Order Code IB95112
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Terrorism, the Future, and
U.S. Foreign Policy
Updated January 9, 2001
Raphael F. Perl
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Definitions
U.S. Policy Response
Framework
Dilemmas
Policy Tools
Diplomacy/Constructive Engagement
Economic Sanctions
Covert Action
Rewards for Information Program
Extradition/Law Enforcement Cooperation
Military Force
International Conventions
Potential Tools
An International Court for Terrorism
Media Self-Restraint
Policy Reform
U.S. Organization and Program Response
Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program
Counter-Terrorism Research and Development Program
Diplomatic Security Program
Options for Program Enhancement
State-Supported Terrorism
Adding and Removing Countries on the List
Countries on the List
Iran
Iraq
Libya
Syria
Sudan
Cuba
North Korea
An Informal Watchlist?

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Terrorism, the Future, and U.S. Foreign Policy
SUMMARY
International terrorism threatens U.S.
terrorism as politically motivated and violent
foreign and domestic security and compromis-
behavior may limit our ability to combat new
es a broad range of U.S. foreign policy goals.
and expanding forms of terrorism.
This issue brief examines emerging interna-
tional terrorist threats and the U.S. policy
Terrorist access to chemical, biological,
response. Available policy options range from
or nuclear weaponry raises the specter of
diplomacy, international cooperation and
mass-casualty attacks. Faced with such pros-
constructive engagement to economic sanc-
pects, governments are increasingly likely to
tions, covert action, physical security enhance-
consider utilizing covert operations to protect
ment and military force.
their citizenry.
Throughout successive administrations, a
In light of the shifting nature and en-
key element of stated U.S. policy has
hanced intensity of the new terrorist threat,
remained: no concessions to terrorism. Re-
some analysts believe a comprehensive review
cent willingness by such groups as the PLO,
of U.S. terrorism policy, organizational struc-
and IRA to moderate behavior may indicate
ture, and preparedness to respond to major
success of this policy. In this context, current
terrorist incidents in the United States is desir-
U.S., British, and Israeli policies of engage-
able. PDD 62, which established a terrorism
ment with such groups is seen by many as a
coordinator at the National Security Council
response to changing circumstances.
(NSC), may take much of the terrorism
decisionmaking process out of the realm of
Dramatic events, such as the Oklahoma
congressional oversight as NSC members do
City, World Trade Center, and U.S. embassy
not generally testify on the Hill.
bombings in Kenya and Tanzania, as well as
the Tokyo subway gas attack, have brought
Radical Islamic fundamentalist groups
the issue of terrorism to the forefront of Amer-
pose a major terrorist threat to U.S. interests
ican public interest. These specific occurrences
and friendly regimes. Nations facing difficult
raise questions whether U.S. policy and orga-
challenges include Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt,
nizational mechanisms are adequately focused
Israel, Jordan, Pakistan, and to a lesser degree,
to combat what may be a new brand of terror-
Russia and Saudi Arabia. One of the seven
ist: one who does not work for any estab-
states on the State Department’s terrorism list,
lished organization and who is not an agent of
Iran, is seen as the most active state sponsor.
any particular state sponsor, yet has access to
Iran has been aggressively seeking nuclear
the most lethal weaponry.
weapons technology. Sanctions have not
deterred such activity to any meaningful de-
Formal definitions of terrorism do not
gree. Some see utility in an informal
include terrorist activity for financial profit or
“watch-list” of nations not currently qualify-
terrorists motivated by religious goals.
ing for inclusion on the terrorism list. See also:
Non-traditional harm such as computer “vio-
CRS Report 98-733, Terrorism: U.S. Re-
lence” may not be included as well. Such
sponse to Bombings in Kenya and Tanzania:
activity may well be on the rise, and policy and
A New Policy Direction?
organizational mindsets geared to deal with
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
Investigations continue to determine culpability for the October 12, 2000 attack on
U.S.S. Cole, a navy destroyer refueling in the Yemen’s seaport of Aden. Seventeen American
servicemen were killed and 39 injured in the explosion which seriously damaged the ship
with the cost of repairs estimated at $240 million. The attack is believed to be the work of
radical Islamic militants. Meanwhile, Administration officials are weighing response
options should culpability lead to Osama Bin Laden or other clearly identifiable private
groups or state sponsors.
In related developments, Administration counter-terrorism officials continue to brief
presidential transition team members. Suggested initiatives include (1) a regional initiative
to isolate Afghanistan; (2) enhanced policy focus on sanctions against Iran for their active
support of Mid- East terrorist groups and operations; and (3) elevating the State
Department’s Counter-Terrorism Office to full “Bureau” (Assistant Secretary) status.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
In recent years, terrorism has been primarily viewed as an international and foreign
policy issue. Numerous acts of state-sponsored terrorists and of foreign-based groups have
given support to this notion. While U.S. policies, citizens and interests are prime targets for
international terrorism — in 1999 approximately 52%, up from 40% in 1998, of all terrorist
incidents worldwide were committed against U.S. citizens or property according to the U.S.
Department of State — the vast majority of those acts took place on foreign soil. Although
terrorism may be internationally motivated, financed, supported or planned, on the receiving
end all terrorism is local. Thus, U.S. public perception of terrorism as primarily an overseas
issue may be changing with the bombings of the Trade Center in New York and the Federal
Building in Oklahoma City. The predominant method of attack during 1999 was bombing
(roughly one-half); the most common targets were business related.
On May 1, 2000, the Department of State released its Patterns of Global Terrorism
report (Patterns 1999). In 1999, casualties associated with terrorism worldwide were
significantly down from 1998 data. The report indicates that worldwide deaths from terrorist
incidents are down roughly threefold from 1998 (from 741 to 233) and the number of
wounded was down roughly eightfold from 5,952 to 706. In terms of deaths by region, Asia
ranked first; Africa, second; and the Middle East, third. In terms of wounded by region, Asia
ranked first, Africa, second, and the Middle East , third as well. In 1998, Africa was highest
in both the number of dead and wounded by terrorism; Asia was in second place. In 1999,
the number of attacks rose in all regions of the world except the Middle East.
Both timing and target selection by terrorist groups has produced significant political and
economic impact on phenomena such as the Middle East peace process and tourism in nations
such as Egypt. Some analysts have expressed concern that radical Islamic groups may seek
to exploit economic and political instabilities in Saudi Arabia. Other potential target nations
of such groups include Algeria, Bahrain, Egypt, India, Jordan, Turkey, and Pakistan. Patterns
1999 suggests that a decline in state sponsorship of terrorism has moved terrorism eastward
from Libya, Syria, and Lebanon to South Asia. The result: more U.S. policy focus on Usama
bin Laden and the alliance of groups operating out of Afghanistan with the acquiescence of

