Order Code RS20969
July 19, 2001
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Uganda: Recent Elections and
Current Conditions
Ted Dagne
Specialist in International Relations
Zarina Harding
Research Associate
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Summary
On March 12, 2001, Yoweri Museveni was re-elected president of Uganda after
defeating his one- time ally, Kizza Besigye. International and regional election monitors
declared the elections relatively free, although the electoral process was marred by
mismanagement and sporadic violence. In the legislative elections in late June 2001,
more than 50 incumbent members of Parliament were defeated, including 10 ministers.
The elections were marred by violence in which an estimated 12 people were killed.
Relations between Washington and Kampala are warm. The Clinton Administration
championed the Museveni regime, and President Clinton visited Uganda during his 1998
tour of Africa. Relations began to cool when Ugandan troops once again intervened in
the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC) in 1998. Secretary of State Colin Powell
visited Uganda during his four-nation tour of Africa in late May 2001. Powell met with
President Museveni and opposition leaders to discuss a wide range of issues, including
Sudan and DRC. This report will be updated as events warrant.
Recent Political Developments
The Presidential Elections. On March 12, 2001, Uganda held national elections,
its second since Yoweri Museveni’s National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to
power in 1986. President Museveni won 69.3% of the votes cast,1 while his closest
challenger, Kizza Besigye, received 27.8% of the votes. Besigye, a doctor and Museveni’s
one-time ally, was a member of the NRM and Museveni’s personal physician during the
insurgency in the early 1980s. He ran on an anti-corruption platform, vowing to rid the
government of its excesses. He also raised questions about Uganda’s military
involvement in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), advocating Uganda’s
withdrawal from the DRC.
1 Ugandan Elections 2001 [http://www.uganda-elections.com].
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Election observers, both local and international, declared the elections to be ‘free and
fair’, although they acknowledged that the electoral process and management had many
weaknesses. According to Reverend Cannon Grace Kaiso, the national coordinator of the
Non-Governmental Organization Election Monitoring Group-Uganda (a consortium of six
Ugandan non- governmental organizations), “on the whole, the results of the elections
reflect the will of the people.” This sentiment was also expressed by the chairman of the
Post Referendum Support Group, composed of Uganda’s donors.2
The results of the elections were rejected, however, by Besigye on the grounds that
there were discrepancies and inconsistencies in the electoral process. He filed a petition
at the Supreme Court in Mengo challenging the declaration of Museveni as president elect
and sought to annul the elections.3 Besigye subsequently lost the petition and said he
would respect the Supreme Court verdict. 4
Pre-Election Conditions. Allegations of political violence, intimidation, and
corruption characterized much of the pre-election campaigning. Opposition groups
charged that the election was marred by the disappearance of voter cards and favoritism
toward Museveni by the state run media. The Monitor, a newspaper critical of the
government, reported instances of persons breaking into the Electoral Commission’s data
center and bribing of prospective voters to register at multiple polling stations.
The political campaign was marked by intensely personal attacks by the two main
candidates, Besigye and Museveni. Besigye accused Museveni of political intimidation and
of personally approaching members of opposition groups with promises of future
government positions and money if they changed sides. In return, Museveni accused
Besigye of having HIV/AIDS and of being an agent of the dictatorships that ruled Uganda
in the 1970s and early 1980s.5
Issues surrounding the elections included political freedom, allegations of official
corruption, and Uganda’s involvement in the DRC.6 Museveni campaigned under the
slogan “Vote for Consolidating Our Achievements”7 highlighting his accomplishments as
president of Uganda.
The Post Election Environment. The post election environment was also marred
by violence and charges and counter charges between Museveni and Besigye. The
explosion of several pipe and nail bombs in the capital, Kampala, shortly after the elections
2 Foreign Broadcasting Information Service (FBIS), March 15, 2001.
3 The Monitor, March 28, 2001.
4 BBC Monitoring Africa, April 21, 2001.
5 The Washington Post, March 15, 2001.
6 BBC News Online: World: Africa, March 1, 2001
7 Elections 2001 [http://www.museveni.co.ug].

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results were announced, resulted in 11 dead and scores of injuries.8 It was unclear if these
explosions were related to the announcement of Museveni’s victory.
Parliamentary Elections. In late June, more than 50 incumbent members of
Parliament lost their seats, including 10 ministers. The no-party parliamentary elections
reportedly gave President Museveni a major base of support in Parliament. He campaigned
aggressively for his favorite candidates, although a number of his ministers were defeated
by lesser known individuals. According to press reports, the elections were marred by
violence in which an estimated 12 people were killed.

