to
missile defenses that it would be willing, if not eager, to withdraw from the ABM Treaty.
This view seemed evident in Russia’s initial reaction to President Bush’s speech on missile
defense policy. Foreign Minister Ivanov, in a press conference after the speech, praised
the President’s call for discussions about strategic stability and a new strategic framework.
However, he did not appear to accept the Administration’s view that this new framework
could replace the ABM Treaty. He said that Russia would "insist on preserving and
52Pincus, Walter, U.S. Considers Shift in Nuclear Targets. Defenses to Focus on China,
Expert Says. Washington Post. April 29, 2001. p. 23.

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strengthening" the ABM Treaty and that the Treaty cannot be separated "from the general
architecture" of arms control agreements "that has been formed in the last 30 years and that
has become the basis of international security.”53
Hence, although the Bush Administration appears to place a lower priority on
reaching agreement with the Russians than did the Clinton Administration, it also appears
that the Russians may be less resistant to reaching an agreement now that it believes the
United States is more likely to withdraw from the ABM Treaty. However, it remains to
be seen whether Russia will alter its positions on the dangers of missile defense for Russia’s
nuclear deterrent and importance of the ABM Treaty for international strategic stability.
Issues for Congress
Members of Congress have expressed a range of opinions about the Bush
Administration’s approach to missile defense and arms control.54 Congress is not likely
to vote directly on binding legislation that would address the question of whether the United
States should withdraw from the ABM Treaty. It will, however, have annual opportunities
to review the Administration’s plans for missile defenses, and their implications for the
ABM Treaty when it reviews the Administration’s budget requests during the annual
authorization and appropriations process. These debates may be dominated by questions
about the costs and technical feasibility of U.S. missile defense plans. But the Members
may also address some questions about the implications of these plans for the U.S.
relationship with Russia and the future of the arms control process.
Will Russia continue to cooperate on offensive arms reductions?
Many critics of U.S. missile defense policy consider Russia’s threat to withdraw from a
range of offensive arms control agreements as a key threat to U.S. security. They note that
these agreements not only reduce the size of the only arsenal that can threaten U.S.
survival, but they also include monitoring and verification provisions that bring
predictability, transparency, and cooperation to the U.S.-Russian nuclear relationship.
Others, however, argue that the benefits of arms control are not worth the cost of
remaining vulnerable to missile attack. They note that Russian nuclear forces are likely to
decline sharply during the next decade under economic constraints, with or without arms
control. They also note that the United States could reduce its offensive forces, as
President Bush has promised to do, without negotiating formal agreements. Finally, they
contend that the United States and Russia have established a mature, cooperative
relationship on nuclear weapons issues and that the transparency and predictability from
this relationship could continue even if the countries were not monitoring compliance with
arms control treaties.
53Tyler, Patrick E. Global Reaction to Missile Plan is Cautious. New York Times
May 3, 2001.
54See, for example, Biden, Joseph R., Jr. Missile Defense Will Make Us Less Secure, Wall
Street Journal, May 3, 2001; John Kyl. ABM Treaty Must Go. USA Today May 2, 2001.
p. 12; and Alison Mitchell, Senate Democrats Square off with Bush Over Missile Plan. New
York Times May 3, 2001. p. 1.

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Will Russia continue to cooperate in non-proliferation and threat
reduction activities? Some critics of U.S. missile defense policy argue that Russia
might cease its cooperation in a range of other policy areas if the United States were to
withdraw from the ABM Treaty. They point to Russia’ expanding nuclear cooperation
with Iran as evidence that Russia could do serious harm to U.S. national security if it chose
to pursue a less restrained nonproliferation policy. Some also contend that Russia might
withdraw from participation in the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program,
where the United States provides financial and technical assistance in securing and
eliminating Russian nuclear weapons and materials. Without U.S. participation, these
weapons and materials might be lost, stolen, or sold to nations seeking their own nuclear
weapons. Some believe these possibilities could pose a greater threat to U.S. security than
the emerging missile threats that would be the target of U.S. missile defenses.
Others, however, doubt that Russian policies in these areas would be linked to U.S.
withdrawal from the ABM Treaty. They note that Russia has been cooperating with Iran
in nuclear developments and military sales for many years, and that these activities are
driven more by Russia’s interest in earning hard currency than by Russia’s interest in
undermining U.S. non-proliferation objectives. Some also argue that Russia would not be
likely to cut off cooperation under the Nunn-Lugar programs because it recognizes the
threats posed by the potential loss of nuclear weapons and materials and it would be
unable to safeguard and eliminate aging nuclear weapons without U.S. assistance.
Will Russia convince other nations to support its objections to U.S.
missile defense policies? Russia has been conducting a world-wide public relations
campaign in an effort to win the support of other countries in its opposition to U.S. missile
defense policies. It has joined with China on numerous occasions to criticize U.S. missile
defenses as a threat to international stability and it has sought to win support from U.S.
allies in Europe by promising to cooperate on the development of theater missile defenses
for Europe. It has also issued declarations with many other nations in support of the ABM
Treaty and opposition to U.S. missile defense plans.
Some critics of U.S. missile defense plans argue that the United States might find itself
isolated in the international community if it continues to pursue missile defenses and
withdraws from the ABM Treaty. They note that most countries are at least
uncomfortable, if not outright opposed, to this policy. Some fear that these nations might
interfere with or complicate other areas of U.S. policy if they feel that the United States has
upset the international order with its pursuit of missile defenses.
The Bush Administration has pledged to consult with U.S. allies before it proceeds
with missile defense, in part to ease their concerns and reduce their resistence. Supporters
of missile defense deployments generally support consultation with U.S. allies, although
some have expressed concern that the Administration’s emphasis on these consultations
could leave U.S. policy vulnerable to the objections of other nations. And many do not
think these objections will affect the U.S. international position. They argue that U.S.
missile defenses will enhance, not degrade, international security, and that other nations will
realize that they will benefit in the long run if the United States pursues this course. Some
also note that international criticism will not, in the long run, affect U.S. policy objectives.

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Conclusion
It is not clear, at this time, whether Russia will continue to press its objections to U.S.
policies on missile defense and the ABM Treaty, or whether it will try to reach an
accommodation with the Bush Administration on a new framework for strategic stability.
Many members of the Bush Administration seem to believe that the United States will gain
Russia’s cooperation when Russia realizes that the U.S. is prepared to withdraw from the
ABM Treaty. They note that Russia remains extremely interested in reductions in offensive
nuclear forces and that the Bush Administration’s plans to reduce U.S. forces will ease
Russia’s concerns about U.S. intentions. Eventually, they believe that Russia will
cooperate with the United States in a transition to a new strategic framework that
combines both offensive and defensive weapons in the deterrence equation.
Others, however, argue that Russia has outlined well-reasoned and complex
objections to U.S. policy on missile defense and the ABM Treaty, and that it is not likely
to change its views in the near term. Instead, they believe that, if and when the United
States withdraws from the ABM Treaty, Russia could follow through on its threats to
withdraw from a range of arms control agreements and its plans to augment its nuclear
forces. They argue that the United States might eventually become less secure than it is
today, even if it deploys missile defenses, because it will be faced with a more adversarial,
less cooperative Russia. And Russia will retain enough nuclear weapons to saturate the
U.S. defenses and threaten the survival of the United States.

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