Order Code IB88090
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Nuclear Energy Policy
Updated January 12, 2001
Mark Holt and Carl E. Behrens
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Overview of Nuclear Power in the United States
Nuclear Power Research and Development
Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Regulation
Safety
Domestic Reactor Safety
Reactor Safety in the Former Soviet Bloc
Regulation
Decommissioning and Life Extension
Nuclear Accident Liability
Nuclear Waste Management
Interim Storage Legislation
Low-level Waste Facilities
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
South Asia
The Middle East
China
North Korea
Russia
Environmental Problems at Nuclear Weapons Facilities
Uranium Enrichment
Federal Funding for Nuclear Energy Programs
LEGISLATION

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Nuclear Energy Policy
SUMMARY
Nuclear energy policy issues facing Con-
Whether progress on nuclear waste
gress include questions about radioactive
disposal and other congressional action will
waste management, research and development
revive the U.S. nuclear power industry’s
priorities, power plant safety and regulation,
growth will depend on economic consider-
nuclear weapons proliferation, nuclear weap-
ations. Natural gas- and coal-fired power-
ons facilities cleanup, and technology for
plants currently are favored over nuclear
producing nuclear fuel.
reactors for new generating capacity. Howev-
er, the nuclear industry believes that simpler,
Federal funding for nuclear energy re-
safer versions of today’s commercial reactors
search and development was substantially
could eventually be built in the United States.
reduced by the Clinton Administration, which
placed a higher priority on energy efficiency
Concern about the spread, or prolifera-
and alternative energy technologies. However,
tion, of nuclear weapons throughout the world
the Department of Energy (DOE) sought, and
has risen sharply since longtime rivals India
Congress provided, $35 million in FY2001 for
and Pakistan conducted competing nuclear
the Nuclear Energy Research Initiative, which
weapons tests in May 1998. The heightened
focuses on advanced nuclear technology
tensions in Southeast Asia have focused atten-
research.
tion on the effectiveness of the international
nuclear nonproliferation regime. Potential
Disposal of highly radioactive waste has
nuclear weapons development by North Korea
been one of the most controversial aspects of
and Iran have also recently raised considerable
nuclear power. The Nuclear Waste Policy Act
U.S. concern.
of 1982 (P.L. 97-425), as amended in 1987,
requires DOE to begin detailed physical
Cleaning up severe environmental prob-
characterization of Yucca Mountain in Nevada
lems at U.S. nuclear weapons production
as a permanent underground repository for
facilities, owned by DOE, is expected to cost
high-level waste.
about $150 billion over the next several de-
cades. After sharp growth in the early 1990s,
Legislation was introduced in the 106th
DOE environmental cleanup funding under the
Congress (H.R. 45, S. 608) to establish an
Clinton Administration has been nearly flat.
interim storage facility for nuclear waste at
Congress approved about $6.4 billion for the
Yucca Mountain. But the Clinton Administra-
program in FY2001.
tion opposed temporary storage at the site. In
response, the Senate approved an alternative
The enrichment of natural uranium to
measure February 10, 2000, to authorize DOE
make nuclear fuel, formerly a government
to store waste at Yucca Mountain only after
activity, now is carried out by the newly pri-
receiving a construction permit for a perma-
vatized U.S. Enrichment Corporation (USEC).
nent repository (S. 1287). The House passed
USEC was privatized in a $1.9 billion initial
the bill without amendment March 22, 2000,
public stock offering that was completed July
but President Clinton vetoed it April 25, 2000.
28, 1998. USEC announced June 21, 2000,
A Senate effort to override the veto fell short
that it would close one of its enrichment plants
on May 2, 2000, by a vote of 64-35.
by June 2001.
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Most Department of Energy (DOE) nuclear-related programs will receive steady or
increased funding under the FY2001 Energy and Water Appropriations bill (P.L. 106-377)
signed by President Clinton October 27. Nuclear energy programs will receive about $260
million (plus $53 million transferred into a new uranium remediation fund), and DOE’s
civilian nuclear waste disposal program receive a $50 million boost over FY2000, to as
much as $401 million. Funding for environmental restoration and waste management totals
about $6.4 billion.
The Senate voted May 2, 2000, not to override President Clinton’s veto of a bill to
advance the schedule for receiving nuclear waste at a planned permanent repository at
Yucca Mountain, Nevada (S. 1287). The 64-35 vote was three votes short of the two-thirds
of the Senate needed for a veto override. The legislation would have authorized DOE to
begin storing waste at the site as early as 2007, if the repository received a construction
permit from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC). The Environmental Protection
Agency (EPA) would have been barred from issuing final environmental standards for the
repository until June 1, 2001. In vetoing the bill April 25, President Clinton contended that
it would hinder EPA’s rulemaking authority and reduce public confidence in the repository
program.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Overview of Nuclear Power in the United States
The U.S. nuclear power industry, while currently generating about 20% of the nation’s
electricity, faces an uncertain future. No nuclear plants have been ordered since 1978 and
more than 100 reactors have been canceled, including all ordered after 1973. No units are
currently under active construction; the Tennessee Valley Authority’s Watts Bar 1 reactor,
ordered in 1970 and licensed to operate in 1996, was the last U.S. nuclear unit to be
completed. The nuclear power industry’s troubles include high nuclear power plant
construction costs, public concern about nuclear safety and waste disposal, and regulatory
compliance costs.
High construction costs are perhaps the most serious obstacle to nuclear power
expansion. Construction costs for reactors completed since the mid-1980s have ranged from
$2-$6 billion, averaging about $3,000 per kilowatt of electric generating capacity (in 1995
dollars). The nuclear industry predicts that new plant designs could be built for about half
that amount, but their total generating costs would still exceed currently projected costs for
new coal- and gas-fired plants.
