Order Code RL30844
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The Electoral College:
Reform Proposals
in the 107th Congress
Updated March 13, 2001
Thomas H. Neale
Government and Finance Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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The Electoral College: Reform Proposals in the 107th
Congress
Summary
The United States Constitution provides for indirect election of the President and
Vice President by a group of officials known collectively as the electoral college. For
additional information on contemporary operation of the system, consult CRS Report
RS20273, The Electoral College: How It Works in Contemporary Presidential
Elections.
Critics contend that the electoral college is archaic and undemocratic, that it
provides an unfair advantage to less populous states; that the “winner-take-all”
provision, by which most states award all their electoral votes to the candidates
winning the most popular votes, deprives many voters of any influence in the election;
and that the system has the potential to elect a President who receives more electoral
votes, but fewer popular votes, than his principal opponent. Further, they assert, the
contingent election process, by which Congress elects the President and Vice
President if no candidates receive an electoral college majority, is even less
democratic. For additional information on contingent election, consult CRS Report
RS20300, Election of the President and Vice President by Congress: Contingent
Election. Supporters maintain that the electoral college is an integral element of the
federal system, that the need to accrue state-by-state majorities is a strong support of
the two party system, and that the system has delivered clear electoral mandates in all
but four elections since 1804.
Following the closely contested presidential election of 2000, in which the
winning candidates for President and Vice President gained fewer popular votes than
their major party opponents, there has been renewed congressional interest in
electoral college reform. For additional information on electoral college contingencies
and broader aspects of reform proposals, consult CRS Report RL30804, The
Electoral College: An Overview and Analysis of Reform Proposals.
Six proposals to reform the electoral college system have been introduced to
date in the 107th Congress. H.J. Res. 3 (Representative Green of Texas), and H.J.Res.
5 (Representative Delahunt) would eliminate the electoral college, substituting direct
popular election of the President. H.J.Res. 1 (Representative Clyburn) and H.J.Res.
18 (Representative Engel) would incorporate the “district” method of awarding
electoral votes, and H.J.Res. 17 (Representative Engel) would provide for
proportional award of electoral votes. H.J.Res. 25 (Representative Leach) is a hybrid
plan. These measures have been referred to the House Judiciary Committee and await
further action.
This report will be updated to reflect any action on these measures or the
introduction of any additional related legislation.

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Contents
Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Direct Popular Election v. Electoral College Reform . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
Electoral College Reform: Pro and Con in Brief . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Reform Proposals in the 107th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Direct Popular Election Proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Electoral College Reform Proposals (District Plan) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Electoral College Reform Proposals (Proportional Plan) . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Electoral College Reform Proposals (Hybrid plans) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Prospects for Action in the 107th Congress . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10

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The Electoral College: Reform Proposals in
the 107th Congress
Introduction
American voters elect the President and Vice President of the United States
under a complex arrangement of constitutional provisions, federal and state laws, and
political party practices known as the electoral college system. Despite occasional
close elections, this system has delivered uncontested results in 46 of 50 elections
since adoption of the 12th Amendment, effective in 1804. Throughout this period,
however, it has been the subject of persistent criticism and many reform proposals.
In 2000, in an extremely close election, the presidential and vice presidential
candidates who received a majority of electoral votes, and thus won the election,
gained fewer popular votes nationwide than the electoral college runners-up. This
situation, which was followed by a period of intense legal and political activity, has
generated renewed interest in Congress in proposals for reform.
Direct Popular Election v. Electoral College Reform
A wide range of proposals to reform presidential election procedures has been
introduced over time. In recent decades, they have fallen into two categories: (1)
those that seek to eliminate the electoral college system entirely, and replace it with
direct popular election; and (2) those that seek to repair perceived defects of the
existing system.
The direct election alternative would abolish the electoral college, substituting
a single, nationwide count of popular votes. The candidates winning a plurality of
votes would be elected President and Vice President. Most direct election proposals
would constitutionally mandate the joint tickets of presidential/vice presidential
candidates already adopted in state law,1 and would set the minimum number of votes
necessary to win election at 40% of those cast. In the event no presidential-vice
presidential ticket were to attain the 40% threshold, most direct election measures
would require the two tickets that received the most votes to compete in a subsequent
runoff election. Some versions would provide for Congress, meeting in joint session,
to elect the President and Vice President if no ticket received 40% of the vote.
1This provision, currently in use in all the states, requires each voter to cast a single vote for
a joint ticket for President and Vice President, thus insuring that the President and Vice
President will always be of the same political party.

