Order Code IB94040
CRS Issue Brief for Congress
Received through the CRS Web
Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S.
Military Involvement
Updated August 25, 2000
Nina M. Serafino
Foreign Affairs, Defense, and Trade Division
Congressional Research Service ˜ The Library of Congress

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CONTENTS
SUMMARY
MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Context for the Debate
The Definitional Problem
Current U.S. Military Participation in Peacekeeping
PDD 25 and Criteria for U.S. Participation
Issues of U.S. Military Involvement
Executive Consultation and Congressional Approval
Command and Control
Legislative Action
Funding Issues: Costs and Reimbursements
Costs
FY2001 Budget Request and FY2000 Supplemental Appropriations Request, and
Legislative Action
Congressional Action
U.N. Reimbursements and NATO Burdensharing
Suitability and Desirability as a U.S. Military Mission
The Readiness Controversy and Related Concerns
Debate Over Force Size and Structure
Operational Tempo
Training Effects
Greater Use of the Reserves?
Bosnia and Kosovo Debates
LEGISLATION
FOR ADDITIONAL READING
CRS Issue Briefs
CRS Reports

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Peacekeeping: Issues of U.S. Military Involvement
SUMMARY
For several years, Congress has expressed
informing Congress and consulting with con-
reservations about many complex and inter-
gressional leaders about ongoing and potential
twined peacekeeping issues. In an attempt to
peacekeeping operations, but does not say that
resolve some of them, on May 3, 1994, Presi-
congressional approval would be sought.
dent Clinton signed presidential Decision
Other important concerns have been the high
Directive (PDD) 25, defining the scope and
cost of and the appropriate method for funding
conditions of future U.S. participation in
DOD peacekeeping activities, and how much
multilateral peacekeeping efforts. (An unclas-
of U.S. contributions to U.N. peacekeeping
sified summary was distributed; all references
should be reimbursed.
in this report are to that summary.) Still, con-
cern continues.
Peacekeeping operations have fed into
congressional concerns about the military
Thousands of U.S. military personnel
“readiness” issue, as Members and military
currently serve in or support peacekeeping
analysts worry that costs drain funds that DOD
operations, performing tasks ranging from
uses to prepare its forces to defend against a
providing humanitarian relief to monitoring
threat to U.S. vital interests, and that troops
and enforcing cease-fires or other agreements
deployed for peacekeeping lose their facility
designed to separate parties in conflict. Of
for performing combat tasks. A related issue is
these, 25 were serving in mid-1999 in four
the suitability and desirability of U.S. military
operations under U.N. control. The others are
participation in peacekeeping operations.
serving full-time in operations run unilaterally
by the Department of Defense (DOD) or
President Clinton’s decision to deploy
together with U.S. allies in support of these
U.S. military personnel to Kosovo, first as part
operations, particularly the NATO Stabiliza-
of a NATO air operation to force the with-
tion Force (SFOR) in Bosnia and the NATO
drawal of Yugoslav troops from Kosovo and
Kosovo Force (KFOR). About 37,000 more
next as part of a NATO peacekeeping force,
serve in or support peacekeeping operations in
extended the peacekeeping debate over these
South Korea. These “peacekeeping” opera-
issues into the 106th Congress. As it begins to
tions are undertaken to promote, maintain,
appear that the United States and other NATO
enforce, or enhance the possibilities for peace,
nations have undertaken indefinite peacekeep-
and can sometimes be dangerous.
ing commitments in Bosnia and Kosovo, an
emerging issue is whether the United States
For Congress, two enduring, primary
Army should be increased in size, and perhaps
issues have been (1) whether U.S. troops
reconfigured, in order to perform peacekeep-
should be placed under U.N. control and (2)
ing missions with less strain on the force, or
when the President should consult with and
whether the United States should continue to
seek congressional approval to deploy U.S.
participate in these missions at all.
troops on peacekeeping missions. In PDD 25,
the President sets forth the procedures for
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MOST RECENT DEVELOPMENTS
The conference report on the FY2001 Military Construction bill (H.R. 4425, H.Rept.
106-710), which was signed into law July 13 (P.L. 106-246), included the Administration’s
requested $2.05 billion in emergency FY2000 supplemental funding for the Overseas
Contingency Operations Transfer Fund, to be used primarily in Kosovo. The conference
version of the DOD Appropriations bill for FY2001 (H.R. 4576, H.Rept. 106-754, P.L. 106-
259), signed into law August 9, contained $3.94 billion for continued DOD contingency
operations in Bosnia, Kosovo and Southwest Asia. This is some $161.8 million less than the
president’s request for $4.10 billion, which had been approved by the House and Senate, but
reduced in conference because of anticipated cuts in the number of U.S. personnel involved.
BACKGROUND AND ANALYSIS
Many questions have been raised in debate over U.S. involvement in international
peacekeeping. These have ranged from the basic question of definition — what is
peacekeeping? — to the broad strategic question — how and when does it serve U.S.
interests? On May 3, 1994, President Clinton signed a classified presidential decision
directive (PDD 25) that defined the scope and conditions of future U.S. participation in, and
contributions to, multilateral (mostly United Nations) peacekeeping efforts. (References in
this issue brief are to a 15-page unclassified summary, “The Clinton Administration’s Policy
on Reforming Multilateral Peace Operations,” Department of State Publication 10161, May
1994.) PDD 25 addresses several intertwined policy and budgeting issues.
Some issues directly concern U.S. military involvement and are discussed here. For
Congress, two primary issues have been (1) when the President should consult with Congress
and seek its approval to send U.S. troops on peacekeeping missions; and (2) whether the
Congress should restrict the placement of U.S. troops under U.N. control. Important related
issues concern U.S. peacekeeping operations’ effects on the military’s warfighting capacity
(“readiness”) and the suitability and desirability of deploying U.S. troops on peacekeeping
missions. (See CRS Issue Brief IB90103, United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress,
for information on the costs of U.N. operations and its capability to handle them.)
Debate over peacekeeping has been complicated by the difficult context in which the
demand for U.S. troops and funds for such operations takes place. At home, this has
included the downsizing of U.S. forces, and the press of U.S. domestic programs for funds
spent on the military and on foreign aid. Internationally, complicating factors have included
the sometimes fractious relationship between the United States as a world leader and its
allies, and the nature of current ethnic and regional conflicts.