Nevertheless, all is not bleak for the U.S. nuclear power industry, which currently
comprises 103 licensed reactors at 65 plant sites in 31 states (NRC data on each site, by state,
is available at [http://www.nrc.gov./AEOD/pib/pib.html]). Electricity production from U.S.
nuclear power plants is greater than that from oil, natural gas, and hydropower, and behind
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only coal, which accounts for 55% of U.S. electricity generation. Nuclear plants generate
more than half the electricity in six states.
Average operating costs of U.S. nuclear plants dropped substantially during the 1990s,
and costly downtime has been steadily reduced. Licensed commercial reactors generated
electricity at a record-high average of nearly 85% of their total capacity in 1999, according
to industry statistics. The Calvert Cliffs nuclear plant received the first 20-year license
extension from the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) in March 2000, and several more
extensions are pending. Industry consolidation could also help existing nuclear power plants,
as larger nuclear operators purchase plants from utilities that run only one or two reactors.
Several such sales have been announced, including the planned sale of the Millstone plant in
Connecticut to Dominion Energy for a record $1.2 billion. The merger of two of the nation’s
largest nuclear utilities, PECO Energy and Unicom, completed in October 2000, consolidated
the operation of 17 reactors under a single corporate entity, Exelon Corporation.
Existing nuclear power plants appear to hold a strong position in the ongoing
restructuring of the electricity industry. In most cases, nuclear utilities have received
favorable regulatory treatment of past construction costs, and average nuclear operating costs
are currently estimated to be lower than those of competing technologies.1 Although eight
U.S. nuclear reactors have permanently shut down since 1990, recent reactor sales could
indicate greater industry interest in nuclear plants that previously had been considered
marginal. Despite the shutdowns, total U.S. nuclear electrical output increased nearly 25%
from 1990 to 1999, according to the Energy Information Administration. The increase
resulted primarily from reduced downtime at the remaining plants, the startup of five new
units, and reactor modifications to boost capacity.
Global warming that may be caused by fossil fuels — the “greenhouse effect” — is cited
by nuclear power supporters as an important reason to develop a new generation of reactors.
But the large obstacles noted above must still be overcome before electric utilities will risk
ordering new nuclear units. The Energy Information Administration forecasts that no new
U.S. reactors will become operational before 2010, at the earliest.
Nuclear Power Research and Development
Under the Clinton Administration, development of advanced reactors has largely ended,
although some research is continuing. In FY1995, Congress accepted the Administration’s
plan to halt development of the advanced liquid metal reactor (ALMR), also called the
Integral Fast Reactor (IFR). For FY1996, Congress agreed to terminate research on the gas
turbine modular helium reactor (GT-MHR), although $5 million was provided in FY1999 for
a joint U.S.-Russian program to develop the GT-MHR for destruction of surplus weapons
plutonium. Congress and the Administration continued funding for improved versions of
today’s light water reactors (LWRs) through FY1997. But the Administration’s FY1998
request declared the program completed and provided only $5.5 million in termination costs
for advanced LWR development.
1 “Production Costs Made Nuclear Cheapest Fuel in 1999, NEI Says,” Nucleonics Week,
January 11, 2001, p. 3.
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The Clinton Administration’s FY2001 budget request included $40 million for two new
LWR programs in DOE, which started in FY1999 and FY2000. The “nuclear energy plant
optimization” (NEPO) program, for which $5 million was requested, is intended to improve
the economic competitiveness of existing nuclear power plants. The “nuclear energy research
initiative” (NERI), with a $35 million funding request, is designed to support innovative
nuclear energy research projects. The FY2001 Energy and Water Development
Appropriations bill (P.L. 106-377) provides the full request for both programs, plus $7.5
million for studies of advanced nuclear power technologies.
DOE justifies its efforts to encourage the continued operation of commercial U.S.
nuclear plants as an important element in meeting national goals for reducing carbon dioxide
emissions. Because nuclear plants directly emit no carbon dioxide, the continued operation
of existing U.S. reactors avoids more than 620 million tons of carbon dioxide emissions each
year, according to the FY2000 DOE budget justification. Opponents have criticized the
nuclear energy research proposals as providing wasteful subsidies to an industry that they
believe should be phased out.
Shutting down the ALMR program and its associated research facilities, particularly the
Experimental Breeder Reactor II (EBR-II) in Idaho, is expected to take several years. Some
ALMR facilities are being used for electrometallurgical treatment of EBR-II fuel, for which
$45 million was appropriated in FY1999. Opponents of the program have expressed concern
that such activities could help keep the ALMR/IFR program alive and have called for
Congress to halt further funding. Supporters contend that the technology could convert
unstable fuel elements into safer forms for storage and disposal. DOE issued a Record of
Decision September 19, 2000, to use the electrometallurgical process for full-scale treatment
of spent fuel at the Idaho site.
Nuclear Power Plant Safety and Regulation
Safety
Controversy over safety has dogged nuclear power throughout its development,
particularly following the 1979 Three Mile Island accident in Pennsylvania and the April 1986
Chernobyl disaster in the former Soviet Union. In the United States, safety-related
shortcomings have been identified in the construction quality of some plants, plant operation
and maintenance, equipment reliability, emergency planning, and other areas. In addition,
mishaps have occurred in which key safety systems have been disabled. NRC’s oversight of
the nuclear industry is an ongoing issue; nuclear utilities often complain that they are subject
to overly rigorous and inflexible regulation, but nuclear critics charge that NRC frequently
relaxes safety standards when compliance may prove difficult or costly to the industry.
Domestic Reactor Safety. In terms of public health consequences, the safety record
of the U.S. nuclear power industry in comparison with other major commercial energy
technologies has been excellent. In more than 2,250 reactor-years of operation in the United
States, the only incident at a commercial power plant that might lead to any deaths or injuries
to the public has been the Three Mile Island accident, in which more than half the reactor core
melted. Public exposure to radioactive materials released during that accident is expected to
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cause fewer than five deaths (and perhaps none) from cancer over the following 30 years. An
independent study released in September 1990 found no “convincing evidence” that the TMI
accident had affected cancer rates in the area around the plant. However, a study released
in February 1997 concluded that much higher levels of radiation may have been released
during the TMI accident than previously believed.