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CRS-2
Reform measures that would retain the electoral college have included a range
of different proposals, of which the most popular include:2
• the Automatic Plan, which would award all electoral votes in each state directly
to the winning candidates who obtained the most votes statewide; this alternative
would constitutionally mandate the “general ticket” or “winner-take-all system”
currently used to award electoral vote in 48 states and the District of Columbia;
• the District Plan, which would award one electoral vote to the winning
candidates in each congressional district, and an additional two electoral votes,
reflecting the two “constant” or “senatorial” electoral voters assigned to each
state, regardless of its population, to the statewide winners; this alternative
would constitutionally mandate the system currently used to award electoral
votes in Maine and Nebraska;
• the Proportional Plan, which would award electoral votes in each state in
proportion to the percentage of the popular vote gained by each ticket; and
• hybrid plans, which would combine various elements of different reform
proposals.
Most versions of these plans would eliminate the office of elector, and award electoral
votes directly to the candidates. In common with direct election, most would also
require joint tickets of presidential-vice presidential candidates.
Electoral College Reform: Pro and Con in Brief
Proponents of direct popular election cite a number of factors in support of their
proposal. At the core of their arguments, they assert that their process would be
simple, national, and democratic.
• They assert that direct popular election would provide for a single, democratic,
choice in which all the nation’s voters would directly choose the two highest
ranking officials in the United States government, the President and Vice
President.
• The candidates who won the most popular votes would always win the
election, and in the event no one received at least 40% of the vote, a runoff
election between the two leading tickets would decide the choice. (Some direct
election proposals would substitute election by joint session of Congress for a
runoff in the event no ticket received at least 40% of the vote.)
• Every vote would carry the same weight in the election, no matter where in the
nation it was cast.
2For more detailed information on these reform options, consult CRS Report RL30804, The
Electoral College: An Overview and Analysis of Reform Proposals.

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CRS-3
• All the various mechanisms of the existing system, such as the contingent
election process, would give way to these simple requirements.3
They assert that, in contrast, the electoral college system is cumbersome and
potentially anti-democratic:
• The electoral college, they argue, is almost the antithesis of this simple and
democratic concept. It is, they contend, philosophically obsolete: indirect
election of the President is an anachronism that dates from the 18th century which
has no place in the 21st.
• Moreover, the 12th Amendment provisions governing cases in which no
candidate attains an electoral college majority (contingent election) are even less
democratic than the primary provisions of Article I Section 1 (see footnote 3).
• By providing a fixed number of electoral votes per state that is adjusted only
after each census, the electoral college does not accurately reflect state
population changes in intervening elections.
• The two “constant” or “senatorial” electors assigned to each state regardless
of population give some of the nation’s least populous jurisdictions a
disproportionate advantage over more populous states.
• The office of presidential elector itself, and the resultant “faithless elector”
phenomenon,4 provide opportunities for political mischief, and deliberate
distortion of the voters’ choice.
• By awarding all electoral votes in each state to the candidates who win the
most popular votes in that state, the “winner-take-all” or “general ticket” system
effectively disenfranchises everyone who voted for other candidates. Moreover,
this same flawed arrangement is the centerpiece of one category of electoral
college reform proposals, the Automatic Plan.
• Finally, the electoral college system has the potential to elect presidential and
vice presidential candidates who obtain an electoral college majority, but fewer
popular votes than their opponents.
3In a contingent election, the President is elected in the House of Representatives, with each
state casting a single vote, regardless of its population and the election results in that state.
The Senate elects the Vice President in such cases, with each Senator casting a single vote.
4Faithless electors are those who cast their votes for candidates other than those to whom they
are pledged. Notwithstanding political party rules and state laws, most constitutional scholars
believe that electors remain free agents, guided, but not bound, to vote for the candidates they
were elected to support.

