Order Code 97-1027 F
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
Programs: Issues for Congress
Updated March 23, 2001
Amy F. Woolf
Specialist in National Defense
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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ABSTRACT
Congress established the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Program (CTR) in 1991
so that the United States could assist the former Soviet republics with the safe and secure
transportation, storage, and elimination of nuclear weapons. The CTR program seeks to
reduce the threat these weapons pose to the United States and to reduce the proliferation risks
from nuclear weapons and materials in the former Soviet Union. Congress has authorized and
appropriated around $300-$400 million each year for CTR. Most in Congress support the
core objectives of the CTR program, but some have questioned whether all of the proposed
and ongoing projects contribute to U.S. national security. Some have also questioned Russia's
commitment, both political and financial to the some of the projects. This report reviews
many of the concerns that have been raised in Congress during debates over CTR. It also
provides a summary of the funding for different CTR projects. It will be updated at least once
each year.

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Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction Programs:
Issues for Congress
Summary
Congress established the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
program in 1991, authorizing the use of Defense Department funds to assist with the
safe and secure transportation, storage, and dismantlement of nuclear, chemical and
other weapons in the former Soviet Union. Initially, many supported U.S. assistance
as an emergency response to fears about a loss of control over nuclear weapons in the
disintegrating Soviet Union. Now, many see the CTR program as a part of a more
comprehensive threat reduction and nonproliferation effort.
Congress has demonstrated continuing support for the CTR programs, providing
between $300 million and $400 million in Defense Department funds each year between
FY1992 and FY1998; it added $440 million for FY1999, $475 million for FY2000,
and $443.4 million for FY2001. Congress has also increased its oversight efforts and
added numerous reporting requirements. Many of these changes reflected congressional
concern with the slow pace of implementation during the first few years and with the
U.S. ability to account for its expenditures and progress on CTR projects. The Clinton
Administration resolved most of the issues raised during the first few years of program,
but the congressional debate over funding in recent years has revealed new concerns
about the focus of some projects in the CTR program.
The Clinton Administration credited the CTR program with significant
achievements in reducing threats from the former Soviet Union. Some Members of
Congress disagree and believe that the CTR programs have diminished U.S. national
security by subsidizing the Russian defense establishment. Others have argued that
Clinton Administration claims of success are exaggerated and that the programs have
produced more limited results. On the other hand, some Members of Congress believe
that the program could do much more to protect the United States from proliferation
and terrorist threats. Congress added funds to the FY1997 budget to expand efforts
to enhance the security of nuclear and other weapons materials in the former Soviet
Union. But, in FY2000 and FY2001, it refused to authorize the use of CTR funds for
the construction of a chemical weapons dismantlement facility.
Members of Congress have also questioned the Administration’s spending priorities
for CTR programs. Most support efforts to dismantle nuclear weapons. However,
Congress has prohibited the use of CTR funds for defense conversion projects,
environmental restoration projects, and housing for retired officers, and, beginning in
FY2000, in prohibited their use for the elimination of conventional weapons. Some
Members of Congress have also argued that U.S. assistance to Russia should be linked
to a number of areas of Russian military and foreign policy. Others, however, have
argued that efforts to link CTR assistance to a wider range of Russian activities would
backfire, with Russia forgoing the assistance and retaining its nuclear weapons while
continuing the policies that brought U.S. objections. These issues were discussed at
length during the House debate on FY1997 funding, but they were not included in the
final legislation. In recent years, Congress has approved almost all of the
Administration's request for CTR funding, but it continues to express concerns about
the focus of some CTR projects.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Overview of the CTR Program . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Evolving Rationale . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Emergency Response to Potential Chaos . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Threat Reduction, Nonproliferation, and Cooperation . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Nonproliferation and Anti-terrorism . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Program Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
The U.S. Interagency Process . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
International Negotiations . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Project Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Focus of the CTR Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
CTR Programs in Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Funding . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Legislative Mandate . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Oversight and Reporting Requirements . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12
Issues For Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Program Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Pace of Implementation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Accountability . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Value of U.S. Assistance Under CTR . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Relationship to U.S. National Security . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
Relationship to Key Program Objectives . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 17
Scope of the CTR Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Dismantlement and Destruction Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
Chain of Custody Activities . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 21
Demilitarization Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
Russia's Financial Commitment to CTR Projects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Linkage Between U.S. Assistance and Russian Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Requirements in Current Legislation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Proposals for Changes in the Linkage between U.S. Assistance and Russian
Policies . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Appendix: Funding Status of CTR Programs . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
List of Tables
Table 1. Allocation of Funds Among CTR Program Areas . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Table 2. Allocation of CTR Funds by Recipient Nation . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14

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Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction
Programs: Issues for Congress
Introduction
Congress established the Nunn-Lugar Cooperative Threat Reduction (CTR)
Programs in November 1991. A failed coup in Moscow in August 1991 and the
subsequent disintegration of the Soviet Union had raised concerns about the safety and
security of Soviet nuclear weapons. Congress responded by authorizing the use of
$400 million in FY1992 Department of Defense funds to assist with the safe and secure
transportation, storage, and dismantlement of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons.1
Congress appropriated an additional $300 to $400 million per year for the CTR
programs between FY1993 and FY1998. It added $440.4 million in DOD funds for
FY1999, $475.5 million in FY2000, and $443.4 million in FY2001.2 Most of these
funds support projects in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus and Kazakhstan — the four nations
that had Soviet nuclear weapons on their territories — but Congress has also authorized
their use for projects and military contacts in other former Soviet republics.
The CTR programs seek to reduce the threat to the United States from nuclear
and other weapons in the former Soviet Union. Towards this end, the programs focus
on four key objectives:
! Destroy nuclear, chemical, and other weapons of mass destruction;
! Transport, store, disable, and safeguard these weapons in connection with their
destruction;
! Establish verifiable safeguards against the proliferation of these weapons, their
components, and weapons-usable materials; and
1The amendment to the implementing legislation for the Conventional Armed Forces In Europe
(CFE) Treaty (P.L. 102-228) was sponsored by Senators Nunn and Lugar. It established the
Soviet Nuclear Threat Reduction Act of 1991. For more information on this legislation, see
CRS Report 94-985, The Nunn-Lugar Program for Soviet Weapons Dismantlement:
Background and Implementation, by Theodor Galdi. p. 1-4.
2Congress also appropriated $1745 million for Materials Protection Control and Accounting
activities in FY2000. Although these efforts began under the auspices of the Nunn-Lugar
CTR program and seek similar objectives, they are administered separately by the Department
of Energy. See Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service. Nuclear Weapons in
Russia: Safety Security and Control Issues, CRS Issue Brief 98038.

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CRS-2
! Prevent the diversion of scientific expertise that could contribute to weapons
programs in other nations.3
While most Members of Congress support the central objectives of the Nunn-Lugar
effort, some Members have questioned whether CTR programs truly enhance U.S.
security. Some have objected to specific projects while others have generally challenged
the notion that the programs reduce the threat to the United States. Many who hold
this view believe that U.S. defense dollars could be better spent on U.S. defense
programs. Others, however, believe that CTR programs can do more to stem
proliferation and enhance U.S. security. Those who hold this view have supported
adding funds to the budget requests for CTR.
These concerns are discussed in detail in the second half of this report. The report
first offers an overview of the evolving rationale for the CTR programs and a brief
description of processes used to implement the programs, the types of projects
supported by CTR funds, and congressional action on these programs in past years.
Overview of the CTR Program
Evolving Rationale
Emergency Response to Potential Chaos. Initially, many in Congress
saw U.S. assistance under the Nunn-Lugar amendment as an emergency response to
risks that could arise when the Soviet Union dissolved into its constituent republics.
Some feared that the command and control structure for Soviet nuclear weapons would
collapse, allowing leaders in the various republics, or even rogue commanders in the
field, to take control of these weapons. Many were also concerned about the
possibilities that, in an environment of political and economic chaos, nuclear weapons
or materials might be lost, stolen, or sold on the black market and that nuclear scientists
and technicians might be tempted to sell their knowledge to nations seeking to develop
these weapons. Senator Nunn noted that “...the former Soviet Union, still a nuclear
superpower, is coming apart at the seams. The danger of proliferation of existing
weapons, weapons materials, and weapons know-how is growing as both the Soviet
economy and traditional Soviet control mechanisms lose effectiveness.”4 Most
acknowledged that the United States would not be able to ensure complete control
of all nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons and materials in the former Soviet
Union, but many hoped that U.S. interest and assistance might “provide focus and
priority to the destruction of a large part of these weapons.”5
3U.S. Department of Defense. Cooperative Threat Reduction. April 1995. Washington, D.C.
p. 4.
4Senator Lugar added “there is a danger of seizure, theft, sale, or use of nuclear weapons or
components during the period of transition, particularly if a widespread disintegration of the
custodial system should occur.” Congressional Record, v. 142, November 25, 1991. p.
18004-18005.
5Congressional Record, v. 142, November 25, 1991. p. 18004.

