Order Code RL30790
CRS Report for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
The Andean Trade Preference Act: Background
and Issues for Reauthorization
January 3, 2001
J. F. Hornbeck
Specialist in International Trade and Finance
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress
The Andean Trade Preference Act: Background and Issues
for Reauthorization
Summary
The Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) was signed into law on December
4, 1991(P.L. 102-182, title II), providing for a 10-year period of duty-free or
reduced-rate treatment of selected U.S. imports from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador,
and Peru. ATPA improves access to U.S. markets of such exports to encourage
economic alternatives to illicit drug activity. ATPA will expire on December 4, 2001,
and the debate over extending ATPA trade preferences may focus on whether it has
met expectations that ATPA-induced export growth can be linked to economic
diversification and decreased drug related activity in the Andean countries without
materially hurting U.S. producers.
Although the trade effects of ATPA have been relatively small, there is some
indication that the composition of trade has changed and that, with a few products,
a case can be made that ATPA has supported this change. It is possible that the
slightly altered composition of U.S. imports from ATPA countries reflects broader
change in what Andean countries are producing and that this in turn points to some
indirect evidence that resources once used for drug-related activity are being
redirected toward ATPA-eligible products. Isolating ATPA’s role from other
counternarcotics and economic diversification programs, however, has been a difficult
challenge, producing imprecise estimates.
Supporters of ATPA argue that its effects are at least indirectly evident and have
proposed at least three program initiatives. First, reauthorize ATPA to reinforce the
U.S. commitment to the alternative development counternarcotics strategy. Second,
extend preferential treatment to other Andean exports to broaden the program effects,
particularly in Colombia, which remains the most problematic country. Third, include
Venezuela as a beneficiary country. The first option may be the least controversial
given there is no broad opposition to ATPA. The second and third propositions may
generate more debate depending on domestic industry responses and on the political
climate surrounding U.S.-Venezuelan relations.
In considering the merits of ATPA, it is important to understand that its benefits
have been shown to be quantitatively small. Because many imports are not eligible
by law for preferential treatment or enter the United States under other preferential
trade arrangements, only 10% of imports from ATPA countries enter the United
States exclusively under the ATPA provisions. This has not changed in recent years,
suggesting that ATPA’s trade effects are likely to remain small, unless the program’s
parameters are modified. Because the trade response is small, so too are ATPA’s
likely effects on the Andean economies.
The ATPA debate will likely also consider more intangible benefits. Supporters
argue that ATPA is an expression of direct U.S. support for the regional
counternarcotics efforts with potentially positive side benefits in the area of economic
development. They also note that it is a less expensive and invasive counter-drug
option compared to the large financial and military commitment of Plan Colombia,
and that it is in concert with U.S. regional trade liberalization interests.
Contents
An Overview of ATPA’s Scope and Impact . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1
U.S.-ATPA Country Trade . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2
Imports from ATPA Countries by Duty Status . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
Imports from ATPA Countries by Product Level . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
ATPA Program Effects: Andean and U.S. Responses . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
ATPA’s Economic Effects on the Andean Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Bolivia and Peru . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7
Colombia and Ecuador . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Coca Eradication and Crop Substitution . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
ATPA’s Economic Effects on the United States . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 8
Changes in Trade Composition . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Consumer Welfare and Tariff Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Producer Welfare Effects . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9
Summary and Conclusions . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 10
Appendix 1. ATPA Program Details . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 13
Appendix 2. U.S.-ATPA Country Merchandise Trade, 1990-1999 . . . . . . . . . 14
List of Figures
Figure 1. U.S. Imports from ATPA Countries by Product Category . . . . . . 3
List of Tables
Table 1. Duty Status of U.S. Imports from ATPA Countries . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
Table 2. Major U.S. Imports Entering Under ATPA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
The Andean Trade Preference Act: Background
and Issues for Reauthorization
Following passage by the 102nd Congress, President George Bush signed into
law the Andean Trade Preference Act (ATPA) on December 4, 1991(P.L. 102-182,
title II), making it part of a multifaceted strategy to counter illicit drug production and
trade in Latin America. For ten years, it has provided preferential, mostly duty-free,
treatment of selected U.S. imports from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru.
ATPA’s goal is to encourage increased exports, thereby promoting development and
providing an incentive for Andean farmers and other workers to pursue economic
alternatives to the drug trade. ATPA expires on December 4, 2001 and the 107th
CRS-2
Congress will likely consider reauthorizing it given increasing congressional interest
in regional counternarcotics efforts1 and Andean country preference for its extension.
