Order Code RL30983
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Tibet, China, and the 107th Congress:
Issues for U.S. Policy
May 30, 2001
Kerry Dumbaugh
Specialist in Asian Affairs
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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Tibet, China, and the 107th Congress: Issues for U.S.
Policy
Summary
The political and cultural status of Tibet remains a difficult issue in U.S.-China
relations and a matter of debate among U.S. policymakers. Controversy continues
over Tibet’s current political status as part of China, the role of the Dalai Lama and
his Tibetan government-in-exile, and the impact of Chinese control on Tibetan culture
and religious traditions. These controversies have prompted recurring U.S.
congressional action in support of Tibet’s status and traditions. This report briefly
reviews Tibet’s historical status and discusses current issues. It will be updated
regularly.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Brief Historical Background of Tibet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Tibet and U.S. Policy Since the 1980s . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Efforts to Create a Special Envoy for Tibet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Current Issues: Implications for the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Status of the Dalai Lama’s Negotiations with China . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Economic Development in Tibet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
World Bank Project Loan . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
China’s “Patriotic Education” and Other Campaigns . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The Panchen Lama Succession . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
The Bush Administration and the 107th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Tibet Legislation in the 107th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
H.R. 1779/S. 852: The Tibetan Policy Act of 2001 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix A: Tibet-related Interest Groups . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
International Campaign for Tibet (ICT) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
The Committee of 100 for Tibet . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
The Tibet Information Network (TIN) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12

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Tibet, China, and the 107th Congress:
Issues for U.S. Policy
Introduction
The political and cultural status of Tibet remains a difficult issue in U.S.-China
relations, and appropriate U.S. actions remain matters of debate among U.S.
policymakers. Controversy continues over Tibet’s current political status as part of
China, the role of the Dalai Lama and his Tibetan government-in-exile, and the impact
of Chinese control on Tibetan culture and religious traditions. These controversies
have prompted recurring U.S. congressional actions in support of Tibet’s status and
traditions – actions that are routinely denounced by the Chinese government in
Beijing.
This report briefly reviews Tibet’s historical status, discusses current issues
within Tibet and as components of U.S.-China relations, and discusses Bush
Administration views and pending legislation in the 107th Congress.
Brief Historical Background of Tibet
Tibetan history is notable in two particular respects. One is the extraordinarily
pervasive influence of Buddhism in all aspects of daily life. At one time, a sizeable
number of Tibet’s male population were monks and lamas, and eventually this
ecclesiastical group became Tibet’s temporal rulers as well as its spiritual leaders.
The Dalai Lama, believed to be the reincarnation of Tibet’s patron deity, is the highest
and most revered among this ruling monastic theocracy.
The second noteworthy aspect of Tibetan history is the ambiguity and
disagreement surrounding Tibet’s long political relationship with China. Tibetans
generally view Tibet as an historically independent nation that had a close relationship
with a succession of Chinese empires. A succession of Chinese governments, on the
other hand, have claimed Tibet as a political and geographical part of China.1 In
1949-1951, the newly established communist government of the People’s Republic
of China (PRC) backed up this claim by sending military troops to occupy Tibet.
Since then, Tibet has been under active Chinese rule as its westernmost province,
Xizang (the Tibet Autonomous Region). Much of the PRC’s tenure there has been
troubled, particularly during the tumultuous Cultural Revolution (1966-1976) when
most monasteries, palaces, and other aspects of Tibetan Buddhism and culture were
1 Such claims have been made by previous Chinese dynasties, the Republic of China
government under Chiang Kai-shek (now the government on Taiwan), and the communist
government of the People’s Republic of China.

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CRS-2
either damaged or destroyed. The International Campaign for Tibet claims that over
1 million Tibetans died during the first 30 years of PRC rule.2
In 1959, at the age of 24, the Dalai Lama fled Tibet and went into exile in India
with a group of his followers. He remains there today, along with a Tibetan refugee
community of tens of thousands, and he is still widely regarded as the spiritual leader
of the Tibetan people, their foremost advocate, and a figure of international stature.