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the Taliban. A heavy area of focus remains the ability of terrorists to raise funds through non-
state sources, often through charitable contributions, kidnaping, and drug trafficking.
Patterns 1999 cited North Korea, Cuba, and Syria as possible candidates for removal
from the list of state sponsors of terrorism (see CRS Report RL30613, North Korea:
Terrorism List Removal?). Iran, despite political changes in 1999, is again listed as the most
active state sponsor of international terrorism. Iran and Syria were cited for supporting
regional terrorist groups, and Lebanon was cited as a key safe haven. Concern was expressed
by Russia and Chechnya’s neighbors that increased radicalization of Islamist populations
would encourage violence and spread instability elsewhere in Russia and beyond. Though not
added to the list, Afghanistan and Pakistan were singled out as major sites of terrorist activity.
The bombings of U.S. Embassies in East Africa, of the N.Y. World Trade Center, and
of the Jewish cultural center in Buenos Aires may indicate a trend to inflict higher casualties
on what are generally less protected civilian targets. It appears that state-sponsored terrorism
is decreasing significantly as, in a post-Cold War era, groups find it harder to obtain sponsors
and rogue states are less willing to risk exposure to broad based and severe international
sanctions. In this environment, access to private sources of funding for terrorist enterprises
becomes critical.
International terrorism is recognized as a threat to U.S. foreign and domestic security;
it also undermines a broad range of U.S. foreign policy goals. Terrorism erodes international
stability, a major foreign and economic policy objective for the United States. Terrorist
groups often seek to destabilize or overthrow governments, sometimes democratically elected
— or friendly — governments, and such groups often draw their support from public
discontent over the perceived inability of governments to deliver peace, security, and
economic prosperity. Efforts by governments to enhance national or regional economic
development and stability may become the object of particularly virulent attack. In this
regard, and because of their avowed goals to overthrow secular regimes in countries with
large Muslim populations, extremist Islamic fundamentalist groups, and Iran’s support for
such groups, are seen as a major threat to U.S. foreign policy goals and objectives.
Definitions
There is no universally accepted definition of international terrorism. One definition
widely used in U.S. government circles, and incorporated into law, defines “international
terrorism” as terrorism involving the citizens or property of more than one country.
Terrorism is broadly defined as politically motivated violence perpetrated against
noncombatant targets by subnational groups or clandestine agents. A “terrorist group” is
defined as a group which practices or which has significant subgroups which practice
terrorism (22 U.S.C. 2656f). One potential shortfall of this traditional approach is its focus
on groups and group members and exclusion of individual (non-group organized) terrorist
activity which has recently risen in frequency and visibility. Another possible weakness of
these standard definitions is the criteria of violence in a traditional form. Analysts pointing
to “virus” sabotage incidents warn that terrorists acts could include more sophisticated forms
of destruction and extortion such as disabling a national infrastructure by penetrating vital
computer software.
Current definitions of terrorism all share one common element: politically motivated
behavior. Such definitions do not include violence for financial profit or religious motivation.

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The rapid growth of transnational criminal organizations and the growing range and scale of
such operations could well result in their use of violence to achieve objectives with financial
profit as the driving motivation. Thus, although the basic assumption today is that all terrorist
acts are politically motivated, some are driven by other factors, and this number may grow
in light of expanding international criminal activity and an increasing number of extremist acts
carried out in the name of religious and cultural causes. A new approach might focus more
on defining terrorist acts, giving less emphasis to the motivation behind the acts.
U.S. Policy Response
Framework
Past administrations have employed a range of options to combat international terrorism,
from diplomacy and international cooperation and constructive engagement to economic
sanctions, covert action, protective security measures and military force. The application of
sanctions is one of the most frequently used tools of U.S. policymakers. Governments
supporting international terrorism (as identified by the Department of State) are prohibited
from receiving U.S. economic and military assistance. Export of munitions to such countries
is foreclosed, restrictions are imposed on exports of “dual use” equipment such as aircraft and
trucks.
Throughout successive administrations, U.S. policy as publicly stated has remained: no
concessions to terrorists, the U.S. government will not pay ransoms, release prisoners, change
its policies, nor agree to other acts that might encourage additional terrorism. Practice,
however, has not always been so pure. Recent U.S. and Israeli overtures to the PLO, and
recent U.S. and British approaches to the IRA clearly appear to reflect some change in
approach as such groups begin to moderate their behavior.
Most experts agree that the most effective way to fight terrorism is to gather as much
intelligence as possible; disrupt terrorist plans and organizations before they act; and organize
multinational cooperation against terrorists and countries that support them. The U.N.’s role
in mandating sanctions against Libya for its responsibility in the 1988 Pan Am 103 bombing
was significant as the first instance when the world community imposed sanctions against a
country in response to its complicity in an act of terrorism. Several factors made the action
possible. First, terrorism has touched many more countries in recent years, forcing
governments to put aside parochial interests. (Citizens from over 30 countries have
reportedly died in Libyan-sponsored bombings.) Second, the end of the Cold War has
contributed to increased international cooperation against terrorism. And third, U.S.
determination to punish terrorist countries, by military force in some instances, once their
complicity was established, was a major factor spurring other countries to join
U.N.-sponsored action.
In the past, governments have often preferred to handle terrorism as a national problem
without outside interference. Some governments were also wary of getting involved in others
battles and possibly attracting additional terrorism in the form of reprisals. Others were
reluctant to join in sanctions if their own trade interests might be damaged or they
sympathized with the perpetrators’ cause. Finally, there is the persistent problem of
extraditing terrorists without abandoning the long-held principle of asylum for persons fleeing
persecution for legitimate political or other activity.