Background and Analysis
Political Conditions. Uganda, a country slightly smaller than Oregon, gained its
independence from Britain in 1962. Until the mid 1980s, the east African country was
mired in civil war, ethnic strife, and a brutal dictatorship. By the time the National
Resistance Army (NRA) took power in early 1986, the country was in ruins, with an
inflation rate of over 240% and a non-existent economic infrastructure. Museveni is
credited with bringing about relative stability to Uganda. His strategy was to coopt his
political opponents and when necessary to use military means to neutralize rebel groups.
His first government included opposition figures who had served in previous governments
and arch critics of his Movement. Despite these efforts at reconciliation, armed
opposition to his government continued for much of the 1980s and 1990s.
In March 1994, Ugandans elected a 288-member constituent assembly, whose task
was to approve a new constitution. The no-party elections gave the ruling NRM and its
allies 150 of the 214 elective seats, while a coalition of opposition groups secured the
remaining seats. (The NRM does not identify itself as a political party, but rather as an
encompassing national movement; others disagree.) President Museveni did not run, but
several of his ministers were defeated by opposition candidates. The elections were
considered free and fair, although restrictions on party activities hampered the chances of
opposition parties. The constitution was promulgated in October 1995 and a referendum
was called for in 2000 on the future introduction of a multi-party system.
In May 1996, after a long transition period, President Museveni was elected to a five
year term by a large margin. Museveni won 74.2% of the votes cast, while his opponent,
Paul Ssemogerere, former deputy prime minister and longtime rival of the president,
received 23.7%. The elections were declared by international observers to be free and fair.
However, political party activity prior to the elections was, as in the 1994 elections,
prohibited. Opposition candidates were reportedly harassed, although according to
observers the harassment was not widespread or systematic.
The so-called no-party elections gave President Museveni much needed legitimacy,
as they represented the first attempt at democracy since he took power in 1986. Upon
being elected, Museveni declared that multiparty democracy would not be restored for at
least another 5 years. A national referendum on multiparty politics was held in June of
2000. The NRM prevailed with 90.7% of Ugandans favoring a no-party government
system. Museveni stated that multiparty politics could only be introduced when the no-
8 Xinhua News Agency, March 16 , 2001.

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party system had succeeded in eliminating the threat of a return to sectarian politics.
Critics dismiss Museveni’s argument, asserting that the President is not committed to
multi-party democracy.
The Economy. Uganda is blessed with fertile soils, regular rainfall, and sizable
deposits of copper and cobalt. Its largest sector is agriculture, which employs 81% of the
workforce, and accounts for about 90% of export earnings and 50% of Uganda’s Gross
Domestic Product (GDP). Coffee exports make up half its export earnings and Uganda is
Africa’s largest coffee producer. Other major exports include cotton, tea, and to a lesser
extent, maize. Crop production has been hampered by security concerns in the northern
and western regions of Uganda. To stabilize the economy, Museveni adopted a policy of
reducing inflation while simultaneously increasing production and export earnings. Uganda
raised producer prices on export crops, increased the prices of imported petroleum
products, and boosted civil service wages.

The industrial sector has also expanded, with real output growth approaching 12%
a year. The main industries include the processing of coffee, cotton, tea, sugar, tobacco,
edible oils, dairy products, and grain milling as well as brewing. Other ventures include
vehicle assembly and the manufacture of textiles and metal products. In 1997, Uganda’s
GNP per capita stood at $330, making it one of the 17 poorest countries of the world.
Museveni’s economic recovery plans have long received support from the International
Monetary Fund (IMF) and the World Bank. According to a recent IMF report, Uganda’s
economy grew by 5% in 1999-2000, while consumer price inflation averaged 6.3%.
Meanwhile, the proportion of the population living under the poverty line declined from
56% in 1992-1993 to 44% in 1996-1997 and to 35% in 2000.9 According to the IMF, the
government is on a path that could reduce poverty to 10% by 2017.
Obstacles to economic recovery remain. Rebel insurrections continue, and following
the murder of several foreign tourists in March 1999, there has been a decrease in tourism.
Moreover, Uganda’s heavy reliance on coffee exports makes it vulnerable to international
commodity price fluctuations and poor weather conditions.10 Falling coffee prices have
hit export revenues hard. In addition, privatization initiatives pose a problem as they are
seen by many to be a scramble for the fruits of state-owned property. Another problem
plaguing Uganda’s economy is corruption. The International Corruption Perceptions Index
for 2000 - an annual index compiled by the global anti-corruption non-governmental
organization, Transparency International (TI) - rated Uganda the eleventh most corrupt
of 90 countries. According to TI, corruption prevails in all aspects of Ugandan life, from
politics to the economy.

Foreign Debt. Uganda’s debt burden is estimated at US$3.4 billion,11 which
represents about 64% of its 1998 GNP. Uganda was the first African country to be
declared eligible for and to benefit from the Heavily Indebted Poor Countries (HIPC)
Initiative in April 1998. Under this Initiative, Uganda was ensured approximately $650
million in debt relief, 50% of which is from the World Bank. Part of the debt relief was
9 International Monetary Fund, Press Release, May 2, 2000.
10 BBC News Online, March 6, 2001.
11 The World Bank, September 9, 2000 [http://devdata.worldbank.org].