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Context for the Debate
The Definitional Problem
“Peacekeeping” is a broad, generic, and often imprecise term to describe the many
activities that the United Nations and other international organizations undertake to promote,
maintain, enforce, or enhance the possibilities for peace. These activities range from
providing observers to monitor elections, recreating police or civil defense forces for the new
governments of those countries, organizing humanitarian relief efforts, and monitoring and
enforcing cease- fires and other arrangements designed to separate parties recently in conflict.
The use of the term “peacekeeping” gained currency in the late 1950s, when United Nations
peacekeeping efforts mostly fit a narrower definition: providing an “interpositional” force to
separate parties that had been in conflict and to supervise the keeping of a peace accord they
had signed. In 1992, the United Nations began to use a broader terminology to describe the
different types of peacekeeping activities. (See CRS Report 93-1017.) In particular, it
created the term “peace enforcement” to describe operations where peacekeepers are allowed
to use force because of a greater possibility of conflict or a threat to their safety.
Subsequently, the Administration and executive branch agencies replaced the term
“peacekeeping” with “peace operations.” (DOD categorizes peace operations among its
“operations other than war” [OOTW].) Congress has tended to use the term “peacekeeping,”
as does this issue brief.
The definitional problem stems from a semantic dilemma: no single term currently in use
can accurately capture the broad and ambiguous nature of all these types of operations. Use
of any term with the word “peace” conveys the misleading impression that there is no risk of
danger in such operations. Sometimes, in fact, “peace” operations put those involved in
hostile situations resembling war.
Current U.S. Military Participation in Peacekeeping
Thousands of U.S. military personnel participate full-time in a wide variety of activities
that fall under the rubric of peacekeeping operations, most sponsored or otherwise endorsed
by the United Nations. As of April 30, 2000, 35 U.S. troops were serving in six U.N.
peacekeeping operations. These were located in the Middle East (13 in two operations), the
Western Sahara (15), Georgia (2), Kosovo (2), and East Timor (3). Other U.S. forces are
deployed in operations that the United States undertakes by itself or in cooperation with other
nations under U.N. authority. These included, as of late June 2000, some 4,200 troops
participating in the Bosnia Stabilization Force (SFOR) under NATO auspices, and some
5,600 troops participating in the NATO Kosovo Force (KFOR). Over 37,000 U.S. troops
serve as peacekeepers in South Korea under bilateral U.S.-Republic of Korea agreements and
U.N. authority. Some 917 soldiers also serve in the coalition Multilateral Force (MFO) in the
Sinai, which has no U.N. affiliation.
Approximately 20,000 U.S. troops — mostly sailors and marines — are usually involved
(the numbers fluctuate) in Southwest Asia around Iraq, enforcing maritime sanctions in the
Arabian Sea and two no-fly zones over northern and southern Iraq. These tasks are among
those involved in “peace enforcement” efforts, i.e., the upper end of the peacekeeping
spectrum where unstable situations require the threat or application of military force. Some
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analysts, however no longer consider these operations as peacekeeping as they have become
a vehicle for actively containing Saddam Hussein. The air operations – Northern Watch and
Southern Watch — are performed in coalition with the United Kingdom. (See CRS Report
98-120, Iraq Crisis: U.S. and Allied Forces, for additional information on U.S. activities in
Southwest Asia.) Several other nations contribute to operations in the Arabian Sea.
PDD 25 and Criteria for U.S. Participation
In PDD 25, the Clinton Administration defined guidelines for U.S. support of and U.S.
military participation in multilateral peacekeeping operations; these narrow the broad,
“assertive” multilateralist vision the Administration expounded during its first year. Early
Administration statements cast the United Nations, with U.S. support, as a central player in
ensuring world stability. PDD 25 defined the more restrictive role for peacekeeping that
Administration officials articulated after the deaths of U.S. special operations forces in
Somalia in the fall of 1993. (See CRS Report 94-260, Peacekeeping in Future U.S. Foreign
Policy, for a discussion of PDD 25 and a copy of the unclassified summary.)
Under PDD 25 guidelines, a primary consideration for U.S. support of multilateral
peacekeeping operations is whether “there is a threat to or breach of international peace and
security.” This is defined as situations involving international aggression, a humanitarian
disaster in a violent situation, or the sudden interruption of an established democracy or gross
violation of human rights in a violent or potentially violent situation. Basic considerations for
political and financial support are whether U.N. or other peacekeeping operations advance
U.S. interests and whether other countries commit adequate resources.
In deciding whether to send U.S. troops, other factors to consider are: whether the U.S.
presence is essential to an operation’s success, the risks to U.S. troops are acceptable,
resources are available, and domestic and congressional support “exists or can be marshaled.”
Where U.S. troops might encounter combat, other factors include whether there are: “a
determination to commit sufficient forces to achieve clearly defined objectives;” “a plan to
achieve those objectives decisively;” and “a commitment to reassess and adjust” as necessary
the size, composition and use of forces.
Despite PDD 25 and its guidelines, or perhaps because of it, the debate over
peacekeeping intensified. Some critics judged it an unacceptable statement of “assertive
multilateralism,” representing a “significant revolution” in U.S. security policy that could
result in “increased subordination of American Military forces and U.S. foreign policy
prerogatives to the U.N.” (S.Rept. 103-282) Others found the guidelines either too vague
or too restrictive. Some doubted that the guidelines could prevent the U.S. military from
becoming involved in missions that initially appeared manageable, but eventually would cost
more lives and money than U.S. interests would merit. Many remain uncertain or skeptical
of how peacekeeping operations can serve U.S. interests.
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Issues of U.S. Military Involvement
Executive Consultation and Congressional Approval
A primary concern of Congress is that it be consulted about the commitment of U.S.
forces in peacekeeping operations; many Members also want Congress’ approval sought if
and when U.S. forces are to be placed at risk. Debate over the type of consultation and
approval that the executive branch must seek is a continuation of the ongoing dispute
regarding powers under the Constitution to deploy U.S. troops abroad into hostilities. The
War Powers Resolution (P.L. 93-148), a 1973 legislative attempt to clarify that dispute,
requires the President to consult with and report to Congress any introduction of U.S. forces
into hostilities or imminent hostilities. The War Powers Resolution also requires that troops
usually be withdrawn after 60 days if Congress does not approve a continued stay. It does
not provide a mechanism for Congress to disapprove the initial deployment of troops.