An Overview of ATPA’s Scope and Impact
ATPA was created as part of a broader Andean initiative to address the growing
drug trade from Latin America. It provides zero or reduced tariffs on certain U.S.
imports from Bolivia, Colombia, Ecuador, and Peru (see Appendix 1 for program
details) to complement crop eradication, interdiction, military training, and other
counternarcotics efforts. In 1992, when the program was implemented, supporters
expected that ATPA-induced export growth would encourage economic alternatives
to coca production and other drug-related activity, with one estimate projecting as
much as a three-fold increase in U.S. imports from ATPA countries over a decade.2
One indication of ATPA’s success would be some evidence of a decline in drug
activity that could be linked to the expansion of ATPA supported industries. Indeed,
there has been some movement on the drug front. For example, total coca cultivation
has fallen by 11% from 1991 to 1999. This represents significant declines in Bolivia
(55%) and Peru (68%), but an offsetting large increase in Colombia (227%). Little
coca is grown in Ecuador.3 Determining the role of ATPA tariff preferences in this
trend, however, presents a difficult challenge because their effects must be isolated
from other counternarcotics and economic development efforts.
Studies by the U.S. International Trade Commission (USITC) of ATPA’s trade
effects suggest that overall the program has had a positive, but small influence on the
volume and composition of U.S. imports from ATPA countries. For example,
although total U.S. imports from ATPA countries on a dollar-value basis have grown
85% through the decade 1990-99, this is much less than some had hoped for and
represents no growth of ATPA imports relative to U.S. import growth worldwide.
Further, the composition of U.S. imports from Andean countries has changed only
slightly in favor of products that are ATPA eligible. This suggests that there has been
no major change in the production structure of ATPA economies, particularly in the
biggest ATPA beneficiary, Colombia, which has actually experienced a large increase
in coca production in the 1990s.
1 For example, the 106th Congress approved a $1.3 billion supplemental appropriation for the
“Plan Colombia” (P.L. 106-246). This initiative provides equipment and training for two new
counternarcotics battalions along with regional aid for coca crop eradication, economic
development, and judicial institution improvements. See: CRS Report RL30541. Colombia:
U.S. Assistance and Current Legislation, by Nina M. Serafino.
2 For more on early expectations, see: CRS Report 92-172 F, The Andean Drug Initiative:
Background and Issues for Congress, by Raphael F. Perl. February 13, 1992, p. 3.
3 United States Department of State. Bureau for International Narcotics and Law
Enforcement Affairs. International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR). March
2000. pp. II-8, II-11, II-21, IV-7, and IV-21.
CRS-3
One of the most telling indicators of ATPA’s limited influence is that U.S.
imports given preferential treatment exclusively under ATPA represent only 10% of
total imports from the four eligible countries.4 This represents a small percentage of
trade and has not grown thus far in the life of the program. Without legislative
change to the ATPA program, a larger response may be limited in the short run by the
Andean export sector’s dependence on a limited number of natural-resource based
products and simple manufactures, ATPA’s program exclusion of many major Andean
products (e.g. petroleum products, textiles, certain leather goods), and the fact that
many products are already eligible for duty-free or preferential treatment under other
trade arrangements.
In short, as detailed below, although there may have been a positive response to
the ATPA preferential tariff provisions, the overall impact has been small and operates
at the margin of Andean trade. Similarly, the tariff preferences have little effect on the
United States economy, suggesting the costs of these preferences is low.
U.S.-ATPA Country Trade
Colombia and Bolivia qualified as ATPA beneficiaries in mid-1992, with Ecuador
and Peru following one year later. Since then, aggregate U.S. trade with ATPA
countries has remained small and has grown in line with the average for U.S. trade
worldwide. For the decade 1990 to 1999, U.S. exports to ATPA countries rose by
79%, roughly the same as overall export growth (see Appendix 2 for aggregate trade
data.) On a relative basis, U.S. exports to ATPA countries have remained largely
unchanged at approximately 1% of total exports to the world, although there was a
slight increase in the mid-1990s. U.S. imports from ATPA countries, although rising
4 U.S. International Trade Commission. Andean Trade Preference Act: Impact on U.S.
Industries and Consumers and on Drug Crop Eradication and Crop Substitution. Seventh
Report 1999. Publication No. 3358, September 2000. p. 34.
CRS-4
by 85% in dollar terms from 1990 to 1999, also remained relatively unchanged at
approximately 1% of total U.S. world imports throughout the decade.