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Dilemmas
In their desire to combat terrorism in a modern political context, nations often face
conflicting goals and courses of action: (1) providing security from terrorist acts, i.e. limiting
the freedom of individual terrorists, terrorists groups, and support networks to operate
unimpeded in a relatively unregulated environment versus (2) maximizing individual freedoms,
democracy, and human rights. Efforts to combat terrorism are complicated by a global trend
towards deregulation, open borders, and expanded commerce. Particularly in democracies
such as the United States, the constitutional limits within which policy must operate are often
seen to conflict directly with a desire to secure the lives of citizens against terrorist activity
more effectively.
Another dilemma for policymakers is the need to identify the perpetrators of particular
terrorist acts and those who train, fund, or otherwise support or sponsor them. Moreover,
as the international community increasingly demonstrates its ability to unite and apply
sanctions against rogue states, states will become less likely to overtly support terrorist
groups or engage in state sponsored terrorism.
Today a non-standard brand of terrorist may be emerging: individuals who do not work
for any established terrorist organization and who are apparently not agents of any state
sponsor. The worldwide threat of such individual or “boutique” terrorism, or that of
“spontaneous” terrorist activity such as the bombing of bookstores in the United States after
Ayatollah Khomeini’s death edict against Salman Rushdie, appears to be on the increase.
Thus, one likely profile for the terrorist of the 21st century may well be a private individual
not affiliated with any established group. Another profile might be a group-affiliated
individual acting independent of the group, but drawing on other similarly minded individuals
for support. Because U.S. international counter-terrorism policy framework is sanctions-
oriented, and has traditionally sought to pin responsibility on state-sponsors, some policy
realignment may be required.
Another problem surfacing in the wake of the number of incidents associated with
Islamic fundamentalist groups is how to condemn and combat such terrorist activity, and the
extreme and violent ideology of specific radical groups, without appearing to be anti-Islamic
in general. A desire to punish a state for supporting international terrorism may also be
subject to conflicting foreign policy objectives.
Policy Tools
The U.S. government has employed a wide array of policy tools to combat international
terrorism, from diplomacy and international cooperation and constructive engagement to
economic sanctions, covert action, protective security measures, and military force.
Diplomacy/Constructive Engagement. Most responses to international terrorism
involve use of diplomacy in some form as governments seek cooperation to apply pressure
on terrorists. One such initiative was the active U.S. role taken in the March 1996 Sharm
al-Sheikh peacemaker/anti-terrorism summit. Another is the ongoing U.S. effort to get Japan
and major European nations to join in U.S. trade and economic sanctions against Iran. Some
argue that diplomacy holds little hope of success against determined terrorists or the countries
that support them. However, diplomatic measures are least likely to widen the conflict and
therefore are usually tried first.

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In incidents of international terrorism by subnational groups, implementing a policy
response of constructive engagement is complicated by the lack of existing channels and
mutually accepted rules of conduct between governmental entities and the group in question.
In some instances, as was the case with the PLO, legislation may specifically prohibit official
contact with a terrorist organization or its members. Increasingly, however, governments
appear to be pursuing policies which involve verbal contact with terrorist groups or their
representatives.
The media remain powerful forces in confrontations between terrorists and governments.
Appealing to, and influencing, public opinion may impact not only the actions of governments
but also those of groups engaged in terrorist acts. From the terrorist perspective, media
coverage is an important measure of the success of a terrorist act or campaign. And in
hostage type incidents, where the media may provide the only independent means a terrorist
has of knowing the chain of events set in motion, coverage can complicate rescue efforts.
Governments can use the media in an effort to arouse world opinion against the country or
group using terrorist tactics. Public diplomacy and the media can be used to mobilize public
opinion in other countries to pressure governments to take action against terrorism. An
example would be to mobilize the tourist industry to pressure governments into participating
in sanctions against a terrorist state. See CRS Report 97-960, Terrorism, The Media, and
the Government: Perspectives, Trends, and Options for Policymakers.
Economic Sanctions. In the past, use of economic sanctions was usually predicated
upon identification of a nation as an active supporter or sponsor of international terrorism.
On August 20, 1998, President Clinton signed an executive order freezing assets owned by
Saudi-born Islamic terrorist leader Osama bin Laden, specific associates, and their self-
proclaimed Islamic Army Organization, and prohibiting U.S. individuals and firms from doing
business with them. Previously, the Clinton Administration had frozen the assets of 12
alleged Middle East terrorist organizations and 18 individuals associated with those
organizations. On October 8, 1997, the State Department released a list of 30 foreign terrorist
organizations. As of October 1999, the number of organizations on this list stood at 28. The
1996 Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act makes it a crime to provide support to
these organizations, and their members shall be denied entry visas into the United States.
On August 10, 1999, the United States froze the assets of Afghanistan’s national airline
under sanctions designed to punish the Taliban movement for harboring bin Laden.
Apprehension of bin Laden remains a publically announced top priority for the U.S. counter-
terrorism community, despite suggestions from some that such policy focus overstates his
importance, aids his recruitment efforts, neglects other foreign policy and national security
priorities, and diverts resources from other counter-terrorism areas where they are badly
needed. In related developments, on July 6, 1999, the United States banned trade with parts
of Afghanistan controlled by the Taliban.
Economic sanctions fall into six categories: restrictions on trading, technology transfer,
foreign assistance, export credits and guarantees, foreign exchange and capital transactions,
and economic access. Sanctions may include a total or partial trade embargo, embargo on
financial transactions, suspension of foreign aid, restrictions on aircraft or ship traffic, or
abrogation of a friendship, commerce, and navigation treaty. Sanctions usually require the
cooperation of other countries to make them effective, and such cooperation is not always
forthcoming.

