Order Code RL30699
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and
Missiles: The Current Situation and Trends
Updated August 10, 2001
Robert Shuey
Specialist in U.S. Foreign Policy and National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and
Missiles: The Current Situation and Trends
Summary
Nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons (NBCW) pose the most serious threats
to the United States and its foreign interests. Ballistic and cruise missiles, aircraft, covert
forces, and terrorist groups are considered possible means of delivering these weapons of
mass destruction. The total number of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
stockpiled throughout the world is decreasing as the major powers scale back their
inventories, but some additional countries and groups are trying to acquire these weapons.
U.S. and allied policy makers debate the rate of proliferation and the nature and extent of
the threat to the United States and its allies, and the weapons’ effects on international
stability. These issues and the policy preferences of various segments of the security
policy communities in the United States and overseas have led to markedly different
approaches to countering NBC weapons and missile threats. The purpose of this paper
is to assemble current information on the status of weapons programs around the globe and
analyze patterns regarding the threats posed by these weapons.
China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States have well-
established arsenals of nuclear weapons and are considered nuclear-weapon states under
the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). India and Pakistan tested nuclear weapons
in 1998; Israel is believed to have numerous nuclear weapons; and North Korea is thought
to have one or two. U.S. intelligence officials predict more countries will acquire them in
the next decade or so. About a dozen countries have offensive biological weapons
programs, and about 17 countries were reportedly known or likely to have had chemical
weapons when the Chemical Weapons Convention went into effect. The number of
countries and subnational groups that will be able to produce at least small quantities of
CW and BW weapons is likely to grow as new technologies are developed and the
international flow of goods, people, and technology continues to increase. The number that
will produce and stockpile WMD may decrease if diplomatic efforts, arms control treaties,
nonproliferation regimes, and security strategies are effective. While the United States and
Russia are reducing their intercontinental missile inventories and have eliminated
intermediate-range missiles, China is modernizing and expanding its missile force, and
North Korea, Iran, Israel, India, and Pakistan are building short- and medium-range
missiles and are developing longer-range missiles. Dozens of countries have or are
developing ballistic missiles and more are likely to acquire them.
From the United States and Europe, across North Africa and the Middle East,
through South Asia to Northeast Asia, nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons and
missiles will probably be a potential threat for the foreseeable future. More countries and
groups will have the ability to inflict mass casualties and mass destruction on their
adversaries within their country, within their region, and even those at a great distance.
While the threats of nuclear, biological, and chemical warfare associated with the Cold
War are greatly diminished, new threats have emerged and more may develop in the
coming decade as elements in North Korea, Russia, China, and other countries continue
to export weapons technology.

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Contents
Background . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Implications for U.S. Policy Decisions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Countries that Have or May Soon Acquire NBC Weapons and Missiles . . . 3
Nuclear Weapon Arsenals and Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Biological Weapon Arsenals and Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Chemical Weapon Arsenals and Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Missile Arsenals and Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Trends Regarding NBC Weapons and Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Positive Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Negative Developments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Contributing Factors . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Trends in Nuclear Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Risks of Nuclear Conflict . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Trends in Biological and Chemical Weapons . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Trends in Missiles . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Assessments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
List of Figures
Figure 1. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Ballistic Missiles 4
Figure 2. Worldwide Risks of a Nuclear Attack From Any Source,
Late 1940s-2000 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
List of Tables
Table 1. The State of Proliferation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Table 2. International Commitments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Contributors
Steven Bowman, Helit Barel, Stuart Goldman, Richard Grimmett, Shirley Kan, and
Merav Zafary of the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division contributed to the
analysis in this report. Angela Hooker of the Electronic Research Products Office
produced the map, and Sarah Mitchell of the Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
formatted the report for production.

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Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical
Weapons and Missiles: The Current
Situation and Trends
Background
Only nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons (NBCW) could now threaten the
national integrity of the United States or could inflict massive casualties and destruction on
the country.1 These weapons are also a threat to U.S. troops abroad, U.S. allies, and
regional stability. With the end of the Cold War and the diminished strategic Soviet threat,
U.S. policy makers have been able to give greater attention to the potential use of nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons by less powerful countries or terrorist groups. For these
reasons, there is concern in Congress about the countries and groups that have NBC
weapons, are developing them, or trying to acquire them, and about those who have or
seek missile delivery systems. President Clinton reported to Congress that “Weapons of
mass destruction pose the greatest potential threat to global stability and security.
Proliferation of advanced weapons and technologies threatens to provide rogue states,
terrorists and international crime organizations with the means to inflict terrible damage on
the United States, our allies and U.S. citizens and troops abroad.”2 The Bush
Administration has focused on weapons programs and restructuring of the military to deal
with aspects of a growing NBCW and missile threat.3
But world leaders debate the extent of the threats, and whether the threats are
growing or receding. Some U.S. and foreign analysts emphasize positive developments,
such as the demise of the Soviet Union and progress made in U.S.-Russian arms control
and international arms control. Others emphasize negative developments such as the
nuclear tests by India and Pakistan; missile tests by North Korea, Iran, India, and
Pakistan; continuing transfers of dangerous technology particularly by China, Russia, and
North Korea; and a growing interest in weapons of mass destruction among terrorists.
The purpose of this report is to contribute to discussions of U.S. policies on these complex
national security issues by providing information and analysis regarding the current threat
and trends in nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and missiles.
1Nuclear and biological weapons can cause massive casualties and other damage. The
effects of chemical weapons are generally confined to smaller geographic areas and cause
fewer casualties but can create panic in a poorly protected population.
2A National Security Strategy for A New Century. Released by the White House Press
Secretary, January 5, 2000, p. 6.
3Wolfowitz, Paul, Testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services, July 12, 2001.

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CRS-2
Implications for U.S. Policy Decisions
Numerous laws address the proliferation, development, testing, production,
stockpiling, and use of these weapons.4 Potential NBCW and missile (NBCW+M) threats
to U.S. security interests impinge on numerous national security and foreign policy
decisions. Whether potential adversaries have and are likely to use NBCW+M is often
instrumental in determining:
! the size and nature of the U.S. military force structure
! U.S. acquisition of weapon systems and equipment
! U.S. doctrine and strategy for homeland defense and military operations abroad
! foreign policy and economic policy toward those countries and their neighbors.
The status and trends of these strategic weapons are key factors in national and
international debates regarding:
! whether the most dangerous threat or the most likely threat to U.S. security is
NBCW delivered by terrorists, missiles, aircraft, or ships
! whether likely adversaries are acquiring NBC weapons and missiles as deterrence
or as an offensive military capability to use against the United States or its allies
! whether intelligence estimates should be based on the capability of countries and
terrorist groups to acquire and use NBC weapons and missiles or on their
perceived intent to acquire and use them
! whether U.S. intelligence collection and analysis resources are adequate
! whether the United States should emphasize a strategy of deterrence or a strategy
of independent national defense
! the appropriate mix of active defense, passive defense, arms control, and economic
growth through expanded exports.
Resolution of these difficult issues is critical in determining sound U.S. national
security policies. Some analysts conclude that issues that are “too hard” – such as how to
counter biological weapons attacks in the United States by terrorists, or how to prevent
particular countries from acquiring NBCW – are necessarily put on a back burner. Others
contend such threats should be a primary focus of U.S. defense policy. Some argue that
economic interests have overruled security concerns in determining whether to exercise
U.S. political and economic clout to slow the proliferation of NBC weapons and missiles.
Other analysts and policy makers emphasize the view that U.S. economic strength is the
basis for U.S. security and must be protected.
While economic policy has been a large benefactor of the post Cold War period, the
U.S. government has also taken many steps to address NBC weapons.5 Still, most
4See, Nuclear, Biological, Chemical, and Missile Proliferation Sanctions: Current Law,
by Dianne Rennack, CRS Report 98-116 F, updated July 21, 2000.
5See, Proliferation Control Regimes: Background and Status, CRS Report 97-343,
(continued...)

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CRS-3
analysts agree much remains to be done to reduce the WMD threat. In October 1996,
President Clinton described the situation as follows:
...we have worked patiently and pragmatically to reduce the threat of
weapons of mass destruction, to take on the challenge of terrorism, to build an
open trading system for the 21st century, to help secure the gains that peace and
freedom are making around the world. We are making the future more secure
by lifting the danger of weapons of mass destruction.6
Countries that Have or May Soon Acquire NBC
Weapons and Missiles
About twenty-five countries, according to various U.S. government sources, are
suspected of having nuclear, biological, or chemical weapons (NBCW) or of seeking such
weapons. While the government has not listed all the countries with NBCW programs in
unclassified reports, it has identified some of the countries. The media, foreign
governments, and the academic community have identified others. Table 1 lists about two
dozen countries that have, or may have had these weapon programs within the last several
years, based on a combination of sources. While the total number of nuclear, biological,
and chemical weapon countries is in approximate accord with U.S. government totals,
some of the listed countries may not be the same as those referred to by the Secretary of
Defense, Director of Central Intelligence, or other officials in public reports.
The total number has not grown significantly since the end of the Cold War, as a few
countries have abolished their programs and others have acquired weapons. What is
perhaps more significant is which particular countries are actively building NBCW
inventories and their increasing capabilities to deliver these weapons, taking advantage of
widely available missile technology. Also significant is the potential for additional countries,
or possibly terrorist groups, to produce NBC weapons using available technology.
5(...continued)
updated March 30, 2000.
6Clinton, William J. President. Foreign Policy Speech, in Detroit, Michigan, October 22,
1996.