He has steadfastly maintained that Tibet is an independent country under illegal
occupation by Chinese government forces. But he has also been willing to negotiate
with Beijing, and has advanced a number of fairly moderate proposals regarding
Tibet’s future status. The Chinese government condemns the Dalai Lama’s political
activities and his leadership of a “government-in-exile,” although it recognizes him as
a major religious figure.
Tibet and U.S. Policy Since the 1980s
In the late 1980's, Tibet became a recurring issue in congressional consideration
of matters relating to China. A number of factors have contributed to Members’
greater interest. These include: the Dalai Lama’s and the Tibetan community’s
ongoing political activities; reports of human rights abuses and China’s continuing
repressive social and political controls in Tibet; and the lack of consensus among U.S.
policymakers over what U.S. policy should be toward China. On matters involving
Tibet — as on many matters involving China — congressional views have often been
at odds with those of the White House. As a matter of official policy, the U.S.
government recognizes Tibet as part of China and has always done so, although some
dispute the historical consistency of this U.S. position.3 Since normalization of
relations with the PRC in 1979, a succession of both Republican and Democratic U.S.
Administrations have favored policies of engagement with China. In the process, they
frequently have sought to minimize areas of potential tension with Beijing where
Chinese leaders have taken strong positions, such as on the question of Tibet’s
political status.
2 There are varying estimates for how many Tibetans may have died as a direct consequence
of Chinese rule. The figure of 1.2 million is the figure generally used by the Tibetan
government-in-exile. Warren W. Smith, author of The Tibetan Nation (p. 607) calculates that
the number of deaths is closer to 600,000.
3 Some assert that past U.S. actions which treated Tibet as if it were an independent state in
effect signaled U.S. recognition. Michael C. van Walt van Praag, for instance, in The Status
of Tibet: History, Rights, and Prospects in International Law, (Westview Press, Boulder
Colorado, 1987) states that “Washington supported Tibet and treated it as an independent
State, even recognizing its de facto (italics included) independence...” p. 139. In the daily
press briefing of October 8, 1987, responding to a question concerning what year the United
States formally recognized Tibet as a part of China, the State Department’s Public Affairs
office issued the following statement: “We have never recognized Tibet as a sovereign state
independent of China. We first made the statement that we considered Tibet to be a part of
China in 1978; however, our earlier formulations were not inconsistent with the statement, and
we have never challenged China’s claim. No third country recognizes Tibet as a state
independent of China.”

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The Dalai Lama himself has been the most charismatic and renowned advocate
for the Tibetan people over the past decade. He has a number of supporters in the
U.S. Congress.4 The Dalai Lama’s and his exiled community’s efforts to gain
international support for Tibet’s cause took a major step forward in 1986-1987, when
a series of meetings between Tibetan and Western supporters in New York,
Washington, and London launched what has become known as Tibet’s “international
campaign.”5 The goal of this campaign was to garner Western and principally U.S.
support for Tibet’s situation, and ultimately to bring this international pressure to bear
on Beijing to make satisfactory political concessions. One result of this new strategy,
the U.S. Congress in 1987 began to put pressure on the White House to protect
Tibetan culture and accord Tibet greater status in U.S. law, despite Beijing’s strong
objections.
Two events of particular importance occurred in 1987. First, on September 21,
the Dalai Lama made his first political speech in the United States, at the invitation
of the Congressional Human Rights Caucus. In that speech, the Dalai Lama made a
five-point proposal for resolving the Tibet question that was well-received in the
United States and had significant consequences on congressional attitudes toward
Tibet. Second, Congress put non-binding measures into place in 1987 declaring that
the United States should make Tibet’s situation a higher policy priority and should
urge China to establish a constructive dialogue with the Dalai Lama.6
This language, not the first that Congress had passed regarding Tibet,7
nevertheless, marked the beginning of a significant increase in congressional activity
on Tibet’s status.8 From this point on, congressional supporters sought to mention
Tibet separately whenever possible in legislation relating to China. In 1990, in
considering foreign relations authorization legislation that contained the so-called
“Tiananmen sanctions,” Congress singled out Tibet for special mention in sense-of-
Congress language that closely resembled the “five points” the Dalai Lama had
proposed two years earlier and, in the same legislation, mandated the Voice of
4 These have included Representatives Charlie Rose, Ben Gilman, and Tom Lantos, and the
late Senator Claiborne Pell.