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The President has a variety of laws at his disposal, but the broadest in its potential scope
is the International Emergency Economic Powers Act. The Act permits imposition of
restrictions on economic relations once the President has declared a national emergency
because of a threat to the U.S. national security, foreign policy, or economy. While the
sanctions authorized must deal directly with the threat responsible for the emergency, the
President can regulate imports, exports, and all types of financial transactions, such as the
transfer of funds, foreign exchange, credit, and securities, between the United States and the
country in question. Specific authority for the Libyan trade embargo is in Section 503 of the
International Trade and Security Act of 1985, while Section 505 of the Act authorizes the
banning of imports of goods and services from any country supporting terrorism.
Other major laws that can be used against countries sponsoring terrorism are the Export
Administration Act, Arms Export Control Act, foreign assistance legislation. The Export
Administration Act (Section 6(j)) allows the President to regulate export of dual use
technology and prohibit or curtail the export of critical technology or other technological
data. U.S. sales of technology, particularly high technology processes, have been
considerable, and sales restrictions or prohibitions are known to have put pressure on states
reluctant to control terrorism. Under this Act, exports of various sensitive articles to
terrorism-list states are strictly controlled or prohibited because of their support of terrorism.
The Arms Export Control Act authorizes the President to restrict the sale of defense articles
and restrict or suspend defense services to states fostering terrorism. Foreign assistance
authorization and appropriations acts deny foreign aid to countries supporting terrorism and
require the U.S. to vote against loans to such countries in the multilateral developments
banks. Country specific export control restrictions on munitions list items and dual use
equipment apply to Iraq and Iran and are found in the Iraq Sanctions Act (Section 586 of P.L.
101-513). More recently, Executive Orders 12957 and 12959 prohibit U.S. development of
Iran’s oil industry and U.S. exports to and imports from Iran, as well as third country reexport
of U.S. products to the Islamic Republic. P.L. 104-172, the 1996 Iran Oil Sanction’s Act,
prohibits U.S. trade with companies that invest more than $40 million in Iran’s or Libya’s
petroleum development, or with companies not complying with U.N. mandated embargoes
on sales of oil equipment to Libya. On March 17, 2000, Secretary of State Albright
announced suspension of a ban on imports of Iranian pistachio nuts, caviar, and carpets —
a move seen as a gesture to Iranian reformers and their supporters.
P.L. 104-132 prohibits the sale of arms to any country the President certifies is not
cooperating fully with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. The seven terrorist list countries and
Afghanistan are currently on this list. Sections 325 and 326 of this law also require that aid
be withheld to any country providing lethal military aid to countries on the terrorism list.
On July 6, 1999, President Clinton issued an executive order imposing sanctions against
the Taliban and on October 15, 1999, the U.N. security Council unanimously adopted a
resolution imposing limited sanctions against the Taliban. The Council demanded that the
Taliban turn over alleged Saudi terrorist suspect Usama bin Laden to a country where he will
be effectively brought to justice. Sanctions called for include (1) denying aircraft landing and
takeoffs to and from Taliban controlled territory, and (2) freezing funds and financials
resources from Taliban owned or controlled undertakings.
The United States can suspend airline service to and from a nation or deny entry to
terrorists and their supporters. In 1978, the United States joined with West Germany, Canada,
Britain, France, Italy, and Japan in declaring a willingness to suspend commercial airline
service between any of those countries and any country harboring hijackers. Recently, efforts

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have been made to sanction third-party countries for trading with an already sanctioned
country.
Covert Action. Intelligence gathering, infiltration of terrorist groups and military
operations involve a variety of clandestine or so called “covert” activities. Much of this
activity is of a passive monitoring nature. A more active form of covert activity occurs during
events such as a hostage crisis or hijacking when a foreign country may quietly request
advice, equipment or technical support during the conduct of operations, with no public credit
to be given the providing country.
Some nations have periodically gone beyond monitoring or covert support activities and
resorted to unconventional methods beyond their territory for the express purpose of
neutralizing individual terrorists and/or thwarting preplanned attacks. Examples of activities
might run the gamut from intercepting or sabotaging delivery of funding or weapons to a
terrorist group to seizing and transporting a wanted terrorist to stand trial for assassination
or murder. Arguably, such activity might be justified as preemptive self defense under Article
51 of the U.N. charter. On the other hand, it could be argued that such actions violate
customary international law. Nevertheless, a July 1989 memorandum by the Department of
Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel advises that the President has the authority to violate
customary international law and can delegate such authority to the Attorney General level,
should the national interest so require.
Assassination is specifically prohibited by U.S. Executive Order (most recently, E.O.
12333), but bringing of wanted criminals to the United States for trial is not. There exists an
established U.S. legal doctrine that allows an individual’s trial to proceed regardless of
whether he is forcefully abducted from another country, or from international waters or
airspace. For example, Fawaz Yunis, a Lebanese who participated in the 1985 hijacking of
a Jordanian airliner with two Americans among its 70 passengers, was lured aboard a yacht
in international waters off the coast of Cyprus in 1987 by federal agents, flown to the United
States for trial, and convicted.
Experts warn that bringing persons residing abroad to U.S. justice by means other than
extradition or mutual agreement with the host country, i.e., by abduction and their
surreptitious transportation, can vastly complicate U.S. foreign relations, perhaps jeopardizing
interests far more important than “justice,” deterrence, and the prosecution of a single
individual. For example, the abduction of a Mexican national in 1990 to stand trial in Los
Angeles on charges relating to torture and death of a DEA agent led to vehement protests
from the government of Mexico, a government subsequently plagued with evidence of high
level drug related corruption. Subsequently, in November 1994, the two countries signed a
treaty to Prohibit Transborder Abductions. Notwithstanding the unpopularity of such
abductions in nations that fail to apprehend and prosecute those accused, the “rendering” of
such wanted criminals to U.S. courts is permitted under limited circumstances by a January
1993 Presidential Decision Directive issued under the Bush Administration, and reaffirmed
by President Clinton. Such conduct, however, raises prospects of other nations using similar
tactics against U.S. citizens.
Although conventional explosives — specifically car bombs — appear to be the
terrorism weapon of choice, the world is increasingly moving into an era in which terrorists
may gain access to nuclear, chemical or biological weaponry. Faced with the potential of
more frequent incidents and higher conventional casualty levels, or a nuclear or biological