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CRS-4
Figure 1. Nuclear, Biological, and Chemical Weapons and Ballistic Missiles
Nuclear, Biological, and
Chemical Weapons
R ussia
and Ballistic Missiles
C W
U.K.
K C
ICB M BW
K C
SL BM
B el a rus
N eth .
B el .
U kra in e
Kazakhstan
France
K C S LB M
N . Korea
SRB M
B la ck S e a
CW
CW
CW
Turk ey
China
WDP
Ja pan
BW
Serbia
Syri a
S. Korea
A f ghan.
Isr ae l
Pak.
K C
Iraq
CW
BW
ICB M
Iran
CW
Jo rda n
Libya
SR BM
Alger ia
B W India
S RB M
CW
Sa u di
W DP
Egypt
Ara b ia
U .A .E .
Burma
BW
K C
Taiwan BW
CW
M RB M
KC
CW S RB M
B W
Oma n
C W
Eritrea
CW
CW
Sudan
Yem e n
Vietnam
MR BM
Philip pine s
Cambodi a
Thailand
CW
CW SRB M
T urkmen istan
Ethiopia
Sr i Lanka
Tu rkey
Malaysia
CW
C yprus
Syria
Iraq
Israel
Iran
Indonesia
BW
CW
Afga n ista n
C W
KC
B W
S R BM
S RB M
MR B M CW
BW
C W
M RB M
Jordan
WD P B W
LEGEND
P ak.
Egypt
KC = Known Nuclear Capacity
Saudi Arabia
WDP = Nuclear Weapon Development
Qa tar
Program
CW
BW
S R BM
U.A.E.
C W
M RB M
Reported Chemical Weapon Program
Om an
CW
Reported Biological Weapon Program
Sudan
BW
CW
ICBM = Intercontinental Ballistic Missiles
Eritr ea
IRBM = Intermediate Range
Yem en
MR BM = Medium Range

SRBM = Short R ange
Ethiopia
SLBM = Submarine Launched

S o
urce: Information based on public media and defense journals. Map adapted by CRS from Magellan Geographix.
Used with permission. Many other countries have missiles, but no known NW, BW, or CW programs.

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CRS-5
Nuclear Weapon Arsenals and Programs
Five countries have well-established arsenals of nuclear weapons and are considered
nuclear-weapon states under the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT): China, France,
Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States.7
India, Pakistan, Israel, and possibly North Korea are reported to have nuclear
weapons but are not considered nuclear-weapon states under the NPT. India tested a
nuclear device in May 1974 and tested several more in May 1998. Israel is said to have
produced its first atomic weapon in the late 1960s and may now have between 100 and
200 weapons.8 Pakistan responded to India’s 1998 test by testing a number of nuclear
devices in May 1998. North Korea “probably has one, possibly two, nuclear weapons.”9
As part of the Agreed Framework, North Korea has frozen its graphite-moderated
reactors including the plutonium reprocessing plant, and halted the construction of two
other reactors, but already had enough material for one or two weapons. Each of these
countries has aircraft with which they could deliver nuclear weapons; each has missiles that
may now or soon be able to deliver their nuclear weapons. India and Israel may also be
developing ship-based missiles.10
Iran, Iraq, and Libya are reportedly trying to develop nuclear weapons. Iran has a
number of civilian nuclear facilities and reportedly has a covert program to develop nuclear
weapons. Iraq’s nuclear weapon program was stalled by the Gulf War and UN
inspections, but it could probably produce nuclear weapons in a relatively short time if it
is able to import fissile material or the equipment to produce it. Libya’s attempts to
develop nuclear weapons apparently have not made much progress.
Other governments have relinquished their nuclear weapons (Belarus, Kazakhstan,
Ukraine, and South Africa) or have abandoned or forsworn nuclear weapon programs
(Argentina, Brazil, Germany, Japan, South Korea, Sweden, and Taiwan). Nuclear
technology is increasingly available, and nuclear weapon materials and production
equipment may be available on the international black-market or may be transferred from
one state to another. Additional countries may therefore be able to develop nuclear
7For a discussion of U.S. nuclear forces, see U.S. Nuclear Weapons: Policy, Force
Structure, and Arms Control Issues, CRS Report RL30345, by Amy F. Woolf, Oct. 1,
1999.
8 Spector, Leonard S. Nuclear Ambitions. Boulder, Westview Press, 1990, p. 155; Cohen,
Avner. Israel and the Bomb. New York, Columbia University Press, 1998, p. 1;
“Completing the Deterrence Triangle,” Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, Non-
Proliferation Project, v. 3, no. 18, June 29, 2000.
9U.S. National Intelligence Council. Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future
with Nongovernment Experts. NIC 2000-02, December 2000, p. 36.
10For further information see, Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Proliferation in
India and Pakistan, by K. Allan Kronstadt, CRS Report RL30623; Pakistan-U.S.
Relations, by Barbara Ann LePoer, CRS Issue Brief IB94041; Nuclear Nonproliferation
Issues, by Carl Behrens, CRS Issue Brief IB98039.

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CRS-6
weapons if they are able to obtain fissile material. Even terrorist groups may acquire and
use radiological weapons which use a conventional explosive to disperse deadly
radioactive material: in the mid-1990s, Chechen rebels and the Aum Shinrikyo cult tried
to acquire and use radioactive materials as terrorist devices.

Biological Weapon Arsenals and Programs
Almost a dozen countries have offensive BW programs.11 Public information sources
indicate two countries (Iraq and Egypt) are known to have BW, and several countries are
likely to have BW, suspected of having BW, or are seeking BW. In addition, a number
of subnational terrorist groups have reportedly tried to develop or acquire BW. Because
much of the material and equipment used to produce BW has legitimate medical,
agricultural, or industrial purposes, and because BW could possibly be produced covertly
in a relatively small facility, other countries or groups may have undetected BW programs.
However, experts in the field say terrorist groups would have difficulty obtaining sufficient
materials and know-how to grow, handle, store and disperse biological agents to have a
large-scale lethal effect.12 A small volume of biological agent or toxin, if properly
dispersed, could cause massive casualties in an unprotected densely populated area. The
material could be sprayed from an aircraft or drone; from submunitions delivered by
artillery, rockets, cruise or ballistic missiles; or disseminated by terrorists. Each of the
countries that reportedly have offensive BW programs have aircraft, artillery, and missiles.
During the Gulf War, Iraq had BW warheads on some of its short-range missiles but
apparently did not use those weapons.
Chemical Weapon Arsenals and Programs
“At least sixteen states ... currently have active CW programs,” according to a
statement by a CIA official in 1999.13 Unclassified, public sources have named about
countries (including the United States) that were reportedly known or likely to have had
chemical weapons inventories in the late 1990s. Additional countries and a few terrorist
groups were suspected of having or seeking CW.
Under the Chemical Weapons Convention (CWC), which went into effect in 1997,
member countries will have to destroy their stockpiles by 2007. The United States,
Russia, South Korea, and India acknowledged CW inventories, and all but Russia have
begun destroying the CW weapons and materials. Eleven countries also reported facilities
for the production of CW and have pledged to destroy them or convert them to civilian
uses. Other countries may be prevented from acquiring precursor materials needed to
1 1 Lauder, John A. Special Assistant for Nonproliferation to the Director of Central
Intelligence. Unclassified Statement to the Commission to Assess the Organization of the
Federal Government to Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, as
prepared for delivery on 29 April 1999, p. 4.
12Leitenberg, Milton. “An Assessment of the Threat of the Use of Biological Weapons or
Biological Agents,” September 18, 2000, p. 18.
13Ibid.