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CRS-4
Defenders of the electoral college, either as presently structured, or reformed,
offer various arguments in its defense.
• They reject the suggestion that it is undemocratic. Electors are chosen by the
voters in free elections, and have been in nearly all instances since the first half
of the 19th century.
• The electoral college system prescribes a federal election of the President by
which votes are tallied in each state. The founders intended that choosing the
President would be the action of citizens of a federal republic, in which they
participate both as citizens of the United States, and as members of their state
communities.
• While electoral vote allocation does provide the “constant two,” or “senatorial”
electors for each state, regardless of population, this is another federal element,
and is no less justifiable than equal representation for all states in the Senate.
Moreover, the formula also assigns additional electors equal in number to each
state’s delegation in the House of Representatives, which more than
compensates for any minor distortion.
• Further, defenders reject the suggestion that less-populous states like Alaska,
Delaware, and Wyoming, each of which casts only three electoral votes, are
somehow “advantaged” when compared with California (55 electoral votes
beginning in 2004), which casts more than 20% of the electoral votes needed to
win the presidency.
• The electoral college system promotes political stability. Parties and candidates
must conduct ideologically broad-based campaigns throughout the nation in
hopes of assembling a majority of electoral votes. The consequent need to forge
national coalitions having a wide appeal has been a contributing factor in the
moderation and stability of the two-party system.
• The faithless elector phenomenon is unimportant. Only nine such electoral
votes have been cast against instructions since 1820, and none has ever
influenced the outcome of an election. Moreover, nearly all electoral college
reform plans would remove even this slim possibility for mischief by eliminating
the office of elector.
Electoral college defenders also point to what they assert are flaws in direct election:
• Direct election proponents claim their plan is more democratic, and provides
for “majority rule,” yet most direct election proposals require winning candidates
gain as little as 40% of the vote in order to be elected. How can such plurality
Presidents be reconciled with the concept of “majority rule”?
• As was demonstrated in the presidential election of 2000, close results in a
single state in a close election are likely to be bitterly contested. Under direct
election, every close contest could resemble the post-election struggles in 2000,
but on a nationwide basis, as both parties seek gain every vote.

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CRS-5
Reform Proposals in the 107th Congress
This section lists and examines proposed constitutional amendments introduced
in the 107th Congress that would change or reform the presidential election system.
These proposals are divided into two categories: those that would establish direct
popular election, and thus eliminate the electoral college system entirely, and those
that would reform the existing arrangements. At the time of this writing, six electoral
college reform proposals have been introduced in the 107th Congress, H.J.Res. 1,
introduced by Representative Clyburn, H.J.Res. 3, introduced by Representative
Green of Texas, H.J.Res. 5, introduced by Representative Delahunt, H.J.Res. 17 and
H.J.Res. 18, both introduced by Representative Engel, and H.J.Res. 25, introduced
by Representative Leach. These measures take the form of joint resolutions, the
customary vehicle for constitutional amendments.
Direct Popular Election Proposals.
H.J.Res. 3 (Representative Green of Texas). This amendment would
establish direct election of the President and Vice President, with the President and
Vice President elected “by the people” (Section 1), and “The persons having the
greatest number of votes” (Section 3) would be elected. Section 2 would prescribe
voting qualifications as the same for those for Senators and Representatives, but
would empower the states to set less restrictive residence requirements. It also would
empower Congress to set uniform national residence and age qualifications for voters.
Section 4 would mandate joint presidential-vice presidential candidacies and a single
vote for both offices, and Section 5 would authorize Congress to provide by law for
cases in which a candidate dies before the election, or in the event any election ends
in a tie. Section 6 would be a standard enacting clause.
Although H.J.Res. 3 would include most of the provisions common to direct
popular election proposals, it would also have several distinguishing features.
First, it would not set a minimum percentage of popular votes as necessary for
election. In contrast, many similar measures would require that the winning
candidates receive at least 40% of the popular vote,5 with the rationale that this
percentage would constitute a minimum acceptable threshold for a mandate from the
voters. If the 40% threshold were not attained, then these proposals would require
a runoff election contested by the two presidential-vice presidential tickets that had
gained the most popular votes. Other versions of direct election have provided that
Congress, meeting in joint session, would elect the President and Vice President if no
ticket attains the 40% vote threshold.
Second, Section 2 would empower Congress (1) to set uniform residence
requirements by law for voters for President, a function currently performed by the
states; and (2) to set voting age qualifications by law. This latter provision of the
5This provision anticipates a presidential election contested by three or more major candidates.
It is interesting to note that the only President elected with less than 40% of the popular vote
under the current electoral college system was Abraham Lincoln, who won with 39.8% in
1860.