5 These three cities are all still centers for Tibet-related offices and information networks.
According to Dr. Melvyn Goldstein, professor of anthropology at Case Western Reserve
University, the details of how the “international campaign” strategy was formed have not yet
been documented. Goldstein, Melvyn, The Snow Lion and the Dragon: China, Tibet, and the
Dalai Lama, University of California Press, 1997. pp. 76 and 138.
6 President Reagan signed into law H.R. 1777, the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of
FY88-89, on December 22, 1987 (P.L. 100-204); section 1243 contains language on Tibet.
In 1985, 91 Members of Congress reportedly had also sent a letter to China’s President, Li
Xiannian, expressing support for continued talks with the Dalai Lama.
7 Congress considered a number of non-binding measures in the 1980s concerning Tibet. In
1986, Congress listed “Tibet” as an independent country in H.R. 5548, legislation dealing the
Export-Import Bank. This bill was approved on October 15, and became P.L. 99-472.
8 According to a legislative database, in the four years prior to 1987, only 6 measures had
been introduced in Congress concerning Tibet, whereas the 1987 legislation was one of 14
measures introduced in 1987-1988. [http://thomas.loc.gov]

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America to begin broadcasts in the Tibetan language.9 In 1994, Congress enacted a
number of Tibetan-related provisions in the Foreign Relations Authorization Act of
FY1994-1995, including:
! a provision mandating that Tibet be listed separately in the State
Department’s annual report, “Country Reports on Human Rights”;
and
! a provision mandating the State Department to issue a report on the
“state of relations between U.S. and those recognized by Congress
as the true representatives of the Tibetan people; the Dalai Lama, his
representatives, and the Tibetan Government in exile, and on
conditions in Tibet.”10
Congressional efforts to raise the profile of Tibet over the last ten years or more
have been resisted or mitigated by successive U.S. Administrations, but generally in
a low profile, non-confrontational manner. As early as 1986, when Congress passed
legislation authorizing Export-Import Bank funding which listed Tibet as a separate
country, President Reagan signed the legislation into law.11 In his remarks, however,
the President said:
I note that Tibet is listed as a country in section 8. The United States recognizes
Tibet as part of the People’s Republic of China. I interpret Tibet’s inclusion as
a separate country to be a technical oversight.12
In other respects, however, consistent congressional pressure has contributed
to U.S. Administrations acknowledging, however subtly, the position of the Tibetan
community-in-exile. Thus, President George Bush in 1991 became the first U.S.
President to meet with the Dalai Lama, while President Bill Clinton met with the Dalai
Lama several times in casual “drop-by” meetings. Although these meetings were
deliberately low-key and informal, they nevertheless offended Chinese leaders, as did
the Clinton Administration’s decision, after having opposed the Special Envoy
position for four years, to compromise by establishing the position of Special
Coordinator for Tibet.
9 This bill, H.R. 3792, was enacted as P.L. 101-246, and contains the “Tiananmen sanctions”
on China that are still largely in effect. Its provisions on Tibet stated that U.S. policy toward
China should be explicitly linked with the situation in Tibet, specifically to include lifting of
martial law in Lhasa and other parts of Tibet; opening Tibet to foreigners, including the press
and international human rights organizations; release of political prisoners; and conduct of
negotiations between representatives of the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government.
10 Established pursuant to Section 536 of the Foreign Relations Authorizations Act, H.R.
2333, enacted as P.L. 103-236.
11 H.R. 5548 was approved on October 15, and became P.L. 99-472.
12 “Statement on Signing the Export-Import Bank Act Amendments of 1986,” October 15,
1986, in Public Papers of the Presidents of the United States: Ronald Reagan, Book II, June
28 to December 31, 1986, pp. 1390-1391.