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CRS-7
produce chemical weapons by export control and monitoring mechanisms. The effect of
the CWC has probably been to reduce the number of parties with chemical weapons and
to reduce the likelihood they will be used. But it is not clear which countries still have CW
programs because the Convention has not been aggressively implemented and there have
been no challenge inspections.14 Several countries that ratified the CWC have probably
terminated their CW programs, but it is suspected that some signatories (such as Iran and
Sudan) and several countries that have not signed the CWC (Egypt, Iraq, Israel, Libya,
North Korea, and Syria) may still be developing or producing CW.
Technology and materials for the production of lethal chemical agents are available
internationally, and production facilities can be concealed, so it is possible that additional
countries and subnational groups may now, or soon, have CW capabilities. In 1995, the
Japanese religious cult Aum Shinrikyo launched attacks in the Tokyo subway with sarin,
a chemical nerve agent. While the number of producers of small quantities of CW could
increase, restrictions established under the CWC will probably limit large-scale production
and stockpiles among CWC states parties.15 The extent to which the worldwide CW
threat decreases or increases in the coming decade depends in part on how effectively the
CWC is implemented.
Chemical agents can be delivered by aircraft, drones, artillery, rocket launchers,
submunitions on cruise or ballistic missiles, dispersion from a chemical reaction or manual
or mechanical release. All but three of the countries that reportedly have had or have
sought chemical weapons also have missiles and other means of delivery. Several
countries reportedly have CW warheads for their missiles.
14Tucker, Jonathan B. “The Chemical Weapons Convention: Has it Enhanced U.S.
Security?” Arms Control Today, April 2001, pp. 8-12.
15Chemical Weapons Convention: Issues for Congress, CRS Issue Brief IB94029, by
Steven Bowman.

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CRS-8
Table 1. The State of Proliferation
Nuclear
Biological
Chemical
Ballistic
Weapons
Weapons
Weapons
Missiles
(Longest
)
Algeria
––a
Research?
Suspected
SRBM
China
Known
Likelyb
Has Had
ICBM
Egypt
––
Known
Likely
SRBM
R&D
Ethiopia
––
––
Likelyc
––
France
Known
Ended
Ended
SLBM
India
Knownd
––
Has Had e
MRBM
Indonesia
––
––
Sought
––
Iran
Seeking
Likely
Has Had f
MRBM
Iraq
Seeking
Known g
Knowng
SRBM
Israel
Knownh
Likely R&D
Likely
MRBM
Kazakhstan
Ended
––
Suspectedi
SRBM
Libya
Seeking
Research
Likely j
MRBM
Myanmar
––
––
Likely
––
North Korea
Likely k
Likely
Known
IRBM
Pakistan
Knownl
–– m
Likely
MRBM
Russia
Known
Suspected n
Known
ICBM
Saudi Arabia
––o
––
Suspected
MRBM
p
South Africa
Ended
Ended
Suspected
Ended
South Korea
Ended
––
Suspected
SRBM
Sudan
––
q
Suspected r
––
Syria
––
Seeking
Known
SRBM
Taiwan
Ended
Suspected s
Likely
SRBM
Thailand
––
––
Suspected
––
United Kingdom
Known
Ended
Ended
SLBM
United States
Known
Ended
Known
ICBM
Vietnam
––
––
Likely
SRBM
Yugoslavia (Serbia & Montenegro)
––
––
Known t
Suspected

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CRS-9
Terms Used In Table 1
! Missiles: The table indicates the range group of the longest range ballistic missile
in the possession of each country that also has nuclear, chemical, or biological
weapons. India, Iran, North Korea, and Pakistan are developing, but do not yet
possess, longer range ballistic missiles.
SRBM: Short Range Ballistic Missile, <1000 km (620 mi.)
MRBM: Medium Range Ballistic Missile, 1001-3000 km (621-1860 mi.)
IRBM:
Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile, 3001-5500 km (1861-3410mi.)
ICBM: Intercontinental Ballistic Missile, >5500 km (3410 mi.)
SLBM: Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile
Sources: Primary sources used in the production of the table were:
Proliferation Threat and Response. Office of the Secretary of Defense: April 1996, and
November 1997.
The Arms Control Reporter. Institute for Defense and Disarmament Studies.
Adherence To and Compliance With Arms Control Agreements. Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency: 1996 Annual Report.
The Nonproliferation Review. Center for Nonproliferation Studies at the Monterey Institute of
International Studies, various issues.
Report of the Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States, Executive
Summary, July 15, 1998.
Table 1 Notes
a A few indicators suggest a possible military use of Algeria’s 15 MWt Es Salam reactor at Ain
Oussera, and evoked suspicion that Algeria is developing nuclear weapons. Rodney W. Jones, Mark
G. McDonough with Toby Dalton and Gregory Koblentz, Tracking Nuclear Proliferation, Carnegie
Endowment for International Peace, 1998, p.163.
b ACDA reported in 1996 that China previously had a biological weapon (BW) program and that it was
highly probable that China remained noncompliant with obligations under the BW Convention.
Adherence to and Compliance With Arms Control Agreements , Arms Control and Disarmament
Agency, 1996. U.S. Department of Defense, Proliferation: Threat and Response, 1997 stated, “China
likely has maintained the offensive biological warfare program it is believed to have had before
acceding to the BWC.”
c Ethiopia was termed a “probable” chemical weapons possessor by Rear Admiral Thomas Brooks,
Director of Naval Intelligence, statement before the House Committee on Armed Services,
Subcommittee on Sea Power, Strategic and Critical Materials, March 7, 1991, p.107.
d India detonated a nuclear device in 1974 and several more in 1998.
e When it became a state party to the Chemical Weapons Convention, India admitted that it had
produced a chemical weapons stockpile, but has since hosted all required CWC inspections. It retains
the capability to produce CW. Proliferation: Threat and Response, January 2001, p. 25.
f Iran used chemical weapons in 1987 during the Iran-Iraq War and also supplied Libya with chemical
weapons which were later used in Chad. Proliferation: Threat and Response, 1996, pp. 15-16. “It is

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CRS-10
also believed to be conducting research on nerve agents.” Proliferation: Threat and Response,
January 2001, p. 36
g Iraq claims its CW and BW stockpiles have been destroyed, but UN inspection officials suspect
small stockpiles, possibly including missile warheads, remain. Iraq used CW against Iran and against
its own Kurdish population in the 1980s.
h Although press reports and the academic community generally report that Israel has nuclear
weapons, many of which could be deployed with its missile force, neither the Israeli nor U.S.
government has officially acknowledged their existence.
i Kazakhstan reportedly retained some Soviet-era CW stockpiles.
j Libya used Iranian supplied chemical weapons in Chad, and according to Proliferation: Threat and
Response, 1996, Libya has begun domestic production of chemical weapons.
k It is believed that North Korea has produced enough weapons grade material for at least one nuclear
weapon and may have produced a nuclear weapon. Estimates as to the potential number of weapons
it could produce vary: State Department estimates 2; CIA estimates 1-2; Russian Defense Ministry
estimates 2-3. Former Secretary of Defense Perry has stated that if North Korea has achieved greater
technological capabilities than is currently believed, they “could make five bombs out of the amount
of plutonium we estimate they have.” Niksch, Larry, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program, C R S
Issue Brief IB91141, pp. 3-5. The National Intelligence Council reported, “P’yongyang probably has
one, possibly two, nuclear Weapons.” Global Trends 2015, December 2000, p. 36.
l Pakistan detonated several nuclear devices in May 1998.
m “Pakistan is beleived to have the resources and capabilities to support a limited biological warfare
research and development effort,” according to DoD’s Proliferation: Threat and Response, Ja n u a r y
2001, p. 28.
n Russia has acknowledged it had a clandestine BW program and claims to have stopped production.
However, the U.S. is not assured that Russia is in compliance with the Biological Weapons
Convention.
o Saudi Arabia has reportedly shown interest in funding the Pakistani nuclear programs and may be
seeking to acquire a nuclear capacity. See: Shahram Chubin, “Eliminating Weapons of Mass
Destruction: The Persian Gulf Case,” The Henry L. Stimson Center, March 1997, p. 20; “Saudi Arabia:
Weapons of Mass Destruction Capabilities and Programs,” Center for Nonproliferation Studies,
Monterey Institute of International Studies; New York Times, July 10, 1999; Reuters, August 3, 1999;
New York Times, August 7, 1994.
p There are unconfirmed reports that Saudi Arabia may have developed chemical warheads for its CSS-
2 missiles. NBC Capabilities, Saudi Arabia, Jane’s NBC Defense Systems 1998-1999. Also, Defense
and Foreign Affairs Weekly, April 1991, reports Chinese assistance to Saudi Arabia in developing
chemical warheads. Also, in the Arms Control Reporter as of March 13, 1991 and May 1992, 704.E-
0.10.
q CIA stated that: “Given its history of developing chemical weapons and its close relationship with
Iraq, Sudan may be interested in a Biological weapons program as well”. Director of Central
Intelligence, Report to Congress on the Acquisitions of Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Advanced Conventional Munitions, July 1999.
r The same DCI Report to Congress states that, “Sudan has been developing the capability to produce
chemical weapons for many years [and] has obtained help from many countries including Iraq.”
s According to the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, Taiwan has been upgrading its
biotechnology capabilities, but the “evidence indicating a BW program is not sufficient to determine