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CRS-3
Threat Reduction, Nonproliferation, and Cooperation. Even after the
sense of impending chaos in the former Soviet Union passed in 1992 and 1993, many
U.S. analysts and Members of Congress remained concerned about the potential for
diversion or a loss of control of nuclear and other weapons. Many began to view CTR
programs as part of a long-term threat reduction and nonproliferation effort. In this
vein, former Secretary of Defense William Perry frequently referred to CTR as “defense
by other means.”6 He and other Clinton Administration officials argued that CTR
programs have reduced the threat to the United States — by assisting with deactivation
of thousands of nuclear weapons in Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan — for
far less money than the United States has spent to maintain and operate nuclear forces
to deter that threat.7 And, by helping safeguard nuclear warheads, materials and
components, the programs have reduced the risk that these materials would “leak out”
of former Soviet republics. In addition, because projects funded by the CTR program
require extensive cooperation and because they touch on closely held secrets of the
Cold War era — nuclear weapons information — many CTR supporters believe these
efforts can also foster cooperation and build understanding between the United States
and the recipient nations.
Nonproliferation and Anti-terrorism. By the latter half of the 1990s,
Members of Congress and analysts outside government have began to show increasing
concerns about proliferation risks posed by nuclear materials in the former Soviet
Union.8 Experts noted that the Soviet Union never instituted a comprehensive control
and accounting system for these materials, relying instead on physical security and
isolated facilities to protect against attacks from the outside and the control of the
Communist regime to protect against subversion or theft from the inside. But they
argued that these controls may no longer be sufficient to protect against theft or
diversion.9 Experts point to the frequent reports of smugglers carrying nuclear materials
(although most have not been weapons-grade materials) into Europe for possible sale.
These reports have not identified specific nations who were seeking the materials, but
experts fear they could end up in places such as Libya or Iran, or that they could be
sold to representatives from terrorist organizations. Although these groups may lack
the know-how to manufacture nuclear explosive devices, some have postulated that
6See, for example, U.S. Department of Defense. Cooperative Threat Reduction. April 1995.
Washington, D.C., p. 1.
7According to DOD, the United States spends approximately $8 billion per year to maintain
and operate its strategic offensive forces. See U.S. Department of Defense. Annual Report
to the President And Congress. William J. Perry, Secretary of Defense, March 1996.
Washington, D.C. p. 216.
8After a November 1998 visit to Russia to view projects funded by the CTR program, Senator
Levin stated that "we will take back what we've learned ... to Congress in order to make sure
that the anti-proliferation, anti-terrorist programs which we have put in place continue..." See
Senators urge U.S. Cash for Russian Disarmament," Reuters, November 19, 1998.
9These problems are described in detail in Allison, Graham T., Owen R. Cote, Jr., Richard
A. Falkenrath, and Steven E. Miller. Avoiding Nuclear Anarchy: Containing the Threat of
Loose Russian Nuclear Weapons and Materials. Cambridge, MA, MIT Press, 1996. p. 20-
48.

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CRS-4
they could combine radioactive materials with conventional explosives in a
“radiological” weapon that would spread poisonous radiation over a wide area.
After experts testified that Russian nuclear and chemical facilities, with their
crumbling security and lack of accounting procedures, could provide a source for
terrorists seeking nuclear or chemical materials, Congress, in the FY1997 Defense
Authorization Act, expanded the CTR programs that focus on this threat.10 Congress
not only added funds for security at facilities with nuclear materials, it also indicated
that more attention should be paid to security at facilities with materials that could be
used in chemical or biological weapons.
Concerns about proliferation from Soviet nuclear, biological, and chemical weapons
facilities intensified in the wake of the financial crisis that began in Russia in
August1998. Congress addressed some these concerns in the FY1999 Defense
Authorization Act, when it mandated that the Secretary of Defense provide Congress
with a report on the number of individuals in the former Soviet Union with expertise
in weapons of mass destruction and the risks that might exist if these individuals sold
their knowledge to other nations. The Clinton Administration also responded in its
FY2000 and FY2001 budgets, by requesting funds to expand several DOE and State
Department programs that sought to assist Russia in safeguarding weapons materials
and finding alternative employment for weapons scientists.11 Some in Congress,
however, questioned whether these programs would be effective in stemming
proliferation, and it reduced funding for many of them.12
In January 2001, a task force sponsored by the Department of Energy called for
increased funding for programs that sought to stem proliferation from Russia’s nuclear
facilities. This task force stated that “the most urgent unmet national security threat
to the United States today is the danger that weapons of mass destruction or weapons-
usable materials in Russia could be stolen and sold to terrorists or hostile nation states
10The March 1995 nerve agent attack in the Tokyo subway system by the Aum Shinryo cult
raised the profile of this type of threat.
11 See U.S. Library of Congress, Congressional Research Service. The Expanded Threat
Reduction Initiative for the Former Soviet Union: Administration Proposals for FY2000. CRS
Report RS20203, by Amy F. Woolf and Curt Tarnoff.. May 20, 1999.
12 In February 1999, the General Accounting Office issued a report that reviewed and
criticized DOE’s Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program, which sought to
provide alternative employment for Russian nuclear scientists. The report noted that Russian
institutes had received only around one-third of the funds allocated to IPP projects and that
taxes, fees, and other charges had further reduced the amount of money available to Russian
scientists. The report also questioned DOE’s oversight of the programs, noting that program
officials do not always know how many scientists are receiving funds through the IPP
program. See U.S. General Accounting Office. Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns with
DOE’s Efforts to Reduce the Risks Posed by Russia’s Unemployed Weapons Scientists.
GAO/RCED-99-54, February 1999. Washington, D.C.

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CRS-5
and used against American troops abroad or citizens at home.”13 Although it focused
only on those programs funded through the Department of Energy, and not those funded
by DOD through the CTR program, the task force concluded that the United States
should expand its nonproliferation efforts in this area with a comprehensive strategic
plan and $30 billion in funding over the next 10 years.
Program Implementation
When Congress passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment in 1991, many Members and
experts outside government expected a relatively simple program. They seemed to
envision an effort where, using funds from the DOD budget, officials from the United
States would travel to Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to quickly safeguard
and help dismantle nuclear, chemical, and other weapons left vulnerable by the demise
of the Soviet Union. But the process of program implementation, both within the U.S.
government and between the United States and the newly independent states of the
former Soviet Union, was far slower and more complex than many expected.
The U.S. Interagency Process. Within the U.S. government, the CTR
program is an interagency effort. Initially, most of the funds for CTR projects came
from the DOD budget,14 but experts with the knowledge and skills needed to implement
these projects resided in several different agencies. For example, the Department of
Defense has provided most of the general policy direction, which essentially determined
the types of projects funded by the CTR program, and much of the expertise needed
to implement programs focused on weapons security and dismantlement. The State
Department took the lead in negotiating the broad agreements needed before recipient
nations could receive U.S. assistance under the CTR programs and in providing for
broad policy coordination among the U.S. agencies and between the United States and
recipient nations. It also manages funds for the International Science and Technology
Centers in Moscow and Kiev. The Department of Energy plays a major role with its
Materials Protection, Control and Accounting program which seeks to improve security
and controls at facilities with nuclear materials, its Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention
Program (IPP), which seeks to fund commercial employment opportunities for weapons
scientists, and its Nuclear Cities Initiative, which is designed to assist Russia with the
downsizing of its nuclear weapons complex and to promote alternative, commercial
enterprises in Russia’s nuclear cities. The Department of Commerce has also
participated in projects that focus on establishing effective export controls in the
recipient nations.
Within the Department of Defense, several organizations have responsibility for
different aspects of the CTR program. For example, the Cooperative Threat Reduction
Office, under the Undersecretary of Defense for Policy, takes the lead in developing
broad U.S. policy objectives for the CTR program and for identifying specific projects
13Baker, Howard and Lloyd Cutler, Co-Chairs, Russia Task Force. A Report Card on the
Department of Energy’s Nonproliferation Programs with Russia. The Secretary of Energy
Advisory Board, United States Department of Energy. January 10, 2001. P. 1.
14Beginning in FY1996, funding for some projects that began under CTR auspices moved to
the State Department and the Department of Energy.

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CRS-6
that will help achieve these objectives; this office also participates in negotiations with
recipient nations. The Joint Chiefs of Staff and Military Services also offer advice on
the goals and direction of the CTR program. Until the end of September 1998, the
CTR Program Office under the Undersecretary of Defense for Acquisition and
Technology had also helped plan future CTR programs, and, through the Defense
Special Weapons Agency (formerly the Defense Nuclear Agency), took the lead in
contracting with U.S. firms that would provide technology and assistance to the former
Soviet republics. This office also managed day-to-day interaction with representatives
in recipient nations to make sure that U.S. assistance met their specific needs.15
In November 1997, Secretary of Defense Cohen announced that the CTR Program
office, the Defense Special Weapons Agency, and a small program management staff
from the Office of the Special Coordinator for Cooperative Threat Reduction would
join with the On-Site Inspection Agency in a new Defense Threat Reduction Agency.
This new entity, which began operations on October 1, 1998, is now responsible for
managing the CTR program and implementing CTR projects.16
International Negotiations. The United States has negotiated “umbrella
agreements” with each recipient nation that set out the privileges and immunities of
U.S. personnel who work on CTR projects and establish the legal and customs
framework for the provision of aid. The United States and recipient nations then
negotiate agreements that identify specific projects, outline the amount of money that
the United States would commit to the particular project and identify each party’s rights
and responsibilities when implementing the projects.
Project Implementation. According to the legislation establishing the CTR
programs, Administration officials must notify Congress at least 15 days in advance
of its intent to obligate funds for a specific project; this generally occurs before the
United States and recipient nation have completed an agreement outlining the specific
details of a project. After completing the agreement, the United States can begin
obligating funds for that project and expending those funds. It sets aside the amount
of money that will be needed to pay contractor fees, equipment costs, and other U.S.
agencies (such as DOE) during the implementation of the agreed project. DOD then
contracts with the U.S. firms who will provide the assistance. It can take several years
for the expenditures on a project to equal the amount of money obligated for that project
because funds are dispersed as work progresses and it can take several years for
contractors to complete their work. This complex implementation process has
contributed to some of the delays in the CTR programs, but U.S. officials have
recognized the problems and improved implementation efforts in recent years.
15U.S. Department of Defense. Annual Report to the President And Congress. William J.
Perry, Secretary of Defense, March 1996. Washington, D.C., 1996. p. 64.
16U.S. Department of Defense. Defense Reform Initiative Report. William Cohen, Secretary
of Defense, November 1997. Washington, D.C. 1997. p. 19-20.