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CRS-6
section would appear to provide Congress with a substantial new power: the authority
to lower (or raise) the voting age by law, rather than by constitutional amendment.
A third distinguishing feature of this amendment is found in Section 5. In this
section, Congress would be authorized to provide by law to name replacements in “...
the case of the death of any candidate for President or Vice President before
(emphasis added) the day on which the President-elect or Vice President-elect has
been chosen....” At present, this is done through internal party rules. Section 5
would empower Congress to supplant these party procedures by legislation.
Finally, the seven-year time limit for ratification of this proposed amendment is
included in the preamble to the resolution, rather than in the body of the amendment.
This arrangement, which would allow Congress to extend the ratification time limit
by joint resolution, has been incorporated in all six reform measures pending in the
107th Congress.
H.J.Res. 5 (Representative Delahunt). This measure would establish
direct popular election of the President and Vice President in Section 1. In common
with H.J.Res. 3, it does not set a 40% popular vote threshold as a prerequisite to
election. Section 2 would set voting qualifications identical to those found in Section
2 of H.J.Res. 3. Section 3 would mandate joint candidacies, and Section 4 would
empower Congress to provide by law in the event of a tie vote. Section 5 would
establish procedures for counting the votes and declaring the winners in Congress.
Section 6 would give Congress the power to enforce the article by legislation, and
Section 7 would be a standard enacting clause. H.J.Res. 5 differs from H.J.Res. 3 in
that it does not empower Congress to intervene in cases wherein a candidate dies or
leaves the ticket before the election. In common with H.J.Res. 3, the seven-year
ratification deadline is incorporated in the preamble, and the ratification period could
thus be extended by Congress.
Electoral College Reform Proposals (District Plan). In brief, the
district plan or system would require that electors or electoral votes be awarded on
both a district and a statewide basis. Section 1 would provide that the two electors
representing the “constant two” or “senatorial” electors, provided to each state
regardless of its population, would be awarded to the presidential-vice presidential
ticket winning the most popular votes statewide. The remaining electors, equal in
number to the state’s House of Representatives delegation, and allocated according
to existing congressional district boundaries,6 would be awarded in each case to the
ticket winning the most popular votes in that district.
The asserted advantage of this arrangement is that the allocation of electors by
district would account for geographical differences in support for various candidates.
For instance, in a state with a “rural-urban” split, urban congressional district electoral
votes might be awarded to one ticket on the basis of the popular vote in these
congressional districts, while the preferences of voters in rural districts, who might
6As noted earlier in this report, some versions of the district plan would empower the states
to establish ad hoc presidential election districts for counting and awarding district electors
under the District Plan.