---

CRS-11
if Taiwan is engaged in activities prohibited by the BWC . ” A C D A , Adherence to and Compliance
with Arms Control Agreements: 1997, Annual Report to Congress.
t Pentagon officials believe that the Yugoslav army has stocks of lethal and non lethal chemical
weapons. Judith Miller, “U.S. Officials Suspect Deadly Chemical Weapons in Yugoslav Army
Arsenal,” New York Times, April 16, 1999. William Potter of the Monterey Institute said Yugoslavia
has the capability to produce nuclear Weapons. European Stars and Stripes, May 29, 2000, p. 2.
Missile Arsenals and Programs
Nearly all countries that reportedly have or are seeking nuclear, biological, or
chemical weapons also have ballistic missiles – four do not16. About 15 other countries
have ballistic missile programs but no known NBCW capability.17 The five established
nuclear powers – China, France, Russia, the United Kingdom, and the United States – and
possibly North Korea18 have intercontinental ballistic missiles or submarine launched
ballistic missiles. In the late 1980s, Saudi Arabia bought medium range ballistic missiles
(MRBMs, 1000-3000 km) from China. Israel, India, Pakistan, and Iran have MRBMs
and are probably working to develop intermediate range ballistic missiles (IRBMs, 3000-
5500 km) and, perhaps eventually intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs, >5500 km).19
Libya reportedly bought Nodong MRBMs from North Korea.20 At least 25 other
16The ballistic missiles referred to in this paper are guided during a portion of their ascent,
then follow a ballistic (unguided and unpowered) trajectory over the remainder of the flight.
Cruise missiles are continually powered by an air-breathing or rocket engine and are
generally guided for their entire flight. Excluded are all air-to-air, surface-to-air, antitank,
anti-ship, and air-to-surface missiles, unguided artillery rockets, and satellite launch vehicles.
17Countries with ballistic missiles but no known NBCW are: Afghanistan, Argentina,
Armenia, Belarus, Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Greece, Netherlands, Romania, Slovakia,
Turkey, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, and Yemen. For further discussion
of the missiles held by each country, see Missile Survey: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles of
Foreign Countries, by Robert Shuey, CRS Report RL30427.
18North Korea test fired a Taep’o-dong 1 with a third stage that failed. If North Korea can
make the third stage function properly, and if it has a reentry vehicle to protect a warhead,
it might be able to deliver a small payload to ICBM range. According to the September 1999
intelligence estimate on missile threats, North Korea may also have developed and have
ready to test the Taep’o-dong 2 ICBM, which, with a third stage, could deliver a large
warhead to most areas of the United States. With two stages it could deliver a large
warhead to points in Hawaii and Alaska.
19Israel produces the Jericho 1 SRBM and Jericho 2 MRBM and is developing the Jericho
3 which various reports describe as an IRBM or an ICBM. Israel also produces space
launch vehicles that could be converted to ballistic missiles, possibly ICBMs. India has
developed and tested the Agni MRBM and space launch vehicles. Pakistan’s Ghauri and
Iran’s Shahab 3 are both MRBMs based on North Korea’s Nodong. Both those countries
are developing longer range missiles. See Missile Survey, CRS Report RL30427.
20Testimony by CIA Director George Tenet before the Senate Select Committee on
Intelligence, February 7, 2001, tended to confirm press reports that Libya acquired Nodong
missiles form North Korea: “You have to worry about what the North Koreans are going to
(continued...)

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CRS-12
countries have short range ballistic missiles (SRBMs, <1000 km). For the last five years,
North Korea has been the primary exporter of missiles and missile technology, but firms
in Russia and China continue to help foreign programs. Organizations in those two
countries have recently supplied material, components, and technical assistance to Iran,
India, Libya, Pakistan, Syria, and even North Korea.21
Trends Regarding NBC Weapons and Missiles
The ebb and flow of nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons technology around
the globe and the rise and fall of aggressive governments have varied the overall risk that
some country or group will attack another with weapons of mass destruction. The risk is
increasing in some regions while decreasing in others. Despite several encouraging
developments, nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons and missiles continue to pose
severe threats to many populations. NBCW are the greatest threat to U.S. national
security, and it is likely that more countries and groups will be able to threaten the United
States and its allies with these weapons in the coming decades.
Positive Developments
! The demise of the Soviet Union has greatly decreased the likelihood of a world
conflagration in a massive exchange of nuclear weapons and diminished the chance
of massive biological or chemical attacks.
! The reduction of weapons under the START process , continuing unilateral
reductions, and improved safeguarding of nuclear weapons and materials continue
to decrease the likelihood of nuclear war in Europe and North America, an
accidental launching, and the proliferation of nuclear weapons.
! The Chemical Weapons Convention has entered into force and decreased the
likelihood of large-scale CW production and use.
! The Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty has been signed by many countries and may
reduce the likelihood that some additional countries will develop, test, and deploy
nuclear weapons.22
20(...continued)
do and who they proliferate (sic). ... Everybody has a medium-range ballistic missile
capability. Libyans have one, the Iranians have one – everybody wants to acquire that
capability.”
21Central Intelligence Agency, Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition of
Technology Relating to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Weapons, 1 July through 31 December 1999; and “Russia Sells Missile Technology to
North Korea,” Washington Times, June 30, 2000.
22See, Nuclear Weapons: Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty, by Jonathan Medalia, CRS
(continued...)

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CRS-13
! Members of the Biological Weapons Convention are trying to create a workable
verification protocol.
! China acceded to the NPT, stopped nuclear tests, signed the CTBT, and pledged
to improve its record on nonproliferation.
! North Korea has agreed to stop producing fissile material and suspend missile
tests, and has offered to abandon ICBM development in exchange for satellite
launch services.
! President Putin signed the law on ratification of START II, with certain
conditions.23
! The Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty has been extended and the 2000 review
conference did not derail the global consensus to hold fast nonproliferation goals.
! The settlement between Israel and Egypt and the political moderation that is
apparently occurring in Iran are reducing some of the tensions that could lead to an
NBCW exchange in the region.
! The risk of NBCW warfare in Southeast Asia has been diminished with the end
of the Vietnam war and Cambodian civil strife.
! While the risk of NBCW war on the Korean peninsula remains a serious concern,
it has probably peaked and may be further reduced in the coming years through
ongoing diplomacy.
! The risk of NBC warfare in South America was reduced by the decisions of
Argentina and Brazil to abandon nuclear weapons programs and the development
of advanced missiles.
The perceived need for NBCW could be further reduced by a Middle East peace
agreement, political moderation of Iran, continued containment of Iraq, reconciliation on
the Korean peninsula, resolution of issues between India and Pakistan and between China
and Taiwan.
22(...continued)
Issue Brief IB92009.
23Approved on April 18, 2000, the Russian ratification law allows for withdrawal from the
treaty if the U.S. abrogates the ABM Treaty or deploys nuclear weapons in new NATO
countries. It also makes START II entry into force conditional on U.S. acceptance of the
1997 U.S.-Russian agreements on the ABM Treaty. See Nuclear Arms Control: the U.S.-
Russian Agenda, by Amy Woolf, CRS Issue Brief IB98030.

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CRS-14
Table 2. International Commitments
Country
NPT
CWC
BWC
CTBT
N S G
MTCR
IAEA
Algeria
A
R
–
S
–
–
P
China
A
R
A
S
–
Pledged
P
Egypt
R
–
S
S
–
–
P
Ethiopia
R
R
R
S
–
–
P
France
A
R
A
R
P
P
P
India
–
R
R
–
–
–
Partial
Indonesia
R
R
R
S
–
–
P
Iran
R
R
R
S
–
–
P
Iraq
R
–
R
–
–
–
P
Israel
–
S
–
S
–
Adherent
Partial
Kazakhstan
A
S
–
S
–
–
P
Libya
R
–
A
–
–
–
P
Myanmar
A
S
S
S
–
–
P
(Burma)
North Korea
A
–
A
–
–
–
P
Pakistan
–
R
R
–
–
–
Partial
Russia
R
R
R
R
P
P
P
Saudi Arabia
A
R
R
–
–
–
–
South Africa
A
R
R
R
P
P
P
South Korea
R
–
R
R
P
P
P
Sudan
R
A
–
–
–
–
P
Syria
R
–
S
–
–
–
P
Taiwan
R
–
R
–
–
–
Thailand
A
S
R
S
–
–
P
United Kingdom
R
R
R
R
P
P
P
United States
R
R
R
S
P
P
P
Vietnam
A
R
A
S
–
–
P
Yugoslavia
R
A
R
S
–
–
P
(Serbia &
Montenegro)