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CRS-7
Focus of the CTR Projects
The Department of Defense divides the CTR program into three distinct project
areas.17 These include destruction and dismantlement, chain of custody, and
demilitarization. Table 1, below, displays the amount of money allocated to projects
in each of these three areas as of early January 2001. This table divides funding into
the three categories mentioned above — the amount notified to Congress, the amount
obligated in each area, and the expenditures that have occurred to date. The Appendix
at the end of this report provides a detailed list of the amount of money notified,
obligated, and expended on specific projects in each of these categories.
Table 1. Allocation of Funds Among CTR Program Areas
(in millions of dollars)
Notified
Obligated
Expended
Destruction and
1,698
1,397.4
1,049
Dismantlement
Chain of Custody
969.7
803.6
$518.7
Demilitarization
351.5
324.5
299.9
Other
119
116.2
96.3
Source: CTR Program Office, Department of Defense
Destruction and dismantlement projects are designed to help with the elimination
of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons and their delivery vehicles. To date, many
of the projects in this area have helped Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan remove
warheads, deactivate missiles, and eliminate launch facilities for the nuclear weapons
covered by the START I treaty. The United States is also helping Russia design a
destruction facility for its chemical weapons stockpile. As Table I indicates, around
half of the CTR funds currently obligated and notified to Congress support projects
in this category.
Chain of custody activities include projects designed to enhance the safety, security,
and control over nuclear weapons and fissile materials. Some of the first CTR projects
provided Russia with bullet-proof Kevlar blankets, secure canisters, and improved rail
cars to enhance the safety and security of warheads as they were transported from
Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan to storage and dismantlement facilities in Russia.
The United States is also helping Russia design and construct a storage facility that
will house plutonium removed from nuclear warheads when they are dismantled. The
CTR program is also funding several projects that are attempting to improve the security
and accounting systems at storage facilities for nuclear weapons and materials to reduce
the possibility of theft or losses at those facilities.
17This division, and the description in the next few paragraphs come from U.S. Department
of Defense. Cooperative Threat Reduction. April 1995. Washington, D.C. p. 5-6. The
fourth category, "Other," includes administrative expenses and a special project on Arctic
nuclear waste.

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CRS-8
Demilitarization efforts include projects that are encouraging Russia, Ukraine,
Belarus, and Kazakhstan to convert military efforts to peaceful purposes. These include
the International Science and Technology Centers, which provide grants to scientists
and engineers who had produced nuclear or other weapons of mass destruction so that
they can pursue projects with peaceful objectives. Demilitarization funds also support
projects that seek to convert defense facilities and factories in the former Soviet Union
to peaceful purposes. And they support military-to-military contacts between officers
in the United States and those in the former Soviet republics. According to the
Department of Defense, these contacts allow the United States to help train military
officials in the other nations so that they can better protect weapons, technology, and
weapons expertise.18
CTR Programs in Congress
This section will briefly describe trends that have characterized the funding history
and legislative oversight of the CTR programs. A more detailed description of the
program’s legislative history from 1991 through 1995 can be found in CRS Report
94-985, The Nunn-Lugar Program for Soviet Weapons Dismantlement: Background
and Implementation.
Congress has demonstrated continuing support for the CTR programs. Although
some Members have sought to reduce or delay funding in response to concerns about
specific programs, Congress has approved most of the funds that the Executive Branch
requested for these efforts. The Senate has generally supported higher funding levels
and a broader mandate for the CTR program than has the House, in part because the
House has historically been less supportive of foreign assistance programs, but also
because the program’s original sponsors, Senators Nunn and Lugar, and, more recently,
Senator Domenici, remained active in their support.
Funding. When Congress first passed the Nunn-Lugar Amendment, it authorized
the transfer of $400 million in FY1992 funds from other DOD accounts for threat
reduction activities in the former Soviet Union. Few of these funds were spent in
FY1992, so Congress extended the transfer authority for FY1992 funds and authorized
the transfer of an additional $400 million from other DOD accounts in FY1993. In
FY1994 and FY1995, the Clinton Administration requested and Congress approved
new appropriations of $400 million annually for CTR programs.19 In FY1996, Congress
approved $300 million of the $371 million in Defense Department funds requested by
the Clinton Administration. Congress also included $33 million in the State Department
budget and $70 million in the Department of Energy budget to continue projects that
had begun in the CTR program.
18U.S. Department of Defense. Cooperative Threat Reduction. April 1995. Washington,
D.C. p. 6.
19Spending authority for $329 million in unobligated funds had lapsed by the end of FY1994
and $20 million was rescinded from FY1995 funds. After the first four years, only $1.236
billion of the $1.6 billion authorized by Congress remained available for use.

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CRS-9
The Clinton Administration requested $327.9 million in DOD funds for the CTR
program in FY1997. The House approved only $302.9 million in its version of the
FY1997 Defense Authorization Bill (H.R. 3230), but the Senate added $37 million,
for a total of $364.9 million in its version of the bill (S. 1745). The Senate also added
$57 million to the Department of Energy request of $95 million for materials control
and accounting programs at facilities in the former Soviet Union. The House accepted
the Senate provisions and these additions were included in the final version of the
FY1997 Defense Authorization Act.
The Clinton Administration requested $382.2 million in DOD funds and $167
million in Department of Energy funds for FY1998. The House approved $284.7 million
in DOD funds; it rejected funding that the Administration had requested for chemical
weapons destruction, nuclear reactor core conversion, and nuclear weapons storage
security. The House also rejected some funding for DOE programs. The Senate, in
contrast, approved the full request of $382.2 million for DOD and $167 million for
DOE. The House accepted the Senate provisions and Congress approved the full
request in the FY1998 Defense Authorization Act (P.L. 105-85).
The Clinton Administration requested $442.4 million in DOD funds and $167
million in DOE funds for FY1999. The Senate approved $440.4 million in DOD funds
for CTR programs, but the House approved only $414.4 million. Among other changes,
the House reduced the amount requested for chemical weapons destruction activities
by $53.4 million and added $31.4 million for strategic arms elimination activities in
Russia and Ukraine. In its report on the Bill (H.Rept. 105-532), the House National
Security Committee noted that strategic offensive arms pose a direct threat to U.S.
security, while Russia's chemical weapons pose more of an environmental problem than
a threat to U.S. security.20 The Conference Committee adopted the Senate's position,
however, approving $440.4 million without reallocating funds from chemical weapons
destruction to strategic offensive arms destruction. Congress also approved a total
of $172 million in DOE funds, adding $5 million to the $20 million request for the
Initiatives for Proliferation Prevention Program.
The Clinton Administration requested $475.5 million in DOD funds for CTR
programs in FY2000. The Senate approved the full request but the House approved
only $444.1 million and eliminated all funding for the construction of a chemical
weapons destruction facility. The House Armed Services Committee again expressed
its concerns with U.S. funding for Russia’s chemical weapons destruction program,
and cited a recent GAO study to question the nonproliferation benefits of such a facility.
It mandated, instead, that U.S. assistance seek to improve security at existing chemical
weapons storage facilities. The Conference Committee on the FY2000 Defense
Authorization Bill approved the Administration’s request for $475.5 million for CTR
programs, but it also approved House position precluding funding for the construction
of a chemical weapons destruction facility.
The Clinton Administration also requested $205 million for the Department of
Energy’s programs FY2000; Congress approved the full $145 million for DOE’s
20U.S. Congress, House, Committee on National Security. National Defense Authorization
Act For Fiscal Year 1999. Report 105-532, Washington, D.C. May 12, 1998. p. 352.

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CRS-10
MCP&A program. But it reduced the requests for $30 million for the Initiatives for
Proliferation Prevention (IPP) program and an additional $30 million for the Nuclear
Cities Initiative (NCI) to $25 million for IPP and only $7.5 million for NCI. These
reductions reflected the concerns raised in the February 1999 GAO report that
questioned DOE’s oversight and the effectiveness of the programs.21
The Clinton Administration requested $458.4 million for CTR in its FY2001
budget. The Senate Armed Services Committee approved the full amount in its version
of the FY2001 Defense Authorization Bill. It did, however, limit the use of funds for
the construction of the chemical weapons destruction facility until the Secretary of
Defense could certify that Russia was committed to providing at least $25 million per
year to help construct and operate the facility; that Russia was committed to destroying
all its remaining nerve agent; that other nations were committed to providing funding
for the social infrastructure around this facility; and that Russia was committed to
destroying its chemical weapons production facilities. The House, in contrast, again
eliminated all funding for the chemical weapons destruction facility and provided only
$433.4 million for CTR. The House prevailed and the Conference Report authorizes
the appropriation of only $433.4 million for CTR and precludes any expenditures on
the construction of a chemical weapons destruction facility in Russia. Instead, it
expresses the sense of Congress that the international community should do more to
help Russia eliminate its chemical weapons in accordance with its obligations under
the Chemical Weapons convention.
The Clinton Administration also requested $174 million for the Department of
energy’s MPC&A program, $22.5 million for the IPP program, and 17.5 million for
the NCI program in FY2001. Congress approved the requested funding, and even added
several million dollars to the IPP and NCI programs.
The Bush Administration has not yet outlined a funding request for the CTR
program in FY2002. During the campaign, President Bush expressed support for the
CTR program, stating that he believed it was an area “where we can work with Russia
in the post-Cold War era.” And he stated that he would seek an increase in funding
for the program.22 However, in response to questions from the Senate Armed Services
Committee prior to his nomination hearings, Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld called for
a review of CTR spending and said that Russia should not request addition funding
for weapons dismantlement while it continued to build new weapons. He did, however,
acknowledge that the program had benefitted U.S. security.23 Furthermore, press
21 U.S. General Accounting Office. Nuclear Nonproliferation: Concerns with DOE’s Efforts
to Reduce the Risks Posed by Russia’s Unemployed Weapons Scientists. GAO/RCED-99-54,
February 1999. Washington, D.C.
22 The NewsHour with Jim Lehrer. February 16, 2000.
23 Donnelly, John M. and George Lobsenz. Rumsfeld Wants Review of Threat-Reduction
Spending. Defense Week. January 16, 2001.

