Order Code IB87050
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Strategic Petroleum Reserve
Updated January 9, 2001
Robert Bamberger
Resources, Science, and Industry Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Reauthorization the SPR
The Drawdown Authorities
Purchases of Crude Oil
Royalty-In-Kind Acquisition for the SPR
Drawdown of the Reserve
Drawdown Capability
Debate Over When to Use the Reserve
Calls for a Drawdown: Home Heating Oil, Winter 1999-2000
September 2000: A Swap Is Announced
Establishment of a Regional Home Heating Oil Reserve
The FY2000-2001 Budget
LEGISLATION
CHRONOLOGY
FOR ADDITIONAL READING

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Strategic Petroleum Reserve
SUMMARY
On October 24, 2000, the Department of
bring about an increase in petroleum prices
Energy (DOE) completed awards for a swap
sharp enough to have “a major adverse im-
of 30 million barrels from the Strategic Petro-
pact” on the economy. The statutory authority
leum Reserve (SPR). Bidders promised to
has been used once – in January 1991 – dur-
return 31.36 million barrels to the SPR in
ing the Persian Gulf War. That authority,
2001. The swap drew criticism amid reports
however, expired on March 31, 2000, and the
that some of the SPR oil was destined for
106h Congress struggled during the second
European markets. Critics were roused by
session to reach agreement on an extension.
European Union nations that hold strategic
stocks of refined products, but did not appear
The onset of severe winter weather in
to have any apparent intention of releasing
late 1999, coupled with low crude and product
them. On October 16, Secretary of Energy
stocks, brought about sharp increases in home
Richardson indicated that some domestic
heating oil prices in the Northeast. Amidst
refineries had agreed to temporarily cease
calls for an SPR drawdown, the Administra-
exporting heating oil to Europe, where prices
tion argued that this was not the sort of situa-
had been higher.
tion for which the SPR was intended. Estab-
lishment of a regional heating oil reserve in the
The SPR was authorized in late 1975 in
Northeast was supported by the President and
the Energy Policy and Conservation Act
included in by the House in its reauthorization
(EPCA) to protect the Nation against a repeti-
bill, H.R. 2884.
tion of the economic dislocation caused by the
1973-74 oil embargo. Congressional attention
There were renewed calls from some for
to the SPR declined during the 1990s as a
an SPR drawdown. DOE counsel had ruled
number of developments intersected: (1) the
that an in-force annual appropriation for the
need to cut federal spending; (2) declining
SPR extends authority to take certain actions.
likelihood of prolonged and crippling oil sup-
In addition to the swap, the President ap-
ply interruptions; (3) unregulated oil markets
proved two exchanges of crude in June 2000,
that appear to operate efficiently in allocating
and then authorized an interim regional 2
and pricing oil; (4) a consensus that the SPR
million barrel home heating oil reserve, pend-
was probably at an adequate level and addi-
ing passage of reauthorization by the 106th
tional fill was not justified. In early 1994, the
Congress.
Administration and Congress agreed to sus-
pend further purchases for the SPR. Main-
On October 19, 2000, the Senate passed
taining SPR readiness and upgrading aging
an amended version of reauthorization legisla-
infrastructure became the major priority.
tion that also permanently established the
regional home heating oil reserve. The House
Drawdown of the Reserve can be autho-
agreed to this version on October 25, and it
rized by the President in the event or likeli-
was signed into law (P.L. 101-469) on No-
hood of a “severe energy supply interruption,”
vember 9, 2000. There have been calls for use
to meet U.S. obligations to International
of the regional distillate reserve, but DOE has
Energy Agency allies for emergency oil-shar-
not observerd a market dislocation.
ing, or in the event of a shortage that would

Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The 106th Congress resolved issues surrounding reauthorization of the SPR. The final
version of the legislation (P.L. 101-469), signed into law on November 9, 2000, included
provisions for permanent establishment of a home heating oil reserve, and purchase of
stripper well oil for the SPR when prices are depressed. The explicit authorities governing
the SPR had expired at the end of March 2000. However, the DOE General Counsel
determined in early July 2000 that authority existed for the Administration to establish an
interim home heating oil reserve, which now holds its full complement of 2 million barrels.
On October 24, 2000, the Department of Energy (DOE) completed awards for a swap
of 30 million barrels from the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR). Bidders promised to
return 31.36 million barrels to the SPR in 2001.
There have been calls for further use of the SPR, and drawdown of the new Northeast
Heating Oil Reserve (NHOR). However, DOE is not observing any severe market
dislocations that would call for any intervention. Crude prices fell in late December 2000,
and prices of some petroleum products had softened by early January 2001.
The Clinton Administration requested $158 million for the SPR for FY2001. The
FY2001 Interior Appropriations (P.L. 106-291, H.R. 4578) provides $165 million. This
includes $8 million for the home heating oil reserve, of which $4 million is coming from
unexpended funds transferred from the SPR’s Petroleum Acquisition account.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
To help prevent a repetition of the economic dislocation caused by the 1973-74 Arab oil
embargo, Congress authorized the Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR) in the Energy Policy
and Conservation Act (EPCA, P.L. 94-163). Physically, the SPR comprises five underground
storage facilities, hollowed out from naturally occurring salt domes, located in Texas and
Louisiana. Oil stored at one of the sites, Weeks Island, was transferred after problems with
the structural integrity of the cavern were discovered in the mid-1990s.