The relatively small amounts of radioactivity released by nuclear plants during normal
operation are not generally believed to pose significant hazards. Documented public exposure
to radioactivity from nuclear power plant waste has also been minimal, although the potential
long-term hazard of waste disposal remains controversial. There is substantial scientific
uncertainty about the level of risk posed by low levels of radiation exposure; as with many
carcinogens and other hazardous substances, health effects can be clearly measured only at
relatively high exposure levels. In the case of radiation, the assumed risk of low-level
exposure has been extrapolated mostly from health effects documented among persons
exposed to high levels of radiation, particularly Japanese survivors of nuclear bombing.
The consensus among most safety experts is that a severe nuclear power plant accident
in the United States is likely to occur less frequently than once every 10,000 reactor-years of
operation. These experts believe that most severe accidents would have small public health
impacts, and that accidents causing as many as 100 deaths would be much rarer than once
every 10,000 reactor-years. On the other hand, some experts challenge the complex
calculations that go into predicting such accident frequencies, contending that accidents with
serious public health consequences may be more frequent.
Reactor Safety in the Former Soviet Bloc. The Chernobyl accident was by far the
worst nuclear power plant accident to have occurred anywhere in the world. At least 31
persons died quickly from acute radiation exposure or other injuries, and between 5,000 and
45,000 fatal cancers may result over the next 40 years from radiation released during the
accident. Those cancers would represent an increase in the cancer rate of about half a percent
among the 75 million people in the western part of the former Soviet Union and a smaller
increase in non-Soviet Europe, with a higher increase possible in the contaminated region
around the plant.
The 10-year anniversary of the Chernobyl accident prompted renewed interest in the
disaster’s long-term consequences. According to a November 1995 report by the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the primary observable
health consequence of the accident has been a dramatic increase in childhood thyroid cancer.
About 1,000 cases of childhood thyroid cancer have been reported in certain regions
surrounding the destroyed reactor — a rate that is as much as a hundred times the pre-
accident level, according to OECD. The death rate for accident cleanup workers has also
risen measurably, the organization reported. Other recent studies have found increased genetic
mutations among children born in contaminated regions.
Environmental contamination from the accident was widespread. The OECD report
estimated that about 50,000 square miles of land in Belarus, Ukraine, and Russia were
substantially contaminated with radioactive cesium. Significant levels of radioactive strontium,
plutonium, and other isotopes were also deposited. Although radiation levels have declined
during the past decade, land-use restrictions in the most contaminated areas may remain
indefinitely, according to OECD.
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World concern in recent years has focused on the safety of 13 other Chernobyl-type
reactors (called RBMKs) that are still operating in the former Soviet Union (the last operating
Chernobyl unit was permanently closed at the end of 2000). Despite safety improvements
made after the Chernobyl disaster, the RBMKs remain inherently unstable and dangerous,
according to many Western experts. Also still operating in the former Soviet bloc are 10
early-model Soviet light water reactors (LWRs), which are similar to most Western reactors
but suffer from major safety deficiencies, such as the lack of Western-style emergency cooling
systems. More than two dozen newer Soviet-designed LWRs that are currently operating are
substantially safer than the earlier models but still do not meet all Western standards.
Immediate shutdown of the Soviet-designed reactors appears impractical because of the
ex-Soviet bloc’s critical need for electricity. Western help has been proposed for developing
replacement power sources, allowing shutdown of the riskiest nuclear units, as well as funding
for short- and long-term safety improvements. Russian leaders have estimated that total costs
of the effort could range as high as $40 billion.
The United States is providing direct assistance for upgrading the safety of Soviet-
designed reactors, a program being coordinated by DOE, NRC, the Agency for International
Development (AID), and the Department of State. DOE was appropriated $45 million in
FY1997 for improving the operation and physical condition of Soviet-designed nuclear power
plants. The program was appropriated $35 million in FY1999, and Congress provided $15
million for FY2000. For FY2001, the Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill
provides $20 million for the program.
The General Accounting Office estimates that $1.93 billion had been provided through
November 1999 by the United States and other industrialized nations to improve the safety
of Soviet-designed reactors. Of that amount, $753 was contributed by the European Union,
$532 by the United States, $43 million by the International Atomic Energy Agency (which
receives much of its funding from the United States), and the remainder from 14 other
countries.
Regulation
For many years a top priority of the nuclear industry was to modify the process for
licensing new nuclear plants. No electric utility would consider ordering a nuclear power
plant, according to the industry, unless licensing became quicker and more predictable, and
designs were less subject to mid-construction safety-related changes ordered by NRC. The
Energy Policy Act of 1992 largely implemented the industry’s licensing goals.
Nuclear plant licensing under the Atomic Energy Act of 1954 (P.L. 83-703; U.S.C.
2011-2282) had historically been a two-stage process. NRC first issued a construction permit
to build a plant, and then, after construction was finished, an operating permit to run it. Each
stage of the licensing process involved complicated proceedings. Environmental impact
statements also are required under the National Environmental Policy Act.
Over the vehement objections of nuclear opponents, the Energy Policy Act (P.L. 102-
486) provides a clear statutory basis for one-step nuclear licenses, allowing completed plants
to operate without delay if construction criteria are met. NRC would hold preoperational
hearings on the adequacy of plant construction only in specified circumstances.
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A fundamental concern in the nuclear regulatory debate is the performance of NRC in
issuing and enforcing nuclear safety regulations. The nuclear industry and its supporters have
regularly complained that unnecessarily stringent and inflexibly enforced nuclear safety
regulations have burdened nuclear utilities and their customers with excessive costs.
Moreover, the nuclear industry is concerned about the size of NRC’s own budget, because
the agency is required to cover most of its costs through annual fees imposed on commercial
reactors. But many environmentalists, nuclear opponents, and other groups charge NRC with
being too close to the nuclear industry, a situation that they say has resulted in lax oversight
of nuclear power plants and routine exemptions from safety requirements.