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holocaust, nations may be more prone to consider covert operations designed to neutralize
such threats.
Rewards for Information Program. Money is a powerful motivator. Rewards for
information have been instrumental in Italy in destroying the Red Brigades and in Colombia
in apprehending drug cartel leaders. A State Department program is in place, supplemented
by the aviation industry, offering rewards of up to $4 million to anyone providing information
that would prevent or resolve an act of international terrorism against U.S. citizens or U.S.
property, or that leads to the arrest or conviction of terrorist criminals involved in such acts.
This program was at least partly responsible for the arrest of the Unabomber, of Ramzi
Ahmed Yousef, the man accused of masterminding the World Trade Center bombing, and of
the CIA personnel shooter, Mir Amal Kansi. The program was established by the 1984 Act
to Combat International Terrorism (P.L. 98-533), and is administered by State’s Diplomatic
Security Service. Rewards over $250,000 must be approved by the Secretary of State. The
program can pay to relocate informants and immediate family who fear for their safety. The
1994 “crime bill” (P.L. 103-322) helps relocate aliens and immediate family members in the
U.S. who are reward recipients. Expanded participation by the private sector in funding and
publicizing such reward programs has been suggested by some observers.
Extradition/Law Enforcement Cooperation. International cooperation in such areas
as law enforcement, customs control, and intelligence activities is an important tool in
combating international terrorism. One critical law enforcement tool in combating
international terrorism is extradition of terrorists. International extradition traditionally has
been subject to several limitations, including the refusal to extradite for political or
extraterritorial offenses and the refusal of some countries to extradite their nationals. The
United States has been encouraging the negotiation of treaties with fewer limitations, in part
as a means of facilitating the transfer of wanted terrorists. Because much terrorism involves
politically motivated violence, the Department of State has recently sought to curtail the
availability of the political offense exception, found in many extradition treaties, to avoid
extradition.
Military Force. Although not without difficulties, military force, particularly when
wielded by a superpower such as the United States, can carry substantial clout. Proponents
of selective use of military force usually emphasize the military’s unique skills and specialized
equipment. The April 1986 decision to bomb Libya for its alleged role in the bombing of a
German discotheque exemplifies use military force. Other examples are: (1) the 1993 bombing
of Iraq’s military intelligence headquarters by U.S. forces in response to Iraqi efforts to
assassinate former president George Bush during a visit to Kuwait and (2) the August 1998
missile attacks against bases in Afghanistan and a chemical production facility in Sudan.
Concerns about the terrorist threat prompted an extensive buildup of the military’s
counter-terrorist organization. A special unit known as “Delta Force” at Fort Bragg, NC, has
been organized to perform anti-terrorist operations when needed. Details about the unit are
secret, but estimates are that it has about 800 assigned personnel.
Use of military force presupposes the ability to identify a terrorist group or sponsor and
its location, knowledge often unavailable to law enforcement officials. Risks of military force
include (1) military casualties or captives, (2) foreign civilian casualties, (3) retaliation and
escalation by terrorist groups, (4) holding the wrong parties responsible, (5) sympathy for the
“bullied” victim, and (6) perception that the U.S. ignores rules of international law.

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P.L. 104-264 includes a sense of the Senate statement that if evidence suggests “beyond
a clear and reasonable doubt” that an act of hostility against any U.S. citizen was a terrorist
act sponsored, organized, condoned or directed by any nation, then a state of war should be
considered to exist between the United States and that nation.
International Conventions. To date, the United States has joined with the world
community in developing all of the major anti-terrorism conventions. These conventions
impose on their signatories an obligation either to prosecute offenders or extradite them to
permit prosecution for a host of terrorism-related crimes including hijacking vessels and
aircraft, taking hostages, and harming diplomats. An important new convention not yet in
force is the Convention for the Marking of Plastic Explosives. Implementing legislation is in
P.L. 104-132. On December 8, 1999, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the Anti-
Terrorism Financing Convention that grew out of G-8 nation endeavors to combat terrorist
financing.
Potential Tools
An International Court for Terrorism. Each year bills are introduced urging that an
international court be established, perhaps under the U.N., to sit in permanent session to
adjudicate cases against persons accused of international terrorist crimes. The court would
have broad powers to sentence and punish anyone convicted of such crimes. Critics point out
many administrative and procedural problems associated with establishing such a court and
making it work, including jurisdictional and enforcement issues. An International Court of
Justice in the Hague exists, but it deals with disputes between states and lacks compulsory
jurisdiction and enforcement powers.
Media Self-Restraint. For some, the term “media self-restraint” is an oxymoron; the
sensational scoop is the golden fleece and dull copy is to be avoided. While some of the
media struggle to maintain objectivity, they are occasionally manipulated into the role of
mediator and often that of publicist of terrorist goals. Though not an international incident,
the publication of the Unabomber’s “manifesto” illustrated this. Notably, there have been
attempts by the media to impose its own rules when covering terrorist incidents. Standards
established by the Chicago Sun-Times and Daily News include paraphrasing terrorist demands
to avoid unbridled propaganda; banning participation of reporters in negotiations with
terrorists; coordinating coverage through supervising editors who are in contact with police
authorities; providing thoughtful, restrained, and credible coverage of stories; and allowing
only senior supervisory editors to determine what, if any, information should be withheld or
deferred. Such standards are far from uniformly accepted. In an intensely competitive
profession consisting of a multinational worldwide press corps, someone is likely to break
the story. See CRS Report 97-960, Terrorism, the Media, and the Government:
Perspectives, Trends and Options for Policymakers.
Policy Reform
On June 5, 2000, the National Commission on Terrorism (NTC), a congressionally
mandated bi-partisan body, issued its report which included a blueprint for U.S.
counterterrorism policy with both policy and legislative recommendations.
The NTC report is likely to stimulate strong congressional interest in counterterrorism
policy when the 107th Congress convenes in January 2001. Likely areas of focus are (1) a
more proactive counterterrorism policy; (2) a stronger state sanctions policy; and (3) a more