It was generally believed that the mere existence of a large, operational reserve of crude
oil would deter future oil cutoffs and would discourage the use of oil as a weapon. In the
event of an interruption, introduction into the market of oil from the Reserve was expected
to help calm markets, mitigate sharp price spikes, and reduce the economic dislocation that
had accompanied the 1973 disruption. In so doing, the Reserve would also buy time — time
for the crisis to sort itself out or for diplomacy to seek a resolution before pressures built
toward large-scale intervention. The SPR was to contain enough crude oil to replace imports
for 90 days, with a goal initially of 500 million barrels in storage. In May 1978, plans for a
750-million-barrel Reserve were implemented.
The program fell increasingly behind schedule. By the end of 1978, the SPR was
supposed to contain 250 million barrels, but contained only 69 million barrels. When the
Iranian revolution cut supplies in the spring of 1979, purchases were suspended to reduce the
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upward pressure on world oil prices. Filling of the Reserve was resumed in September 1980
following enactment of the Energy Security Act (P.L. 96-294), which established a minimum
fill rate of 100,000 barrels per day (b/d). An amendment to the FY1981 DOE appropriations
legislation required that the Administration accelerate the fill rate to 300,000 b/d, subject to
adjustments for cost and other market factors. The fill rate was 292,000 b/d in FY1981, but
steadily declined to a low of 34,000 b/d in FY1990.
Filling of the SPR was suspended during 1990-1992 after the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait,
but was resumed at a modest rate. Fill declined to 16,500 b/d during FY1994. The SPR itself
reached 592 million barrels before purchases were again suspended. Owing to sales of SPR
oil during 1996, the level in the Reserve had fallen to 563.5 million barrels by the early spring
of 1997. At the prices prevailing in the late spring of 1998, that inventory would have
declined to roughly 542 million barrels had a sale authorized for FY1998 been carried out.
The cumulative cost of oil held in the SPR as of the end of FY1997 was nearly $16
billion, or nearly $27/barrel (bbl). Total appropriations for the SPR through FY1996,
including the costs of operation, facilities and maintenance totaled almost $21.0 billion.
Reauthorization of the SPR
The authorities governing a drawdown of the SPR are included in the Energy Policy and
Conservation Act (EPCA, P.L. 94-163). These authorities also provide for U.S. participation
in emergency-sharing activities of the International Energy Agency (IEA) without risking
violation of antitrust law and regulation. The 104th and 105th Congresses agreed to fairly
short-term extensions of the authorities governing the use of the SPR, pending a broader
review of SPR policy. The 106th Congress passed a short-term extension of the SPR (H.R.
2981) until March 31, 2000, to allow additional time for consideration of legislation (S. 1051,
H.R. 2884) to extend the authorities until the end of FY2003. No agreement was reached
before the authorities expired on March 31, 2000.
On April 12, 2000, the House passed (416-8) an amended version of H.R. 2884. It
included an amendment added by Representative Barton that would provide DOE with the
option of buying oil from marginal well operators at $15 per barrel, adjusted for inflation, if
the national average price of crude falls below that level. The bill also included an amendment
addressing the complementary high-oil price concerns of Northeastern states dependent upon
home heating oil. That amendment would authorize creation of a 2.0 million barrel home
heating oil reserve for the Northeastern United States. Opposition to the House provisions,
including the home heating oil reserve and the Barton amendment, led to a hold being placed
on the legislation in the Senate, which meant that it would require 60 votes to bring the
measure up for debate.
In a bid to raise the number of opportunities for SPR reauthorization to pass, the House
Committee on Appropriations on June 20, 2000, by voice vote, added to the FY2001 Energy
and Water Appropriations Act a simple extension until Sept. 30, 2001, of the EPCA
authorities governing the SPR. On June 27, the House amended and lengthened the extension
to the end of FY2003. The House also added other provisions previously passed by the
House in H.R. 2884, including provisions for the establishment of a Northeastern home
heating oil reserve, and for the purchase of stripper well oil for the SPR in the event of a
future sharp and prolonged plunge in oil prices. These provisions were all subsequently
dropped from the Energy and Water Appropriations. After the hold was lifted on H.R. 2884,
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the Senate passed an amended version on October 19, 2000, including more extensive
language governing drawdown of the regional reserve. The House approved the Senate
version on October 24, 2000, and the bill was signed into public law (P.L. 101-469) by the
President on November 9, 2000.
The Drawdown Authorities
The Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA) authorizes drawdown of the Reserve
upon a finding by the President that there is a “severe energy supply interruption.” Quoting
the statute, this is deemed to exist if three conditions are joined: If “(A) an emergency
situation exists and there is a significant reduction in supply which is of significant scope and
duration; (b) a severe increase in the price of petroleum products has resulted from such
emergency situation; and (c) such price increase is likely to cause a major adverse impact on
the national economy.” 1
Congress enacted additional drawdown authority in 1990 (Energy Policy and
Conservation Act Amendments of 1990, P.L. 101-383) after the Exxon Valdez oil spill, which
interrupted the shipment of Alaskan oil, triggering spot shortages and price increases. The
intention was to provide for an SPR drawdown under a less rigorous finding. This section,
42 U.S.C. § 6241(h), would allow the President to use the SPR for a short period without
having to declare the existence of a “severe energy supply interruption” or the need to meet
obligations of the United States under the international energy program. Under this provision,
a drawdown may be initiated in the event of a circumstance that “constitutes, or is likely to
become, a domestic or international energy supply shortage of significant scope or duration”
and where “action taken ... would assist directly and significantly in preventing or reducing
the adverse impact of such shortage.” This authority allows for a limited use of the SPR. No
more than 30 million barrels may be sold over a maximum period of 60 days, and this limited
authority may not be exercised at all if the level of the SPR is below 500 million barrels.