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CRS-11
reports indicated that the Bush Administration is likely to propose sharp reductions
in funding for DOE’s MPC&A, IPP, and NCI programs.24
Legislative Mandate. Between 1992 and 1995, Congress expanded the
mandate of CTR programs beyond the initial efforts to aid in the safe and secure
transportation, storage, and elimination of nuclear, chemical, and other weapons. For
example, in the Defense Authorization Act for FY1993 (P.L. 102-484, Sec. 1412),
Congress indicated that threat reduction programs should also seek to prevent diversion
of scientific expertise from the former Soviet Union; facilitate demilitarization of defense
industries; establish science and technology centers in Russia and Ukraine; and expand
military-to-military contacts between officers in the United States and the former Soviet
republics. The mandate expanded further in FY1994 when Congress indicated, in P.L.
103-160, that threat reduction funds could also be used to assist in environmental
restoration at former military sites and provide housing for former military officers who
had been demobilized as a result of the dismantling of strategic offensive weapons.
The Clinton Administration had stated that these types of programs were needed to
help convince officials in Ukraine, Kazakhstan, and Belarus to eliminate the nuclear
weapons on their territories. In FY1994, Congress also established the Defense
Enterprise Fund to facilitate defense conversion efforts by providing grants for joint
ventures between U.S. industry and industrial concerns in the former Soviet Union.
The 104th Congress reversed previous trends and reduced the mandate for CTR
programs. In the FY1996 Defense Authorization Act, P.L. 104-106, Congress stated
that CTR funds could not be used for peacekeeping exercises or to provide housing
for military officers. It also denied additional funding for the Defense Enterprise Fund.
These restrictions expanded in FY1997 (and remained in FY1998) with added
prohibitions on the use of CTR funds for environmental restoration at former military
sites, job retraining, and defense conversion. In the FY2000 Defense Authorization
Bill, Congress made these prohibitions permanent.
Congress did, however, expand the mandate for threat reduction programs in other
areas in the FY1997 Defense Authorization Act. During debate over that legislation,
the Senate passed a new amendment sponsored by Senators Nunn, Lugar and Domenici
that added $94 million to DOD and DOE budgets to expand U.S. efforts to contain
and control nuclear, chemical and biological weapons in the former Soviet Union. Most
of these funds have been allocated to DOE programs that are designed to enhance the
safety and security of nuclear materials in the former Soviet Union, and therefore, are
not technically a part of the CTR program. Nevertheless, this amendment demonstrated
that Congress remained willing to extend U.S. assistance to former Soviet republics
when it believed that the effort would ease proliferation risks and enhance U.S. security.
This pattern continued in the Defense Authorization Act for FY1999, when Congress
allocated $2 million for biological weapons proliferation prevention activities in Russia
and authorized the use of CTR funds for emergency assistance to remove weapons
24White House Plans Deep Reductions in Russia Nuclear-Safeguard Fund. Wall Street
Journal, March 16, 2001.

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CRS-12
of mass destruction or materials and equipment related to these weapons from any of
the former Soviet republics.25
In the FY2000 Defense Authorization Act, Congress again limited the mandate
for the CTR program. For example, the conference committee adopted the House
language that eliminated funding for the construction of a facility that would be used
to destroy chemical weapons. The House had questioned funding for this facility for
several years; in FY2000, its position was bolstered by a GAO report that questioned
the cost of this facility and its contribution to U.S. nonproliferation objectives.26
Congress further limited the mandate for CTR in the FY2000 legislation when it
prohibited the use of CTR funds for the elimination of conventional weapons or delivery
vehicles intended for conventional weapons. The conferees noted that they believed
the CTR program should remain focused on the eliminating the theat from weapons
of mass destruction.
Oversight and Reporting Requirements. Congress has expanded its
oversight of expenditures on CTR projects over the years. In FY1992, Congress did
not specify how the Bush Administration should spend any of the $400 million that
it had provided under the Nunn-Lugar Amendment. By FY1995, Congress had begun
to approve or reject funding requests in each of the program areas identified in the
Administration’s budget. Congress has also added many reporting requirements to
the legislation over the years. For example, in FY1992, Congress indicated that the
Administration should provide at least 15 days notice prior to obligation of funds to
specific projects. By FY1995, Congress had mandated that the Administration provide,
among other things, audit and accounting reports for U.S. assistance in the recipient
nations, reports on compliance with arms control agreements, and a report on the
multiyear plans for the CTR program. Furthermore, during debate over the FY2000
Defense Authorization Bill, the Senate expressed concerns about Russia’s financial
commitment to the CTR programs and about other areas of Russia’s nuclear weapons
programs. As a result, it requested that the Administration inform Congress whenever
Russia asks the United States to absorb a greater portion of the costs for specific
projects. It also required the Administration re-submit certifications on arms control
compliance and weapons modernization that had been required by earlier versions of
the legislation.
25DOD has used CTR funds for this purpose in several instances, without specific
congressional authorization. For example, in November 1997, the United States purchased
21 nuclear-capable MIG-29 aircraft from the Republic of Moldova. The United States feared
that Moldova might sell these aircraft to a nation seeking nuclear delivery capabilities. In
April 1998, using CTR funds, the United States and Great Britain worked with the Georgian
government to move 8.8 pounds of highly enriched uranium and 17.6 pounds of highly
radioactive spent fuel from a nuclear reactor outside Tbilisi, Georgia to Dounreay, Scotland.
26 U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Effort to Reduce Russian
Arsenal May Cost More and Achieve Less than Planned. GAO/NSIAD-99-76. Washington,
D.C. April 1999.

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CRS-13
Issues For Congress
Program Implementation
Pace of Implementation. The slow pace of implementation proved to be the
key concern for Congress during the first few years of CTR efforts. The Bush
Administration spent less than $30 million during the program's first year. After three
years, the Bush and Clinton Administrations had obligated $434 million but spent only
around ten percent of the $1.2 billion that Congress had appropriated for CTR efforts.27
Authority to spend $329 million of the original $1.2 billion had lapsed by the end of
1994.
Analysts have highlighted several factors that slowed the process of obligating
funds for CTR projects during the program’s early years. First, some have noted that
the Bush Administration did not support the program, believing it was premature and
that U.S. defense funds would be better spent on U.S. defense programs. Although
the Bush Administration sent negotiating teams to Moscow for protracted discussions,
it did little to identify specific projects until Congress grew restless with the inaction.28
Another source of delay was the negotiation of umbrella agreements with the
recipient nations, a process that took several years to complete. Congress authorized
U.S. assistance in late 1991; the agreement with Russia was signed in June 1992, with
Belarus in October 1992, with Ukraine in October 1993, and with Kazakhstan in
December 1993.29 Negotiations on agreements for specific CTR projects have also
proven to be time consuming. The United States has had to identify responsible officials
in newly independent states where lines of authority and responsibility have not always
been clear. In addition, the United States has had to overcome the suspicions of many
of these officials to convince them that they should accept U.S. assistance.30 In some
cases, these officials were unwilling to allow U.S. access to sensitive nuclear facilities
in Russia unless the U.S. allowed Russian officials reciprocal access at U.S. facilities.
Even after the United States completed agreements with the recipient nations,
it was unable to accelerate the obligation and expenditure of CTR funds because most
of the funds were to be used to pay U.S. contractors who would then undertake the
27Most of these obligations and expenditures occurred during 1994. See Lockwood, Dunbar.
Getting Down to Business. Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, v. 51, January/February 1995.
P. 12. See also, Fact Sheet: Preventing Nuclear Smuggling. U.S. Congress, Arms Control
and Foreign Policy Caucus. October 21, 1994. p. 2.
28Wilson, Heather. Missed Opportunities: Washington Politics and Nuclear Proliferation.
The National Interest, v. 34, Winter 1993/1994. p. 29.
29For a detailed description of the process leading up to the signing of the umbrella
agreements, see CRS Report 94-985, The Nunn-Lugar Program for Soviet Weapons
Dismantlement: Background and Implementation, by Theodor Galdi. p. 8-11.
30Stern, Jessica E. U.S. Assistance Programs For Improving MPC&A in the Former Soviet
Union. The Nonproliferation Review, Winter 1996. p. 18.

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CRS-14
projects in the recipient nations. For several years, the Department of Defense used
its standard contracting procedures to seek proposals and award contracts for these
projects. In early 1994, the Department of Defense established a separate CTR program
office to expedite the contracting process.
This change, along with the political commitment expressed by the Clinton
Administration and the completion of negotiations with the recipient nations, have
accelerated the CTR program. Obligations have increased from around $100 million
in early 1994 to over $2.6 billion in January 2001. The rate of expenditures has also
accelerated, with nearly $2 billion expended through the end of the year 2000. Table
2 summarizes the amount of money allocated to projects in each of the recipient nations
in early January 2001.
Table 2. Allocation of CTR Funds by Recipient Nation
(in millions)
Notified
Obligated
Expended
Russia
2,014.8
1,599.4
1,059.6
Ukraine
615.6
562.5
472.1
Belarus
70.0
69.4
68.7
Kazakhstan
162.4
155.3
143.7
Other
275.5
255.2
219.8
Source: CTR Program Office, Department of Defense
Accountability. Congress has also expressed concerns about the U.S. ability
to account for funds spent on CTR projects. Because Congress saw few results in the
early years, some worried that CTR funds were being squandered on airplane tickets
and hotel rooms for U.S. delegations to Moscow.31 In addition, in 1994, the General
Accounting Office reported that the United States had yet to conduct any audits or
examinations to confirm that CTR funds were being used in the intended manner.32
As a result, in the FY1995 Defense Authorization Act, Congress mandated that the
Secretary of Defense submit a report on U.S. efforts to ensure that assistance provided
under CTR programs “is fully accounted for and that such assistance is being used for
its intended purposes.”33
31In response to these concerns, Senator Hank Brown requested a review by the General
Accounting Office. See U.S. General Accounting Office. Soviet Nuclear Weapons: Priorities
and Costs Associated with U.S. Dismantlement Assistance. GAO/NSIAD-93-154, March
1993. Washington, D.C. p. 4-8.
32U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction: Reducing the Threat from
the Former Soviet Union. GAO/NSIAD-95-7, October 1994. Washington, D.C. p. 7.
33U.S. Congress. House. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1995.
(continued...)