Congress’ primary power to exercise control over peacekeeping deployments and
expenditures is the power of the purse, but many consider this insufficient. Not all Members
wish to change this situation, preferring not to take a position on uses of force abroad.
The first session of the 104th Congress rejected attempts to repeal the War Powers Act
and substitute another mechanism, but did adopt some conditions on peacekeeping
deployments in the FY1996 DOD appropriations act (P.L. 104-61, H.R. 2126) which
required the president to consult with appropriate congressional authorities before committing
U.S. forces to any sizable, new peacekeeping missions, with certain exceptions and waivers.
During the second session, the House passed Sense of Congress language (in H.R. 3308) that
the President should consult closely with Congress about U.N. peace operations and that U.S.
troops should only participate when there were clear national security interests at stake. The
Senate did not consider the bill. Since then, annual legislation has required the president to
consult with Congress on ongoing operations.
Command and Control
The participation of U.S. troops in peacekeeping operations raises the issue of whether
U.S. troops should serve under the “command” or control of foreign officers. U.S. troops
have served under foreign officers in the past and currently serve under foreign officers in
U.N. and other operations (see section on U.S. military participation, above. Sometimes, the
question of foreign “command” has been posed as a symbolic one, reflecting larger questions
about U.S. leadership in the world and the use of collective security mechanisms. The
pragmatic question also persists: whether the United States should trust its citizens’ lives to
the judgment of foreign officers.
The term “command” is often loosely and inaccurately used. In PDD 25, the
Administration explains that the United States does not put U.S. troops under the “command”
of foreign officers, but cedes “operational control” for specific missions. In DOD terminology,
“command” includes the authority to use resources and to plan for, organize, direct,
coordinate, and control military forces to accomplish assigned missions, as well as
responsibility for their health, welfare, morale, and discipline. The United States would never
abrogate command authorities and responsibilities. “Operational control” is a temporary
authority to organize forces and to employ them in tasks necessary to accomplish a given
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mission. According to PDD 25, a foreign officer with operational control over U.S. forces
cannot separate units, divide their supplies, administer discipline, promote anyone, or change
their internal organization.
Some Members and military officers are reluctant to relinquish any authority to foreign
officers, of whose competence they are not certain and whose judgment may differ from that
of a U.S. officer. Military analysts note that training and cultural differences may create
differences in approach and style; thus, foreign officers might put U.S. troops at risk where
U.S. officers would not. Concerns are less evident with NATO officers, more so with those
outside this longstanding alliance. Some also note that cultural and language difficulties can
make combined operations too cumbersome for the quick responses needed in the more
difficult “peace enforcement” operations.
Some analysts also point out that decisions on the use of U.S. soldiers in peacekeeping
missions involve different criteria than the use of soldiers of other countries, as when U.S.
soldiers are involved, the prestige of the world’s sole superpower is on the line. This makes
U.S. soldiers more tempting targets in conflictive peacekeeping missions. It also complicates
the response of U.S. soldiers: for instance, where a soldier from another country would be
praised for negotiating his unit’s way through a roadblock, a U.S. soldier must consider
whether that would make it appear that the U.S. could be intimidated and was backing down.
Practical considerations are cited to counter objections. Most importantly, the United
States takes precautions that U.S. troops serve under respected foreign officers and that U.S.
officers are positioned to look after U.S. troops. U.S. officials have a virtual veto power in
the selection of top commanders for U.N. operations in which U.S. troops participate.
Responding to questions whether U.S. troops are able to refuse to obey or question what they
may regard as illegal or unwise orders from foreign commanders, PDD-25 states that
commanders of U.S. military units participating in U.N. operations can “report separately to
higher U.S. military authorities” and “will refer to higher U.S. authorities order that are illegal
under U.S. or international law, or outside the mandate of the mission to which the U.S.
agreed with the U.N.” The United States also reserves the right to take the action necessary
to protect U.S. forces. In addition, military analysts note that under U.S. and international
law, soldiers are obliged to refuse illegal orders.
The command issue also has been raised in connection with the January 1996 court-
martial and bad-conduct discharge of U.S. Army Specialist Michael G. New (upheld by his
commanding general in June 1996). New, who refused to obey an order to wear the
designated U.N. patch and blue beret when his unit was assigned to the U.N. Preventive
Deployment Force in Macedonia, argues that he owes allegiance to the United States, not to
the U.N., that the insignia are not authorized, that the chain of command was not
constitutional, and that the operation was not legal. In March 1996, the U.S. District Court
of the District of Columbia rejected New’s civil suit of Habeas Corpus challenging the
court-martial’s finding and sentence; in November 1997, the U.S. Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit upheld the District Court’s dismissal on the grounds that civilian
courts must await the final outcome of military court proceedings on a court martial before
considering an action brought by a service member. The U.S. Army Court of Criminal
Appeals heard the case on May 28, 1998, and affirmed the court martial in April 1999. On
February 4, 2000, New appealed the decision before the Court of Appeals of the Armed
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Forces. If it upholds the decision, New can file an appeal with the Supreme Court. (The
official Michael New Home Page is at [http://www.mikenew.com/].)
Secretary of State Madeleine Albright has stated that soldiers serving in U.N.
peacekeeping operations wear the U.N. patch on one shoulder of their own national uniforms
and the U.N. blue beret or helmet, in addition to their national patch on the other shoulder
and other national insignia, “for reasons of identification and protection.”
Legislative Action. Since the 104th Congress’ House version of the “Contract for
America” legislation (H.R. 7), Members have made a number of attempts to prohibit or limit
the placement of U.S. troops under U.N. command. In 1995, Congress included restrictions
on such placement in a FY1996 DOD authorization bill (H.R. 1530) that was vetoed by the
President, who listed the provision as an infringement on the President’s constitutional
authority as Commander in Chief and one of the reasons for the veto. Congress deleted the
provisions from its subsequent version of the FY1996 DOD authorization bill, which was
signed by the President. Since then, Congress has not approved any restrictions on DOD
funding regarding the participation of U.S. troops in U.N. peacekeeping operations.