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Efforts to Create a Special Envoy for Tibet. During the early years of
the Clinton Administration, Congress began considering measures to establish the
position of a U.S. Special Envoy for Tibet, with ambassadorial rank. In introducing
such a measure in 1994, Senator Claiborne Pell stated he believed it was necessary to
further focus White House attention on issues involving Tibet:
I recall how difficult it was to engage previous administrations in serious,
knowledgeable discussions on Tibet...A Special Envoy for Tibet would ensure that
this important element of United States-China relations was continually reflected
in policy discussions on a senior level.13
While legislation to create a Special Envoy for Tibet was never enacted,
provisions similar to those in the 1994 legislation were also introduced as sections of
authorization bills in the 104th and the 105th Congresses.14 In each case, the provision
called for the Special Envoy to have ambassadorial rank and to actively promote
negotiations between the Dalai Lama and the Chinese government. Clinton
Administration officials opposed these provisions, primarily because of concerns
about the creation of an ambassadorial rank position for an entity (Tibet) that the
United States recognizes as part of China rather than as an independent country in its
own right.
On October 31, 1997, in a move seen as a compromise to appeal to proponents
of the “Special Envoy” position, Secretary of State Madeleine Albright designated a
Special Coordinator for Tibetan issues within the State Department and named
Gregory Craig to serve in the position concurrently with his job as Director of Policy
Planning. Although the new Special Coordinator position did not come with
ambassadorial rank, its creation nevertheless suggested there would be a higher level
of official attention on issues involving Tibet. Consequently, the 105th Congress
dropped the Special Envoy provision from subsequent legislation.15
13 Statement by Senator Pell, Congressional Record, October 7, 1994, p. S14878. Senator
Pell’s bill, S. 2554, was not enacted; nor was H.R. 5254, a similar bill introduced in the
House on October 7, 1994, by Representative Howard Berman.
14 In the 104th Congress, that legislation was the American Overseas Interests Act of 1995
(H.R. 1561-Gilman, and S. 908-Helms). President Clinton vetoed this legislation on April 12,
1996; the House override vote on April 30,1996 failed to achieve the two-thirds necessary for
passage (234-188). Similar legislation in the 105th Congress, H.R. 1486, was replaced by
three separate bills after consideration by the House Rules Committee on June 3, 1997: H.R.
1757, authorizing appropriations for the State Department for FY1998-1999 (and containing
the Tibet Special Envoy provision); H.R. 1758, the European Security Act (NATO
enlargement); and H.R. 1759, a foreign aid authorization and reform bill. The Special Envoy
provision was dropped from this separate legislation before final passage.
15 On January 20, 1999, the position of Special Coordinator for Tibet was assumed by Julia
Taft, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Population, Refugees, and Migration. She stepped
down on January 19, 2001. On May 17, 2001, Secretary of State Colin Powell announced
that Paula Dobriansky, Undersecretary of State for Global Affairs, would serve as the next
Special Coordinator for Tibet.

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Current Issues: Implications for the United States
In addition to issues involving Tibet’s political status and that of the Dalai
Lama’s exiled community, many other aspects of Tibet-PRC relations have been
sources of tension. There are long-standing disputes over basic statistics: the
geographic area of Tibet, the number of Tibetans living there, and the number of
ethnic Han Chinese residents. There are ethnic frictions between Tibetans and
Chinese living in close proximity, with all the burdens of social discrimination and
economic disparity that often accompany such frictions. And the still deep-rooted
influence of religion in Tibet — as a way of life, a cultural identity, and an institutional
force — clashes continually with the secular traditions and bureaucratic requirements
of the Chinese communist government system. Among these entrenched tensions, a
number of issues in particular have implications for Tibet’s future, as well as political
implications for U.S.-China relations. These issues are described below.
Status of the Dalai Lama’s Negotiations with China. Despite the
creation of the U.S. Special Coordinator on Tibet with the specific mission of helping
to promote talks, relations between China and the Dalai Lama and his exiled followers
have remained stalled for years, with no negotiations currently scheduled or even
planned. In the past, both China and the Dalai Lama maintained that they were willing
to hold discussions about Tibet’s future. The Dalai Lama himself — whose views on
the subject are more cautious and diplomatic than those of many of his followers —
generally speaks of Tibetan interests within the context of rule by China. He has
spoken of a future Tibet that is part of China, but which also has “cultural autonomy”
within the Chinese system. But the Dalai Lama also has insisted that there should be
no preconditions for any discussions he has with Beijing; instead, the negotiators
should be able to address every issue in contention.