CRS-5
In addition to trade volume, another indicator of ATPA’s possible effects is
change in the composition of ATPA imports. Figure 1 contrasts the composition of
U.S. imports from ATPA countries between 1994 and 1999. Because 1994 is the first
Figure 1. U.S. Imports from ATPA Countries by Product Category
full year all four countries participated, it provides a base for comparison since it is
unlikely to reflect large changes in the trade composition due to ATPA given that
insufficient time had passed for industries to have responded fully. The year 1999 was
chosen to reflect the most recent annual trade data.5
For 1999, the major U.S. imports (approximately 80% of the ATPA countries
total), by harmonized tariff schedule (HTS) chapter are: HTS 27, mineral fuels (85%
of which is crude oil); HTS 71, precious stones and metals (50% gold); HTS 09,
spices, coffee, and tea (99% coffee); HTS 08, edible fruit and nuts (92% bananas);
HTS 03, fish and seafood (86% crustaceans or shrimp); HTS 61 and 62, apparel (70%
sweaters, shirts, and suits); HTS 06, live plants and trees (99% cut flowers); and HTS
74, copper articles (95% copper cathodes).
A comparison of the two years suggests that on a broad product category basis,
the composition of U.S. imports from eligible countries has changed only marginally
since the ATPA program began. Most notable has been the addition of Peru’s refined
5 Data for 1994 are from the U.S. International Trade Commission. Andean Trade
Preference Act: Impact on U.S. Industries and Consumers and on Drug Crop Eradication
and Crop Substitution. Seventh Report 1999, Publication 2995. September 1996, p. 8. Data
for 1999 originated from the U.S. Department of Commerce as reported in World Trade
Atlas. Because 1999 data are revised, they differ slightly from comparable data shown in the
USITC September 2000 ATPA report.
CRS-6
copper cathode imports, which began in 1995 and are ATPA eligible. Petroleum
products, which are not eligible for ATPA tariff preferences, remain a large portion
of imports, but come predominantly from Colombia. There has been a contrasting
relative decline in seafood and coffee imports.
In general, the minimal change in U.S. import composition reflects three factors.
First, most U.S. imports from ATPA countries are natural-resource based products
(petroleum, gold, fish, coffee, bananas, cut flowers) or simple manufactures (knit
apparel, sweaters, shirts, suits, copper cathodes), many of which are not ATPA
eligible. This trend is likely to continue regardless of ATPA. Second, the continuing
large portion of oil imports on a dollar-value basis in 1999 continues to skew import
figures, reflecting in part the worldwide surge in oil prices. Third, Colombia stands
out as the dominant ATPA trade partner, accounting for 60% of total U.S. imports
from the group in 1999, followed by Peru and Ecuador, both with 19%, and Bolivia
trailing with only 2%.6
Given that the relative size and composition of ATPA imports, variables
expected to reflect the program’s effects, have not changed significantly during the
course of the program, it appears that little trade effect can be attributed to the ATPA
provisions. A closer look at the trade data at the sectoral level supports this
conclusion until the data are further disaggregated by duty treatment and product
type. These trends are in keeping with economic reasoning that would suggest a
program such as ATPA would not affect the overall structure of trade, but might alter
the composition of ATPA imports at the margin and within very specific product
categories.
Imports from ATPA Countries by Duty Status
To determine which products are benefitting from ATPA, it is necessary to
ascertain what portion would have entered duty-free exclusively because of their
ATPA eligibility. Many imports qualify unconditionally as duty-free under general
tariff rates (e.g. coffee) or through other favorable tariff arrangements such as the
GSP or production sharing provisions and can enter under more than one of these
arrangements. For example, some products eligible to enter under GSP come in
under ATPA. As shown in table 1, when these products are subtracted, it turns out
that imports eligible exclusively for ATPA preferences represented only 10% of total
imports from the ATPA countries.7 The table contrasts selected Andean country
import data in 1995 and 1999 to reflect changes that may have occurred during a time
when the ATPA program was in full force. Duty-free imports rose from 59% of total
imports in 1995 to 66% in 1999, but because the ATPA-only category is unchanged,
the increase appears due entirely to non-ATPA trade arrangements (general rates,
GSP, production-sharing arrangements, or other smaller programs).
6 U.S. International Trade Commission, Andean Trade Preference Act, September 2000, p.
14.
7 Estimates by USITC, ibid, p. 34. It is noted that the 10% figure was higher during the mid-
1990s when the GSP program lapsed on a few occasions, causing greater reliance on the
ATPA provisions.
CRS-7
Table 1. Duty Status of U.S. Imports from ATPA Countries
(1995 and 1999 in $ millions)
Duty Status
Bolivia
Colombia
Ecuador
Peru
Total
% of
Total
1995 Total
256.8
3,807.4
1,929.2
965.4
6,958.7
100%
Imports:
Dutiable
19.0
1,717.0
756.6
360.5
2,853.1
41%
Duty-Free
237.8
2,090.4
1,172.7
604.7
4,105.6
59%
(ATPA only)*
na
na
na
na
699.0
10%
(Other Duty-
na
na
na
na
3,406.6
49%
Free)**
1999 Total
216.8
5,476.2
1,798.6
1,781.8
9,273.6
100%
Imports:
Dutiable
40.1
2,059.3
587.8
450.6
3,137.8
34%
Duty-Free
176.7
3,417.1
1,210.8
1,331.2
6,135.8
66%
(ATPA only)*
na
na
na
na
939.0
10%
(Other Duty-
na
na
na
na
5,196.8
56%
Free)**
na = not available, per discussion with USITC.
