Order Code IB93108
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Central Asia’s New States:
Political Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests
Updated May 18, 2001
Jim Nichol
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Historical Background
Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns
U.S. Policy after the Soviet Collapse
Fostering Pro-Western Orientations
Russia’s Role
Obstacles to Peace and Independence
Regional Tensions and Conflicts
Democratization and Human Rights
Security and Arms Control
Weapons of Mass Destruction
Support for Economic Reforms
Trade and Investment
Energy Resources
Aid Overview

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Central Asia’s New States: Political Developments and
Implications for U.S. Interests
SUMMARY
After the collapse of the Soviet Union in
tory (the last were removed in 1995) and the
1991, the United States recognized the inde-
security of other nuclear materials. The Unit-
pendence of all the former Central Asian
ed States pursued some economic and business
republics and established diplomatic relations
interests in Central Asia, particularly in oil and
with each by mid-March 1992. The United
natural gas development in Kazakhstan,
States also supported their admission to the
Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. The United
Organization on Security and Cooperation in
States initially forged expanded ties with
Europe (OSCE) and other Western organiza-
Kyrgyzstan because it appeared committed to
tions, and elicited Turkish support in counter-
democratization. The Clinton Administration
ing Iranian influence in the region. Congress
was concerned about human rights and civil
was at the forefront in urging the formation of
liberties problems in all the states. In
coherent U.S. policies for aiding these and
Tajikistan, U.S. humanitarian aid focused on
other new independent states (NIS) of the
alleviating the effects of civil war and on other
former Soviet Union, and approved the Free-
urgent needs. For FY2001, the Administration
dom Support Act and other legislation for this
emphasized security assistance for counter-
purpose.
narcotics, non-proliferation, border and cus-
toms, and defense programs.
The former Clinton Administration em-
phasized forging closer U.S. relations with the
Some observers call for different empha-
Central Asian states. U.S. policy goals in-
ses or levels of U.S. involvement in Central
cluded fostering stability, democratization, free
Asia. Some have called for strengthening
market economies, free trade and transport
conditions linking aid to progress in improving
throughout the Eurasian corridor, de-
human rights or in making adequate progress
nuclearization in the non-Russian states, and
in democratization and the creation of free
adherence to international human rights stan-
markets. Some dispute the importance of
dards. An over-arching U.S. priority was to
energy and other resources to U.S. national
discourage attempts by radical regimes and
security interests. Others point to civil and
groups to block or subvert progress toward
ethnic tensions in the region as possibly
these goals. Clinton Administration policy
endangering U.S. lives and investments.
also aimed to integrate these states into the
Heightened congressional interest in Central
international community so that they followed
Asia was reflected in passage of “Silk Road”
responsible security and other policies, and to
language in late 1999 (Consolidated Appropri-
discourage xenophobic and anti-Western
ations; P.L.106-113) authorizing enhanced
orientations that threatened regional and
U.S. policy attention and aid to support con-
international peace and stability. The former
flict amelioration, humanitarian needs, eco-
Clinton Administration’s policy goals in
nomic development, transport (including
Central Asia reflected the different characteris-
energy pipelines) and communications, border
tics of these states. U.S. interests in
controls, democracy, and the creation of civil
Kazakhstan included promoting the removal of
societies in the South Caucasian and Central
strategic nuclear weapons located on its terri-
Asian states.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
As part of Russian President Vladimir Putin’s efforts to establish a rapid reaction
military presence in Central Asia, visiting Tajik President Emomali Rakhmonov reportedly
agreed with Putin on April 22, 2001, on the establishment of a 3,000-man tactical air base
in Tajikistan, marking the reintroduction of such forces absent since the Soviet period.
Russia also announced that it would bolster its border troops along the Tajik-Afghan border.
Putin and visiting Uzbek President Islam Karimov agreed in early May on stepped-up
Russian arms sales. The sanctioning of the rapid reaction forces will be discussed at a late
May 2001 summit of the members of the Collective Security Treaty. Uzbek and Kyrgyz
officials have been increasingly concerned about alleged imminent attacks by terrorist
groups based in Afghanistan (and, reportedly, in the mountains of Tajikistan).
Visiting U.S. Central Command Commander-in-Chief Tommy Franks on May 16, 2001,
announced that Tajikistan had been admitted into NATO’s Partnership for Peace. General
Franks reportedly offered officer training with NATO and invited the “strategically
important” Tajikistan to observe upcoming NATO exercises in Germany. He visited
Kyrgyzstan the next day to discuss U.S. military assistance.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Historical Background
Central Asia consists of the former
Central Asia: Basic Facts
Soviet republics of Kazakhstan,
Area: 1.6 million sq. mi., larger than India;
Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, and
Kazakhstan: 1.1 m. sq. mi.; Kyrgyzstan: 77,000
Uzbekistan, and borders Russia, China, the
sq. mi.; Tajikistan: 55,800 sq. mi.; Turkmenistan:
Middle East, and South Asia. The major
190,000 sq. mi.; Uzbekistan: 174,500 sq. mi.
peoples of all but Tajikistan speak Turkic
Population: 55.7 million (1999 est., World Bank),
languages (the Tajiks speak an Iranian
somewhat less than France; Kazakhstan: 15.4 m.;
language), and most are Sunni Muslims
Kyrgyzstan: 4.7 m.; Tajikistan: 6.2 m.; Turk-
(some Tajiks are Shiia Muslims). Most are
menistan: 4.8 m.; Uzbekistan: 24.6 m.
closely related historically and culturally.
Gross Domestic Product: $38.5 billion in 1999
By the late 19th century, Russian Tsars
(World Bank); Kazakhstan: $15.6 b.; Kyrgyzstan:
had conquered the last independent
$1.6 b.; Tajikistan: $1.8 b.; Turkmenistan: $2.7 b.;
khanates and nomadic lands of Central
Uzbekistan: $16.8 b.
Asia. After the breakup of the Tsarist
empire, Central Asia was at first included
within Soviet Russia, but by 1936 five “union republics” had been delineated. Soviet
communist rule resulted in massive loss of life from collectivization and purges, though
economic development occurred. Upon the collapse of the Soviet Union in December 1991,
the five republics gained worldwide diplomatic recognition. (For overviews, see CRS Report
97-1058, Kazakhstan; CRS Report 97-690, Kyrgyzstan; CRS Report 98-594, Tajikistan;
CRS Report 97-1055, Turkmenistan; and CRS Report 97-1060, Uzbekistan, updated
regularly.)