In recent years, Chinese leaders have been highly critical of the Dalai Lama,
going so far as to describe him as a “criminal” intent on splitting Tibet from China,
and at times intimating that dialogue with him is impossible.16 In June 1998, during
President Clinton’s summit trip to China, President Jiang Zemin appeared to take a
more moderate position, indicating that the door to dialogue with the Dalai Lama was
open. Since then, however, Beijing’s position has hardened, with some speculating
that Jiang had little support for his more moderate stance among hardliners in Beijing.
China continues to insist that discussions with the Dalai Lama should have several
preconditions, including: an absolute ban on the subject of independence for Tibet;
and the Dalai Lama’s public acknowledgment that Tibet and Taiwan are both part of
China.

Some speculate that the Dalai Lama may have grown increasingly pessimistic
about his ability to achieve a solution to Tibet’s situation. He has implied that the
moderate approach he has been pursuing has failed because of China’s unwillingness
to hold free-ranging talks, and has hinted that time may be running out for a
negotiated settlement. Some are concerned that traditional Tibetan culture and values
16 “Annual Report on International Religious Freedom for 1999: China,” U.S. Department of
State, Bureau for Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor, Washington, D.C. September 9,
1999. Text can be found at: [http://www.state.gov/www/global].

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increasingly are being overwhelmed by the growing Chinese presence in Tibet. They
worry about some of the educated and bilingual Tibetan elite, trained by the Chinese
communists, who are now serving in government positions in Tibet and who therefore
have more of a vested interest in the status quo. And, he has suggested that
continued delay in achieving a negotiated settlement increases the possibility that
frustrated Tibetans may resort to violence as an alternative to his own peaceful
approach.
Economic Development in Tibet. Chinese government policies on
economic development in Tibet appear to have helped raise the living standards of
Tibet generally, but at a high cost to Tibet’s traditions and cultural identity. These
policies reportedly have disrupted traditional living patterns and contributed to
tensions between Tibetans and Chinese immigrants. In an evident effort to assuage
Tibetan resentment, Beijing has spent substantial sums restoring Buddhist temples in
Tibet. At a large conference conducted on Tibet in 1994, Chinese officials adopted
plans to increase economic activity in Tibet by 10 percent per year and continue
substantial economic subsidies to help Tibet’s backward economy. China since then
has moved ahead with a number of major economic development and infrastructure
projects.
The Dalai Lama and other Tibetans are concerned that Chinese economic activity
in Tibet disrupts cultural identity, in part by encouraging huge migrations of non-
Tibetans into the region — both technical personnel to work on the projects
themselves, and entrepreneurs seeking new economic opportunities. Some have even
suggested that Beijing has consciously pursued an economic development strategy in
Tibet as a way to “solve” its Tibet problem, by ensuring that the Tibetan economy is
tied more tightly into that of China’s eastern provinces. The tensions inherent in
balancing economic development priorities and cultural preservation concerns will
continue to influence how American policymakers view China’s Tibet policies.
World Bank Project Loan. Controversy arose in 1999 over a World Bank
loan that was approved for China on June 24, 1999. One portion of the $160 million
“Western Poverty Reduction” loan, totaling $40 million, would have financed
construction of a dam, irrigation system, and poverty alleviation activities in an area
of Qinghai Province which many Tibetans consider part of historical Tibet. According
to the Bank’s estimates, this portion of the project also would involve resettlement
of approximately 58,000 people, most of whom are non-Tibetan, into this area of
Qinghai. Critics of the loan maintain that the resettlement plans will reduce the
overall share of the population that ethnic Tibetans now have in this region. Faced
with strong criticism, the Bank suspended its final commitment on the Qinghai portion
of the loan pending completion of an investigation by an independent Inspection
Panel. That panel found that although the Bank had violated some of its own rules
in making the loan, China nevertheless should take remedial steps to address some
valid criticisms, and that the Bank would have to vote a second time.17 On July 7,
2000, China withdrew its application for the loan, announcing it would use its own
17 See CRS Report RL30786, World Bank Lending: Issues Raised by China’s Qinghai
Resettlement Project, by Jonathan Sanford.