---

CRS-15
Abbreviations
NPT - Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty
CWC - Chemical Weapons Convention
BWC - Biological Weapons Convention
CTBT - Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty
NSG - Nuclear Suppliers Group
MTCR - Missile Technology Control Regime
IAEA - Safeguards Agreement with the International Atomic Energy Agency
A - Acceded
P - Participant
R - Ratified
S - Signed
Pledged - Unilaterally agreed not to export missiles that meet MTCR thresholds
Adherent- Entered an international agreement with the U.S. to abide by MTCR
Sources for Table 2:
U.S. Arms Control & Disarmament Agency [http://www.acda.gov]
International Atomic Energy Agency [http://www.iaea.or.at]
“Inventory of International Nonproliferation Organizations and Regimes,” Center for
Nonproliferation Studies, Monterey Institute of International Studies:
[http://cns.miis.edu/pubs/reports/pdfs/9707inve.pdf]
Negative Developments
Several countries continue to acquire NBC weapons and missiles, increase the number
of weapons in their inventories, enhance the capabilities of their weapons, and establish
doctrine for the operational use of strategic weapons, largely offsetting positive
developments cited above.
! Russia continues to maintain thousands of nuclear weapons and has military doctrine
that calls for the use of nuclear weapons to assure victory on the battlefield. Russia
has large stockpiles of nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons material. Several
Russian organizations have provided missile technology to Iran, North Korea, and
other potentially hostile countries.24
! China is expanding and modernizing its nuclear missile force though its size is not
expected to approach that of the United States or Russia. China maintains CW and
possibly BW stocks and provides missile technology to Iran, Pakistan, North Korea,
24Nuclear Weapons in Russia: Safety, Security, and Control Issues, by Amy Woolf, CRS
Issue Brief IB98038.

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CRS-16
and perhaps other countries. China’s vertical and horizontal proliferation increase the
risk of NBC or missile warfare. The threatening posture of the People’s Republic of
China toward Taiwan is a particular source of tension.25
! South Asia is frequently called the most likely location for nuclear war. India and
Pakistan each tested nuclear devices in 1998, both are building medium range
missiles, both probably have chemical weapons. Despite international pressures, the
parties have not begun to negotiate a settlement of the Kashmir conflict.26
! Iran is reportedly trying to develop nuclear weapons, and is thought to have chemical
and biological weapons as well as medium range missiles.27
! Iraq was reportedly close to building a nuclear weapon before the Gulf War, and
had CW, BW, and missiles. It has used CW against Iran and Iraqi Kurds and fired
missiles at coalition forces in Saudi Arabia and at Israeli cities. Since it has denied
access to UN weapons inspectors, U.S. military officials suspect Iraq has resumed
its NBC+M programs.
! Syria, Libya, Egypt, and Israel probably have CW and missile programs and may
have BW programs; Israel reportedly has numerous nuclear weapons.
! North Korea remains unpredictable, has frequently been belligerent, and is armed
with CW, BW, missiles, and probably nuclear weapons.28
! Terrorists are apparently interested in, and probably capable of acquiring chemical
weapons and possibly biological and radioactive weapons.
25See China: Ballistic and Cruise Missiles, CRS Report 97-391 F, by Shirley A. Kan,
updated June 20, 2000; Chinese Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction: Current
Issues. CRS Issue Brief IB92056 by Shirley A. Kan.
2 6 See Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile Proliferation in India and Pakistan:
Issues for Congress, CRS Report RL30623, by K. Alan Kronstadt, July 31, 2000.
27See Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, CRS Report RL30408, January
14, 2000; Iran: Arms and Technology Acquisitions, by Kenneth Katzman, CRS Report
RL30551; Iran: Current Developments and U.S. Policy, by Kenneth Katzman, CRS Issue
Brief IB93033.
28National Intelligence Council, Global Trends 2015, p. 36. South Korea’s Defense White
Paper issued in December 2000 found no change in the North Korean military threat. See
also, North Korea’s Nuclear Weapons Program, by Larry Niksch, CRS Issue Brief
IB91141.

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CRS-17
Contributing Factors
A number of factors have been cited that could prompt the spread of dangerous
technology to additional countries and groups and might increase the likelihood that
NBCW+M will be used:
! Technological developments (NBCW, computer, and production technology)
! Increased availability of information
! Increased ability to travel
! Increased ability to trade in open markets
! Growing disparities in conventional military capabilities
! Growing disparities in strategic defenses
! Continuing prestige of nuclear power
! Growing prestige of missile capabilities
! Perceived utility of NBCW threats to deter U.S. intervention, and
! Indications of disdain by major powers for certain arms control agreements and
international cooperation on nonproliferation.
As mentioned, the reduction of global and regional tension helps reduce the perceived
need for mass destruction weapons. Economic and political integration are also thought to
reduce proliferation. The strong and credible U.S. deterrent capability might weaken the
likelihood that some hostile countries will acquire or use NBCW. Analysts debate whether
U.S. development of a National Missile Defense system will further deter the proliferation
and use of NBCW+M or will incite further proliferation.
Trends in Nuclear Weapons
The total number of nuclear warheads in the world has decreased and will probably
continue to decrease over the next few decades as the United States and Russia reduce their
stockpiles. The nuclear inventories of China, India, and Pakistan are small, but all will
probably be expanded. There is no indication the alleged nuclear arsenal of Israel will
significantly increase or decrease in the near future.
However, the number of nations with nuclear weapons has increased, with the addition
of India, Pakistan and probably North Korea, and may increase further if Iran, Iraq, Libya,
and other countries are not dissuaded from acquiring sensitive materials and technology and
building nuclear devices and delivery systems. Jayantha Dhanapala, Under Secretary
General for Disarmament Affairs at the United Nations, described nuclear proliferation as
“the gravest threat to international peace and security of our time—the gravest threat, indeed,
to the future of humankind.”29
2 9 Dhanapala, Jayantha. “The NPT at a Crossroads,” The Nonproliferation Review, Spring
2000, p. 138.

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CRS-18
Director of Defense Intelligence Vice Admiral Thomas R. Wilson predicted:
We will continue to face strategic nuclear threats – from Russia and China,
and eventually from North Korea and other ‘rogue’ states. While the total number
of warheads targeted against us will be much lower than during the Cold War, the
mix of threat nations, force structures, capabilities, and employment doctrines will
complicate the strategic threat picture. ...
Several rogue states will likely acquire nuclear weapons during the next
decade or so, and some existing nuclear states will undoubtedly increase their
inventories. As these trends unfold, the prospects for limited nuclear weapons use
in a regional conflict will rise. So too will the potential for a terrorist or some other
subnational group to acquire and use a weapon.30
Even though Russia will probably continue to reduce its strategic forces below START
II levels because of financial constraints, it is widely predicted Russia will maintain the ability
for the foreseeable future to strike the United States with hundreds of warheads given the size
of the existing arsenal and the priority Russia continues to give its strategic forces. Russia’s
strategic forces are designed to deter nuclear and conventional aggression, but Russia “is
prepared to conduct limited nuclear strikes” to repel an enemy or change the course of
battle. However, it is deemed unlikely that Russia will launch an accidental or unauthorized
nuclear attack against the United States.31
China is improving its strategic nuclear force with planned deployments of new mobile
ICBMs, possibly with multiple reentry vehicles carrying nuclear warheads, and upgraded
command, control, and communications. Its small strategic deterrent force will improve
significantly in numbers (to several tens of missiles), accuracy, reliability, and survivability in
the next 20 years.32 According to a recent DoD report, China is concentrating on building
its political, diplomatic, and economic power for achieving its national goals and considers
its nuclear weapons primarily a deterrent. But, “If a third party were to intervene militarily
in a regional conflict involving China, the PLA would employ all means necessary in the hope
of inflicting high casualties and weakening the intervening party’s resolve.”33 The National
Intelligence Council judges “an unauthorized launch of a Chinese strategic missile is highly
unlikely.”34 China is also expanding and modernizing its tactical missile forces and is
attempting to intimidate Taiwan with SRBMs, likely armed with conventional warheads
although they are capable of delivering NBCW.
Director of Central Intelligence George Tenet noted India and Pakistan have intensified
their nuclear rivalry with tests of nuclear weapons and MRBMs in 1998, and both have
30Wilson, pp. 6, 10.
31U.S. National Intelligence Council. “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile
Threat to the United States,” September 1999, pp. 8 and 9; Wilson, p. 13.
32Wilson, p. 14.
33U.S. Department of Defense. “Annual Report on the Military Power of the People’s
Republic of China,” June 22, 2000, pp. 2 and 7.
34U.S. National Intelligence Council, p. 9.