* Includes value of both duty-free and reduced-duty ATPA imports. Reduced-duty imports
amounted to only 0.3% of total imports from ATPA countries in both years and so are not shown
separately.
** Includes all other imports that entered the United States duty-free: 1) under general rates; 2)
under non-ATPA programs (e.g. GSP or production sharing provisions) and/or; 3) under ATPA,
but eligible to enter duty free under another program.
Data source: U.S. International Trade Commission. Andean Trade Preference Act: Impact on
U.S. Industries and Consumers and on Drug Crop Eradication and Crop Substitution.
Publication No. 3358, September 2000. pp. 17 and 34.
The 10% figure is important because it shows first that the amount of imports
entering duty-free exclusively under ATPA is a small portion of trade and second that,
over the life of the program, ATPA-eligible imports as a group have not grown any
faster than U.S. imports from the four Andean countries as a whole. This is unlikely
to change in the short run without legislative action given that many imports already
enter the United States duty free, other big items, such as petroleum and textile
products, are not eligible for duty-free treatment, and economic diversification into
new (ATPA-eligible) areas is a slow process.
Imports from ATPA Countries by Product Level
The major products entering the United States under ATPA appear in table 2
in descending order of importance. Between 1995 and 1999, cut flowers, most of
which come from Colombia, were the largest import item. Copper cathodes from
Peru grew to become the second largest ATPA import, rising in 1999 to nearly 19%
of the total on a dollar-value basis. Precious metals, mostly jewelry and gold products
from Peru, are the third largest import group, comprising some 11% of the total.
Colombian pigments (9%), Ecuadoran non-canned tuna (5%), and Peruvian zinc (5%)
round out the major ATPA imports.
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Table 2. Major U.S. Imports Entering Under ATPA
(1995 and 1999, in percent)
HTS*
Article
% 1995
% 1999
Beneficiary Country
06
Live Plants (cut flowers)
39.6
25.0
Colombia - 80%
Ecuador - 20%
74
Copper articles (cathodes)
2.9
18.9
Peru - 100%
71
Precious metals
18.9
10.7
Peru - 70%
(jewelry/gold products)
Bolivia - 30%
32
Pigments
0.3
9.3
Colombia - 100%
16
Tuna (non-canned)
4.2
5.0
Ecuador - 99%
Colombia - 1%
79
Zinc
0.8
4.8
Peru - 100%
Other
33.3
26.3
Total
100.0
100.0
* HTS = harmonized tariff schedule chapter.
Data source: USITC, Andean Trade Preference Act, September 2000, pp. 16-24, D-3.
The composition of ATPA imports has changed some over the life of the
program, but not in clearly predictable ways. Cut flowers, for example, which remain
the largest U.S. import item on a dollar basis, have actually fallen from nearly 40% to
25% of total ATPA imports, reflecting falling demand in the United States for cut
flowers and growth in other ATPA imports such as copper cathodes and pigments,
which represent new U.S. imports since the ATPA the program began. Although
there has been a large increase in zinc products coming in under ATPA, this growth
is partially due to a shift in duty treatment of zinc products, which previously entered
the United States duty-free under the GSP provisions.8
On a country basis, the benefits of ATPA fall generally in line with the overall
trade importance of the individual countries. In 1999, Colombia and Peru benefitted
the most, accounting respectively for 45% and 36% of the dollar value of ATPA
imports. Colombia’s percentage has actually fallen slightly since 1995, reflecting the
decline in cut flower imports, which has been somewhat compensated by an increase
in U.S. imports of pigments. Peru is the fastest growing exporter under ATPA,
reflecting its new copper cathode manufacturing industry. Ecuador accounted for
15% of ATPA imports in 1999, followed by Bolivia with only 4%. Ecuador accounts
for most of the tuna imports and a small portion of cut flowers. Bolivia exports
mostly gold jewelry items, which is the only major ATPA item it produces.9
Overall, the ATPA trade effects appear to be relatively small. Nonetheless, at
the product level there has been some indication of a change in trade composition
with new products coming on line, at least in part to take advantage of ATPA’s duty-
free provisions. This reflects some level of Andean economic diversification, but not
8 Ibid., pp. 23-24.
9 Ibid., pp. 24-26, D-3. Bolivia also exports small amounts of wood products under ATPA.
CRS-9
a net growth in the amount of Andean exports eligible under ATPA on a relative
basis. Given that total imports eligible exclusively under ATPA have remained at
10% of total U.S. imports from these countries, it appears that gains in some
industries or products have been offset by declines in others.