Primary responsibility for nuclear safety compliance lies with nuclear utilities, which are
required to find any problems with their plants and report them to NRC. Compliance is also
monitored directly by NRC, which maintains at least two resident inspectors at each nuclear
power plant. The resident inspectors routinely examine plant systems, observe the
performance of reactor personnel, and prepare regular inspection reports. For serious safety
violations, NRC often dispatches special inspection teams to plant sites.
The House and Senate Appropriations Committees have been strongly urging NRC to
reduce the cost of nuclear regulation. The Senate Committee report on the FY1999 Energy
and Water Development Appropriations Bill sharply criticized NRC for allegedly failing to
streamline its regulatory system in line with improvements in nuclear industry safety. The
Committee contended, among other problems, that NRC’s regional offices were inconsistent
with one another, that NRC was inappropriately interfering with nuclear plant management,
and that numerous NRC review processes were outdated and unnecessary. The House panel
directed NRC to “reduce its workforce, reduce the regulatory burdens on licensees, and
streamline its adjudicatory process.”
In response, NRC has begun reorganizing and overhauling many of its procedures. The
Commission is moving toward “risk-informed regulation,” in which safety enforcement is
guided by the relative risks identified by detailed individual plant studies. NRC began
implementing a new reactor oversight system April 2, 2000, that relies on a series of
performance indicators to determine the level of scrutiny that each reactor should receive.
However, the Union of Concerned Scientists issued a report August 17, 2000, that questioned
the validity of the individual plant studies on which risk-informed regulation is based.
The House and Senate Appropriations committees have expressed general satisfaction
with the NRC’s new regulatory program, and Congress approved nearly the full NRC
FY2000 funding request, except for a $1 million cut for the NRC Inspector General. For
FY2001, the final Energy and Water appropriation provides the full NRC request, with a
$700,000 reduction in the Inspector General’s request.
Decommissioning and Life Extension
When nuclear power plants end their useful lives, they must be safely removed from
service, a process called decommissioning. NRC requires nuclear utilities to make regular
contributions to special trust funds to ensure that money is available to remove all radioactive
material from reactors after they are closed. Because no full-sized U.S. commercial reactor
has yet been completely decommissioned, which can take several decades, the cost of the
process can only be estimated. Decommissioning cost estimates cited by a 1996 DOE report,
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for one full-sized commercial reactor, ranged from about $150 million to $600 million in 1995
dollars. Disposal of large amounts of low-level waste, consisting of contaminated reactor
components, concrete, and other materials, is expected to account for much of those costs.
For planning purposes, it is generally assumed that U.S. commercial reactors could be
decommissioned at the end of their 40-year operating licenses, although several plants have
been retired before their licenses expired and others could seek license renewals to operate
longer. NRC rules that took effect June 13, 1992, allow plants to apply for a 20-year license
extension, for a total operating life of 60 years. On March 23, 2000, the Calvert Cliffs nuclear
plant in Maryland became the first U.S. plant to receive a license extension. Several other
license-extension applications are pending, and more are expected to be filed. Assuming a
40-year lifespan, without life extension, more than half of today’s 103 licensed reactors could
be decommissioned by the year 2016.
Nuclear Accident Liability
Liability for damages to the general public from nuclear accidents is controlled by the
Price-Anderson Act (Section 170 of the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. 2210). The
act is up for reauthorization on August 1, 2002, but existing nuclear plants will continue to
operate under the current Price-Anderson liability system if no extension is enacted.
Under Price-Anderson, the owners of commercial reactors must assume all liability for
accident damages to the public. To pay any such damages, each licensed reactor must carry
the maximum liability insurance available, currently $200 million. Any damages exceeding
that amount are to be assessed equally against all operating commercial reactors, up to $83.9
million per reactor. Those assessments – called “retrospective premiums” – would be paid
at an annual rate of no more than $10 million per reactor, to limit the potential financial
burden on reactor owners following a major accident.
For each accident, therefore, the Price-Anderson liability system currently would provide
up to $8.84 billion in public compensation. That total includes the $200 million in insurance
coverage carried by the reactor that had the accident, plus the $83.9 million in retrospective
premiums from each of the 103 currently licensed reactors. On top of those payments, a 5%
surcharge may also be imposed. Under Price-Anderson, the nuclear industry’s liability for an
accident is capped at that amount, which varies depending on the number of licensed reactors,
the amount of available insurance, and an inflation adjustment that is made every five years.
Payment of any damages above that liability limit would require congressional action.
The same total liability limit (whatever it may be at any given time) also applies to
contractors who operate hazardous DOE nuclear facilities. Price-Anderson authorizes DOE
to indemnify its contractors for the entire amount, so that damage payments for accidents at
DOE facilities would ultimately come from the Treasury. However, the law also allows DOE
to fine its contractors for safety violations.
The mechanism for imposing fines on DOE contractors has become controversial since
the 2000 startup of the National Nuclear Security Administration (NNSA) within DOE to
administer the Department’s nuclear defense programs. In approving legislation to clarify the
situation (H.R. 4446), the House Commerce Committee recommended that the DOE
Assistant Secretary for Environment, Safety, and Health continue to directly impose Price-
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Anderson fines on DOE contractors who are now managed by NNSA (H.Rept. 106-694, Part
1), while the House Armed Services Committee recommended that such fines be imposed
only through the NNSA Administrator (H.Rept. 106-694, Part 2).
The Price-Anderson Act’s limits on liability were crucial in establishing the commercial
nuclear power industry in the 1950s. Supporters of the Price-Anderson system contend that
it has worked well since that time in ensuring that nuclear accident victims would have a
secure source of compensation, at little cost to the taxpayer. However, opponents contend
that Price-Anderson subsidizes the nuclear power industry by protecting it from some of the
financial consequences of the most severe conceivable accidents.