Funding Issues: Costs and Reimbursements
As U.S. spending on peacekeeping activities soared in the 1990s, Congress became
increasingly concerned about the costs of U.N. and U.S. peacekeeping operations, and the
related issue of peacekeeping’s effect on readiness. Because the “incremental” costs of
peacekeeping and other military contingency operations generally have been funded through
supplemental appropriations, DOD has had to postpone and cancel training and maintenance
and to rescind funds from weapons modernizations and other accounts. Supplemental
appropriations designated as “emergency” funding do not disrupt DOD activities and plans,
but they can be controversial as they can raise overall spending above the budget caps set by
Congress. In the second session of the 104th Congress, Congress sought to resolve the
problem by budgeting funding for ongoing missions in an “Overseas Contingency Operations
Transfer Fund,” (OCOTF) in the annual DOD measures, a mechanism which has been
included in legislation of the 105th and 106th Congresses, but the President still sought
supplemental funding for Bosnia, and then Kosovo, in subsequent years. (For more
information on the concept of incremental costs, legislative and executive attempts to create
more efficient methods of funding contingency operations, and the means by which Bosnia
and SWA have been funded since FY1992, see CRS Report 98-823, Military Contingency
Funding for Bosnia, Southwest Asia, and Other Operations: Questions and Answers.)
Costs. Until the 1990s, DOD did not keep a central accounting of figures on
peacekeeping because these “incremental” costs (i.e., the amount spent on peacekeeping over
that which would have been normally spent on regular salaries, and on routine training,
equipment repairs and replacements) were minimal. At the end of this report, there is a
detailed chart of DOD incremental costs (actuals) of peacekeeping and related security
operations from FY1991-FY1999, and part-year FY2000 incremental costs.
FY2001 Budget Request and FY2000 Supplemental Appropriations Request, and
Legislative Action. In its February 7, 2000 budget request, the Clinton Administration asked
for a total of $4.1 billion for continuing contingency operations: $3.1 billion for peacekeeping
operations in Bosnia ($1.4 billion) and Kosovo ($1.7 billion) and $1.1 billion for Iraq in
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FY2001. It also requested that $2.0504 billion in FY2000 emergency supplemental
appropriations be placed in the OCOTF. Most would be used to cover DOD’s unbudgeted
costs in Kosovo. These would include the operation and maintenance, and personnel costs
of maintaining some 6,200 U.S. personnel in Kosovo as part of the NATO-led Kosovo Force
(KFOR) and up to 1,000 personnel providing support in surrounding countries, as well as
enforcing the international sanctions regime on the Former Republic of Yugoslavia, as well
as continued naval support to KFOR. Some $25 million would be used to fund U.S. military
support of the International Force in East Timor.
Congressional Action. The conference report on the FY2001 Military Construction
bill (H.R. 4425, H.Rept. 106-710), which passed the House on June 29 and the Senate on
June 30, included the Administration’s requested $2.0504 billion in emergency FY2000
supplemental funding for the Overseas Contingency Operations Transfer Fund, to be used
primarily in Kosovo.
Conferees on the DOD appropriations bill for FY2001 provided $161.8 million less than
the $4,100,577,000 requested, however, and provided over a third of the funding as an
FY2000 emergency supplemental. Both the House and the Senate have included the full
amount of requested funding for the OCOTF in the DOD appropriations bill (H.R. 4576,
passed by the House June 7 and by the Senate, amended, on June 13), and in the DOD
authorization bill, H.R. 4205 (passed by the House May 18, and by the Senate on July 13).
The FY2001 appropriations conference report (H.Rept. 106-754) provided $3.9 billion
($3,938,777,000) for the OCOTF: $2.8 billion ($2,838,777,000) of that in FY2001 funding,
and $1.1 billion in FY2000 emergency supplemental appropriations. The authorization bill
is still in conference.
U.N. Reimbursements and NATO Burdensharing. Some Members argue that the
costs of U.S. direct or indirect support for U.N. and U.N.-sanctioned operations, including
DOD incremental costs, should be credited towards the payment of U.S. assessments for U.N.
peacekeeping operations and other payments to the U.N. (See CRS Issue Brief IB90103 for
more on U.N. assessments.) (In the 104th Congress, provisions to credit such support
towards U.S. assessments for U.N. peacekeeping were included in “Contract with America”
legislation (S. 5 and H.R. 7), but did not become law.) Current practice is for the United
States to be reimbursed only for the troops which it contributes to actual U.N. operations, and
for any assistance provided under Letters of Assist, through which the U.N. specifically
pledges reimbursement. A little less than one-third of U.N. reimbursements for troop
contribution is credited to DOD to cover DOD’s incremental costs in deploying those troops;
the remainder is credited to the State Department.
The Clinton Administration and others who object to provisions requiring reimbursement
for all costs to the United States of supporting U.N. operations note that such assistance is
voluntary and would not be provided if it were not in the U.S. interest. Also, many other
countries provide voluntary support that is not reimbursed or credited to their assessments
by the United Nations. A State Department compilation of the 1995 voluntary contributions
of the United States and 13 other countries to support U.N. peacekeeping operations
(excluding economic and humanitarian aid), shows that the United States provided 57%, 11
NATO countries and Australia some 42%, and Japan slightly under one percent. (The
contributions are incremental costs for either FY1995 or calendar year 1995.) Subsequently,
the State Department questioned whether these figures, because of the different methods used
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to compile them, presented a valid comparison between U.S. and other contributions, and
it did not plan to update them.
The FY2000 DOD appropriations bill repeats provisions of the DOD appropriations
acts for FY1999 (P.L. 105-262) and FY1998, (P.L. 105-56) regarding reimbursement.
These bills require the Secretary of Defense to submit quarterly reports on all DOD costs in
support of the U.N. peacekeeping and U.N. Security Council resolutions, detailing “all
efforts” made to seek credit against past U.N. expenditures and to seek compensation from
the U.N. for DOD costs incurred in implementing and supporting U.N. activities. They also
require DOD to notify specified committees 15 days before obligating or spending money to
transfer defense articles or services (other than intelligence) to another nation or an
international organization for use in any U.N. or other international peacekeeping,
peace-enforcement or humanitarian operation. (Sections 8073 and 8074 of H.R. 2561.) The
House and Senate FY2001 defense appropriations measures both contain the same provision
(H.R. 4576, Sections 8070, S. 2593, Section 8068).