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CRS-7
favor different candidates, would also be recognized by awarding electors to the
candidates who won these districts. The statewide winners would receive a bonus,
in the form of the electors or electoral votes representing the “constant two” or
“senatorial” electors. In contrast, the winner-take-all, or general ticket, system
awards all electoral votes to the candidates who receive the most votes statewide.7
Considering Missouri (which is currently allocated 11 electoral votes) as an
illustration, in 1996, Democratic candidate and incumbent President Clinton would
have received eight electoral votes under the proportional plan (six for the six
congressional districts he won and two for winning the statewide vote). Republican
nominee Dole would have received three electoral votes for the three congressional
districts he won, and Reform candidate Perot would have received none, having failed
to win any congressional districts. On the national level, the district plan would have
yielded the following electoral vote results in 1996: Clinton, 345 (compared with 379
under the current arrangement); Dole: 193 (compared with 159 under the current
arrangement); and Perot, none.8
H.J.Res. 1 (Representative Clyburn). This measure proposes reform of
the existing electoral system through the district system. Section 1 would provide for
allocation of electors according to the district plan, but it is worth noting that the
resolution would retain the office of presidential elector. In contrast, many electoral
college reform plans offered in past Congresses proposed to eliminate electors and
retain electoral votes, on the grounds that eliminating electors would automatically
eliminate the faithless elector phenomenon. Further, H.J.Res. 1 would not mandate
joint presidential and vice presidential candidacies, implicitly leaving this requirement
as a state option. Finally, unlike the current system, it would not require a majority
of electoral votes to win the presidency and vice presidency. Section 2 would provide
for election districts, granting states the option to use existing congressional districts,
or to establish ad hoc presidential election districts. Section 3, providing presidential
electors for the District of Columbia, would incorporate provisions of the 23rd
Amendment, thus superseding it. Section 4 would empower Congress to provide by
law for cases in which any candidate were to die before election day, or for any
election tie.
H.J.Res. 1 includes a distinctive variation on the district plan model: the measure
would implicitly retain the sometimes-criticized contingent election process provided
under the 12th Amendment. In contrast, some district system plans offered in past
Congresses proposed to eliminate the contingent election process, substituting in its
place election by a joint session of Congress in cases where no presidential-vice
presidential ticket won an electoral vote majority.
7For information on comparative electoral vote results in the 1992, 1996, and 2000 elections
under the district and general ticket systems, consult The 1992, 1996, and 2000 Presidential
Vote: The Winner Take All, Proportional, and District Systems Compared, CRS
Congressional Distribution Memorandum, by David C. Huckabee (Washington: December
26, 2000). Available to Members of Congress and congressional staff from the author. It
should be noted that congressional district presidential returns for all states will not be
available before the second quarter of 2001.
8Statistics derived from ibid., pp. 33,43.

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CRS-8
H.J.Res. 18 (Representative Engel). This proposal would also incorporate
the district plan. Unlike H.J. Res 1, Section 1 of the amendment would eliminate the
office of presidential elector, awarding electoral votes directly to winning candidates.
It would not mandate joint presidential/vice presidential candidacies, implicitly leaving
this requirement as a state option. Unlike the current system, it would not require a
majority of electoral votes to win the presidency: Section 1 states that the candidates
“having the greatest number of electoral votes” would be elected. Sections 2 and 3,
respectively, would provide for contingent election of the President by the House of
Representatives and the Vice President by the Senate in case of an electoral vote tie.
These sections would retain the 12th Amendment’s procedure by giving each state a
single vote in the House and each Senator a vote in the contingent election. Section
4 would provide for election districts, granting states the option to use existing
congressional districts or to establish ad hoc presidential election districts. Section
5 would supersede the 23rd Amendment by providing that the District of Columbia “be
treated as if it were a State” in presidential elections. The District would, however,
be excluded from the contingent election process.
Electoral College Reform Proposals (Proportional Plan). The
proportional plan would allocate electoral votes in each state in a direct ratio to the
percentage of the vote in that state. In the interests of fairness and accuracy, most
such proposals would require that the electoral vote be expressed in hundredths, that
is, to the third decimal point. Many, though not all, proportional plan amendments
would also require that candidates gain a minimum of 5% of the popular vote in a
state in order to win any share of its electoral votes. It is argued that this threshold
would be high enough to deter splinter or fringe parties, but low enough for a new
party or independent candidacy that enjoyed a reasonable level of support to compete
in the contest for electoral votes. Some, but not all, proportional plan amendments
would require a candidate to win a plurality of at least 40% of electoral votes
nationwide in order to be elected. These plans generally would provide for election
by a joint session of Congress in the event no candidate attained the 40% threshold.
Proponents argue that the proportional system provides for the fairest and most
accurate accounting of candidate support in each state.
Again considering Missouri (which is currently allocated 11 electoral votes) as
an example, in 1996, Democratic candidate and incumbent President Clinton would
have received 5.229 electoral votes under the proportional plan. Republican nominee
Dole would have received 4.537 electoral votes, and Reform candidate Perot would
have received 1.107. On the national level, the proportional plan would have yielded
the following electoral vote results in 1996: Clinton, 263.652; Dole: 220.118; Perot:
45.223; other: 3.007.9
H.J.Res. 17 (Representative Engel). This proposal would incorporate the
proportional plan or system of awarding electoral votes, while requiring candidates
to receive at least 5% of popular vote in a state to gain any of its electoral votes. It
is worth noting that it would not set a 40% national plurality threshold of electoral
votes in order for a presidential or vice presidential candidate to be elected, instead
stating that, “The candidate having the greatest number of electoral votes ...” shall be
9Statistics derived from ibid.