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Overview of U.S. Policy Concerns
The major goals of former Clinton Administration policy toward the NIS, including
Central Asia, entailed fostering stability, democratization, free market economies and trade,
denuclearization in the non-Russian states, and adherence to international human rights
standards. These positive policy goals were supported by another priority — to discourage
attempts by radical regimes and groups to block or subvert progress toward these goals or
otherwise threaten regional peace and stability. While a consensus appears to exist among
most U.S. policymakers and others on the general desirability of these goals, there are various
views on the types and levels of U.S. involvement. Many of those who endorse continued or
enhanced U.S. support for Central Asia argue that political instability in Central Asia can
produce spillover effects in important nearby states, including U.S. allies and friends such as
Turkey. They also argue that the United States has a major interest in preventing terrorist
regimes or groups from illicitly acquiring nuclear weapons-related materials and technology
in the region. They maintain that U.S. interests do not perfectly coincide with those of its
allies and friends, that Turkey and other actors possess limited aid resources, and that the
United States is in the strongest position as a superpower to influence democratization and
respect for human rights. They stress that U.S. leadership in world efforts to provide
humanitarian and economic reform aid will help alleviate the high levels of social distress that
are exploited by anti-Western Islamic extremist groups seeking new members. Although
many U.S. policymakers acknowledge a role for a democratizing Russia in the region, they
stress that U.S. and other Western aid and investment strengthen the independence of the
states and forestall Russian attempts to re-subjugate the region.
Those who have objected to aspects of past policy toward Central Asia argue that the
United States has historically had few interests in this region and that developments there
remain marginal to U.S. interests. They advocate limited U.S. contacts undertaken with
Turkey and other friends and allies to ensure U.S. interests. Many discount fears that an
anti-Western Islamic extremism, such as that fostered by Iran or Afghanistan’s Taliban group,
will make headway, or that Russia will seek or be able to re-subjugate the region. They
question whether the oil and other natural resources in these new states are vital to U.S.
security and point out that oil resources are, in any event, unlikely to be fully available to
Western markets for many years. Some also criticize aid for democratization among cultures
they view as historically attuned to authoritarianism. Others urge reducing or cutting off most
aid to repressive governments that widely violate human rights, arguing that such aid provides
tacit support for these regimes, and may even unwittingly encourage the rise of Islamic
fundamentalism as an alternative channel of dissent. Some point to lingering instability in
Tajikistan and elsewhere in the region as another reason for the United States to eschew
major involvement that might place more U.S. personnel and citizens in danger.
U.S. Policy after the Soviet Collapse
After the collapse of the Soviet Union at the end of 1991, the United States recognized
the independence of all the former Central Asian republics and offered diplomatic relations
to Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan, which were viewed as following responsible security and
democratic policies. Citing the dangers the Central Asian states faced from Iranian-sponsored
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Islamic fundamentalism, U.S. diplomatic relations were quickly established with the remainder
by mid-March 1992. Faced with calls in Congress and elsewhere that the Administration
devise a policy on aiding the NIS, former President Bush sent the Freedom Support Act to
Congress, which was signed into law on October 24, 1992 (P.L. 102-511). The incoming
Clinton Administration in 1993 soon pledged to focus on close ties with the NIS as a top
foreign policy priority. (For details on aid, see CRS Report RL30148, U.S. Assistance to the
Soviet Union and its Successor States 1991-1998).
In congressional testimony on March 17, 1999, then-Ambassador-at-Large for the New
Independent States Steve Sestanovich stated that the over-arching goal of U.S. policy in
Central Asia was to secure the sovereignty, independence and territorial integrity of the states.
This goal was being pursued by advocating democratization (because it is “the long-term
guarantor of stability and prosperity”), free markets, cooperation within the region (including
on building east-west pipelines and on defense) and its integration into the Euro-Atlantic
community, and responsible security policies (including nonproliferation, counter-terrorism,
and counter-narcotics). Although the states were making halting progress in some areas, he
stated, the Administration was committed to continue working with them. In testimony in
April 1998, then-Ambassador Sestanovich stated that the United States had a “big stake” in
assisting the peaceful and historic integration of Central Asia and the South Caucasus into the
world community, interests that were seen as “strategic” and “vital.”
U.S. diplomatic and other ties have greatly increased in all the Central Asian states , and
the embassies are being upgraded (except in Tajikistan, see below). A U.S.-Kazakh Joint
Commission held its first meeting in November 1994, chaired by Vice President Gore and
President Nazarbayev. A U.S.-Uzbekistan Joint Commission, highlighting the
Administration’s view that “in geopolitical terms [and] commercially, [Uzbekistan] is a very
important country for the United States,” held its first meeting in February 1998. Although
these commissions are not being retained by the Bush Administration, some of their working
groups and other forums will continue to address bilateral issues of concern.
Fostering Pro-Western Orientations
The United States has encouraged the Central Asian states to become responsible
members of the international community, and supported their admission to the Organization
for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE), NATO bodies, and other Western
organizations. The Clinton Administration supported these integrative goals through bilateral
aid and through coordination with other aid donors, including regional powers such as
Turkey. The former Administration used these and other means to discourage radical
regimes, groups, and Islamic fundamentalists — who used repression or violence to oppose
democratization — from attempts to gain influence. Upon independence, all the Central
Asian states professed desires for good relations with both East and West as a means of
demonstrating independence, and a certain opportunism has been evident in the quest for
relations with aid donors. All the Central Asian leaders publicly embraced Islam, but display
hostility toward Islamic fundamentalism. At the same time, they have established some trade
and aid ties with Iran. While they have had greater success in attracting development aid from
the West than from the East, many observers argue that, in the long run, their foreign policies
will probably not be anti-Western, but may be more oriented toward Islamic states and
interests. (See also CRS Report RL30294, Central Asia’s Security.)
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Russia’s Role. The former Clinton Administration generally viewed a democratizing
Russia as able to play a stabilizing role in Central Asia, though there was increasing emphasis
by the late 1990s that Russia should not seek to dominate the region or exclude Western and
other involvement. Some observers warn that Russia might soon reabsorb Central Asia into
a new empire. Others, however, discount such capabilities because of what they view as
Russia’s deep economic, political, ethnic, and military disorder, but nonetheless endorse
monitoring Russian actions that might infringe on the independence of the NIS.
Russian officials have variously emphasized interests in strategic security and economic
ties with Central Asia, and concerns over the treatment of ethnic Russians. Strategic concerns
have focused on drug trafficking and regional conflict, and the region’s role as a buffer to
Islamic extremism. Russia endeavors to meet its strategic concerns by concluding bilateral
military arms, training, basing, and border security agreements, as well as multilateral
agreements among the members of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), such as
on Collective Security. By the late 1990s, Russia’s economic decline and demands by Central
Asia caused it to reduce its security presence. Russian border troops still defend “CIS
borders” in Tajikistan, but were largely phased out in Kyrgyzstan in 1999 (some 100 Russian
“advisors” remain, many deployed along the Kyrgyz-Chinese border). In late 1999, the last
group of Russian military advisors left Turkmenistan. In 1999, Uzbekistan withdrew from
the Collective Security Treaty, citing its ineffectiveness and obtrusiveness, though
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan reaffirmed membership. Russia has justified its
military base accord with Tajikistan by citing the Islamic extremist threat to the CIS.