Though this authority has never been formally used, it may have been the model for the swap
ordered by President Clinton on September 22, 2000. The House and Senate passed differing
versions of H.R. 2884, extending the EPCA authorities governing the SPR, and agreement
was not reached until the final days of the 106th Congress. During the roughly 7 months that
no formal authorities were in place, the Administration’s position was that the existence of
an annual appropriation for the SPR conveys Congress’ intention to maintain the SPR
irrespective of whether or not the statutes have lapsed. The existence of legislative proposals
in both the House and Senate to fund the SPR in FY2001 and to reauthorize the program
were also interpreted by DOE counsel as further evidence of Congress’ intention toward the
SPR.
Purchases of Crude Oil
With the expiration in the late 1980s of the most recent agreement with Petroleos
Mexicanos (PEMEX), the Defense Fuels Supply Center resumed making purchases for the
SPR on behalf of DOE from the spot market until fill was suspended for a second time after
FY1994.
1 Sec. 42 § 6241(d)(2).
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Until the late 1990s, replenishing or resuming fill of the SPR was clearly not on the
congressional or Administration agenda. Alternative approaches to direct purchase of oil for
the Reserve were studied and debated during the 1980s. Most alternatives had distinct
disadvantages or risks. Among the options examined at length were the sale of oil-
denominated bonds with the revenues applied to oil purchases; imposition of SPR-dedicated
fees on gasoline or oil imports; and sale of the Naval Petroleum Reserve (NPR) or dedication
of NPR revenues to SPR purchases. The only option examined thought to have the same
advantages as direct purchases was oil leasing.
In the 102nd Congress, omnibus energy legislation in the House (H.R. 776) included a
provision that would have required that refiners of domestic and imported oil be assessed 1%
of their domestic and imported crude, and imported product purchases or cash equivalent, to
provide 150,000 b/d for the SPR. The Administration and the industry were opposed to this
approach, arguing that a set-aside would be the equivalent of a tax and that it would be borne
disproportionately by certain companies. The contentious set-aside language was struck on
the House floor, and a similar provision in the Senate was defeated during committee markup.
From 1995 until the latter part of 1998, sales of SPR oil, not acquisition, were at the
center of debate. However, reduction and elimination of the annual deficit and the precipitous
drop in crude oil prices into early 1999 generated new interest in replenishing the SPR, either
to further energy security objectives or as a means of providing price support to domestic
producers who are struggling to keep higher-cost, marginal production in service. As an
initiative to help domestic producers, Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson requested that the
Office of Management and Budget (OMB) include $100 million in the FY2000 budget request
for oil purchases. The proposal was rejected, but legislation was introduced in the 106th
Congress that would require the resumption of oil purchases for the SPR as a means of
helping domestic producers (H.R. 490). At the prices prevailing during the winter of 1999-
2000, the issue became, for the moment, moot.
Royalty-In-Kind Acquisition for the SPR
DOE appealed OMB’s decision by suggesting as an alternative that a portion of the
royalties to the government from oil leases in the Gulf of Mexico be accepted “in kind” rather
than as revenues. The Department of Interior (DOI) was reported to be unfavorably disposed
to the royalty-in-kind (RIK) proposal, but a plan to proceed with such an arrangement was
announced on February 11, 1999. (Legislation had also been introduced — H.R. 498 — in
the 106th Congress to direct the Minerals Management Service to accept royalty-in-kind oil.)
Producers have favored institution of such a program because they maintain the current
system for valuation of oil at the wellhead is complex and flawed.
Final details were worked out during the late winter of 1999. The ultimate intention was
to replace the 28 million barrels that were sold in recent years; it would take about 10 months
to replenish this volume at the anticipated rate of roughly 100,000 b/d. At its inception, the
RIK plan was greeted as a well-intended and helpful first step. However, the Secretary of
Energy indicated on January 26, 2000, that he would renegotiate delivery of 5 million barrels
of RIK oil while the Northeast coped with cold weather and a significant spike in home
heating oil prices.
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In late September 1998, the Big Hill site was activated as a foreign trade subzone, which
would enable foreign countries to store surplus production in the Reserve without paying
customs fees and taxes, but there have been no developments in this regard. It has also been
periodically suggested that it be U.S. policy to purchase domestic oil for the SPR as a means
of keeping marginal wells in production. The version of the SPR reauthorization enacted by
the 106th Congress (H.R. 2884) included an amendment authorizing purchase of oil from U.S.
wells producing 15 barrels or less (25 or less if there is a high water content to the recovered
oil) in the event that the price of crude falls to $15/bbl or below.
Table 1 summarizes the number of sources that provided oil for the Reserve from the
program’s inception until the end of 1995. Following the test sale and actual drawdown of
SPR oil during the Persian Gulf War, the SPR’s holdings declined to 568.5 million barrels.
Purchases restored the reserve to nearly 591.6 million barrels before they were suspended.
Currently, the SPR holds 571.4 million barrels.
Table 1. The Strategic Petroleum Reserve:
Crude Oil Received Through 1995
Source
Net Contract/Quantity
Percent of Total/%
Mexico
256.7
41.9
North Sea (U.K.)