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CRS-19
begun to establish doctrine, tactics, and contingency plans for the use of nuclear weapons.
In his view, in the spring 1999, “the two countries narrowly averted a full-scale war in
Kashmir, which could have escalated to the nuclear level.”35 While the nuclear competition
between India and Pakistan is dangerous, most analysts conclude India’s quest for nuclear
weapons is driven primarily by its desire for the status of a major power and by its regional
competition with China.
North Korea, Iran, Iraq, and Libya are developing, or trying to develop, NBCW and
longer-range missiles to deter U.S. intervention and to intimidate their neighbors. Some
analysts doubt these countries would overtly attack the United States with NBCW because
of the U.S. ability to conduct an overwhelming counterattack. But others contend NBCW
capabilities in these countries could limit U.S. military options to defend its interests out of
concern that the adversary might inflict massive casualties on U.S. forces or allies.
The United States government works hard to decrease the risk of NBCW war, the
spread of NBCW+M, and the U.S. vulnerability to the weapons. U.S. leadership has been
critical for the Non-Proliferation Treaty, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the
Nuclear Suppliers Group, Zangger Committee, the Fissile Material Production ban,
strengthening the Biological Weapons Convention, the Chemical Weapons Convention,
Australia Group, Missile Technology Control Regime, Wassenaar Arrangement, START I,
II, and III, North Korea Agreed Framework, and bilateral efforts with numerous countries
to discourage the spread of weapons technology and the acquisition, deployment, or use of
NBCW+M. But various constituencies have criticized some recent U.S. actions as
stimulating NBCW+M proliferation: policies such as the development of a national missile
defense; threats to abrogate the Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; discussions of regional missile
defense systems in Asia and the Middle East; refusal to consent to ratification of the
Comprehensive Test Ban Treaty; and perceived elevation of economic goals above
nonproliferation goals; although proponents strongly defend their actions as being in the best
national interest.
Proponents of missile defense also argue the defensive posture is less threatening that
the strategy of nuclear deterrence and vulnerability (mutual assured destruction) that ruled
the Cold War.
Risks of Nuclear Conflict
It is possible that as more countries acquire nuclear weapons or expand their nuclear
arsenals, the likelihood they will use nuclear weapons will increase. The acquisition of
nuclear weapons by countries with inadequate command and control systems, vague
strategic doctrine (or aggressive operational doctrine), and poor intelligence on enemy
capabilities and intentions could particularly increase the risk of nuclear warfare. The official
U.S. assessment: “The probability that a missile with a weapon of mass destruction would
be used against US forces or interests is higher today than during most of the Cold War,
35Tenet, George. Director of Central Intelligence. “The Worldwide Threat in 2000: Global
Realities of Our National Security,” Testimony before the Senate Select Committee n
Intelligence, February 2, 2000, pp. 3, 5, and 37.

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CRS-20
and will continue to grow.”36 But several European and Canadian defense experts have
expressed the view that the threat of nuclear war has diminished substantially over the past
decade and their feeling of safety has increased.37
The nuclear arsenals of China, India, and Pakistan are now considered primarily to be
deterrent forces. The CIA estimates “Countries with emerging ICBM capabilities are likely
to view their relatively few ICBMs more as weapons of deterrence than as weapons of war,
recognizing that their use could bring devastating consequences.”38
But some analysts are concerned these countries, like Russia, may be adopting doctrine
calling for the tactical use of nuclear weapons under dire circumstances in regional conflicts.
Others worry that the very existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of antagonist
countries raises the probability of nuclear war through miscalculation or desperation, if not
in response to national doctrine. Other analysts contend the possession of nuclear weapons
by one country in a conflict is likely to deter other countries from using their own nuclear
weapons or, generally, attempting to conquer the nuclear-armed country.39
The following chart is a notional representation of the likelihood of nuclear conflict
occurring somewhere in the world.
36Walpole, Robert. National Intelligence Officer for Strategic and Nuclear Programs.
Testimony before the Senate Governmental Affairs Committee, Subcommittee on
International Security, Proliferation, and Federal Services, September 21, 2000. (His
emphasis.)
37 The Ottawa Citizen, August 25, 2000, cited in the Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
External Affairs Digest, August 31, 2000; Carnegie Endowment for International Peace,
“Why U.S. Allies Do Not See a Missile Threat,” September 21, 2000.
38National Intelligence Council, Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile
Threat to the United States Through 2015, September 1999, p. 7.
39For further discussion of deterrence, see Nuclear Weapons and Ballistic Missile
Proliferation in India and Pakistan, by K. Alan Krondstadt, CRS Report RL30623; and
“Israel’s Nuclear History,” Jane’s Intelligence Review, July 2000, p. 14.

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CRS-21
Figure 2. Worldwide Risks of a Nuclear Attack From Any Source,
Late 1940s-2000
Hig h Risks
Low Risks
1950
1960
1970
1980
1990
2000
This graphic is based on analysis of nuclear risks associated with particular historical situations and
relationalships between principal a natagonists.
The levels of probability are based on factors such as:
! the existence of nuclear weapons and delivery systems in various countries
! information on the readiness of those weapons for use (weaponization, deployment,
alert status)
! evidence indicating that the conditions for using nuclear weapons in a country’s
strategy and doctrine were close to being met
! the level of conflict between a nuclear-armed state and its adversary(ies)
! the perceived level of threat to the viability of the nuclear-armed state and
! the level of frustration with a long confrontation that was inflicting heavy casualties,
draining national resources and patience, and challenging the leader’s credibility, even
if not threatening national integrity.
The probability that a future nuclear war is more likely to occur in Asia or the Middle
East may assuage the concerns of Europeans who lived under the threat of a Soviet attack
for decades. Also the fact that a future nuclear attack may consist of a small number of
detonations rather than a catastrophic exchange of hundreds or thousands of nuclear
warheads may lead some to feel the threat is reduced. Here we are considering the
probability of a nuclear attack regardless of scale and regardless of location.

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CRS-22
According to most national security analysts, high risks of nuclear warfare climbed in
the early 1950s and probably peaked during the Cuban Missile Crisis. Tensions remained
relatively high through the 1960s, leading to a high risk Sino-Soviet confrontation in 1969.
A series of event in the early 1980s raised the risks of US-USSR nuclear warfare, but that
risk declined steadily beginning the late 1980s. In the 1990s, new risks emerged in the
Middle East, South Asia, and on the Korean Peninsula. The clash in Kargil was probably
the greatest risk of nuclear war since the end of the Cold War. Some key events related to
nuclear risk are listed below:
1945 USSR Subjugates Poland
1948 USSR Completes Subjugation of East Europe
1949 USSR Atomic test
1950-53 Korean War
1953 Russia tests H-Bomb
1954- 55 Formosa Strait Crisis
1956 Mid-East War, Hungary Uprising,
1961 Berlin
1962 Cuban Missile Crisis
1963 Berlin
1964 China Atomic Test
1968 Prague Spring, VN Tet Offensive, USS Pueblo Seized
1969 Height of Sino-Soviet confrontation – Border Clash
1973 Mid-East War
1974 Indian Atomic Test
1977 USSR begins deploying SS-20 intermediate-range missiles
1979 USSR-Afghan War, US and USSR military buildups
1981 Martial law imposed on Poland
1983 Heightened Cold War tension; peaceful coexistence doubted by Andropov and
Reagan; USSR shoots down KAL007;U.S. deploys Pershing 2 intermediate-range
missiles in Europe
1985-86 Gorbachev ascendancy, revision of Soviet military doctrine
1989 Berlin Wall torn down
1990 Germany reunified
1991 Threats of CW attacks during the Gulf War Soviet Union dissolved; U.S. &
Soviet nuclear weapons reductions
1993 North Korean nuclear diversion discovered; U.S. and Russia sign START II
1994 Agreed Framework on North Korea signed
1995 Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty extended indefinitely
1998 India and Pakistan test nuclear devices; North Korea, Pakistan, India, and Iran
test missiles
1999 Kargil clash, India and Pakistan alert forces
2000 Kashmir conflict continues; North Korea talks with South Korea
Trends in Biological and Chemical Weapons
The entry into force of the Chemical Weapons Convention and establishment of the
Organization for the Prevention of Chemical Weapons have had positive effects in reducing

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CRS-23
international transfers of weapons materials and equipment and in bringing about the
destruction of CW stocks. Several countries that were thought to have CW have joined the
Convention and accepted the requirement to destroy their CW stockpiles. The probability
of large-scale CW attack will probably decline as these stocks are destroyed, especially if
restrictions on CW development and trade are enforced. And yet chemical weapons remain
in the arsenals of some aggressive countries and possibly some terrorist groups and trade in
CW ingredients continues.