Two bills were introduced in the 106th Congress to extend the Price-Anderson Act (S.
2162 and S. 2292), although no further action was taken. Without an extension, any
commercial nuclear reactor licensed after August 1, 2002, could not be covered by the Price-
Anderson system, although existing reactors would continue to be covered. Because no new
U.S. reactors are currently planned, the lack of an extension would have little short-term
effect on the nuclear power industry. However, if Price-Anderson expired, DOE would have
to use alternate indemnification authority for hazardous nuclear contracts signed after that
time. NRC issued a report to Congress in October 1998 recommending that Price-Anderson
be extended for another 10 years and that the annual per-reactor limit on retrospective
premiums be doubled to $20 million. A DOE report on Price-Anderson extension is available
at [http://www.gc.doe.gov].
Nuclear Waste Management
One of the most controversial aspects of nuclear power is the disposal of radioactive
waste, which can remain hazardous for thousands of years. Each nuclear reactor produces
an annual average of about 20 tons of highly radioactive spent nuclear fuel and 50-200 cubic
meters of low-level radioactive waste. Upon decommissioning, contaminated reactor
components are also disposed of as low-level waste.
The federal government is responsible for permanent disposal of commercial spent fuel
(paid for with a fee on nuclear power) and federally generated radioactive waste, while states
have the authority to develop disposal facilities for commercial low-level waste. Spent fuel
and other highly radioactive waste is to be isolated in a deep underground repository,
consisting of a vast network of chambers carved from rock that has remained geologically
undisturbed for hundreds of thousands of years.
DOE is studying Nevada’s Yucca Mountain as the site for such a geologic repository,
as required by the Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 (NWPA, P.L. 97-425) as amended.
DOE issued a “viability assessment” in December 1998 that found no insurmountable
problems with the site, but a final recommendation on the site’s suitability is not expected
until 2001. DOE contends that it will need its full FY2001 budget request of $437.5 million
to keep the program on schedule. The final FY2001 Energy and Water Appropriations bill
provides $391 million for the program, plus another $10 million that DOE can use upon
written certification that it is necessary to complete the site suitability recommendation by
2001. The extra $10 million comes from $85 million in FY1996 appropriations for interim
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storage, which was contingent on enactment of legislation that was vetoed by President
Clinton. The remaining $75 million would be rescinded.
As originally enacted, the 1982 nuclear waste law established procedures and timetables
for DOE to examine candidate sites for at least one deep repository for commercial spent fuel
(with the option of also taking government high-level waste), to begin operating by January
31, 1998. Nuclear utilities were required to sign a contract with DOE for disposal services.
The Nuclear Waste Fund, consisting of revenues from a fee on nuclear power, was created
to pay for the disposal program. However, DOE could not spend money from the fund
without annual congressional appropriations. The waste repository was required to meet
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) standards and be licensed by the Nuclear Regulatory
Commission (NRC).
Controversy over implementation of the waste law led to fundamental revisions included
in the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1987 (P.L. 100-203). The revised waste law
singled out Yucca Mountain as the only candidate site for a permanent waste repository.
With no federal storage or disposal facility available by the nuclear waste law’s 1998
deadline, nuclear power plants must continue storing their waste at reactor sites much longer
than originally anticipated. Most are expected to build additional on-site storage facilities, a
move that has drawn strong state and local opposition in several recent cases. A federal
appeals court ruled August 31, 2000, that nuclear power plant owners could sue DOE for
damages resulting from the missed 1998 disposal deadline. (For more background, see CRS
Report 96-212, Civilian Nuclear Spent Fuel Temporary Storage Options.)
Interim Storage Legislation
DOE’s current goal for opening the Yucca Mountain waste repository is 2010 — 12
years later than required by NWPA. The nuclear industry and state utility regulators are
urging Congress to authorize waste to be stored at an interim facility near Yucca Mountain
until the permanent repository is ready.
Legislation to establish a Yucca Mountain nuclear waste interim storage facility was
introduced in both Houses in the 106th Congress (H.R. 45, S. 608), but Clinton
Administration veto threats stalled the idea. In an effort to reach a compromise, an alternative
bill was developed in the Senate (S. 1287) that would allow waste to be shipped to Yucca
Mountain after NRC granted a repository construction permit – as early as 2007, under the
bill’s schedule. In addition to authorizing expedited waste shipments, the bill would bar EPA
from issuing final environmental standards for the repository until June 1, 2001. The Senate
approved S. 1287 by a vote of 64-34 on February 10, 2000, and the House passed the same
bill without amendment March 22, 2000, by 253-167, but President Clinton vetoed it.
H.R. 45 was approved by the House Commerce Committee’s Subcommittee on Energy
and Power on April 14, 1999, by a vote of 25-0, with full Committee approval following on
April 21, 1999, by a 40-6 vote. The Committee-passed version would have required an
interim storage facility at Yucca Mountain to open by June 2003 and required work on a
permanent repository to move forward at the same time. To pay for both activities, the bill
would have exempted the program’s spending from budget ceilings while maintaining utility
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fees at the current level. Several key Commerce Committee leaders spoke out against the
move to bring S. 1287 to the House floor rather than H.R. 45.
The Clinton Administration opposed the siting of an interim storage facility at Yucca
Mountain before more technical study of the site’s suitability for a permanent repository was
completed. Administration veto threats blocked the proposal in the 104th and 105th
Congresses. Before the Energy and Power Subcommittee markup of H.R. 45, Energy
Secretary Richardson reiterated the Administration’s opposition.
The Senate Energy Committee marked up S. 1287 on June 16, 1999, including
provisions that would have authorized DOE to take title to spent fuel at commercial reactor
sites and pay for storage costs, and eliminated EPA’s role in setting repository standards, in
addition to authorizing early waste shipments to the repository site (S. 1287, S. Rept. 106-
98). Environmental and anti-nuclear groups staunchly oppose any proposal that would hasten
waste shipments to Yucca Mountain, charging that the risks of transporting unprecedented
amounts of high-level radioactive waste across the country are unwarranted. Supporters of
the various nuclear waste bills contend that minimal transportation risks would be outweighed
by the margin of safety gained by removing spent fuel from multiple reactor sites. (For more
on the transportation issue, see CRS Report 97-403 ENR, Transportation of Spent Nuclear
Fuel).