The Senate defense authorization bill (S. 2549) contains a related new provision
concerning burdensharing in Kosovo. Section 1205 requires a biannual report from the
President on the contributions of European nations and organizations to the peacekeeping
operations in Kosovo. An exhaustive CRS attempt to gather information on NATO
contributions to Kosovo found no single, definitive source of consistent data on military and
non-military contributions, and at best could provide an approximate idea of relative costs.
See CRS Report RL30398, NATO Burdensharing and Kosovo, A Preliminary Report.
Suitability and Desirability as a U.S. Military Mission
Some analysts question whether military forces in general and U.S. military forces in
particular are, by character, doctrine, and training, suited to carry out peacekeeping
operations. One reason given is that military forces cultivate the instincts and skills to be
fighters, while the skills and instincts needed for peacekeeping are those inculcated by law
enforcement training. (In some peacekeeping operations, however, the military’s training to
work in units and employ higher levels of force are seen as necessary.) Another reason is that
peacekeeping requires a different approach than combat operations. Many senior U.S.
military planners hold that successful military action requires “overwhelming” force. U.S.
troops are taught to apply “decisive” force to defeat an enemy. Most peacekeeping tasks,
however, require restraint, not an “overwhelming” or “decisive” use of force.
As the military has gained more experience with peacekeeping missions and analyzed
their requirements, and as some officers and analysts have begun to look more favorably on
peacekeeping as a mission, many assert that to be a good peacekeeper, one must first be a
good soldier. (“Peacekeeping is not a job for soldiers, but only soldiers can do it,” states the
Army field manual outlining doctrine on Peace Operations, FM 100-23, in a quote attributed
to former U.N. Secretary General Dag Hammarskjold.) In part this argument is based on the
growing recognition that troops in peacekeeping operations need military and combat skills
to respond to unanticipated risks, in part it is based on the judgment that part of the task of
a peacekeeping operation is to provide a deterrent to the continued use of force and that the
most credible deterrent is a soldier well-trained for combat. U.S. military participation in
peacekeeping has become regarded more favorably by some military officers who argue that
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although combat skills deteriorate (“degrade”) during peace operations, many other skills
necessary for military operations are enhanced. (See section on Training Effects, below.)
Questions also arise as to whether peacekeeping is a desirable mission for U.S. forces.
On the one hand, some point out that as representatives of the sole world “superpower,”
U.S. troops are particularly vulnerable to attempts to sabotage peacekeeping operations by
those who want to convince potential followers of their power by successfully engaging U.S.
forces. On the other, analysts note that other countries are often reluctant to commit forces
if the United States does not, and that U.S. participation in peacekeeping is an important part
of “shaping” the world environment to decrease the possibilities of future conflict and war.
In recent years, DOD and the military services made several changes to adjust for
peacekeeping missions. In particular, the U.S. military has been increasing special training
for peacekeeping functions. Most of the training is for units who are deployed, or expect to
be deployed, for peace operations: the Army norm is that units should receive four to six
weeks of special training. The unified commands have developed exercise programs involving
staff planning, command and control, simulated deployments, and training with
non-governmental organizations and foreign militaries. Some units that are drawn upon for
peacekeeping operations have also incorporated training for peace operations in their normal
training routines. (For more information, see: GAO/NSIAD-96-14, Peace Operations: Effect
of Training, Equipment, and Other Factors on Unit Capability, October 1995, and CRS
Report 98-477, Peacekeeping Training in the U.S. Army.)
Some analysts argue that U.S. combat forces should not be used for peacekeeping.
Instead, they suggest two options: establish a separate peacekeeping force, distinct from the
current military service branches, or create special units dedicated solely to peacekeeping
within the current services. (In PDD-25, the Administration stated that it did not support the
concept of a standing U.N. army, nor would it earmark military units for participation in U.N.
peacekeeping operations.) The military has resisted the concept of dedicated units.
The Readiness Controversy and Related Concerns
“Readiness” issues have been a driving force in congressional debate over the extent to
which the U.S. military should engage in peacekeeping. Readiness is a subjective and
ambiguous concept referring to the degree to which the armed forces’ are “prepared” — i.e.,
currently in training and well-equipped — to defend the nation. As the U.S. military has been
increasingly called upon to perform peacekeeping and other non-combat missions — at the
same time as it has downsized significantly — Members of Congress have questioned whether
U.S. military forces can perform their “core” mission, i.e., national defense where U.S. vital
interests are threatened, if they engage extensively in other activities. Readiness, as related
to peacekeeping, depends on several factors: the size of the force, the numbers of troops
devoted to specific tasks (force structure), and the size, length, and frequency of deployments
(operational tempo), as well as the availability of opportunities for training in combat skills
during a peace operation.
In a May 1999 report to the Senate Armed Services Subcommittee on Military Readiness
and Management Support, the General Accounting Office (GAO) found that “OOTW
[principally peace operations] has adversely affected the combat capability of deployed units
in Bosnia and Southwest Asia and some units that remain at the home station as they have to
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pick up the work of the deployed units.” The GAO also found, however, that the impact
across the services varies (with the Army and the Air Force more affected than the Marines
and Navy) and that even within the Army and the Air Force many units are relatively
unaffected.” Most affected within the Army and Air Force are the combat units, because the
tasks they perform in peacekeeping operations are most unlike their wartime tasks, and they
lack the necessary training opportunities to maintain warfighting skills at peak levels. Support
units are less affected as many of the tasks they perform in peacekeeping require them to use
their wartime skills. (Support units provide intelligence, medical, signal, logistics,
transportation, and engineer support.) The GAO also notes that OOTW deployments “can
have some positive effects,” particularly at the smaller unit and individual levels (i.e., at
company level and below). (Military Operations: Impact of Operations Other Than War
on the Services Varies. GAO/NSIAD-99-69.)