ATPA Program Effects: Andean and U.S. Responses
An evaluation of ATPA should indicate how any changes in trade patterns are
affecting the economies of the Andean countries and the United States. Two studies
required by the ATPA legislation tackle these questions. First, the U.S. International
Trade Commission ATPA report evaluates both the Andean and U.S. responses to
ATPA. The U.S. Department of Labor produces a separate targeted evaluation of
ATPA’s effects on U.S. workers. Both point to the marginal effects of ATPA on the
economies of participating countries and the United States.
ATPA’s Economic Effects on the Andean Countries
Although the trade effects of ATPA have been relatively small, there is some
indication that the composition of trade has changed and that, with a few products,
a case can be made that ATPA has contributed to this change. It is possible that the
altered composition of U.S. imports from ATPA countries reflects broader change in
what Andean countries are producing and that this in turn points to some indirect
evidence that ATPA-eligible products are being substituted for illicit coca.10
It is difficult to gauge the effects of ATPA on national economies because the
program has a small effect relative to other variables. National macroeconomic
policies, particularly in countries in the Andean region that have undergone
considerable economic reform over the past decade, have a much larger effect on
economic decisions and trends. Domestic Andean government policies also support
crop substitution, the effects of which are not easily distinguishable from those of
ATPA. In effect, they work together. External shocks to the region’s economies,
such as repeated El Ninos and other natural phenomena, have devastating effects on
the agricultural sector that easily overshadow incremental policy shifts like ATPA.
Isolating the marginal effects of ATPA, therefore, is an imprecise exercise.11
Bolivia and Peru. In its 2000 report, the USITC used Bolivia and Peru as case
studies to explore the possibility of a link between ATPA program effects and changes
in economic production. Bolivia showed some diversification in exports to the United
States that coincided with ATPA. In the mid-1990s, there was a marked expansion
of jewelry and, to a lesser extent, leather and wood product exports that may be
related to ATPA, but other domestic policy changes (e.g. the tax code) also affected
10 The USITC also points out that the benefits of ATPA to eligible countries is declining as
the “margin of preference” declines for various reasons, such as the continuing phase-in of
other trade agreement tariff rate cuts from the Uruguay Round, as well as sectoral and
regional agreements. For details, see: ibid., pp. 33.
11 Ibid., pp. 53 and 55.
CRS-10
production incentives for these goods. After 1996, however, this export growth trend
slowed. In Peru, a broader array of export growth was discernible over the past
decade, with a noticeable increase in copper cathodes and agricultural products,
especially asparagus, all of which benefit from ATPA. Asparagus also stands out
because it is grown near traditional coca cultivation areas and is presumed to be an
alternative cash crop, at least in part encouraged by ATPA provisions.12
Colombia and Ecuador. In its 1999 report, the USITC evaluated ATPA’s
impact on Colombia and Ecuador. Of the ATPA-eligible products from Colombia
over the past decade, cut flowers have increased the most as a proportion of U.S.
imports, but overall, the composition of Colombia’s exports to the United States has
not changed dramatically since ATPA began, in part because of the dominance of
petroleum. Other nontraditional products, such as asparagus, do present some
potential for increased benefits from ATPA, but overall its benefits are considered
small. Ecuador has a similar profile, with little change in the composition of exports
to the United States, but some credit significant increases in the production of cut
flowers and seafood, both of which benefit from ATPA, with encouraging export
diversification. The overall effect is still small given the myriad variables that affect
production capabilities and decisions.13
Coca Eradication and Crop Substitution. Alternative crop production is a
critical component of the coca eradication effort underway in the Andes. Although
there is some indirect evidence to suggest that crop substitution is occurring, it is
small overall and the effect of ATPA on this process is marginal at best. Whereas
larger substitution effects may be linked to the cut flower industry in Colombia, there
are many factors that allowed such alternatives to exist before ATPA was even
conceived. All the evidence points to ATPA’s supportive, but relatively small, effect,
particularly given the magnitude of the problem and the comprehensive effort needed
to address the drug problem. For example, numerous obstacles impede the alternative
development strategy including the high profitability of coca production, lack of
physical infrastructure required to support alternative cash crops, and overt, often
violent, guerrilla pressure to reject the program.14
ATPA’s Economic Effects on the United States
Although ATPA was created to influence the economic landscape of the Andean
region, Congress also provided for analysis of how changes in trade patterns related
to ATPA might affect the United States. The USITC looks at three basic issues: 1)
consumer welfare gains from lower-priced imports; 2) the offsetting tariff revenue
losses; and 3) producer welfare losses (production displacement). The U.S.