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cohesive/better coordinated U.S. federal counterterrorism policy. (See CRS Report
RS20598, National Commission on Terrorism Report: Background and Issues for Congress.)
U.S. Organization and Program Response
The chain of command on anti-terrorism planning runs from the President through the
National Security Council, a representative of which chairs a senior interagency Terrorism
Security Group (TSG). The State Department is designated the lead agency for countering
terrorism overseas; the Justice Department’s Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) is the lead
agency for domestic terrorism; and the Federal Aviation Administration is the lead for
hijackings when a plane’s doors are closed. These roles were reaffirmed by Presidential
Decision Directive (PDD) No. 39 in June 1995. PDD 62 (Protection Against Unconventional
Threats) and PDD 63 (Critical Infrastructure Protection) of May 22, 1998: (1) established
within the NSC a National Coordinator for Security, Infrastructure Protection, and
Counterterrorism who also provides “advice” regarding the counterterrorism budget; (2)
established within the NSC two Senior Directors who report to the National Coordinator
—one for infrastructure protection and one for counterterrorism; (3) established a new inter-
agency working group primarily focused on domestic preparedness for WMD incidents; and
(4) laid out the architecture for critical infrastructure protection. Intelligence information
among the various agencies is coordinated by an Intelligence Committee, chaired by a
representative of the CIA. An important policy question is whether current organizational
structure brings excessive focus on state-sponsored actions at the expense of attention on
so-called “gray area” terrorist activity (i.e. terrorist activity not clearly linked to any
perpetrator, group, or supporting/sponsoring nation). In light of recent trends in terrorist
activity, some suggest an independent comprehensive review of counter-terrorism policy,
organizational structure, and preparedness to respond to major terrorist incidents in the
United States is warranted. Whether PDD 62, by establishing a national terrorism coordinator
at the NSC, takes too much of the terrorism decisionmaking process out of the realm of
congressional oversight is another issue as NSC members generally do not testify before
Congress.
A number of Administration programs focus specifically on combating international
terrorism. They include the Department of State’s (1) Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program
(ATA), (2) Counter-Terrorism Research and Development Program, and (3) Diplomatic
Security Program. The DOD Authorization Act (Title XIV) for FY1997 (P.L. 104-201)
seeks to ensure DOD assistance to federal, state, and local officials in responding to
biological, chemical and nuclear emergencies.
On January 22, 1999, President Clinton announced a $10 billion initiative to address
terrorism. Included were $1.4 billion to protect against chemical and biological terrorism and
$1.46 billion to protect critical systems from cyber and other attacks.
Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program
The State Department’s anti-terrorism assistance program provides training and
equipment to foreign countries to help them improve their anti-terrorism capabilities. More
than 20,000 individuals from 100 countries have received training since the program’s
inception in 1983 in such skills as crisis management, VIP protection, airport security
management, and bomb detection and deactivation. The Administration’s FY1998 $18 million

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request for this program was fully funded at $19 million; the FY1999 request totaled $21
million and was funded at $41 million (which included $20 million from a FY1999 emergency
security supplemental appropriations), and the FY2000 request was $23 million.
Counter-Terrorism Research and Development Program
The State Department’s Counter-Terrorism Research and Development Program, which
is jointly funded by the Departments of State and Defense, constitutes a response to combat
the threat posed by increasingly sophisticated equipment and explosives available to terrorist
groups. Recent projects include detectors for nuclear materials, decontaminants for chemical
and biological weapons, law enforcement and intelligence database software and surveillance
technology. The State Department’s FY1997- FY2000 budget requests for these programs
totaled $1.8 million. DoD’s FY2000 request totaled $52.2 with a $54.8 million request
projected for FY2001.
Diplomatic Security Program
The Diplomatic Security Program of the State Department is designed to protect U.S.
personnel, information and facilities abroad. Providing security guards and counterintelligence
awareness are important elements of the program. Detection and investigation of passport
and visa fraud is another component of the program.
The Administration’s FY2000 request for the Diplomatic Security Program is $226.514
million. One component of the broader program provides protection of international
organizations, foreign missions and officials under the Foreign Missions Act of 1982. Security
enhancement for U.S. embassies is funded through the “Acquisition and Maintenance of
Buildings Abroad” account. The FY1999 request was $640.8 million with $1,030.6 million
appropriated.
The State Department’s FY2000 request to Congress includes $568 million for embassy
security (see CRS Report 98-771, Embassy Security: Background, Funding, and the FY2000
Budget). The Administration included in its State Department request an advance
appropriation of $3 billion for FY2001-FY2005. Beginning with a FY2001 baseline of $300
million, the Administration will allocate these funds in additional $150 million increments each
year ending with $900 million for FY2005.
Options for Program Enhancement
Numerous options have been proposed to improve the effectiveness of programs
designed to combat terrorism. Some notable areas cited for improvement include contingency
planning; explosives detection; joint or multinational research, operational and training
programs/exercises; nuclear materials safeguarding; and disaster consequence management.
Some have suggested that U.S. public diplomacy/media programs could be broadened to
support anti-terrorism policy objectives. Cyber security remains an important area for
program enhancement. On January 9, 2000, the Administration released a comprehensive plan
to combat cyber-terrorism including $2 billion in proposed spending next year to make the
nation’s computer systems less vulnerable to attack. Plan elements include (1) enhanced
funding for research and development; (2) creation of an ROTC-type corps of information
specialists; and (3) creation of a national institute charged with forging a research partnership
with the private sector.

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State-Supported Terrorism
The Secretary of State maintains a list of countries that have “repeatedly provided
support for acts of international terrorism.” Data supporting this list is drawn from the
intelligence community. Listed countries are subject to severe U.S. export controls,
particularly of dual use technology, and selling them military equipment is prohibited.
Providing foreign aid under the Foreign Assistance Act is also prohibited. Section 6(j) of the
1979 Export Administration Act stipulates that a validated license shall be required for export
of controlled items and technology to any country on the list, and that the Secretaries of
Commerce and State must notify the House Committee on Foreign Affairs, and both the
Senate Committees on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and Foreign Relations, at least
30 days before issuing any validated license required by this Act. In addition, Section 509(a)
of the 1986 omnibus anti-terrorism act (P.L. 99-399) bars export of munitions list items to
countries on the terrorism list. Indirect state sponsorship or sponsorship by proxy is
addressed in a second State Department terrorist list (required by P.L. 104-132) — which is
distinct from the list of state sponsors generally referred to as the “list”— prohibits the sale
of arms to nations not fully cooperating with U.S. anti-terrorism efforts. Strong language
critical of Greece in Patterns 1999 prompts some to question whether Greece should be
included in the latter category of nations. The current list of countries not fully cooperating
includes the seven state supporters plus Afghanistan. P.L. 104-132 also requires the
withholding of foreign assistance to nations providing lethal military aid to countries on the
list of state sponsors.
Adding and Removing Countries on the List
In late January each year, under the provisions of Section 6(j) of the Export
Administration Act of 1979, as amended, the Secretary of Commerce in consultation with the
Secretary of State provides Congress with a list of countries supporting terrorism.
Compilation of the list is the result of an ongoing process. Throughout the year the
Department of State gathers data on terrorist activity worldwide, and then beginning about
November, the list is formally reviewed. Each new determination under Section 6(j) of the
Act must also be published in the Federal Register. (For removal criteria see CRS Report
RL30613, North Korea: Terrorism List Removal?.)
Paragraph 6(j)(4) of the Export Administration Act prohibits removing a country from
the list unless the President first submits a report to the House Committee on Foreign Affairs,
and the Senate Committees on Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs, and Foreign Relations.
When a government comes to power (i.e., a government different from that in power at the
time of the last determination), the President’s report, submitted before the proposed
rescission would take effect, must certify that (1) there has been a fundamental change in the
leadership and policies of the government of the country concerned (this means an actual
change of government as a result of an election, coup, or some other means); (2) the new
government is not supporting acts of international terrorism; and (3) the new government has
provided assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future. When
the same government is in power, the President’s report — submitted at least 45 days
before the proposed rescission would take effect — must justify the rescission and certify
that, (1) the government concerned has not provided support for international terrorism