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CRS-15
In a study published in 1995, the General Accounting Office reported that the
United States had begun to conduct audits and examinations of CTR projects in Russia
and Ukraine.34 But this same study raised new questions about the use of U.S.
assistance when it reported that some scientists who received grants from the
International Science and Technology Centers (ISTC) “may also continue to be
employed by institutes engaged in weapons work.”35 GAO interpreted this finding to
mean that the centers had not succeeded in redirecting weapons scientists to peaceful
endeavors. Other critics of the CTR program claimed that GAO’s findings indicated
that, by supporting Russian weapons scientists, U.S. funds were supporting Russian
weapons programs.
The State Department disputed both of these conclusions, noting that the grants
from the ISTC were intended to supplement, not replace the scientists income from
work in other institutes. This was a not a defense conversion project, but a
nonproliferation program that sought to provide weapons scientists with added income
from work on peaceful projects so that they would not sell their knowledge and skills
to nations outside the former Soviet Union. And the State Department claimed that
the United States could be sure that the scientists were not using ISTC grants to support
their work at defense-related institutes.
Value of U.S. Assistance Under CTR
Relationship to U.S. National Security. The Clinton Administration states
that the CTR program has helped the United States achieve “some tremendous gains
... toward ensuring our security by helping to eliminate weapons that could be aimed
at us and by helping to prevent weapons proliferation to hostile countries.”36 To support
this conclusion, the Administration cites numerous developments, including the complete
withdrawal of nuclear weapons from Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan; the accelerated
reductions of strategic offensive weapons in Russia, the enhancement of safety, security,
and control of fissile material and weapons in Russia; the transfer of 600 kilograms
of enriched uranium from insecure facilities in Kazakhstan to secure facilities in Oak
Ridge, Tennessee; and the increases in transparency and understanding afforded by
the cooperation among military officials from all the participating nations.37
33(...continued)
Conference Report, 103-701, 103d Congress, 2d Session. Washington, G.P.O., August 12,
1994. p. 226.
34U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction, Reducing the Threat From
the Former Soviet Union: An Update. GAO/NSIAD-95-165, June 1995. Washington, D.C.
35U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction, Reducing the Threat From
the Former Soviet Union: An Update. GAO/NSIAD-95-165, June 1995. Washington, D.C.
p. 27.
36U.S. Department of Defense. Cooperative Threat Reduction. April 1995. Washington,
D.C., p. 1.
37U.S. Department of Defense. Annual Report to the President and Congress. William Perry,
(continued...)

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CRS-16
Some supporters of the CTR have argued that the projects have not done as much
as they could to advance U.S. national security interests because they focused more
on security and control over nuclear weapons than on the security and control of
materials that can be used to make nuclear, chemical, or biological weapons. They
note that, in relative terms, these materials are in a far more precarious position than
nuclear weapons and that proliferation resulting from the leakage of materials out of
the Soviet Union is a far more likely threat to the United States than proliferation from
the illegal sale or transfer of warheads. They believe that terrorist groups or nations
such as Libya and Iran might use these materials to develop their own weapons of mass
destruction.38 In response to these concerns, Senators Nunn, Lugar, and Domenici
sponsored an amendment to the FY1997 Defense Authorization Bill that would expand
funding, through both the CTR programs and Department of Energy programs, for
efforts to secure and control fissile and other materials that pose a proliferation risk.39
And, as was noted above, a recent report by a DOE Task Force called for a further
expansion of these efforts to address “the greatest unmet national security threat”to
the United States.
On the other side of the debate, some observers, both in Congress and outside
government, have argued that the CTR programs could diminish U.S. national security
by subsidizing the Russian defense establishment. During the debate over CTR funding
for FY1997, Representative Solomon stated that “if we are giving them this money,
it is freeing up other money” and he added that “we are subsidizing the Russian
Government to dismantle old nuclear missiles while they are still in the process of
modernizing and building up other nuclear missiles.” Representative Hunter summarized
this point of view when he asked, “does it make sense for us to subsidize the Soviet
Union to the tune of some $300 million?”40 Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld appeared
to share these concerns during his confirmation process in January 2001 when he said
that Russia should not request additional funding for weapons dismantlement while
it continued to build new weapons.
Although the debate over this issue has calmed in recent years, some Members
of Congress remain concerned. For example, in its report on the FY1999 Defense
Authorization Act, the House National Security Committee noted that it remained
concerned about Russia's willingness to eliminate weapons systems without U.S.
assistance, in spite of its START I Treaty obligations and in light of the fact that it
37(...continued)
Secretary of Defense, March 1996. Washington, D.C., 1996. p. 67-68.
38Mann, Paul. Post-Cold War Nightmare. Aviation Week and Space Technology, v. 144,
June 17, 1996. p. 58-63. See also Senator Sam Nunn, Opening Statement, Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, Hearings on Global Proliferation of Weapons of Mass
Destruction and Illicit Trafficking of Nuclear Materials. March 13, 1996.
39Senator Lugar stated “If the United States is to have any chance of stopping the detonation
of a weapon of mass destruction on our soil, prevention must start at the source, the weapons
and materials depots and research institutions in the former Soviet Union.” Congressional
Record, v. 142, June 26, 1996. p. S6990.
40Congressional Record, v. 142, May 15, 1996. p. H5070-H5071.

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CRS-17
continued to spend its own resources on strategic offensive arms modernization
programs.41 In addition, Congress prohibited funding for a chemical weapons
destruction facility in the FY2000 Defense Authorization Act, in large part because
a GAO study had raised questions whether that this facility would further U.S.
nonproliferation objectives, and, therefore, enhance U.S. national security. The GAO
study also raised questions about the plutonium storage facility at Mayak, and noted
that the United States “lacked clear assurances” from Russia that this facility would
house nuclear materials removed from weapons that had threatened the United States.
As a result, Congress conditioned U.S. funding for a second wing at this facility on
U.S.-Russian agreement on transparency measures that would provide these assurances.
Those who support the CTR programs have argued that U.S. funds are not
supporting the Russian defense industry or other Russian military and foreign policy
activities. They note that the United States does not provide Russia with cash that it
can divert to these efforts; it provides technology, expertise, and other in-kind assistance
for specific projects.42 These analysts also contend that, without U.S. assistance, Russia
would simply choose not to pursue the safe and secure elimination of its older nuclear
weapons while continuing to spend its own funds to modernize its forces or pursue
other military goals and foreign policy goals.43 Hence, the CTR program has provided
Russia and the other recipient nations with an incentive to pursue denuclearization
efforts that are a high priority for the United States.
Relationship to Key Program Objectives. Some observers dispute the
Clinton Administration’s positive assessment of the value of CTR assistance by noting
that the program has failed to result in the verified dismantlement of any nuclear
warheads.44 The Clinton Administration and other supporters of the CTR programs
have responded to this criticism by stating the “CTR program never set out to dismantle
warheads directly.” The goal was, instead, to facilitate in the “transportation, storage,
41U.S. Congress, House, Committee on National Security. National Defense Authorization
Act For Fiscal Year 1999. Report 105-532, Washington, D.C. May 12, 1998. p. 350.
42Senator Nunn has stated that “we are not furnishing cash to the Russians. They do not have
any way to convert this cash to their own defense programs that do not relate to this. They
are basically being furnished equipment and know-how for a specific purpose.”
Congressional Record, v. 142, June 26, 1996, p. S6996.
43Responses to Questions for the Record. Provided by the Office of the Assistant Secretary
of Defense (International Security Policy), Special Coordinator for Cooperative Threat
Reduction, to the Senate Armed Services Committee, Subcommittee on Strategic Forces,
March 1996.
44At least one analyst has stated that warhead dismantlement should be the key measure of
success for U.S. assistance because Dr. Ashton Carter, who later served as the Assistant
Secretary of Defense responsible for CTR policy, had proposed such a goal in an academic
study he authored before he joined the Clinton Administration. See Rich Kelly. The Nunn-
Lugar Act: A Wasteful and Dangerous Illusion. CATO Institute Foreign Policy Briefing, no.
39, March 18, 1996. p. 3.

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CRS-18
safeguarding and destruction of nuclear and other weapons.”45 And officials in Russia
have repeatedly insisted that they have the means to dismantle their warheads themselves
and, therefore, do not need U.S. assistance with that effort.
Even those who do not use the single measure of dismantled warheads have
questioned whether U.S. assistance has achieved the goals that the Clinton
Administration attributed to the program. For example, the Clinton Administration
argued that CTR assistance has resulted in the complete denuclearization of Ukraine,
Kazakhstan, and Belarus. But others point out that most CTR projects were in their
early stages when these nations gave up the nuclear weapons on their territories, so
the amount of CTR money actually expended (as opposed to the amount obligated
to those projects) was too low to have produced significant results. Russia had also
eliminated many of its strategic offensive forces covered by the START I Treaty before
it received much assistance from CTR programs. The General Accounting Office
highlighted this point in its 1995 report, stating that “to date, the material impact
(emphasis added) of the aid actually delivered by the CTR program’s destruction and
dismantlement projects has generally been limited.”46
The Clinton Administration contended that GAO’s measure of material impact
understates the effects of the CTR program because it does not measure the effect that
U.S. assistance had in demonstrating the high priority the U.S. places on the safe and
secure elimination of these weapons. It also did not measure the effect that promises
of U.S. assistance might have had on political decisions in recipient nations. For
example, the Administration noted that the promise of U.S. assistance under the CTR
program played a significant role in convincing leaders in Ukraine, Belarus, and
Kazakhstan to eliminate all nuclear weapons on their territories. These three nations
had each agreed to return their nuclear weapons to Russia in the 1992 Lisbon Protocol
to the START I Treaty, but each began to question this commitment and all voiced
concerns about the costs of eliminating the delivery vehicles and basing facilities for
these weapons.47 After the Clinton Administration promised that the United States
would provide assistance with the costs of deactivating and dismantling their weapons
if the nations resumed their commitment to become nuclear-free, each of these nations
approved the START Treaty, joined the NPT as non-nuclear weapons states, and
proceeded to return the warheads on their territories to Russia.
The Clinton Administration acknowledged, as GAO noted, that Russia began
eliminating its strategic offensive weapons under START I even before it began
receiving U.S. assistance. And it did not dispute those who state that Russia probably
45U.S. Department of Defense. Cooperative Threat Reduction. April 1995. Washington, D.C.
p. 19-20.
46U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction, Reducing the Threat from
the Former Soviet Union: An Update. GAO/NSIAD-95-165, June, 1995. Washington, D.C.
p. 12.
47For more details on the views in these nations and the efforts to convince them to eliminate
the nuclear weapons on their territories, see CRS Issue Brief 91144, Nuclear Weapons in the
Former Soviet Union: Location, Command and Control, by Amy F. Woolf, updated regularly.
p. 4-9.