The negotiating members of the Biological Weapons Convention developed a draft
protocol to establish measures to verify the legitimate activities of biotechnology plants
around the world. But the United States found the safeguards insufficient and too intrusive.
The covert development of biological weapons, especially in non-member states, remains
hard to detect; the use of BW is hard to defend against; and a BW attack could cause
enormous casualties or destruction of crops. International trade in BW material, equipment,
and technology remains a concern. In the coming decades, as biotechnology makes further
advances and international flows of information, people, and goods continue to grow, the
threat of BW warfare may also increase.
Director of Defense Intelligence, Vice Admiral Wilson noted biological and chemical
weapons are relatively easy to develop, hide, and deploy and said, “I expect these weapons
to be widely proliferated, and they could be used in a regional conflict over the next 15 years.
I am also concerned that sub-national groups or individuals will use chemical or biological
agents in a terrorist or insurgent operation.”40 The General Accounting Office criticized the
Administration for not having developed a comprehensive assessment of the domestic and
international threat of CW and BW attacks by terrorists. They reported that, even without
sophisticated knowledge or dissemination methods, terrorists could attack with toxic
industrial chemicals such as chlorine. But, GAO judged,
terrorists would need a relatively high sophistication to successfully cause mass
casualties with some other chemical and most biological agents. Specialized
knowledge would be needed to acquire the right biological agent or precursor
chemicals, process the chemical or biological agent, improvise a weapon or device,
and effectively disseminate the agent to cause mass casualties.41
As Jonathan Tucker noted, the fact that large cities are quite vulnerable to terrorist CW and
BW attacks does not demonstrate an existing threat from such terrorist attacks.42
40Wilson, p. 10.
41U.S. General Accounting Office. Combating Terrorism: Need for Comprehensive
Threat and Risk Assessments of Chemical and Biological Attacks, GAO/NSIAD-99-163,
September 1999, pp. 2-3.
42Tucker, Jonathan B. Toxic Terror: Assessing Terrorist Use of Chemical and Biological
Weapons. Monterey Institute of International Studies. Cambridge, Massachusetts, MIT
Press, 2000, p. 1.

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CRS-24
The Central Intelligence Agency has identified several dangerous trends:43
! Developments in biotechnology, including genetic engineering, may produce a wide
variety of live agents and toxins that are difficult to detect and counter; and new CW
agents and mixtures of CW and BW agents are being developed.
! Some countries, such as Iran, are building self-sufficiency in the production of CW
and BW agents, producing more of the necessary equipment and materials so they
do not have to depend on imports.
! Countries are using the natural overlap between weapons programs and civilian
applications of chemical and biological materials to conceal CW and BW production.
! Countries with CW and BW capabilities are acquiring sophisticated delivery systems
including cruise and ballistic missiles.
! Scientists with experience in CW and BW production continue to leave countries of
the former Soviet Union.
! Controlling exports of dual-use technology is ever more difficult.
! About one dozen terrorist groups have sought CW, BW, and nuclear material or
expressed interest in them; a number of the countries with CW and BW capabilities
have sponsored terrorists.
Trends in Missiles
There are conflicting trends in the area of missile threats to the United States and U.S.
interests – several developments tend to alleviate concern but several others cause concern.
Beneficial developments include the following:
! Russia is down to about 1000 strategic missiles with 4,500 warheads – far less than
half the earlier Soviet arsenal and well ahead of scheduled reductions under START
I. Russia has ratified START II, with certain conditions, and has begun preliminary
discussion on further reductions. Belarus, Kazakhstan, and Ukraine have eliminated
their strategic missiles and nuclear weapons. The intelligence community estimates
Russia will retain a formidable strategic force but will reduce its size below arms
control limits primarily for financial reasons.44
43Lauder, John A. Special Assistant for Nonproliferation. Worldwide WMD Threat,
presentation to the Commission to Assess the Organization of the Federal Government to
Combat the Proliferation of Weapons of Mass Destruction, April 29, 1999, pp. 4 and 5.
44National Intelligence Council, p. 9.

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! The MTCR has added many new partners, growing from 7 in 1987 to 332 by 2001,
but China has still not pursued participation.
! In September 1999, North Korea agreed to suspend long range missile tests while
it is engaged with the United States in talks on improving relations. In response to
policy recommendations of former Secretary of Defense Perry, the Clinton
administration offered North Korea political and economic concessions and a pledge
not to use U.S. missiles against North Korea. In July 2000, Kim Jong-Il suggested
an offer to the visiting Russian President Vladimir Putin that North Korea would
abandon its long-range missile program in exchange for international assistance in
launching North Korean satellites.45 North Korean officials later confirmed the offer
in writing, and still later said it was a joke. North Korea’s intentions on this issue
remain unclear.
! The United States signed a memorandum of understanding with Israel strengthening
the U.S. commitment to help against WMD and long range missile attacks, to
enhance Israeli defensive and deterrent capabilities, and to upgrade bilateral military
and technological cooperation.
! The United States successfully tested its National Missile Defense, Theater High
Altitude Area Defense, and Patriot PAC-3 although it also had several unsuccessful
tests. Israel and Taiwan also tested theater missile defense systems.
Several other developments in the area of missile proliferation were more ominous:
! In August 1998, North Korea tested a three-stage space launch vehicle/missile that
demonstrated the potential to deliver a small warhead over 5,000 km. North Korea
is building underground missile facilities near the borders with South Korea and with
China.
! North Korea exported missiles and production technology for Scud-variants,
including the Nodong, a single-stage MRBM. Recipients of its missile technology
included Iran, Pakistan, Egypt, Syria, Vietnam, and Libya. Iran and Pakistan each
tested MRBMs reportedly based on the Nodong and both are developing longer
range missiles.
! In April 1999, South Korea tested a missile believed to be capable of traveling 300
km or more. The United States and South Korea replaced their 1972 agreement that
Seoul would not build missiles with a range greater than 180 km. Under the new
agreement, South Korea to build missiles up to the MTCR threshold of 300 km range
with a 500 kg. warhead. In March 2001 South Korea’s membership in the MTCR
was announced. South Korea also plans to build satellite launch vehicles and a
launch facility.
45Washington Post, July 20, 2000. North Korean officials have since reaffirmed the offer
and partially clarified it to Russian and U.S. officials.

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! In 1998 Iraq blocked inspectors of the United Nations Special Commission
(UNSCOM) as they attempted to discover and destroy Iraq’s nuclear, chemical, and
biological weapons and missiles. The United Nations replaced UNSCOM with the
United Nations Monitoring and Verification and Inspection Commission but that
organization has never been permitted to operate in Iraq. Meanwhile Iraq continues
to build and test short range missiles and is suspected of developing weapons of mass
destruction.
! India announced its intention to produce the Agni MRBM, test fired an Agni II which
is to have a range of between 2,000 and 3,000 km, and is developing longer range
missiles.
! Both India and Pakistan tested nuclear explosive devices in 1998 and both may have
developed nuclear warheads for some of their ballistic missiles.
! Numerous Russian firms and institutions have reportedly supplied missile technology
to foreign countries including Iran and North Korea. Russia test fired several of its
existing missiles and deployed a second regiment of Topol-M ICBMs.
! In 1998, China did not accept a U.S. proposal that it become a partner in the Missile
Technology Control Regime (MTCR) in return for a larger U.S. quota of authorized
satellite launches and other incentives. According to CIA, China has supplied
additional missile technology to Pakistan, Iran, North Korea, Libya, and other
countries.

! By 2000, China had deployed 150-200 SRBMs to areas near the Taiwan Strait,
continued to threaten Taiwan, and test fired a new mobile strategic missile, the DF-
31.
! Taiwan is reportedly considering an offensive missile force to deter and counter
China’s missiles.
! A French-British firm sold Black Shahine land attack cruise missiles to the United
Arab Emirates.
Given these contrasting developments and other factors that will be mentioned below,
there is a range of views on the seriousness of the missile threat to the United States. The
1999 intelligence estimate said that “during the next 15 years the United States most likely
will face ICBM threats from Russia, China, and North Korea, probably from Iran, and
possibly from Iraq, although the threats will consist of dramatically fewer weapons than today
because of significant reductions we expect in Russian strategic forces.”46 It elaborated that
North Korea could convert its Taep’o-dong 1 space launch vehicle into an ICBM capable
46National Intelligence Council. “Foreign Missile Developments and the Ballistic Missile
Threat to the United States Through 2015,” unclassified, September 1999, p. 7.