12 Ibid., pp. 55 and 62.
13 U.S. International Trade Commission. Andean Trade Preference Act: Sixth Report 1998.
USITC publication 3234, September 1999, pp. 106, 111-14, 118, 120-22.
14 Wilson, Scott. Colombia’s Anti-Drug Plan Fuels Fight in Coca Country. The Washington
Post, October 14, 2000, p. A14 and DeYoung, Karen. Colombia Plan Faces ‘Crunch Time.’
The Washington Post, December 22, 2000, p. A35.
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Department of Labor produces a separate report dealing solely with ATPA’s effects
on the domestic labor force.
Changes in Trade Composition. Given that only a very small share of U.S.
imports are involved in the ATPA program, its effects on the aggregate U.S. economy
are negligible. Therefore, measuring the gains and losses to the U.S. economy must
be done at the product/industry level. In 1999, copper cathodes, cut flowers (roses
and chrysanthemums), tuna, and gold compounds together accounted for 83% of total
imports that benefitted exclusively from the ATPA provisions. Copper cathodes and
cut flowers each contributed to approximately one-third of the ATPA-exclusive
imports. Hence, an analysis of the benefits and displacement costs related to these
products covers most of the effects ATPA has on the U.S. economy.15
Consumer Welfare and Tariff Effects. USITC market share data showed that
ATPA-imported copper cathodes, although growing briskly, still accounted for only
7.4% of the U.S. market in 1999 and imported gold compounds claimed only 6.7%.
Cut flowers, by contrast, accounted for up to 75% of the U.S. market. Based on an
partial equilibrium analysis, the USITC estimated that the consumer welfare effects
in all three cases were, nonetheless, small. In the first two, market penetration was
simply too small, but even in the case of Colombia’s dominance of the U.S. cut flower
market, the USITC suggests that U.S. consumers would have paid only 5.5% more
for flowers than they would have in the absence of ATPA. In addition, the consumer
benefits were offset, in many cases, by reduced tariff revenues. The net welfare
effects for the United States as a whole, therefore, were considered small.16
Producer Welfare Effects. Of greater concern to many are ATPA’s effects on
U.S. producers. To the extent that ATPA encourages a marginal increase in imports,
those industries in the United States that produce competing products are potentially
“displaced” from the market. Given market share figures, the USITC found that only
cut flowers and asparagus caused “displacement” of over 5% of the market.
Asparagus imports are small and enter during the late summer and fall months when
domestic crop production is low and so have a clear benefit to U.S. consumers.
Because they do not directly compete with the U.S. growing season, however, they
are not a primary target for concern over displacement.17
Cut flower imports have been a greater concern, but as the USITC points out,
Colombia, the major flower exporter, had established its market dominance before
ATPA, and the U.S. growers had already responded by differentiating their products.
The overall impact of ATPA flower imports is deemed small given domestic industry
adjustment. One indication that U.S. flower growers are no longer seriously
concerned with competition from Andean imports is their decision to discontinue
pursuing antidumping and countervailing duty remedies as of May and October 1999,
15 U.S. International Trade Commission, Andean Trade Preference Act, September 2000, pp.
36-37.
16 Ibid., pp. 38 and 45.
17 Ibid., p. 38.
CRS-12
respectively. In short, should ATPA tariff preferences be eliminated, it appears there
would be little effect on the domestic cut flower industry.18
The U.S. Department of Labor (DOL) report targets ATPA’s impact on the
domestic work force. It concluded that the overall effects of ATPA in 1998 were
negligible given the strong U.S. economy and employment picture, and the fact that
ATPA-eligible imports were so small that their effect on aggregate U.S. employment
was virtually unmeasurable.19 Based on an analysis of products that entered the
United States duty free exclusively from ATPA provisions, the Department of Labor
argued that only the cut flower industry was likely to have presented any adjustment
problem. U.S. cut flower production had fallen by 11% in 1998 as ATPA imports
rose, perhaps suggesting that ATPA may have had some effect on the industry’s
contraction, but the Department of Labor report is quick to note that other factors
may have affected cost competitiveness of the U.S. cut flower industry, such as
complying with worker protection standards, and that in any case, their estimates
were not precise.20
Of the workers potentially affected by layoffs in the flower industry, the DOL
noted that all were seasonal agricultural workers who experience periods of
unemployment, have a very low wage level, and live predominantly in poverty. Some
43% were estimated to be of “illegal, temporary, or unknown legal status.” DOL did
not estimate the “degree of adjustment difficulty,” but noted that the strong U.S.
economy should be able to minimize any employment dislocation that might occur.