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CRS-19
has the resources to comply with START I without U.S. assistance. But Clinton
Administration officials noted that U.S. assistance can ensure that the reduction process
takes place in the “safest and most secure manner possible.”48 U.S. assistance can also
accelerate the reduction process and help Russia reach the treaty limits earlier than it
could by itself.
Scope of the CTR Programs
As was noted above, the Clinton Administration has divided the CTR program
into three distinct project areas: destruction and dismantlement; chain of custody; and
demilitarization.49 Early projects — such as the provision of storage containers, bullet-
proof blankets, and secure rail cars — were chain of custody efforts. Many projects
that received significant funding in recent years focused on strategic offensive arms
elimination and other dismantlement and destruction activities. To date, funding for
demilitarization efforts has been relatively low and Congress has refused to fund some
projects in this area. This is discussed in more detail below.
Several factors have affected the balance of funding among CTR program areas.
For example, the focus of U.S. efforts has shifted as time has passed. Early projects
assisted the safe and secure transportation of warheads out of the non-Russian republics,
a process that is now complete. In recent years, a significant portion of U.S. funding
has assisted with elimination of the missiles and launchers that once carried these
warheads. This effort may also wind down in a few years, when all four recipient
nations complete their reductions under the START I Treaty, but it could resume in
the future if the Russian parliament approves the START II Treaty and the United States
provides funding to help Russia eliminate weapons covered by that agreement.
Some analysts argue that these funding outcomes reflect political and
organizational, as much as policy priorities.50 For example, although CTR programs
are an interagency effort, some analysts believe the Department of Defense has more
influence than other agencies because its budget contains the funds for CTR programs.
48See the Statement of Undersecretary of Defense, Walter Slocombe in U.S. Congress.
Senate. Committee on Armed Services. National Security Implications of U.S. Ratification
of the Strategic Arms Reduction Treaty — START II. Hearing, 104 Congress, 1st Session.
May 17, 1995. Washington, G.P.O., 1996. P. 11.
49In its FY1998 budget request, the Clinton Administration sought $210 million for
destruction and dismantlement projects; $100.7 million for chain of custody activities; $41
million for reactor core conversion; and $30.5 million for military contacts and other program
support. Demilitarization projects are included in this last category.
50For example, the decision to provide blankets, storage containers, and rail cars came from
“a laundry list compiled largely of notions picked up from cocktail party conversation with
members of the Russian delegation. The intent was not to promote U.S. security interests, but
to make some progress that was politically sustainable with the Congress.” See Wilson,
Heather. Missed Opportunities: Washington Politics and Nuclear Proliferation. The National
Interest, v. 34, Winter 1993/1994. p. 29.

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CRS-20
Because the Department of Defense has preferred to focus on dismantlement and
destruction activities, these efforts have received the most CTR funding in recent years.51
The preferences and priorities of officials in the recipient nations have also affected
the funding for CTR programs. For example, officials in the non-Russian republics
indicated that they could not eliminate the nuclear weapons on their territories unless
they received financial assistance for this effort. As a result, CTR funding for strategic
offensive arms and nuclear infrastructure elimination has grown in recent years. At
the same time, although the United States would have liked to allocate more funds for
chain of custody efforts, officials in Russia did not share this priority. The United States
experienced particular difficulties gaining cooperation from the Ministry of Atomic
Energy (MINATOM), which is responsible for nuclear materials and facilities in Russia.
Several analysts have noted that officials at MINATOM have been unwilling to give
the United States access to sensitive facilities where most nuclear materials are stored.52
Officials in Russia have also taken steps that slowed the implementation of some
projects. For example, the United States is helping Russia design and construct a facility
at Mayak, near the Russian city of Chelyabinsk, to store materials and components from
nuclear weapons. It has allocated $15 million to help design the facility and $330 million
for construction, but this project has been delayed several times. Officials in Russia
altered the design plans and the two sides were unable to agree on the details of the
final design or construction schedules for the facility. In early 1997, Clinton
Administration officials noted that the two sides had resolved many of these issues and
construction was proceeding. However, they noted that the project could slow again
because MINATOM had not been able to provide its full financial contribution to the
project and because the two nations had not reached an agreement on transparency
measures that would assure that materials stored in the facility remained there.
The congressional debate over CTR funding in recent year has indicates that some
in Congress disagree with the Clinton Administration’s priorities for CTR programs.
For example, concerns about DOD's priorities were part of the reason that Congress
expanded funding for DOE programs directly in the FY1997 Defense Authorization
Act. The following discussion highlights some of the specific differences in priorities.
Dismantlement and Destruction Activities. Most Members of Congress
continue to support U.S. assistance with the dismantlement and destruction of nuclear
and other weapons in the former Soviet Union. Some, however, have questioned
whether the United States needs to provide so much assistance on some projects that
may not have direct implications for U.S. national security. Specifically, some Members
have questioned whether the United States should help fund the elimination of Russia’s
chemical weapons. In FY1998 and FY1999, the House cut out funding for the chemical
51See, for example, the discussion in Ellis, Jason D. Nunn-Lugar’s Mid-Life Crisis,
forthcoming, Survival, Winter 1996/7. p. 17.
52See U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction. Reducing the Threat
from the Former Soviet Union: An Update. GAO/NSIAD-95-165, June 1995. Washington,
D.C., pp. 24-25. See also, Jessica E. Stern. U.S. Assistance Programs for Improving
MPC&A in the Former Soviet Union. The Nonproliferation Review. Winter 1996. p. 17-32.

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CRS-21
weapons destruction facility; the funds were restored by the Conference Committee.
In its report on the FY1999 Defense Bill (H.Rept. 105-532), the House noted that
it believed strategic offensive arms elimination should take priority over chemical
weapons destruction because Russia’s chemical weapons stockpile does not pose a
direct security threat to the United States.53 Members who support U.S. assistance
for chemical weapons destruction note that it does contribute to U.S. security, both
by reducing the threat from Russian weapons and by supporting Russian compliance
with the international Chemical Weapons Convention. Nevertheless, in FY2000and
FY2001, the Conference Committee adopted the House position and eliminated funding
for the chemical weapons destruction facility.
Chain of Custody Activities. Most Members of Congress also believe that
chain of custody projects generally serve U.S. interests by reducing the risks of
proliferation. Some have, however, questioned the U.S. approach to implementing
these projects, in part because large sums of money have been obligated with few
apparent results. In addition, some questioned the need for added funds in these areas
because the United States and Russia had not yet concluded agreements needed to
implement some of the projects. Nevertheless, Congress approved the Administration’s
FY1998 request for $100.7 million for chain of custody activities. These funds will
be used to support the design and construction of the fissile materials storage facility
at Mayak, the provision of containers that will hold the stored fissile materials, and
improvements in security at weapons storage areas.
Some in Congress believe that the Administration has devoted too few resources
to ensuring the safety and security of materials that could be used to produce nuclear,
chemical, or biological weapons. This concern, and questions about the U.S. ability
to deter or respond to terrorist attacks with these weapons, prompted Senators Nunn,
Lugar, and Domenici to sponsor the Defense Against Weapons of Mass Destruction
Act of 1996. Although Administration officials testified that they did not need additional
funds for CTR programs, this legislation added $37 million to the CTR budget. The
added funds supported materials protection, control, and accounting projects and efforts
to dismantle facilities that had produced chemical and biological weapons.54 Congress
approved an additional $20 million in DOD funds in FY1998 for the dismantlement
of chemical and biological weapons facilities and $137 million in DOE funds in FY1998
for materials protection, control, and accounting projects. In FY1997, Congress also
mandated that DOD use $10 million to support a DOE project that will help Russia
design a nuclear power reactor to replace a reactor that had both generated power and
produced plutonium for nuclear weapons. Although the House initially rejected added
funding for this project, Congress eventually approved the requested $41 million for
this effort in FY1998. The House also approved the Administration's request for $29.8
53U.S. Congress, House, Committee on National Security. National Defense Authorization
Act For Fiscal Year 1999. Report 105-532, Washington, D.C. May 12, 1998. p. 352.
54Congress also added $57 million to the $95 million requested by the Department of Energy
for its materials protection, control and accounting programs in Russia. In addition to
supporting programs already in the budget, DOE can use these funds to demonstrate a
verification technology that can be used to account for the plutonium removed from nuclear
warheads.

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CRS-22
million for this project in FY1999, although it noted that management had moved back
to DOD and that it believed responsibility for the program should reside in DOE.
Demilitarization Programs. Congress added demilitarization programs to
the CTR mandate in FY1993. Most Members continue to support funding for the
International Science and Technology Centers in Moscow and Kiev55. But, many have
been critical of projects designed to convert plants in Russia’s defense industry to
peaceful endeavors. Some believe that this funding will simply subsidize the Russian
defense industry and would rather use the funds for defense conversion or other projects
in the United States. In addition, in its 1995 report, the General Accounting Office
found that most CTR defense conversion efforts were “converting dormant facilities
that once produced items related to weapons of mass destruction,” rather than
eliminating current production capacity.56
The Clinton Administration responded to these criticisms by noting that defense
conversion projects at dormant facilities would reduce pressure on Russia to reopen
these plants and either rearm itself or sell high-tech weapons abroad. In addition, U.S.
assistance was never designed to convert all of Russia’s defense industry to civilian
purposes, but, instead, to promote conversion by encouraging U.S. investment in
Russian enterprises. Congress was not swayed by these arguments. The FY1998
Defense Authorization Act contains an amendment that prohibits the use of funds in
the CTR budget for defense conversion in the former Soviet Union. But ongoing
projects that use private corporate funds or are funded through the Defense Enterprise
Fund or DOE’s Industrial Partnering Program will continue.
Congress has also strongly opposed the use of CTR funds for housing construction
and environmental restoration projects. In support of these projects, Secretary Perry
noted that several former Soviet republics have laws that prohibit the demobilization
of military units unless there is civilian housing for the officers retiring from that unit.
But these new nations suffer from severe housing shortages. So, without assistance
in the construction of housing, the recipient nations would not have been able to
complete the deactivation and elimination of nuclear weapons on their territories.57
Secretary Perry noted similar reasons for U.S. assistance with environmental restoration
at former nuclear weapons facilities. Both Ukraine and Belarus claimed that the Soviet
Union had seriously undermined the environment when establishing nuclear missile
bases in their nations. As a result, these nations sought U.S. assistance with both
weapons deactivation and environmental restoration as a part of the effort to eliminate
those bases.
55Since FY1996, funding for these Centers has been included in the State Department Budget.
56U.S. General Accounting Office. Weapons of Mass Destruction, Reducing the Threat from
the Former Soviet Union: An Update. GAO/NSIAD-95-165, June 1995. Washington, D.C.
p. 30.
57U.S. Department of Defense. Cooperative Threat Reduction. April 1995. Washington,
D.C., p. 18.