147.3
24.0
United States
48.1
7.8
Saudi Arabia
27.1
4.4
Libya
23.7
3.9
Iran
20.0
3.3
UAE
18.4
3.0
Nigeria
15.1
2.5
Norway
11.9
1.9
Oman
9.0
1.5
Egypt
8.9
1.5
Ecuador
6.2
1.0
Algeria
6.2
1.0
Cameroon
3.4
0.6
Iraq
3.4
0.6
Gabon
2.4
0.4
Qatar
2.3
0.4
Angola
1.0
0.2
Venezuela
0.9
0.1
Peru
0.4
0.1
Argentina
0.4
0.1
Total Receipts
612.8
100.0
Source: U.S. Department of Energy
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Drawdown of the Reserve
Drawdown Capability
The resources of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve are of little value unless DOE can
remove, transport, and sell the oil expeditiously and in significant volume during a supply
emergency. SPR drawdown and distribution capability was designed to be 4.3 million barrels
per day (mbd), sustainable for 90 days. However, owing to the decommissioning of the
Weeks Island storage site (completed during FY1999) the drawdown capability for the SPR
would be roughly 4.1 million barrels daily during the first 90 days.
Fears were expressed periodically during the 1980s whether the facilities for
withdrawing oil from the Reserve were in proper readiness; the absence of problems during
the first real drawdown in early 1991, during the Persian Gulf War, appears to have allayed
much of that concern. However, some SPR facilities and infrastructure were beginning to
reach the end of their operational life. A Life Extension Program, initiated in 1993 and now
completed, upgraded or replaced all major systems to ensure the SPR’s readiness to 2025.
Concern has also been periodically raised about whether the SPR would be able to
provide meaningful relief to Hawaii. Reauthorization legislation enacted late in the 105th
Congress (P.L. 105-388) included new provisions that would allow companies servicing
Hawaii to enter into a binding agreement for purchase of SPR oil during a drawdown. The
state would be assured some quantity of oil at a price that would be an average of all
successful bids. The volume sold to Hawaii in this manner could be subject to certain limits.
Debate Over When to Use the Reserve
A debate during the 1980s over when, and for what purpose, to initiate a drawdown of
SPR oil reflected the significant shifts that were taking place in the operation of oil markets
after the experiences of the 1970s, and deregulation of oil price and supply. Sales of SPR oil
authorized by the 104th Congress — and in committee in the 105th — renewed the debate
for a time. The intended use of the SPR has become an issue again, beginning with the rise
in home heating prices during the winter of 1999-2000.
The SPR Drawdown Plan, submitted by the Reagan Administration in late 1982,
provided for price-competitive sale of SPR oil. The plan rejected the idea of conditioning a
decision to distribute SPR oil on any “trigger” or formula. To do so, the Administration
argued, would discourage private sector initiatives for preparedness or investment in
contingency inventories. Many analysts, in and out of Congress, agreed with the
Administration that reliance upon the marketplace during the shortages of 1973 and 1979
would probably have been less disruptive than the price and allocation regulations that were
imposed. But many argued that the SPR should be used to moderate the price effects that
can be triggered by even small shortages (like those of the 1970s or the tight inventories
experienced during the spring of 1996) and lack of confidence in supply availability. Early
drawdown of the SPR, some argued, was essential to achieve these desirable objectives.
The Reagan Administration revised its position in January 1984, announcing that the
SPR would be drawn upon early in a disruption. This new policy was hailed as a significant
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departure, easing considerably congressional discontent over the Administration’s
preparedness policy, but it also had international implications. Some analysts began to stress
the importance of coordinating stock drawdowns worldwide during an emergency lest stocks
drawn down by one nation merely transfer into the stocks of another, and defeat the
price-stabilizing objectives of a stock drawdown. In July 1984, responding to pressure from
the United States, the International Energy Agency (IEA) agreed “in principle” to an early
drawdown, reserving decisions on “timing, magnitude, rate and duration of an appropriate
stockdraw” until a specific situation needed to be addressed.
This debate was revisited in the aftermath of the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait on August 2,
1990. The escalation of gasoline prices and the prospect that there might be a worldwide
crude shortfall approaching 4.5-5.0 million barrels daily prompted some to call for drawdown
of the SPR. The debate focused on whether SPR oil should be used to moderate anticipated
price increases, before oil supply problems had become physically evident.
In the days immediately following the Iraqi invasion of Kuwait, the Bush Administration
indicated that it would not draw down the SPR in the absence of a physical shortage simply
to lower prices. On the other hand, some argued that a perceived shortage does as much and
more immediate damage than a real one, and that flooding the market with stockpiled oil to
calm markets is a desirable end in itself. From this perspective, the best opportunity to use
the SPR during the first months of the crisis was squandered. It became clear during the fall
of 1990 that, in a decontrolled market, physical shortages are less likely to occur. Instead,
shortages are likely to be expressed in the form of higher prices as purchasers are free to bid
as high as they wish to secure scarce supply.
Within hours of the first air strike against Iraq in January 1991, the White House
announced that President Bush was authorizing a drawdown of the SPR, and the IEA
activated the plan on January 17. Crude prices plummeted by nearly $10/barrel (bbl) in the
next day’s trading, falling below $20/bbl for the first time since the original invasion. The
price drop was attributed to optimistic reports about the allied forces crippling of Iraqi air
power and the diminished likelihood, despite the outbreak of war, of further jeopardy to
world oil supply; the IEA plan and the SPR drawdown did not appear to be needed to help
settle markets, and there was some criticism of it. Nonetheless, more than 30 million barrels
of SPR oil was put out to bid, and 17.3 million barrels were sold and delivered in early 1991.