Adjustment costs faced by other industries from increased import competition from
ATPA were considered insignificant.21
Summary and Conclusions
ATPA is only a small part of the larger Andean counternarcotics effort. Coca
production is a primary target of these efforts and because coca is a highly profitable
undertaking and particularly enticing for poor areas of the world, a key element of the
strategy is supporting the cultivation of alternative cash crops.22 ATPA’s supporters
argue that reduced tariffs conceivably play a part of the “alternative development”
strategy by providing an additional financial incentive to substitute legal crops for
18 Ibid., p. 43.
19 U.S. Department of Labor. Bureau of International Labor Affairs. Trade and Employment
Effects of the Andean Trade Preference Act. Sixth Annual Report to Congress, by Robert
C. Shelburne. 1999. p 14.
20 Ibid., p. 10. The DOL report covers 1998 and so does not reflect the fact that in 1999 the
cut flower industry representatives dropped interest in antidumping and countervailing duty
investigations, suggesting doubt in their ability to make a strong case that the industry is being
materially harmed by ATPA-eligible imports.
21 Ibid., pp. 11-14.
22 U.S. Department of State, International Narcotics Control Strategy Report (INCSR),pp.
II-8, II-11, II-21, IV-7, and IV-21.
CRS-13
coca cultivation. The increase in non-agricultural exports (e.g. copper cathodes), it
could be argued, may also reflect in part ATPA’s preferential tariff treatment.
Testimony before congressional committees has expressed the desire by groups
in the United States and the Andean countries to reauthorize ATPA and consider
expanding the tariff preferences to more products and countries. In support of these
policy considerations, ATPA has been presented as having “a positive effect on drug-
crop eradication and crop substitution in the beneficiary countries...” and providing
“viable economic alternatives to drug-crop cultivation, production and trafficking.”23
Supporters of ATPA have proposed at least three program initiatives. First,
reauthorize ATPA for another extended period of time to reinforce the U.S.
commitment to the alternative development counternarcotics strategy. Second,
extend duty-free treatment to other Andean exports, such as textile products, to
broaden the program effects, particularly in Colombia, which remains the most
problematic country. Third, include Venezuela as a beneficiary country, which
although not currently a major coca producer, is part of the larger drug trafficking
problem. The first option may be the least controversial given there is no broad
opposition to ATPA. The second and third propositions may generate more debate
depending on which domestic industries are affected and on the political climate
surrounding U.S.-Venezuelan relations.
In considering the merits of ATPA, it is important to understand that the benefits
it provides are quantitatively small. ATPA’s influence should be visible in the
changing composition of U.S. imports, which has so far been relatively small.
Because many imports are not eligible by law for duty-free treatment or enter the
United States under other preferential trade arrangements, only 10% of ATPA
country imports enter the United States exclusively under the ATPA provisions. This
has not changed in recent years, suggesting that ATPA’s effect on trade is likely to
remain small, unless the program’s parameters are modified.
Because the trade response is small, so too are ATPA’s likely effects on the
Andean economies. Still, indirect evidence suggests that it may have supported
economic diversification into products such as copper cathodes and asparagus.
Asparagus, for example, is being cultivated in larger quantities near traditional coca
producing regions. Although an encouraging sign, given the high profitability of coca
and active resistence by both armed guerrilla groups and peasants, there are limits to
what ATPA may be expected to accomplish and it is not clear that there is a strong
direct link between increased ATPA-eligible exports and any verifiable diminished
drug-related activity.
In addition to the economic analysis, the debate over ATPA will likely consider
more intangible policy benefits. For example, supporters argue that ATPA is an
expression of direct U.S. support for the regional counternarcotics efforts with
potentially positive side benefits in the area of economic development. They also note
23 Testimony of Ambassador Richard Fisher, Deputy United States Trade Representative,
before the Senate Caucus on International Narcotics Control and the Senate Finance
Committee Subcommittee on International Trade. February 22, 2000. p. 3
CRS-14
that it is a less expensive and invasive counter-drug option compared to the large
financial and military commitment of Plan Colombia
ATPA also operates in concert with broader U.S. initiatives to liberalize trade
in the region. As the Western Hemisphere countries move towards a completed draft
of the Free Trade Area of the Americas (FTAA), U.S. support for Andean countries
at a time when South American countries have also expressed greater need for
economic and political solidarity may be another consideration. Ironically, to the
extent that trade liberalization continues in the hemisphere, whether through regional
or bilateral arrangements, the trade preference benefits of ATPA become less
significant. However, the political good will extended by the United States in the
form of ATPA trade preferences may be a positive force for bilateral relations and
encourage trade and investment, regardless of the economic costs and benefits, which
by most accounts, are small.