In a summary of the views of 22 active duty and retired military officers of the value of
peace operations, a report by the Peace Through Law Education Fund states that the military
“is adapting to minimize the negative aspects [of peace operations on readiness] while it
enhances the positive elements for the force.” Stressing those positive aspects, the report
quotes various commanders of peace operations stating that morale and “operational
capability” improve with the deployment in peace operations, which provide more realistic
training opportunities than exercise grounds for those military personnel who are actually
performing their wartime missions. (A Force for Peace: U.S. Commanders’ Views of the
Military’s Role in Peace Operations, released July 1, 1999).
The debate continued in late 1999 and 2000. The Washington Post reported on Nov.
10, 1999, that two of the 10 U.S. Army divisions had been rated as unprepared for war.
(“Two Army Divisions Unfit for Major War,” pp. 1A, 28A.) The armed services committee
reports on the House and Senate DOD authorization bills (H.R. 4205, H.Rept. 106-616, and
S. 2549, S.Rept. 106-292) both contain discussions of the effects of the pace of peacekeeping
deployments on the readiness of the force. Both contain new readiness-related reporting
requirements.
Debate Over Force Size and Structure. The Clinton Administration argued in PDD-
25 that multinational peacekeeping efforts can be a “force multiplier” for the United States,
requiring fewer U.S. troops to ensure that the world’s instabilities do not threaten U.S.
interests. The Clinton Administration’s defense program purports to size the U.S. military
to fight two nearly simultaneous major regional conflicts (MRCs). Some defense analysts and
military officers have questioned whether the military is appropriately sized and structured to
fight two MRCs and also take on peacekeeping and other so-called “non-combat” missions.
For several years, many Members have expressed concern that the U.S. military is too small
and too stretched to take on peacekeeping operations. At House Armed Services Committee
(HASC) hearings in late 1993, a retired officer estimated that the army needed 12 to 13
divisions to accomplish all missions expected of it [HASC No. 103-28]; the army currently
has 10 divisions. In November 1993, conferees on the FY1994 authorization bill doubted that
the Army’s end strength could be reduced below its FY1994 level of 541,000 if the Army was
to perform peacekeeping missions and still be able to respond to two major regional
contingencies nearly simultaneously (Congressional Record, p. S 158190). In keeping with
the QDR recommendation of May 1997, the Administration asked Congress to provide for
a 480,000 FY1999 army end strength, which it did in the FY1999 and FY2000 DOD
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authorization and appropriations bills. FY2001 defense authorizations and appropriations
measures all provide the same.
Nevertheless, service end strengths, in particular army end strength, remained a topic for
consideration, at least through 1999. Army Secretary Louis Caldera stated in a 1999 memo
to Defense Secretary William Cohen that the “‘demand for soldiers’” exceeded that
anticipated by the QDR, suggesting that “‘a force with a greater number of deployable
soldiers may be appropriate.’” (Inside the Army, July 5, 1999, p. 3.) A 1999 news report
indicated that military leaders from each of the armed services have indicated, publically or
privately, that requests for additional troops “are under serious consideration.” (Washington
Post, July 18, 1999, p. A4. The newspaper also reported that the cost of adding 20,000 Army
troops would be two billion dollars, one billion for pay and benefits and one billion for
operational, training, housing, and other costs.) Senator Stevens, chairman of the Senate
Appropriations Committee, commented that year that Army end strength is low and should
be increased, in order to accommodate the need for peacekeepers while preserving combat
capabilities. Rep. Ike Skelton, ranking member of the House Armed Services Committee,
also noted that a more appropriate Army end strength would be 540,000.
The current force structure is also being questioned. In H.Rept. 106-244 (accompanying
the House version of DOD FY2000 appropriations, H.R. 2561), the House Appropriations
Committee states that “current force structure and current commitments are not in balance.
It is now all to apparent that the military services are not yet properly reconfigured from their
old ‘Cold War’ orientation, or are simply undermanned or underequipped in certain key
categories, to meet the Nation’s emerging global commitments at an acceptable level of
risk....it is clear that the strategy, roles and missions, and force structure assumptions
underpinning the Quadrennial Defense Review (QDR) two years ago (and which now form
the basis of current DoD planning) must be revisited.”
Some military analysts suggest that the overall force might be restructured to include
more of the types of specialities needed for peacekeeping, and in units sized appropriately for
peace operations. For instance, civil affairs, psychological operations (PSYOPS), and military
police units are specialties that are particularly needed in peace operations but in short supply
in the active military. This could entail increasing the number of such specialties in the active
force and reserve, or altering the current requirement that the military be prepared to engage
in two nearly simultaneous MRCs. Some analysts have suggested that structuring the forces
to engage in one MRC and a few small-scale contingencies such as peace operations might
be more appropriate to current world conditions; others argue that this would leave the
United States too vulnerable to military challenges from states such as Iraq and North Korea.
Operational Tempo. A related concern is that peacekeeping burdens forces with an
unacceptable work pace. The increased “operational tempo” demanded by peacekeeping
takes time from necessary maintenance, repairs, and combat training, and can shorten the
useful life of equipment. In one of the first publicly-available studies of the stresses caused
by peacekeeping, a March 1995 GAO report (GAO/NSIAD-95-51) found that the increasing
“op tempo,” deployments due to peacekeeping, and reduced force structure taxed certain
Navy and Marine Corps units, and “heavily” stressed certain Army support forces, such as
quartermaster and transportation units, and specialized Air Force aircraft critical to the early
stages of a MRC, to an extent that could endanger DOD’s ability to respond quickly to
MRCs. Although DOD disagreed at the time, the pace of operations has since become a
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source of concern throughout the services and DOD, as well as in Congress. In a July 2000
report (GAO/NSIAD-00-164), the GAO reported that a number of problems in meeting the
demands of contingency operations, including an inadequate number of active-duty civil
affairs personnel, of Navy and Marine Corps land-based EA-6B squadrons, of fully trained
and available Air Force AWACs aircraft crews, and of fully-trained U-2 pilots.