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funds to carry out the project and thus avoid having to address any of the Bank’s
concerns.
China’s “Patriotic Education” and Other Campaigns. In 1991, two
years after the Tiananmen Square crackdown, China launched a “patriotic education”
campaign in an effort to promote loyalty to the communist regime.18 In the mid-
1990s, the campaign became a government tool in efforts to control monastic activity
in Tibet and discredit the Dalai Lama among Tibetans. Under the guise of “patriotic
education,” teams of Chinese officials visit Tibetan monasteries and subject Tibetan
monks to “patriotic” education and training. The campaign requires monks to sign
a declaration attesting to a number of patriotic statements, including rejection and
denunciation of the Dalai Lama; acceptance of China’s choice for the Panchen Lama
(see next section); recognition that Tibet is part of China; and a promise not to listen
to Voice of America broadcasts. There reportedly has been widespread and intensive
resistance to this campaign. According to some reports, monks refusing to accept
“patriotic education” or sign the corresponding declaration have been expelled from
their monasteries.
In addition to this campaign, in January 1999, Chinese officials began a three-
year campaign to foster atheism in Tibet. According to a U.S. government report, a
Chinese propaganda official in Tibet described the new campaign in a television
interview, saying “intensifying propaganda on atheism plays an extremely significant
role in promoting economic construction...and to help peasants and herdsmen free
themselves from the negative influence of religion.”19
Finally, there are reports that the Chinese government is poised to initiate a new
campaign to target and undermine the Dalai Lama. According to a Hong Kong
newspaper report, in late May 2001, at the Fourth Tibet Work Forum to be held in
Tibet, Chinese authorities will discuss how to cope with what they refer to as the
“convergence and collaboration of five evil forces” – defined as Tibetan
independence, Xinjiang independence, Taiwan independence, the Falun Gong
movement, and the pro-democracy movement.20 According to reports, the work
forum will attempt to lessen the Dalai Lama’s influence in Tibet by defining him as a
“loyal tool of the Western anti-Chinese forces.”21
The Panchen Lama Succession. In 1995, controversy arose over the
selection of the successor to the Panchen Lama, the second most important spiritual
leader among Tibetans. When the Dalai Lama fled to India in 1959, the 10th Panchen
Lama remained behind, living in China until his death in 1989. Tibetans believe that
18 The first official document on this subject was “Circular on Fully Using Cultural Relics to
Conduct Education in Patriotism and Revolutionary Traditions,” Chinese Communist Party
Propaganda Department, 1991. See also Suisheng Zhao, “A State-Led Nationalism: The
Patriotic Education Campaign in Post-Tiananmen China,” in Communist and Post-
Communist Studies, Vol. 31, pp. 287-302, 1998.
19 “Annual Report on International Religious Freedom for 1999: Tibet,” September 9, 1999.
20 Hong Kong Ming Bao, in Chinese, May 19, 2001, translated in FBIS online.
21 Ibid.

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when a high-ranking spiritual leader dies, his soul is then reincarnated to await
rediscovery by special “search committees.” In May 1995, the Dalai Lama announced
that after years of searching — using search committees sanctioned by the Chinese
government — Gedhun Choeki Nyima, a 6-year-old boy living in Tibet, had been
found to be the legitimate reincarnation of the deceased Panchen Lama.
Chinese communist officials reportedly were furious that the Dalai Lama made
his announcement unilaterally. They regarded it as a challenge to Beijing’s authority
to have a final say in this important decision. Chinese officials responded by
maintaining that only they had the authority to name this spiritual leader.
Consequently, in November 1995, Chinese leaders rejected the Dalai Lama’s choice
and announced they had discovered the “real” Panchen Lama – 5-year-old Gyaltsen
Norbu, son of a communist yak herder. On November 29, 1995, he was officially
enthroned as the 11th Panchen Lama in a ceremony attended by Tibetan monks and
senior Chinese communist leaders. Immediately thereafter, both boys and their
families were taken into custody by Chinese authorities and held in undisclosed
locations in China. In June 1999, Gyaltsen Norbu, the boy recognized by Beijing,
returned to Tibet for the first time, reportedly under heavy military protection.