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CRS-23
Many in Congress were not convinced by these arguments. They have argued
that the funds could be better used for projects in the United States; some suggested
that the funds could provide housing for U.S. veterans who lack sufficient resources.
As a result, Congress banned the use of CTR funds for housing construction or
environmental restoration in the FY1996, FY1997, and FY1998 Defense Authorization
Acts.58
Russia's Financial Commitment to CTR Projects
Both supporters and critics of the CTR program have noted that final costs of
some projects could grow as the projects proceed. In addition, they have noted that,
in many cases, Russia seems less willing, or able, to commit resources to these projects
than does the United States. As a result, some have expressed concerns that the United
States could end up paying far more than it intended to complete projects that were
initiated with the expectation that Russia would contribute a substantial portion of the
funding. The Clinton Administration has acknowledged that Russia's economic
weakness may limit its contribution to some CTR projects, but it does not agree that
the United States will end up footing Russia's portion of the bill.
Nevertheless, Congress included several provisions in the FY1998 Defense
Authorization Act that are designed to limit the size of the U.S. contribution to some
projects and to ensure that Russia contributes its own resources. For example, Section
1404 of the FY1998 Defense Authorization Act states that no FY1998 CTR funds can
be obligated or expended on strategic offensive arms elimination projects in Russia
that are related to the START II Treaty until the Secretary of Defense certifies that
Russia has agreed to share the costs for the projects. This provision responded not
only to concerns about Russia's willingness to commit its own resources to the arms
elimination process, but also to lingering concerns about Russia's strategic modernization
programs.59 As was noted above, some Members of Congress believe that U.S.
dismantlement assistance is "subsidizing" Russia's modernization programs because
Russia can direct its resources towards modernization while the United States pays
to eliminate its older weapons systems.
Congress has also sought to limit the U.S. contribution to the construction of the
plutonium storage facility at Mayak. The United States had stated that it planned to
limit its contribution to $275 million, but Russia has not agreed on that amount and
Russia has been unable to provide its portion of the funding thus far.60 As a result,
Section 1407 of the FY1998 Defense Authorization Act states that FY1998 CTR funds
58These prohibitions are in Section 1503 of the FY1997 Defense Authorization Act. See
Congressional Record, v. 142, July 30, 1996. p. H9708.
59U.S. Congress. House. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998. Report
of the Committee on National Security, 105-132, 105th Cong. 1st Sess. Washington, June,
16, 1997. p. 413-414.
60U.S. Congress. House. National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1998. Report
of the Committee on National Security, 105-132, 105th Cong. 1st Sess. Washington, June,
16, 1997. p. 417.

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CRS-24
cannot be obligated or expended on this project until the United States and Russia reach
an agreement that specifies the total cost to the United States for this project.61
Linkage Between U.S. Assistance and Russian Policies
Virtually all supporters and critics of the CTR programs agree that U.S. assistance
should be linked, in some way, to policies in the recipient nations. Many disagree,
however, on which activities should be linked to U.S. assistance and how high the
standards for behavior should be.
Requirements in Current Legislation. When Congress first passed the
Nunn-Lugar amendment in 1991, it mandated that the President certify annually that
each of the recipients is committed to:
! making a substantial investment of its own resources for dismantling or
destroying nuclear, chemical, and other weapons;
! forgoing any military modernization that exceeds legitimate defense requirements
or is designed to replace destroyed weapons of mass destruction;
! forgoing the use of fissile materials and other components from destroyed nuclear
weapons in new nuclear weapons;
! facilitating U.S. verification of weapons destruction that uses U.S. money;
! complying with all relevant arms control agreements; and
! observing internationally recognized human rights, including the protection of
minorities.
Through FY1997, the Clinton Administration consistently certified that each of
the recipient nations — Russia, Ukraine, Belarus, and Kazakhstan — met these
conditions. The Administration withdrew its certification for Belarus for FY1998
because that nation has demonstrated a pattern of human rights abuses.62 Some
observers have, nonetheless, questioned the Administration’s certifications. The debate
results, in part, from the fact that the President must certify that each of the recipient
nations is committed to the actions specified in the conditions. Some observers argue
that this formulation leaves too much room for interpretation because the Clinton
61Section 1407 also precludes the obligation or expenditure of FY1998 funds on the Mayak
facility until the United States and Russia conclude a transparency agreement that would
permit the United States to monitor the quantities and types or materials stored at the facility.
U.S.-Russian negotiations on this issue have yet to produce an acceptable agreement.
62The Administration has also stated that it will certify all the other former Soviet republics,
with the exception of Tajikistan, so that they can participate in CTR projects. Congress
authorized the expansion of the program to these other states in the FY1997 Defense
Authorization Act. The Administration expects these states to participate in programs
offering military-to-military contacts.

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CRS-25
Administration can base its certification on statements by Russian leaders, rather than
actual events or activities.
For example, the Clinton Administration acknowledges that, at the present time,
some Russian activities raise questions about compliance with the Biological Weapons
Convention and the bilateral Chemical Weapons Data Exchange and Destruction
Agreements.63 But the Administration certified that Russia had satisfied the condition
that it comply with all relevant arms control agreements by highlighting the extensive
steps Russia has taken to comply with START I and other treaties and by referring
to statements that President Yeltsin had made, both publicly and privately, about his
commitment to resolve outstanding questions on the other treaties. In another example,
the Clinton Administration has pointed to the ongoing political reforms in Russia as
evidence that Russia is committed to observing internationally recognized human rights,
but many other observers have argued that Russia continues to oppress its minorities,
with the 1996 conflict in Chechnya as the primary example.
In some cases, critics argue that the United States does not have enough
information to draw the conclusions needed in the certifications. For example, the
Clinton Administration certified that Russia was not using fissile materials from
dismantled weapons in new weapons because Russia has agreed to sell the United States
500 metric tons of uranium from nuclear weapons. But many observers have noted
that this represents a small proportion of the highly enriched uranium that the Soviet
Union produced over the years. And the United States has no way of knowing what
Russia is doing with the rest of the uranium, regardless of any verbal assurances received
from the Yeltsin government. Similarly, the Clinton Administration has noted that
Russia does not plan to reuse plutonium from eliminated weapons because it has sought
U.S. assistance with the construction of a long-term storage facility for this material.
Russian officials have stated that they did not need such a facility when they were
reusing materials in new weapons. But, many observers have noted that the United
States does not know how much plutonium the Soviet Union produced, so it will never
know whether the plutonium placed in the storage facility came from old stockpiles
or dismantled warheads.
In some cases, critics have questioned the conditions in the current legislation
because they allow the recipient nations to pursue activities that can threaten U.S.
national security. For example, when certifying that recipient nations are using their
own resources to eliminate nuclear and other weapons, the Administration has pointed
to the progress that these nations have made in reducing their weapons under the
START I Treaty. But some observers charge that Russia, in particular, must not be
committing enough of its own resources to weapons dismantlement because it has
continued to commit resources to weapons modernization programs. They argue,
63Senator Kyl proposed an amendment to the FY1998 Defense Authorization Bill that would
have required the United States and Russia to resolve all compliance issues related to the
bilateral Chemical Weapons Data Exchange and Destruction Agreements before Russia could
receive any CTR funds. The Clinton Administration objected to this language, arguing that
the destruction of Russia's CW capability was in the U.S. interest and that Russia was
committed to complying with the requirements of the bilateral agreements. The final text of
the Defense Authorization Act addressed these concerns by requiring that the United States
and Russia make "substantial progress" in resolving compliance questions.

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CRS-26
similarly, that these ongoing modernization programs indicate that Russia is not
satisfying the condition that it forgo any military modernization that exceeds legitimate
defense requirements. Critics claim that two programs in particular — the continuing
production of the follow-on to the SS-25 ICBM (now designated the SS-27 ICBM)
and reports of continuing work on a huge underground military complex at Yamanatau
in the Urals Mountains — provide evidence of excessive military modernization in
Russia.
The Clinton Administration agreed that Russia was modernizing its ICBM force
with the new, single-warhead SS-27 missile, but it argues that this program is neither
prohibited by nor inconsistent with Russia’s obligations under arms control treaties.
To the contrary, the United States has tried to craft arms control agreements so that
the Soviet Union (now Russia) would replace its large, multiple warhead missiles with
single-warhead systems. This is because most analysts believe single-warhead missiles
do not pose the same destabilizing first strike threat as multiple warhead systems. And,
because Russia has to eliminate so many multiple warhead missiles under START II,
it can only keep its forces at the levels permitted by that treaty if it produces new single-
warhead systems. With respect to the underground facility at Yamanatau, the Clinton
Administration has noted that this project seems misplaced in light of Russia’s economic
crisis, but it does not believe the complex is a threat to the United States at this time.
Proposals for Changes in the Linkage between U.S. Assistance and
Russian Policies. Several members of Congress and analysts outside government
have suggested changes in the certification process and new links between U.S.
assistance under the CTR program with Russian behavior in a number of areas.
Stricter Standards for Certification. Some have proposed that Congress
alter the certification process by removing the “committed to” section of legislation.
This change could reduce the Administration’s flexibility when determining whether
recipients should continue to receive U.S. assistance because the certification might
have to reflect ongoing activities, without reference to stated intentions by officials
in the recipient nations. For example, the United States would have to certify that the
recipient nations were actually complying with all arms control agreements, not just
committed to such compliance. Although Congress has not adopted this change for
all arms control efforts, it did, in the FY1999 Defense Authorization Act, block
expenditures on chemical weapons and biological weapons projects until the
Administration provides such certifications with respect to chemical weapons and
biological weapons agreements, or until the Administration certifies that these projects
are in the U.S. national security interest.
Some have also proposed that Congress alter the legislation so that the United
States would have to certify that Russia had ceased all nuclear modernization programs
without reference to whether the U.S. deems the programs to be in excess of legitimate
defense requirements. Those who favor this approach see it as a response to concerns
about whether U.S. assistance is subsidizing ongoing military programs in Russia.64
64In the debate over CTR programs in the FY1997 Defense Authorization Bill, Representative
Solomon stated, “What we are doing is financing their remodernization of a new class of
(continued...)