Training Effects. The effects of peace operations on a soldier’s ability to maintain
military and combat skills through training has been a source of concern; military analysts and
personnel have noticed mixed effects on soldiers’ skills, and thus on readiness. For some
types of military activities and skills, participation in peacekeeping operations is considered
to be a good substitute for normal training activities. This is true for many activities short of
high-intensity combat skills, e.g., support functions, such as logistics and medical aid. Many
military officers and analysts state that peacekeeping operations provide far superior
opportunities for the development of leadership skills by small unit commanders than do
normal training exercises. Nevertheless, all acknowledge that participation in peacekeeping
operations significantly “degrades” some crucial combat skills—e.g., shooting (“live
firepower) skills, coordination of the use of weapons and equipment (combined arms skills),
and large unit maneuver ability. (The longer the deployment, the greater the deterioration of
skills, according to some analysts.) To reduce such deterioration, efforts are made for troops
to continue some level of combat training during peacekeeping deployments.
Greater Use of the Reserves?
Increasing use of Army reservists and National Guardsmen in peacekeeping operations
has culminated in the Texas Army National Guard’s 49th Armored Division’s assumption of
command on March 7, 2000 of the U.S. Bosnia SFOR contingent. Until October 2000, the
Texas guardsmen, some 1,200 in all, will be in charge of the U.S. headquarters, led by Brig.
Gen. Bob Halverson. Reportedly, this is the first time since World War II that a National
Guard General has commanded active duty Army troops. For the near future, Army National
Guard divisions will alternate with active duty divisions in commanding Bosnia. In October
2001, the 29th Infantry Division from Virginia will deploy for six months; in October 2001,
it will be the turn of the 28th Infantry Division from Pennsylvania. For some time, many
defense experts have argued that the reserves and guardsmen should be used more extensively
in peacekeeping, even though both have played a significant part in past peacekeeping
missions. The National Defense Panel (NDP) stated in its December 1997 report that “the
specialized skills that reside in the reserves can make a significant contribution in tailoring our
contingency forces to deal with emerging challenges to our security” i.e., what the NDP
referred to as the “lesser military threats” that would require responses such as peacekeeping.
Two sources of concern are the cost of their use and the effect on recruitment and
retention. The costs of increasing the use of the Reserves and Guard for peacekeeping could
vary substantially, depending on the relative size of the active duty force and on the “tempo”
of operations, i.e., the size, length, and frequency of deployments, according to defense
experts. Although Reservists and Guardsmen are less expensive to maintain on a daily basis
than active duty soldiers, who are paid year round, once deployed they temporarily increase
the number of active duty personnel and thus the overall cost of the force. They also add
more to the incremental cost of an operation than do active duty soldiers. In GAO/NSIAD-
00-162, the GAO reported that the “integration of Guard forces in peacekeeping missions
such as Bosnia significantly increases the cost of these missions...”
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In addition, many defense experts fear that repeated call-ups for reservists and guards
would eventually affect their recruitment and retention, thus depleting the pool available for
such operations and for deployment to a major regional conflict. In order to reduce that
prospect, the Army announced on March 6, 2000, that future deployments of active and
reserve components for operations other than war (OOTW) would be limited to 179 days.
The GAO reports that the Army is considering the possibility of deploying a National
Guard division to Kosovo beginning in mid-2000, notes that the preparation required to
prepare to send the first Guard division to Bosnia “suggests that this will not be easy,” and
recommends an assessment of the 49th Armored Division’s rotation in Bosnia before making
a decision. (GAO/NSIAD-00-164)
Bosnia and Kosovo Debates
The Bosnia debates since 1993 have reflected many of the above issues. On the issue
of presidential authority to deploy troops on a NATO peacekeeping mission to
ex-Yugoslavia, Congress in effect deferred to the President. Congress did not challenge
President Clinton’s decision to seek congressional support, but not authorization, for the
deployment; some key members have viewed his decision to deploy troops as the President’s
prerogative. Despite continuing statements of reservation and opposition within the Congress
to the Bosnia mission, Congress has continued to fund U.S. military actions there. Even
Members who oppose the deployment have stated that they did not wish to deprive U.S.
troops of the means to perform their mission. In 1998 and 1999, Congressional reactions to
the possibility of U.S. military action, under NATO, in Kosovo, a region of the Former
Republic of Yugoslavia (i.e., Serbia and Montenegro), indicated that Members remained
reluctant to restrict the President’s ability to act, but believed they should be consulted and
informed. Congressional action on FY2000 supplemental appropriations for Kosovo
indicated continuing reluctance by the Congress as a whole to restrict the President, although
some Members feel strongly that it is within the Congress’ prerogatives to do so. For further
information on Kosovo and Bosnia, and legislation related to U.S. deployments there, see
CRS Issue Brief IB98041, Kosovo and U.S. Policy; CRS Issue Brief IB10027, Kosovo: U.S.
and Allied Military Operations; CRS Issue Brief IB93056, Bosnia: U.S. Military
Operations; and CRS Report RS20161, Kosovo Military Operations: Costs and
Congressional Action on Funding.
LEGISLATION
P.L. 106-246 (H.R. 4425)
FY2001 Military Construction and other appropriations. Introduced May 11, 2000,
H.Rept. 106-614. Passed House May 16, Passed Senate May 18, in lieu of S. 2541.
Conference action incorporated FY2000 supplemental funding for peacekeeping and other
purposes. H.Rept. 106-710, passed House June 29, Senate June 30. Signed into law July 13.
P.L. 106-259 (H.R. 4576)
Department of Defense appropriations for FY2001. House Appropriations Committee
reported an original measure June 1, H.Rept. 106-644. Passed House June 7, 2000. Senate
incorporated S. 2593 (S. Rept. 106-298) as a substitute amendment on June 8, and passed
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it on June 13. Conference report (H. Rept. 106-754, July 17) passed the House on July 19,
and the Senate on July 27. Signed into law Aug. 9.
H.R. 4205 (Spence)
National Defense Authorization Act for FY2001. Reported by the House Armed
Services Committee May 12, H.Rept. 106-616. Passed House May 18. Received in the
Senate May 22. Passed by the Senate July 13 in lieu of S. 2549 (S. Rept. 106-292), which
was incorporated as a substitute amendment.
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DOD Incremental Costs of U.S. International Peace and Security Commitments, FY1991-FY1999
(Budget authority in millions of current year dollars)
FY2000
FY2000
Operation
FY1991 FY1992
FY1993
FY1994
FY1995
FY1996
FY1997
FY1998
FY1999 to 04/30/00
TOTAL Year Est.