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during the preceding 6-month period; and (2) the government concerned has provided
assurances that it will not support acts of international terrorism in the future. Congress can
let the President’s action take effect, or pass legislation to block it, the latter most likely over
the President’s veto. To date Congress has passed no such legislation or resolution, although
Syria would be the likely target of such endeavors, should the Administration prematurely
seek its removal from the terrorism list. Patterns 1999 notes that “if a state sponsor meets
the criteria from being dropped from the terrorism list, it will be removed — notwithstanding
other differences we may have with a country’s other policies and actions.”
Countries on the List
Currently seven countries are on the “terrorism list”: Cuba, Iran, Iraq, Libya, North
Korea, Sudan and Syria. (For further information on states sponsoring international
terrorism, see Patterns of Global Terrorism (Patterns 1999), Department of State, April
2000.) Of the seven, five are Middle Eastern nations with predominantly Muslim populations.
(See CRS Report 98-722, Terrorism: Middle Eastern Groups and State Sponsors). Of
these, Iran and Iraq could currently be characterized on one extreme as active supporters of
terrorism: nations that use terrorism as an instrument of policy or warfare beyond their
borders. Iran, Iraq, and Libya are major oil producers, holding 17% of the world’s remaining
oil and producing, in 1994, 5.5% of the world’s oil supply, 31% of Europe’s (OECD) oil
consumption, and 9% of Japan’s. Such dependence on oil complicates universal support for
sanctions against these nations.
On the other extreme one might place countries such as Cuba or North Korea, which at
the height of the Cold War were more active, but in recent years have seemed to settle for a
more passive role of granting ongoing safe haven to previously admitted individual terrorists.
Closer to the middle of an active/passive spectrum is Libya, which grants safe haven to
wanted terrorists. Syria, though not formally detected in an active role since 1986, reportedly
uses groups in Syria and Lebanon to project power into Israel and allows groups to train in
territory under its control, placing it somewhere in the middle to active end of the spectrum.
And Sudan, which allows sites for training, remains an enigma. Although Sudan has been
considered primarily a passive supporter, charges have been made that Sudan was actively
involved in a 1995 attempt to assassinate Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak.
A complex challenge facing those charged with compiling and maintaining the list is the
degree to which diminution of hard evidence of a government’s active involvement indicates
a real change in behavior, particularly when a past history of active support or use of
terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy has been well established. Removing a country
from the list is likely to result in some level of confrontation with Congress, so the
bureaucratically easier solution is to maintain the status quo, or add to the list, but not to
delete from it.
Iran. In a change from Patterns 1998, Patterns 1999 names Iran as the most active
state sponsor of terrorism despite acknowledged political changes in Iran during 1999. Iran
continues to be deeply involved in the planning and execution of terrorist acts by its own
agents and surrogate groups. It provides ongoing direction, safehaven, funding, training,
weapons and other support to a variety of radical Islamic terrorist groups including Hizballah
in Lebanon, as well as Hammas and Palestinian Islamic Jihad (PIJ) to undermine the Middle
East peace process. There are press reports that Iran is building a terrorist infrastructure in
the region by providing political indoctrination, military training, and financial help to
dissident Shia groups in neighboring countries, including Kuwait, Bahrain, and Saudi Arabia.

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Iran has reportedly concentrated efforts to make Sudan a center for terrorist training and
activities and reportedly continues to conduct assassinations of writers and political dissidents
beyond its borders. Iran was placed on the terrorism list in January of 1984. President
Clinton has halted U.S. trade with Iran and barred U.S. companies from any involvement in
the Iranian oil sector. The threat perceived from Iran as a leading supporter of terrorism is
substantially raised by reports that Iran is acquiring nuclear technology and seeking nuclear
weapons technology.
Iraq. On September 13, 1990, Iraq was placed once again on the terrorism list, after
having been removed in 1982. Iraq’s ability to instigate terror has been curbed by U.S. and
U.N. sanctions which were imposed after the Kuwait invasion. Nevertheless, Patterns 1999
indicates that Saddam Hussein’s regime continues to murder dissidents and provide a
safehaven for a variety of Palestinian rejectionist groups. There are numerous claims that the
Iraqi intelligence is behind killings and at least one planned bombing during 1999. Iraq also
provides active assistance to the MEK, a terrorist group opposed to the Teheran regime. In
the past, Iraq has temporarily expelled terrorists, only to invite them back later.
Libya. Libya has a long history of involvement in international terrorism. Libya was
placed on the terrorism list when it was started in December 1979 and approximately $1
billion in bank deposits belonging to Libya are frozen by the United States. Libyan terrorism
has been sharply reduced after imposition of U.N. sanctions in the wake of Libyan
involvement in the bombings of Pan Am flight 103 and in the 1989 bombing of French UTA
flight 772 that killed 170 persons, including seven Americans. Evidence suggests Libya has
not abandoned its support for international terrorism as an instrument of foreign policy, and
it still refuses to hand over some accused of terrorist acts. Throughout 1998, Libya continued
to support groups opposed to the Mid-East peace process that engage in violence.
Nevertheless, the response of the international community and U.S. Congress (P.L. 104-172)
seems to have been relatively effective in restraining the level of Libya’s outlaw behavior and
may provide one model for future international action. There is no evidence of Libyan
involvement in recent acts of international terrorism. In April 2000, Libya took what Patterns
1999 notes as “an important step by surrendering ... two Libyans accused of bombing Pan Am
flight 103 ... in 1988.”
Syria. Syria was placed on the first terrorism list in December 1979. It is generally
believed within the western community that Syria has a long history of using terrorists to
advance its own interests. The United States has said that it has no evidence of Syrian
government direct involvement in terrorism since 1986. Informed sources suggest, however,
that the Syrian government remains active, hiding behind the sophisticated operational level
of their intelligence services and their ability to mask such involvement. Many major terrorist
groups are known to maintain an active presence (including training camps and operational
headquarters) in Syria or in Syrian-controlled Lebanon and Syria has allowed Iran to supply
Hizballah with weaponry via Damascus. Providing such support, free movement, and safe
haven has caused prominent Members of Congress to contend that Syria should remain on
the terrorism list, and Administration spokespersons have firmly maintained in testimony
before Congress that until this problem is resolved, Syria will remain on the list. In contrast,
the Administration has made it clear to Syria that it will consider removing Syria from the list
should a peace treaty with Israel be signed. Some observers argue that Syria should continue
to be subject to U.S. sanctions because of involvement in drug trafficking by some of its
ruling elites and their alleged involvement in counterfeiting of U.S. currency.