Gedhun Choeki Nyima, the boy recognized by the Dalai Lama, apparently remains
under house arrest and has not been seen since. The monk who headed the official
search party, Chadrel Rinpoche, was arrested and is serving 6 years in jail, allegedly
for collaborating with the Dalai Lama.
The decision of the Chinese government to become a direct player in the ancient
spiritual rites of Tibetan Buddhism has several implications for Tibet’s political future
and for U.S.-China relations. First, it has complicated the political and religious
environment by presenting Tibetans with potential rival centers of spiritual authority
in the two Panchen Lamas, thus burdening the private religious decisions of Tibetans
with possibly serious political consequences and raising the prospects for future
religious strife and divided loyalties. In addition, the Chinese government’s
involvement in the Panchen Lama succession has led many observers to speculate that
Beijing is positioning itself to choose the next Dalai Lama. In the eyes of Chinese
leaders, such an option might improve Beijing’s prospects for co-opting Tibet’s
religious leaders and marginalizing the Tibetan independence movement. But it also
could create a long-term religious succession crisis in Tibet and cause serious rifts
among Tibetans that could ultimately prove divisive and destabilizing for Chinese rule.
The Bush Administration and the 107th Congress
Consistent with its other early policy decisions regarding the People’s Republic
of China, the Administration of George W. Bush appears to have taken a somewhat
higher profile on Tibet, one less deferential to Beijing’s views. On May 17, 2001,
Secretary of State Colin Powell appointed Paula Dobriansky, Undersecretary of State
for Global Affairs, as the next U.S. Special Coordinator for Tibet. As
Undersecretary, Ms. Dobriansky is the highest-ranking of the three U.S. officials who
have held this position. In a further higher profile move, Secretary of State Powell
met personally with the Dalai Lama during the latter’s visit to Washington on May 22,
2001, reportedly to discuss “human nature, religious values, and the situation in
Tibet.” This was followed by a personal meeting on May 23, 2001, between

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President Bush and the Dalai Lama. This meeting (not held in the oval office) was
characterized as a presidential meeting with a religious figure.
Tibet Legislation in the 107th Congress. There are indications that
Members of the 107th Congress plan to continue and to expand upon their efforts to
focus more U.S. attention on Tibet. Representative Steven Rothman reportedly has
drafted legislation expressing the sense of the House that the President should
consider recognizing the Tibetan government-in-exile as the legitimate government
of Tibet if PRC authorities have not agreed to Tibetan political autonomy within three
years or if they haven’t engaged in substantive talks with the Tibetan government-in-
exile.
H.R. 1779/S. 852: The Tibetan Policy Act of 2001. In both the House
and Senate, legislation was introduced on May 9, 2001 (H.R. 1779 by Representative
Tom Lantos, and S. 852 by Senator Dianne Feinstein) entitled The Tibetan Policy Act
of 2001. The bills introduce a number of sense-of-Congress proposals, including:
that the United States should “initiate steps” to encourage a negotiated agreement
between Beijing and the Dalai Lama; that the United States-European Parliamentary
Group should encourage Sino-Tibetan dialogue; that the United States should seek
unconditional release for political prisoners in Tibet; and that the United States should
oppose any efforts in the United Nations either to prevent consideration of issues
involving Tibet or to prevent the participation of the Dalai Lama or his representatives
from participation in U.N. fora. Other major provisions of the legislation include:
! reaffirmation of the view that Tibet is an illegally occupied country;
! semi-annual reports to Congress on the status of Sino-Tibetan
discussions;
! separate listing for Tibet in all mandated U.S. country-by-country
reports;
! a statutory mandate for a Special Coordinator for Tibetan Issues in
the State Department (as opposed to leaving such an appointment to
presidential discretion);
! authorization of $2 million in U.S. funds for Tibetan migration and
refugees assistance in each of the three fiscal years from FY2002-
FY2004;
! policy declarations that the U.S. should encourage NGOs and
international organizations to undertake projects designed to assist
Tibetans to become self-sufficient and raise their standard of living;s
! upport for projects in Tibet by the U.S. EximBank, Overseas Private
Investment Corporation (OPIC), and Trade Development Agency
(TDA);
! the United States should seek to open in Lhasa, Tibet a branch office
of the U.S. Consulate General in Chengdu, to monitor developments
in Tibet;
! Tibetan language training for U.S. foreign service officers; and
! the United States should seek a meeting with and the release of the
boy the Dalai Lama announced as the 11th Panchen Lama.