In an apparent shift toward a more activist Russian role in Central Asia, in January 2000,
then-Acting President Putin approved a “national security concept” that termed foreign efforts
to “weaken” Russia’s “position” in Central Asia as a security threat. Among recent Russian
activism, in early 2000, Russia supplied Kazakhstan with Suvorov jet fighters and trainers and
promised to soon deliver an S-300 anti-missile complex and Tupolev bombers; in March
2000, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan joined Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan in coordinating air
defenses with Russian Air Defense Forces; and in May 2001, Russia agreed on arms sales to
Uzbekistan. Russia reportedly has linked recent military aid to Kyrgyzstan to profitable
concessions on uranium, gold, and rare-earth minerals mining and processing.
At CIS summits in 2000, Russia called for setting up antiterrorism centers to allow
Russia’s security, police, and military forces to rapidly deploy to CIS territory. Some CIS
leaders have been concerned about Russia’s intentions in setting up what they view as threats
to sovereignty and have insisted on prior consultations on such deployments and otherwise
tried to limit the powers of the centers. Russian Valeriy Nikolayenko, head of the CIS
Collective Security Council, announced that meetings would be held in April-May 2001 to
work out details to forming a Central Asia-based rapid-reaction military unit composed of
Russian, Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Tajik troops, aimed to counter Islamic extremism but also
apparently aimed to counter U.S. and NATO security influence.
Economically, Russia seeks to counter Western business interests and gain substantial
influence over oil and gas resources in the region through participation in joint ventures and
by insisting that pipeline routes transit Russian territory. At the same time, Russia has
avoided large economic subsidies to the region. Russia’s stance was illustrated in September
1999 when Russian Foreign Minister Igor Ivanov stated that U.S. proposals for an east-west
Caspian pipeline by-passing Russia were “detrimental to Russia, and consequently
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unacceptable to us,” and amounted to “playing anti-Russian cards in the Caspian” (see below,
Trade). A foreign policy concept approved by Putin in February 2000 and a foreign policy
speech he made in February 2001 highlight Russia’s concerns about the treatment of the
twenty million Russians residing in the “near abroad” former Soviet republics.
The safety of ethnic Russians (or more broadly, “Russian-speakers”) in Central Asia has
been of popular concern in Russia but has mainly served as a political stalking horse for those
in Russia advocating the “reintegration” of former “Russian lands.” According to the 1989
Soviet census, nearly ten million ethnic Russians resided in Central Asia, constituting about
40% of all ethnic Russians then residing outside of Russia (25.3 million). Six of the ten
million resided mainly in northern and eastern regions of Kazakhstan, and many Kazakhs fear
potential separatism in these regions. Ethnic Russian fears are raised by employment,
language, electoral, and other policies or practices they deem discriminatory. These and other
factors contributed to the decline of Russians to 6.6 million by 2001, about 12% of the
population of Central Asia, according to the CIS Statistics Agency. Russians remaining tend
to be elderly or low-skilled. In Kazakhstan, ethnic Kazakhs have again become a majority.
While seeking ties with Russia to provide for security and economic needs, at least in
the short term, the Central Asian states have tried to resist or modify Russian policies viewed
as diluting their sovereignty. Uzbek President Islam Karimov and Kazakh President
Nursultan Nazarbayev have been harsh critics of what they have viewed as traditional Russian
tendencies to treat Central Asia as an “unequal partner.” Some observers argue that a heavy-
handed approach by Russia in pursuing interests in Central Asia, as well as damaging its ties
with the West, will backfire among increasingly nationalistic populations and elites and harm
its long term ties with these states.
Russia and Iran have found some common grounds for cooperation in countering what
they view as adverse Western influences in Central Asia. Similarly, Russia has increased
efforts to forge a “partnership” with China on Central Asia issues. China has shown increased
interest in ethnic issues and with energy and other trade with the region, and in border and
other security through the “Shanghai Forum” group of China and NIS bordering states. Some
observers warn that this growing similarity of interests among Russia, Iran, and China in
countering the West and attempting to increase their own influence could heighten threats to
the sovereignty and independence of the Central Asian states. Others discount the near-term
threats to the region posed by cooperation among the three states, stressing their limited
economies, their diverging interests, and Russia’s weakened regional influence.
Obstacles to Peace and Independence
The former Clinton Administration endeavored to foster stability necessary for the NIS
to successfully implement pro-Western reforms. Then-Deputy Secretary Talbott stated in
July 1997 that U.S. support for peace settlements aims at preventing the region from
becoming a hotbed of terrorism, religious and political extremism, and wider conflict. He also
noted that there are substantial oil resources in the region, “yet another reason why conflict
resolution must be job one for U.S. policy.” However, conflict mediation and the evaluation
of other threats to stability in Central Asia have not been a primary responsibility of the State
Department’s Special Negotiator for Nagorno Karabakh and New Independent States
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Regional Conflicts, though U.S. diplomacy did play a role in U.N. and OSCE mediation
efforts in Tajikistan.
All the Central Asian states, except Tajikistan, have appeared largely stable politically
since independence, unlike many other NIS. The presidents have remained in place by
orchestrating extensions of their terms and by limiting political freedoms. U.S. policymakers
have warned, however, that political repression ultimately harms stability. The lack of
obvious successors to the present leaders raises concern among many observers, though all
the current leaders are sixty-two or younger. Kyrgyzstan’s Constitutional Court in 1999 ruled
that President Askar Akayev could run for a third term as president, although the constitution
set a two-term limit, and Niyazov orchestrated a constitutional change in late 1999 naming
him president for life. Nazarbayev too in 2000 gained some official powers for life. Belying
this appearance of stability, Uzbekistan’s capital of Tashkent was shaken in February 1999
by explosions that Karimov denounced as a coup attempt (see below), and even Niyazov’s
repressive regime faced popular protests in early 2001.
Regional Tensions and Conflicts. The legacies of co-mingled ethnic groups,
convoluted borders, and vague national identities pose serious problems to stability in all the
Central Asian states. During the Soviet period, an overarching “Soviet” identity was stressed,
but more significant was the spur, given by the delineation of republics in the 1920s-1930s,
to the growth of national identities. With the Soviet collapse, most in Central Asia support
these national identities, but also are emphasizing identifications with clan, family, region, and
Islam. Among the four Turkic-language states (Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Turkmenistan, and
Uzbekistan), some promote a pan-Turkic identity. Most analysts conclude, however, that in
the foreseeable future the term Central Asia will denote a geographic area more than a region
of shared identities and aspirations.