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Sudan. Sudan was added to the terrorism list in August 1993. Sudan continues to
harbor members of some of the world’s most violent organizations and according to Patterns
1999 continues to serve as a refuge, nexus, and training hub for a number of terrorist
organizations including Hizballah, Hamas, and bin Laden’s al-Qaida organization. Egypt and
Ethiopia have charged the Sudanese government with involvement in a failed assassination
attempt against President Hosni Mubarak while in Ethiopia in June 1995. On September 11,
1995, the Organization for African Unity (OAU), in an unprecedented action criticizing a
member, passed a resolution calling on Sudan to extradite three suspects charged in the
assassination attempt to Ethiopia. The U.N. Security Council has also demanded extradition
of the three suspects. Sudan continues to permit its territory to be used by Iran to transport
weapons to Islamic extremist groups and as a meeting place for Iranian-backed terrorist
groups.
Cuba. Fidel Castro’s government has a long history of providing arms and training to
terrorist organizations. A cold war carryover, Cuba was added to the 1982 U.S. list of
countries supporting international terrorism based on its support for the M-19 guerrilla
organization in Columbia. Patterns 1999 does not cite evidence that Cuban officials were
directly involved in sponsoring an act of terrorism in 1999, but notes that Havana remains a
safe haven to several international terrorists. The report noted that Cuba no longer actively
supports armed struggles in Latin America or elsewhere. Nevertheless, Havana continues to
maintain close ties to other state sponsors of terrorism. The Castro regime also reportedly
maintains close ties with leftist insurgent groups in Latin America.
North Korea. North Korea was added to the “official” list of countries supporting
terrorism because of its implication in the bombing of a South Korean airliner on November
29, 1987, which killed 115 persons. According to the State Department, North Korea is not
conclusively linked to any terrorist acts since 1987. A North Korean spokesman in 1993
condemned all forms of terrorism, and said his country resolutely opposed the encouragement
and support of terrorism. A similar statement was made in November 1995. Nevertheless,
North Korea continues to provide political sanctuary to members of a group that hijacked a
Japan Airlines flight in 1970 and may be linked to the murder of a South Korean diplomat in
Vladivostoc in 1996. Patterns 1999 notes that North Korea has made “some positive
statements condemning terrorism in all its forms” and has stressed that actions triggering
removal from the list “are consistent with its stated policies.”
An Informal Watchlist?
Some suggest that there is utility in drawing to Congress’ attention countries that do not
currently qualify for inclusion in the terrorism list but where added scrutiny may be warranted.
Such a list would be similar to the Attorney General’s National Security Threat List that
includes sponsors of international terrorism, the activities of which warrant monitoring by the
FBI within the United States. Although informal, it would be controversial and speculative.
But it would reflect legitimate concerns of those in the intelligence and policy community and
might serve as an informal warning mechanism to countries that their activities are being
scrutinized. For example, the State Department warned Pakistan in January 1993 that it was
under “active continuing review” to determine whether it should be placed on the terrorism
list. When the list came out in April 1993, Pakistan was not on it. (See CRS Issue Brief
IB94041, Pakistan-U.S. Relations.) Sudan was also warned that it was being subjected to
special review prior to its being placed on the terrorism list in August 1993.

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Currently, some informally discussed candidates for such a list include (1) Afghanistan,
which Patterns 1999 characterizes as “the primary safehaven for terrorists”— concerns are
that Islamic fundamentalist terrorists linked to numerous international plots continue to train
and operate out of the country and/or enter or exit with impunity, and more specifically that
the Taliban continues to offer sanctuary to Osama bin Laden and his associated terror
networks; (2) Pakistan — Patterns 1999 notes that Pakistan has tolerated terrorists living
and moving freely within its territory; supported groups that engage in violence in Kashmir;
and provided indirect support for terrorists in Afghanistan; (3) Yugoslavia — concerns
remain over potential use of terrorism in reaction to NATO military operations. Another
concern is that militant Iranian elements remaining in the territory of former Yugoslavia may
resort to terrorist violence against European nations and the United States; (4) Lebanon —
growing concern exists over terrorist groups operating with impunity from there, often under
Syrian protection; (5) Greece — which Patterns 1999 describes as “one of the weakest links
in Europe’s efforts against terrorism” and where the absence of strong government measures
allows terrorists “to act with virtual impunity;” and (6) Yemen — a growing safe haven for
international terrorist groups where a growing kidnaping industry flourishes. Patterns 1999
also reflects a growing concern in policy circles that Chechnya may increasingly become a
magnet and rallying center for Islamic radicals and notes that concern exists that “increased
radicalization of Islamist populations connected to the Chechnya conflict would encourage
violence and spread instability elsewhere in Russia and beyond.”

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