AREAS OF ONGOING OPERATIONS
Southwest Asia/Iraq
Provide Comfort/Northern Watch
325.0
101.5
116.6
91.8
138.2
88.9
93.1
136.0
156.4
89.4
1,336.9
Southern Watch/Air Expeditionary Force
715.9
333.0
468.4
576.3
597.3
1,497.2
933.2
407.3
5,528.6
Vigilant Warrior
257.7
257.7
Desert Strike/Intrinsic Action
102.7
5.6
13.8
124.6
246.7
Desert Thunder (Force Buildup, 11/98)
43.5
43.5
Desert Fox (Air Strikes, 12/98)
92.9
92.9
UNIKOM (UN/Iraq Observer Group)
21.5
4.9
6.0
32.4
Total Southwest Asia/Iraq
346.5
106.4
838.5
424.8
864.3
665.2
793.1
1,638.8
1,239.8
621.3
7,538.7
1,100.0
Former Yugoslavia (Bosnia)
IFOR/SFOR/Joint Forge
2,231.7
2,087.5
1,792.8
1,382.5
806.1
8,300.6
Other Former Yugoslavia Operations*
5.8
138.8
292.0
347.4
288.3
195.0
169.9
155.4
75.5
1,668.1
Total Bosnia
5.8
138.8
292.0
347.4
2,520.0
2,282.5
1,962.8
1,537.9
881.6
9,968.8
1.600.0
Former Yugoslavia (Kosovo)
Balkan Calm (Observer Mission, Pre-Air
34.6
34.6
War)
Eagle Eye (Air Verification 10/98-03/99)
20.3
20.3
Noble Anvil (Air War)
1,775.7
1,775.7
Joint Guardian (KFOR)
1,050.2
1,009.6
2,059.8
Sustain Hope (Refugee Assistance)
124.6
124.6
Total Kosovo
3,005.4
1,009.6
4,015.0
1,700.0
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FY2000
FY2000
Operation
FY1991 FY1992
FY1993
FY1994
FY1995
FY1996
FY1997
FY1998
FY1999 to 04/30/00
TOTAL Year Est.
East Timor (Operation Stabilize)
1.5
57.5
59.0
Korea*
69.7
90.9
160.6
COMPLETED OPERATIONS
Haiti*
Safe Harbor
9.3
9.3
E m b a r g o / I n t e r d i c t i o n / S a n c t i o n s
Enforcement
2.8
65.8
68.6
Uphold Democracy
198.2
448.8
647.0
UNMIH
56.5
86.9
143.4
Total Haiti
9.3
2.8
372.1
569.0
86.9
1,040.1
Somalia
1.6
943.1
528.0
49.4
1,522.1
Rwanda
1.0
106.7
36.5
144.2
Angola
0.5
0.1
2.6
3.2
Cambodia
0.5
0.5
5.0
6.0
Western Sahara
0.9
0.3
0.1
1.3
TOTALS
346.5
125.0
1,925.1
1,801.0
1,957.5
3,272.1
3,075.6
3,601.6
5,784.6
2,570.0
24,459.0
4,400.0
Sources: Under Secretary of Defense (Comptroller) for full and part-year incremental costs; FY2001 Budget Request documents for FY2000 estimates. FY2000 figures provided June 29,2000.
*Notes: This chart consists of the DOD incremental costs involved in U.S. support for and participation in peacekeeping and in related humanitarian and security operations, including U.S. unilateral
operations, NATO operations, U.N. operations, and ad hoc coalition operations. Opinion as to which of them constitute “peacekeeping” or “peace operations” differ. U.N. reimbursements are not
deducted. Totals may not add due to rounding.
Other Former Yugoslavia operations include Able Sentry (Macedonia), Deny Flight/Decisive Edge, UNCRO (Zagreb), Sharp Guard (Adriatic), Provide Promise (Humanitarian Assistance),
Deliberate Forge. Because Korea Readiness has long been considered an on-going peacetime function of U.S. troops, DOD only counts above-normal levels of activity as incremental costs. The Haiti
accounts do not include the DOD processing of Haitian migrants, which totaled $108.1 million in FY1996 and $63.7 million in FY1997.
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FOR ADDITIONAL READING
U.S. General Accounting Office. Contingency Operations: Providing Critical Capabilities
Poses Challenges. [Washington] GAO/NSIAD-00-164. July 2000.
—— Defense Budget: Fiscal Year 2000 Contingency Operations Costs and Funding
[Washington] GAO/NSIAD-00-168. June 2000.
—— Force Structure: Army Is Integrating Active and Reserve Combat Forces, but
Challenges Remain. [Washington] GAO/NSIAD-00-102. July 2000.
—— Military Operations: Impact of Operations Other Than War on the Services Varies.
[Washington] GAO/NSIAD-99-69. May 1999.
—— Military Readiness: Improvements Still Needed in Assessing Military Readiness.
[Washington] GAO/T-NSIAD-97-107. March 11, 1998.
—— Military Readiness: Observations on Personnel Readiness in Later Deploying Army
Divisions. [Washington] GAO/T-NSIAD-98-126. March 20, 1998.
—— Military Readiness: Readiness Reports Do Not Provide a Clear Assessment of Army
Equipment. [Washington] GAO/NSIAD-99-119. June 1999.
—— Reserve Forces: Cost, Funding, and Use of Army Reserve Components in Peacekeeping
Operations. [Washington] GAO/T-NSIAD-98-126, March 20, 1998.
CRS Issue Briefs
CRS Issue Brief IB90103. United Nations Peacekeeping: Issues for Congress, by Marjorie
Ann Browne.
CRS Issue Brief IB81050. War Powers Resolution: Presidential Compliance, by Richard
Grimmett.
CRS Reports
CRS Report 97-866. Military Readiness: Congressional Issues Regarding Tiered
Readiness, by Michael A. Longoria and Michael C. Ryan.
CRS Report 98-41. Military Readiness, Operations Tempo (OPTEMPO) and Personnel
Tempo (PERSTEMPO): Are U.S. Force Doing Too Much? by Michael C. Ryan.
CRS Report RL30398. NATO Burdensharing and Kosovo, A Preliminary Report, by Carl
Ek.
CRS Report 94-887. U.S. Forces and Multinational Commands: PDD-25 and Precedents,
by Edward F. Bruner.
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