Central Asia’s borders, described as among the world’s most convoluted, fail to
accurately reflect ethnic distributions and are hard to police, hence contributing to potential
instability. Ethnic Uzbeks make up sizeable minorities in the other Central Asian countries
and Afghanistan. In Tajikistan, they make up almost a quarter of the population. More ethnic
Turkmen reside in Iran and Afghanistan — over three million — than in Turkmenistan.
Sizeable numbers of ethnic Tajiks reside in Uzbekistan, and a million or more in Afghanistan.
Many Kyrgyz and Tajiks live in China’s Xinjiang province. The fertile Ferghana Valley was
divided by Stalin among Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan, leaving large numbers of
people outside their new “national” borders. Criss-crossing mountains thwart Tajikistan’s
integrity. In early 2001, Akayev faced widespread popular criticism for agreements with both
Uzbekistan and China ceding border territories. The Kyrgyz government quickly repudiated
a February 2001 memorandum with Uzbekistan ceding access to Uzbekistan’s Sokh enclave.
The Kyrgyz-China border delimitation agreement of 1999, recently submitted to the
legislature for ratification, set forth an exchange of some territory. Some Kyrgyz legislators
have called for Akayev’s impeachment.
In 1996, Russia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Tajikistan, signed the “Shanghai treaty”
with China pledging the sanctity and substantial demilitarization of mutual borders, and in
1997 they signed a follow-on treaty demilitarizing the 4,300 mile former Soviet border with
China. China has used the treaty to pressure Central Asia to deter their ethnic Uighur
minorities from supporting separatism in China’s Xinjiang province. China and Russia appear
recently to be converting the grouping, renamed the Shanghai Forum, into a security conclave
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to combat Islamic extremism and oppose U.S. influence, according to some observers.
Karimov indicated interest in May 2001 in joining the Forum.
The Bombings in Tashkent, Uzbekistan. After the February 16, 1999, explosions, which
by various reports killed 16-28 and wounded 100-351, Uzbek officials detained dozens of
suspects, including political dissidents. Karimov in April 1999 accused Mohammad Solikh
(former Uzbek presidential candidate and head of the banned Erk Party) of masterminding the
plot, along with Tohir Yuldashev (former leader of the banned Uzbek Adolat social
movement) and the Taliban. The first trial of 22 suspects in June 1999 resulted in six
receiving the death sentence. The suspects were described in court proceedings as Islamic
terrorists who received training in Afghanistan (by the Taliban), Tajikistan, Pakistan, and
Russia (by the terrorist Khattab in Chechnya), and were led by Solikh, Yuldashev, and Jama
Namanganiy. Testimony alleged that Solikh had joined the Islamic Movement of Uzbekistan
(IMU), led by Yuldashev and Namanganiy, in mid-1997, and that Solikh, Yuldashev,
Namanganiy, and others had agreed that Solikh would be president and Yuldashev defense
minister after Karimov was overthrown and a caliphate established. According to an Uzbek
media report in July 1999, the coup plot included a planned attack on Uzbekistan by
Namanganiy and United Tajik Opposition (UTO) allies transiting through Tajikistan and
Kyrgyzstan (see below).
Another secret trial in August 1999 of six suspects in the bombings (brothers of Solikh
or members of his Erk Party) resulted in sentences ranging from 8 to 15 years. In November
2000, the Uzbek Supreme Court convicted twelve persons of terrorism, nine of whom were
tried in absentia. The absent Yuldashev and Namangoniy were given death sentences and the
absent Solikh, 15.5 years in prison. U.S. officials criticized the apparent lack of due process
during the trial. Solikh has rejected accusations of involvement in the bombings or
membership in the IMU. Yuldsashev too has eschewed responsibility for the bombings but
warned that more might occur if Karimov does not step down.
In September 2000, the State Department designated the IMU, led by Yuldashev, as a
Foreign Terrorist Organization, stating that the IMU resorts to terrorism, actively threatens
U.S. interests, and attacks American citizens. The “main goal of the IMU is to topple the
current government in Uzbekistan,” it warned, linking the IMU to bombings and attacks on
Uzbekistan in 1999-2000. The IMU is being aided by Afghanistan’s Taliban and by terrorist
bin Laden, according to the State Department, and it stressed that the “United States supports
the right of Uzbekistan to defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity from the violent
actions of the IMU.” The former Clinton Administration supported Uzbekistan’s efforts to
combat terrorism but stressed that such efforts should not include human rights abuses. Some
observers stressed that Uzbek officials who were once in charge of repressing dissent and
religion during the Soviet era largely continued to carry out their functions, creating
increasing popular alienation. Reportedly, besides the IMU, nearly a dozen Islamic extremist
groups are attracting increasing popular support.
The Incursions into Kyrgyzstan. Several hundred Islamic extremists and others first
invaded Kyrgyzstan in July-August 1999. Namanganiy headed the largest guerrilla group.
They seized hostages and several villages, allegedly seeking to create an Islamic state in south
Kyrgyzstan as a springboard for a jihad in Uzbekistan. With Uzbek and Kazakh air and other
support, Kyrgyz forces finally forced the guerrillas out in October 1999. Karimov heavily
criticized Akayev for supposed laxity in suppressing the guerrillas. According to some
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observers, the incursion indicated both links among terrorism in Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan,
Russia (Chechnya), and elsewhere and the weakness of Kyrgyzstan’s security forces.
Analysts disagree on the degree to which this terrorism was related to Islamic fundamentalism
or to control over increasingly lucrative drug trafficking. Dozens of IMU and other
insurgents again invaded Kyrgyzstan and Uzbekistan in August 2000, in Kyrgyzstan taking
foreigners hostage and leading to thousands of Kyrgyz fleeing the area. Uzbekistan provided
air and some other support, but Kyrgyz forces were largely responsible for defeating the
insurgents by late October 2000, reporting the loss of 30 Kyrgyz troops.
Civil War in Tajikistan. State Department officials served as observers at the
U.N.-sponsored inter-Tajik peace talks and pledged to help Tajikistan rebuild after a peace
settlement, indications of the Administration’s efforts to ease ethnic and civil tensions in the
NIS. The United States has been the major humanitarian donor to alleviate the effects of the
Tajik civil war. The United States supported the presence of U.N. observers in Tajikistan,
and urged Russian-CIS “peacekeeping” forces to cooperate fully with them and to abide by
international law. U.S. programs in Tajikistan have been complicated by the U.S. closure of
its embassy in Dushanbe in 1998, and relocation of personnel to Kazakhstan, because of
inadequate security. Beginning in 2000, some diplomatic personnel have traveled back and
forth to Dushanbe. A site will be identified where a secure chancery can be built. Then-
Ambassador-at-Large Sestanovich warned in March 1999 that the truncated diplomatic
presence might allow Iran to increase its influence.