The Persian Gulf War was an important learning experience about ways in which the
SPR might be deployed to maximize its usefulness in decontrolled markets. Legislation
enacted by the 101st Congress, P.L. 101-383, had liberalized drawdown authority for the
SPR to allow for its use to prevent minor or regional shortages from escalating into larger
ones; an example was the shortages on the West Coast and price jump that followed the
Alaskan oil spill of March 1989. In the 102nd Congress, omnibus energy legislation (H.R.
776, P.L. 102-486) broadened the drawdown authority further to include instances where a
reduction in supply appeared sufficiently severe to bring about an increase in the price of
petroleum “severe” enough to “likely . . . cause a major adverse impact on the national
economy.”
A new dimension of SPR drawdown and sale was introduced by the Clinton
Administration’s proposal in its FY1996 budget to sell 7 million barrels to help finance the
SPR program. While agreeing that a sale of slightly more than 1% of SPR oil was not about
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to cripple U.S. emergency preparedness, some in the Congress vigorously opposed the idea,
in part because it might establish a precedent that would bring about additional sales of SPR
oil for purely budgetary reasons, as did indeed occur. There were three sales of SPR oil
during FY1996. The first was to pay for the decommissioning of the Weeks Island site. The
second was for the purpose of reducing the federal budget deficit, and the third was to offset
FY1997 appropriations. The total quantity of SPR sold was 28.1 million barrels, and the
revenues raised were $544.7 million.
Calls for a Drawdown: Home Heating Oil, Winter 1999-2000
At the start of 2000, the budget was no longer the argument for a sale of SPR oil. Some
now argued that the leap in home heating oil prices from the winter of 1998-1999 to the
winter of 1999-2000 was a rationale for drawing down the SPR. As the price increases
generalized to diesel fuel and gasoline, the calls for an SPR drawdown began to multiply.
Oil prices began making a sharp recovery in the late winter of 1999, rising from the low
teens at the beginning of the year to more than $22/bbl by the early fall and crossed $30/bbl
in mid-February 2000. A major cause was production cuts settled upon in March 1999 by
Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and other major oil-exporting
nations. On September 21,1999, warning of high home heating oil prices in the winter in the
Northeast, Senator Charles Schumer made the first of several requests to Secretary of Energy
Richardson to authorize a drawdown from the SPR to blunt price increases.
At issue during the winter of 1999-2000 was whether the price for home heating oil had
reached a level severe enough to stir a shift in policy governing SPR use – and whether the
SPR could be any sort of remedy. Though the price of heating oil and other petroleum
products is inextricably tied to oil supply, policy governing SPR use has generally been that
SPR oil is to be used primarily to ameliorate oil supply shortages and their consequences
(including higher prices), but not to be used to explicitly regulate prices.
Additionally, some argued that a drawdown of the SPR would not alleviate the problem.
The Administration’s contention was that high prices were the consequence of a number of
temporary factors that could not be resolved any faster by intervention. This was because the
tight supply of home heating oil in the Northeast was due in part to idle refinery capacity and
refiners’ drawdown of stocks during recent months while crude prices were escalating.
Refiners preferred to use lower-cost inventory rather than purchasing higher-priced crude.
Prolonged freezing temperatures also have made certain ports less accessible, adding to
distribution problems. The Administration argued that the high prices prevailing would
encourage increased production of home heating oil, a shift of refined product stocks to the
Northeast, and additional product imports that would arrive in due course. Though it would
take some weeks for these effects to take hold, the argument was that these developments
would alleviate the supply problem long before a drawdown from the SPR could help. In the
meantime, some governors requested and received additional funds from LIHEAP, the
Low-Income Home Energy Assistance Program administered by the Department of Health
and Human Services.
As gasoline and diesel fuel prices began to increase in the late winter of 2000, the calls
for an SPR drawdown began to come from sections of the country other than the Northeast.
The Administration continued to oppose a drawdown, investing its efforts instead in a
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number of trips by Secretary Richardson to the Middle East and elsewhere to talk with OPEC
oil ministers, and the oil ministers of other oil-exporting nations. Following OPEC’s
commitment on March 28, 2000, to boost production, crude price began to decline to the
mid-twenties. The pressure for an SPR drawdown had subsided by the first week of April
2000; however, it resumed in June when gasoline prices began to reach and breach
$2.00/gallon in the Midwest.
September 2000: A Swap Is Announced
As the summer of 2000 ended, crude oil prices continued to escalate despite boosts in
production by the OPEC cartel. Stocks of home heating oil had been at historic lows, and
concern was growing about the fresh pressure that escalating crude prices, colder weather,
and anticipated refinery maintenance might have on home heating price and supply during the
winter. On September 22, 2000, the President announced a swap of 30 million barrels of oil
from the SPR, and contracts were awarded on October 4. Interested parties bid to borrow
quantities of not less than 1 million barrels. Contracts were awarded on the basis of how
much oil bidders offered to return to the SPR between August 1 and November 30, 2001.