Supporters of S. 1287 made further changes on the Senate floor in an effort to win
enough votes to override a presidential veto. The EPA role in setting environmental
standards for the repository was restored, but the agency was barred from issuing final
standards until June 1, 2001, after a new Administration would be in place. The provision
allowing DOE to take title to nuclear waste at reactor sites was dropped, in response to
concerns that DOE might keep the waste at reactor sites indefinitely.
Despite the changes, President Clinton vetoed S. 1287 on April 25, 2000, contending
that it would interfere with EPA rulemaking and undermine public confidence in the
repository program. An effort in the Senate to override the veto fell short of the necessary
two-thirds majority, 64-35, on May 2, 2000.
Low-level Waste Facilities
Disposal facilities for commercially generated low-level radioactive waste — from
nuclear power plants, hospitals, universities and industry — are a state responsibility. The
Low-Level Radioactive Waste Policy Amendments Act of 1985 (P.L. 99-240) gave states and
regions until the beginning of 1993 to begin operating their own low-level waste disposal
facilities before potentially losing access to outside waste sites.
Only two commercial low-level sites, in South Carolina and Washington, are currently
operating. Certain types of low-activity waste are also accepted by a Utah disposal facility,
which has applied for a license to receive all three major classes of low-level waste. Access
to the Washington site is allowed only to states in the Pacific Northwest and Rocky Mountain
regions. A planned disposal facility at Ward Valley, California, for use by the Southwestern
disposal region received a state license in 1993, but the facility’s operation has been blocked
by the federal government’s refusal to transfer the federally owned site to the State of
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California. California Governor Davis established an advisory panel in June 1999 to study
alternative waste management strategies.
Congress approved a disposal compact among Texas, Maine, and Vermont September
2, 1998 (P.L. 105-236), which allows waste from the three states to go to a site to be
developed in Texas and the exclusion of waste from other states. The South Carolina site is
currently open nationwide, but South Carolina joined a compact with Connecticut and New
Jersey on July 1, 2000, that will allow access outside those three states to be phased out. (For
further details, see CRS Issue Brief IB92059, Civilian Nuclear Waste Disposal.)
Nuclear Weapons Proliferation
Nuclear technology was first used to make nuclear weapons, initially by the United
States, and subsequently in Russia, England, France, and China. Peaceful nuclear energy
followed the development of nuclear weapons. The nuclear tests carried out by India and
Pakistan in May 1998, combined with proliferation problems in Iraq, North Korea, Iran, and
Russia, intensified longstanding concerns about worldwide efforts to prevent the spread, or
proliferation, of nuclear weapons. Both the international nonproliferation regime and U.S.
policy are receiving attention from many directions.
The discovery following the Gulf War in 1991 that Iraq had been near success in
developing nuclear weapons led to efforts to strengthen inspection and enforcement of the
Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT). The NPT is nearly universal, with 187 members.
The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) operates a global safeguards system that
monitors nuclear technology and materials to deter and detect diversions from peaceful to
military uses. Detection by the IAEA of undeclared nuclear activities in North Korea — like
Iraq, a member of the NPT — triggered efforts to halt nuclear weapons development in that
nation as well.
The United States continues to be a leading proponent of the international non-
proliferation regime. It also has a system of export control and licensing laws covering
transfers of nuclear technology or materials. There are also laws requiring sanctions against
countries that obtain or test nuclear weapons, which were applied against India and Pakistan.
In addition to broad questions about the effectiveness of international nonproliferation
efforts, Congress is sometimes faced with the repercussions of nonproliferation policy in
specific instances, particularly with respect to sanctions and controls that do not solve
proliferation problems, but still have negative effects on bilateral relations and trade.
South Asia. The sanctions imposed on India and Pakistan included a prohibition on
export credits, including export credits for agricultural products. The 105th Congress passed
separate legislation exempting credits, guarantees, and financial assistance to support
purchase of food or agricultural commodities from the mandated sanctions. In addition, the
Omnibus FY1999 Appropriations Act (P.L. 105-277) gave the President authority to waive
some sanctions for a year. President Clinton used the new authority by lifting some of the
sanctions on India and Pakistan November 6, 1998, to encourage the two countries to halt
further testing, establish effective export controls, and begin bilateral discussions on nuclear
weapons. There has since been little progress or restraint, despite further lifting of sanctions
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and the President’s visit to India and Pakistan in March 2000. Restrictions on transfers of
nuclear technology, however, remain in place.
The Middle East. The ongoing confrontation between certain Middle East countries
and Israel has long had a nuclear undercurrent. Israel has made no official acknowledgment
of a weapons program, but is widely considered to have developed nuclear weapons. Israel's
weapons program has led to calls in Arab states for development of an "Islamic bomb." Iraq,
before its defeat in the Gulf War in 1991, actively pursued nuclear weapons development.
Iran declares it has no nuclear weapons program, but the United States claims that it does.
The Clinton Administration has not succeeded in efforts to dissuade Russia from selling
nuclear reactors to Iran. It is feared that such assistance could be a cover for weapons-related
activities. (See Weapons of Mass Destruction in the Middle East, CRS Report RL30408.)
China. China has long been a nonproliferation concern. It was the major supplier to
Pakistan's nuclear weapons program in the 1980s and early 1990s, and also supplied
technology to Iran and Algeria. However, China has gradually taken steps to join
international nonproliferation agreements, and the 105th Congress approved a U.S. agreement
for nuclear cooperation with China. However, the projected demand for U.S. nuclear
technology sales to China has not materialized.
North Korea. North Korea had an active nuclear weapons program in the early 1990's.