Tajikistan was among the Central Asian republics least prepared and inclined toward
independence when the Soviet Union broke up. In September 1992, a loose coalition of
nationalist, Islamic, and democratic parties and movements – largely consisting of members
of Pamiri and Garmi regional elites who had long been excluded from political power – tried
to take over. Kulyabi and Khojenti regional elites, assisted by Uzbekistan and Russia,
launched a successful counteroffensive that by the end of 1992 had resulted in 20,000-40,000
casualties and up to 800,000 refugees or displaced persons, about 80,000 of whom fled to
Afghanistan. In 1993, the CIS authorized “peacekeeping” in Tajikistan, consisting of Russia’s
201st Rifle Division, based in Tajikistan, and token Kazakh, Kyrgyz, and Uzbek troops (the
Kyrgyz and Uzbek troops pulled out in 1998-1999).
After the Tajik government and opposition agreed to a cease-fire in September 1994,
the U.N. Security Council established a small U.N. Mission of Observers in Tajikistan
(UNMOT) in December 1994 with a mandate to monitor the cease-fire, later expanded to
investigate cease-fire violations, monitor the demobilization of UTO fighters, assist ex-
combatants to integrate into society, and offer advice for holding elections. In December
1996, the two sides agreed to set up a National Reconciliation Commission (NRC), an
executive body composed equally of government and opposition members. On June 27,
1997, Tajik President Emomali Rakhmanov and UTO leader Seyed Abdullo Nuri signed the
comprehensive peace agreement, under which Rakhmanov remained president but 30% of
ministerial posts were allotted to the opposition. Benchmarks of the peace process were
largely met, including the return of refugees, demilitarization of rebel forces, legalization of
rebel parties, and the holding of elections. In March 2000, the NRC disbanded, and UNMOT
pulled out in May 2000. The CIS declared its peacekeeping mandate fulfilled in June 2000,
but Russian troops remain under a 25-year basing agreement. Stability in Tajikistan remains
fragile. An unsuccessful insurrection in northern Tajikistan in late 1998 highlights concerns
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by some observers about secessionist tendencies in the Soghd (formerly Leninabad) region
and about ethnic tensions between ethnic Tajiks and Uzbeks in Tajikistan.
Democratization and Human Rights
A major concern of U.S. policy in Central Asia has been to foster the long-term
development of democratic institutions and policies upholding human rights. U.S.
democratization support has been provided for political parties, voter education and electoral
laws, legal and constitutional reform, media, structuring the division and balance of
governmental powers, and parliamentary and educational exchanges. At the same time, the
United States has worked with the ex-Communist party officials who have led in four of the
five states (except Tajikistan) since before independence, recognizing that they may continue
to hold power for some time. In testimony before the Congressional Helsinki Commission
in May 1999, State Department official Ross Wilson stressed that the Administration had
“serious reservations” about calls to link U.S. aid mainly to progress in democratization. He
stressed that other salient U.S. policy goals included halting proliferation and fostering free
market reforms, energy development, U.S. business, and regional cooperation. In testimony
in March 2000, John Beyrle, then-Deputy Special Advisor to the Secretary of State for the
NIS, similarly argued that U.S. policy toward Turkmenistan weighed its human rights abuses
against continued engagement on regional energy development, nonproliferation, and anti-
narcotics goals, with the hope that Turkmen someday might embrace democracy.
Scenarios of political development in Central Asia include continued rule in most of the
states by former Soviet and ex-Communist party elites, gradual transitions to more
nationalistic elites who are at least somewhat democratic and Western-oriented, or large-scale
and perhaps violent transitions to Islamic fundamentalist or xenophobic rule. All the Central
Asian governments gave assurances in 1992 to the United States that they would pursue
democratization. During Nazarbayev’s 1994 U.S. visit, he and then-President Clinton signed
a Charter on Democratic Partnership recognizing Kazakhstan’s commitments to the rule of
law, respect for human rights, and economic reform. However, the State Department’s
Country Reports on Human Rights Practices for 2000 concludes that presidential power in
all the Central Asian states overshadows legislative and judicial power, and that they have
lost ground in democratization and respect for human rights.
The OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights official Hrair Balian
has termed elections in Central Asia during 2000 as regressive. Such races increase political
alienation and frustration among the populations of the states, according to some observers,
and contribute to the formation of clandestine groups seeking to overthrow the regimes.
Among recent regional elections that indicate halting or negligible democratization, the OSCE
and other international observers reported instances of bribery of voters, governmental
intimidation of voters, media bias, ballot box-stuffing, and manipulation of tabulations during
Kyrgyzstan’s October 29, 2000, presidential election. The OSCE concluded that the vote
represented a setback to democratization, though it hailed the democratic sentiments of many
election officials and voters as promising for the future.
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Security and Arms Control
Besides diplomatic efforts and humanitarian and reform aid, some U.S. security
assistance has been provided to the region. Except for CTR aid, amounts have been modest,
but funding increased in FY2000-FY2001. Indicating growing Congressional interest, H.R.
4919 (P.L.106-280; signed into law on October 6, 2000) authorizes aid to combat nuclear,
biological, and chemical weapons and conventional weapons proliferation in the NIS, and
$45.5 million in FY2001-FY2002 to assist GUUAM countries (Georgia, Ukraine, Uzbekistan,
Azerbaijan, and Moldova) and Armenia to carry out provisions of the Silk Road Act to
strengthen national control of borders and to promote independence and sovereignty.
Among U.S. accords on security, during Nazarbayev’s 1994 U.S. visit, the two sides
signed a defense cooperation memorandum, to include talks on defense doctrine, training, and
budgets, and in 1997, they signed a military cooperation accord pledging U.S. training,
nuclear materials security, and conversion aid. Similar military accords have been signed with
Uzbekistan. In February 2000, the United States transferred sixteen military transport
vehicles to the Uzbek military to enhance interoperability with NATO forces, the first sizeable
military equipment to be provided under the Foreign Military Financing program to Central
Asia. Coast guard vessels are being transferred to Turkmenistan and Kazakhstan. U.S.
Central Command in 1999 became responsible for U.S. military engagement activities,
planning, and operations in Central Asia. USCENTCOM states that its strategy focuses on
PFP, Marshall Center (the defense educational coordinator for PFP), and IMET programs to
foster “apolitical, professional militaries capable of responding to regional peacekeeping and
humanitarian needs” in the region.