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CRS-11
Appendix A: Tibet-related Interest Groups
International Campaign for Tibet (ICT). Apart from the Dalai Lama, a
number of interest groups established both in the United States and abroad since the
mid-1980s have worked to bring the Tibetan cause to the attention of the
Administration, the international community, and Members of Congress. These
groups remain important forces of influence on the political scene in 2001. Among
the most visible advocates for the Tibetan cause is the U.S.-based International
Campaign for Tibet (ICT), formed in 1988. Although the ICT pursues broad human
rights issues involving Tibet, its primary goals concern Tibet’s political and
international status – specifically, to help Tibet regain independence from China,
which the ITC regards as an illegal occupying power. Through its work, the ITC
hopes to create sufficient international support for Tibet to force China to begin
serious talks with the Dalai Lama about Tibet’s future status. The ITC has offices in
Washington and Amsterdam. Although it occasionally receives small grants (for
instance, from the National Endowment for Democracy), the ITC is largely dependent
on donations from private individuals.
International Campaign for Tibet
1825 K St. N.W., Suite 520
Washington, D.C. 20006
Ph: (202) 785-1515
[http://www.savetibet.org/]
The Committee of 100 for Tibet. In a similar vein, the Committee of 100
for Tibet, formed in 1992, seeks to put Tibet on the international agenda, and to
encourage international support for a free, independent Tibet. According to its self-
description, the Committee maintains “uncompromising support of the Tibetan
peaceful struggle for independence,” and it “cooperates with and complements the
work of other organizations working for Tibet and the Tibetan people.”22 The
Committee tries to disseminate news about Tibet through the World Tibet Network
News (WTN) and the Tibet News Digest.
The Committee’s membership (of approximately 100) is an international one, and
draws heavily from the actor/artist community (including Richard Gere, Joan Baez,
John Cleese, Marvin Hamlisch, and Catherine Ingram); the Nobel Laureate
community (13 Nobel prize winners, including Desmond Tutu and Elie Wiesel); and
current and former U.S. officials (House International Relations Committee Chairman
Ben Gilman, Representative Charlie Rose, former Attorney General Ramsey Clark,
and former U.S. Ambassador to the United Nations Jean Kirkpatrick). Membership
also includes officials associated with other Tibetan activist organizations, including
Lodi Gyari, president of the International Campaign for Tibet; Rinchen Dharlo,
representative of the Dalai Lama to North America; and Tsewang Phuntso, president
of the Tibetan Youth Congress.
22 Taken from the group’s website, which also includes a complete list of the group’s
membership. [http://www.tibet.org/Tibet100/]

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The Committee of 100 for Tibet
P.O. Box 60612
Palo Alto, CA 94306-0612
[http://www.tibet.org/Tibet100/]
The Tibet Information Network (TIN). A third group, the Tibet
Information Network (TIN – formed in October 1987) describes its goal as providing
“accurate information free from political bias” (a claim supported by a spokesperson
from the office of the U.S. Special Coordinator for Tibetan Affairs).23 Contrary to
other advocacy/support groups on Tibet, TIN is an independent news organization.
Based in London, with a U.S. office in Jackson, Wyoming, TIN maintains it is not
associated with any government organizations or other Tibet-related organizations.
Since its inception, TIN has been providing reports on social, economic, and political
developments in Tibet, based on both official Chinese and Tibetan sources, and on
independent observations from foreign visitors. In addition to its website, TIN offers
its “News subscribers” about 35 faxed or e-mailed news reports annually, plus
periodic book length studies, and moderate length briefing papers. Subscribers to its
TIN Publications Service receive mailed copies of more in-depth reports a minimum
of four times a year.
Tibet Information Network USA
P.O. Box 2270
Jackson, WY 83001
Ph: (307) 733-4670
[http://www.tibetinfo.net/]
23 Quote taken from the TIN website: [http://www.tibetinfo.net/admin/whattin.htm]

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