In October 1994, the United States signed an agreement with North Korea to exchange its
existing nuclear reactors and reprocessing equipment for light water reactor technology that
is less suited to making bombs. The agreement has had a difficult history, with funding being
a continuing issue. A House amendment to the Foreign Operations Appropriations Bill for
FY2000 (H.R. 2606) put new conditions on aid to the Korea Peninsula Energy Development
Organization (KEDO), which is building the nuclear power plant in North Korea. Conditions
include a new certification for U.S.-North Korean nuclear cooperation. The Clinton
Administration waived parts of the certification when it was submitted February 24, 2000.
(For more details see CRS Issue Brief IB91141, North Korea's Nuclear Weapons Program.)
Russia. Maintaining control over the storage and disposal of Russian nuclear materials
is also a nonproliferation issue. The Departments of Energy, Defense, and State are involved
in the Cooperative Threat Reduction (Nunn-Lugar) program to improve the security of
Russian nuclear material, technology, and expertise. In February 1993 the United States
agreed to buy 500 metric tons of highly enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled Russian
weapons to use in commercial nuclear power reactors. Implementation of the purchase by
the newly privatized U.S. Enrichment Corporation has faced numerous hurdles, however.
Disposal of plutonium from weapons is a more difficult problem; President Clinton and
Russian President Boris Yeltsin signed a joint statement September 2, 1998, calling for the
elimination of 50 metric tons of weapons plutonium by each nation. The Department of
Energy plans to “burn” part of the excess plutonium as fuel in existing civilian power reactors,
but the plan is expensive and controversial. (For more information, see CRS Report
RL30170, Nuclear Weapons: Disposal of Surplus Weapons-Usable Plutonium.)
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Environmental Problems at Nuclear Weapons Facilities
The aging U.S. nuclear weapons production complex, managed by the Department of
Energy, faces long-term problems with environmental contamination, radioactive waste
disposal, and other environmental risks. DOE’s Environmental Management Program, which
is responsible for cleaning up the nuclear weapons complex, has grown into DOE’s largest
activity since its formal establishment in 1989. For FY2000, DOE was appropriated $6 billion
for the program, excluding the Uranium Enrichment Decontamination and Decommissioning
Fund. The FY2001 Energy and Water Development Appropriations bill provides about $6.4
billion for the program.
A DOE proposal for accelerating the cleanup program, issued in June 1998, estimated
that total costs could reach about $150 billion through 2070, with cleanup completed at 41
of 53 major sites by 2006. DOE managers contend that substantial long-term savings can be
gained by focusing on completing work at those sites, allowing the earliest possible
termination of infrastructure costs.
The bulk of the EM privatization funding was intended to go toward the Hanford Tank
Waste Remediation System, consisting of a “vitrification” plant that would turn liquid high-
level waste into radioactive glass for eventual disposal. However, high costs estimates
prompted DOE to decide in May 2000 to switch the project to traditional contracting
methods. Other major privatized projects include a project to treat “mixed” radioactive and
hazardous waste at the Idaho National Engineering and Environmental Laboratory, and waste
treatment, storage, and disposal facilities at Oak Ridge, Tennessee.
The EM privatization effort is intended to reduce costs by increasing competition for
cleanup work and shifting a portion of project risks from the federal government to
contractors. Profits to contractors would depend on their success in meeting project
schedules and holding down costs; potentially, profits could be substantially higher than under
traditional DOE contracting arrangements.
Uranium Enrichment
Only 0.7% of the uranium found in nature is the fissile isotope uranium-235 (U-235).
The remaining 99.3% is U-238. Before uranium can be used in most nuclear reactors, the
amount of U-235 must be increased (enriched) to 3-5%. Uranium is enriched in the United
States for commercial reactors at plants originally built for the nuclear weapons program.
Until July 1, 1993, the enrichment program was run by DOE.
The Energy Policy Act of 1992 (EPACT) established the U.S. Enrichment Corporation
(USEC), a wholly owned government corporation that took over operation of DOE’s
uranium enrichment facilities and enrichment marketing activities.
EPACT authorized the
sale of USEC to the private sector and required the corporation to prepare a privatization
plan by July 1, 1995. Legislation to facilitate USEC privatization was included in an omnibus
continuing appropriations bill for FY1996 signed by President Clinton April 26, 1996 (P.L.
104-134).
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The USEC privatization was completed July 28, 1998, with an initial public offering of
stock that raised an estimated $1.9 billion for the federal government. The privatized USEC
leases its enrichment plants at Portsmouth, Ohio, and Paducah, Kentucky, from DOE.
Controversy over the privatized corporation has focused on whether USEC will continue
purchasing highly enriched uranium (HEU) from dismantled Russian nuclear weapons (under
an agreement negotiated in 1993), and future sales of USEC’s large inventories of natural
uranium. Under the HEU agreement, USEC receives enriched uranium from Russian nuclear
weapons and, in addition to its payment for the material, returns an equivalent amount of
natural (unenriched) uranium to Russia to sell on the world market.
USEC’s board of directors voted June 21, 2000, to close the Portsmouth enrichment
plant by June 2001, leaving the company with only the Paducah plant. The USEC
privatization agreement requires the company to operate both plants until 2004, unless certain
financial problems arise. USEC says it is facing such problems, making a plant shutdown
necessary. Opponents of the shutdown contend that it will leave the United States vulnerable
to foreign suppliers.
DOE, which retains ownership of the Portsmouth plant, announced a plan October 6,
2000, to maintain part of the facility in standby condition for possible restart. The plan also
calls for construction of a new enrichment plant at the site to demonstrate advanced gas
centrifuge enrichment technology. Maintaining the Portsmouth plant in cold standby and
building a centrifuge demonstration plant are estimated by DOE to cost $468 million over the
next five years, with funding coming from a Treasury account for USEC privatization
expenses. At the same time, DOE plans to accelerate the cleanup of the parts of the
Portsmouth plant that will not be kept in standby condition.