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CRS-9
elected. It should also be noted that the proposal does not provide a constitutional
requirement for joint presidential/vice presidential candidacies, leaving this question
to the states to determine. Finally, it retains a contingent election mechanism by
providing for election of the President in the House of Representatives (with each
state casting a single vote) and the Vice President in the Senate (with each senator
having a single vote) in the event of an electoral vote tie. The District of Columbia
would not participate in a contingent election.
Electoral College Reform Proposals (Hybrid plans). These proposals
would establish procedures that include elements of other reform measures.
H.J.Res. 25 (Representative Leach). This proposal is highlighted by
several major elements.
First, in Sections 5 and 6, it would provide states with the option of awarding
electoral votes by either the general ticket or winner-take-all system (Section 5), or
by the district system.
Second, Section 8 of this resolution would incorporate an innovation generally
known as the “National Bonus Plan.”10 This arrangement would retain the current
allocation of electoral votes (538) among the states, but would also create an
additional 102 national bonus electoral votes: two for each state and the District of
Columbia. This would result in a total of 640 electoral votes. The additional national
bonus electoral votes would be awarded en bloc to the candidates who won the most
popular votes, as opposed to electoral votes. The candidates winning a majority of
the combined total of state electoral votes and national bonus electoral votes (321 of
640) would be elected. The purpose of the national bonus electoral votes would be
to eliminate a major electoral college contingency: presidential elections in which
candidates who had a majority of electoral votes were elected, but whose opponents
won more popular votes. Awarding the 102 national bonus electoral votes to the
popular vote winners would eliminate this contingency in almost every conceivable
election scenario. It would also magnify the electoral vote margin in close elections,
thus arguably conferring greater legitimacy on the winning candidates.
A third innovation in H.J.Res. 25 is found in Section 10, which would provide
for contingent election in the event no candidates receive an electoral college
majority. According to this proposal, the contingent election could be conducted in
two rounds. The first round would replicate the existing arrangement, in which the
President is chosen in the House of Representatives from among the three candidates
winning the most electoral votes, with each state casting a single vote, and the Vice
President is chosen by the Senate from among the two leading candidates, with each
Senator casting a single vote. H.J.Res. 25 would, however, also provide that if no
candidate were to attain the requisite majority in the first round of contingent election,
a second round would be held. Senate procedures would remain unchanged in the
second round. In a major departure from existing arrangements, each Representative
10The National Bonus Plan was originally conceived in 1977 by a Twentieth Century Fund
Task Force. See Twentieth Century Fund, Winner Take All (New York: Holmes & Meier,
1978).