CRS-15
Appendix 1. ATPA Program Details
The ATPA program has two facets. First, each of the four Andean nations must
be designated a “beneficiary country” by meeting legislated standards.24 Beneficiary
status can be denied if a country: 1) is a Communist country; 2) unfairly nationalizes
or expropriates U.S. property, tangible or intellectual, without due recourse or
commitment for compensation; 3) fails to act in good faith in recognizing arbitral
awards in favor of U.S. citizens or companies; 4) affords preferential treatment to
products from other developed countries that may have a significant impact on U.S.
commerce; 5) has a government entity that fails to follow copyright agreements for
broadcast materials; 6) is not a signatory to an agreement providing for the extradition
of U.S. citizens; or 7) is not taking steps to afford internationally recognized workers
rights as in the Trade Act of 1974. All conditions, except 4 and 6, may be waived by
the President if conferring beneficiary status is deemed in the economic or security
interests of the United States. The President is also required to consider other factors,
among them the prospective beneficiary country’s: 1) interest in ATPA; 2) economic
conditions and development policies; 3) trade policies and practices complying with
rules defined in the World Trade Organization (WTO) agreement; and 4) efforts to
meet the narcotics cooperation certification criteria.
Second, eligible articles must be imported directly from a beneficiary country.
The content of materials and processing costs originating in CBERA or ATPA
beneficiary countries, Puerto Rico, the Virgin Islands and up to 15 percentage points
of U.S. origin value must sum to at least 35% of the value of the article when it enters
the United States. Many products are denied duty-free treatment, including textile
and apparel products subject to textile agreements, crude and refined petroleum
products, canned tuna, and certain footwear, watches, sugars, syrups, molasses, and
rum products. Selected import sensitive products are eligible for only a 20-percent
reduction in duties, including certain handbags, luggage, flat goods, work gloves, and
leather wearing apparel. The President may suspend duty-free treatment under title
II of the Trade Act of 1974 (safeguard actions) or the national security provision (sec.
232) of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, as amended (19 U.S.C. 1862). Other trade
regulations apply, such as quotas and food-safety requirements.25
ATPA operates in addition to the Generalized System of Preferences (GSP), a
program in place since 1976 giving duty-free treatment to certain developing country
imports to promote economic development. Where the two programs overlap, many
Andean exporters prefer to use ATPA because it covers more tariff categories, tends
to be more liberal and easier to qualify under, and has had a ten-year authorization
and so has never expired as has the GSP on various occasions in the 1990s.26
24 P.L. 102-182, title II, sec. 203, as amended (19 U.S.C. 3202). Because these benefits are
not extended under general rates, they require a temporary waiver by the World Trade
Organization, which was renewed through December 4, 2001 in: WTO General Council.
United States-Andean Trade Preference Act-Decision of 14 October 1996. WT/L/184.
25 Ibid., sec. 204 (19 U.S.C. 3203), including detailed provisions for “perishable products.”
26 See: CRS Report 97-389 E, Generalized System of Preferences, by William H. Cooper.
CRS-16
Appendix 2. U.S.-ATPA Country Merchandise Trade,
1990-1999
($ millions)
U.S. Exports
% Change
Country
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
1999
90-99
Bolivia
138
222
185
270
417
298
115.9%
Colombia
2,029
3,286
4,064
4,714
4,816
3,560
75.5%
Ecuador
678
999
1,195
1,259
1,683
910
34.2%
Peru
772
1,005
1,408
1,774
2,063
1,696
119.7%
Total ATPA
3,617
5,512
6,852
8,017
8,979
6,464
78.7%
Total World
393,592 448,164 512,627 625,075 682,138
695,797
76.8%
U.S. Imports
% Change
Country
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
1999
90-99
Bolivia
203
162
260
275
224
224
10.3%
Colombia
3,168
2,837
3,171
4,424
4,656
6,259
97.6%
Ecuador
1,376
1,344
1,726
1,958
1,752
1,821
32.3%
Peru
802
738
841
1,261
1,975
1,928
140.4%
Total ATPA
5,549
5,081
5,998
7,918
8,607
10,232
84.4%
Total World
495,310 532,665 663,256 795,289 911,896 1,024,618
106.9%
U.S. Balance of Trade
% Change
Country
1990
1992
1994
1996
1998
1999
90-99
Bolivia
-65
60
-75
-6
193
75
Colombia
-1,139
449
893
291
160
-2,699
Ecuador
-697
-345
-532
-700
-69
-911
Peru
-29
266
566
513
87
-232
Total ATPA
-1,930
430
852
98
371
-3,767
Total World
-101,718
-84,501 -150,629 -170,214 -229,758 -328,821
Data Source: U.S. Department of Commerce.