In effect, bidders based their offers on their best models of what it would cost them to acquire
replacement crude, weighed against the benefit to them of having additional supply at the
beginning of this winter. Although there were reports that interest in the swap was thin, this
proved not to be the case. DOE awarded 24 million barrels of sweet crude, and 6 million
barrels of sour. Under the contracts accepted by DOE, a total of 31.5 million barrels would
be returned to the SPR in 2001.
Over the course of the days between announcement of the swap, to the day after the
awards were made, crude prices softened from $37 to less than $31/bbl. How much of this
was attributable to the swap, or whether, absent the escalation in Middle East tensions during
the week of October 9, 2000, the decrease would have been maintained, is arguable. It may
have been that U.S. willingness to use the SPR temporarily took the wind out of a speculative
element in the futures market. Some argued that the Administration announcement was a
calculated political gesture to affect price, that the circumstances did not merit a drawdown
of SPR oil, and that adding crude to the market would do little to boost home heating oil
supply because refineries are operating at near capacity. Others contended that there was a
legitimate need to call upon SPR supply, that it would increase supply and exert some
stabilizing influence.
The preponderant risk in the transaction appears to be borne by the oil companies or
refiners who place bids. The volume a refiner has promised to return, and the price at the time
the refiner acquired the replacement crude will clearly impact the refiner’s effective return on
participating in the swap. However, in the absence of congressional appropriations to acquire
oil for the SPR in recent years, the Reserve receives under the swap a net acquisition that it
would not have otherwise had. In that sense, it is not especially material whether or not the
quantity of oil returned to the SPR is at price parity with the quantity originally borrowed
Criticism of the swap was renewed when three bidders awarded a total of 10 million
barrels of sweet crude were having difficulties securing letters of credit. Two were unable
to meet the deadline; on October 14, DOE awarded the 7 million barrels they controlled to
three firms who had been successful bidders in the initial solicitation.
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The peculiar circumstances surrounding some of the original bidders spurred fresh
criticism and congressional hearings into the swap, as did reports that higher prices for home
heating oil in Europe were likely to draw product refined from the SPR crude to overseas
market. Senator Murkowski, Chairman of the Senate Energy Committee, issued a press
release on October 6 underscoring the irony that oil from the U.S. SPR might relieve
European, rather than domestic markets. While it can be argued that, in a world market, it
does not greatly matter where the product goes, a principal issue here appears to be the
reluctance among some European nations to draw upon their own strategic stocks. Officials
in Spain and France called for a coordinated stock drawdown by the European Union in light
of the U.S. action, but opinion was divided among the membership, and it was supposed that
countries more receptive to such a drawdown would be disinclined to act independently. An
advantage of a European drawdown is that these stocks are held in the form of refined
products, as well as crude, and would reach product markets faster. European Union
distillate stocks are reported to cover 100 days’ demand.2 On October 16, Secretary of
Energy Richardson indicated that several domestic refiners had agreed to temporarily cease
exporting home heating oil.
Establishment of a Regional Home Heating Oil Reserve
While a number of factors contributed to the virtual doubling in some Northeastern
locales of home heating oil prices during the winter of 1999-2000, one that drew the
particular attention of lawmakers was the sharply lower level of middle distillate stocks going
into the winter of 1999-2000. It renewed interest in establishment of a regional reserve of
home heating oil. The Energy Policy and Conservation Act (EPCA, P.L. 94-163) includes
authority for the Secretary of Energy to establish regional reserves as part of the broader
Strategic Petroleum Reserve (SPR); however, the actual SPR Plan originally presented to
Congress in 1977 did not provide specifically for a regional reserve. Legislation was
introduced in both the House and Senate (S. 2047, H.R. 3608) to establish a regional reserve.
On April 12, 2000, the House included in SPR reauthorization legislation (H.R. 2884)
language to establish a 2.0 million barrel home heating oil reserve in the Northeast. Within
45 days of enactment, the Secretary would transmit to Congress a plan detailing how the
Reserve would be developed. The legislation extends latitude to the Secretary of Energy to
acquire storage capacity and refined product by purchase, contract, exchange or lease. Home
heating oil from the Reserve could be released in the event of a severe supply disruption, a
“severe” price increase, or “another emergency affecting the Northeast.” The same language
was also included by the House in its version of the FY2001 Energy and Water
Appropriations (H.R. 4733).
President Clinton endorsed establishment of a regional reserve in his radio address on
April 18, 2000, but requested that Congress specifically authorize such a reserve for the
Northeast. When the House and Senate had not resolved their differences over SPR
reauthorization, the Administration announced on July 10, 2000, its intention to proceed with
establishment of a regional home heating oil reserve on an interim basis after DOE’s General
Counsel made the determination that congressional enactment of FY2001 appropriations for
2See: “Euro SPR Release Would Be Tricky But Effective,” appearing in Petroleum Intelligence
Weekly, Vol. XXXIX, No. 40, Oct. 2, 2000: p. 1-2.
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the SPR was sufficient authority to proceed. The Administration also submitted to Congress
an amendment to the Strategic Petroleum Reserve Plan that would give the regional reserve
permanent status. The proposed amendment provided for a regional distillate reserve, not to
exceed two million barrels. On July 18, 2000, the Senate amended H.R. 4578, the FY2001
Interior Appropriations, to provide $4 million for funding the regional reserve. The conferees
provided $8 million, including a transfer of $4 million in unexpended funds from the SPR
Petroleum Acquisition account. The House approved the conference report on October 4,
2000 (348-69), and the President signed it into public law (P.L. 106-291).