Efforts to foster military cooperation were furthered when all the Central Asian states
except Tajikistan joined NATO’s PFP by mid-1994. Central Asian officers and troops have
participated in PFP exercises in the United States since 1995. Troops from Centrazbat (the
Central Asian Battalion; composed of
Kazakhstan, Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Tajikistan under U.N. auspices for
Cumulative Obligations FY1992-FY2000 for
Central Asian Security Programs (Freedom
potential peacekeeping) took part in
Support Act and Other Funds)
“PFP-style” exercises in 1997 in
(million dollars)
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan along with
State Dept. Anti-Crime Training
15.47
500 U.S. troops who flew directly from
State Dept. Science Centers
15.74
the United States. In 1998, Centrazbat
Defense Dept./Customs & Border Security
1.12
Defense Dept/FBI Counterproliferation
2.3
forces took part in PFP-sponsored
State Dept. Export Controls (NADR)
2.02
exercises in Uzbekistan and Kyrgyzstan,
State Dept. Nonproliferation & Disarmament 2.97
and in September 2000, U.S. troops
State Dept. Antiterrorism
2.35
took part in Centrazbat exercises in
International Military Education & Training
8.11
Kazakhstan. Many in Central Asia view
Partnership for Peace (PFP)
3.45
Foreign Military Financing (FMF)
19.85
these exercises as “sending a message” to
Comprehensive Threat Reduction (CTR)
169.07
Islamic extremists and others in
Dept. of Energy Nonproliferation, Arms
Afghanistan, Iran, and elsewhere against
Control, and Materials Protection
37.08
fostering regional instability. Centrazbat,
National Science Foundation Civilian Res.
1.04
however, has suffered from wrangling
Total
280.57
Source: State Department
among its members and its future is
clouded. Former U.S. Deputy Defense
Secretary Jeffrey Starr met with Tajik
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Defense Minister Sherali Khayrulloyev and border guard officers in January 2001 to discuss
military cooperation, including urging Tajikistan to join PFP. The two sides discussed
regional security and the conflict in Afghanistan, with Starr reportedly stating that Tajikistan
was a key to stability in Central Asia.
Weapons of Mass Destruction. Major U.S. security interests have included
elimination of nuclear weapons remaining in Kazakhstan after the breakup of the Soviet Union
and other efforts to control nuclear proliferation in Central Asia. In March 1999, then-
Ambassador Sestanovich warned that Iran is targeting these countries, and that U.S. aid aims
to bolster their export and physical controls over nuclear technology and materials. After the
Soviet breakup, Kazakhstan was on paper one of world’s major nuclear weapons powers (in
reality Russia controlled these weapons). Though some in Kazakhstan urged “retaining” the
weapons, it pledged to become a non-nuclear weapons state. All bombers and their
air-launched cruise missiles were removed by late February 1994. On April 21, 1995, the last
of about 1,040 nuclear warheads had been removed from the SS-18 missiles and transferred
to Russia, and Kazakhstan announced that it was nuclear weapons-free. The SS-18s were
eliminated by late 1994 and silos were blown up in 1995-1996. Then-Vice President Gore
and Nazarbayev in December 1993 signed a U.S.-Kazakh Cooperative Threat Reduction
(CTR) umbrella agreement for the “safe and secure” dismantling of approximately 104
SS-18s, the destruction of their silos, and related purposes.
Besides the Kazakh nuclear weapons, there are active research reactors, uranium mines,
and milling facilities in Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and Uzbekistan that pose proliferation
concerns. Kazakhstan is reported to possess one-fourth of the world’s uranium reserves, and
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan are among the world’s top producers of low enriched uranium.
Kazakhstan had a fast breeder reactor at Aktau, the world’s only nuclear desalinization
facility. Shut down in April 1999, it has nearly 300 metric tons of enriched uranium and
plutonium spent fuel in storage pools. Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan report that their mining
and milling activities have resulted in massive and hazardous waste dumps. Concerns that
Iran or other terrorist states or groups might illicitly obtain nuclear materials led the United
States and Kazakhstan to cooperate in 1994 to remove about 600 kg of highly enriched
uranium from a Kazakh warehouse and to ship it to the United States. In 1997 and 1999,
U.S.-Kazakh accords were signed on safeguarding and mothballing the Aktau reactor and
eventually removing its weapons-grade plutonium. U.S. interest in nonproliferation in
Central Asia was highlighted following Uzbekistan’s successful interdiction (reportedly with
U.S.-supplied detectors) in March 2000 of radioactive materials entering from Kazakhstan
and bound for an area of Pakistan bordering Afghanistan.
Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan hosted major chemical and biological warfare (CBW)
facilities during the Soviet era. CTR and Energy Department funds are being used to
eliminate infrastructure at a former biological weapons production facility in Stepnogorsk,
Kazakhstan, and for retraining scientists. At the U.S.-Uzbek Joint Commission meeting in
May 1999, the two sides signed a CTR agreement on securing, dismantling, and
decontaminating the Soviet-era Nukus chemical research facility. Other aid will help keep
Uzbek weapons scientists employed in peaceful research. U.S. scientists are also examining
hazards at a Soviet-era CBW testing site on an island in the Aral Sea belonging to Kazakhstan
and Uzbekistan. Western media in mid-1999 reported the discovery of live anthrax spores
at the site. Uzbekistan has acceded to the Chemical Weapons Convention, which bans
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signatories from developing, producing, stockpiling, and using chemical weapons and pledges
them to destroy such weapons and production sites.
Support for Economic Reforms
Support for private sector development has been a major component of U.S. aid efforts
in the NIS. Technical assistance and training programs supporting the creation of market
economies have included those dealing with entrepreneurship, agribusiness, small business
development, telecommunications, banking, defense conversion, tax policy, bankruptcy, and
labor management. A Central Asian-American Enterprise Fund (CAAEF) was set up in 1994,
with Congressional authorization to lend up to $150 million. The Fund’s regional offices
have obligated $111 million in loans to over 400 small- and medium-size private enterprises
as of September 30, 1999. CAAEF reports a difficult small-business climate and has written
off losses of about $30.5 million. A memorandum on U.S. advice for Kazakh defense
industrial conversion was signed during Nazarbayev’s 1994 U.S. visit. Joint committees for
defense conversion set up with Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan plan U.S. aid in converting state
enterprises to privately held, non-defense firms. Peace Corps volunteers, teaching small
business development and English language, serve in all of the Central Asian states except
Tajikistan.
The Central Asian states, the poorest part of the former Soviet Union, witnessed steep
declines in gross domestic product (GDP) after they gained independence. Average per
capita income in the region was less than $800 in 1999 (World Bank), with Tajikistan
described by the Asian Development Bank as one of the poorest countries in the world. The
declines in GDP appeared to reverse in the late 1990s in all the states but their economies
remain fragile. The Kazakh and Turkmen economies are dependent on energy exports; if
export revenues decline, the regimes may collapse, according to some observers. Economic
growth is increasingly threatened by corruption, the deteriorating health of the populations,
and crime, including that linked to drug trafficking and production. Except for Kazakhstan,
the Central Asian states are unlikely soon to gain substantial revenues from oil, gas, or other
development, suggesting that they may be vulnerable to popular discontent and instability for
several years. Lagging economic reform in Uzbekistan led the IMF to suspend lending to
Turkmenistan and Uzbekistan, and the EBRD is contemplating more conditions on or ending
most of its economic reform lending to Turkmenistan.