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of reaching parts of the United States with a light CW/BW payload and could test the more
powerful Taep’o-dong 2 at anytime (rather than within 5 years as often stated in the press)
which could deliver a large payload anywhere in the United States. As soon as the missile
is tested successfully it would be deemed to “be available for the country to use as a threat
or in a military role.”47 Iran was said to be able to build an ICBM with Russian help and test
it between 2005 and 2010, or it could build a Taep’o-dong type ICBM, possibly with North
Korean help in the next few years.48
Lieutenant General Ronald Kadish, Director of the Ballistic Missile Defense
Organization, has said the missile threat is “real and now,” and that U.S. security depends
on the ability to defeat that threat. He explained, “Employing active defenses would provide
basic protection, help preserve freedom of action, and “remove a hostile state’s capability
to coerce U.S. foreign policy or shape national security decisions.”49 Under Secretary of
Defense Walter Slocombe buttressed this position, saying missile defense complements U.S.
deterrence, diplomacy, and arms control measures by “enhancing the credibility of U.S.
global security commitments” in the face of missile threats to U.S. cities.50
Some officials in the Clinton White House, Department of State, Department of
Defense, and Central Intelligence Agency reportedly thought the estimated threat should not
be based merely on the technological capability of countries to acquire missiles, but should
be leavened with political, economic, and social factors that might decrease the determination
of a country to acquire or to use missiles against the United States, its troops, or its allies.51
Joseph Cirincione of the Carnegie Endowment for International Peace argues the recent
estimates exaggerate the missile threat and termed the Rumsfeld report “somewhat
hysterical” in that it asserts new nations could deploy ICBMs with little or no warning.52
47Ibid., pp.2 and 7. The estimate noted that North Korea would require an operable third
stage and a survivable reentry vehicle, which apparently have not been observed, to produce
an ICBM. The Commission to Assess the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States
(Rumsfeld Commission) concluded North Korea and Iran could “inflict major destruction on
the U.S. within about five years of a decision to acquire such a [ballistic missile] capability
(10 years in the case of Iraq).” Many interpreted that statement to indicate the threat would
materialize in 2004, but North Korea could have made the decision some years ago and be
much closer to the capability. The Clinton administration subsequently reported it would not
be able to deploy a national missile defense before 2005 and that became the target date for
meeting a developing North Korean threat even though Pyongyang tested the Taep’o-dong
1 in August 1998 and was expected to test the Taep’o-dong 2 in 1999 or 2000.
48Ibid., p. 8
49U.S. Department of State. Washington File,” Ballistic Missile Defense Organization
Director Answers Critics,” June 16, 2000, p. 1.
50Slocombe, Walter B. “The Administration’s Approach,” The Washington Quarterly, v.
23, no. 3, Summer 2000, pp. 79-80.
51Sciolino, Elaine and Steven Lee Meyers. “U.S. Study Reopens Division Over Nuclear
Missile Threat,” New York Times, July 5, 2000, p. 1.
52“The Ballistic Missile Threat Evolves,” by Joseph Cirincione, Carnegie Endowment for
(continued...)

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Several analysts have questioned the sophistication of North Korea’s missile program, the
likely progress in Iran’s missile program, and the level of success in India’s and Pakistan’s
nuclear tests. The Bush administration is convinced of the current and developing WMD and
missile threat.
The great emphasis on the long-range missile threat and efforts to defend against that
potential threat, in the view of some analysts, detracts from the more likely threats to U.S.
security posed by terrorists armed with NBCW, by foreign ships in U.S. ports, or by short-
range ballistic or cruise missiles launched from ships stationed off the U.S. coasts. But the
intelligence community has found the threat of shipborne missile attack to be remote, and
former Secretary of Defense Cohen noted, “To say that we can’t protect against everything
[e.g., all possible terrorist attacks] doesn’t mean that we shouldn’t protect against those that
can cause us catastrophic harm.”53
There is less controversy over the threat of missiles that can attack U.S. forces overseas
and U.S. allies. Over the past few years, the number of countries with short range ballistic
missiles (SRBMs) has grown – Scud missiles and basic missile production technology are
widely available.
Another concern is vertical proliferation – the improvements and new designs being
made by China, North Korea, Iran, Syria, India, and Pakistan. These countries are
improving the range and accuracy of their missiles and significantly increasing their numbers
of missiles. Basic missiles and missile technology are fairly readily available, and these
countries are increasing the sophistication of their missiles. Technologies to watch for include
stage separation, multiple warheads, submunitions, improved guidance, and penetration aids.
North Korea reportedly has about 500 Scuds and 100 Nodong missiles and has
exported hundreds of missiles to the Middle East.54 Israel, India, and North Korea have
developed multistage missiles, a key step in building intercontinental missiles. Pakistan and
Iran may soon test two or three stage missiles. Vice Admiral Wilson said that he expects
“the number of ballistic missiles with ranges between 500 and 3,000 kilometers to increase
significantly during the next 15 years and to become more accurate and destructive.
Likewise, the potential for widespread proliferation of land attack cruise missiles is high. ...
52(...continued)
International Peace, Non-Proliferation Project Issue Brief, vol. II, no. 13, Sept. 10, 1999.
Comments on the 1999 intelligence estimate and on the report of the Commission to Assess
the Ballistic Missile Threat to the United States.
53Sciolino, p.1.
54Schwartz, Thomas, General, U.S. Army, Commander of United Nations Command and
ROK/U.S. Combined Forces Command. Testimony before the Senate Armed Services
Committee, March 7, 2000.

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Major air and sea ports, logistics bases and facilities, troop concentrations, and fixed
communications nodes will be increasingly at risk.”55
The new medium-range missiles are “significantly altering strategic balances in the
Middle East and Asia.”56
Another dangerous trend is the spread of production technology, as North Korea,
China, and various groups in Russia have helped other countries design, test, and produce
their own missiles. With their help, Pakistan and Iran test fired medium-range ballistic
missiles in April and July 1998 respectively. The Russian and Chinese governments have
promised to restrict missile technology exports, but it is not yet clear they will be able to do
so or are committed to the effort. While North Korea is voluntarily abstaining from missile
flight tests, it has not agreed to limit missile developments, deployments, or exports. Even
Iran, Libya, and Egypt have been identified as sources of missiles or some missile production
technology.
Assessments
Although the potential scale of NBCW warfare has diminished with the end of the Cold
War, the number of countries or groups that could initiate a nuclear, biological, or chemical
attack may be increasing. The number of countries with missiles is increasing, and countries
have frequently used missiles in combat or as a tool of intimidation. The zone of particular
concern spreads from North Africa across the Middle East, through South Asia to Northeast
Asia. Within this band of countries, Israel, India, Pakistan, and China reportedly have
nuclear weapons and are working to improve their warheads and delivery systems. North
Korea probably has nuclear weapons and Libya, Iran, Iraq are trying to develop nuclear
weapons. Chemical weapon and missile development programs are rife in this zone, and
several of the countries are reportedly developing biological weapons.
Russia supplies Iran civilian nuclear, biological, and chemical technologies that enhance
Iran’s weapons programs. In the past, China has supplied nuclear weapons technology to
Pakistan and CW production equipment to Iran but has apparently improved its export
control policies in recent years.57 North Korea, China, and Russia continue to be primary
suppliers of missile technology. Some countries in the Middle East have acquired the means
to produce and develop missiles and are potential or actual suppliers to less advanced
countries.
According to Vice Admiral Wilson, the Director of the Defense Intelligence Agency,
“All told, the prospects of limiting proliferation are slim, and the global WMD threat to US-
55Wilson, p. 11.
56Director of Central Intelligence, February 2, 2000, p. 5.
57U.S. Director of Central Intelligence. “Unclassified Report to Congress on the Acquisition
of Technology Related to Weapons of Mass Destruction and Advanced Conventional
Munitions, 1 January through 30 June 1999,” pp. 9 and 10

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allied territory, interests, forces, and facilities will increase significantly.”58 A former head of
CIA’s Nonproliferation Center concluded that the United States and its allies are not on top
of the NBCW proliferation problem, “We are not even staying even. We are slipping.”59
Former Secretary of Defense Cohen described the dangers posed by the “more than
25 countries [that] either have or may be developing nuclear, biological, and chemical
weapons,”60 and said:
America’s military superiority cannot shield us completely from this threat.
Indeed, a paradox of the new strategic environment is that American military
superiority actually increases the threat of nuclear, biological and chemical attack
against us by creating incentives for adversaries to challenge us asymmetrically.
In December 2000, the National Intelligence Council reported, “The probability that
a missile armed with WMD would be used against US forces or interests is higher today than
during most of the Cold War and will continue to grow.” It predicted that between 2000 and
2015, “the likelihood will increase ... that WMD will be used either against the United States
or its forces, facilities, and interests overseas.”61
58Wilson, Thomas R., Vice Admiral, Director, Defense Intelligence Agency. Military
Threats ans Security Challenges Through 2015. Statement before the Senate Select
Committee on Intelligence, February 2, 2000, p.10.
59Oehler, Gordon C. Conference on Countering Chemical and Biological Weapons: The
Threat. Jane’s Information Group, Nov. 19, 1997.
60Office of the Secretary of Defense. “Proliferation: Threat and Response 1997,”
November 25, 1997.
61U.S. National Intelligence Council. Global Trends 2015: A Dialogue About the Future
with Nongovernment Experts. NIC 2000-02, December 2000, p. 38 and p. 9.

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