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CRS-10
would cast a single vote for President in the second round, rather than each state
casting a single vote. A majority of the whole number of Senators and
Representatives would be necessary to elect both the President and Vice President.
Aside from these notable characteristics, H.J.Res. 25 shares several elements
common to electoral college reform proposals. Section 1 would implicitly eliminate
the office of elector, while retaining electoral votes. Section 2 would provide for joint
presidential-vice presidential candidacies. Section 3 would vest authority for the
“times, places, and manner of holding” elections with Congress. Section 4 would
provide for retention of current allocation formulas for state electoral votes.
Prospects for Action in the 107th Congress
Congressional interest in presidential election reform has generally been
dependent on the immediacy of the situation. Historically, sudden and intense
concern has arisen with the possibility that a President and Vice President might be
elected with a majority of electoral votes, but fewer popular votes than their major
party opponents. For instance, following the three candidate 1968 election,11 the
House of Representatives approved a direct election amendment in 1969 (H.J.Res.
681, 91st Congress), only to have the Senate version of the proposal (S.J.Res. 1, 91st
Congress fall victim to a filibuster. Interest revived following the closely contested
election of 1976.12 In the subsequent 96th Congress, Sen. Birch Bayh, chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee’s Subcommittee on the Constitution, guided S.J.Res. 28
to the Senate floor for debate and a vote in 1979, but the proposal failed to obtain the
necessary two-thirds majority, gaining 51 favorable votes to 48 in opposition.13
Finally, and most recently, hearings were held on three direct election amendments
11Contestants in the 1968 election included Democratic nominee (and Vice President) Hubert
H. Humphrey, Republican nominee Richard M. Nixon, and a major third party challenger,
American Independent Party candidate George C. Wallace. At times during the campaign,
it appeared that Wallace might deprive either major party candidate of an electoral college
majority, leading to contingent election. Moreover, Wallace stated publicly that he might be
prepared to shift his electoral votes to a major party candidate in return for policy concessions,
particularly in the area of civil and voting rights, a suggestion denounced by both Nixon and
Humphrey. Although Nixon eventually won with a modest popular vote plurality and a more
comfortable electoral college majority, the concern caused by these political developments
contributed to the sense of urgency surrounding congressional consideration of election reform
proposals in 1969-1971.
12Democratic nominee Jimmy Carter won over Republican President Gerald R. Ford in 1976
by a popular vote margin of 1.7million votes, and by a narrow electoral vote margin of 297
to 240 (with one faithless Republican elector who voted for the Libertarian Party candidates).
After the election, statisticians calculated that a switch of 9,246 Carter votes in Hawaii and
Ohio to Ford would have changed the electoral vote margin to 269 for Ford and 268 for
Carter, and one vote for the Libertarian Party candidate, thus leading to contingent election.
Here again, the closeness of the race, and the potential for “bargaining for electoral votes”
helped spur Congress into active consideration of reform measures.
13Mindful of the previously cited 1970 filibuster, Democratic leadership in 1979 agreed that
the House would not bring a reform measure to the floor unless and until the Senate passed
a direct election amendment by the required two-thirds majority.

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(S.J.Res. 297, S.J.Res. 302, and S.J.Res. 312, 102nd Congress) on July 22, 1992,
when it seemed possible that Ross Perot’s independent candidacy in the 1992
presidential contest might deadlock the electoral college and lead to contingent
election.
Congressional action on electoral college reform proposals has also historically
been dependent on the interest and advocacy of senior Members in either chamber.
For instance, Senator Birch Bayh was a determined and effective proponent of direct
popular election. As chairman of the then Subcommittee on Constitutional
Amendments of the Senate Judiciary Committee, he was able to guide direct election
amendments to the Senate floor twice in one decade (1970, 1979), albeit
unsuccessfully.
The 1992 hearings were the most recent congressional action on any electoral
college reform measure, aside from introduction and pro forma committee referral
prior to the presidential election of 2000. As it became apparent that this election
would be closely contested, congressional concern over the various contingencies
inherent in the electoral college system grew. Five related measures were introduced
late in the second session of the 106th Congress, but due to the constraints of time and
a full post-election legislative agenda, no further action was taken prior to
adjournment.
Given the closeness of the election, and the political and legal turbulence that
occurred in its aftermath, the 107th Congress seems likely to give substantial attention
to a wide range of election reform proposals, among them measures such as those
already introduced, that would either eliminate the electoral college system or attempt
to reform it. As noted previously, these proposals will likely take the customary form
of joint resolutions, and will almost certainly be referred to the Subcommittee on the
Constitution, Federalism, and Property Rights of the Judiciary Committee in the
Senate, and the Subcommittee on the Constitution of the Judiciary Committee in the
House of Representatives. This report will track further developments.

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