The U.N. World Food Program reported in February 2001 that it was hard-pressed to
meet urgent food needs by up to three million or more people in drought-stricken Tajikistan.
Uzbekistan again appealed to the U.N. in January for urgent food aid for up to one million
people because of drought in its Karakalpakstan and Khorezm regions (a U.N. mission in
December 2000 assessed urgent food needs for 45,000 people). Responding to Uzbekistan’s
food needs, the U.S. Department of Agriculture in early 2001 announced a $20 million Food
for Progress concessional sale of soybeans, rice, and other grains.
Regional economic cooperation has proven elusive. A customs union was formed
between Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in 1994 (which Kyrgyzstan joined soon after and
Tajikistan joined in 1999). Renamed the Central Asian Economic Community (CAEC) in
1998, it consists of an Interstate Council of heads of state and government, a Council of
Foreign Ministers, Centrazbat, and a Central Asian Bank. The bank is undercapitalized, but
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Centrazbat has met with some success. Despite this CAEC, economic disputes have included
Kazakh and Uzbek restrictions on imports from Kyrgyzstan, the imposition of a January 2001
visa regime by Uzbekistan on Tajikistan, Kazakhstan’s opening of border posts at the Kyrgyz
border, and the repeated Uzbek cut off of natural gas deliveries to Kyrgyzstan because of
payment arrears. Uzbekistan’s tightening of border controls with Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan,
including minefields and the alleged establishment of “no-man’s lands” by razing villages,
stymies trade and travel and increases tensions among the states. At a session of the CAEC
in January 2001, Karimov argued that the CAEC appeared to be failing as a trade group, and
proposed that it be transformed into a discussion forum on regional problems.
Trade and Investment
The former Clinton Administration and others stressed that U.S. support for free market
reforms directly served U.S. national interests by opening new markets for U.S. goods and
services, and sources of energy and minerals. U.S. private investment committed to Central
Asia has greatly exceeded that provided to Russia or most other NIS except Azerbaijan,
although the region is relatively isolated and the states lag behind Russia in accommodating
commercial ties. U.S. energy companies have committed to invest billions of dollars in
Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan. U.S. trade agreements have been signed and
entered into force with all the Central Asian states. Duty-free access to U.S. markets under
the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP) is in effect for Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, and
Uzbekistan. Kyrgyzstan has received normal trade relations status and Jackson-Vanik trade
provisions calling for presidential reports and waivers no longer apply.
The Export-Import Bank (Eximbank) has obligated funds for short-term insurance,
loans, or guarantees for export sales of industrial and agricultural equipment and bulk
agricultural commodities to all the states except Tajikistan. The Overseas Private Investment
Corporation (OPIC) has signed agreements with all the Central Asian states on insuring U.S.
private investments overseas, and has obligated funds for financing or insurance in all the
states except Tajikistan. The U.S. Commerce Department has set up a Business Development
Committee with Kazakhstan to facilitate official discussions on trade and economic issues.
The Foreign Commercial Service (FCS) opened offices in Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan in
1993, and co-located American Business Centers were opened in 1994.
Kazakhstan and Turkmenistan have large oil and natural gas reserves, and the other
states of the region possess potential sources of export earnings, but major investments are
needed to revamp, develop, or market these resources in most cases. Uzbekistan’s cotton and
gold production rank among the highest in the world and much is exported. It also has
moderate oil and gas reserves. Kyrgyzstan owns major gold mines and strategic mineral
reserves, and is a major wool producer. Tajikistan has one of the world’s largest aluminum
processing plants (exporting over $300 million worth in 1999) and is a major cotton grower.
Energy Resources. U.S. policy goals regarding energy resources in the Central
Asian and South Caucasian states have included supporting their sovereignty and ties to the
West, supporting U.S. private investment, breaking Russia’s monopoly over oil and gas
transport routes by encouraging the building of pipelines that do not traverse Russia,
promoting Western energy security through diversified suppliers, assisting ally Turkey, and
opposing the building of pipelines that transit “energy competitor” Iran or otherwise give it
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undue influence over the region. To carry out these goals, the Clinton Administration
endorsed building trans-Caucasus oil and gas pipelines to Turkey, with trans-Caspian links
to Central Asia, as part of a “Eurasian Transport Corridor” plan given impetus in 1997. In
1998, a Special Advisor to the President and the Secretary of State for Caspian Basin Energy
Diplomacy was appointed to coordinate TDA, OPIC, Eximbank and other agency programs
to ensure the “development of the Caspian and open commercial access to its energy” (this
post was apparently retained in the new Bush Administration). In 1999, TDA, OPIC, and
Eximbank opened a Caspian Finance Center in Turkey.
The policy of the Bush Administration regarding Caspian energy development was
explicated by Ambassador Elizabeth Jones, Senior Advisor on Caspian Basin Energy
Diplomacy, in a State Department televised interview with residents of the region on April
12, 2001. She stated that the United States would continue to support the Baku-Ceyhan
pipeline and other approaches of the previous Administration. She also stated that the United
States would not intervene with force to halt incursions by Islamic terrorists into the region
but would help regional states to defend themselves through NATO’s Partnership for Peace
and by providing counter-terrorism aid.
The Central Asian states have been pressured by Russia to yield portions of their energy
wealth to Russia, in part because Russia controls most existing pipelines to export markets.
The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) reports estimates of 10-17.6 billion barrels of proven
oil reserves and 53-83 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in Kazakhstan, and 98-155 trillion
cubic feet of proven gas reserves in Turkmenistan. Kazakhstan’s Tengiz oil field began to be
exploited by Chevron and Kazakhstan in a joint venture during 1993 (U.S. Mobil Oil and
Russia’s LUKoil later joined). In April 2001, the joint venture announced that Tengiz
reserves were much higher than previously thought. Kazakhstan announced in May 2000 that
a consortium (including U.S. firms Exxon-Mobil and Phillips Petroleum) had found "big
deposits of oil" in the Kashagan field in the north Caspian Sea (another successful test well
in early 2001 strengthened prospects of a major oil find).
The Clinton Administration viewed the oil find as “a tremendously important boost” to
plans for a pipeline from Baku, Azerbaijan to Ceyhan, Turkey, though some experts
questioned whether it would be economical to barge this oil to Baku or build a connecting
pipeline. Russia’s restrictions on Tengiz oil exports to Europe were eased slightly in 1996
after the consortium admitted LUKoil, and after Gazprom was admitted to another
consortium (in October 2000, however, Russia easily agreed to Kazakhstan’s requested oil
transit quotas for 2001, in order to persuade it that the planned Baku-Ceyhan pipeline is not
needed). The Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC; formed in 1992 but restructured in 1996)
protocol grants Russian interests the largest share, 44%, with the remainder held by U.S.,
other Western, and Omani partners. Initial construction was completed in November 2000
on a 930-mile oil pipeline from Kazakhstan to Russia’s Black Sea port of Novorossiisk, to
initially carry up to one million barrels per day when fully operational in late 2001. This is the
region’s first new large-capacity pipeline.