Federal Funding for Nuclear Energy Programs
The following tables summarize current funding for DOE nuclear fission programs and
uranium activities, and for the NRC. The sources for the funding figures are Administration
budget requests and committee reports on the Energy and Water Development
Appropriations Acts, which fund all nuclear programs. President Clinton’s funding request
for FY2001 was submitted to Congress February 7, 2000, and the House passed the FY2001
Energy and Water measure June 27, 2000. The Senate approved its version of the FY2001
spending bill September 7, 2000. The conference report was passed by the House September
28, 2000, and by the Senate October 2, 2000. President Clinton vetoed the measure October
7, 2000, primarily over a waterway management provision.
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Table 1. Funding for the Nuclear Regulatory Commission
(budget authority in millions of current dollars)
FY2000
FY2001
FY2001
FY2001
FY2001
Approp.
Request
House
Senate
Conf.
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Reactor Safety
210.7
217.2
—
—
–
Nuclear Materials Safety
53.3
57.4
—
—
–
Nuclear Waste Safety
52.4
57.8
—
—
–
Defense and International
4.7
4.8
—
—
–
Management and Support
143.8
144.7
—
—
–
Inspector General
5.0
6.2
5.5
5.5
5.5
TOTAL NRC BUDGET
469.9
488.1
487.4
487.4
487.4
AUTHORITY*
* Entirely offset by fees on NRC licensees through FY2000, plus payments from the Nuclear
Waste Fund for repository licensing. FY2001 conference total is offset 98%. Subtotals in
House and Senate bills not specified.
Table 2. DOE Funding for Nuclear Activities
(budget authority in millions of current dollars)
FY2000
FY2001
FY2001
FY2001
FY2001
Approp.
Request
House
Senate
Conf.
Nuclear Energy (selected programs)
Advanced Radioisotope Power Systems
34.5
30.9
29.2
34.2
32.2
Program Direction
24.7
27.6
25.9
24.7
22.0
University Reactor Assistance
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
12.0
Nuclear Energy Plant Optimization
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
5.0
Nuclear Energy Research Initiative
22.5
34.9
22.5
41.5
35.0
Nuclear Energy Technologies
–
–
–
–
7.5
Uranium Programs
41.9
53.4
–
–
–
Isotope Support
20.5
16.7
15.2
21.2
19.2
Accelerator Transmutation of Waste
9.0
0
—
5.0
3.0*
International Nuclear Safety**
15.0
20.0
20.0
20.0
20.0
Total, Nuclear Energy
288.7
288.2
231.8
262.1
259.9
Uranium Facilities Maintenance and
301.4
393.4
Remediation
Nuclear Waste Activities
Environmental Management, Defense
5,716.0
6,159.7
5,864.0
6,042.1
6,122.2
Env. Management, Non-Defense
332.4
282.8
281.0
309.1
277.8
Uranium Enrichment D&D Fund
249.2
294.6
—
297.8
–
Nuclear Waste Fund Activities***
347.2
437.5
413.0
351.2
401.1
*Funded under “Advanced Accelerator Applications” under “Other Defense Activities.”
** Funded under “Defense Nuclear Nonproliferation.”
*** Funded by a 1-mill-per-kilowatt-hour fee on nuclear power, plus appropriations for defense waste
disposal. FY2000 request excludes $39 million in previous appropriations for interim storage.
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LEGISLATION (106th Congress)
P.L. 106-377 H.R. 5483
Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill for FY2001. Introduced October
18, 2000, as successor to the vetoed H.R. 4733. Incorporated by reference in conference
report on the appropriations bill for the Departments of Veterans Affairs and Housing and
Urban Development and other agencies (H.R. 4635, H. Rept. 106-988). H.R. 4635 approved
by House and Senate October 19, 2000. Signed into law October 27, 2000.
H.R. 45 (Upton)/S. 608 (Murkowski)
Rewrites Nuclear Waste Policy Act of 1982 and mandates construction of an interim
storage site for spent nuclear fuel at Yucca Mountain, Nevada. House bill introduced January
6, 1999; referred to Commerce Committee, with sequential referrals to the Committees on
Resources and Transportation and Infrastructure. Approved 25-0 by Energy and Power
Subcommittee on April 14, 1999. Senate bill introduced March 15, 1999; referred to
Committee on Energy and Natural Resources.
H.R. 4377 (Packard)
Energy and Water Development Appropriations Bill for FY2001. Provides funding for
DOE nuclear-related programs. House Appropriations Committee reported June 23, 2000,
and House approved June 27, 2000 (H.Rept. 106-693). Approved by Senate Appropriations
Committee July 18, 2000 (S.Rept. 106-395), and by the Senate September 7, 2000.
Conference report passed by the House September 28, 2000, and by the Senate October 2,
2000. Vetoed October 7, 2000. Superseded by H.R. 5483.
S. 1287 (Murkowski)
Nuclear Waste Policy Amendments Act of 2000. Authorizes DOE to receive spent fuel
at Yucca Mountain site after NRC issues a construction permit for a permanent repository.
Reported as an original bill by Senate Energy and Natural Resources Committee (S.Rept.
106-98) June 24, 1999. Approved by the Senate February 10, 2000, by vote of 64-34.
Approved by the House, 253-167, on March 22, 2000. Vetoed April 25, 2000. Senate
defeated veto override May 2, 2000, by vote of 64-35.
S. 2162 (Bingaman)
Extends authority under the Price-Anderson Act for DOE to indemnify its contractors
and for NRC to indemnify commercial nuclear plants, and amends DOE authority to impose
fines on nonprofit contractors. Introduced March 2, 2000; referred to Senate Committee on
Energy and Natural Resources.
S. 2292 (Inhofe)
Extends authority for NRC to indemnify commercial nuclear plants under the Price-
Anderson Act. Introduced March 23, 2000; referred to Senate Committee on Environment
and Public Works.
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