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CRS-27
Some supporters of CTR programs have objected to these proposed changes.
They note that strict compliance with arms control agreements is an elusive objective.
The United States and Russia often have questions about the other side’s compliance
records; most of the perceived problems are not central to the treaty’s objectives or
significant enough to justify a disruption in ongoing CTR projects. And some have
noted that CTR projects, such as the construction of a chemical weapons destruction
facility, could actually help the recipient nations meet their arms control obligations.
Cutting off assistance in response to question’s about Russia’s compliance to date with
chemical weapons agreements could actually prove counterproductive. CTR supporters
have also noted the efforts to link CTR assistance to Russian nuclear weapons
modernization could produce unintended consequences. They believe that, if forced
to choose, Russia would continue its modernization programs and leave older weapons
in place. This would not serve the long-standing U.S. interest in eliminating Russia’s
large, multiple-warhead ICBMs.
Broader Linkage to Russian Defense and Foreign Policy. During
debate over the FY1997 and FY1998 Defense Authorization Bills, many Members of
the House supported proposals to link U.S. assistance under CTR programs to a number
of Russian foreign and defense policies. These included not only Russia’s compliance
with arms control agreements and nuclear weapons modernization programs but also
Russia’s military operations in Chechnya, its relationship with other former Soviet
republics, its planned sale of short range missiles to China, and its cooperation programs
with other nations including Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, and Syria.65 Many who supported
efforts to link CTR assistance to this broad range of issue areas believed that the United
States could discourage Russian activities that were inconsistent with U.S. security
interests.
Others have argued that such links would be ineffective. They note that the value
of U.S. CTR assistance, at around $400 million per year, is too low to provide the
United States with much leverage over Russian actions. And they argue that Russia
would probably forgo U.S. aid if it believed it needed to pursue other actions to satisfy
its national security needs. Others have stated that the CTR program was the wrong
place to raise these issues because the United States would undermine its own interests
if it stopped the CTR programs to punish Russia for its behavior in other areas.66
64(...continued)
weapons; they are tearing down the obsolete silos, building new ones with our money so that
these warheads that they are not abolishing or doing away with can be remounted. We should
not be paying for it.” Congressional Record, v. 142, May 15, 1996. p. H5075.
65The link to the missile sale to China was contained in an amendment, sponsored by
Representatives Rohrabacher and Solomon, to the FY1998 Defense Authorization Bill; the
other provisions were in an amendment, sponsored by Representative Solomon, to the FY1997
Defense Authorization Bill. The Solomon Amendment failed by a vote of 220-202; the
Rohrabacher amendment failed by a vote of 215-206.
66Representative Hamilton noted that “it would stop a program that is making the biggest
contribution to nonproliferation in the very part of the world which represents the greatest
nonproliferation threat. It would stop a program that every single day reduces the nuclear
(continued...)

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CRS-28
Representative Dellums summarized this perspective when he stated “If we have foreign
policy concerns ... there are other places where we can fight that battle. But to use
the CTR program as the vehicle to challenge on all these other bases I would suggest
... that it cuts off our nose to spite our face.”67
Conclusion
When Congress first passed the Nunn-Lugar amendment in November 1991, it
sought to provide U.S. assistance quickly in response to the expected collapse of nuclear
control and security in the Soviet Union. Even though the original impetus for U.S.
assistance has passed, Congress continues to provide strong support for the Cooperative
Threat Reduction Program. Nevertheless, Congress has prohibited CTR expenditures
on some demilitarization programs and has questioned progress on several other
projects. At the same time, Congress approved more money for CTR programs to
enhance the security of nuclear materials than the Administration requested.
The issues raised in the past few years are likely to reappear in future debates over
CTR funding. As long as Members remain concerned about security at nuclear facilities
and the potential for nuclear materials to leak to rogue nations or terrorist groups, many
are likely to continue to support active U.S. involvement in efforts to secure these
materials. But as long as Russia continues to pursue programs and policies that run
counter to U.S. preferences and interests, many Members are likely to continue to
question the net value of U.S. assistance to Russia and the other former Soviet republics.
66(...continued)
threat to the United States.” Congressional Record, v. 142, May 15, 1996. p. H5073.
67Congressional Record, v. 142, May 15, 1996. p. H5076.

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CRS-29
Appendix: Funding Status of CTR Programs
January 2001 (in current dollars)
Notified
Obligated
Disbursed
Destruction and Dismantlement
$1,697,974,000
$1,397,403,653
$1,048,985,671
Strategic Offensive Arms Elimination
Russia
$729,900,000
$598,641,061
$396,665,929
Ukraine
$468,949,000
$425,386,950
$340,660,264
Belarus
$3,578,000
$3,343,316
$3,313,985
Kazakhstan
$64,339,000
$58,680,740
$56,388,237
WMD Infrastructure Elimination
Ukraine
$23,400,000
$14,954,476
$11,596,490
Kazakhstan
$29,500,000
$28,913,847
$26,365,353
Environmental Restoration Belarus
$24,950,000
$24,914,523
$24,742,019
Belarus
Continuous Communications Links
Ukraine
$2,222,000
$2,029,460
$1,896,585
Belarus
$1,036,000
$1,001,777
$970,834
Kazakhstan
$2,600,000
$2,362,496
$2,291,962
Chemical Weapons Destruction, Russia
$286,500,000
$181,780,828
$136,307,985
Biological Weapons Proliferation Prevention
Russia
$21,000,000
$15,394,179
$7,786,028
Special Project
$40,000,000
$40,000,000
$40,000,000
Chain of Custody
$969,723,291
$803,641,977
$518,697,179
Material Control and Accounting
Russia
$44,789,000
$44,125,909
$43,707,686
Ukraine
$22,215,000
$22,178,813
$21,970,022
Belarus
$2,644,000
$2,616,644
$2,593,438
Kazakhstan
$22,553,000
$22,401,877
$21,975,704
Emergency Response Training and Equipment
Russia
$16,436,000
$14,988,859
$14,815,376
Ukraine
$3,110,000
$2,947,227
$2,796,108
Belarus
$5,000,000
$4,982,939
$4,822,180
Kazakhstan
$4,903,000
$4,689,583
$3,987,922
Export Controls
Russia
$2,260,000
$2,224,084
$2,224,084
Ukraine
$13,949,000
$13,931,429
$13,749,048
Belarus
$12,475,000
$12,267,221
$12,028,557
Kazakhstan
$7,260,000
$7,164,943
$7,114,396
Georgia
$1,300,000
$1,275,317
$1,126,300
Nuclear Reactor Safety Initiative, Ukraine
$11,000,000
$11,000,000
$10,888,154

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CRS-30
Russia Only:
Armored Blankets
$3,322,000
$2,991,247
$2,991,247
Fissile Material Containers
$73,507,291
$73,430,553
$57,378,612
Fis. material storage facility
$330,700,000
$325,191,692
$122,293,503
Storage facility design
$15,000,000
$14,998,584
$14,955,828
Fissile material processing and packaging
$18,700,000
$0
$0
Weapons transport. security
$59,500,000
$36,977,189
$34,241,461
Weapons storage security
$217,200,000
$127,691,317
$80,603,175
Rail Car Security Enhancements
$21,500,000
$21,442,609
$20,910,598
Reactor Core Conversion
$55,800,000
$29,981,902
$17,388,801
Auburn Endeavor, Georgia
$4,600,000
$4,142,039
$4,134,979
Demilitarization
$351,505,000
$324,540,868
$299,985,228
Science and Technology Centers
Russia
$35,000,000
$34,892,568
$34,892,567
Ukraine
$15,000,000
$15,000,000
$14,690,031
Belarus
$1,034,460
$1,034,460
$1,034,460
Kazakhstan
$9,000,000
$9,000,000
$9,000,000
Other
$3,965,540
$3,965,540
$3,965,540
Defense Enterprise Fund
Russia
$10,000,000
$10,000,000
$10,000,000
Belarus
$5,000,000
$5,000,000
$5,000,000
Kazakhstan
$7,000,000
$7,000,000
$7,000,000
Other
$44,670,000
$44,670,000
$44,670,000
Defense Conversion
Russia
$43,661,000
$34,668,851
$34,078,611
Ukraine
$55,730,000
$55,047,985
$53,885,856
Belarus
$19,270,000
$19,252,793
$19,237,164
Kazakhstan
$17,200,000
$17,067,031
$16,549,296
Industrial Partnering Program (all)
$10,000,000
$10,000,000
$9,025,440
Research & Development Foundation, Russia
$10,000,000
$10,000,000
$10,000,000
Chemical Research, Uzbekistan
$6,000,000
$4,854,272
$3,341,105
BW Weapons Proliferation, Kazakhstan
$5,000,000
$4,991,632
$0
Defense and Military Contacts
Russia
$14,664,333
$12,452,259
$10,058,898
Ukraine
$7,500,000
$5,392,804
$3,691,364
Belarus
$500,000
$472,075
$419,911
Kazakhstan
$2,300,000
$1,572,962
$1,043,329
Other
$25,009,667
$15,711,010
$8,296,778
CP
$4,000,000
$2,494,626
$104,878
Arctic nuclear waste study - Russia
$30,000,000
$30,026,624
28339706
Administrative Costs
$89,039,709
$86,183,335
$67,924,735
Grand Total
$3,138,242,000
$2,641,796,457
$1,963,932,519
Source: CTR Program Office, Department of Defense

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