Russia’s influence over pipeline routes and regional energy development may have
increased with LUKoil’s March 2000 announcement that a test well in the north Caspian Sea
had found an oil deposit that may yield over two billion barrels. Russian President Putin in
April 2000 asserted that the West was unduly active in the region and later named former Fuel
Minister Viktor Kalyuzhny to this post. At about the same time, a Foreign Ministry envoy,
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Andrey Urnov, became active. During a May 2000 U.S. visit, Urnov stated that Russia
would not assert a “Monroe doctrine” for the region, though he faulted “outside forces” he
alleged were trying to push Russia out. He asserted that Russia must be involved in all
matters affecting the CIS and dismissed the need for non-Russian pipelines.
In the late 1980s, Turkmenistan was the world’s fourth largest natural gas producer. It
is now largely dependent on Russian export routes. In 1993, Russia had halted Turkmen gas
exports to Western markets through its pipelines, diverting Turkmen gas to other NIS who
had trouble paying for the gas. In 1997, Russia cut off these shipments because of transit fee
arrears and other problems. Turkmenistan called for Russia to lower transit fees and to
permit gas shipments to Europe, but Russian officials and the Gazprom natural gas firm
refused. In late 1998, Turkmenistan and Ukraine acceded to Gazprom’s pricing demands for
piping gas to Ukraine. This arrangement ended due to payment arrears, but in late 1999,
Turkmenistan again conceded to export 20 billion cubic meters of its gas at concessionary
rates to Russia in 2000 under an accord with Gazprom (since raised to 30 bcm). Seeking
alternatives to Russian pipeline routes, Turkmenistan in December 1997 opened the first
pipeline from Central Asia to the outside world beyond Russia, a 125-mile pipeline linkage
to Iran’s pipeline system to export gas to northern Iran. As per a 1996 Turkey-Iran gas
purchase agreement, Iran is building a section of an Iran-Turkey gas pipeline (with a possible
future link to Turkmenistan).
In November 1999, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Turkey, and Kazakhstan signed the “Istanbul
Protocol” (Uzbekistan observed and voiced support) on construction of the Baku-Ceyhan oil
pipeline (proposed to be completed in 2004 with a capacity of one million barrels per day),
to boost chances for international financing. Also, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Georgia, and
Turkey signed a framework accord on a trans-Caspian gas pipeline (TCGP) to Turkey
(proposed for completion in 2002 with an eventual capacity of sixteen billion cubic meters per
year). Attending the signings, then-President Clinton hailed the accords as “advanc[ing] the
prosperity and security of [these states] critical to the future of the entire world.” The TCGP
project has floundered over Turkmenistan’s demands, disputes with Azerbaijan, and
Niyazov’s desires for quick revenues. Despite past problems with Russia’s Gazprom,
Turkmenistan agreed to ship 30 billion cubic meters of gas to Russia in 2000 at concessionary
prices, allegedly following Russian threats to cut off shipments otherwise. It also agreed in
late 2000 to restart concessionary sales to Ukraine through Gazprom’s Itera subsidiary. In
January 2001, Niyazov halted planned shipments of 30 billion cubic meters of gas to Russia
in 2001, because Russia would not agree to his request for higher prices, but soon backed
down, though in February 2001 he negotiated a somewhat better barter and cash arrangement
for an added shipment of 10bcm.
Aid Overview
For FY1998, the Clinton Administration called for added civil society assistance for the
NIS, particularly for Russia and Central Asia. However, Congressional earmarks fenced off
much of the NIS aid, so Central Asia benefitted little. Increased appropriations in FY1999
permitted a 26% increase for Central Asia to $136.9 million, but in FY2000, earmarks and
priorities led to an allocation of $112 million. Estimated spending in FY2001 was $115.95
million. For FY2002, the Administration requested slightly less for Central Asia, $110
million, as part of its $808 million NIS request.
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Among the NIS, Russia, Ukraine, Armenia, and Georgia ranked highest in cumulative
U.S. government aid obligated as of September 30, 2000, with most Central Asian states
receiving much less (including food, medical, and technical aid, and aid for nuclear weapons
disarmament and safeguards for Kazakhstan). Kazakhstan and Kyrgyzstan were exceptions,
with Kazakhstan ranked fifth ($684.22 million, slightly less than aid to Georgia) and
Kyrgyzstan sixth ($484.23 million). In per capita terms, Kyrgyzstan has ranked in the top five
aid recipients among the NIS. Humanitarian and health care aid for Tajikistan has been a
special concern since FY1994, but Tajiks have said that the U.S. government has failed to
provide aid promised for rebuilding after the Tajik civil war. The World Bank held a third
consultative group meeting of international donors in Tokyo, Japan, on May 15, 2001, to
focus on rebuilding assistance for post-war Tajikistan for 2001-2002. Six countries, including
Japan and Switzerland, and international lenders pledged $430 million in aid. The United
States, an observer of the Tajik peace process, pledged no added aid.
The value of Defense Department excess commodities and privately donated aid
transported at U.S. expense are not included in the cumulative obligations in the table but
were $166.54 million for Kazakhstan, $121.47 million for Kyrgyzstan, $38.25 million for
Tajikistan, $39.94 million for Turkmenistan, and $114.46 million for Uzbekistan.
Consolidated Appropriations for FY2000 (P.L. 106-113) include “Silk Road Strategy Act”
authorizing language calling for enhanced policy and aid to support conflict amelioration,
humanitarian needs, economic development, transport and communications, border controls,
democracy, and the creation of civil societies in the South Caucasus and Central Asia.
Besides bilateral and regional aid, the United States contributes to international financial
institutions and nongovernmental organizations that aid Central Asia. Policy issues regarding
U.S. aid include whether the states are properly using it, what it should be used for, and who
should receive it. (For details, see CRS Issue Brief IB95077, The Former Soviet Union and
U.S. Foreign Assistance.)
Table 1. Cumulative Obligations as of September 30, 2000, the FY2001
Estimate, and the FY2002 Request
(in millions of dollars)
1992-2000 Cumulative
FY2001
Central Asian Country
Obligations*
Estimate**
FY2002 Request**
Kazakhstan
684.22
44.596
44.0
Kyrgyzstan
484.23
30.355
28.0
Tajikistan
287.3
11.23
11.0
Turkmenistan
181.65
6.2
5.5
Uzbekistan
218.32
23.565
22.0
Total
1,885.72
115.946
110.5
Sources: USAID and State Department.
*Includes Freedom Support Act (FSA) and non-FSA aid such as Cooperative Threat Reduction aid. Excludes
the value of private donations transported at U.S. expense and Defense Department excess commodities.
Some regional assistance was also spent in Central Asia.
**FSA and other Function 150 resources.
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