DOE invited bids for the provision of storage and distillate. Crude oil from the SPR will
be provided in exchange for the product and facilities. On August 20, DOE announced that
the regional reserve would be situated at three sites: [1] Equiva Trading would provide
500,000 barrels of storage at a terminal in New Haven, Connecticut; [2] Morgan Stanley
Capital Group, Inc., would provide an additional 500,000 barrels of storage at its own site
in New Haven; and [3] 1 million barrels would be stored in a Woodbridge, New Jersey,
terminal (considered part of the New York Harbor) operated by Amerada Hess. The
terminals in New Haven can distribute product by tanker, barge, tank truck or connection to
the Buckeye Pipeline. The New Jersey site, near Perth Amboy, distributes heating oil by
barge.
On August 24, 2000, DOE accepted a bid from Equiva to provide 1 million barrels of
distillate to the two sites in New Haven, and on August 29, announced that the remaining 1
million barrels of home heating oil would be provided to the Amerada Hess storage terminal
by Morgan Stanley Capital Group, Inc. The regional reserve was filled by the middle of
October 2000.
The EPCA authorities that govern the Strategic Petroleum Reserve had lapsed on March
31, 2000. Controversy over the regional reserve, and the language that would govern tapping
of the regional reserve, became caught up in differences between the House and Senate over
extension of the EPCA authorities. Opponents of establishing a regional reserve suspected
that the regional reserve might be tapped at times that some consider inappropriate, and that
the potential availability of the reserve could be a disincentive for the private sector to
maintain inventories as aggressively as it would if there were no reserve. One critic of the
proposal, the Petroleum Industry Research Foundation, observing the sharp increase in
product imports that quickly resulted from high prices last winter, predicted that “aggressive
use of a government reserve to hold down prices would hold down the supply response as
well.” However, advocates of the regional reserve pointed out that the experience of the
1999-2000 winter demonstrated how the problems experienced in the Northeast can quickly
generalize into associated increases in the price of other petroleum fuels. They argued that
the benefits from measures that prevent the sort of price increases experienced in home
heating oil ultimately are shared by consumers of diesel fuel and gasoline, too.

An approach that was proposed by Senator Murkowski and included in the Senate
version of H.R. 2884 passed by unanimous consent on October 19, 2000. It predicated
drawdown on a regional supply shortage of “significant scope and duration,” or if – for seven
consecutive days – the price differential between crude oil and home heating oil increases by
more than 60% over its five-year rolling average. The intention was to make the threshold for
use of the regional reserve high enough so that it would not discourage oil marketers and
distributors from stockbuilding. The House approved the Senate version of H.R. 2884 on
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October 24, 2000, and it was signed into law (P.L. 101-469) by the President on November
9, 2000. The regional reserve was officially titled the Northeast Heating Oil Reserve (NHOR).
During mid- and late December 2000, the 60% differential was breached. However, this
was due to a sharp decline in crude prices rather than to a rise in home heating oil prices. In
fact, home heating oil prices were drifting slightly lower during the same reporting period.
As a consequence, while the 60% differential was satisfied, other conditions prerequisite to
authorizing a drawdown of the NHOR were not. Nonetheless, some Democratic members of
Congress were urging President Clinton to initiate a drawdown from the NHOR before
leaving office.
DOE updates a table weekly which shows the various inputs that go into the calculation
to determine the current differential. The latest version may be viewed at
[http://www.fe.doe.gov/spr/heatingoil/heatingoil_salebasis.html]. For additional information
on the NHOR and home heating oil price and supply, readers are also referred to CRS Report
RL30781, U.S. Home Heating Oil Price and Supply During the Winter of 2000-2001: Policy
Options.
The FY2000-2001 Budget
In late 1998, the Secretary of Energy requested an appropriation for FY2000 to
purchase oil to replenish the SPR, but the request was turned down by the Office of
Management and Budget (OMB). The Administration’s request for FY2000 for the SPR,
given its predisposition not to resume oil purchase, was $159 million, little changed from the
FY1999 request; this was the level enacted by Congress for FY2000.
The Administration requested $158 million for FY2001. The House Committee on
Appropriations recommended, and the House approved $157 million in H.R. 4578, the
FY2001 Interior Appropriations, a decrease of nearly $1.4 million below the FY2000
enactment, and $1 million below the Administration request. The Senate Committee on
Appropriations also recommended $157 million, but sought a transfer of $12 million in
unobligated SPR oil purchase funds to oil technology research. On July 18, 2000, the Senate
amended H.R. 4578 to provide $4 million for funding the regional reserve. The conferees
provided $8 million, including a transfer of $4 million in unexpended funds from the SPR
Petroleum Acquisition account, in addition to transferring $12 million in unexpended funds
for oil technology research. The House approved the conference report on October 4, 2000
(348-69), and the President signed the measure into law on October 11 (P.L. 106-291).

LEGISLATION
P.L. 101-469 (H.R. 2884, Bliley)
Energy Policy and Conservation Act Reauthorization. Extends authorities governing
the SPR through FY2003. Introduced September 21, 1999, and referred to Committee on
Commerce. Reported (Amended) by the Committee on Commerce. H.Rept. 106-359,
October 1, 1999. Passed, amended, by the House (416-8) on April 12, 2000. A hold placed
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on the bill in the Senate was lifted, and it passed by unanimous consent October 19, 2000.
Passed by the House October 24, 2000. Signed into law November 9, 2000.