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in the form of an International Development Association (IDA) grant of $75 million
allocated to the Universal Primary Education Program. Uganda has also been declared
eligible for debt relief under the Enhanced HIPC Initiative, in recognition of its effective
poverty reduction strategy to date, the involvement of civil society in the formulation of
the strategy, and the government’s continued commitment to macroeconomic stability.
However, the IMF suspended its disbursement of a loan of US$18 million for 2 months
in 2000 because of Uganda’s high defense spending. At present, though, total debt-service
under the HIPC Initiative, including the US$650 million provided under the original
Initiative, will yield roughly US$2 billion in additional resources.12
Foreign Policy. In the 1990s, the civilian population in northern Uganda was
terrorized by the Lord’s Resistance Army (LRA), currently led by Joseph Kony and
supported by Sudan. From its base near Juba in Sudan, the LRA consistently targeted
school children; abducting hundreds and mutilating thousands. LRA’s publicly stated
political objective is a “holy war” against the Museveni government. Between 1993 and
1998, the LRA reportedly killed an estimated 10,000 Ugandans and forced an estimated
220,000 to seek refuge in protected camps.
Sudan. The National Islamic Front (NIF) government in Sudan is the principal
backer of the LRA and uses LRA soldiers in its fight against the Sudan People’s Liberation
Army (SPLA). The Khartoum government accuses the Museveni government of backing
the SPLA. In December 1999, however, President Museveni and President Omar Bashir
of Sudan signed an 11-point peace agreement, negotiated by former President Carter,
which called for normalization of relations between the two countries. Further talks on
Sept. 29, 2000 between Sudan and Uganda resulted in an agreement in principle to disarm
and relocate the LRA at least 1,000km deeper into Sudan away from the Uganda border.
Khartoum and Kampala also agreed to exchange diplomats and to repatriate LRA
abducted children.
Democratic Republic of the Congo. In August 1998, Uganda joined Rwanda
and Congolese rebels in a joint effort to oust the government of Laurent Kabila of the
Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC). Between 1996-97, Uganda along with
Rwanda, had helped the then-rebel leader Kabila to oust former dictator Mobutu Sese
Seko. Kabila became president in May 1997, after the ouster of the Mobutu regime, but
tensions between Kabila and his allies, Rwanda and Uganda, soon began to mount. Efforts
to resolve their differences failed, and by August 1998, the former allies were engaged in
a full-blown conflict. By early 1999, the Congolese rebels and their Rwandan and
Ugandan allies were in control of eastern Congo.
In northwest Congo, a pro-Uganda Congolese rebel group, the Movement for the
Liberation of the Congo (MLC), appeared in late 1998. However, the emergence of the
MLC led to serious tensions between the pro-Rwanda rebel group, the Congolese
Democratic Rally (RCD), and MLC, as well as between Rwanda and Uganda. In August
1999, Ugandan and Rwandan troops clashed in Kisangani, in eastern Congo. The leaders
of the two countries were able, at first, to bring a quick end to the conflict, but tensions
12 International Monetary Fund, Press Release, May 2, 2000.

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remained. Rwanda and Uganda clashed twice in 2000 but later agreed to a peace
package.13
U.S.-Uganda Relations. Relations between Washington and Kampala are warm.
Over the years, successive American Administrations considered the Museveni government
as reformist and a staunch ally of the United States. The Clinton Administration
championed the Museveni regime, and President Clinton visited Uganda during his 1998
tour of Africa. Relations cooled when Ugandan troops once again intervened in Congo
in 1998. Clinton Administration officials were also critical of Uganda and Rwanda when
the two former allies clashed in eastern Congo in 1999 and 2000.
The Bush Administration has had good relations with Kampala. Secretary of State
Colin Powell visited Uganda during his four-nation trip to Africa in late May 2001.
Secretary Powell met with President Museveni and opposition leaders to discuss a wide
range of issues, including Sudan and DRC. Secretary Powell praised Museveni for
lowering Uganda’s HIV-AIDS infection rate, and pledged $50 million to help Uganda for
a period of five years to fight AIDS. Powell also won a pledge from Museveni to
withdraw most of the 8,000 Ugandan troops in the Congo.
Table 1. U.S. Assistance to Uganda
($ millions)
Programs
FY1998
FY1999
FY2000
FY2001
FY2002
Actual
Actual
Actual
Estimate
Request
Development Aid
44.764
49.272
51.412
50.766
50.204
ESF
–-
0.500
0.400
–-
–-
Food Aid
30.997
20.387
18.844
24.512
14.998
Peace Corps
1.397
0.972
0.276
0.961
0.797
IMET
0.357
0.305
0.247
0.100
0.100
Total
77.515
71.436
71.179
76.339
66.099
13 For more information, see CRS Issue Brief IB96037 by Raymond Copson.