CHRONOLOGY
11/09/00 ---
The President signed legislation (P.L. 101-469, H.R. 2884) reauthorizing the
SPR and permanently establishing a Northeat Heating Oil Reserve (NHOR).
09/22/00 ---
The President authorized a “swap” of 30 million barrels from the SPR.
07/10/00 ---
The Administration initiated establishment of an interim regional home heating
oil reserve, and transmitted to the Congress an amendment to the SPR Plan
that would make the regional reserve permanent..
08/11/99 —
DOE announced that the Weeks Island site had been filled with brine, was
stable geologically, and ready to be turned over to the General Services
Administration for disposition. Of the oil stored in Weeks Island, 98% was
recovered and transferred to other SPR sites.
06/16/99 —
DOE announced four contracts to provide an additional 9.3 million barrels to
the SPR as royalty-in-kind (RIK) for production from federal leases. This
brings the total volume settled upon to date from this program to more than
13 million barrels.
02/11/99 —
Secretary of Energy Bill Richardson announced a plan that would provide 28
million barrels of oil to the SPR at the rate of 100,000 b/d of crude oil as
payment “in-kind” of royalties on federal leases in the Gulf of Mexico.
05/11/98 — The President canceled the FY1998 sale of oil from the SPR.
11/13/96 —
DOE announced that it had accepted another $53.5 million in bids for SPR oil
authorized to be sold during FY1997, raising total sales for the current fiscal
year to $142 million, or roughly two-thirds of the amount authorized by P.L.
104-208.
04/29/96 —
The President ordered the release of 12 million barrels of SPR oil to help blunt
a recent runup in crude and product prices.
03/00/96 —
DOE completed sale of SPR oil authorized to finance emptying and
decommissioning of the Weeks Island site. Owing to higher crude prices, sale
of 5.1 million barrels, at an average price of $18.92/bbl, was sufficient to
generate $96.4 million in revenues.
10/00/94 —
The FY1995 Department of Interior and Related Agencies Appropriations
Act (P.L. 103-332) essentially curtails oil purchases and fill of the SPR for
FY1995, in keeping with the Administration’s budget proposal.
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10/24/92 —
P.L. 102-486 enacted, broadening the circumstances under which the SPR can
be tapped, providing for expansion of the SPR to one billion barrels, and
including further provisions affecting leasing, potential purchases of oil
stripper well production, and requiring a study of how U.S. insular areas
would be accommodated in the event of a disruption.
06/19/92 —
The SPR took delivery of the first oil since fill was suspended in 1990.
05/12/92 —
The Administration announced purchase of one million barrels of North Sea
oil for the SPR at a contract price of $19.78, plus transportation costs. A few
days earlier, arrangements were announced for delivery of 2.4 million barrels
of Naval Petroleum Reserve oil over a 4-month period commencing in June.
02/25/91 —
The Administration announced it was preparing to resume purchase of oil for
the SPR on international spot markets at a rate of 25,000 b/d for three
months.
01/16/91 —
Within hours of the initial air attacks on Iraq, President Bush authorized a
drawdown of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve in support of the plan agreed
to just days earlier by the International Energy Agency.
08/08/90 —
The Administration indicated its willingness to use the SPR in the event of
“any severe supply interruption,” but indicated that any release of SPR crude
will be coordinated with U.S. allies.
08/01/90 —
Iraqi forces invaded Kuwait and met minimal resistance. Acquisition of oil for
the SPR was suspended.
07/11/84 —
The IEA agreed on principle that government-owned or -controlled oil stocks
should be used early during a supply disruption if deemed helpful to calming
nervous oil markets and restraining price increases. The agreement did not
supersede the emergency sharing program already in place, but was intended
to broaden the repertoire of emergency responses that the IEA may consider.
01/24/84 —
Secretary of Energy Donald Hodel testified before the Senate Subcommittee
on Energy, Nuclear Proliferation, and Government Processes of the
Committee on Governmental Affairs that the Administration supported early
use of the Strategic Petroleum Reserve during a petroleum disruption to help
stabilize markets.
05/00/82 —
DOE released a report required by the Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act
of 1981, which concluded that a Reserve larger than 750 million barrels would
not provide net economic benefits to the United States.
06/30/80 —
Congress passed the Energy Security Act requiring that the SPR be filled at
a rate of at least 100,000 b/d for FY1981 beginning October 1, 1980. Fill was
resumed in late September 1980.
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03/00/79 —
Purchase of oil for the SPR was suspended because of the tight international
crude oil market, Saudi objections, and budget considerations.
08/00/77 —
First crude oil pumped into SPR.
12/22/75 —
Energy Policy Conservation Act authorized the Strategic Petroleum Reserve.
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
U.S. Department of Energy. Report to the Congress on Alternative Financing Methods for
the Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Submitted in response to the Strategic Petroleum
Reserve Amendments Act of 1989 (P.L. 101-42). February 1, 1990. Three volumes.
DOE/FE-0155.
—— Assistant Secretary for Fossil Energy. Office of Strategic Petroleum Reserve. Strategic
Petroleum Reserve: Annual Report for Calendar Year 1997. Washington, D.C.
DOE/FE-0358. Available at [http://www.fe.doe.gov/spr/spr_ann.html].
U.S. General Accounting Office. Strategic Petroleum Reserves: Analysis of Alternative
Financing Methods. March 1989. 37 p. GAO/RCED-89-103.
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